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
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
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Second Series.
VOL. IX. NOS. XVII., XVIII.—WHOLE NOS. XLIX., L.

NEW-YORK:
PUBLISHED FOR THE PROPRIETOR BY E. LITTELL,
OFFICE OF THE REPOSITORY AND OF THE AMERICAN ECLECTIC AND MUSEUM OF
FOREIGN LITERATURE,
NO. 236 BROADWAY.
BOSTON:
SAXTON AND PIERCE, 133½ WASHINGTON-STREET.
LONDON:
WILEY AND PUTNAM, 35 PATERNOSTER ROW.
1843.

ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843, by
J. H. AGNEW,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern
District of New-York.

University Press,
JOHN F. TROW, PRINTER.
33 Ann-street,
NEW-YORK.

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NEW-YEAR.

We are happy to greet our readers at the commencement of another year, with the *Repository* on better paper, and in the best of type. And our purpose is to devote so much of our time to its interests, as may be requisite to secure the contributions of the best Biblical and Literary Scholars of our country, and also to make the typographical execution such as it should be.

During the past year, the changes in the relations of the work have been frequent; and the present editor has been occasionally absent, by necessity, at times when his presence was needful. This will account for errors which have occurred too frequently, and for which we owe an apology to some of our highly respected correspondents. Mistakes will occur, notwithstanding the utmost care; but our hope is, that in future, they will be rare.

It is unnecessary to say, that the *Repository* occupies a position held by no other quarterly, and that its reputation in Great Britain is of the highest order. We have very recently received assurance of confidence in it from that quarter, and an expression of opinion highly commendatory. The contributors to its pages are, many of them, amongst the first names in our land—names that would do honor to any country in respect to scholarship. "It is the organ of no party. Its literature, as well as its theology, is designed to be distinctively Biblical and Christian." We hope to present, in the course of the year, some important articles from a jurist, on deeply interesting topics.

With these prefatory remarks, we leave our readers to enter on the duties and trials of a new year. May God grant to us and them much of that wisdom, which cometh from above, that when our toil on earth shall have ceased, we may meet around the throne of the Lamb to attune our golden harps eternally to his praise.

EDITOR.

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THE
AMERICAN
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

JANUARY, 1843.

SECOND SERIES, NO. XVII.—WHOLE NO. XLIX.

ARTICLE I.

BENEVOLENCE AND SELFISHNESS.

By Jeremiah Day, D. D. L. L. D. President of Yale College, Connecticut.

It is asserted by many, by some even who appear to be exemplary Christians and able divines, that *self-love* is the moving principle of all voluntary action ; that it is common to saints and sinners ; that it is an essential element in benevolence itself. By others, it is considered as identical with selfishness ; as directly opposed to benevolence ; as the radical principle of all iniquity. Is it not high time, that Christian brethren should come to some understanding, with respect to the essential characteristic of the religion which they profess ? If the existing disagreement, on this all important point, is in *appearance* only ; if it is nothing more than a difference in the interpretation of certain words and phrases, while there is a real harmony of belief, with respect to the nature of the distinction between virtue and vice, benevolence and selfishness ; strenuous efforts ought to be made to dispel the mists which the ambiguities of language have thrown around the subject ; that those who are brethren in profession should no longer be alienated from each other, on account of supposed differences of opinion, which are, in reality, only verbal ; and on the other hand, that those who have adopted erroneous and heretical tenets, should not have the

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privilege of veiling their errors, under vague and deceptive phraseology.

If there is either a *kind* or *degree* of self-love which is virtuous, and another kind and degree which is sinful, the distinction should be drawn, in characters which cannot be easily mistaken. The want of such distinction may be, to multitudes, the occasion of fatal delusion. Those who hold the truth themselves, and yet express it in dubious language, may be unintentionally instrumental in leading *others* into ruinous errors. If we say that self-love is, in *some* sense, the moving principle in all moral action, while we do not distinctly show in what sense it bears this relation, the selfish man will be sure to give to the assertion a construction in his own favor.

The more specious any selfish theory of morals is, the more nearly it copies the language in which the truth is expressed, the more dangerous will it be, if it be radically erroneous. It may escape the detection to which the grosser forms of error are exposed. This is not a subject of barren metaphysical speculation, having no practical relation to the duties and responsibilities of life. It may have a determining influence upon the judgment which we form of the essential elements of Christian character. Many may be fatally deceived, by mistaking a refined selfishness, for the impartial benevolence which the divine law and the gospel require. Though all classes have a deep interest in the practical applications of the subject; yet a correct understanding of its nature and relations, requires a greater nicety of discrimination than is consistent with the loose, metaphorical style of a popular address or essay.

In attempting to draw the line of distinction between benevolence and selfishness, we have to encounter not only the almost endless perplexities of ambiguous phraseology, but what Dugald Stewart significantly denominates the "*ambiguity of things*;" the apparent identity of mental states, or objects of thought, which are really distinct, but which are so intimately blended, that we find it difficult to separate them, especially when the same terms and phrases are indiscriminately applied to them.

1. We have an example of this, in making the inquiry, whether, in all our actions, we are influenced solely by a *love of happiness*. There have been, at least, *four* different ap-

plications of this expression. It has been used to signify our present *enjoyment* of happiness,—or our regard for the present happiness of *others*,—or our desire for their *future* happiness,—or a desire of our *own* future happiness. The first of these uses appears to be an improper one. The other three may be correct, if due caution be observed in keeping the different significations distinct.

Without taking for granted any point respecting benevolent affection and action which may, in the course of our inquiry, come under examination, let it be supposed, that a Christian minister has a sincere regard for the spiritual welfare of his people, that his labors have been blessed to the conversion and increasing sanctification of numbers, and that he hopes to be the instrument of bringing others into the kingdom of Christ, in whose recovery from the bondage of iniquity he may hereafter rejoice. Here are, at least, *three* different states of feeling which may be termed a love of happiness; his joy in the *present* welfare of a portion of his flock, his desire of the *future* spiritual prosperity of these and others, and the hope that *he* himself will be a partaker of their joy, that his happiness will be promoted by witnessing theirs. He may also expect to receive a reward from his Father in heaven.

But there appears to be no propriety in applying the expression “love of happiness” to *present enjoyment*, without reference to the good of others, or our own future good. Yet many a specious argument has no other foundation, than the artful, or undesigned substitution of this, for one of the other three meanings. Love is an affection which always *has an object*; an object distinct from itself. It is true, that it is a *pleasing* emotion. There is enjoyment in love. But this enjoyment is distinct from the good which is the object of the emotion. To love, is to be pleased with something. But this something is not the pleasure itself. The act of loving is not simply loving to be happy; being pleased with being pleased. If I rejoice in the happiness of another, *his* joy is not *my* joy, but the *object* of my joy. My love of his happiness is not a love of my own happiness. The pleasure of *loving* is as distinct from the object loved, as the pleasure of viewing a landscape is distinct from the landscape itself. It is true, that present enjoyment is accompanied with a desire for the *continuance* of the happiness. But continuance

refers to the *future*. Our own future good may be the object of our present love or desire. This may, properly enough, be denominated *self-love*. But what propriety is there in applying the term to present gratification, without any reference to the future? The expression *self-love* and a desire of happiness are not always synonymous. For, although all *self-love* may be a desire of our own happiness, yet all desire of happiness is not *self-love*. There may be a desire of the happiness of *others*.

2. In the discussions respecting benevolence and selfishness, it is important to distinguish between different mental states which are considered as *voluntary action*, or *choice*. The inquiry is made, What is the immediate cause, reason, or motive of such acts? Is it something *within*, or *without* the mind of the agent? Is it *subjective* or *objective*; an *internal*, or an *external* motive? Before we can answer this inquiry understandingly, we must know what is intended by the terms *voluntary action*, *choice*, &c. Are they used to denote simply an *emotion*, a *being pleased* with an object, without any effort to obtain it; or do they signify a *purpose*, or an *imperative act*, to secure the object desired? In the former case, there must be an *external* motive, some object of thought, which, if not actually existing, is yet apprehended by the mind, as distinct from its own present act. The influence of this object upon some sensibility of the agent, is the immediate antecedent, cause, ground, or reason of the emotion.

But if any thing with which we are pleased is now in our possession, we desire its *continuance*. If it is not yet in our possession, but is considered as attainable, we may form a *purpose* to do something to secure it, and at the proper time of acting, we may put forth *imperative* or *executive* volitions, in reference to its attainment. The immediate antecedent of the purpose, and of the imperative acts, is desire, an *internal* or *subjective* motive. This desire implies that *we are pleased* with the object sought, either for what it is in itself, or as a means of obtaining something else which we love. Objects of *pursuit* are such, because they were previously objects of *affection*. If I rejoice in the present happiness of my child, I shall desire that this happiness may continue, I shall purpose to do something to promote it, I shall put forth imperative acts, to carry this purpose into

execution. My joy in the present welfare of the child, is a present gratification. My desire, my purpose, and my imperative volitions, all have reference to *the future*; to something which is *to be obtained*.

If the inquiry be made, What is it that immediately *prompts* a man to act? the answer must depend upon the *kind* of act to which the inquiry relates. An executive act is prompted by some purpose or desire. Purposes and desires are prompted by the love of some object, either real or imaginary. But this love is excited by the object itself, presented to some sensibility of the agent. That which we *dislike* may also prompt us to action. If it be a present evil, we desire and endeavor to remove it. If it be something future which we dread, we make exertions to avoid it. In this case, also, the evil, whatever it be, excites aversion, and this prompts to desires and efforts to prevent the injury which it threatens.

3. This brings us to a still more important instance of ambiguous phraseology. What is the *ultimate end* of voluntary agency? The term ultimate has a reference to some kind of succession. If it is applied to a series of *events*, it denotes that which is last in the order of *time*. But it frequently relates to the order of our *inquiries*. In our investigations in the physical sciences, we often begin with a particular phenomenon, and reversing the natural order of succession, *trace back* the series, from effects to causes. The first of these causes which we are able to observe, is sometimes called an ultimate fact, or ultimate principle, as being the last at which we arrive in the course of our investigation. The same fact may be called either primary or ultimate;—primary, in reference to the natural order of succession;—ultimate, in reference to the order of our inquiries. So in the case of voluntary agency, a specific act of will is owing to a desire; the desire, to a previous emotion; and that emotion, to some *object* of affection and desire. This object is sometimes considered, so far at least as our observation extends, the ultimate ground or cause of the particular volition; because it is the last, in the order of our inquiries, though first, in the natural order of succession. But by the ultimate ground or cause of an act, some writers appear to mean the *immediate* antecedent on which the act depends;—in a series of causes, the last in the order of time. In this sense, the ultimate ground of a particular executive volition

may be a *desire*;—of that desire, an *emotion*;—of that emotion, some *object* of affection.

Perhaps the principal reason, however, why the term ultimate is applied to the object of our choice and pursuit is, that it is that which we are aiming to attain, and which, when attained, will succeed, even in the order of time, the series of feelings and acts which lead to its attainment. It is especially ultimate in relation to subordinate objects, which are sought only *as means* of securing a good that is desired on its own account. If in this application of the term there is any ambiguity, it would seem that the expression *ultimate end* must be sufficiently definite. An end of voluntary action is something which the agent *seeks* or *aims at*, in what he does. An *ultimate* end is that which is sought *for its own sake*, and not for the sake of some farther end. It is carefully distinguished, by President Edwards,* not only from subordinate ends, but from the *chief* end at which an agent is aiming. "A chief end," he observes, "is opposite to an inferior end; an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. Though the chief end be always an ultimate end; yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end. The chief end is an end that is most valued, and therefore, most sought after by the agent, in whatever he does. Two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same works or acts, and yet one valued more highly, and sought more than another." An object of pursuit may be *an* ultimate end of an agent, in particular acts, without being *the* ultimate end, that is, the *only* ultimate end at which he is aiming in those acts. "Some subordinate ends," says Edwards, "may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends;—though a subordinate end is never more valued, than *that* ultimate to which it is subordinate. A thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and *also* of a subordinate end; as it may be sought *partly* on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end." A man may seek a good reputation, both as an object desirable in itself, and as a means of sustaining and extending his influence; partly as an ultimate end, and partly as a subordinate

* End of Creation.

end. He may seek the enjoyment of health, both as a good in itself, and also as giving him strength for the duties of life.

On the supposition, that the glory of God and the welfare of our fellow men, are primarily chosen for their own sake, and on this ground are made ultimate objects of pursuit by the Christian, his own future happiness may *also* be an ultimate object with him ; not his *only* ultimate object, nor that which, in his desires and pursuits, he *chiefly* regards. While he seeks the welfare of others principally on its own account, he may, at the same time, have a reference to the satisfaction which he himself will experience in seeing them happy. He may seek their prosperity both as a good in itself, and as a means of promoting his own enjoyment. It may be to him partly an ultimate good, and partly subordinate to another ultimate good. His own happiness, and the happiness of others, may each be an ultimate good, in the sense of being chosen by him for its own sake. It is conceivable, however, that the mind of an individual *may be* so intently fixed upon the interests of another, as to have, at the time, no thought of the enjoyment which he himself may find, in the gratification of his desires. A father's heart may be so absorbed in rescuing his child from a house in flames, as to preclude all consideration of the joy which he himself is to experience, in the deliverance of the child. This does not imply that he is the subject of no uneasiness, at seeing the imminent danger of one whom he tenderly loves. But the uneasiness which prompts him to exertion, is a *present* feeling ; not the future *object* of his efforts.

From the fact that *mere inanimate matter*, which is incapable of enjoyment, is commonly sought as a *means only*, some appear to have inferred, that this is the case with every other good, except the agent's own happiness. But if the welfare of others may be an object sought for its own sake, it may have the nature both of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end. Delicious fruit is desired, because it is delicious ; for the sake of the gratification which we expect from eating it, and not for any pleasure which the fruit will enjoy in being eaten. But we may seek the welfare of our fellow men, not merely for the sake of our own gratification, but also for the sake of the good which *they* are capable of enjoying.

4. To the term *disinterested*, meanings are frequently

given very different from what is intended by the advocates of disinterested benevolence. In their use of the word, it does not imply that the benevolent man is *uninterested*; that he is in a state of *indifference* with respect to the objects of his benevolence; that he takes no interest in their prosperity. On the contrary, the more benevolent he is, the more deeply is he interested in the welfare of others; the more readily does he sympathize with them in their joys and their sorrows.

Neither does the expression disinterested imply, that there is no enjoyment in the exercise of benevolent affection. It not only seeks the good of others, but is itself a most delightful emotion. The happiest of men are those who are the most intently engaged in promoting the happiness of others.

Disinterested benevolence does not imply that he who is the subject of it has no regard for his own individual interest. As the good of others is not inconsistent with our personal welfare, the most benevolent man may make provision for his own future happiness. Even those efforts in which he has a primary reference to the interests of others, *may* be accompanied with an expectation of reward to himself. He is not destitute of all regard to his own happiness. In loving his neighbor *as himself*, he does not cease to love himself.

But what is meant by those who adopt the expression "disinterested benevolence" is this; that the direct and proper *object* of benevolent affection and pursuit, is the happiness of others; that love to God, and love to men, are not exercised merely because they are subservient to our own private interest; that personal gratification is not the only ultimate end of all our actions; that the welfare of others is a good which we may seek for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of promoting our individual enjoyment. This is so far from being a forced and unusual signification of the term disinterested, that it is the very meaning commonly given to it by men in the ordinary walks of life. It is an expression in frequent use in the familiar intercourse of society, and is well understood in the sense in which it is adopted by the advocates of disinterested benevolence.

A man's present gratification may be the highest, when his thoughts are least directed towards his own future good;

when his mind is so engrossed with nobler and more exalted objects, that his individual interests are, in a great measure, out of sight. The pleasure which we experience in the exercise of the affections, bears some proportion to the magnitude and excellence of the object upon which they are fixed. The benevolent man brings within his view far higher interests than his own individual happiness. The value of his private good is not to be compared with the welfare of a nation, the salvation of a world, the bliss of the countless myriads of heaven. When his thoughts are most intently fixed upon these objects, they are turned off from his personal interests. And yet this is the time when his enjoyment is the greatest. He is the most happy when he thinks least of himself; when his attention is not divided between what is immeasurably great and excellent, and what is comparatively unimportant. David Brainard, in giving an account of his own conversion, makes this statement: "As I was walking in a dark, thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the view and apprehension of my soul. I stood still; wondered; and admired. I knew that I never had seen before any thing comparable to it for excellence and beauty. My soul rejoiced with joy unspeakable to see such a God, such a glorious Divine Being. My soul was so captivated and delighted with the excellency, loveliness, greatness, and other perfections of God, that I was even swallowed up in him; at least, to that degree, that I had no thought, as I remember, at first, about my own salvation, and scarce reflected that there was such a creature as myself."*

5. *Self-love* is too often confounded with *selfishness*. All selfishness is self-love; but all self-love, all regard to our own happiness, is not selfishness, in the usual and proper acceptance of the term. To love ourselves as we love our neighbor is not selfishness: It is justifiable self-love. Selfishness is *exclusive* self-love. It is the loving ourselves more than our fellow men; more than God, and the welfare of his kingdom. It is a disposition to sacrifice all other interests which we deem inconsistent with our own private interests.

It has been said, indeed, that *all* self-love is criminal; that

* Edwards' Works, vol. x. p. 44.

it is of the same nature with selfishness ; that it is condemned, in an unqualified manner, in the Scriptures ; that no worse character is there given of men than this, that they are "lovers of their own selves." But if loving ourselves is self-love, then there is a self-love admitted by the divine law, which requires us to love our neighbors *as ourselves*. It is urged, however, that self-love differs from the love which is enjoined in the Scriptures, not merely in *degree*, but in *kind*; that in its very nature, and in every degree, it is criminal. If this be conceded, in respect to that kind of self-love which is properly denominated selfishness, still it must be admitted that there is a state of the affections which the Scriptures call loving ourselves as we are required to love our neighbors. This is in accordance with the familiar use of the terms in common life. While selfishness is universally condemned, every degree and kind of love to ourselves is not considered criminal. If we are required to love others as ourselves, we are at least permitted to love ourselves as we love others. If by the term self-love, any mean a man's loving himself, as it is sometimes expressed, *as self*—that is, simply because it is himself, and not another, seeking his own interest merely *because* it is his own, always preferring it to the good of others, this is indeed criminal selfishness.

Agreement and Difference of Benevolence and Selfishness.

Selfishness is not only confounded with self-love, but is often mistaken even for benevolence. Though there is an essential difference between them, yet, in several respects, they resemble each other. To enable us to discriminate accurately between them, it is important to mark the points in which they *agree*, as well as those in which they differ.

In the first place, there may be gratification in the *exercise* of selfish affections, as well as of those which are benevolent. It is true that far *higher* enjoyment is found in the latter than in the former. It is also true, that some of the malevolent affections are painful in their exercise. Still, there is often a degree of pleasure in emotions which are altogether selfish.

There is also more or less gratification in the *pursuit* of the objects of our desire, however unworthy they may be. Though the benevolent man finds a richer pleasure in pro-

moting the welfare of others, than the selfish man does, in seeking to advance his private interests ; yet the latter may derive some enjoyment from the active engagement of his faculties, in carrying into execution his plans of ambition or avarice.

Again, benevolence and selfishness may both find satisfaction in *obtaining* the objects of their pursuit. Though disappointment is, sooner or later, the certain result of the aims and labors of the selfish man, yet he may experience a momentary pleasure, from the accomplishment of his designs.

Still farther, the benevolent and the selfish man agree in making some provision for their own welfare. The best of men are not divested of all regard for their own individual interests. In common with others, they take measures to preserve their lives, to avoid disgrace and suffering, to procure for themselves the means of a comfortable subsistence. Their own immortal interests are, at least, as dear to them, as endless happiness is to the sinner. Seeking the good of others does not eradicate all desire to benefit ourselves.

Once more, the most benevolent man, even in his most benevolent actions, *may* have respect to a *reward*, distinct from the object of his benevolence ; distinct from the gratification which he finds, or expects to find, in loving, pursuing, and attaining that object. The compassionate physician, who has a much higher regard for the lives and health of his patients, than for his own fees, may yet have *some* respect, in his practice, to the pecuniary compensation by which he and his family are to be supported. The true patriot, who makes great sacrifices for the good of his country, may look for some reward of his labors, in the gratitude and affectionate remembrance of those to whose interests he is devoted. The martyr, who yields up his life for the defence of the truth, may hope to hear, from his Saviour and final Judge, the approving sentence, " Well done, good and faithful servant."

Notwithstanding these several points of agreement between benevolence and selfishness, there is still a wide and radical difference between them.

In the first place, the happiness of *others* is the immediate object of benevolent affection. Their welfare is loved *for its own sake*, and not merely because it is subservient to the private interest of the individual who exercises this affection. He not only rejoices with those who rejoice ; but *their* joy is

the object which excites *his* joy. He not only weeps with those who weep, but it is the view of their suffering which, in itself considered, gives him pain. The man who is wholly selfish rejoices in the welfare of others only so far as it may be the means of promoting his own private interest. The merchant who is greedy of gain may contemplate with satisfaction the luxuriant fields and abundant harvests of the farmers in his vicinity, as promising to himself a ready and profitable market; while he envies the success of those who are competitors with him, in his own line of business. A prince may rejoice in the prosperity of his subjects, as constituting the glory and strength of his realm; while he repines at the welfare of neighboring and rival kingdoms. He may hate his enemies as cordially as he loves his friends.

According to some writers, benevolence consists in seeking our own happiness, by promoting the welfare of others. It is true, that the benevolent man takes pleasure in advancing the interests of others; for his benevolence essentially consists in his being pleased with the happiness of others. This his pleasure is what immediately prompts him to efforts for promoting their welfare. But it does not follow, that he seeks their good merely *as a means* of increasing his own enjoyment; that their happiness is not an ultimate object of his pursuit; a good which he endeavors to secure *for its own sake*, as well as for the gratification which he expects to experience, in accomplishing his purpose.

A man who is wholly selfish may do good to those who, in return, will do good to him. He may aim to purchase the favor of others, by services which he renders to them. He imparts to others, expecting to receive, in some way, an equivalent in exchange. But his kind offices are not extended to those from whom he has no hope of remuneration. The prospect of a reward *may be* a motive, even to a benevolent man. But it is not the *only* object of his pursuit.

Again, to the truly benevolent man, there is a *higher* object of affection and pursuit, than his own private interest. The good of his country, of the world, of the universe, he loves *more* than himself. The welfare of the divine kingdom is with him, not only an *ultimate* end, but his *chief* end. If he loves happiness for its own sake, wherever it may be found, he will prefer a greater good to a less, the welfare of thousands to his own personal gratification. When he apprehends

a competition between the two, he will not sacrifice the interest of multitudes, for the benefit of himself alone. Though he does not love his neighbor, his equal, better than himself, yet he regards the happiness of a nation as of more value, than the gratification of himself, a single individual.

Once more, the benevolent man's love is *impartial*. He does not prefer his own interest to an equal interest of his neighbor, provided the one is as distinctly in his view as the other. He may *do* more for his own welfare, than for that of a stranger; not because *it is his own*, but because he has a more particular knowledge of his private interests, and also because the charge of providing for them is specially committed to him by his Maker.

Reality of Impartial Benevolence.

The preceding observations have been made, not for the purpose of proving the *reality* of such benevolence as has now been described; but to explain the *meaning* of the expressions love of happiness, self-love, selfishness, disinterested benevolence, ultimate end, &c. Let us now inquire, whether the benevolence here spoken of is any where to be found among men; a benevolence which is not uninterested, but disinterested; which is not without enjoyment in its exercise, while it has for its object the enjoyment of others; which may aim at future gratification, in performing acts of beneficence, but which also seeks the welfare of others, as the direct object of these acts; which does good, not merely for the sake of a reward, but from the love of doing good; which makes the interests of the divine kingdom not only an ultimate end, but the *chief* end of its pursuits.

1. In the first place, if a man has no regard for the welfare of others, *for its own sake*, he cannot seek it on account of the happiness which *he himself* is to derive from its attainment. For, by the supposition, it is an object from which he can expect no gratification. If he takes no pleasure in the prospect of securing it hereafter, he will find none in actually attaining it, unless there should be a change in his disposition. Benevolence exercised from self-love only is a manifest absurdity. If an object is not loved for itself, it cannot be loved for the mere pleasure of loving it. When any thing is primarily sought for its own excellence, it may *also* be

sought for the sake of the gratification which it affords us. But this secondary motive can have no place, in reference to an object which is perfectly indifferent. The expectation of enjoyment, from the exercise of particular affections, presupposes objects adapted to the gratification of these affections. The pleasure resulting from the satisfaction of particular desires implies, that these desires were previously directed to some object different from the pleasure itself. This pleasure, which is the *effect* of the gratified desires, is not the *cause* of these desires; is not the object which excites them. If in the nature of a thing, there is nothing adapted to excite a particular affection in the mind, the mind has no power to call forth from itself this affection towards that thing. Loving an object is taking pleasure in the object; and not merely taking pleasure in the pleasure. If we could excite in ourselves, at will, pleasing emotions towards any object whatever, nothing would be of easier attainment than perfect happiness. All that would be requisite for this purpose, would be to resolve to be pleased with every thing which could possibly be brought before our minds. We might be as happy in the prospect of poverty and disgrace, as with the expectation of affluence and renown.

It may be said, that we can desire nothing but that which is the means of good to ourselves; present good, in the exercise of pleasing emotions; future good, in the gratification to be found in obtaining the object desired. But does this imply, that our own enjoyment is the *only* thing which we ever desire; that there is nothing else in the universe which we seek on its own account? Because we are gratified with the attainment of the objects of our desire, does it follow that these objects are in themselves *not* desired? Does our taking pleasure in witnessing the happiness of others imply, that our own pleasure is the *only* thing in which we take pleasure? When a pious mother's heart is filled with rapture, at the conversion of a beloved child, has she no desire for the everlasting salvation of the child, on its own account? Does the fact that she finds or expects a high gratification, in believing that one so dear to her has obtained a title to heavenly glory, imply that this self-gratification is *all* which she desired in seeking the momentous change? Is it not evident, on the contrary, that if the holiness and happiness of the child were not, in the first place, sought for their own sake, they

could not be sought, for the sake of the gratification to be expected from their attainment? It is one thing to assert that those objects only are desired by us which may, in some way or other, be the means of enjoyment to ourselves; and a very different thing to hold, that they are desired for the sake of this enjoyment *only*;—for the sake of the happiness of desiring them. The latter proposition does not follow as a logical consequence from the other.

Is happiness the *ultimate* end of all voluntary action? If an ultimate end is that which is sought for its own sake, and if we ever seek the good of *others* for its own sake, then our *own* happiness is not the *only* ultimate end of our actions. The welfare of others may be to us both an ultimate and a subordinate end; ultimate, as being a good in itself; subordinate, as contributing to our own gratification. Our own future happiness may be both an ultimate and a subordinate end. We may seek the salvation of our souls, as a good in itself, and also as a means of bringing glory and joy to the Saviour. Our own benefit may be an ultimate end, while it is not *the* ultimate end, that is, the *only* ultimate end of all our actions. To the truly pious man, the glory of God and his kingdom is not only an ultimate end, but his *principal* ultimate end. He places a higher value upon it, than upon his own personal gratification.

But is not our own pleasure our ultimate *motive* to benevolent action; that which immediately *prompts* us to act? If by action be here meant *imperative* acts of the will, put forth to obtain the objects of our desire, *these* acts are undoubtedly prompted by our *present* pleasure, in hope of obtaining what we desire. This is the internal, or subjective motive to voluntary action. But this present pleasure is not the *future* good which is the ultimate *end* of our action. The hope which a thirsty man has of soon drinking freely from the flowing fountain, is not the pleasure which he will find in the draught itself.

If by benevolent action be meant benevolent *affection*, pleasing *emotion* exercised in the prospect of good to others; this present pleasure is not the motive to itself. A man is not pleased, merely because he is pleased. If he takes pleasure in any object, the pleasure itself is not the object which he seeks. *Future* pleasure, or the *continuance* of present pleasure, may indeed be an object of pursuit. But

the *act* of loving is distinct from the object of love. It is also distinct from the *motive* by which it is excited.

What then is the motive, the external, or objective motive of benevolent affection ; the cause or reason why it is exercised ? It is the good, which is the object of this affection ; primarily the happiness of others, secondarily the gratification which we expect to find, in securing this object. It is the same as the ultimate *end* of beneficent action. From the fact, that our present pleasure is that which prompts us to imperative acts of the will, we are not warranted to draw the conclusion, that our personal *future* gratification is exclusively the motive which excites our emotions and desires. If every thing which we love gives us pleasure, it does not follow that that pleasure, or the continuance of it, is the only ultimate object of our love. Because we cannot see without eyes, we do not infer, that we see nothing but our own eyes.

It is sometimes said, that although the selfish and the benevolent man agree in making their own happiness the ultimate end of all their actions ; yet that the difference between them consists in the *particular kind* of happiness which they seek ; that the latter finds his chief enjoyment in glorifying God, and doing good to others. But this implies, that the glory of God, and the good of others are sought on their own account. If they are not, no gratification will be found in advancing them. If the apostate spirits in the prison of darkness were admitted to heaven, with their present disposition, they would derive no pleasure from witnessing the transports of holy joy and praise around them.

2. The voice of *conscience* decides, that we are bound to seek the welfare of others for its own sake. *Their* happiness is as really a good in itself as *ours* is. It is as worthy to be sought for its own sake. We all desire that others should take an interest in *our* welfare. We are in distress, if we entertain a suspicion, that no one has any sincere regard for us. When we claim, that we are entitled to the benevolent affection of others, this is an acknowledgment that we are bound to reciprocate the disinterested good will which we ask from them.

That this is our duty, is evident also from the consideration, that nothing short of this will secure the harmony and highest happiness of a community of rational beings. A mere profession of benevolent regard, without the reality, will not

answer the purpose. Nor will the end be attained by an exchange of good offices, performed merely with a view of receiving an equivalent in return. There must be, on the part of each member of the society, as sincere a desire for the prosperity of others, in itself considered, as for his own personal welfare. This alone will prevent these conflicting interests and pursuits which, if not prevented, would fill the community with discord, and violence, and wretchedness.

3. The common voice and language of mankind make a marked distinction between benevolence and selfishness. All profess to have a sincere regard for the good of others. All agree in condemning selfishness, and approving benevolence. Even those speculating philosophers whose theories are inconsistent with a clear distinction between the two, would deem it an insult to be charged with being altogether selfish. The men who are the most exclusively devoted to their own private interests, endeavor to assume, as far as practicable, an *appearance* of regard for the public good ; well knowing that this is the only way in which they can escape the censure of their fellow men. It is true that in our fallen world, the appearance and profession of benevolence are too often false and hollow. But where there are so many counterfeits there must be something to be counterfeited ; some real excellence, which it is the aim of the dissembler to imitate. Who thinks of counterfeiting that which is commonly believed to have no existence ?

4. The *sacred scriptures* maintain the distinction which has been made between benevolence and selfishness. An impartial regard for the good of others is required in the divine law. We are to love our neighbor *as ourselves* ; with the same sincere desire for his welfare, which we have for our own. As our own happiness is the ultimate object of our love for ourselves ; so his happiness should be the ultimate object of our love for our neighbor. As we do not love ourselves merely for the sake of the pleasure found in the exercise of this love, so, if we are truly benevolent, we do not love our neighbor solely for the sake of the pleasure of loving him. His happiness may be as truly an object of desire to us, as our own. If we seek our individual welfare for its own sake, we are bound to seek his welfare for its own sake.

At the head of one of the darkest catalogues of vices, specified in the New Testament, we find this description : "Men

shall be *lovers of their own selves*.* How can this be a distinguishing trait of a particular class of persons, if *all men* make their own happiness the only ultimate object of their affections and pursuits? "Charity," says the Apostle, "*seeketh not her own*."† How can this be true, if she seeketh, as an ultimate end, nothing else? If, as the same Apostle says, "None of us," that is, no Christian, "*liveth to himself*,"‡ how can it be true, that every Christian makes himself—his own personal interest, the only ultimate end for which he lives?

The disinterested benevolence of *Jesus Christ* is exhibited in the scriptures, for the imitation of his followers. "We then, that are strong, ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and *not to please ourselves*. Let every one of us please his neighbor, *for his good*, to edification. For even Christ pleased not himself."§ "Though He was rich, yet *for your sakes* he became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich."|| "Look not every man on his own things, but also on the things of others. Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus."¶ When we were yet enemies, Christ died for us. His sufferings and death, for the salvation of a revolted and perishing world, are the most exalted exercise of self-denying benevolence which has ever been brought to our knowledge.

It is claimed, however, that like Moses, "He had respect to the recompense of the reward:" that "for the *joy that was set before him*, He endured the cross;" that because "He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, God hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name;" that He hath "set Him at His own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power and might, and dominion."***

It is true, that Christ is spoken of, in the scriptures, as having respect to a reward for his unparalleled benevolence. But are we justified in drawing the conclusion, that the reward set before him was the *only* motive of his actions; the only ultimate end which He was endeavoring to obtain?

* 2. Tim. iii. 2. † 1. Cor. xiii. 5. ‡ Rom. xiv. 7.
§ Rom. xv. 1, 2, 3. || 2. Cor. viii. 9. ¶ Philip ii. 4, 5.
*** Philip ii. 8, 9; Ephes. i. 20, 21.

When it is said, that "for *our* sake He became poor," does this mean, that it was for His *own* sake only that He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death? Did He not seek the everlasting salvation of multitudes which no man can number, as a good in itself considered, as well as in reference to the reward which He was to receive? Let us look at the *nature* of this reward. What is "the joy set before Him?" Was it not, partly at least, the joy of seeing the heavenly world filled with innumerable hosts redeemed from perdition, and made perfect in holiness and happiness forever? But how could this be a source of joy to Him, if He had no regard to their everlasting welfare for its own sake?

It may be farther said, that even in the performance of the most virtuous acts, we are encouraged to look for a reward. "By patient continuance in well-doing, we are to seek for glory and honor, and immortality, and eternal life." "When thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and thy father who seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." "When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind, and thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." But do these and similar passages imply that the good man has *no other* ultimate end in view, than a reward to himself; that there is nothing else which he seeks for its own sake; that when he invites the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, to his house, he has no regard for *their* welfare, in itself considered; that a future benefit to himself is *all* which induces him to relieve them; that the promotion of his own glory is his *only* motive to "patient continuance in well-doing?"

5. We may appeal to the *consciousness* of the pious and benevolent, to decide whether their own individual interest is the *only* ultimate end of all their actions. Have they no regard for the happiness of others, for the glory of God, and the welfare of His kingdom, in themselves considered? The inquiry is not whether they have *any* ultimate respect to their own happiness; but whether this is *all* which they are seeking to obtain for its own sake. Ask the Christian who devotes his time, his talents, his attainments, and his possessions to the service of God, whether he is conscious of having no other final object of pursuit, than his own happiness, in the present or in the future life. Ask the sincere patriot,

who sacrifices his private interests to the good of his country, if he is seeking their prosperity *merely* as a means of increasing his own happiness. Has he no regard for the welfare of his fellow citizens, for its own sake? Ask the compassionate visitor of the destitute, the sick and the afflicted, whether his own gratification is the *only* end at which he is aiming, in his efforts to relieve them. He doubtless anticipates enjoyment, in witnessing their deliverance from suffering. But is his own enjoyment *all* the ultimate good to which his benevolent labors are directed? Has he no regard for the relief of the distressed as a good in itself considered? If he rejoices in their joy, then it is, on its own account, an object of his pursuit.

Ask the Christian missionary, who breaks away from the strong ties of family endearments and early associations, to toil and die in distant lands, whether the principal object of his pursuit is the salvation of the heathen, or the pleasure which he himself will find in witnessing their deliverance — *their* joy in being saved, or *his own* joy in seeing them saved. When a zealous and faithful minister, in a time of deep religious interest among the people of his charge, exhausts his mental and physical strength, in labors for the conversion of those who are yet in their sins, is it chiefly for *their* good, or his own, that he instructs, and warns, and fervently prays? When he arrives at the heavenly world, and from time to time finds one and another of his former hearers following him to the abodes of endless felicity, what is it that swells most the tide of his joy, the fact that so many are saved, or the consideration that *he* was made an instrument of their repentance and salvation?

Benevolence is liable to be confounded with Selfishness.

Notwithstanding the essential difference between benevolence and selfishness, yet they are, on many accounts, liable to be confounded. One reason why many deny the existence of any benevolent affection which does not spring from self-love, probably is, that not being *conscious* of any such affection in their own breasts, they are slow to believe that it is exercised by others. All *appearances* of disinterested benevolence in their fellow men, they think may be accounted for, in the same way in which they know from experi-

once, that the same appearances in their own case may be explained. This impression is confirmed by the fact, that there are so many pretensions to purely benevolent action, where there is manifestly none in reality ; that those who are the most exclusively and notoriously selfish, are frequently the loudest in their professions of disinterested motives ; that those who have the public good forever on their tongues, are only aiming to make it subservient to their own private interests ; and that the most ardent patriots are often the most pertinacious in their demands of emolument and office. The hypocrisy which is known to belong to so many is, without consideration, applied to all.

Another reason which may lead some to doubt whether there is any radical difference between benevolence and selfishness is, that many of those who are truly benevolent are so *defective* in their exercise of this virtuous affection. Their disinterested feelings are mingled with so much that is of an opposite character, that it may be doubtful, even in their own minds, whether *all* their aims are not selfish ; whether all their actions may not be accounted for, from self-love alone.

Again, our *interest* and our *duty*, in the final result, commonly *coincide*. He who is the most faithful in the discharge of his duty, provides the most effectually for his own welfare in the end. Such are the appointments of infinite wisdom and goodness, that he who has the most benevolent regard for the interests of others, may expect from his Maker the highest rewards for himself. Who among glorified saints will wear a brighter crown, than he whose love of doing good prompts him to the most self-denying sacrifices for the salvation of his fellow men ? “ They that turn many to righteousness shall shine as the stars forever.”

The *misapprehensions* which are so often entertained respecting the nature of disinterested affection, may prevent many from having correct views of the distinction between benevolence and selfishness. By a misapplication of the term self-love, our *present* pleasure, which prompts us to imperative acts of will, is confounded with the *future* good which is the object of our pursuit ; and as the former is always an affection of our *own* minds, the inference seems to be drawn, that the latter must be so also. A similar conclusion is obtained, by confining the phrase “ love of happiness”

to our own individual happiness. Because a man, in all his actions, is influenced by a regard to future good, it is taken for granted, that it must be his own enjoyment, and not the happiness of others, that is the final object of his pursuit.

The term *disinterested* is frequently understood as if it were synonymous with *uninterested*; implying that we take no interest in the objects of our benevolent regard; or, on the other hand, that any respect to our own personal interest, is inconsistent with true benevolence; that all love of ourselves is extinguished by genuine love to others; that we take no pleasure either in the exercise of virtuous affection, or in attaining the end which it seeks.

No misapprehension on this subject has, perhaps, occasioned more perplexity, than the confounding of the *ultimate object* of our pursuit, with that state of mind which immediately precedes imperative volition; and to which also the term *ultimate* is, by some writers, applied. The latter is invariably our *own* pleasure or uneasiness, while the former may be the welfare of *others*. The one is a *present* feeling, in the prospect of good to be obtained, or of evil to be avoided. The other is this *future* good or evil itself. The difficulty of forming a correct opinion in the case may be increased, by the frequent use of the expression, *the* ultimate end of voluntary agency; producing the impression that an agent can have but one ultimate end of any of his pursuits.

Our liability to confound benevolence with selfishness, and to fail of keeping in our view the radical distinction between them, renders great caution necessary in the use of the ambiguous phraseology so commonly applied to this subject. The confusion of terms is such, that some writers who differ only in their modes of expression, are reputed to hold opposite views on the nature of benevolence; while the apparent agreement of others is nothing more than the use of the same language to express widely different opinions. There is reason to believe, that groundless jealousies and alienation of feeling are frequently to be found among Christian brethren, whose doctrinal belief is substantially the same, though expressed by different phraseology. It is highly important that measures should be taken to remove the occasion of those injurious apprehensions. On the one hand, the advocates of impartial benevolence ought so to guard their use of technical

phrases, as not to make the impression that *indifference* is an essential element in their definition of virtuous affection; or that they agree with Shaftsbury in affirming, that all self-love, all regard to our own interest, all hope of reward, is inconsistent with true benevolence. On the other hand, if any maintain that self-love is the only immediate incitement to voluntary action, it is incumbent upon them to give such full and distinct explanations, as will leave no ground for the suspicion, that they consider the agent's personal benefit as the only ultimate object of his affection and pursuit; the only good which appears to him valuable in itself; the only end which he chooses for its own sake.

Desirable as it is, that mutual alienation among Christian brethren should be avoided, it is still more important, that men who are altogether selfish should not be able to quiet their consciences by the unguarded language of the truly benevolent; that they should not be furnished with the plea, that they are no more selfish than all other men, as they are taught that self-love is the moving principle of action in all. The radical difference between benevolence and selfishness, should be kept so clearly and steadily in view, that it cannot fail to be seen, even by those who would gladly escape from the reproach and condemnation which it brings upon themselves. They will give a welcome reception to phraseology which serves to conceal the essential distinction between virtue and vice.

Benevolence of the Creator.

There is some reason to believe, that erroneous views of the ultimate end of right moral agency may have been more or less favored, by the language which has been used respecting the ultimate design of the *Supreme Being*, in His works of creation and providence. From the doctrine, that He makes *himself alone* His last end, in forming and governing the world, some may draw the conclusion, that by those whom He has made in his own likeness, their own future good must be the only object of final pursuit. It may, therefore, be proper, in this place, briefly to inquire how far the opinions which have been entertained on this subject, and the language in which they have been expressed, are correct.

The question is not, whether God, in all His works, does

as *He pleases* ; whether it is His own *present* pleasure that prompts Him to acts of benevolence. On this point, it is presumed, there can be no difference of opinion among those who understand the nature of intelligent and voluntary agency. It is His "*own good pleasure*," and not the pleasure of some other being, that immediately moves Him to will and to act. In this sense, "*He hath done whatsoever hath pleased Him*." But the real question under discussion is, What is the *future* good, the prospect of which excites this present pleasure ? What is the *objective* motive on which this subjective motive depends ? What is the ultimate *end*, to which the aims of the Creator are directed ? It is something to be *attained*, *promoted*, or *secured*, by the measures which are adopted for this purpose. If there is a reference to any thing which is now in possession, the object to be gained must be a *continuance* of the present good.

It becomes us to approach, with great caution and reverence, a subject relating to the purposes of that infinite Being whose "*judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out*." With respect to His ultimate end or ends, in creating, preserving, and governing the world, there may be made three suppositions, at least ; that the final results at which He is aiming, in all His works, will belong either to *Himself alone*, or to *the created universe alone*, or to *both together*. Is it His own advantage, or the good of His intelligent and holy kingdom, or both united, to which all the measures of His boundless wisdom and benevolence are directed ?

President Edwards, in his elaborate dissertation on "*The End for which God created the World*," seems to incline to the first supposition ; though some of his observations appear to be inconsistent with this view of the subject. Several of his arguments go to prove, that God makes Himself *one* ultimate end of all His works. This is the purport of the numerous passages of scripture which are adduced to "*show that God's glory is an ultimate end of the creation* ;" that He made the world "*for His great name's sake, and for His praise*."—Sections iii. and iv. Other arguments are brought to prove, that God makes Himself, His glory, and His praise, the *chief* end of His works. "*If God Himself*," he observes, "*be in any respect properly capable of being His own end, in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable*

to suppose, that He had respect to Himself, as His last and *highest* end in this work ; because He is worthy in Himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and the best of beings."

But the fact that He makes Himself *an* ultimate end of His operations, and even the *highest* end, does not prove that He does this, to the exclusion of *all other* ultimate ends. President Edwards, in the introduction of the work just referred to, distinctly states, that "two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one be valued more highly, and sought more than another." "Though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end." "A chief end is opposite to an *inferior* end. An ultimate end is opposite to a *subordinate* end."

There is *one* argument, however, sometimes applied to this subject, which, if it were valid, would go to show, that in the work of creation, God could have in view *no other* ultimate end but Himself. It is said, that before God began to create, there was *nothing else* in existence ; and therefore, nothing else which could be made an end in creating. President Edwards observes, that "merely in this disposition to diffuse Himself, or to cause an emanation of His glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, God cannot so properly be said to make a creature His end, as Himself." "This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight." Very true ; the *disposition or desire*, the *subjective* motive to create, must be prior to the existence of the creature. But how does it follow from this, that the ultimate end to be obtained must be in the Creator alone ? What absurdity is there in supposing, that a God of overflowing and boundless benevolence should purpose to give existence to intelligent beings, for the sake of the happiness which *they* would enjoy, if created and rendered obedient to His laws ? If the *good* which is aimed at, as the final result of a course of measures, be future ; why may not the existence of the *beings* who are to possess this good, be future also ? The *objective* motion to action is *always* future. It is some good to be *obtained* by acting, or the *continuance* of some good already in possession.

There is another argument of Edwards, which seems

almost to annihilate the good of the created universe, as an ultimate end of the Creator's works. He is "infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and excellence, are perfectly *as nothing*, in comparison of Him." "To determine what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all His creatures taken together, both must be, as it were, put in the balance. In this case, the whole system of created beings would be found as the light dust of the balance." All this is very true. But does it imply, that the created universe, comprising numberless systems of worlds, with their countless hosts of living and intelligent beings, is in any danger of being *overlooked*, in the benevolent regards of Him without whose notice, not a sparrow falls to the ground? Can we admit, that their highest welfare is too insignificant to be made an ultimate end by the Creator, "if we consider," as Edwards himself observes, "the degree and manner in which He aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness, in His creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness, during the whole of the designed *eternal duration* of the world He was about to create; which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with Himself,—in *constant progression*, throughout all eternity?" "The good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, must be viewed as infinite."

In endeavoring to show that God makes Himself His end in His works, he observes, that "He values and loves things accordingly as they are *worthy* to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely for itself, and *on its own account*, then it is the *ultimate* object of His value. He does not value it merely for the sake of a farther end to be obtained by it." In connection with this he adds, "Whatever thing is actually the *effect* or *consequence* of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that thing is an *ultimate end* of God's creating the world."

These observations are applied, by Edwards, to the purpose of proving that God's last end, in creating the world, was His own glory. Are they not also applicable to the holiness and happiness of the *created* universe? Is not this a good which is valuable in itself, on its own account? Is it

not so regarded by God ;—and not *merely* for the sake of a farther good to be obtained by it ? Is it not an effect or consequence of the creation of the world ; and therefore, according to Edwards' own mode of reasoning, an ultimate end of the creation ? This is not inconsistent with its being also subservient to a higher end, the glory of God. For, as Edwards observes, "a thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end ; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a farther end." He states that "the happiness and salvation of men was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at, in the labors and sufferings he went through, for our redemption, and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the work of creation." He holds, however, that "the glory of God, and the emanation and fruits of his grace in man's salvation," are not to be understood as *two distinct things* ; as we shall see more particularly as we proceed.

As Edwards endeavors to prove that God makes *Himself* His ultimate end in His works ; others hold that the good of the *creation* is exclusively the final object of what He does. The late Dr. Samuel Austin, in an able dissertation* "respecting the end which God had ultimately in view in creating the world," calls in question the supposition, that God *could be*, in any respect, "His own end, in the creation of the world." He fully agrees with President Edwards, in his representation of "the incomparable and ineffable excellence of God, and the worth of His being, as the original and immutable source of all other beings ;" and he adds, "It seems perfectly suitable, that *He* should ever respect this infinite worth and excellence of His own nature." "But the question is, whether this respect which God is allowed to have for Himself be not one thing, and the end He had in view in creating, another,—in perfect agreement with it indeed, but distinguishable from it, as any two objects are distinguishable. Could His respect for Himself be a respect to any thing *attainable* ? Is there any thing attainable in regard to God himself ? Could any thing be *added* to Him, from that which should wholly proceed from Himself ?—Is not His

* In a volume of Dissertations published at Worcester in 1826.

original, immutable all-sufficiency absolutely inconsistent with such an idea? His *happiness* is original and unalterable; it is incapable of increase or diminution. God's excellency inherently considered, and His respect to this excellency of His nature, were the same before creating, that they were afterwards."^{*}

This is very true. But does it follow, as the writer affirms, that "they must have been the same, if He had not created; that His personal enjoyment or happiness, as, in any sense, a future and attainable object, could not have been more or less His end in creating?" Does not His excellence, in some measure, consist in His purpose to create, and in actually creating, for the sake of conferring happiness on the beings created? Does not His own blessedness consist, in part, in the prospect of the bliss which the obedient subjects of His immeasurable kingdom will forever enjoy? Have we any reason to believe that His *happiness* is independent of His attributes and works? "Let what will be God's last end," says President Edwards, "*that*, He must have a real and proper *pleasure* in; whatever be the proper object of His will, He is *gratified* in. He is not indifferent whether His will be fulfilled or not.—And if He has a real pleasure in attaining His end, then the attainment of it belongs to His happiness." This does not imply, that there is any *increase* of God's happiness, by His works of creation and providence;—any *addition* to what He has forever possessed. For His eternal purpose renders the glory and blessedness of His created kingdom *as certain*, as it will be when in actual existence; and His omniscience makes it as present to His view, to be ever the object of His complacency and delight. There is no *increase* of His happiness, as there is no addition to the objects of joy before His mind. According to Dr. Austin's own view of God's infinite benevolence, He takes great delight in the holiness and happiness of His creatures. But let it be supposed, that nothing had been created, would God then have possessed *this* joy which He now finds in contemplating the excellence and enjoyment of His creation? Or would this his joy *continue*, on the supposition, if it be not irreverent to *make* the supposition, that the created uni-

* Pages 35, 36, 37.

verse should cease to exist? President Edwards observes, that, "in some sense, it can truly be said, that God has *more* delight and pleasure, for the holiness and happiness of His creatures." May not the *continuance* of this delight and pleasure be one ultimate object of His works of providence and redemption? But how can He rejoice in the highest good of His creatures, without making *that* also an ultimate end to be attained?

This brings us to the last of the three suppositions before stated, concerning the ultimate end for which God created the world, viz. that it was either for *Himself alone*, or the good of the *created universe*, or *both together*. How could one of these be made an ultimate end, without the other? How can God make that in which He has no pleasure an ultimate end; and how can He fail of making His own future pleasure an ultimate end? "According to the Scriptures," says President Edwards, "*communicating good to the creatures* is what is in itself *pleasing* to God; and this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a farther end—but what God is inclined to, *on its own account*, and what He delights in simply and ultimately." How could *communicating* good to the creatures be pleasing to God, if this good itself were not an object which He values on its own account? President Edwards, after quoting several passages of Scripture expressing strongly the love and grace of God to man, observes, "*If our good* be not at all regarded *ultimately*, but only subordinately; then our good or interest is, in itself considered, nothing in God's regard or love." Again, "The Scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of His people, when obtained, as in what He ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of His race; obtained the prize He aimed at." "That God uses the whole creation, in His whole government of it, for the *good of His people*, is most elegantly represented in Deut. xxxiii. 26. The good of men is spoken of as the ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things He does, and so be one end of things that He requires moral agents to do—these things may be easily explained; but otherwise, it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself, from time to time." The way in which Edwards en-

deavors to reconcile these statements with "the Scriptures, which represent God as making *Himself* His own last end in the creation of the world," we shall have occasion to consider soon.

Besides the three suppositions which have been already stated, it may be thought, perhaps, that still another may be made; viz., that the ultimate design of the creation was a *display of the divine perfections*. This is very particularly dwelt upon by Edwards, in treating of the exhibition, emanation, exercise, manifestation, and communication of God's essential glory. But it is difficult to see how, under any of these forms of expression, the supposition can be made really distinct from each of those which have just been considered. As God and His creation comprise all the objects in the universe, it would seem that the ultimate ends of all voluntary agency must be found in one or the other of these, or in both together. The expression which is used in the Scriptures, more frequently perhaps than any other, to designate the ultimate end of the works of creation and providence, is *the glory of God*. It is used in two or three different senses, intimately related to each other. The *primary* meaning appears to be the divine excellence. In this sense, it expresses His whole character; all His glorious attributes, as they exist in *Himself*. But it is frequently used to signify the *manifestation* of His excellence; the *exhibition* of His perfections to His creatures. In this sense, the whole earth is said to be full of His glory. According to the former of these significations, the glory of God is wholly *within Himself*. According to the latter, it consists of effects produced among His *creatures*. President Edwards speaks also of the *exercise* and *expression* of the divine attributes, as an end greatly to be desired. But this exercise must either be within *Himself*, or it must produce its effects upon the creatures of His power. There are no other objects upon which it can terminate.

In his concluding section, Edwards undertakes to show, "that the ultimate end of the creation of the world is *but one*. It appears," he observes, "that all that is ever spoken of, in the Scriptures, as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrase, *the glory of God*." That all which is thus spoken of may be *included* in this single expression, may be very true; and yet it may be equally true, that there

is a marked distinction among the objects thus included. Things very diverse from each other may be comprehended under one general name. The whole created universe, with its numberless worlds, and its endlessly diversified orders of beings, is, in a sense, but one thing, that is, but one universe. Edwards himself observes, that "the whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these *three* things, viz., His infinite knowledge, His infinite virtue or holiness, and His infinite joy or happiness;" and that "His *external* glory consists in the communication of these." But he represents the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the creature as *not distinct* from the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the Creator; because the excellence of the creature is *communicated* from the Creator. If this be admitted as a valid reason, will it not lead us to pantheism; to the conclusion, that the Creator and his creatures *are not distinct beings*? The *existence* and *faculties* of the one have been communicated from the other. Are we to infer from this, that human existence, and the human faculties, are not distinct from the divine existence, and the divine attributes? If they *are* distinct, are not the *acts* of these beings, and the *exercise* of these faculties, their knowledge, their holiness, and their happiness, distinct from the knowledge, the holiness, and the happiness of God? It is true, that they are inseparably *connected*; and in all beings perfectly holy, there is an entire *harmony* of feeling, of design, and of action. But are not God and the creature distinct *objects* of thought, of knowledge, and of benevolent regard?

President Edwards repeatedly speaks of the knowledge, the holiness and the happiness of creatures as being *effects* of the Creator's agency. But does this prove that they are not *distinct* from Himself? Is the effect never distinct from its cause? Is the *material* world one with God, because He is its author? Even where effects are of the *same nature* as their cause, they may be as really distinct from it, as any one thing is distinct from any other which it resembles. Because man was made in the *image* of God, does it follow that they are not separate beings? Every thing which man or angels know, God also knows. But does this imply, that the creature's knowledge is not distinct from that of the Creator? Holiness in men is of the *same nature* with God's holiness. But can we infer from this, that men have

no holiness which is properly their own? The joy of a creature who is perfectly holy, may be the same in kind, as the joy of his Maker; and the character of each may be a ground of rejoicing to the other. But does it follow that there is no distinction between them?

According to Edwards, the thing signified by the phrase the glory of God, as an ultimate end of His works, is the *emanation* of His internal glory, the excellent brightness and fulness of the Divinity *diffused, overflowing*, or in one word, existing *ad extra*. The effect produced by God's exercising His perfections, is His *fulness communicated*; and the producing this effect is the communication of His fulness. These expressions seem to imply, that every excellence in the creature has flowed out from the Creator in the same manner as a stream of water proceeds from its fountain. Though this comparison may be a happy illustration, yet we are not to consider the resemblance as perfect in every point of view. The stream of water consists of that which was previously in the fountain, but which is now *no longer there*. The fountain is so far *diminished*, unless replenished from some other source. But the communications which are made from the Creator of the universe withdraw nothing from His infinite fulness. The holiness of creatures consists of *acts* of their minds. Are these acts the acts of God? Have they flowed out from Him to the creature. Admitting that He is their primary cause, the original source from which they proceed, are they nothing distinct from Him? Are all effects nothing else than a portion of the cause from which they proceed? When Christians rejoice in the immeasurable blessedness of God, is there no distinction between their joy and His?

"The glory of God," says Edwards, "is fitly compared to an effulgence or *emanation of light* from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in scripture." This is indeed a beautiful figure. But can we infer from it, that the parallelism is in all respects complete, between the material sun and the infinite source of spiritual light and joy; that the holiness and happiness of creatures have *come out* from the Creator, in the same manner as the solar beams have radiated from the visible sun?

We are brought, then, to the conclusion, that while God has a supreme regard to His own infinite excellence and

blessedness, He has also a real regard for the welfare of His moral kingdom, *for its own sake*. He values it for what it is in its own nature, and not merely on account of its relation to Himself. The happiness of His creatures, and His joy in contemplating it, though evidently distinct, are inseparably connected. If He had no regard for their prosperity in itself considered, what delight could He take in promoting it? But if He seeks their highest good for its own sake, how can He fail to rejoice at its attainment? He thus becomes an example of impartial benevolence, for the imitation of His creatures. He says to His people, "Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy." "Love your enemies," says Christ to His disciples, "bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you—that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven." The same ultimate objects of pursuit are proposed to us, which He makes the end of all His works; the glory of His name, and the highest good of His kingdom. These we are bound to seek on their own account, and not merely for the sake of procuring benefits for ourselves.

ARTICLE II.

EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR TAPPAN'S REVIEW OF EDWARDS ON THE WILL.

By Rev. Benjamin N. Martin, New York City.

THE "Inquiry into the modern notions of the Freedom of the Will," here brought under review, has possessed a degree of influence over the opinions of succeeding generations, rarely conceded to any psychological work. The concurrent testimony of friends and foes to the distinguished ability of its Author, has stamped Edwards as the prince of modern metaphysicians, and given him an authority, which has made his lightest sayings, to many minds, oracular. Scarcely could the philosophy of Aristotle have been more potent in its most flourishing days, than is the philosophy of Edwards at this day, over many a reflecting mind in this nation.

Under these circumstances, the announcement that Prof. Tappan had commenced his work on the Will, with a direct and hardy attack upon the Colossus that did thus "bestride our narrow world," invested that work with an unusual interest, and secured for it a very general and attentive perusal. If the reviewer has failed to secure a conviction of the soundness of his argument, he has not failed to impress upon his readers a highly favorable sense of his own critical abilities; for we believe that all who have alluded to his work, have made most respectful mention of it. The calm and philosophic spirit in which he has prosecuted his undertaking, the patient, and even profound reflection which many passages of the Review exhibit, the simplicity of statement, and the logical accuracy of many of his reasonings, have all received, as they certainly deserve, very great praise; and we rejoice to add our testimony to that of others, who have honored him as an earnest, fearless, and able investigator of the truth. But, while we thus cheerfully concede to Prof. T. no ordinary merit, we are not prepared, either to coincide with him in his views of Edwards, or to adopt his own statements of philosophic truth. We propose to confine ourselves in the present article, to an examination of his Review, and to inquire how far he has succeeded in loosening the hold, which this strong man of a past age yet has upon the public mind.

To whatever cause the fact may be attributed, it must, we think, be admitted as a fact, that, to form an accurate estimate of the great work of Edwards, is an exceedingly difficult thing. Notwithstanding the numerous efforts which have been made, no one, however he may have been dissatisfied with the "Inquiry," has yet been able fundamentally to overthrow it, or however he may coincide with its general tenor, satisfactorily to vindicate it. The opponents of Edwards acknowledge its merits, and his disciples admit that it has its defects; yet no attempt to discriminate between them, has been fortunate enough to meet with general approbation. His errors are like the specks we sometimes see in cloth; we know they do not belong to it, but they are interwoven with the very substance of the fabric so skilfully, that it is difficult to lay hold of them, and so closely, that it is still more difficult to extricate them.

It must be known to every one, who knows any thing of

the effect of the Inquiry on the convictions of the world, that no great work was ever the subject of more controversy in respect to its main design. By one party, Edwards has been esteemed the champion of human liberty; by another, his work is regarded (and our Reviewer seems to think with entire justice), as the text-book of fatalism. Now, whatever may be the respective merits of these claims, it would seem to require but a moderate degree of penetration to perceive, that there must be *something* in the work which gives plausibility to each of them. Neither party would have esteemed it so highly—neither would have appealed to it so confidently, without finding in it something which they deemed favorable to their views. These facts would indicate that any exposition of the Inquiry, in order to be successful, must include much cautious discrimination, not only between truth and error, but between the conflicting statements on the same subject, which these opposing parties adduce. There must be something of candid concession—the endeavor to ascertain the *design*, and to develop the *system* of Edwards, from statements, some of which are admitted to be inconsistent with either of them.

This view, we are persuaded, is the only one which promises a satisfactory settlement of this involved and protracted controversy. We regret that the Reviewer has not adopted it; he has proved himself competent to have done it ample justice, and we should have looked for some valuable results from so able an advocacy of it. He maintains a very different opinion. He considers Edwards a thorough and consistent fatalist—construes all his language in consonance with this idea—pronounces his theory a psychological “monster,” and meets it at every point with decided opposition. He does not, we believe, concede to his opponents a single disputed passage, nor acknowledge that he finds in the Inquiry any thing inconsistent with his own views of it. He has proceeded as though fatalism were so obviously designed in it, that nothing more was necessary than to exhibit the statements which avow it, and then to attack and vanquish the theory. Had he but contended that *some* of the principles of the Inquiry involve the fatalism he condemns, had he endeavored to distinguish these from the acute and forcible reasonings which have made that work so celebrated, we should have deemed the aim a happy one, and wished it all

success. But the effort to class Edwards with the deliberate defenders of this shallow and profligate scheme, is one which we think ought never to pass unnoticed.

The "Review" is divided into three parts. Of these, the first is a "statement of Edwards' system—the second, a reduction of that system to its logical consequences—and the third, an examination of his argument against self-determination." It is with the first and third of these, that we are at present more particularly concerned.

PART I. "*Statement of Edwards' System.*"

Prof. Tappan has here made a strenuous effort to identify the system of Edwards, with that which affirms the most rigid and unavoidable necessity of volition. This design is accomplished by the exhibition of certain important passages of the Inquiry, accompanied with explanations which the reviewer hopes "will serve to make Edwards better understood." Our opinion of these explanations has not been formed without all that respectful and patient consideration, which is due to the high standing and acknowledged abilities of Prof. Tappan; but we cannot agree with him. We are constrained to believe that his anxiety to reduce the various statements of Edwards to a correspondence with his view of Edwards' scheme, has led him to look beyond their obvious and real meaning, and to attach to them ideas which they by no means authorize, and to which they are in some instances decidedly opposed. We express this opinion with the less diffidence, because we find our views of the most important of those passages of the Inquiry, in the interpretation of which we differ from Prof. T., sanctioned by the high authority of President Day, in his recent interesting and valuable work upon Edwards.

The first point with which the Reviewer endeavors to connect his theory of fatalism, is Edwards' alleged identification of will and desire; which we are told differ in the system of the Inquiry, only as genus and species. The same idea is more fully developed in some subsequent remarks upon "the proper use of the term—most agreeable;" which the Reviewer says "is identified by Edwards in express terms with volition."

We notice these remarks, not to deny their correctness, but to say that Professor Tappan has scarcely, we think,

paid sufficient attention to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards always expresses himself on these points. Of the first, he says, "I do not suppose that will and desire are words of *precisely the same* signification;" "but yet, I cannot think they are *so entirely distinct*, that they can ever be said to run counter." In concluding the discussion of the topic, he says, "not to dwell any longer on this, *whether will and desire be precisely the same things, or no*, yet I trust it will be admitted," &c.—language which, we think, plainly indicates, that though he was inclined to the view here imputed to him, the precise mutual relation of these two things was by no means settled in his mind. Of the latter, he says, "*they seem, hardly, to be properly, and perfectly distinct*," which scarcely amounts to the *express* identification claimed in the review.

While, however, it must be confessed, that Edwards has affirmed the identity alleged, we deem the guarded phraseology of the affirmation worthy of some attention. Its importance arises from the fact, that Edwards does, in many instances, depart from this view, and with equal explicitness, authorize the opposite one. For example, in Part I., Sec. IV., he says, that moral necessity sometimes arises "from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motive;" where inclination or desire, is obviously *distinguished from volition*, and classed with *motive*, as *the cause of volition*. The same idea is, we think, conveyed in all his language about volition "caused by *antecedent* bias"—about the "*will following* the last dictate of the understanding," under which he includes the mind's sense of the pleasure to be derived from the choice—about "the strongest appetite," which, he says, "it is agreeable to have gratified." This inconsistency would seem to have escaped the notice of our critic, who repeatedly states, that in the system of Edwards, volition, and the strongest desire, *are identical*; and then, as we shall hereafter show, charges him with making one *the antecedent* of the other, and argues with equal earnestness against this view also.

We notice next, the Reviewer's observations on the meaning of the phrase, "determination of the will." By this, Edwards informs us that he means, "causing that the act of will should be thus, and not otherwise;" "as by the determination of motion, we mean causing it to be in such a di-

rection rather than in another." Upon this, Professor Tappan argues, that Edwards intends to distinguish the *determination* of choice, from its *causation*, no more than the determination of motion can be distinguished from its *causation*; that in the instance of motion, *there is only one cause*, which both produces the motion, and determines its direction, and that therefore, in the case of choice, there is but a single cause, which both produces volition, and determines its particular character; and as Edwards maintains that it is motive which *determines*, he must be understood to maintain, that *motive produces volition*. Thus is the conclusion attained, that, in the philosophy of Edwards, motive *is*, and the mind *is not*, the efficient cause of choice. This, Professor Tappan imputes, throughout the review, as the cardinal principle of the scheme of his author. Every where he alleges, that *determination* of volition, means the *causation* of it; and as it is motive which determines, motive is also, the efficient, producing, and sole, *cause* of volition: a conclusion which, we suspect, will be regarded by the disciples of Edwards, generally, with very great surprise.

The validity of this reasoning depends upon the validity of the principle, that the cause which sets a body in motion, is the same cause which determines the direction of that motion; a position which we cannot regard as by any means unquestionable. On the contrary, it strikes us that the *fact*, and the *direction*, of motion, when either of them is distinctly specified, are *always* regarded as distinct effects, and assigned to distinct causes. For example:—What causes the *motion* of a balloon? *Its own buoyancy*. What now causes that motion to be "*thus, and not otherwise*"—east, and not west? Plainly, a very different cause—*the wind*. Are we not right in supposing, that men invariably distinguish thus between the *cause* of motion, and the *determiner* of its direction, and assign in answer one, or the other, as the inquiry respects one or the other of the two effects? The same reasoning applies to every instance of motion. The *motion* of a locomotive is due to the *steam*, its *direction*, to the *track* on which it moves. The motion of a planet was derived from Omnipotence; its elliptical direction from gravitation. That all common usage recognizes this distinction, is undeniable; that Edwards has appealed to it for illustration of his doctrine, is, we think, obvious. Of course, Professor Tappan

cannot, with propriety, deprive him of the benefit of this appeal.

Nor does it aid the Reviewer's argument to say, as he does, that when there are several causes, they constitute together one complex whole, which determines both the extent, and the direction, of the motion. This is perfectly true; they are very often, and very properly, so considered; but the remark does not apply to the present instance. Edwards inquires *not* generally for the complex whole, but specifically for one of the component parts; for that which determines the motion to be *in one direction*, recognizing, palpably, the distinction we have alleged. It would appear then, that determination, and causation, are not the same, either in themselves, or in their causes, in the instance either of motion, or of choice. Of course it follows, that the Reviewer's decision that they are, is unsustained by correct usage; and that the interpretation which this decision puts upon the language of Edwards, is unauthorized and unsatisfactory.

On pp. 50, 51, the Reviewer proceeds to consider Edwards' remarks on moral necessity. The language of the Inquiry is quoted thus:—"No opposition or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." "For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act, or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting, present choice; as absurd as to talk of two contrary motions of the same moving body at the same time."*

On this passage, which the Professor says "is clear and full," he remarks as follows: "The cause of volition does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition, therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be made by a volition." "*Choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence, THEREFORE, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavor, but by a philosophical and absolute necessity of cause and effect.*" It is necessary as the

* The necessary limits of our article require us to abbreviate somewhat our quotations, both from Edwards, and from his Reviewer. We shall endeavor, in doing so, to be guilty of no injustice to either party.

falling of a stone which is thrown into the air—as the freezing or boiling of water at given temperatures.”

It is worthy of observation, that Professor Tappan is here using, as he himself informs us, the peculiar language of Edwards, of course, in the sense which Edwards gave it. But explained by the usage of Edwards, his conclusion amounts only to this—that volitions come into existence *by an absolute certainty*. For philosophical necessity is defined to be “nothing different from certainty,” and the addition of the epithet “absolute,” makes the phrase express simply *absolute certainty*. The same observation applies to the phrase “sure and perfect,” as applied to philosophical necessity—it qualifies the idea of certainty alone. But it is most manifest, from the illustrations of the falling of a stone, &c., that these terms are employed *by the Reviewer*, to convey the idea of a necessity precisely similar to that by which physical phenomena take place; a use of them which we have always regarded as strongly indicative of a serious misapprehension of the whole phraseology of Edwards in reference to volition. The Reviewer attaches to all this language, ideas which the definitions of Edwards, we think, forbid, and against which the Inquiry contains repeated warning. “Philosophical and absolute necessity, as sure and perfect as natural necessity,” means in the usage of Edwards, if definitions can convey meaning, only *perfect and absolute certainty*; in that of the Reviewer, it means something more, viz.: certainty, with that absolute impossibility of the contrary, which constitutes necessity of the most rigid character.

Whether the conclusion introduced by the word “therefore” in this extract, was designed as a statement of the reasoning of Edwards, or as an inference of the Reviewer from the admissions of the passage, we find it difficult to decide. The former, which would perhaps be the more natural supposition, we cannot think the correct one. Edwards does not *announce* any such conclusion—he does not say that volition comes into existence by the same kind of necessity by which water freezes—he does not say that moral necessity has no relation to voluntary endeavor. We think, therefore, that we should wrong Prof. T. by saying that he presents this idea as the formal and designed conclusion of his author. It must be regarded as an inference of his own, from the passage in question—a conclusion which

he deems authorized by the language of Edwards. Viewed as such, his argument would stand thus—choice cannot, on the scheme of Edwards, affect its own cause in the act of its own causation, *therefore* volition is unavoidably necessary. The conclusion which affirms this dreaded fatality of volition, is formally drawn from the principle, that “choice cannot exist before its cause.” Of course if the alleged conclusion is contained in the specified premise, we can avoid it only by surrendering that premise, and admitting that choice *may* exist before its cause. There must be choice “in the act of its causation,” as well as in the act caused, or volition is physically necessary. But if there must be choice in the act of causation, as well as in the volition caused, then *this* choice, being itself caused, must have another act of causation, which again involves the necessity of still another previous choice, &c. &c., “in endless retrogression.” In other words, we have here the very error which, under the name of *self-determination*, Edwards so successfully opposed.

It strongly suggests itself as an explanation of the Reviewer's opposition to the very harmless language of the Inquiry, that he has overlooked that limitation of it, which confines it to *existing* volitions. Edwards speaks only of a *present* act of will, and says that it is absurd to suppose another volition to exist *with* it, and oppose it. But because an *existing* volition cannot meet with voluntary opposition, does it therefore follow that this existing volition could not have been prevented? that another could not have been made to exist in its stead?

This passage of the Review concludes with a reference to another statement of the Inquiry, which candor requires us not to leave unnoticed. It is that which declares that “the difference between these two kinds of necessity” (natural and moral) “lies not so much in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms connected!” This, we have ever regarded, as an unfortunate admission of the doctrine which Prof. T. charges upon Edwards. A minute criticism of the terms employed might, by virtue of the qualifying clause “so much,” maintain that Edwards intended even here, to indicate *some* difference between these two relations. We prefer, however, frankly to acknowledge, as we have had occasion to do before, that the passage is hostile to the view we maintain;

and that whatever weight it carries with it, is thrown into the scale of fatalism. We deem it a hasty and ill-considered expression, inconsistent with the general tenor and design of the work in which it occurs; and we rely upon our exhibition of opposite views in the Inquiry, to sustain our judgment, and set aside the sanction which this sentence would otherwise give, to the reasonings of our opponents. Indeed, we are somewhat surprised that Prof. T. has not constructed a more formal argument, upon a passage so much to his purpose. He has shown, however, his high appreciation of its value, by the frequency with which he has appealed to it. Again and again do we find it exhibited in significant quotation marks, and almost every argument employed to fasten his system of fatalism upon Edwards, is *clinched* with this brief but pregnant declaration. Whether it is sufficient to sustain alone the weight of such a system, our readers must decide.

As we proceed in the examination of the Review, the questions become somewhat more complicated. The Professor continues his explanations of the Inquiry, and brings to his aid the conclusions which he deems established by the arguments we have already noticed.

After his discussion of necessity, he passes to consider the view of natural and moral inability, which Edwards has given in the following passage: "It may be said in one word, that moral inability consists, in the want, or opposition of inclination. For when a person is unable to will a thing through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing, as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination." Upon this language he observes, that "The inability in this case does not relate to the connection between volition and its consequents; *but to the production of the volition itself*. This inability to the production of a volition cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist. The inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of the volition, or to the motive." The Reviewer is here speaking of "the *production* of a volition," and he says that the inability *to produce* it, belongs to its cause, that is, to the motive. Motive, then, is represented to be, in the philosophy of Edwards, the producing cause of volition—not a mere circumstance, or condition or reason, of the existence of choice, but its *producing* cause.

This representation our critic has made before, and has endeavored, as we have seen, to sustain it by some reasoning, upon the comparison Edwards has instituted between motion and choice. We cannot find, however, that he has adduced any new argument in support of it; it rests therefore, both here and elsewhere, on the logic of that passage alone. This could scarcely be considered a very ample foundation for an allegation so important, were the reasoning undeniable. But when it is remembered that the argument is by no means unquestionable, and that it stands opposed to the whole usage of Edwards, who *never once* calls motive the producing cause of choice, but always speaks of "the *soul exerting volition*"—of "the activity of the soul *enabling it to be the cause*," it will be perceived how deficient is the proof of it.

There is, however, a passage in the Inquiry, which we cannot but consider absolutely decisive of all controversy upon this point; the one in which Edwards formally explains his use of the word cause, as applied to motive. On perceiving what statements Prof. T. had made in respect to this topic, we turned "over the pages of his work with rather an eager curiosity, to see what explanation even the ingenuity of our Reviewer could frame to avoid its force. It was with equal surprise and disappointment, that we found he had omitted altogether to notice it. This unfortunate omission we take the liberty to supply. In discussing the question, "whether any event whatever, and *volition in particular*, can come to pass without a *cause*," Edwards speaks (Part II. Sec. 3.) as follows: "I would explain how I would be understood when I use the word cause in this discourse, since for want of a better word I shall have occasion to use it, *in a sense which is more extended*, than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used so as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency, or *influence to produce* a thing. But there are many things which have *no such productive influence*, which yet are causes. Therefore I sometimes use the word cause, to signify any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the *reason why* the proposition which affirms that event is true, *whether it has any positive productive influence*, or not; and the word event for the consequence of that which is rather *an occasion*, than a *cause*, most properly speaking."

This passage indicates beyond a doubt, that Edwards used the word cause in its application to the antecedent of volition in particular, to signify that which has "no *productive influence*," but is a mere "occasion"—and yet Prof. T. affirms that Edwards intends to designate motive as the producing cause; and says that on the scheme of his author, "motive as a cause must put forth a *causative act* in the *production of a volition*," (p. 183). The Reviewer's omission to notice this controlling passage of the Inquiry, renders his discussion incomplete, and unsatisfactory, in the most important particular—the grand and fundamental principle of the philosophy he opposes; and we deeply regret, for his own sake, and for that of his argument, that a discussion otherwise so able, should be marred by such a material oversight.

In concluding his remarks on moral inability (which Edwards says consists in a want of inclination), Prof. T. expresses himself as follows:—"A want of inclination to one object (implying a stronger inclination to another), implies that the state of mind, and the nature and circumstances of the one object are not correlated; but that the state of mind, and the nature and circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first is, a want of sufficient motives; the second, stronger motives to the contrary," "*Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition; volition cannot produce or relieve it.*" This last idea occurs perhaps more distinctly in the appeal to consciousness which forms part of the subsequent portion of Prof. T.'s work—"this want of inclination" (implying of course, the stronger inclination to another object), "exists, according to Edwards, *antecedently to volition*, and is therefore absolutely necessary relatively to the individual."

These passages represent that, according to Edwards, moral inability to any volition, consists in a want of inclination to it, and a stronger inclination to the opposite; which, as they exist "*antecedently to volition*," volition can neither "produce nor relieve."

Now if the reader will turn to p. 35 of the Review, he will find that volition, and the strongest inclination, are *there* alleged to be in the system of Edwards the very same thing. "*Volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment the strongest inclination,*" &c.;—again, p. 76, "*The strongest desire at any given moment is choice.*" The inconsistency is palpable, even in the terms of the statement.

In one place we are told, that moral inability is produced by a stronger inclination to the opposite object, and that this stronger inclination exists *antecedently to volition*; in the other that the strongest inclination, is *volition*. There is not the slightest intimation throughout the Review, that *Edwards* has inconsistently authorised opposing statements on this subject; on the contrary, Prof. T. distinctly and constantly charges upon him *one* of these views, that which identifies inclination with volition; and opposes his theory on the ground of it. What is the value of all this oft-repeated argument, which alleges that Edwards identifies them, and imputes fatalism to his *system*, in consequence of the identification, the Reviewer's own inconsistent denial of his allegation will serve sufficiently to show. If Edwards did identify them, he had too much acuteness to persist in an error so manifest, and he relieved his system of its embarrassments by a happy inconsistency, for which his critic has not given him credit.

After some remarks upon general and particular inability, the Reviewer proceeds to comment on Edwards' discussion of the phrase, "want of power or ability." His treatment of this topic, we have not found marked with his usual clearness; while, as in some former instances, we are forced to dissent from the interpretation, which his comment places upon the passage in question. We quote it entire from the *Inquiry*, that our readers may judge for themselves of the validity of his construction of it; dividing it into two paragraphs for the sake of convenient reference.

1. "It must be observed concerning moral inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural inability in the original use of it; and is applied to such cases only, wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. *It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language*, that a malicious man, let him be ever so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. *In the strictest propriety of speech*, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and *a man cannot be truly said* to be unable to do a

thing, when he can do it if he will. *It is improperly said*, that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some respects *more improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of will themselves*; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot, if he will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he cannot will, if he does will. And, in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for the man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing: when once he has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing else remains to be done."

2. "Therefore, in these things to ascribe the non-performance to want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacities of nature, and every thing else sufficient but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will."

We give now the Reviewer's explanation of the first of these paragraphs:

"It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts of will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another, which is absurd. But as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause of its own volitions, and of course to say that a man has ability to produce volitions, it must be absurd likewise, in any particular case, to represent the man as *unable* to produce volitions: for this would imply that in other cases he is able."

We feel bound to object to this exposition as a misconception of the meaning of the passage. We do so on the following grounds:

1. It substitutes an entirely different reason for the impropriety of the language under consideration, from that which Edwards formally assigns. He says "it is evidently false"—"it is a downright contradiction"—"it is saying he cannot will if he does will." Prof. T says "it would imply that in some cases a man is able to produce volitions." Nor

does it help the Reviewer's construction, to show that the implication he alleges, involves an absurdity upon the scheme of Edwards ; for the absurdity, if it be admitted, is a totally different thing from the "downright contradiction," which Edwards has so distinctly specified. But,

2. The alleged implication is not logically involved. The Reviewer argues that "to say that a man has power to produce volitions would imply that he has power to will volitions." By no means. We cannot perceive that this is implied. The only authority for the Professor's statement is the decision we have already noticed, that Edwards does not distinguish between the causation and the determination of volition. On the contrary, Edwards does speak continually of the man's "exerting" or producing volitions without the suspicion that it implies willing them.

3. Even if involved, we cannot consider the implication an absurd one. "This would make" says the Reviewer, "one volition the cause of another, which is absurd." Here again we must dissent. Edwards does indeed maintain, that to make choosing a volition *essential to its liberty* is absurd, but not that choosing a volition is so." He says, "It is no contradiction to suppose that there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or *excite* future acts of will." Edwards here accepts, and affirms, as "no contradiction," the very thing which his Reviewer makes him reject as "a downright contradiction"—that one act of will may "excite" or produce another. Prof. T.'s anxiety to fasten upon the Inquiry the scheme of physical necessity, has led him to what we are compelled to regard as a most strange misapprehension of the meaning of Edwards.

Nor is this the whole of it. In his remarks upon the second of the paragraphs above quoted from Edwards, he makes another effort to maintain his theory. "In these things" (acts of will) "to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or to the want of motives," (for this is plainly his meaning), "is not just, because the thing wanting, that is immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the agent himself can be the subject of remark, is not a being able, that is a having the requisite motives or the moral ability, but a being willing, or the act of volition itself." According to this passage, the inability to which it is 'not just,' to ascribe non-performance, i. e. the non-exertion of a volition, is a *moral* inability—it is

not just to ascribe the absence of a volition to moral inability to produce it. To what inability, then, we would ask, is it justly ascribable? To natural inability? Edwards again and again says, that in this, the proper use of the term, it is absurd to apply it to volition. This inability, therefore, is not natural. Prof. T. says it is not moral; to what hitherto undescribed and unimagined species of inability is it just to ascribe the deficiency, or is there after all no inability of any kind in the case? The inability to which it is not just to ascribe the failure of the act of volition is moral inability; "this is plainly his meaning," says the Reviewer. Now, Professor Tappan is not in the habit of carrying his points by the mere assertion of them, and we should feel unwilling, therefore, even to insinuate that he has nothing to sustain his assertion here; at the same time it would have been far more satisfactory if he had given the reasons which have led him to the conclusion that this is the meaning of Edwards. We have been accustomed to entertain the conviction that his meaning in this passage is precisely the reverse—that it is natural inability to which the failure may not be attributed. In this conviction we know we are not alone. We must request our readers to refer to the passage which we have quoted entire for this purpose, and decide whether it is not ability in the original and proper use of the term, of which he speaks throughout it. The supposition that it is moral inability is not, to our mind, even plausible. We think we may appeal to every student of the Inquiry, whether it is not perfectly notorious, that moral inability is the very thing and the only thing to which, in the philosophy of Edwards, it is just to ascribe the non-production of a volition.

Nor can we help observing here, to what totally different issues the discussion of this topic is brought by Edwards and his Reviewer. "It is evident," says the latter, "that there may be an utter moral inability to do a thing—that is, *the motive may be wanting* which causes the volition which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done," &c.; the former says, "*the thing wanting* is, not a being able, but a being willing;" "the act of volition itself," as Prof. T. explains it. "There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and *every thing else sufficient* but a disposition; *nothing is wanting but a WILL.*" This positive and sweeping language, which Prof. T. has not quoted, seems to us to deny that it is "the

motive which causes the volition," that is wanting. We are unable to see how the Reviewer could so far overlook it, as to set forth such an exposition of the passage; but the urgencies of an untenable theory will account for some extravagances of logic, in the writings even of able men.

We have thus noticed the most important of the reasonings, by which Prof. Tappan would prove Edwards a fatalist; and we cannot think it too much to say of them, that they indicate a false conception in the critic's mind, of the meaning and system of his author. We are confirmed in this opinion, by the fact that he has nowhere intimated that there is a solitary passage which sanctions the views of that numerous class who regard Edwards as an advocate of liberty; for we cannot believe that a work which has been the subject of so much controversy, should furnish so little ground for it.

Let it be remembered, in determining what system Edwards designed to advocate, that, under the name of Arminian liberty, Edwards has stated that he opposed three things:—

1. *Self-determination*, or liberty as consisting in the previous choice of volition;
2. *Indifference*, or liberty as consisting in the absence of previous inclination;
3. *Contingence*, or liberty as consisting in the absence of all cause.

Now, if he designed to oppose also that view of liberty which makes it consist in power to the contrary volition, why has he not included this in his formal specification of the errors he opposes under that name? Instead of which, we find him saying, that to ascribe the *want* of a volition to the *want of power*, "is not just." Let it be remembered, that Edwards defines philosophical necessity to be, "nothing different from certainty," and moral necessity to be "a certainty of the will itself"—moral inability, which Prof. T. says "is a real inability," he declares to be improperly so called; and says that "natural inability ALONE is properly called inability." And if all this be not sufficient, then let it be remembered, that in defending his system from the perversions which the fatalists of his own day were not slow to make of it (the identical perversion of Prof. T.), he uses the following unequivocal language. "This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends

all men's actions ; and that the terms necessary, unavoidable, impossible, &c., are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity." "ON THE CONTRARY, I have largely declared, that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of necessity IMPROPERLY ; and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more properly called CERTAINTY than necessity ; it being NO OTHER than the CERTAIN connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence." "Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing, and choosing as they please, with full freedom ; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive."

This decisive language, with much more of the same tenor, is contained in his letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland, written, as he tells us, to vindicate himself "from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessity," and published in all the subsequent editions of his Inquiry. Could language furnish a more comprehensive or more explicit disavowal of the system which the Reviewer has labored so hard to fasten upon him ? How far the reasonings he employed were always strictly consistent with this design, Edwards was not the proper judge. This, it is for his readers to determine ; and he who determines it successfully, will find occasion for the exercise of his utmost discernment, and will need to be free alike from the partialities of a disciple, and the prejudices of an opponent. The great metaphysician may occasionally have spoken, as in his definition of liberty, beside the question in controversy ; and his reasonings may sometimes have authorised the imputations which Prof. T. has labored to fasten upon his *system* ; and whoever cautiously points out such errors of the Inquiry, will do most useful service to the cause of truth. But the main pillars of that system rest upon a far different and a far stronger foundation ; and the work itself, we are persuaded, will stand even the severe ordeal of the Reviewer's searching examination.

PART II. *Consequences of Edwards' System.*

The second part of the review we do not propose to notice. If the Reviewer is wrong in ascribing to his author the scheme of fatalism, his reduction of that scheme to its consequences, however logically it may be effected, has no relation to the work from which it professes to be drawn, and we are not called upon to question its correctness. Nor are we at all disposed to seek for faults, in a discussion, with which, for the most part, we are highly pleased. Considered simply as an argument against the physical necessity of volitions, it is accurate, and cogent, in a very high degree; and forces upon the advocates of that scheme, consequences, which it will be found alike impossible, to evade, or to justify. Its absolute incompatibility with all our ideas of moral good and evil, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, in short, with all that belongs to responsibility, is pointed out clearly and impressively. Whoever adopts the system here attributed to Edwards, and has not the hardihood to adopt with it, a most appalling series of consequences, will meet in this portion of Professor Tappan's work, an obstacle over which he will find it impossible to carry his views.

PART III. *Examination of Edwards' Argument against Self-Determination.*

We commence our remarks upon this third part of the review, with some observations upon the Professor's use of the most important terms of the discussion. We find occurring throughout it, passages like the following: "Will is simply cause"—"volition is the effort of that cause which we call will"—"it is a cause per se." These, and similar expressions, occur on almost every page. If words can settle any thing, then, according to Professor Tappan, *will is cause*. Take now a different class of expressions: "The divine will is infinite power; the created will is finite power"—"the only escape from necessity, is in the conception of a will as above defined, a conscious, self-moving, power"—"we regard it as a contingent cause, a power to do or not to do." These passages clearly evince, that Professor Tappan does not distinguish between the two ideas of cause, and

power, in a question which respects only the *causation* of certain phenomena : with him they are identical. We can scarcely think it necessary to contend, that these ideas, however related, are perfectly distinct from one another ; nor can we help esteeming it an unfavorable augury for the results of a discussion, to find the controlling terms of it so indiscriminately applied. And here we are called to notice some indefiniteness in the Reviewer's use of the term will. "Let us conceive," he says, "of the will as simply and purely an *activity*, or *cause* ; a cause capable of producing changes, and conscious that it is thus capable." We are here required to appropriate to the will, two distinct conceptions ; that of a *cause*, and that of an *activity*, which is a quality of a cause. Consciousness also is claimed for it ; a faculty which belongs indeed, to the *mind*, but the claim of it for the *will* seems open to the charge of indistinctness of idea. "It is as conscious" says the Reviewer, "of power not to do, as of power to do ; it may be called a power arbitrary and contingent." A power arbitrary and contingent which is conscious of power ? Is not here a manifest identification of the conscious mind with the will ? the power, of which that consciousness takes cognizance ?

Indeed, will, is Professor Tappan's idol. He cannot magnify it too greatly, nor attribute to it too much. On p. 225, he says, "Let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality, or *more properly*, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean the me, or myself. The personality, the me, the will, a self-moving cause, *directs itself* by an act of *attention* to the reason, and receives the laws of its action. The *perception* of these laws is attended with the *conviction* of their rectitude and imperative obligation ; at the same time, there is the *consciousness* of power to obey or to disobey them." The will is here affirmed to be, a thing which exerts acts of consciousness, of attention, of perception, of conviction ; there seems indeed, to be no department of the mind's action which is not monopolised by this all engrossing power, or cause, or activity, which we are finally told is the me or myself. Out of all this confusion of cause with power, agent with activity, *mind* with *will*, it is proposed to prove that the will may be a self-determining power. With such advantages, the effort cannot be considered a very difficult one.

It has been by no means uncommon with writers on this sub-

ject, to use the word will for the word mind; to speak carelessly of the will producing effects, when they mean that the mind produces them by willing; a negligence which Edwards censures with just severity. To Professor Tappan, however, this censure has no application. It is no negligence to which his use of these terms is to be attributed. He has a system of his own, the tendency of which is, to exalt the will, by confining all mental activity to it, and of course, to depreciate all other faculties of the mind. It is his studious conformity to this system which has produced the peculiarities we have noticed; peculiarities which, in the subsequent volumes of his work, he laboriously seeks to justify.

The Reviewer's examination of Edwards' argument against self-determination, is of course controlled by the signification which in the former part of the review, the term self-determination has been made to bear. If our previous remarks on this subject are correct, that signification is unauthorized; of course, in contending against the idea it gives, the Reviewer is not opposing the real doctrine of Edwards. Of the correctness of those remarks, this portion of the work furnishes additional evidence, as we shall now proceed to show.

We quote from the Inquiry the following passage as exhibiting the true issue between Edwards, and the advocates of self-determination. He contends that if the will determine itself to any act, it must do so by a previous act. To this it is replied by his opponents that the determining act is not before the act determined, in the order either of nature or of time, nor indeed distinct from it, but that the will determines the act in forming or producing it. Upon this evasion Edwards remarks as follows:

"If any should say that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that volition, I would on this observe that the thing in question seems to be kept out of sight. *The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of the mind. But the question is, what influences, directs, or determines the mind or will to come to such a conclusion as it does? Or what is the cause, ground, or reason why it concludes thus, and not otherwise?*"

The evasion as Edwards terms it, has for its point, that for the soul to exert a volition, is for it to cause and determine

that volition; to this Edwards fully responds with a "doubtless," admitting the claim in its length and breadth, but contends that it does not touch the point in controversy. We have here, then, the distinct affirmation, that to *exert* a volition is to *cause* it—that it is the *soul* which exerts or causes volition, and that this question of the efficient causation of volition, is not the one in controversy. The controversy respects only the question, why does the soul cause *such* an act, rather than a different one? The Reviewer affirms, however, that the question respects only the causation of volition, and that Edwards regards motive as the efficient cause. Though Edwards affirms numberless times, that *the soul exerts volition*, though he here explains, that by *exerts* he means *causes* it, our Reviewer steadily maintains his position, that the system of the Inquiry recognises only motive as the producing cause of choice, and that this is the question principally in controversy between Edwards and himself. This representation compels us to believe that the Professor has misconceived the scheme of his author, *capitally, essentially*, on the grand question of the whole controversy.

Prof. T. makes distinct allusion to a passage precisely similar to the one we have just quoted; and it is somewhat curious to perceive, with what a cool deliberation he forces this system of fatalism upon Edwards, directly over it. He quotes the language of the Inquiry thus—"the question is not so much how a spirit endued with activity comes to act, as *why it exerts such an act*, and not another; or why it *acts* with a particular determination." This does most manifestly assign the soul as the *efficient* cause, and the motive as only the occasion or reason, the *final* cause of the soul's action. Yet, explicit as it is, this language is not deemed worthy even of an "explanation." The Reviewer contents himself with a reference to the dubious principles, which he considers himself as having previously established, that volition is identical with the strongest desire, and that this desire is produced of necessity, like any other effect; and concludes that *therefore this language* does not recognise the distinction which lies so evidently upon its face. "The distinction of final and efficient causes does not lie in his system." "It belongs to the opposite system to make this distinction in all its clearness and force."—p. 186. It would be impossible to state this distinction more palpably than Edwards has

done, both here, and in his explanation of the word *cause*; or to claim it more distinctly as a part of his system. Yet these plain and forcible declarations are unscrupulously overruled, to a coincidence with what the Reviewer has elsewhere decided to be, the principles of Edwards' philosophy.

This very summary disposal, however, of the marked language of Edwards, does not entirely satisfy even the Reviewer himself. He evidently feels some lingering embarrassments, of which this reasoning does not entirely relieve him. He makes, therefore, a still more labored effort, to deprive Edwards of the benefit of this important distinction. With what a ruinous fatality to his own cause the effort is attended, we shall now endeavor to show.

The Reviewer contends against this language, as he has already done in the instance of the determination of motion, that there is no propriety in supposing two causes to be concerned in the production of an effect. "Every effect is particular and limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction." "Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular determination in the effect. There must necessarily be one object chosen and not another. Thus, if fire be thrown among various substances it selects combustibles, and produces phenomena accordingly." "Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily give it character and particular determination." This language denies all influence of occasional causes. There is but one cause which influences the effect, and this determines both the phenomenon and those attending peculiarities, or properties, which Edwards has attributed to a totally different one. The nature of fire is a sufficient reason for its uniform selection of combustibles; and so the nature of the will is a sufficient reason for its selection of the volitions to which it gives existence.

Now it must be admitted, that the nature of fire does constitute a sufficient account of the fact, that it always selects

combustibles ; and that, for the reason that its nature qualifies it to select nothing else ; and the implication is most obvious, that in Prof. T.'s view, the will as a cause is precisely similar, and selects the volitions it does for the very same reason—that its nature qualifies it to select no others. There is, in the view of Edwards, a difference between these two kinds of causes, which renders an account that is satisfactory in the one case, unsatisfactory in the other. The existence of this difference, the Reviewer denies. Edwards supposes that the soul is a *peculiar* cause, having power, in given circumstances, to produce either of two effects, and asks, when one is produced, for the reason why it did not produce the other ; Prof. T., on the contrary, considers that there is nothing peculiar about this cause, it produces its effect just as fire does, and it is inadmissible to ask for any other cause, to give to that effect its particular determination.

It certainly would be both idle and unjust, to assert that Prof. T. adopts the system of the physical necessity of volition, but his argument against Edwards on this point, does involve that doctrine. He distinctly denies the propriety of attributing any thing in the effect to any thing but the efficient cause, and maintains that it is by the necessity of its nature an attribute of every cause, to produce its effect, and determine all the attending properties of it, by itself alone, and that in this respect the will resembles all other causes. He studiously and repeatedly denies that any thing like an occasional or final cause is essential to volition. Again and again he declares, and apparently deems it highly important to declare, that the will “may act without reference either to reason or passion ;” (p. 226) and that when it does thus act, or when it obeys either of them, it is improper to ask for any reason why it did not act otherwise. He asks (p. 239) “What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason ? *Nothing* moves it ; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction. What moves it to go in the direction of the sensitivity ? *Nothing*—it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction.” Why, when it “goes in one direction” it did not go in the other, is a question the Professor has not thought worthy of an answer ; or rather it is a question which he deems it improper to ask. So far is he from admitting that an occasional cause is essential to any act of volition, that he expressly denies it, and

labors to prove the contrary. He admits that it follows from his view of the will as "a power arbitrary and contingent," that it can act without any dictate of reason or any excitement of emotion to induce its action. In the example which he gives to prove this possibility, the selection of one of the sixty-four squares of a chess-board, he maintains that it is for the advocates of necessity to show a connection, between the square selected and the dictate of reason or emotion.. His happy scheme is embarrassed with no such difficulty "In making this selection," he says, (p. 246) "it appears to me that there is an entire indifferency as to which particular square is selected; *there is no command of the reason, there is no affection of the sensitivity*, towards one square rather than another, and yet the will does select one of the squares." That is, *there is no inducement* to select this—no motive for its selection—no *preference* of it over another, and yet the will prefers it—in other words, that the will prefers without having any preference, or any ground of preference. Truly this "power arbitrary and contingent" is not inappropriately named. The Reviewer tells us too, on p. 226, that the only escape from necessity is in this conception of the will as a power which "may act without reference either to reason or passion"—that is, that whoever maintains that previous inclination, or inducement, is essential to voluntary action, maintains in effect the absolute, and unavoidable, necessity of volitions!

There can be no question here, which is on the side of liberty, Edwards, who deems no account of volition satisfactory, which does not specify the mind as the cause of voluntary action, and the motive as the cause, ground, or reason, why *the mind* exerts such an act, and not a different one, or his Reviewer, who affirms that an occasional cause is not essential to volition, but that volitions do actually take place without it; and that the will selects its effect, just as fire selects combustibles. There can be no question here, whose system admits the distinction between efficient and final causes, which Prof. T. denies to Edwards and claims for himself. We cannot help comparing with this loose and superficial talk, the manly and wholesome reasoning of Edwards—"Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to—viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random. What dignity or

privilege is there in being given up to such a wild contingency as this ? to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently; and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind."

It matters not that Prof. T. has said that cases of this nature are rare and trifling ; he expressly admits the possibility of choice without any previous inducement, and expressly affirms that this possibility is essential to liberty of volition, out of which admissions this "wild contingency" must of necessity grow. Indeed, were the Reviewer correct in his view of Edwards, and were there no alternative between the two, we should hesitate to adopt the scheme of "arbitrary" volition here commended to our acceptance ; and should need to deliberate, before we could decide, whether the fatalism he has attributed to his author, gloomy and pernicious though it be, were not preferable to this emasculated scheme of aimless, unintelligent, hap-hazard contingency, which is all that Prof. T. would allow us in its stead.

The length to which this article has already grown, forbids us to protract it ; and therefore we leave unnoticed, with some regret, other representations of the philosophy of Edwards, the correctness of which we are quite as unwilling to admit, hoping perhaps to allude to some of them, in a future examination of those portions of Prof. Tappan's work, to which this is but an introduction.

We are consciously free from all intention to misrepresent Prof. T. ; for we agree with him in the general scope of his philosophy. Our remarks have been called forth by a simple desire to vindicate Edwards from charges which we are confident are unfounded, and to promote, in a degree which we are sensible is a very humble one, successful investigation. In the present state of our knowledge of this subject, every effort which calls to it the attention of thinking men, is a contribution for which science should be grateful. We rejoice therefore in the manly energy of the work before us, and honor its author for the independence with which he has forsworn all allegiance to Edwards, or to any other man. We cannot, however, consider him successful in this portion of his labors ; and we regret that an effort so vigorously made should have suffered so severely from the want of a sober discrimination. Whoever claims that *all* the truth is on either

side of this great and protracted controversy, will doubtless secure for his views a partisan advocacy, but doubtless also a partisan opposition, and will leave the subject as unsettled as he found it. There is too much of this about our author. He has allowed himself to be misled by that inveterate prejudice, connected with the words necessary, impossible, &c., against which Edwards so earnestly warns his readers; and has thus formed impressions of the Inquiry which it does not in justice authorise; and the ardent effort he has made to vindicate these unfounded impressions, has forced him into the fallacies we have exposed. His work is thereby deprived of much of its value. It comes before the disciples of Edwards with an original improbability upon its face, which renders it to them almost incredible, and absolves them in their own view, even from the necessity of giving it a hearing.

It is ever to be remembered, in investigations of this nature, that seldom does a man like Edwards frame a system which is *in all respects* erroneous; and that it is by a close examination of the systems of antagonist authors, and a careful discrimination of the errors from the facts of each, that the principles which all are laboring to discover, shall yet take rank among the ascertained certainties of metaphysical science.

ARTICLE III.

BAPTISM.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[Continued from Vol. VI., page 56.]

God in his providence seems to be exciting unusual attention to the long continued debate as it regards the mode of Baptism. On this subject, two opposing systems are in conflict. One based on the performance of a specific act—i. e. immersion—the other on indicating an effect, i. e. purification. Each of these systems tends to results peculiar to itself. By these results the true nature of each system will be evolved, and in consequence of them its soundness will be

tested. Such is God's mode of bringing false systems to a close.

§ 39. *Present Position of the Baptists.*

The system based on the performance of a specified act, is evolved. Let us look at its results, as seen in the present position of its advocates.

The denomination of Evangelical Baptists is large, universally diffused, and very active. It is in all the movements of the church, a constantly operating force. Of course the position they assume as it regards other denominations, is a matter of no small consequence. They have it in their power universally to affect the tranquillity of Zion. We shall therefore briefly consider the position which they do in fact assume. This can easily be inferred by carrying out logically the following principles,—that baptism is essential to church membership, and that the command to baptize is a command to immerse. From these principles, they infer,

1. That all other denominations are unbaptized, because unimmersed, and that they are therefore in a state of disobedience to God.

2. That other denominations cannot be recognised and treated by them as members of the Church of Christ, because unbaptized, and are therefore to be excluded on this ground from communion with them at the table of the Lord.

3. That other denominations are guilty of mistranslating the word of God, or at least of covering up its sense on the subject of baptism.

4. That to the Baptist denomination is assigned the great work of giving a correct translation of the Bible to the world, and of restoring the gospel to its primitive purity and simplicity.

These positions are not with them mere points of theory, but have been of late, with increasing vigor and decision, reduced to practice. They have also assumed a tone of uncommon decision and boldness in announcing their principles, as if their correctness were beyond all question. Nay, too often have many of them spoken with contempt and ridicule, not to say insolence, of those who hold the opposite opinions, as if they were holding on to exploded errors, in face of all the learning of the modern world, and even against their own better knowledge.

Prof. Eaton, of Hamilton Baptist Institute, in his speech before the Baptist Bible Society, at their anniversary in 1840, says, Report p. 74—"The translation" of the Baptist Missionaries "is so undeniably correct," that its incorrectness could not be "pretended," without committing the objector's character for scholarship and candor. "Who are they, sir," said he, "who cavil about the plain meaning of the original word whose translation is so offensive? Are they the Parsons, and the Campbells, and the Greenfields, and such like? No, sir. But the cavillers are men who, whatever may be their standing in other respects, have no reputation as linguists and philologists to lose. There really can be no rational doubt in the mind of any sound and candid Greek scholar, about the evident meaning of the word in question. I venture to say, at the risk of the little reputation for Greek scholarship which I possess, that there are no words of plainer import in the Bible. The profane tampering which has been applied to these words," &c. &c. See Hall's Baptist Errors, p. 39, for the preceding quotation—a very able work.

Mr. Hinton, after an argument on the import of the word βαπτίζω, and a professed history of the origin and progress of pouring and sprinkling, says, p. 196, 7—"May I respectfully ask the paedobaptist who reads this volume (Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, or Methodist), 1. Whether he has not been *kept in ignorance* of these facts? 2. Whether those clergy who withhold these facts from their flocks, do not take upon themselves an undue and dangerous responsibility? 3. Whether he will have independence enough to take every adequate means to ascertain if these statements can be denied? And finally, if they cannot be gainsayed, whether he will dare to remain unbaptized, and therefore in a state of disobedience to the King of kings?"

On the 28th of April, 1840, The Baptist American and Foreign Bible Society passed the following resolution: "Resolved, that the fact that the nations of the earth must now look to the Baptist denomination ALONE for faithful translations of the word of God, a responsibility is imposed upon them, demanding for its full discharge an unwonted degree of union, of devotion, and of strenuous, persevering effort throughout the entire body." Moved by Prof. Eaton, seconded by Rev. H. Malcom.

In their Report, this Society stigmatize the translations of all other denominations, as "versions in which the real meaning of words . . . is PURPOSELY KEPT OUT OF SIGHT, so that Baptists cannot circulate faithful versions . . . unless they print them at their own expense." They assert, p. 45, "It is known that the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Society, have virtually combined to obscure at least a part of divine revelation, and that these Societies continue to circulate versions of the Bible, unfaithful at least so far as the subject of Baptism is concerned."—Hall on Baptism, pp. 27, 28.

Again, Prof. Eaton says, Report p. 79, "Never, sir, was there a chord struck that vibrated simultaneously through so many BAPTIST hearts from one extremity of the land to the other, as when it was announced *that the heathen world must look to THEM ALONE for an unveiled view of the glories of the GOSPEL OF CHRIST.*" "A deep conviction seized the minds of almost the whole body, that they were DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence and dissemination of THE GOSPEL as delivered to man by its heavenly author. A new zeal in their Master's cause, and unwonted kindlings of fraternal love glowed in their hearts; and an attracting and concentrating movement, reaching to the utmost extremity of the mass, began and has been going on and increasing in power ever since."—Hall's Baptist Errors, p. 38.

More facts of a similar kind can be found in a correspondence between the Rev. J. Davis Gotch, of the Baptist denomination, and the Rev. T. Milner, a Congregational minister, in which the latter declines attending the celebration of the first half-century since the commencement of Baptist missions, and assigns as a reason the ground taken by the Baptists towards other denominations.—See London Congregational Magazine, and the New England Puritan for August 18, 1842.

Indeed, their whole body has been rallied by a universal impulse, as if on the eve of a general victory, and as if their triumph was destined to usher in the glories of the millennial day.

§ 40. *Inferences from the opposite system.*

The logical consequences of the other system remain now to be stated. These can easily be inferred from its funda-

mental position, THAT THERE IS NO COMMAND TO DIP OR IMMERSE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, BUT SOLELY A COMMAND TO PURIFY, IN THE NAME OF THE TRINITY; and that each denomination may select for itself what it deems the most decorous and appropriate mode of fulfilling this command. This, if kindly received, is a conciliating view, and tends to unity; for it gives Christian liberty to all. So I presented it, and I hoped for it a kind and a candid reception. My hopes have been disappointed. Efforts have been made to suppress it, by affected contempt of the view, and its advocate. Or it has been rejected with scorn, attended by unparalleled personal attacks upon the intellectual and religious character of its advocate. This I deeply regret, for I wrote with feelings of great kindness towards the Baptist denomination, and strong desires for unity in the love of Christ. But perhaps I ought not to be surprised. If the view I advocate is correct, *close communion must die*, and all the charges of Baptists against other denominations must be retracted, and their course as to the translation of the Bible, and the Bible Society, retraced. At all events, union and conciliation they reject; they still continue their attack. Hence logic must have its course.

Of this system, the logical consequences are clear, and no Christian charity calls for their suppression. I announce them soberly, calmly, and yet decidedly, and as in the presence of a holy God.

1. That other denominations are not unbaptized, though unimmersed, because they are purified.

2. They are not substituting human forms in place of a commandment of God—nor are they in rebellion against God.

3. There is no good reason to exclude them from the table of the Lord—nor

4. Are they guilty of mistranslating or obscuring the word of God.

5. The Baptists mistranslate the word of God—not only concealing its meaning, but putting in place of it, one entirely foreign to the mind of the Holy Spirit.

6. They are not divinely set apart to the great work of giving correct translations of the Bible to the heathen world; on the other hand, they are the only denomination

who are combined systematically to mistranslate it, and to hide its meaning from the world.

7. They are guilty of teaching for doctrines the commandments of men, and because others will not comply with uncommanded external forms, of charging them with rebellion against God, and of excluding them from the table of the Lord.

8. For the sake of this same uncommanded form, they have divided the Bible Society, and do still divide and agitate the church of God.

If the position on which this system rests is true, it needs no labored argument to show that these things are so. They are but its logical and necessary consequences. As such, I announce them.

In one point, however, this system does not reverse the position of our Baptist brethren. It does not pronounce them unbaptized, nor exclude them from the table of the Lord. It admits that immersion is baptism, not indeed because it is immersion, but solely because it is one mode of purification.

§ 41. *Translation of the Bible.*

Upon the question of translation, however, a few words may be needed. I remark, then, that to transfer words from one language to another, is not to mistranslate, but simply to take a word from the stores of one language, and by it to enrich those of another. The sense of such a word is to be fixed, as is the sense of all other words, by the association of ideas. For example, to dip, is of Saxon origin, and belongs to the native stores of our language. On the other hand, the word *immergo* did not belong to our language, but to the Latin. At length, from a form of this verb, the word *immerse* was transferred to our language, and *immersio* was transferred as *immersion*. In like manner, *baptize* and *baptism* have been transferred from the Greek. But these are not all. Characterize, scandalize, &c. have been transferred in the same way. Thus also the words, the Christ, the Messiah, and Jesus, have been transferred from the Hebrew and the Greek, meaning the anointed one, and the Saviour. Shall a clamor then be raised, because immersion, Messiah, Christ, and Jesus, have not been translated like

that which is made about not translating baptize? And shall we *translate* scandalize and characterize?

But it may be said that in the case of these words the association of ideas has done its work, and that their meaning is so fixed that they have become a part of our language. True, and what hinders the same result as to *baptism*, and *baptize*? Not the fact that they are transferred words, but that a controversy exists as to their meaning in the original, so that the natural operation of the association of ideas has been, and still is, interrupted. Let the controversy cease, let all think correctly as to the import of the Greek words, and baptize and baptism will soon become as significant as catechize and catechism, or exorcise and exorcism, or even as immerse and immersion.

All will know that BAPTISM means A SACRED PURIFICATION OF CLEANSING, and that BAPTIZE means TO PURIFY OR CLEANSE. And there are certainly advantages in not translating, but in transferring this word. Sacred purification, will then have in all languages one and the same sacred name. This, like Jesus and Christ, will be known and read of all men, in all languages, as denoting either an *external* sacred purification, or that one sacred purification *of the Spirit* which it symbolizes, and which is by the apostle associated with one Lord and one faith.

But if the word βαπτίζω is to be translated and not transferred, it should by all means be translated PURIFY and not IMMERSE. To translate it immerse, is but to perpetuate error and sectarianism, by a false translation of the word of God.

§ 42. *Commandments of men.*

As to teaching for doctrines the commandments of men, this is plain, that if God has commanded only the genus, no one has a right to limit the command to the species. If he says, go preach, no one has a right to limit us to one specific mode of going. If he says, cultivate the earth, no one has a right to limit us exclusively to digging, or to ploughing. So if he commands "*purify*," no one has a right to limit us to immersion, as the only mode. It is not indeed wrong to immerse, but to insist on this as the only mode, is wrong. And to yield to such a demand, is to sanction a groundless usurpation over the consciences of men. This is our answer to the inquiry of our Baptist brethren, "Why not join us and be on the safe side and thus unite the church? for you all admit that immersion is baptism." We reply, we might not in certain cases object to immersion,

it involved no concession of principle ; but if it does, we will not give place by subjection, no not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel may continue with us. All who come to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they may bring us into bondage, we shall fearlessly resist, relying on the Spirit of God for his guidance and aid. Such are the opposing systems and their consequences.

§ 43. *State of the controversy. Mr. Carson's reply.*

It is an entire anomaly in the history of controversy, that consequences so vast should depend upon the meaning of a single word, yet such is the fact. All of these consequences hinge upon the meaning of the single word βαπτίζω. And as to this word, the whole question turns upon the simple inquiry : was there a transition in βαπτίζω from its primary sense to immerse, to the secondary sense to purify, irrespective of mode, and is that the sense in the command ?

Now the possibility of such a transition cannot be denied. For, as I have shown, nothing is more common than such changes. And of the fact that the change did take place, I have alleged what seems to me unanswerable proof.

If, therefore, my premises cannot be overthrown, the conclusions above stated of necessity follow. I had supposed that a position so serious in its bearings, would be at once and severely scrutinized in this country, but it has not been. A short time since, however, I heard, on coming from the west to the east, that Mr. Carson, of Edinburgh, had published a reply, and hoped soon to see it republished in this country. At last, I read in the Christian Watchman a notice taken from an English Baptist magazine, stating in substance that Mr. Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, had totally annihilated my arguments. That they were both dead and buried, and that no one dared to appear in their defence. The editor of the Watchman also remarked that this might be necessary in England, and that Mr. Carson, with his vast stores of learning, was just the man to do it, but that in this country it was needless. My pieces are very harmless here, and would not probably have been noticed but for the respectability of the periodical in which they were published. As, therefore, our American Baptists are, in the judgment of this editor of one of their leading papers, so superior in intellectual acumen to those of Great Britain, I concluded that Mr. Carson's reply would not be republished in this

country at all, and after vain efforts to obtain a copy of it, I at last was obliged to send for it across the Atlantic. I did not see it till I had finished the whole preceding discussion, and hence I lost the advantage of certain lessons in rhetoric and logic, which, as I discover, Mr. Carson prepared expressly for my benefit.

I am glad, however, to receive it even at this late hour. Mr. Carson writes evidently under great excitement, but puts forth all his energy to defend his positions. And in reviewing his reply we shall be called to try the solidity of the foundation on which my whole argument rests. Mr. Carson, if any one, can destroy them, and if he fails his cause is lost.

As Mr. Carson's reply has not been republished here, I must needs give some account of it to my readers. It is a pamphlet of 74 pages, devoted entirely to the examination of my first two numbers. These, it seems, were republished in England under a mistaken impression that the discussion was completed, and Mr. Carson answered them as if they were a full exhibition of all the evidence I had to produce. Hence he answered an incomplete work; and yet his reply considers all the *principles* involved in a thorough discussion of the subject. It may be viewed in two lights—as a specimen of Rhetoric, or of Logic.—In both lights I shall consider it.

Much of it has nothing to do with logic at all. All this I shall put under the head of rhetoric. And as this is the most striking part of the performance, and that in which its greatest power lies, I think it well to bestow on it particular attention.

§ 44. *Mr. Carson's rhetoric. Its influence.*

In this part of the work Mr. Carson makes a very strong appeal for sympathy to his readers, in the unparalleled trials in which my work has involved him.

His own view of the case is this.

His gentle spirit shrinks from the use of severe language towards others, even in exposing their errors, but an imperious sense of duty urges him on to discharge the painful task. "I have no wish," he says, "to be severe," p. 13. "It is painful for me to use the knife so freely: but I must, for the sake of the Christian public, find out the disease under which my patient labors. It is better that one delinquent should suffer, than that a multitude should be drawn into error by his example," p. 11. "It grieves me to be obliged to write in this manner,

but I cannot avoid it," p. 52. The passages, to utter which, caused such grief to his gentle spirit, are these :

"Ignorant persons, in reading Mr. Beecher's work, will think that he is a deep philosopher, and that he is a profound philologist. But the smallest degree of perspicacity will enable any one to see that his philosophy is very shallow sophistry. No man ought with impunity to be allowed to trifle so egregiously with the disciples of Christ, and with the awful commandments of the eternal Jehovah," p. 13. "Is it not astonishing that gentlemen in eminent situations will risk the character of their understanding by pouring forth such crudities ?" p. 11. "The author's philosophy is false, absurdly and extravagantly false. He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim is, that it is original nonsense," p. 52. To be compelled to utter such language as this, concerning a Christian brother, must indeed be painful to a tender spirit, like Mr. Carson, especially as it is so liable to be misunderstood and ascribed to an entirely different frame of mind—for it is not obviously and upon the surface the language of grief. And if it is so painful to be compelled to utter a little of such language, what must be the suffering involved in the necessity of using it almost from the beginning to the end of a pamphlet of 74 pages ; especially as he is called to the painful duty of charging upon a Christian brother, or upon his opinions, not only folly, stupidity, and nonsense, but also dishonesty, obstinacy, fanaticism, heresy, infidelity, and blasphemy ? Indeed, there are cases in which, according to his own account, his trials exceed in severity those of the patriarch Job, and even exhaust his patience, great as it is. "It requires," says he, "more than the patience of Job, to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feelings," p. 10. "Am I to war eternally against nonsense ?" p. 14. "I am weary with replying to childish trifling," p. 45. "It is sickening to be obliged to notice such arguments," p. 46.

His trials, indeed, must be severe, especially when we consider how far he is removed from all such intellectual and moral defects. I had spoken of a certain mode of reasoning, and said, "It assumes a violent improbability of the meaning in question, and resorts to all manner of shifts to prove the possibility of immersion, as though that were all that the case re-

quired." This is quite too much for Mr. Carson. "What shall I say of this?" he exclaims. "Is it calumny, or is it want of perspicacity? *Assume!* I *assume* nothing, Mr. President Beecher, but self-evident truth. My reasoning does not rest at all on assumptions. . . . *All manner of shifts!* I repel the charge with indignation. I never used a *shift* in all the controversy I ever wrote." Again: "I have no theory to support. I never use theories in ascertaining the truths and the ordinances of Christ. I interpret by the laws of language." "I never press an argument a hair's breadth further than it can go." "Fear of the result never in a single instance prevented me from admitting a sound argument. I do not fear the result; for truth is my object wherever it may lie," p. 7. On all these points, Mr. Carson is no doubt a competent and an impartial judge; and if so, it must indeed be an intolerable trial to be called on to deal with one who is "the dupe of his own sophistry, and that a sophistry childishly weak," p. 49, and whose mode of reasoning he cannot dignify with any other designation than that of perverse cavilling, p. 41. In reasoning with whom, he is called on to put obstinacy to the blush, and to overwhelm it with confusion, p. 37. Who proves himself ignorant of one of the fundamental laws of controversy, p. 31. Who gives the lie to the inspired narrator, p. 29. Whose artifice is just that of the Socinians, and a dishonest and uncandid way of escaping, p. 28. Whose rhetoric is Gothic rhetoric, p. 27. Who has not a soul for philological discussions, p. 19. Who is emboldened by his excessive deficiency in *perspicuity*, p. 18. Who uses resources of which no sound philologist would think of availing himself, p. 17. Whose argument proceeds on an amazing want of discrimination, p. 15. Whose cavilling is unworthy of a candid mind and a sound understanding, p. 14; than whose arguments nothing can be more extravagantly idle, p. 14. Whose arguments and objections are mere trifling, p. 12. In whose ideas there is great confusion, p. 12. Whose reasoning is to him a perfect astonishment, so that he has greater difficulty in conceiving how it can have force on any mind, than he has in refuting it, p. 11; and, in fine, whose argument manifests such a want of discrimination and such a confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it has force must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions, p. 10.

Mr. Carson, indeed, being excessively good-natured, p. 33,

has undertaken to give me lessons in rhetoric and logic, pp. 12 and 55, and is encouraged to think that he has forced one of his distinctions into my head, p. 55. But shortly after he seems discouraged again, and exclaims: "*Will!* (i. e. shall) I never be able to force this into the mind of my antagonist? If he would allow himself to perceive this distinction he would be delivered from much false reasoning. I will then try to make the thing plain to every child," p. 55. Surely this is exemplary patience and condescension.

Mr. Carson also seems to be distressed with a strange apprehension that, after all, my reasonings will affect the public mind extensively. They are indeed folly to him, but all do not possess his "perspicacity." "Careless readers will imagine that there is wonderful acuteness in Mr. Beecher's observations," p. 36. "Half learned people will think that this account of the phenomenon is an unparalleled effort of philosophy, and thousands will rely on it who cannot pretend to fathom it," p. 52. It must be painful to Mr. Carson to have so low a view of the capacities of other minds in comparison with his own, for he says, that "the smallest degree of perspicacity, will enable any one to see that his (my) philosophy is very shallow sophistry," p. 13.

However, out of compassion for the ignorant and those that are out of the way, he engages manfully in the work of exposing my sophistry, and, according to his own account, with very gratifying results. His grief at the necessity of dissecting me has passed away, and in rapture he exclaims: "I have now examined Mr. Beecher's arguments, and there is not a shadow of evidence that the word baptism signifies purification. I have met every thing that has a shadow even of plausibility, and *completely dissected my antagonist*. Am I not now entitled to send purify to the museum as a *lusus naturæ*, to be placed by the side of its brother *pop*?"

It would be cruel indeed to deny to Mr. Carson this small consolation as a reward for all his sufferings and labors. But I greatly fear that new conflicts await him before he can wear undisturbed the victor's crown. Such is Mr. Carson's rhetoric.

Let us now briefly consider its influence. On a certain class of minds it will produce revulsion and disgust. Can that be a true cause, they will exclaim, that needs to be defended by such weapons? Are these the teachings of the Spirit of God? Is this the meekness and gentleness of Christ? I will do the ho-

nor to my Baptist brethren to believe that there are many, very many of them who can feel no sympathy in such things. Their own spirit, their own style of writing, forbids the idea. Nothing of this kind have I ever seen in the writings of Professor Ripley, or Professor Chase, or President Sears. I do not, indeed, agree with them in opinion. But in any discussion with them I should confidently expect to find in them the honor and magnanimity of gentlemen, and the meekness and gentleness of Christ; and I rejoice to believe that those of the Baptists who sympathize with such men as these, are not few, and that their influence is not small; and until they disavow it, I will do them the honor to believe that their deep dislike of the spirit of Mr. Carson's reply, is the real reason that it was not republished in this country. When I hear them state that they approve the spirit of that work I will believe that they do, but never till then.

But the moral effects of Mr. Carson's reply, and of all his writings that I have seen, on another class of minds, I do fear. Novices, easily puffed up with pride, and predisposed to arrogant assumptions of superior intellectual power and to contempt of their opponents; and all violent and heated partisans will find Mr. Carson's rhetoric exactly to their taste. To use it requires no meekness, no forbearance, no humility, no aid of the Holy Spirit. The carnal mind will readily receive Mr. Carson's seed and bring forth an abundant crop. And partisan Christians, in whom the flesh is strong and the spirit weak, will come under its full power. Nor is this power small. It may be seen at this hour in the style of a certain class of Baptist writers in all parts of our land. There is in them a lofty tone, and a spirit of contemptuous invective and of fierce attack, that distinctly characterize the Carsonian school; and even in Christian newspapers we read of scalping their antagonists. This to be sure is an improvement on Mr. Carson's favorite figure of dissection, but the father of such a school must not be surprised if his children excel him: for the field opened is boundless; and such contemptuous expressions as "baby sprinklers," &c., will soon not be deemed sufficiently spirited and energetic to meet the exigencies of the case, and each new combatant will resort to the boundless stores of the Carsonian school.

If this were the first instance in which Mr. Carson had dealt in this style of rhetoric, I should regard it less, but it is not. It pervades all his writings that I have seen. Says an English author (Andrew Carmichael), "If they have not wholly and

to a point embraced his views, they are paradoxical, foolish, arrogant, untaught, impious, wicked, silly, presumptuous Protestant theologians; supporters of a very unholy cause; crude theorists, Pharisees and blasphemers. Yet, the person who can heap these epithets upon others, can venture to make this acknowledgment of himself:—*My way* is to endeavor to find what the Scriptures say, and to this I make every human dogma to bend. I will not allow philosophy herself to prate on the things of God." If Mr. Carson should plead that he was writing against Unitarianism, or loose views of inspiration, as his justification, I have only to ask: When was not the cloak of zeal for God and the truth thrown over a bad spirit? This is no way to check error. It will confirm twenty Unitarians or skeptics, where it convinces one. For they will ask: Can that be the truth that breeds such a spirit?

Nor can any denomination long tolerate such a spirit in its writers with impunity. It may assume the form of zeal for God and the truth. It may delude multitudes with the idea that they are especially designated by God for the great work of defending the gospel. But this fire is not from the altar of God. It is strange fire. And let those who offer it take heed lest fire go out from the Lord and devour them. And if the leaders of the Baptist denomination in this country have any regard to their own moral soundness, let them stand between the living and the dead, and pray that the plague may be stayed; and everywhere meet a spirit so unholy, with stern and emphatic rebuke. It may be of great use in rallying a party for a partisan warfare. It may for a time augment sectarian power. But it is no preparation for the coming of the Son of God. It is no preparation for the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire.

§. 45. *Mr. Carson's logic. Preliminary remarks.*

We have considered Mr. Carson's rhetoric. Let us now look at his logic. In doing this I meet with two embarrassments: 1. His work has not been republished in this country. Hence I shall direct my attention at present mainly to principles, as my readers can better comprehend these than details. 2. I have already virtually answered nearly all of it in my last two numbers, though not having seen the work itself, I did not aim to answer it, and hence the application of the various parts of my discussion to Mr. Carson's positions may need to be pointed

out. But as I have not room to attempt this, I shall trust to the intelligence of my readers to do that work.

All of Mr. Carson's reply may be considered as relating either—1, To principles; or, 2, To fundamental arguments; or, 3, To subordinate points; the truth or falsehood of which is of some consequence, but not essential to the main question. Mr. Carson seems to labor very hard to accumulate upon me errors of all sorts, for the purpose, it would seem, of destroying my reputation as a scholar, by repeated charges of folly, stupidity, nonsense, etc. Often the errors charged are upon minute points, not at all essential in the decision of the main question. But they give him a fine opportunity of setting forth my amazing want of perspicacity. Such charges of error are a kind of logical mosquitoes. They have a sting; they irritate; but they have no fatal power; and are so numerous and minute that there is no time to pursue them, and little is really gained by their destruction. In the refutation of such charges, I shall not waste the time of my readers. If the main points are decided in my favor, they will die a natural death. I shall therefore first consider the question of principle, and then look at the fundamental arguments in the case.

Careful reasoners are wont to examine principles, and state definitions clearly at the outset. Mr. Carson ought to have done this. I stated clearly and fully my principles at the outset, presented definitely the point to be proved, and the nature of the proof required. Does Mr. Carson carefully examine this part of my argument? Not at all. He merely alludes to it for the sake of saying that he has no objection to much of it, and that I borrowed all the truth of it from him; and then passes on to his attack upon my examples. Does he anywhere fairly and fully meet and discuss my principles? Not at all. Let me then begin by considering both his principles and mine.

§. 46. *Mr. Carson's system, and canons.*

I will therefore now endeavor to do what Mr. Carson has nowhere done, to collect the scattered fragments of his system, and to present them in one view; for, above all things, it is essential to have clear views of the points actually in debate. Mr. Carson's system then involves four parts.

1. To establish clearly that βαπτίζω actually has the sense immerse in many instances. 2. To assume a canon of proof as to a secondary sense. 3. To provide a set of principles for

testing all alleged secondary senses, to see if they cannot possibly be reduced to the primary sense. 4. If it is possible, then to overrule all probabilities of a secondary sense, by what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω, of which the primary sense has been established. With the results of this process he is remarkably well satisfied. In his preface, he says, "My dissertation on the import of the word βαπτίζω I submit with confidence to the *truly learned*. *If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms.*" Mr. Carson has chosen to disregard the advice of an ancient king: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off." Whether he has done wisely in so doing, the result will show. Let us examine his process a little more in detail.

In establishing the first point, Mr. Carson has laid out much needless labor. No one, so far as I know, ever denied it. Yet Mr. Carson, in his work on baptism, has accumulated passage on passage as if the whole world denied that βαπτίζω ever means to immerse, till he thinks his position impregnable. Having thus firmly established what no one denies, Mr. Carson next lays down his canon as to proving a secondary sense. P. 106, "I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility." The "*thing*" in this case is of course the primary sense of βαπτίζω. For though the canon is general in form, yet it is made for a specific case. But the canon in its general form looks plausible, because it includes unlike cases, and is true of some and not of others. If a *particular fact* is proved by sufficient evidence, as for example, the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we are not to reject *that fact* on account of difficulties. So if the meaning of a word in a particular passage is fairly proved, we are not to reject it in that passage, because of difficulties. But proof of the meaning of a word in one passage, is not of course proof of its meaning in another; because the meanings of all words are liable to change. Now, in all places where the meaning immerse has been proved by Mr. Carson to belong to βαπτίζω, I do not deny that it so belongs. But this is not proof of its meaning in all other cases. Its meaning in each case must be decided for itself. Mr. Carson's canon then, so far as it applies to the case in hand, is merely this: where one meaning of a word has been proved in *certain cases*, no difficulties can be admitted as decisive against retaining it in

other cases, unless they involve an impossibility. Here it is then in all its nakedness. He attempts, indeed, to put this alongside of the impropriety of rejecting proof of the being of a God, and the inspiration of the Scriptures on the ground of difficulties. But who cannot see that the cases are totally unlike? If we admit a new meaning to the word βαπτίζω, on the ground of difficulties, we do not reject the old meaning in cases where it has been proved to exist; we merely prove that in other cases another meaning coexists with it. If, on the ground of difficulties, we reject the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we reject the identical thing which we had before proved true. Mr. Carson's canon then is in brief this: we cannot admit a secondary sense of βαπτίζω, unless we can prove that the primary sense is impossible; and it is in this form that he everywhere reduces it to practise. Mr. Carson next proceeds to lay down canons of trial by which to test alleged secondary senses, in order to discover whether the impossibility of the primary sense which he claims as essential, actually exists. Of these the most important are these:

1. P. 139, "I assert that in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes;" e. g., βαπτίζω cannot signify both dip and sprinkle. This he avowedly asserts, "without reference to the practise of language on the authority of self-evident truth." Another form in which he states it is this: "*A word that applies to two modes can designate neither.*" The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of mode may apply to all modes;" e. g., wash, stain, wet, purify, are effects which may be produced by pouring, dipping, or sprinkling. "But modes are essentially different from each other, and can have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses it, as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word *black*, may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by *white*, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees: but there are no degrees in mode," p. 139. All this is avowedly a priori reasoning, not deduced from facts, but resting on the assumption that it is impossible so to use a word, or at least absurd, and therefore no word is in fact so used.

2. In certain situations, two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS,

MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS, p. 81; e. g., a man who is immersed, and is wet, and washed, and purified by it, may, in describing the transaction, say truly, I was immersed; or I was wet; or I was washed; or I was purified; and yet it does not follow that all of these words mean the same thing. Hence if, in describing the baptism of Christ, it is said he was purified; it does not follow of course that purify is a synonyme of baptize. It may be that it is merely used in its place. Mr. Carson introduces this canon with great authority: "I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission: let them deny it if they can." Mr. Carson obviously looks upon this as a profound and original view; for he says, "it is from *ignorance* of this principle that lexicographers have given meanings to words which they do not possess," p. 32. Its truth I do not deny; of its profundity and originality let others judge.

3. "One mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting by the liveliness of the imagination," p. 48; e. g., "A cold shuddering dew dips me all o'er,"—MILTON. This canon is designed to exclude the meaning to wet from βάπτω, in the case where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: ἐβαπην ἀπὸ τῆς δροσίου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, i. e., his body was wet by the dew of heaven; according to Mr. Carson, his body was *dipped*, is a lively and imaginative mode of expressing his *thorough wetting* by the dew; which in fact was not a dipping. This canon exhausts its full force in disposing of this passage.

4. "Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures; but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance." Reply, p. 12. This canon is introduced, as we shall see in its place, to repel my allegation that there are no examples in the use of language to justify the figure, "immerse in the Holy Spirit."

5. We are to distinguish between the nature of the rite, and the meaning of its name: e. g., when Chrysostom says, "Christ calls his cross baptism, because by it he purified the world;" he may refer not to the import of the name of the rite, but to its nature as a rite of purification. "It is quite immaterial whether the idea of purification be found in the name or in the nature of the ordinance."—Reply, p. 55. Such are Mr. Carson's leading canons of trial.

It is plain on looking at them, that they are all designed for

one end, to explain away alleged secondary senses, by proving that the primary *may be* retained; they do not prove that *it is* retained, but that it *may be*,—that we are not compelled to admit a secondary sense.

Mr. Carson's final step is to introduce what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω itself; i. e., the fact that it clearly has the sense immerse in *other cases*; this, and the fact that it *may have it* in this case, proves that *it actually has it*, however improbable it may be, from the nature of the subject spoken of.

But Mr. Carson commonly takes this last step by assuming the very point in debate; i. e., that he has proved that the word βαπτίζω *never* means any thing but immerse, in the whole range of the Greek language; when the very question in debate is: Has it not another meaning? For,

1. He has made only a limited examination of the uses of the word. Quite large, indeed, in one view of the matter. Far larger than was necessary if he merely aimed to prove that immerse is a meaning of βαπτίζω. But if he aimed to *exclude every other meaning*, far too limited. The word βαπτίζω and its derivatives occur in the writers of ecclesiastical Greek ten times, not to say a hundred times more frequently than in all the classic Greek writers taken together. For as a leading ordinance of Christianity, through which the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life were supposed to come, baptism was to them a subject of deep and incessant interest; it filled all their thoughts—it gave color to all their emotions—it pervaded all their voluminous works. For successive folio pages βαπτίζω or its derivatives meet the eye incessantly on every page. In them also the word is used with direct reference to the Christian ordinance of baptism—so that nothing can be more in point than their testimony. And Mr. Carson earnestly maintains that they must have known the sense in which it was used by the apostles. Yet from this part of the language, in his work on baptism, he produced few examples, yea, I had almost said none. Nor have I yet been able to find any proof that he had ever read the Greek Fathers on this subject—I do not say that he had not, but merely that he has since made assertions that I know not how to explain if he had, as I shall soon show.

2. On this limited examination of the uses of the word, he has based the affirmation that he has “by the use of language *FOUND* that the word has this meaning (i. e. immerse), and no

other." He says he has *found* this to be so. What does this mean? Has he examined every case of its usage in the Greek language? He does not pretend it. Nay, he clearly declares that he has not. "I regret," he says, "that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language." (On Baptism, p. 22.) How, then, did Mr. Carson *find* that the word βαπτίζω means immerse in passages which, even according to his own showing, he never saw? There can be no way except that in which he establishes one of his canons, p. 139: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE PRACTISE OF LANGUAGE AND ON THE AUTHORITY OF SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH!! Truly this is a convenient way of settling the meaning of words. If this is not the way in which Mr. Carson has found out the meaning of βαπτίζω in cases which he has never seen, I wait to learn by aid of what undiscovered principle he has found it.

3. Upon a basis so frail, Mr. Carson, with unparalleled boldness, makes assertions as to the use of the word in the whole range and history of the Greek language. P. 27, "Immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language." P. 28, "I tell Mr. Beecher it never signifies to purify. My authority is the practise of the Greek language." P. 47. He calls this "the *ascertained* meaning of the word." P. 31, "Its established meaning."

4. Incredible as it may seem, yet it is true, that on an assumption so totally devoid of proof, on such a mere *petitio principii*, Mr. Carson's whole argument against me is based. Having *thus* found out and ascertained the meaning of the word, he calls it "the testimony of the word known by its use," p. 31. "The authority of the word," p. 32, and gravely informs us, p. 40, that "probability, even the highest probability avails nothing against testimony;" and p. 47, "to allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence, for the meaning of testimony must be known by the words used." But what is this testimony? Is the word βαπτίζω a living intelligent being? Is it conscious of its own meaning? Has it testified to Mr. Carson as to its universal use? If not, and if Mr. Carson has seen but a few out of the multitude of its usages, how dares he to call the little that he has seen the universal, absolute and exclusive sense of the word, and then to personify it, as a witness in a court of justice, swearing down all probable evidence by direct testimony? Never was there a more perfect illusion than such

reasoning as this. It is neither more nor less than proving the point in question by incessantly and dogmatically assuming it. For until he has first assumed, without proof, that he has "found" or "ascertained," that βαπτίζω means immerse, and nothing else, "in every instance in the whole compass of the language," even in those cases which he never saw, how can he make the word testify to that point?

And yet this is his all-subduing argument in every case. First, by his canons of trial he makes the sense immerse possible, and then brings forward his witness, βαπτίζω, to testify that it has but one sense in the whole range of the Greek tongue, and that one immerse. He compares, p. 28, the meaning that he claims to a client *whose title to the whole estate is in evidence*. P. 30, "The couches were immersed because the word has this signification and no other." P. 29, "To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrators. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only." P. 32, "In fact, to allege that the couches were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate the purification of the couches which never signifies any thing but immerse. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meaning on words is grounded on infidelity." Again: "When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words mean what they cannot mean. This is a respectful way of calling him a liar." I had said, Bib. Rep. April, 1840, p. 359, "The question is not: Will we believe that the couches were immersed, *if the Holy Ghost says so*, but this, *Has he said so?*" and I decided that he has not. This, according to Mr. Carson, is a respectful way of calling him a liar. Now, in reply to all this, I totally deny Mr. Carson's whole groundwork in general and in particular—in the whole and in all its parts. There is no such testimony of the word βαπτίζω as he alleges. It is all a mere fiction of Mr. Carson's, sustained by no evidence but his own unproved assertion. It is a mere dream. Does Mr. Carson allege passages in which the meaning immerse clearly occurs? I do not deny the meaning in those cases: in other cases I do deny it, and claim that there is satisfactory evidence of another sense. And am I to be answered by such a mere figment as an alleged tes-

timony of the word as to its own use in all cases in the whole language, when in fact all that this testimony amounts to is Mr. Carson's unproved assertion? And on such grounds as these am I to be charged with giving the lie to the Holy Spirit? And yet this is the whole foundation of Mr. Carson's argument against me. His whole logical strength lies here. This mere *petitio principii* dressed up in all shapes, and urged with unparalleled assurance, figures from beginning to end of his reply. In this consists its whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and life. It has no energy that is not derived from this.

Such, then, are Mr. Carson's principles—such is his system, and such the mode in which he applies his principles.

§ 47. *My principles—How Mr. Carson represents them.*

Of my principles he speaks fiercely; and calls them false, fanatical, and subversive of all real truth. It is important, then, to inquire what are they, and has Mr. Carson truly represented them?

In answer to this, I reply, he has not.

He has nowhere fairly stated or answered my principles at all; and no one from his reply could imagine what they are. What then has he done? He discusses no principles at the outset. He merely says that I have proved no secondary sense of *βαπτίζω*, and that "my dissertation is no more to critical deduction than Waverly or Kenilworth to history. Indeed the relation is not so true; it wants that verisimilitude which is to be found in the novels of the illustrious Scott. To the ignorant there is an appearance of philosophy and learning, but sound criticism will have little difficulty in taking the foundation from under the edifice which he has labored to erect," page 4. He then takes up the passages on which I rely, and proceeds, *in his way*, to take out the foundation. That is, he assumes the truth of his own principles, though I had proved them to be false—suppresses or misrepresents mine, and then declares that all the evidence I have adduced is no proof—and is filled with unutterable amazement at my excessive want of perspicacity, etc. All of which amounts to merely this, that I rely on arguments which his principles reject, but which are sound and unanswerable according to my own. In other words, though I have proved his principles to be false, yet because I do not see with his eyes, therefore I do not see at all, but am stupid, blind, etc.

At length, on p. 46, he thus represents my principles:

"Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth—namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability of the thing related independently of the testimony of the word."

Mr. Carson does not pretend that this axiom is stated in my words; but he gives it in his own words, and in italics too, as a condensed summary of my principles. To all this I have but one reply to make, and that is a direct denial. I reject this statement of my views as entirely delusive and totally unfair. Do I indeed avowedly disregard the authority of the use of language ascertained by acknowledged examples in assigning meaning to words? All of my principles are avowedly derived from the use of language ascertained by acknowledged examples, and rest upon this use.

What I actually do is this. In assigning secondary meaning to words, I regard three things at least, and not one alone.—I regard, 1. General laws of language, established by examples. 2. The original and primary sense of particular words. 3. The circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. It is by considering all these that I decide when a word has a secondary sense.

§ 48. *True statement of my principles.*

My principles are fully and carefully set forth in §§ 1—7, occupying in all nearly 18 pages. No one who will carefully read them can mistake them, or think that I hold the views ascribed to me by Mr. Carson. I cannot again go over all that ground; but for the sake of perspicuity I will here briefly recapitulate the most important of my principles.

1. In assigning secondary senses, we are to be guided, as just stated, by general laws of language; the primary meaning of the word, the circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of.

2. One of these general laws is, that, inasmuch as in all languages, a large number of words have left their primary sense and adopted secondary senses, it is never a priori improbable that the same should be true of any particular word.

3. But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of βαπτίζω, denoting action by, or with reference to a fluid. This is owing to

the fact, that the effects produced by the action depend not on the action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined, and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies. And this I illustrated at great length by acknowledged examples of the use of language in the case of cognate words.

From this I inferred that the usages of language create no probability against a secondary sense of the word βαπτίζω, but that the probability is decidedly in its favor. Still further, I alleged,

4. That the existence of manners and customs tending to such a result, renders such a result still more probable; and that among the Jews such manners and customs did exist.

5. That this probability is still more increased according to the laws of language, by the fact that βαπτίζω refers to the work of the Holy Spirit, and that this is to purify, and that no external act has in itself any fitness to present this idea to the mind. For the effects of pouring, sprinkling, and immersion, depend not on the act, but on the fluid. The act being the same, ink, or oil, or wine, or pure water, or filthy water, would produce effects entirely unlike. The law of language in this case is, that in the progress of society new ideas produce either new words or new senses of old words—and that βαπτίζω when applied to the operations of the Holy Ghost was applied to a subject of thought unknown to the writers of classic Greek, and therefore had probably undergone a change to qualify it for its purpose, i. e., to designate his peculiar work.

Now all of these principles relate to general laws of language, and in proof of them I appealed to acknowledged facts in the use of language.

But I clearly stated that these principles do not of themselves prove that βαπτίζω means to purify, but merely open the way for such proof, and enable us to decide what, and how much proof is needed in order to prove the point. I also definitely stated that it was to be proved as other facts are, i. e., by appropriate evidence.

And here comes up the real ground of difference between Mr. Carson and me. This point deserves particular attention. The whole stress of this part of the battle rages here.

1. Mr. Carson assumes, against all these previous probabilities, that a secondary sense in the word βαπτίζω cannot be established except by the highest possible proof, i. e., a case in which the primitive sense is impossible. This I totally deny, and maintain that a lower degree of proof is amply sufficient

to prove a meaning, which the laws of language have already rendered so probable.

2. Mr. Carson totally disregards not only the lower degrees of moral evidence, but the laws of cumulative evidence also. He takes each passage separately, and if he can prove that it does not come up to his canon of proof, i. e., if it cannot be shown that the sense immersion is impossible, he sets it aside as a cipher, and so of every other one in detail. He then says, "each of the cases considered separately is nothing; all taken together, then, must be nothing. It is the addition or multiplication of ciphers."—*Reply*, p. 47.

All this I totally deny, and maintain that it is entirely at war with the laws of moral and cumulative evidence. Because the reasoning of philology is not demonstrative, but moral and cumulative, and an ultimate result depends upon the combined impression of all the facts of a given case as a whole, on the principle that the view which best harmonizes all the facts, and falls in with the known laws of the human mind, is true.

And where many and separate and independent facts all tend, with different degrees of probability, to a common result, there is an evidence over and above the evidence furnished by each case in itself, in the *coincidence* of so many separate and independent probabilities in a common result. And to prove that each may be explained otherwise, and is not in itself a demonstration, cannot break the force of the fact that so many separate and independent probabilities all tend one way. The probability thus produced is greater than the sum of the separate probabilities; it has the force of the fact that they coincide, and that the assumption of the truth of the meaning in which they all coincide is the only mode of explaining the coincidence.

Any one of the following facts may be true of a young gentleman and a lady, to whom it is not improper or improbable that he should be married without giving reason to believe that they are engaged. They may be seen walking together in one instance, or riding together, or in a store together, or looking at furniture together, or they may exchange letters in one instance with each other, or they may be seen examining a house together; and each act may be such as to prove no engagement; but can all these acts take place in connexion with each other, and each be oft repeated, and yet furnish no higher proof of an engagement than any one alone? Shall we say each is nothing, and therefore all taken together are nothing; it is the addition or multiplication of ciphers?

So, if there is no reason why βαπτίζω should not have the sense purify, and a strong probability that it should, and innumerable facts on all sides create each a probability of it, is the existence and coincidence of all these facts nothing, because each by itself does not demonstrate it? Such is Mr. Carson's position—such is not mine. Who is correct let the universal opinions and practices of mankind, and the laws of circumstantial evidence in all courts of justice decide.

Such, in short, are my principles, and my whole argument tested by these is sound and unanswerable. Mr. Carson in replying to me ought first to have stated them clearly, and to have shown their falsehood, if he could. This he has not done, nor attempted to do, and that for the best of all reasons, they admit of no reasonable denial, and they cannot be disproved.

§ 49. *Mr. Carson's course and his objections.*

What then does Mr. Carson do? Hear him. "To much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection, because it is a mere echo of my own philological doctrines, illustrated with different examples. In a work controverting the conclusions which I have drawn in my treatise on baptism, it surely was very unnecessary to prove that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import. Can any writer be pointed out who has shown this more fully than I have done? I do not question this principle. *I have laid it down for him* as a foundation." We have here an admirable specimen of Mr. Carson's usual modesty and humility. Does Mr. Carson indeed regard himself as the father of the doctrine, that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import? If not, why does he call it his own philological doctrine? It is *mine* as truly as *his*. Does he indeed think that *he* has laid it down for me as a foundation? My teachers in college, yea, even before that, had anticipated Mr. Carson in that work. Even in my sophomore year, it never occurred to me that this was a discovery, a new idea. On what other principle have all sound modern lexicographers and commentators ever proceeded? I stated it not because I deemed it a new idea, but because I did not. Because I considered it a first principle of common-sense on the whole subject. I was, indeed, surprised to see it fully recognized by Mr. Carson; Baptists are so prone to forget it. But I should as soon think of calling the doctrine that there is a God, or that

every effect must have a cause, my own doctrine, as to call the doctrine that words may have a secondary sense, MY OWN.

But Mr. Carson says, "to much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection." Very well. Of how much is this true? He does not say; he implies that to some he does object, but does not say to what. This again is a prudent silence. It would not answer to state fairly, and in my own words, what he does object to. For the mere statement of the principles on which my argument rests is their proof. And they are entirely fatal to his cause.

What then does he do? He proceeds to the discussion of the passages alleged by me, and silently assuming the truth of his own positions, in cases where we differ, he charges upon me ignorance of the laws of controversy, want of perspicacity, heresy, nonsense, blasphemy, etc., because my conclusions do not agree with his premises, though they follow irresistibly from my own. Would it not have been much better to show that my premises were false? Alas! that he could not do. Being determined not to admit the truth, he did the only thing that remained, first to misrepresent, and then to deny it.

Let it not then be forgotten that the real question at issue is not this, Shall a secondary meaning of βαπτίζω be admitted from mere views of probability, without reference to the usages of language, or to the primary meaning of the word? but this: A certain secondary sense of βαπτίζω being probable according to the laws of language and the human mind, how much evidence is needed to prove it, and of what kind shall it be? Mr. Carson says an impossibility of the primitive sense in some one instance, and rejects all degrees of probability below this as ciphers. I deny the necessity of such proof, and allege that a proof may be made out by lower degrees of probability, so coinciding, as to form a cumulative argument on the principles of circumstantial evidence.

But Mr. Carson may say that these degrees of probability arise, not from the words of the record, but from the nature of the thing spoken of. True, they do; and so does the impossibility that he demands. Why is it impossible to immerse a lake in the blood of a mouse? Not the word βάπτω, but the nature of things forbids it. Why is it highly improbable that all the Jews immersed their couches? Not the word βαπτίζω, but the nature of things makes it highly improbable that such a practice was ever universal among all the Jews, though it is

not absolutely impossible. Does Mr. Carson mean that, in assigning the meaning to words, we are not to regard the nature and properties of the things spoken of *at all*? Or that we are to regard them only when they render a particular meaning *impossible*? But why this distinction? On what is it founded? Here are nine cases in which a given secondary meaning is probable, in different degrees, rising one above another, till at last we reach a tenth, in which no other meaning is possible. Here says Mr. Carson is something worthy of being regarded; but all the nine preceding degrees must be dismissed as ciphers. Is this sound philosophy?

But Mr. Carson says that my principle is the same with that of the Unitarians. I reply, so is his. My principle is, that in assigning secondary meanings to words, we are to regard the nature of the things spoken of; and this is his,—and it is also a principle of the Unitarians, and of all persons of common sense. Does a truth cease to be a truth because Unitarians hold it?

But Mr. Carson says that, on the ground of *probabilities* derived from the thing spoken of, Unitarians and Neologists explain away the word of God. So they do on the ground of *possibilities* derived from the nature of the things spoken of. Has Mr. Carson never heard the argument, that three persons *cannot* be one God? and that the word God is therefore to be taken in a lower and secondary sense, when applied to Christ?

And will he reject a true principle of interpretation because it may be and has been falsely applied? The principle is true, let it lead to what results it may, that in the interpretation of all language we must look at the things spoken of, and regard all that we know of their nature, properties and laws, and not needlessly involve a writer in a contradiction of any of them; and especially is this true of the word of God, for it is inspired; and he who made the laws of mind and matter is not to be represented as contradicting them in his word. And yet, what principle have Unitarians employed more than this against the Trinity? Is it then a Unitarian principle? Nay, rather it is a true principle; falsely applied, indeed, but still true.

So the principle of regarding probabilities derived from the nature of the subject, in assigning secondary senses to words, may be abused; yet, it is nevertheless a true principle, and one of vast importance.

We are also to regard the primary meaning in assigning secondary senses. It would not be rational to assign to βαπτίζω

the sense to sing or dance, because no law of the mind, and no circumstances, manners or customs, led from the sense immerse to them, and no analogy illustrates such a transition: they are, a priori, and in every respect improbable. It is not so of the sense to purify. It denotes an effect of immersion in pure water. Such a transition is natural; it follows the analogy of language and circumstances, and renders it probable; of course it admits of an easy proof by probabilities derived from the nature of the thing spoken of.

Such is my answer to Mr. Carson's vaunted argument from the Columbo bridge. The case is this: Near Columbo is a school, on the bank of a river; over this river is a bridge of boats. It is related by Whitecross, that certain boys, too poor to pay the toll, were accustomed to swim across the river to attend the school. Here, says Mr. Carson, according to Mr. Beecher's philology, if we had only a general statement of the fact, that the boys so swam, a foreigner must take swim, as meaning to walk over a bridge of boats, for it is entirely improbable that the boys would swim when there was a bridge. To this I reply: Mr. Carson admits that no one who reads the whole story in Whitecross could make such a mistake. For he tells us that they *did not* cross the bridge, and why;—and why they swam, and carried their books, and how. As to *παρρίζω*, we have the whole story. If we had but a part of the story, as to the boys, still I reply, there is no relation between the sense *to swim*, and the sense *to walk on a bridge*, such as exists between *immerse* and *purify*. Immersion in pure water tends to produce purification. Does swimming in a river tend to produce walking over a bridge? Mr. Carson alleges that words denoting unlike modes, have nothing in common. How then can swimming in water tend to the sense, walking on a bridge? Can Mr. Carson refer me to such a transition in the whole range of the Greek language, or any other? Why then does he set this forth as a case parallel with mine, and adapted clearly to show my folly? Yet, he exults as if this case were an end of all controversy, and refers to it in his reply again and again. Miserable is that cause that drives its advocates to such shifts as these.

§. 50. *Appeal to facts.*

But all principles are seen most clearly in the light of facts. To them then let us turn.

Clemens Alexandrinus (p. 387, Lugduni Batav. 1616,) says
 ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ βάπτισματος εἶη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐκ Μωϋσέως παραδεδο-
 μένη τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὡδεπως :

‘*Ἡ δ’ ὑδρηγαμένη καθαρὰ χροὶ εἶματ’ ἐλοῦσα*, (Odyss. 4 : 759.)
 ἢ *Πενέλοπη ἐπὶ τὴν εὐχὴν ἔρχεται*—*Τηλέμαχος δὲ*

Χεῖρας νιψάμενος πολιῆς ἀλὸς εὖχετ’ Ἀθήνῃ (Odyss. 2 : 261.)
 “*Ἔθος τοῦτο Ἰουδαίων ὥς καὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἐπὶ κοίτῃ βαπτίζεσθαι.*

On this I remark,

1. That Clement is in the context speaking of Christian baptism.

2. He states that “that may be an image of baptism which has been handed down from Moses to the poets, thus—

Penelope having washed herself, and having on her body clean apparel, goes to prayer, and Telemachus having washed his hands in the hoary sea, prayed to Minerva. This was the custom of the Jews that they also should be often baptized upon their couch.”

Let us now look at the nature of things. Here is before us as a nation, the Jews. They were accustomed to recline on couches at meals. These couches were large enough to hold from three to five persons. Clement states that it was their custom to be baptized often upon their couch. We know that as a matter of fact it was their custom to wash their hands often during their meals whilst reclining upon their couches—and the frequent immersion of men on a couch during their meals is an unheard of thing. We look at the context. He had just spoken of Telemachus as washing his hands—using *νίπτω*—and of Penelope as washing herself, using *ὑδραίνω*, a word perfectly generic, and no more limited to one mode than our word wash. We look further on, and we find that these are spoken of as an image of baptism handed down from Moses to the poets. We reflect that these are rites of purification, and that Clement had been speaking of purity as essential in order to see God. And can we longer doubt? Washing the hands is a purification. Pilate used it to denote his innocence. The Psalmist says, I will wash my hands in innocence. All things point us to purity and purification. The sense is a priori probable—we adopt it. We believe that the Jews were in the habit of purifying themselves often upon their couch at meals, just as Telemachus did, that is, by washing their hands.

But was it not possible to have a fixed pully over each couch in the dining room, and ropes attached to the corners of the

couch, and a baptistery in the floor below covered by a trap door, and was it not possible to elevate the couches, open the trap doors, and immerse guests and couches together, and to do it often during the same meal? But it would be excessively inconvenient. No matter for that, what will not superstition do? But washing hands is spoken of as an image of baptism. No matter, it is an image of it as to its nature, whatever may be the meaning of the name. (We shall hereafter see how much use Mr. Carson makes of this distinction.) Now all this may be said. Mr. Carson on his principles is obliged to say it. But whom will it convince? None but the man who has a cause to maintain which is lost so soon as he admits that the word βαπτίζω means to purify, irrespective of mode.

Now in this case, the probability is so high as to produce on every disinterested mind the impression of certainty, yet because it does not reach Mr. Carson's arbitrary canon it is to be rejected as a cipher. But who will dare to reject it? After the violence of party spirit has put forth all its energies, common sense will certainly resume her sway and cover all such evasions with merited disgrace.

Let us look at another case.

Justin Martyr (p. 164. London, 1772,) says, τί γὰρ ὄφελος κεινοῦ τοῦ βάπτισματος, ὃ τὴν σὰρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαιδρύνει; βαπτισθεὶς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ σῶμα καθαρόν ἐστι. "What is the profit of that baptism which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be baptized as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure." We look at the nature of things. An actual immersion for the sake of purity does not belong to the mind. We look at the usages of language. The mind is never spoken of as figuratively immersed, for mental purity. It is spoken of as immersed in cares, troubles, pollution, &c. We look at the language used. Βαπτίζω is followed by ἀπὸ preceding that from which the mind is to be cleansed—this suits the sense to purify, but not the sense to immerse. We say naturally be *purified from* anger—not be *immersed from* anger. We look at the context. Justin had been speaking of the atonement of Christ, and of its power to cleanse from sin. He had just spoken of the passage in Isaiah, wash you, make you clean, as referring to baptism. He has spoken of purifying, washing, cleansing, in various forms, but has used no undisputed equivalent of im-

mersion, such as *καθαρίω*. Whether then we look at the nature of things, or the general usages of language, or the particular language of this passage, or of the context, all tends to one result. All things, with united voice, call out for the sense to purify. And it is the sense; and the true translation of the passage is this: "What is the profit of that purification, which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be purified as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure." And long after all the efforts of party spirit to wrest it to any other sense have found an ignominious grave, it will stand in its native simplicity and beauty, satisfying and delighting every candid mind by its inherent and self-evidencing power of truth. Another sense can indeed be forced on these words by the violence of arbitrary canons of logic and rhetoric. But the laws of language, and of the human mind, though for a time suppressed by force, cannot die. They will break through all rhetorical and logical chains, and assert and make good their indefeasible claims.

I do not advocate these principles so earnestly because there are no passages that can meet Mr. Carson's highest claims,—in my third number I have produced such, and I have many more to produce before I close,—but because I wish to repel his unreasonable claims of evidence, and to restore the usages of language to their true and inherent liberties, against his violence and force.

The human mind is an instrument of wondrous delicacy, and language is its mirror. The slightest influences of taste, circumstances, and subjects of thought affect its meaning. The manner in which it passes from sense to sense in the use of words is to be ascertained by observation, and cannot be fixed, *a priori*, by theory. And if it passes easily from sense to sense, in words of a given class, no man has a right to make the proof that it has so passed difficult, yea, almost impossible, for party ends, and by arbitrary canons of evidence. Yet this, Mr. Carson has done. He has provided rhetorical and logical cords and chains, for forcing back and confining to the primitive sense all usages of the word *βαπτίζω* which seem to have left it, and happy is that word which has energy enough to retain its inalienable rights of freedom after he has laid his hands upon it.

§ 51. *Mr. Carson's principles subvert themselves.*

But happily, Mr. Carson furnishes the means of destroying

his own principles. I have said that his practice is against his own principles. "Does he not admit that βάπτω means to dye or color when it is applied to the beard and hair? And is it impossible to dip these? Improbable surely it is, but not half so much so as the immersion of couches." Hear his reply. "Here I am caught at last. Surely my feet are entangled in my own net. But let the reader see with what ease I can extricate myself. The assertion of my antagonist arises from his want of discrimination" (of course, as I happen to differ from Mr. Carson). "I admit that βάπτω has a secondary signification, because each secondary signification is in proof, and instances may be alleged in which its primary meaning is utterly impossible," e. g., the immersion of a lake in the blood of a mouse. "Show me any thing like this with respect to βαπτίζω, and I will grant a secondary meaning. And as soon as a secondary meaning is ascertained on sufficient grounds, I do not demand in every instance a proof of impossibility of primary meaning before the secondary is alleged. The competition between rival meanings must then be determined on other grounds." So then all cases of probability are to be set aside as ciphers, till one case can be found to come up to Mr. Carson's canon; and, however numerous they are, to adduce them is only adding ciphers to ciphers, or multiplying ciphers by ciphers. But so soon as one case of the right kind is found, lo! all these ciphers at once assume a value. Mr. Carson is now willing to admit them on lower evidence. If he had not found the passage as to the lake and the mouse, or some one like it, he must have believed that the Indians *dip* their beards and hairs, not that they *dye* them—but now it is easy to see that they do not *dip* them but *dye* them. Is this sound philosophy? If it is, Mr. Carson has dug a mine under all of his reply to me. All my cases of probability, according to him, are as yet ciphers. But I may find the lucky passage at last—and lo! they spring into life and put in their claims for a new trial. Can Mr. Carson refuse it? If not, then all his labor is in vain. He must do all his work over again, and judge on new principles and with new results. Let us try and see if we cannot find a passage.

§ 52. *Cases. Clinic baptism. Purifying agents.*

In Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, vol. iii., p. 48, occurs a passage from Nicephorus, describing a clinic baptism, ὥστε ἀποθανεῖσθαι προσδόκιμον ὅττα τὸ ὕδωρ αἰτῆσαι λαβεῖν ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ;

κλίνῃ ἢ ἐκεῖτο περιχύθῃτα δῆθεν ἱβαπτίζεν. "So that he, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, i. e., baptism. And he baptized him, even upon his couch upon which he lay." Did he then take up couch, man and all, and immerse them? Mr. Carson must say yes, if it is possible—and is it not? But stay, there is still another word, *περιχύθῃτα*, which expressly defines the mode. It is by affusion! So then we have at length reached the mark, and immersion is pointedly excluded, unless affusion or sprinkling is immersion. And now Mr. Carson's labor is all lost, and it will be doubly and trebly lost on his own principles before I am through, for cases equal or superior to this in strength abound. Will Mr. Carson say, that the phrase, *εἰς χερὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον βάπτισμα ὀνομάσαι* follows? It does, indeed, and implies a doubt of the propriety of calling such a transaction a baptism; but could there be any doubt of the utter impropriety of calling it an immersion? Is it, indeed, doubtful, whether pouring or sprinkling is immersion? Let Mr. Carson look at his own canon, and can he doubt? What then was the doubt? Whether such a transaction was a real *purification*, or *remission of sins*. This was the point on which doubt existed, as the question proposed to Cyprian, and his answer alike imply. The common mode of purifying, i. e., remitting sins, was by immersion. In the case of those who were in danger of death another mode was used—all confessed that it was another mode. Did this, could it raise the question whether two modes, by the confession of all totally unlike, were yet so nearly alike that the name of one could be applied to the other? Or did it raise this question, whether the new mode was in fact effectual to absolve from sin, that is, was it an effectual purification, or remission of sins? It did, and Cyprian decided that it was. So then, no sense but purification is possible in this case. So that this is the true translation of the passage: "He, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, and he purified him by affusion, even upon the bed upon which he lay—if, indeed, it is proper to call such a transaction a purification." All my so-called *ciphers* are, therefore, at once restored to their full and true value.

The expression, "asked to receive the water," seems singular. Its singularity will cease when we consider another usage of the fathers. They were accustomed to call water itself a baptism. So they called blood a baptism. On what ground? On the same ground on which Christ is called our sanctification and salvation, because he sanctifies and saves us. On this

ground they called water a purification because it purifies. It is a purifier. On what ground could they call water an immersion? It is not an *immerser*. It does not immerse us—others immerse us in it, and it purifies us. If the fact that others immerse us in water justifies us in calling it an immersion, there is the same reason for calling it a sprinkling or a pouring—for others sprinkle us with it or pour it on us. But what shall we say of blood? Was there a rite of immersion in blood? Men were purified by blood, but it was by sprinkling, not by immersion. Why then call it an immersion? Here all possibility of the sense immersion is cut off. The truth is, that by a natural metonymy, means of purification were called baptisms, i. e., purifications, transferring the name of the effect to the cause.

So Tertullian (p. 257. Paris, 1634) says, speaking of the water and the blood, “Hos duo baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit.” “These two baptisms he poured forth from the wound of his pierced side.” Did he mean to say that Christ poured forth two immersions from his wounded side? or that he sent forth two purifications? So Augustine uses such passages as these, “baptismus, id est aqua:” again, “baptismus, id est aqua salutis.” Isidore Hispalensis (*Monumenta Orthodoxographa*, p. 1774), speaking of the water that flowed from the side of Christ, says, “baptismus est aqua,” and gives as his reason, “nullum aliud est elementum quod purgat omnia.” That is, “water is a purification, because there is no other element that purifies all things.” Once more: air was regarded as a purifying element and a type of the Holy Spirit; and thunder was regarded as a compound of water and air. The philosophy was false. But to what language did it give rise? Maximus (p. 459, vol. ii. Paris, 1675,) says that sons of thunder means sons of baptism. The reason is, ἡ βροντὴ συνίσταται ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος. Thunder is composed of water and air, and this he calls *μυσταγωγία τοῦ βάπτισματος*, i. e., a mystic intimation of purification; and sons of thunder means, on this ground, sons of purification. What has immersion to do with all this? Again, Anastasius speaks of baptism as poured into the water-pots; and the water-pots as baptized by pouring baptism into them, *Bibliotheca Patrum*, vol. v., p. 958. Does he mean that the pots were immersed by pouring immersion into them, or that they were purified by pouring purification, i. e., water, a purifier, into them? This transaction he regards as a type of the baptism of the Gentiles. Did he suppose that they were to be immersed by pouring immersion upon them?

These passages are in themselves sufficient to settle the case. But as Mr. Carson attaches so much importance to the proof of an impossibility of the sense immersion, I will add a few more passages.

§ 53. *Other cases. Expiation by sprinkling called baptism.*

The passages now to be adduced are designed to prove this position: that the fathers apply the word βαπτίζω to denote expiation by sprinkling, and, indeed, expiation however made, so that all the sprinklings and other expiations of the Mosaic ritual, and even of the whole heathen world, are spoken of as baptisms.

Before proceeding to adduce the passages, it will add to the clearness of our ideas, to recur to the usages of language on the subject of sacrificial purification, or expiation by atonement. We have seen, then, that ideas of absolution, expiation, forgiveness, are expressed in Greek by καθαρίζω, to make pure, to purify—also, that the actual removal of moral pollution by the truth and the Spirit are denoted by the same word. Now, in spiritual baptism, these things always co-exist, i. e., those who are forgiven are always made pure in fact, yet there is a logical distinction between the two ideas, and the word καθαρίζω directs the mind sometimes to one chiefly, and sometimes to the other. We see in English the same idiom in our use of the words clear and purge. They have a legal sense denoting to absolve, as when God says he will not clear the guilty; and sin or guilt are said to be purged away by the blood of Christ. So in law, we read of purging by an oath; and of compurgators, who freed accused persons from charges of guilt by an oath in their favor. In such cases the reference plainly is to acquittal from charges, not to an actual purification of the heart. The same idiom exists in the Latin words lavo, purgo—as lavare, or purgare peccatum—to give or to obtain pardon for sins. Thus, “venis precibus lautum peccatum”—you come to obtain by prayers the forgiveness of your sins. Literally, you come by prayers to wash, purify or purge, your sin.

For these reasons I shall not hesitate, in translating the sacrificial sense of καθαρίζω and βαπτίζω, to use as equivalents the words purify, purge, wash, absolve, expiate, atone for, clear, acquit, forgive, &c., as the case may require.

The most striking case of absolution by sprinkling in the word of God is undoubtedly that in which the Israelites were

saved by the sprinkling of the blood of the Paschal Lamb on their door posts. It was established to commemorate the redemption out of Egypt, and was the great type of atonement by the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. In Ex. 12 : 21—28, Moses directs as to the sprinkling of the blood with a branch of hyssop, and says, when the Lord seeth the blood upon the lintel and on the two side posts, the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you. And ye shall observe this thing for an ordinance for ever. This is the only case of sprinkling the blood of a lamb by hyssop in the Old Testament, and in this case there was no bathing, washing or immersion, as some allege in the case of sprinkling the ashes of a heifer by hyssop. I am so particular on this case, because Ambrose speaks of it directly as a baptism under the law. Much controversy has existed as to what the divers baptisms were of which Paul speaks. Of these Ambrose regards the sprinkling of the blood of a lamb with a bunch of hyssop as one,—vol. ii., p. 333. Paris, 1690. Speaking to the baptized, he says, “ye received white garments that they might be an indication that ye have laid aside the garments of sin, and put on the chaste robes of innocence, concerning which the prophet said, thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop and I shall be cleansed. Thou shalt wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow.” *Adsparges me hyssopo et mundabor : lavabis me et supra nivem dealbabor. Qui enim baptizatur, et secundum legem, et secundum evangelium videtur esse mundatus. Secundum legem quia hyssopi fasciculo Moyses adspergebat sanguinem agni; secundum evang. etc.* “For, he who is *baptized*, both according to the law and according to the gospel, is made clean. According to the law, because Moses, with a branch of hyssop, sprinkled the blood of a lamb. According to the gospel,” &c. Here his main position is that *baptized* persons are *made clean*, both according to the law and according to the gospel. Of course there were *baptized persons under the law*. Of these baptized persons Ambrose gives one example, to prove his main position. Who were they? This is the point. Were they persons *immersed*? or were they persons *purified*, i. e., *expiated* by the sprinkling of blood? Plainly the latter; for he refers to a case in which there was nothing but *purification*, i. e. *expiation*, by sprinkling the blood of a lamb, and he does not even allude to immersion at all; and from these facts he proves

that *baptized* persons were made clean. All this is plain, and forcible, and logical, if baptize means to purify, i. e., to expiate; on any other supposition it is of no force at all. For suppose that Moses did sprinkle the blood of a lamb on the posts of the doors, and suppose that it did make expiation, and thus purify the people and make them clean, it only proves that *expiated* persons were made clean; but how does it prove that *immersed* persons were made clean according to the law? It does not, it cannot—and thus the sense immerse is excluded, and no sense but purify or expiate is possible. This, then, is the sense of the passage: "He who is expiated or absolved is made clean, both according to the law and according to the gospel. According to the law, because Moses, in order to make expiation, took a bunch of hyssop and sprinkled the blood of a lamb, and according to the prophet, this makes clean (*adsperges me hyssopo et mundabor*); according to the gospel, because he is made whiter than snow *whose sins are forgiven*." *Supra nivem dealbatur cui culpa dimittitur.* How clearly then does this passage exclude immersion as the meaning of baptism, and establish purification, or the remission of sins as its religious sense. The same sense we shall soon see in the formal definitions of Athanasius, Zonaras, and Phavorinus. It is seen no less plainly in another passage of Ambrose: "Unde sit *baptisma* nisi de cruce Christi, de morte Christi?" vol. i. p. 356. "Whence is *remission of sins*, except from the cross of Christ, from the death of Christ?" "Ibi est omne mysterium, quia pro te passus est. In ipso redemeris, in ipso salvaberis." "There is all the mystery, because he suffered for thee. In him thou shalt be redeemed; in him thou shalt be saved." How beautifully all of this applies to the remission of sins. It is *the remission of sins*, it is not *immersion*, that comes from the cross and death of Christ. Hence, we need not wonder to hear him speak of expiation by the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb as a baptism, for it was a remission of sins; and the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb was the great type of the sprinkling of the blood of the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. Here then, beyond all doubt, expiation by sprinkling is considered as a baptism under the law, and is one of the *διάφοροι βάπτισμοι* spoken of by Paul in Heb. ix. 10.

Nor is this the only case. Cyril of Alexandria, on Isa. 4: 4, vol. ii. Paris, 1838, speaks of the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer as a baptism. He is denying the power of mere exter-

nal rites to purify the soul, and says, *βεβαπτίσμεθα μὴν γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ὕδατι γύμνη ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σπόδῃ δαμάλεως—ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ.* "We have been baptized not with mere water, nor yet with the ashes of a heifer, but with the Holy Spirit and fire." This implies that externally there was a baptism by water; and therefore, just as clearly, that there was an external baptism by the ashes of a heifer. What was this? Let Paul answer: "The ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh." If any one should say there was a rite of washing or bathing connected with sprinkling; I answer—not in the case of the *sprinkled person*, as I have shown (§ 28, 11); and even if there were, still he was not immersed in or by the ashes of a heifer, and to this the word *βαπτίζω* is here limited. Besides, Cyril, in a parenthetic explanation after *δαμάλεως*, evolves his own meaning too clearly to admit of denial—*ἐξοσαντίζεσθαι δὲ πρὸς μόνην τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα καθὰ φησιν ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος.* "We are sprinkled to purify the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul."

According to Cyril then, the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, was an *external* baptism, but it did not effect real and spiritual purification, any more than a mere washing in water. The sprinkling of an unclean person with the ashes of a heifer was, therefore, another of the *διαφόροι βάπτισμοι* of which Paul speaks.

The same Cyril, on Isa. 1: 16, "wash you, make you clean," considers it as a command to baptize, and says, *τοῦτο καὶ ὁ πάλαι νόμος αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐν σκίαις διέτυπον, ἔφη γὰρ, Num. 8: 6, 7.* "This the ancient law imaged forth to them as in shadows, for he said, 'take the Levites and cleanse them, and thus shalt thou do unto them to cleanse them: *sprinkle water of purifying* on them,' &c. There is no immersion or bathing here. But sprinkling alone, *εἰτα ποιὸν ἐτι τό ὕδωρ τοῦ ἁγνίσμον διδάξει λέγων ὁ σοφώτατος Παῦλος, Heb. 9: 13, 14.* "What the water of purification is, the most wise Paul shall teach, saying: the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh." In this Cyril saw baptism imaged forth as in a shadow; and this passage throws light on the preceding, and shows that in all the various sprinklings of the old law, he saw some of the *διαφόροι βάπτισμοι*, of which Paul speaks.

Nor is this all. Tertullian speaks of the sprinklings and expiations of the heathen world, as the Devil's baptism, rivalling the ordinances of God. *De Baptismo*, p. 257. Paris, 1634.

He first unfolds the purifying power of water (as we have seen he calls it a baptism on this ground), and then the various uses made of it by the Gentile world. "At the sacred rites of Isis, or Mithra, they are initiated by a washing [lavacro]; they carry out their gods with washings [lavationibus]; they expiate villas, houses, temples, and whole cities, by sprinkling with water carried around. Certainly they are purified [tinguntur] in the Appolinarian and Eleusinian rites, and they say that they do this to obtain regeneration, and to escape the punishment of their perjuries. Also among the ancients, whoever had stained himself with murder, expiated himself with purifying water. In view of these things we see the zeal of the devil in rivalling the things of God, since he also practises baptism among his own people—cum et ipse baptismum in suis exercet. What can be found like this? The polluted one purifies [immundus emundat]. The destroyer delivers. He who is under condemnation, absolves others [damnatus absolvit]. He will destroy, forsooth, his own work, washing away the sins which he inspires."

Tertullian here traces the purifier water through all its uses in the heathen world in purifying, whether by sprinkling, or in any other way, for absolution, or for cleansing. And he sums it all up as the Devil's baptism. Words, denoting sprinkling, or purification, or absolution, pervade the whole passage—as lavacrum, lavatio, aspergo, purgo, expio, abluo, emundo, absolvo, diluo. But no word occurs denoting of necessity immersion. Mr. Carson may refer to *tingo*. I know that he has said in his work on baptism, p. 78, "*Tingo* expresses appropriately dipping and dying, and these only." Mr. Carson says this with his usual accuracy. Ovid was of a different opinion. Speaking of the ocean in a storm, he says, videtur aspergine tingere nubes.—Metamorph. 11. 497, 498. Did Ovid mean that the ocean seems to dye the clouds with spray, or to immerse them with spray? He means plainly to sprinkle them with spray. He also uses the expression, tingere corpus aqua sparsa. (Fast. 4: 790. See Gesner on *tingo*.) Does this mean to color or to immerse the body by sprinkled water? And what mean the common expressions, tingi nardo, tingi Pallade, tingi oleo? Is oil a coloring substance? or was it customary to be dipped in oil? We read of anointing with oil, or of pouring oil on the head. Who has recorded the custom of dipping in oil? Hilarius too, on Acts 19: 4, speaking

of a spurious baptism, says, *non tincti sed sordidati sunt*. Here the antithesis demands of us to translate, "they were not *purified* but *polluted*." Tingo, then, means to sprinkle, to wet or moisten, to wash, to purify—and in reference to baptism, this last is its appropriate sense. No word, then, occurs, denoting immersion. All kinds of purification and expiation are spoken of, including prominently those by sprinkling, and all are summed up as the Devil's baptism, i. e. the Devil's purification or absolution—and the closing contrast rests for all its force on assigning to the word this sense.

Nor was this idea of the Devil's baptism rivalling God's, peculiar to Tertullian. It is found also in Justin Martyr and Ambrose. After describing Christian baptism, Justin says, καὶ τὸ λουτρὸν δὲ τοῦτ' ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τοῦ προφήτου κεκηρυγμένον ἐνέγγησαν βαπτίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἱερά αὐτῶν ἐπὶ βαινοντες. "The dæmons hearing of this washing, or purification, proclaimed by the prophet, caused those entering into their temples, to sprinkle themselves." He then mentions that they also used an entire washing of the body in certain cases. If the dæmons aimed to rival God's purification, they would naturally use sprinkling as well as bathing, for the Jews used both. But if they were merely trying to imitate God's immersion, why did they use sprinkling at all? Clemens Alexandrinus, as we have seen, takes the washing of hands by Telemachus and the Jews, as a baptism. And Justin as plainly regards sprinkling as part of the Devil's baptism.

Ambrose, taking a general view of Jewish and Heathen absolutions, thus sums up the whole matter—vol 2, p. 355.

Multa sunt genera baptismatum—sed unum baptismum clamat Apostolus. Quare? Sunt baptismata gentium, sed non sunt baptismata. Lavacra sunt, baptismata esse non possunt. Caro lavatur non culpa diluitur, immo in illo lavacro contrahitur. Erant autem baptismata Judæorum alia superflua, alia in figura." In order to translate this passage, we must notice that it is a contrast of ineffectual purifications with real purifications, i. e., remission of sins. I translate it thus:

"There are many kinds of purifications; but the Apostle proclaims one purification. Why? There are purifications of the nations, but they are not purifications, i. e., remissions of sin. Washings they are—purifications, i. e., remissions of sin they cannot be. The body is washed, but sin is not washed away, nay, in that washing sin is contracted. There were also

purifications of the Jews: some superfluous, others typical." Any one can see that the sense of this whole passage turns on assigning to baptismata in the second member of the antithesis, the sacrificial sense of καθαρισμός i. e., absolution, or forgiveness of sins. The purifications of the Gentiles were not purifications for this reason; they did not wash away sins. This is a good reason for denying to them the name purification in its highest sense. But it is no reason for denying that they were immersions. They could be immersions, whether they remitted sins or not—but they could not be real purifications unless they remitted sins. If any one wishes to feel the full force of this, let him try to translate the passage, and use immersions instead of purifications.

"They are immersions, but immersions they cannot be." Why not? "They are washings, immersions they cannot be." Why not? "The body is washed, but sin is not washed away; nay, in that washing it is contracted." But how does this prove that they are not immersions? It proves that they are not purifications. With immersions it has nothing to do. The sense purify is then fully and incontrovertibly established.

§ 54. *Passage from Proclus.*

Let us now look at a beautiful passage in Proclus, which presents this import of the word to the mind in various relations, and with the clearness of a sunbeam—p. 280. Rome, 1630. It is in an oration on the Epiphany, and is an expansion of the ideas contained in the reply of John to Christ: I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me? In expanding this question, the fathers took great delight, and their expansion always turned on the idea, how can the polluted purify the pure? How can one, under condemnation, acquit his judge? πῶς τολμήσω βαπτίσαι σε; πότε πῦρ ὑπὸ χόρτον καθαίρεται; πότε πηλὸς πλύνει πηγὴν; πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος; πῶς βαπτίσω σε δεσπότη; μῶμην οὐ βλέπω ἐν σοι. τῇ κατάρξει τοῦ Ἀδάμ οὐχ ὑπέπθης ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησας. Πῶς βαστάσει ἡ γῆ ὁρώσα τὸν τοὺς ἀγγέλους ἀγιάζοντα, ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἀμαρτωλοῦ βαπτιζόμενον; πῶς σε βαπτίσω δεσπότη τοῖς ἐκ γένεσεως μολυσμοῖς οὐ προσομιλήσαντα; πῶς οὖν ἐγὼ κατὰ ῥήνους ἀνθρώπου ἀγνίσω Θεόν; Ἄναμαρτητον; βαπτιστὴν ἀπίστευτα δεσπότη, οὐ παρήκουσας τοῦ σου προστάγματος. I have abbreviated this passage somewhat, and yet, because of its beauty and varied use of language,

have retained more than I usually quote. Its main force lies in the expression, how shall I, who am under sentence of condemnation, purify, i. e., acquit my judge? *πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος*. How absurd, in such a passage, to inquire, how shall I, a culprit, immerse my judge? But take *βαπτίσω* in the sense purify, or acquit, and it at once harmonizes the whole passage. Nor is this all; the laws of antithesis demand this sense. Let us thus translate it. "How shall I dare to purify thee? When is the fire purified by the stubble? When does the clay wash the fountain? How shall I, a culprit, purify or acquit my judge? How shall I purify thee, O Lord? I see no fault in thee. Thou hast not fallen under the curse of Adam: thou hast committed no sin. How will the earth endure to see him, who makes pure the angels, purified by a sinful man? How shall I purify thee, O Lord, who hast never participated in the pollutions of birth? How, then, shall I, a polluted man, purify God? The sinless God? Thou hast sent me as a purifier, hast thou not disregarded thine own command?" On this last sentence, the editor says: the sense is, as I infer, thou hast made me a purifier, that I should baptize, that is, purify, from pollution, and expiate those defiled by sin. But since thou art polluted by no sins, why dost thou command that I should expiate and wash thee, if there is nothing in thee to be washed away? That is beyond the province of a baptist, i. e., a purifier. I have need to be purified of thee. The interchange of *ἀγιάζω* and *βαπτίσω* in carrying out the antithesis is no less striking. He uses *πῶς βαπτίσω* till near the close, and then exchanges it in the question for *ἀγνίσω*—*πῶς ἀγνίσω Θεόν*: how shall I purify God—the sinless God. Yet, who does not see that the import of the question must be the same throughout the whole passage? So the antithesis *τὸν ἀγιάζοντα ἀγγέλους βαπτίζομενον ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἀμαρτωλοῦ*, requires *βαπτίζω* and *ἀγιάζω* to be taken in the same sense. This passage admirably illustrates the statements in § 28, 2. Jan. 1841. Giving to *βαπτίζω* the sense to purify, the passage is inimitably beautiful and brilliant. It loses all its beauty the moment we assign to it any other sense.

Have I not adduced evidence enough? In any common case it would be enough, and more than enough. But strange as it may seem, the life of a whole denomination depends upon denying this sense of this word. Mr. Carson says, if it were optional, he would never immerse. So says Mr. Hague. And if this meaning is established, all pretext for a separate Bible

Society is taken away. Nor will any valid reason for separate organic action remain. So fundamental an error will not easily die. It has, indeed, no logical life; but it has an organic life of tremendous power. In numerous periodicals this denomination utters its voice. Hundreds of thousands hang on them for the truth; and if they see it not in them, will not see it at all. They are the leaders. It is expected of them to defend the cause. And temptations, almost infinite, urge them not to see the truth. Before such temptations they will fall, unless God, in his mercy, aid them by a full illumination of his Spirit. So may it be. But as things are, the work of adducing evidence must still go on.

§ 55. *Definitions of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα.*

I remark, then, that the sense to purify is established by direct definitions of the Fathers and of Greek Lexicographers, given in a manner most explicit and unambiguous.

On this point I shall first quote Basil. He is commenting on Is. 4: 4. "Ὅτι ἐκπύρει κύριος τὸν ῥύπον τῶν υἱῶν καὶ τῶν θυγατέρων Σιών, καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐκκαθαρίει ἐκ μέσον αὐτῶν ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καύσεως. "The Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons and the daughters of Zion, and shall purge the blood of Jerusalem from the midst of them, by the spirit of judgment and by the spirit of burning." On this he remarks, *Τρανῶς τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ ὁ λόγος προαγορεύει περὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγοντι ὅτι αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πῦρι· περὶ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι εἰς μετάνοιαν.* "Plainly the word foretells the same things concerning the Lord, by John, who says, that he shall baptize you by the Holy Spirit and fire: but, concerning himself, he says, I, indeed, baptize you with water unto repentance." In one series of expressions, the words are, *πλύνω* and *ἐκκαθαρίζω*—in the other *βαπτίζω*. Basil says that the import of both modes of expression is plainly the same. Nor is this all. He proceeds, *ἀπαι γοῦν ἀμφοτέρω συνήψεν ὁ κύριος τὸ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς μετάνοιαν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ πνεύματος εἰς ἀναγέννησιν, καὶ ὁ λόγος αἰνίσσεται ἀμφοτέρω τὰ βάπτισματα μήποτε τρεῖς εἰσιν αἱ ἐπίνοιαι τοῦ βάπτισματος.* "Since, then, the Lord has connected both (baptisms), namely, that from water to repentance, i. e., John's, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, i. e., Christ's, and the word (Is. 4: 4) alludes to both baptisms (i. e., Christian baptism, and that of fire), are there not three significations?" Here

he first speaks of baptisms in the plural (i. e., the baptisms of John, of Christ, and of fire), and as, in some respects, alike, in others unlike; and this seems to call for a definition of the senses of the word. He says they are three, and proceeds to give them. (1.) ὁ τὸ τοῦ ῥήπου καθαρῖσμος (2.) καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις (3.) καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ κρίσεως βάσανος. 1. The purification of filth. 2. Regeneration by the Spirit. 3. Trial or proof in the fire of the judgment. These are three kinds of purification. One external by water—the next internal by the Spirit, i. e., regeneration—the other a purgation in the fires of the judgment day. To this purgation by fire, the fathers referred the words of Paul: "Every man's work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire: and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is; if any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." The man *saved by fire*, is saved by Basil's third kind of purification. Concerning this, Hilarius says, "*per ignem purgatus fiat salvus*," being purified by fire, he may be saved. Hence, Basil refers a part of the purification to this world, and a part to the next, but considers it all as baptism in one way or another, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐκπλύνειν πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴ ἀπόθεσιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ δὲ πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ πνεύματι καύσεως πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δοκιμασίαν. "So that the expression to wash away (in Is. 4: 4) refers to the laying aside sins in this world (by Christian baptism) but the expression, spirit of judgment and spirit of burning, refers to trial by fire in the world to come." How unlike all this is to immersion, I need not say. Can any thing be more to the point? Is it not enough to say, that to wash away filth, and to purge, in Is., and to baptize in the New Testament, are equivalent modes of expression? Is it not enough, that he uses ἐν after βάπτισμα, a preposition at war with the idea immerse? For we are not immersed ἐξ ὕδατος, but ἐν ὕδατι—but we are purified ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ἐν πνεύματος, ἐκ denoting that from which the purification proceeds, and by which it is produced. Is it not enough, that he speaks of baptisms in the plural, and refers two to this world, and one to the next, and then goes on to define three corresponding senses of the word, and that each sense is a purification, and neither an immersion? What more could be asked, or received, if asked? Surely he who will not believe this, would not believe, even though old Basil himself were to arise from the dead and pro-

claim on the house tops: the meaning of βαπτίζω is to purify!

Nor is this all. Athanasius testifies explicitly to the same effect. Speaking of the expression: he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, he expressly states that it has the sacrificial sense to purify, i. e., to remit sins.—Montfaucon, *Collectio nova Patrum Græcorum*. Vol. 2, p. 27. Paris, 1706—and to express this sense, he uses καθαρίζω. His words are: Τὸ αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, τοῦτο θελοῖ ὅτι καθαρίῃ ὑμᾶς. "The expression, he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, means this, that he shall purify, i. e., absolve you, or remit your sins." That this is the sense is plain, for he adds, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ τοῦ Ἰωαννοῦ βάπτισμα τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὃς καὶ ἀφίεναι ἁμαρτίας ἐξουσίαν ἔχει. "Because the purification of John could not do this, but that of Christ, who has power to forgive sins." This last expression fixes the sense of καθαρίζει, and thus the sense of βαπτίσει to remission of sins, or sacramental purification. Athanasius, therefore, directly testifies, that this is the sense. Let us hear no more, then, of immersion in the Holy Spirit. Athanasius declares, that purification by the Holy Spirit is the sense.

Once more the lexicographers. Zonaras and Phavorinus define βάπτισμα thus, ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν δι' ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος—ἡ ἀνεκλόγιστος ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν—ἡ λύσις δεσμοῦ ἐκ φιλανθρωπίας δεδωρόμενη. The remission of sins by water and the Spirit—the unspeakable forgiveness of sins—the loosing of the bond (i. e., of sin), granted by the love of God towards man. These are obviously all equivalents of sacrificial purification, i. e., remission of sins. They would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός. Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given? These definitions are not the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. They are taken from the ideas of the Fathers, and nearly in their words. They also give definitions of the moral sense of βάπτισμα, i. e., moral purification—thus, ἡ ἐκούσιος συνταγὴ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν δευτέρου βίου ἢ ἀναλύσις (ἀναλήψις in Phavorinus) ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον. The voluntary arrangement of a new life towards God, or according to the will of God. The releasing, or recovery of the soul (i. e., from sin), for that which is better, i. e., holiness.

All this certainly denotes moral purification, or the restoration of the soul to a new and holy life. It is equivalent to Basil's second sense, ἀναγέννησις. These last definitions would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός, as denoting moral purification.

Again, I ask : Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given ? Nor are these last definitions the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. As before they are taken from the Fathers, and are given in their phraseology and style. Is there no evidence in all this ? Is it nothing that two lexicographers, writing in Greek, define βάπτισμα thus, and say nothing of immersion ? Does this look as if immersion is the very essence of baptism, as some assert ? Why is all this ? The reason is obvious : they were giving the ecclesiastical, the religious sense of the word, and in so doing they could give nothing else. But who was Zonaras, and what the value of his lexicon ? He was one of the four leading Byzantine historians. He wrote annals from the beginning of the world down to 1118. Also a commentary on the apostolic canons, decrees of councils, etc. He was first a courtier in the court of Alexius Comnenus, then a monk on Mount Athos. Of his history, Tittman says it is not surpassed by that of any Byzantine writer. Of his lexicon : " I consider it, after that of Hesychius, the most learned of all others that survive, the most copious and most accurate ; so that by it we can correct and confirm Suidas, the author of the Etymologium, and others, and even Hesychius himself. Finally, it is invaluable for illustrating passages of authors—some before published, others preserved in him alone." The question is not as to the taste and rhetorical excellence of Zonaras. It is this : Did not a historian who wrote in Greek, and was perfectly familiar with the writings of the Greek Fathers, and who wrote commentaries in Greek on the apostolic canons, did not he know what βάπτισμα means ? And yet of immersion he says nothing ; every definition is an equivalent of καθαρισμός. Does Mr. Carson say he is defining the nature of the rite, and not its name ? I reply : its name and its nature coincide. The Fathers define its name as purification, and its nature is the same. The definition of Basil is not a definition of *the nature of one rite*, i. e., *the rite* of Christian baptism. He is speaking of three baptisms, that of John, that of Christ by the Holy Spirit, and that of fire, at the judgment day. He cannot, therefore, be giving merely the import of one rite. Besides, the rite of Christian baptism does not import trial in the fires of the judgment day. Baptism by water does not import baptism by fire. It is the word, therefore, and the word alone that Basil defines. Nor is the definition accidental, but deliberate and formal. He fixes his eye fully and intently upon the point.

He brings up three cases in which the word is used. Purification is common to them all—purification by water, by the Spirit, by fire. There is a generic likeness but a specific difference, and so he defines: 1. Natural purification from filth—ὁ τοῦ ῥήπου καθαρισμός. 2. Spiritual purification, i. e., regeneration, ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις. 3. Purgation by trial by fire, ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ κρίσεως βάσανος.

§ 56. *Proof from the use of prepositions.*

But, as if to exclude all doubt, the prepositions that often follow βάπτισμα in patristic usage, require the sense purification, and exclude the sense immersion. They are διὰ, ἐκ, ἀπὸ, and in Latin, per. We find βάπτισμα διὰ πυρός, διὰ δάκρυων, διὰ μαρτύριον δι' αἵματος δι' ὕδατος. Purification by fire, by tears, by martyrdom, by blood, by water. Not immersion in fire, in tears, in martyrdom, in blood, in water. We find βάπτισμα ἀπὸ, or ἐκ πνεύματος, or ὕδατος, or πυρός, purification from or by the Spirit, or water, or fire. Not immersion in the Spirit, or water, or fire. So we find baptism per aquam, purification by water—not immersion in it. In making these remarks, I have my eye on numerous passages which, did my limits permit, I would gladly adduce. But the idiom, I think, no one will dare to dispute; but one beautiful illustration of it I will give from a translation, in a commentary of Hilarius. He is commenting on 1 Cor. 10: 1, ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, and says, "their past sins were not imputed to them, but being *purified* by the cloud and by the sea, they were prepared to receive the law." "Non enim illis preterita mala imputata sunt sed *per* mare et *per* nubem *purificati*, præparati sunt ad legem accipiendum." Comment is needless. Who does not see that with him βαπτίζω means to purify in the sacrificial sense, i. e., to remit sins? Hence, he says, *their sins were not imputed to them*, but they were *purified* by the cloud and the sea.

§ 57. *Argument cumulative.*

Any one of the cases I have adduced is decisive; but taking them as a cumulative argument, their force is irresistible. But the force of no one argument is greater than of that which is derived from the usages of language as to clinic baptism. Mr. Carson at least ought to feel this. He says that we may as well call black white as to call sprinkling or pouring immersion; and yet, a man not immersed, but only purified by affu-

sion, is expressly said to have been baptized upon his bed on which he lay. Nor was this an unfrequent case. Hilarius says, on 1 Tim. 3 : 12, 13—"non desunt qui prope quotidie baptizantur ægri." "There are not wanting, almost daily, sick persons who are to be baptized." Emperors were purified in this way. And yet, in formal histories in the Greek tongue, it is announced that they were baptized. Constantius ἀποθνήσκων ἰδοὺς βαπτίζεσθαι "dying, thought fit to be baptized." Theodosius the Great was thus baptized by Ambrose, in his last sickness. Basil says that they were so baptized when they could neither speak, nor stand, nor confess their sins; and when those present could not tell whether they knew what was done to them or not. Gregory Nyss. calls it ἐντάφιος βάπτισμα—sepulchral baptism. In circumstances so entirely excluding all thought of immersion, yea, when it is expressly stated that they were not immersed, but that the rite was performed by affusion, it is said they were baptized. Did the Greeks proclaim a falsehood in their own tongue? Did they declare before heaven and earth that a man was immersed, when every man, woman and child knew that he was not? Yea, did they declare it, when out of their own mouth they could be convicted of falsehood, for they themselves declared that he was not? How would it sound in English to say that a man was immersed by affusion or sprinkling? And would it sound any better in Greek? See § 28, 5, and 15.

But take the other view and all is harmonious at once. A man sprinkled on his bed, was purified on his bed on which he lay. The sprinkling of water or of blood did purify. Hence, when Cyprian reasoned from the sprinklings of the Old Testament to prove that a man could be baptized, i. e., *purified* by sprinkling, his argument was in point. But on any other supposition it is totally devoid of force.

On this ground we see at once why Clement saw, in all the heathen purifications, an image of baptism handed down from Moses; and why he could say that it was a custom of the Jews to be baptized often on their couches. We see why Cyril could speak of baptizing with the ashes of a heifer; and Ambrose of baptizing by sprinkling the blood of a lamb with hyssop; and why water and blood were called baptisms, i. e., purifying agents, as before explained. We can see, too, why Tertullian and Justin Martyr looked upon all the aspersions and expiations of the heathen world as baptisms. Purifications they

were. Immersions they were not. Finally, we see why Justin Martyr said: be baptized as to your soul from anger, etc., for to purify the soul from anger, etc., agrees both with Scripture and common sense. To immerse the soul from anger is at war with both.

§ 58. *Mr. Carson's canons cannot weaken it.*

It would be foolish, even if it were possible, to try to destroy such a cumulative argument by trying to neutralize its parts in detail, according to Mr. Carson's principles. But it cannot be done. All of his canons and principles of trial are powerless here. I am not trying to prove that βαπτίζω means sprinkle or pour—but purify; and therefore the first touches me not. There is no room for his second canon, for my argument depends not on the use of καθαρίζω, in place of βαπτίζω, but on the use of βαπτίζω itself. There is no room for the third and fourth canons. For I do not deal in rhetorical uses of βαπτίζω, but in plain prosaic definitions of it, and prosaic illustrations of those definitions. There is no room for his fifth canon, for there is clear proof that the name and the nature of baptism coincide. Wherever the Fathers see the thing purification, they give the name baptism, whatever the form. I stated at the outset, that by looking at the result and end of immersion in pure water, i. e., purity, the word would lose its modal sense, and pass to the sense to purify, irrespective of mode. And I have given most decisive proof that it did so pass. And this proof is strengthened by ten thousand facts on every side. I feel as though I had hardly begun to adduce the proof that exists on this subject. Indeed, no man can see it fully who will not leave the sultry regions of modern controversy, on this subject, and enter into the patristic world, till its languages, feelings, and usages rise from the dead and surround him, and impress upon his mind the whole scene. He will then find that the modern Baptists and the ancient Fathers live in two entirely different worlds.

The position from which the inferences in § 40 have been logically derived, has been established by evidence most clear and unanswerable. It follows, therefore, that those inferences are also established as true; and if so, their practical bearings are numerous and momentous, and it might seem appropriate to disclose them here. But though the main position has been most clearly proved, yet its whole strength has not been presented, nor can it be till I have considered some of Mr. Carson's

attacks on my former articles a little more in detail. In doing this I shall have occasion to adduce still further evidence from the fathers, so various, pointed, and definite, that, in my judgment, no rational ground for doubt will remain. Having done this, I shall close by a more full exhibition of the practical bearings of the results at which we have arrived. It was, indeed, my intention to finish the discussion in this article. But the reception of Mr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of our article.

ARTICLE IV.

REVIEW OF MORMONISM IN ALL AGES.

By Professor J. M. Sturtevant, Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

Mormonism in all Ages, or the Rise, Progress, and Causes of Mormonism. By PROF. J. B. TURNER, of Illinois College. Platt & Peters, New York.

MORMONISM has of itself no claims to the respectful notice of the periodical press. The shameless imposture of Joe Smith and his associates is as naked of interesting incident, as it is devoid of any semblance of plausible argument. Its details are loathsome and disgusting, and present to the mind only those revolting views of human nature which one would gladly forget, after having been once called to contemplate them, that he might still retain some respect for his species. We doubt not even that the very respectable book, whose title stands at the head of this article, encounters no small prejudice in the minds of many persons, by being made itself to bear some portion of the disgrace, which appropriately belongs to the disgusting developments, which are found on its pages. There are forms of error and fanaticism which we can hardly attempt to expose, without suffering in public estimation some degree of personal degradation. But we are not sure that this feeling is not more the offspring of pride than of philanthropy. We are

ourselves encompassed by infirmity ; and we have no more right to be indifferent spectators of a spreading moral malady, than of a sweeping pestilence. If our feelings of compassion call out our active efforts to stay or to mitigate the evil in the one case, those feelings should no less be stirred, and those efforts elicited in the other.

Professor Turner has therefore only done his duty, in sketching in bold relief the disgusting features of this new religious monster, and holding it up to public gaze in all its naked deformity. He has thus placed the antidote within reach of every man who may be in danger of coming under the influence of the poison. This task he has certainly performed with a master's hand. We assure our readers, who may not yet have read the work, that it is in this respect worthy of perusal. They will find much occasion to admire the power of the author's painting, and the vividness of his colors. As a specimen we extract the following, taken almost at random. The author is speaking of the various classes of persons who were drawn into the delusion.

"Others were appropriately convinced that the Lord had chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty, and consequently took up their line of march for the prophet. Not a few admired the genuine and unaffected humility of a church which was ready to receive those as prophets and apostles who could not even spell the name of the divine office to which they aspired ; especially when they contrasted it with the arrogance and intolerance of those sects they were about to leave, many of whom, in the pride and folly of their hearts, would not submit to be taught things divine by those who could not read intelligibly the decalogue of Moses or the sermon on the mount.

"These drew along in their train a motley host of all shapes and sizes, some from one motive and some from another ; men gaping for marvels, and women ready to swoon ; some praying for an apostle's martyrdom, others for Smith's millennium ; some thinking of their sins, and others of Ohio bank-stock and Missouri lands ; some thinking the world was soon to be overturned, others hoping to overturn it ; but all expecting prodigies of some sort ; and to witness, if not to obtain, the gift of tongues, of prophecy, of healing, etc. ; in short, a multitude which everywhere abounds, who have been kindly gifted with all sorts of sense except common sense, and who possess a genuine power of faith, which enables them to believe any thing whatsoever,

for no other reason, save that it is absurd, and who have obtained those marvellous gifts of a spirit which infallibly teaches them all knowledge, except the very simple and obvious fact, that they never knew any thing; these all were sucked, with wonderful facility, into this new Maelstrom of faith, and drawn with becoming velocity towards the conjuring spirits at the centre in Kirtland, Ohio," pp. 36, 37. The information which the book furnishes is such as no intelligent philanthropist or christian ought to be without. Mormonism is not confined to Nauvoo and vicinity. It is gathering its deluded victims by thousands from every section of the United States, and no portion of our country seems to present a sufficiently elevated grade of religious intelligence, to secure its population effectually against this delusion. We have no right to remain ignorant of the nature, history, and true causes of such a moral malady. In this point of view, therefore, it seems to us, that this work has no insignificant claims to the general attention of the patriot, the christian and the philanthropist.

But the book has claims to the attention of the periodical journalist, on other, and, it seems to us, still higher grounds. Such outbreaks of fanaticism as have so often occurred in the history of the past (the history of Christendom certainly not excepted), bear a close analogy to unnatural excrescences in the body. As the latter result from some diseased action in the system itself, so the former are the consequence of some moral malady widely pervading the body politic. They are too generally the carrying out of false principles, extensively prevalent, to their natural and perhaps necessary consequences. A system of religious imposture, to be successful, must be adapted to the religious fallacies of the time, with as much care as the machinist adapts his machine to the medium in which it is to be worked; and on this adaptation must depend the success or the failure of every attempt at religious imposition.

In the work before us Prof. T. has endeavored not only to expose Mormonism, but, as his title intimates, to disclose those depraved principles of human nature, which have produced like developments in all ages of the world—and to indicate those popular errors now prevalent, through which this particular form of fanaticism derives its nutriment from the religious body politic. In discussing each of these topics he must needs traverse a region of thought, which is of permanent interest to the philanthropist, and the christian moralist and philosopher. The

unthinking man or the skeptic may perhaps pass by with indifference or contempt, the religious follies and absurdities of our brethren of the human family : but the wise man and the christian will surely regard them with a sympathizing solicitude, as the symptoms of that moral disease, which pertains in a greater or less degree to every specimen of human nature ; and endeavor so to trace them to their true moral causes, that if possible the disease may be cured by the application of a timely remedy.

In this point of view, the occurrence among any people, of a successful attempt at religious imposture, is an event full of interest and instruction to that entire people. How often, at such a time, are the great mass of a community looking with expressions of pity or contempt upon a few deluded men, whose only peculiarity, after all, is that they carry out to their logical consequences, false principles, which they hold in common with a community or perhaps an age. To any compassion which may be felt for a band of misguided fanatics, we make no objections : it is appropriate and right : the expression of contempt is unphilosophical and unchristian. There is, however, another view of every such case, which it is incumbent on every good man to take, and which a wise man will not fail to take. The occurrence of such a phenomenon reveals and proves the existence of a moral malady, wide spread through our religious body politic — proves it by an argument which is not subtle and abstract, but very practical and tangible. It does more than this. An examination of the first principles, the fundamental assumptions of any spreading fanaticism would generally lead us to a knowledge of the true nature and extent of that disease, by exposing to public view, some great religious fallacy, held by the deluded few, in common with millions who are preserved by the grace of God from being drawn within the circle of fatal enchantment, and who may be convinced that it is a fallacy, by tracing its effects in the deluded few, when carried out to its ultimate logical consequences. Such an examination of this and every other form of successful religious imposture is therefore important, not only as affording the only hope of a remedy for the particular evil, but as likely to be in a high degree instructive to the entire community.

To what extent Prof. Turner has succeeded in these inquiries we shall leave, for the most part, to the judgment of the reader of his book, without attempting to forestall his opinion by any remarks of ours. All will, we think, agree with us, that he

has presented much material for grave thought ; and if he has not in every instance "worked it up" to the taste of the reader, we hope he will at least have been successful in calling the attention of other minds to a class of topics, which, it seems to us, have been greatly neglected.

But there are two points upon which we purpose to examine the views of the author a little more in detail. The first of these is *the nature of the evidence on which we are to receive the Scriptures as the word of God*. This is a subject which Prof. T. was compelled to discuss, or fail in one of the leading objects of the book. There is in our country an immense mass of skepticism, which is the direct result of familiarity with a factious and sectarian religion. We have among us thousands and tens of thousands, who see nothing in religion but the conflict of opposing, and often, to a greater or less degree, fanatical sects. Such men regard religion as having little or nothing to do with argument or conviction, and as belonging altogether to the imagination and the passions. To their minds, all religious sects are only so many different forms of the same vulgar weakness—all alike devoid of any claims to truth, and destitute of any authority over such enlightened and liberal minds as their own. Hence, when a new fanaticism springs up, however gross, however devoid of one plausible argument in its favor, it seems to them only the rising up of a new sect ; childish and absurd, indeed, but no more so than each and every one of the "numerous crop" already in existence. Now to all this class of readers, what avails it to demonstrate a thousand times over, if you please, that Mormonism is false and absurd, and a base imposture ?—so they always regarded it : and to have demonstrated the falsehood, and absurdity, and hypocrisy of one form of religion, goes far to confirm their confidence, that all others would prove equally unworthy of confidence, if examined with equal thoroughness. All this class of minds will, therefore, be decidedly confirmed in their infidelity, unless at the same time that you demonstrate the falsehood of the newly risen imposture, you also demonstrate that the religion of the Bible rests on entirely another and more substantial foundation. With this army of skeptics the Christian church has to deal, and while she continues to present to the world her present aspect of schism, faction, and contention, will always have to deal with it. As often as she is called to encounter the outbreakings of fanaticism on one side, she will at the same time be forced to

repel the envenomed shafts of infidelity on the other. Both these hostile influences are the direct consequences of a distorted and factious Christianity; and the former will never be left to make its onset upon the Christian faith, without the full and vigorous co-operation of the latter. He who would expose the one, must, therefore, look well to it that he does not at the same time abet and encourage the other.

This numerous class of skeptics are accustomed to make their attack in the form of a definite and tangible argument, which, though it is exceedingly flimsy in the judgment of the well-informed Christian, is to unthinking thousands specious and convincing. *We have received, say they, one religion on the testimony of Jesus and his twelve apostles, and why not another on the testimony of Joseph Smith, Jr., and his eleven witnesses?* If human testimony was a foundation broad enough to support a new religion eighteen hundred years ago, why not now? This is indeed but reiterating the favorite argument of the Mormons themselves; and it cannot be successfully denied, that thousands of Christians are found in the several sects, who are unable to answer it; as well as thousands of irreligious men, intelligent on other subjects, who are ready to pronounce it sound and conclusive. It is no wonder then that Prof. T. felt the necessity of taking decisive ground on the relation of human testimony to the evidence of revealed religion. This he has done in the following language:

"The fourth false ground of religious belief is mere *human testimony*; on the naked 'dictum' of some one or more of our fellow men. This subject merits a careful consideration. We have already proved by reasoning from past experience, that, however worthy of belief the human race may be in all else, in matters of faith they have, as a race, proved themselves liars, and utterly unworthy of all credit." p. 117.

The word testimony is, perhaps, in some degree ambiguous. It may mean simply the evidence, which is conveyed to the mind, of the reality of any alleged fact, by the mere assertion of one or more individuals; or it may include along with that evidence, all the circumstances which tend to produce the conviction that the individuals spoke the truth. We might become convinced by various circumstantial evidence, that an individual had in a given case spoken the truth, though he was notoriously destitute of veracity; so that on his simple say-so we would not believe any thing. Perhaps in such a case we might, in a

loose and popular use of language, be said to believe the facts stated, on that man's testimony. But however that may be, Professor Turner has left us no room to doubt his meaning. He says, "*mere human testimony*, or the naked dictum of some one or more of our fellow men." The latter clause explains the former. When, therefore, he objects to the reception of any religion on mere human testimony, and declares such testimony utterly unworthy of credit when employed for the purpose of giving currency to a new religion, he is to be understood to mean by testimony, "the naked dictum of some one or more of our fellow men." He is also to be understood to speak of the direct testimony of friends to the system, and not of the indirect testimony of enemies. This might also be shown by quotations, but it is unnecessary. On another page we find the author making a distinction between believing "IN" testimony, and believing "ON ACCOUNT" of testimony. He claims that we believe IN the testimony of the apostles, but not ON ACCOUNT of it. His meaning here is, we think, very obvious in view of the considerations already stated. We do not receive the facts of Christianity, because certain men have testified that they are true: the mere naked assertion of five hundred, or five thousand witnesses, could never have produced conviction. But we do believe IN the testimony of the apostles,—the circumstances of the case,—the attendant developments of divine Providence are such, as to render unbelief in the highest degree unreasonable. This we suppose to be the author's obvious meaning. Still it is evident that, in a certain sense, we believe *on account* of their testimony. That testimony is an indispensable link in the chain of evidence. Had they not testified, we should never have known the facts at all; and consequently could never have believed them. The notorious liar, who testifies before a court, may tell a truth of which the court could never have had knowledge without his testimony; and, although that fact would not be received on the simple ground of his word, attending circumstances may establish it beyond a doubt. This is what we suppose the author to mean when, on page 119, he admits the use of human testimony "in transmitting a genuine scheme of faith."

Is this, then, a just view of the subject? Does our belief in the facts of Christianity rest at all on *mere human testimony*, using the word in the limited sense in which it is used by Professor Turner? This is an important question, and we shall

endeavor to answer it. In order to do so, let us, if possible, form a conception of the case which must have been presented to us by the Christian witnesses, in order that our belief might have been challenged on the ground of such human testimony alone. Let us then suppose that the Christian scheme of religion bore no internal mark of divinity; that in its views of man and of God it stood on the same level as the philosophy of a Plato, or an Aristotle; that there were nothing in the character of Jesus, the personage around whom the whole clusters, to distinguish him from any of the sages of antiquity; that the alleged miracles did not claim to have been wrought in the midst of angry thousands, ready to imbrue their hands in the blood of the advocates of the new religion, and of course to prove them impostors if they could, but only in presence of the witnesses themselves, or at most of their friends and followers; that no voice of prophecy had ever predicted the coming Saviour, and that no general expectation had existed of the coming of such a personage; that the testimony of these men had either been rejected in the age in which they lived, or received, if at all, in such a way as to imply no argument in favor of the truth of the testimony; and that there were nothing in the subsequent history of the world inconsistent with the supposition that the whole was an imposition. Now, we ask the candid reader, if, on such grounds as these, our faith were challenged in the miracles of the gospel, would any sober-minded man think of believing them? Grant they were men of unimpeached probity; grant that they claim, and that collateral history proved them to have had the most intimate intercourse with the reputed author of the miracles, and consequently the best opportunity of detecting the fraud, if one existed. Grant that they were intelligent, sober-minded men, so far as history threw any light on their characters. Grant also that they had endured on account of their testimony the greatest sacrifices, and had finally all submitted to a cruel death, rather than abjure it; still, if they testified to miracles such as recorded in the Bible, and in circumstances such as we have supposed, would any rational man believe them? Would not every thinking man say, they might have been laboring under a fatal delusion? or they might have been impelled, by some secret motive of great strength, to practise on the credulity of mankind? Would not either of these suppositions appear far more probable than an interruption of nature's course?

If any one should be found to maintain that in such a case we should and ought to believe, we desire to propound to him another question :—Why then did God ever work miracles in presence of mankind at all ? If in such circumstances as these, the testimony of a Moses, a Paul, or a Peter, is to be taken, why not receive the religion *directly on their testimony, without ever founding it on miracles at all ?* The man who testifies that he has had a secret personal interview with God, asserts a thing no harder to be believed, than he who testifies that he has seen a dead man raised to life ; or a violent storm hushed to a calm at the bare word of a human being : and if I can believe the latter, on the simple say-so of a fellow-man, in such circumstances as we have supposed, then why not the other ? What in that case did our Saviour mean, when he said, “ If I do not the works of the Father, believe me not ? ”* Does he not warn the Jews against resting even *his* claims upon his mere say-so, and refer them to his miracles as the only trustworthy witnesses in his favor ? What does Peter mean, on this supposition, when he says to the Jews : “ Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved (accredited) of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, etc. ? ”† Does he mean that, though the mere testimony of an apostle to a supernatural event is to be received as convincing evidence, the testimony of Jesus himself could only be received, when backed up by miracles, and wonders, and signs ? To us this seems quite inadmissible. In view of these and other texts, is it not obvious that God did not intend that our faith should stand at any time on mere testimony ? At least, do they not prove that this rule was acted on at the outset ? And, surely, it would have been of little avail to have *started* the system under this rule, if it was after all immediately to fall back on mere testimony, so far as respected all subsequent generations. But this point is ably argued in the work before us, and to it we refer the reader.

Does any one object to this view of the subject, that it undermines the evidence in support of the divine authority of the Scriptures ? Have we then no good and substantial foundation still left to rest them on ? Is it no argument in their favor, that the only system of religion and morals ever taught on earth, which was either worthy of God, or suited to the wants of

* John 10: 37, quoted by Prof. Turner.

† Acts 2: 22, quoted by Prof. Turner.

man, is the very one in evidence of which these miracles are alleged to have been wrought? Is it nothing that the character of the personage in whose name they were wrought, was one of superhuman, yea, of superangelic purity and virtue; not only surpassing all other actual specimens of human virtue, but all other conceptions either of the poet or the philosopher, as much as the brilliancy of the noonday sun surpasses the faint glimmerings of the taper? Skeptics and self-styled philosophers may say what they please of this argument: we risk nothing in the prediction, that while it remains, though all others were forgotten, the Bible will be received as true, and as the book of God, by all the most enlightened and pure-minded of the human race. While these facts remain, virtuous and right-minded men will believe and *feel* that it is probable that God would work miracles in confirmation of such a system, taught by *such* a personage; and that it is more probable that a thousand miracles have been wrought, than that such a man has practised imposition in support of *such* a system of religion. While this argument remains unimpaired, we shall always believe that the man who deliberately rejects Christianity, does so because he wishes to avoid the salutary restraints of responsibility to the God of the Bible, and not because there is not evidence enough to produce conviction.

Again, is there nothing of argument in the fact, that the transactions recorded in the New Testament are boldly asserted to have taken place, in the midst of angry thousands, and sometimes millions, who might have disproved every fact stated in the writings of the apostles, had the statements been false, and yet they have never attempted to disprove one of them?—Nothing in the early reception of the faith of the crucified malefactor, in the midst of persecution the most bitter, and opposition the most formidable, by the most enlightened nations, and in the most enlightened age of antiquity?—Nothing in the fact that the life of Jesus was the fulfilment of a long line of predictions, uttered and recorded hundreds of years before his birth, and one of them designating the very time of his appearance?—Is there nothing in the subsequent history of the world, or in the monuments which have survived the wreck of nations for nearly two thousand years, or in the condition of the Jews, at this moment a standing fulfilment of predictions uttered thousands of years ago, or in the present condition and prospects of Christendom, inconsistent with the supposition that the religion of Christ is an imposition and a delusion?

Let it not be supposed, however, that we place the apostles as witnesses, on the same footing as the vile pretenders of other systems of religion. There are several points of distinction the most marked and the most honorable to the Christian witnesses. At two or three of these we will merely glance. In the case of pretenders to miracles under every other system of religion, we can distinctly see, in their circumstances and history, worldly and selfish motives of great power, impelling them to the practice of imposture: in the case of the apostles and first Christians, no such motives appear. There is, on the contrary, abundant evidence from history, both sacred and profane, that every motive of this nature impelled them to deny Christ, though having certain knowledge of his divine character. It is indeed supposable that they might have so used the belief of the people in the new religion, as to have made it subservient to their own ambitious schemes of personal aggrandizement: but there is an entire absence of all evidence that they did so use it, or that they had ever any such schemes. Indeed, there is the most decided evidence that they had not. Paul, and Peter, and John were, so long as we are able to follow their history, the servants of all men for Jesus' sake: they not only suffered the loss of all, but they neither received nor sought any earthly equivalent—they suffered the loss of all things that they might win Christ—they looked for their reward only in heaven. Compare these facts with the history of Joseph Smith and his witnesses. Fifteen years have not elapsed since the first pretended revelations, before we find the prophet, clad cap-a-pie in the costume of a military officer of the highest rank, and manoeuvring at the head of his armed Mormon legion. A Mormon community is organized,—a Mormon city founded,—a splendid temple is commenced,—extensive joint-stock companies are chartered. Joseph Smith and his immediate friends and supporters manage the whole; and all are to be sustained by heavy contributions levied on the faithful, and to be controlled by direct revelations from the Lord, through his *only prophet*. These are the true signs of an impostor: in the Christian witnesses they are entirely wanting.

Again, in almost or quite every other case of pretended miracles, the character of those who have claimed to work them, and of the religious system they taught, has been precisely consistent with the supposition that they were an imposition upon the credulity of mankind. In the case of the Christian

witnesses they are entirely inconsistent with such a supposition. The men were precisely such as we should never expect to be guilty of a deep-laid plot to deceive, and the system was one in defence of which we should no sooner expect fraud to be practised, than we should expect thieves to steal Bibles for their own use. Again, the Christian witnesses are the only pretenders to miracles, who have ever placed their pretensions on such a footing, as that an imposition admitted of easy detection, and that too in circumstances in which thousands were disposed to discredit them if they could. We only purpose to indicate this point of difference, that the reader may not suppose us insensible of it. It is a thought which is fully expanded in the various works on the evidences of Christianity, with which the English language abounds. It is a point too of great importance to the argument. Infidels tell us that history is full of pretensions to miracles, and would make the uninformed and unwary believe that the Christian miracles stand on the same footing with all the rest. No misrepresentation could be more gross. It is not only untrue that the world is full of *such* pretensions to miracles as those which are put forth by the sacred writers, but it is true that those pretensions are *wholly unlike any thing in the religious history of man*. No miracles of any pagan or papal wonder-worker, or of any modern impostor, can bear any comparison with them even in the pretensions put forth, much less in the fair opportunity they afford for detecting imposture. The two cases stand precisely contrasted—the Christian witnesses *sought* the scrutiny of enemies—all other pretenders have *shunned* it.

While, therefore, we deny that the Christian revelation rests at any point on the naked testimony of friends and advocates in its favor, we maintain that the Christian miracles stand contrasted with all other pretenders in this line, just as truth is contrasted with falsehood, and honesty with deception. No candid man can become acquainted with the former without respecting them, or with the latter without despising them.

If the principles thus far stated are just, we wonder not that Mormonism or any like delusion gains converts; or that skeptics are found to draw a parallel between the apostles and the witnesses of Mormonism. The statements of some of our most popular writers on the evidences of Christianity, are not clear or satisfactory in reference to the relation of human testimony to the evidence of divine revelation. In proof of this assertion,

we call the attention of the reader to the following extract from Paley's *Evidence of Christianity*, which has long been a text book on this subject in many of our colleges.

"If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible they should be deceived; if the governor of the country hearing a rumor of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it were at last executed; if I, myself, saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account: * * * * * Now I undertake to say that there exists not a skeptic in the world, who would not believe them, or who would defend such incredulity." p. 14.

Now we put it to the candid judgment of the reader, whether miracles are credible on such evidence as here supposed? Is it not entirely supposable, that twelve men "of acknowledged probity and good sense" should be found, who would still be capable of conspiring together to deceive their fellow-men? Can we have that knowledge of the probity of any twelve men, which would, of itself, be a sure protection to any community against such a conspiracy? Can we ever know, that in such a case it was impossible for a part or all the twelve to be deceived? If there is not that, in the circumstances of the case, to render it probable that in those circumstances God would work a miracle, is it not far more probable that one or the other of these suppositions was true, than that the laws of nature should be arrested? In the case put by Dr. Paley, no such ground of probability exists. He arrays our belief in human testimony, directly in opposition to our belief in the uniformity of nature's laws, with nothing to strengthen the former, or weaken the latter: and where there is an equal conflict between these two kinds of evidence which must prevail? For ourselves, we can be at no loss for an answer.

But in the case of the Christian miracles, we have shown that such a probability of very great strength is inherent in the very circumstances. Hence, in this case there is no conflict between mere human testimony and the uniformity of nature's laws. In

such a case as that presented by Christianity, it is probable a priori that the laws of nature will be arrested whenever it occurs. The truth of this position is sustained by the judgment of the human race in all ages of the world. On this point, the very credulity of the many, and the knavery of the few on the subject of miracles, are important auxiliaries to our argument. Both combine to show, that it ever has been the judgment of mankind, that God would probably by miracles make known his will to man. Had there been no such acknowledged probability, there could have been no temptation to such knavery on the one hand, and no foundation for such credulity on the other.

Is it not then clear, that Dr. Paley, in the very outset of his work, makes a false issue with the skeptic? Our limits will by no means suffer us to enter into an analysis of Dr. Paley's work as it stands related to our argument, but we think it easy to show that, in the present state of the public mind on the question, this false issue in the outset, in a great measure deprives the book of its power to convince the skeptical inquirer, while those who do rest their faith on this form of the argument, will be very likely to be perplexed and baffled when called to meet a crafty impostor. Indeed, if such a man be devoid of mental independence, and not bound to Christianity by any strong ties of moral sympathy, he is in a fair way to become a victim of Mormonism, or some other equally groundless delusion. We think it not inappropriate in this place to suggest, that it is perhaps time that this book should give place, in our colleges, to some other work better adapted to the actual state of skeptical objection in this country. It is certainly a matter of no small interest to the cause of religion in our country, that the evidence of Christianity is a part of nearly every course of college instruction; and it is the duty of Christian instructors to spare no pains necessary to give that argument its full power over the forming mind of the nation. Care should at least be taken to employ a text book, which presents the argument in a form truly logical and unanswerable. We would not be understood, however, to intimate that Dr. Paley's work does not furnish materials for a triumphant vindication of our faith. Our objection lies wholly against his mode of stating his argument.

The only remaining point upon which we purpose to notice the views exhibited by Professor T., relates to certain false notions in reference to the *mode of divine influence over the*

human mind. That such influence is a reality, he does not question: but certain prevalent perversions of this great doctrine of Scripture, he exposes with great freedom and effect. We earnestly commend this portion of the book (the last chapter) to the careful attention of the reader. Its costume is, indeed, in some parts, ludicrous and amusing in a high degree; but there is a vein of thought running through it which is sufficiently grave and solemn to interest the most serious-minded. This chapter, like all the rest of the book indeed, bears internal marks of having been hastily written, and perhaps the author has not, in all cases, guarded his statements with as much care, as a due regard to the extreme sensitiveness of the public mind on this subject requires. But we think a careful consideration of this portion of the work will convince any candid mind, that there is in more than one of the prevailing sects, a great amount of material made ready to the hand of any enthusiast or impostor who may choose to work it up. We are not sure, indeed, that in the application of his principles the author is not a little too sweeping and indiscriminate, but in our opinion the subject is one which requires great plainness of speech. The fact is undeniable, that there are impressions widely prevalent on this subject, which find no support either from Scripture or reason, and which bring into constant jeopardy the religious sanity of him who entertains them.

Let a man assume that he can be conscious not only of his own emotions, but of a supernatural influence by which they are excited, and he is upon an open ocean, with neither sun nor stars to guide him. We are firm believers in the doctrine of the influence of the Spirit of God on the heart of man, in the great work of regeneration and progressive sanctification. But how are we to know that we are at any time under the influence of that Spirit? Can we be *conscious* of it as we are of our own emotions? Or are we merely to *infer* it from the fact, that the fruits of the Spirit are produced? And what are the fruits of the Spirit? Are they not those virtues of the Christian character, which are well defined in God's word? And can we have any evidence that this or that thought or emotion is a fruit of the Spirit, except its perceived agreement with the teachings of Scripture? To us the answer to all these questions seems very plain. Thus viewed, the doctrine of the influence of the Holy Spirit on the mind is rational, and tends to the happiest results. To this view of the subject we are persuaded Christians gene-

rally yield a ready assent, as accordant with both Scripture and reason. If so, then we ask the reader carefully to compare it with the facts and considerations adduced by Professor Turner in his last chapter : and then let him judge whether this doctrine be not extensively and alarmingly perverted. We might extract particular passages. We prefer to urge on the reader the perusal of the work itself, and especially the last chapter ; and we assure him he will need no urging when he has once commenced. The author deals in *facts*—and they are facts from which a child can deduce the inevitable inference.

The simple truth is obvious. There are vast multitudes of nominal Christians among us, whose religion consists largely in a certain glow of excitement, which they consider as evidence of the presence of God's Spirit. It is not definitely any Christian virtue which is brought into exercise ; but it is excitement—*religious excitement*—that is what they want and *will have* ; and in their minds the man whose voice can produce it, is *God's ambassador*, and the doctrines which can call it forth, and roll it up mountain high, are *God's truth, whether they be Calvinism, Arminianism, or Mormonism*. Indeed, in the course of a few years all these, and a great many other conflicting forms of opinion, are likely enough to have their turn. We make these statements with no fear of successful contradiction. We are assured that they are corroborated by the personal observation of every intelligent reader.

Nor is this mere harmless delusion. It is this very delusion which is hurrying its thousands every year into the vortex of fanaticism, and driving back its tens of thousands into cheerless, heartless, hopeless skepticism. There are in this age not a few minds so strongly imbued with this love of excitement, that they will "compass sea and land" in the search of its gratification ; and wherever they go they will carry along with them an undoubting belief, that where it is found there is *the truth*, there is the *felt seal of divine favor and approbation*. Such minds must not be expected to be shocked at any absurdity taught by a "Joe Smith," or any other enthusiast or impostor, provided that they find under his teachings their favorite religious luxury.

There is another class of minds, probably more numerous by far than these, who are utterly devoid of religious emotions and affections. They are as much too cold as those just described are too warm. It is a grave question, seldom raised with the seriousness it should be, How are such men affected by

such religious views and practices as those we allude to, and so powerfully portrayed by Professor Turner? The question needs but to be stated; the answer is obvious. Nor let it be imagined that the evil is confined to the two extremes we have been considering. There are multitudes who are restrained by the love of sect and by the influence of friends from the outbreaks of fanaticism, but who are, nevertheless, by this same cause deeply infected with the disease. Nearly every intelligent pastor knows some of them in his own parish. They are the unquiet, the feverish, the fitful—those who can only be influenced by working on their imaginations and their passions: to them arguments are cobwebs. Who has calculated the injury done to the cause of religion by the influence of such spirits, or pointed out the extent to which they are made what they are by the very delusion of which we are speaking?

We must here take our leave of Prof. T. We have read his book on the whole with much pleasure. The reader will doubtless agree with us, that it is not every man who could write such a book on such a subject. It doubtless has its faults both of style and matter. Its style makes no pretensions to classic elegance. It appears to have been chosen for an occasion and a purpose, and to be well adapted to both. We are mistaken if it does not conduct many a man quite through the history and causes of Mormonism, who but for the fascination of the style would never have been persuaded to read a single page. We think, however, that the author owes it to his own reputation to appear before the public on a subject more dignified and attractive, and in a style more chaste and classic. The author of "*Mormonism*" is certainly capable of so writing as to amuse and instruct.

There is yet one thought to which, in bringing our remarks to a conclusion, we wish to invite the serious attention of every reader, who waits for the consolation of Israel. We have all indulged the pleasing hope that the church and the world are in the present age rapidly advancing towards a brighter and a better day. For ourselves we still cling to this hope, and believe it to be founded on the most substantial evidence. But while we cling to it, and find it full of encouragement and consolation, we cannot deny that the age we live in is also marked, not only by widely prevalent confusion and religious disorganization, but by a readiness of the popular mind to entertain in its bosom, and to warm into life and vigor, almost every species

of imposture and fanaticism. Let us not flatter ourselves that credulity and fanaticism are confined to the Mormons: or that they furnish the only specimens of religious delusion sufficiently prevalent and flagrant to call for the compassion of the wise and the pious. He who supposes so, has studied the religious condition of our country with very little success. What inference, then, are we to make from such an admitted fact? That our hopes of the enlargement and peace of Zion are extravagant and unfounded? A little consideration will enable us to answer this question in the negative. It is no new thing in the history of Christianity, that the same age should be characterized by a real progress in the knowledge and prevalence of true religion on the one hand, and by many and disgraceful outbreaks of fanaticism and imposture on the other.

Nor is it difficult to point out the cause of this combination of opposite phenomena, seemingly resulting from the same causes. When a false principle has been admitted into the religious system of any community, it has a constant tendency to work out its own results, both logical and practical, more and completely, with each successive generation. A point at length is reached in the progress of that community at which those results become obvious and apparent to all. A threefold division of the popular mind may now be expected to take place. One party adheres still to the principle, and pushes it out boldly to all its consequences, however absurd in theory, however ruinous in practice. Those constitute the fanatical class. A second rejects with scorn and contempt the whole system of doctrines with which the false principle has been associated, without any discrimination or reservation. This class embraces the various forms and grades of religious skepticism. Others still, we fear, often a small and feeble band, adhere with attachment and conviction to the great truths of religion, and address themselves with discrimination to the work of eliminating the false principle which has produced all this mischief, and so dreadfully disgraced the respectable society into which it has been admitted. What we have here said of one false principle is of course equally true of many.

Such, we are persuaded, is the true philosophy of the present state of religious society in these United States, and indeed throughout Christendom; and nowhere is the conflict of these three conflicting forms of religious influence so fierce and so universal as in our country, and especially among the alluvial popula-

tion of the new States of the West. If this then is our condition, if the time has really come when our American Zion must either throw off the last remains of the great apostasy, and stand forth in the full freedom and power of the gospel, or sink under her burdens, and fall an easy prey to her enemies; if this struggle is actually commenced, and going on around us, then how natural the occurrence of disorganization, confusion, and fanaticism! And how reasonable to expect the fiercest assaults of all the powers of darkness and spiritual despotism! If this is our condition, how solemn, how responsible is that condition! The man who would act well his part in such a crisis, has something more to do than blindly to adhere to a favorite creed or cherished system, and look with mingled anger and contempt on what he supposes to be the hosts of error around him. It is his duty to his God to scrutinize every phenomenon of religious society around him, and to trace it, if possible, to its proper moral cause, with as much care and patience as the astronomer scrutinizes the phenomena of the heavens. It is his duty to bring every doctrine, and every practice, to the test of God's word, and to abandon all as worthless which cannot abide *that test*; and while he is made to feel, as surely he must, that all else in the moral world is but writing on the sand, to be washed out by the next wave of the swelling ocean of discussion, to rest assured that the word of God is a rock, which shall not be removed from its place by all the tumult and commotion around it. We are mistaken in our judgment, or the darkest omen in the signs of the times is, that there is so little of this true Christian philosophy. God grant it may be multiplied a hundred fold to our American Zion.

ARTICLE V.

THE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBORDINATE TO THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

By Rev. George Duffield, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Detroit.

THE visible universe is adapted to produce, in the mind of a reflecting observer, the conviction of its perpetuity. At first

glance, indeed, appearances of decay and dissolution strike the eye, which, associated with the conviction of our own mortality, make the contrary impression. A second and more scrutinizing view, however, corrects the impression, and convinces us, that all the forms and processes of dissolution which we witness, are but the regular changes taking place in an endless series of being. The acorn breaks and liberates the germ of the stately oak, which, having evolved its innumerable offspring, crumbles in decay, depositing its own substance in the earth, to feed and enrich their growth. One generation passeth away, and another cometh, with the utmost certainty and regularity. Throughout the whole range of animated being, as life decays and disappears in one, it reappears and flourishes in another. And this alternation of life and death, this regular progression in the series of animated beings, is as fixed and uniform as the changes which occur in the physical world. The sun rises and goeth down, and returneth to his place again. The moon waxes and wanes, and passes through her monthly phases and revolutions. The planets sweep their orbits through immense circles of the universe, and preserve the vast cycles of their revolutions with uninterrupted uniformity. Summer and winter, seed time and harvest never fail. The tides have their ebbings and floodings; and the vapor, condensed and precipitated in the showers that refresh the earth, is transmitted through springs and rivulets and larger streams, till it is again borne in its elastic form from the bosom of the ocean, to repeat its revolution. And these processes have gone on, with as much uniformity in the wilderness and desert, as in the cultivated region. Nothing arrests the course of nature. All things, in this respect, continue the same as they were from the beginning of creation. Annihilation forms no feature of the physical government of God.

From this fact, the mind of man has drawn different inferences. Under the guidance of infidelity, it has been led to question the existence of a God, and the reality of a divine moral government altogether, and to reject and scoff at the day of final retribution. The scoffers of whom Peter prophesied, appear in these last days, walking after their own hearts' lusts, and saying, "Where is the promise of his coming? For, since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation," 2 Pet. 3: 4. The uniform course of providence, and the delay on the part of God, to interfere in any miraculous manner, to punish the crimes of men,

have emboldened the wicked to attribute to priestcraft and to ambition of spiritual power, all they hear about the guilt and danger of violating the moral law of God. And science is sometimes adduced to countenance skepticism, and to fortify the minds of men against their apprehensions of coming wrath. Astronomy volunteers its aid to the human eye, as it traverses the immensity of space, and introducing us to worlds and systems, whose revolutions and cycles, compared with those of earth, are like eternity, compared with time, boastfully inquires, Are all these to be extinguished? Is this frail diminutive creature, man, the moral centre of the creation? Is this little globe of primary importance in the general system of the universe, or entitled in any respect of magnitude, position, relation, or constitution, to be regarded as exerting an influence over others? Shall man, remote in his position, low in his origin, insignificant in his abode, claim to be under the government of law, and anticipate adjudications and treatment different from that, which, in common with all the animated tribes of earth, he shares in the physical government of the material universe? If he violates the law of his physical being, it is admitted, he must suffer, as do the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea: but as to danger affecting his future and eternal relations, growing out of his violation of the moral law, many declare themselves to be perfectly incredulous. In the former case, the evil ensues immediately on the violation of a law of nature; but, in the latter case, "because judgment against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore, the hearts of men are wholly set in them to do evil." But, however skeptical man may affect to be, in relation to a divine moral government, and the certainty of its retributions, the Lord Jesus Christ has taught, in the most explicit manner, that God is more tenacious of his moral, than of his physical government, and that less may be hoped for from any change in the former than in the latter. The entire constitution of the visible universe, so far as human nature stands affected by it, may and will undergo a change, but there shall never be the slightest deviation from the grand eternal principles of right and truth, which God has made the basis of his moral government. If we think it difficult, that a change should take place in ponderous globes, and revolving suns and systems, Christ says, "it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail," Luke 16 : 17.

The truth here taught is obviously, that the entire economy of nature is subordinate to the moral government of God. God would sooner, and could with more ease, obliterate the heavens and the earth, than alter his law, or allow its precepts and provisions, in the least respect, to be violated with impunity. In elucidating this interesting and solemn truth, it may be remarked :

I. THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE, THAT IT MUST BE SO. The material universe is a sublime system of machinery, adjusted and balanced with the utmost skill, on the part of its great Architect. Everywhere are to be found traces of design in its structure. The order, arrangement, and motions of its various parts, all indicate the power and wisdom of Him, by whom the worlds were made and are upheld. But in all this great clock-work of creation, there are no vested rights, nothing necessarily affecting the interests and obligations of intelligent and accountable beings. The universe of mind alone is under the moral government of God. It is in the relations of rational beings, that we talk of mutual rights. Whatever changes, therefore, are made in the visible heavens and earth, they do not, in themselves, affect the rights and obligations existing between God and man. They are but new phases of the wisdom, and goodness, and power of the Creator. Revelation assures us, that they will and do wax old as a garment, and, as a vesture, they are changed by the Almighty, when fallen into decay. All such changes, however, serve only to reflect more intensely the glory of the divine power and majesty, just as we admire the wisdom of God, in the varying structure and functions of the worm, as it passes through different stages, from the egg to the chrysalis. But where the rights, and hopes, and interests, of rational and accountable creatures stand affected, changes, in the laws affecting them, become dangerous and improper. A government may level mountains, may drain marshes, and dig canals, turn the course of rivers, and fill up valleys, and change the soil and appearance of the face of the country, and get all the renown which is due to splendid improvements, but they no sooner annul laws, which vest rights, and become capricious or unrighteous in enactments, affecting the interests of their citizens or subjects, than they tarnish the glory of their moral character, and destroy the spirit of patriotism and love of country essential to their welfare. Now, God has a moral character, the maintenance

of which, is of more consequence to the universe of intelligent creatures, than all the sparkling glories of the heavens. Having given a law to regulate their conduct, and direct their hopes of immunity and bliss, a departure from that law on his part could not fail to be disastrous. The least disrespect, on his part, of its precepts or provisions, would produce the most painful doubts and suspicions, and sap the very basis of all rational confidence in his character and government. High public considerations, yea obligations, therefore, affecting his glory as a divine moral governor, and that in a respect of far more consequence than his glory as the God of nature, forbid the annulment or violation of his law by himself, and, consequently, all connivance with man or countenance of its violations by him.

Besides, the Bible plainly teaches, that the God of nature is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has been pleased to legislate for man, and to provide a Saviour for him from the wrath to come. Now, if the laws of nature are not under the control of Him, who is the great moral governor of the universe, then is he not the God of nature, and there can be no security, that his moral government will be either permanent or salutary. That the God of nature is the great moral governor of the universe, all men feel fully and almost instinctively persuaded. That they are not different Beings, but the same, there is proof abundant, not only in the revelations of the Bible, but in the conduct of Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour, when upon the earth. He rebuked the waves, and bid the tempest hush its angry roar. He gave eyes to the blind, and ears to the deaf, and life to the dead, and proved that all the elements of nature were at his command, and therefore, in every respect, is entitled to our confidence. Were it otherwise, all harmony would cease in his government. The jarring elements of nature might clash with his moral administration, and the impression be inevitably made on rational minds, that there is imperfection with God, that he is either unwise in his enactments, or weak and inefficient in their execution: and this done, there never could, in the nature of things, be confidence in his government. For the glory of the divine moral character, being vastly more important than that which attaches to him as the great Creator of the universe, it is of infinite moment, that no change be made in his laws affecting it. It would be a thousand-fold preferable, that the artist's

most beautiful sculpture, or the architect's choicest specimen of skill, and taste, and sublimity, should perish, than that he should be found guilty of dishonesty and falsehood, or any other crime, which would tarnish his moral character, and consign him to infamy among men. And thus God must feel, that it would be infinitely better, that the heavens and the earth should pass away, than that he should compromise his truth and justice, by violating his own law, or suffer its admirable precepts to be broken with impunity.

II. *Another consideration on this subject is suggested by the FACT AND NATURE OF THE MIRACLES OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST.* They prove, from phenomena which have occurred in the history of this world, that the moral governor of men, and the God of nature, are the same.

We want no better proof than a miracle furnishes, that the laws of nature may be, and have actually been set aside. The reality of miracles is assumed in this argument, as very well established by the evidence of testimony. The skeptical objection against the truth of miracles, founded on the uniformity of causation and their contrariety to our experience, needs no further notice than to remark that the uniformity of causation, which is limited to each individual's experience and observation, is, and must of necessity be inferred from a very contracted view of the combination of causes, of which our consciousness of ignorance predisposes us most naturally and readily to receive the testimony of others, who, as veracious witnesses, report to us what they have seen, or heard, or ascertained, by their own senses, to be fact. The evidence of testimony is as strong and satisfactory as that of the senses; and mankind instinctively admit the one as readily as the other to be the means of knowledge, unless they have, by their sophistry and skepticism, bewildered their own minds. He that rejects the evidence of testimony, because it goes beyond the limits of his own experience, must, if he act consistently, doom himself to inevitable ignorance on a thousand subjects of science, which, to him, can in no other way become known.

The miracles of the Bible have been wrought always, and only, for the purpose of promoting and confirming the moral government of God. The miracles of Scripture are events cognizable by the senses of mankind, produced either in direct contradiction, or by suspension of some known and established law of nature, under circumstances of publicity which admit of

no question of the facts having been observed by credible witnesses. The plagues of Egypt, which were all miraculous, were designed to exalt the honor and claims of the God of heaven and earth, above the gods of Pharaoh;—the destruction of fifty thousand Bethshemites, for withdrawing the lid of the ark of the covenant, and looking on the tablets of the law, engraven by the finger of God;—the overthrow of the army of Sennacherib, and an endless number of others, recorded in the sacred Scriptures, while they have proved that the God of nature is the God of the Bible, have also subserved the most important moral purposes. By the death of the Bethshemites, the God of Israel meant to counteract and to destroy the idolatrous superstition of the people, and to teach the dreadful danger of rashly intruding into things which he had kept hidden, of treating with vain curiosity and idle familiarity the most sacred rites and ordinances of his religion, as well as of looking to the moral law without the intervention of a mercy-seat, or propitiatory. By the overthrow of the army of Sennacherib, which was miraculously effected in answer to the prayer of Hezekiah, God meant not only to preserve the rites and ordinances of true religion from idolatrous invasion, but also to counteract the demoralizing tendency of the raillery and blasphemy of that proud monarch's ambassadors, which had been presumptuously, wantonly, and insultingly indulged, in the presence of the people. And as to the miracles of Christ, and his apostles, they all bore the impress of benevolence; and while they authenticated their mission, illustrated the character of their author, and proved that the God of nature considered his moral government of more value than his physical. A law of nature might be suspended, but one jot or one tittle of the law must not be suffered to fail.

III. THERE ARE ABUNDANT FACTS WHICH PROVE THAT GOD HOLDS THE ENTIRE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBORDINATE TO HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT. These facts may be classed under two heads:—1st, Those which have occurred in the dispensations of his retributive providence; and 2dly, Those which grow out of the very constitution of man and the structure of human society.

Examples of the first class are very numerous. They are strung along the history of our race. They appear on the records of the past. Man was driven from his happy abode in Paradise, and the waters of the deluge rolled their desolating surges over all that was beautiful and glorious in this world.

The fountains of the great deep were broken up, and myriads of guilty creatures were swept with the besom of destruction ;—and why ? Why did the earth's huge pillars break, and all its massive bars give way ? Why did God consign this beautiful world to destruction, mingle all the elements together, and make every law of nature work for the general ruin ? Because man had sinned. He had rashly dared to violate the law, and God was determined, that not one jot or tittle of it should fail. Already has he given proof, that he holds the economy of nature subordinate to his moral government ;—that he would sooner the earth should be destroyed, than countenance the crimes of men. The very structure of the earth, replete with the memorials of that mighty wave of ruin that swept around our globe, proclaims to the eye of men this solemn truth. Sooner than sacrifice, or dishonor his law, God sacrificed the race of man, and drowned the place of his abode.

Geologists and philosophers may write and speculate as they please, about the physical causes of the deluge ; but whatever those causes may have been, they were all under the control of the great first cause, the directing hand of God. The real cause was, the crimes of men. God made an example of his determination to maintain his law. More than one hundred years before, he made known his purpose ; but the scoffers of the age laughed Noah to scorn, who revealed the will of God, and called upon them to repent of their crimes. Their unbelief, however, did not “make void the faith of God.” The destruction of millions of the race, of the entire globe, was nothing, compared with the violation of the Almighty's pledge, or of the moral constitution he had ordained for the government of man. Some philosophic spirits of a former age, doubted whence water could be obtained to drown the world. Later infidels have wondered why such an event has not more frequently occurred. But God has pledged his word, that the waters shall not again submerge the globe, and that summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, shall not fail, till the consummation of its destiny. And herein is the world's security. The moral governor of the universe is the God of nature. He is at the helm of creation, and guides and governs all natural causes to subserve the moral purposes of his lofty sway.

The destruction of the cities of the plain, and the preservation of Lot, afford another striking example. It has been supposed, and that with some reason, that volcanic fires produced the over-

throw of Sodom and Gomorrah; and that the asphaltic lakes or Dead Sea, where once those cities stood, are but the crater of an immense volcano which undermined their foundations. Others again, have thought that an earthquake rent the surface, and made the earth and subterranean waters change their places. But let the natural causes be what they may, they were all directed and controlled by that God, who is jealous of his law, and holds his word to be immutable, like himself. He had promised that Lot should escape from the general ruin, and therefore the hidden fires slumber, the earth delays its mighty heavings till he is out of the reach of their fury. "Haste thee, escape thither, to Zoar," said God to him, "for I cannot do any thing till thou be come thither." Lot trod with safety over the opening abyss,—the mighty agents at work in the natural world, were kept in check by the still mightier power of God, who had said that he should be saved. The moral constitution here triumphed over the physical. Whatever philosophic men may have thought and written about the physical necessity for the destruction of Sodom, Christ makes no account of it. The physical causes would have all stayed their destructive work; the volcanic fires would have found another vent, or slumbered to the present hour, had it not been for the crimes of the guilty inhabitants of the cities of the plain. These were the immediate causes of their destruction. Had they repented of their crimes, at the warning voice of Lot, or had the mighty moral works, which were done in Capernaum, been done in them, they would have remained to this day. The pledge of God's word, the protection of his moral sway, is infinitely better than all the security we may propose to ourselves, from what we suppose to be the necessary action of physical causes.

The dispensations of God's providence towards the Jews, and other nations of antiquity, afford illustrations of the same truth. There can be no security, however confident men may be in their individual, social, or national resources, when they seek it in the way of iniquity. Therefore, said God to them (and how many nations and individuals have verified the same to be the invariable law of his providence): "Therefore have I also, saith God, made you contemptible and base before all the people, according as ye have not kept my ways, but have been partial in my law." The least deviation from his law he will not tolerate. If he has sacrificed almost all the race, and once destroyed the globe that we inhabit, and hurled nation after na-

tion to destruction, because they would not submit to the restraints of his law, will he make more account of the impenitent man? By no means. The heavens and earth shall pass away, before God will sacrifice his law, and accommodate himself to the rebellious inclinations and wishes of the wicked.

IV. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT GOD HAS EVER ALTERED THE PROVISIONS OF HIS MORAL LAW, OR EVER WILL. The law, given on Mount Sinai, and published by an audible voice in the ten commandments, was not then for the first time enacted. The law is coeval with our race, and is wisely, wonderfully, and benevolently adapted to the nature of man. It has been enacted for the express purpose of promoting the happiness of mankind. A deviation from it he declared, in the very infancy of our race, would be ruinous. Its violation would be followed with death, and death has followed in one regular and steady flow from the first parent of the race till the present hour. It is true, that the specific form in which God presented his law was that of positive statute, prohibiting Adam and Eve from the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; but this was a mere circumstance, intended to put to the test the obedience of the first pair. It was so prescribed, and they stood in such a relation to God, that its violation was equivalent to the violation of every precept of the decalogue. The violation of a positive statute, which was made the test of obedience to an entire code, would not fail to be regarded as the violation of all; and indeed the principles of a man's conduct, which are too weak to prevent him from violating the law in one respect, cannot be safely relied on in any other, where temptations are equally strong, and circumstances equally favorable to sin. Hence the Spirit of God has declared, "He that offends in one point is guilty of all." It was the same law, enjoined on man in innocence, that now asserts its claims and authority over man in guilt and rebellion. God punished the violation of that law, in the first instance, with death, and death yet reigns over the guilty children of men. The constitution remains inviolate on the part of God, although broken on the part of man. His enactment of the moral law on Sinai, and the explicit and peculiarly pointed and solemn exposition of that law by Jesus Christ, show plainly, that whatever man may think and hope, God has not changed the code under which we live.

The apostle Paul has shown that the heathen world are all under the same law, and that far as the race is found, God is

pursuing, in the infliction of death upon transgressors, the vindication of the honor and authority of his law. Death is the wages of sin, and death reigns and triumphs with as much uniformity, and as certainly, in consequence of sin, as physical evil comes, on the violation of the laws of nature. Men do not expect a change in the latter;—they see the uniform results that flow from their violation, and whether they will, or not, the instincts of their being command their respect for them. Why then, when age after age, and generation after generation, they see death sweep over our guilty race, will they anticipate a change in God's moral constitution? The laws of nature have been occasionally changed by miraculous interpositions of divine power, but where is there an example of a sinner ever having escaped from death, save Enoch and Elijah, whom he exempted from the execution of this law of his moral government? What right or reason can the sinner have to hope for escape from the punishment so justly due to his sins? Will God alter his law for his convenience? Where is the pledge or proof the sinner has, that he either will or can do so? Are we directed to the scheme of redemption? We reply:

V. THE SALVATION OF JESUS CHRIST NEVER WAS INTENDED TO INVALIDATE IN THE LEAST DEGREE THE AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW.

"I came," says Christ, "not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it." By his own example of perfect and perpetual obedience, he has magnified that law, and shown how God and all holy beings regard and honor it. And can it be, that after having set such an example—having labored and suffered so much to vindicate the good and holy law of God, he will grant the sinner permission to violate it, or look with allowance on his sins? He has indeed atoned for our sins, and rendered it consistent for God to forgive those their sins who will repent and turn from their transgressions. But all this does not affect the claim of God's law, or render void our obligations to it. The very design of his redemption is to bring men off from their rebellion, and to establish them in the love and observance of his law—to make all who will accept the proffered pardon zealous of good works, and conscientious in their observance of the commands of God. If, therefore, the sinner has learned to hope in his mercy, and can live in the indulgence of any one sin, or the neglect of any duty, he is perverting the grace of

God into licentiousness. He is expecting what God declares shall never be.

It is indeed true, that the sinner's obedience is not required in order to merit heaven, nor to establish a plea of justification before God, on the ground of personal obedience. But if God offers pardon freely through Christ, and declares that he will justify all transgressors freely through the redemption which there is in him, provided they believe, how can that affect their natural and rightful obligations to do his will? He that says he believes and hopes in the mercy of God for salvation, through Jesus Christ, while he does not conscientiously keep the commandments of God, shows that his mind is blinded, and his conscience defiled. It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for God to suffer the wicked to pass to heaven, who claim the privilege of being saved without a diligent, faithful, and conscientious observance of his will.

VI. GOD AFFORDS PROOF IN THE EXPERIENCE OF EVERY UN-CONVERTED SINNER, THAT HE DOES NOT RECEDE FROM HIS LAW, AND WILL NOT ALLOW HIM TO VIOLATE IT WITH IMPUNITY. Although he may think, that impunity thus far may afford presumptive ground to hope for it in all time to come, yet will he find his mistake ere long. "Although a sinner do evil a hundred times," says the wise man, "and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him: but it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow, because he feareth not before God." The retributions of a God of justice will overtake him. Of this, God furnishes abundant proof long before the hour of awful and signal vengeance.

Take the transgressor, of whatever character, and interrogate him in relation to the thoughts of his mind and the feelings of his heart. What painful forebodings, what agitation and perturbation of spirit! What seasons of gloom and dejection oppress and distress him! To the eye of man, he seems gay and full of glee, but could we enter his heart, what crowds of envyings, and fears, and jealousies, should we find distract him in his retirement! The youthful drunkard does, indeed, as he quaffs his cups, and raises the lewd and lustful song, vainly think himself happy; but when recovering from his debauch, and beginning to reflect on his conduct, who would envy him his feelings? How does his eye drop before the gaze of purity and innocence, and his cheek grow red with blushes, when re-

mind of his bacchanalian exploits! How often does remorse torment him, and his conscience fill him with self-reproach, when he reaps the pain which his excess secures in his own body, or the misery which it inflicts on his wife, and parents, or children, whom he has disgraced and degraded by his crimes! His stomach, gorged and sickened by excess, does not more loathe its food, than does he loathe himself. Unhappiness attends him at every step. His friends desert him—his children despise him—his neighbors refuse to trust him—his property slips from his grasp—his debts accumulate and molest him—and the further he pursues his soul-destroying appetite, the more does he sink degraded in his own estimation. What is all this but the voice of God, proclaiming to him, that he cannot thus violate his laws with impunity?

In like manner, the gambler and seducer, the avaricious and fraudulent, the proud and revengeful, the lustful and unclean, have all their inward woes, at times, when the keen and cutting reproaches of conscience overwhelm them. These are the proofs which God is giving, that his law must be honored, and that he will not compromise its claims. All the misery in the world is the result of its violation. Some wise and gracious design must be had, by a Being infinite in his benevolence, in thus filling the earth with wretchedness. He delighteth not in unhappiness. "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." He would rather it were otherwise, but it is all intended to show the value he puts upon his law, and how unalterably he will adhere to all its provisions. Thus do the sorrows and woes of men speak to the Christian's faith, and proclaim the Almighty's determination to visit the sinner's iniquity upon him.

The skeptic will probably say, that the disease and wretchedness of the youthful sensualist, result from his violation of those physical laws, which God has ordained for the preservation of the health of the human body; and are to be assigned to natural, and not to moral causes. But the economy of nature, as it has been shown, is subordinate to the moral government of God. He ordained the laws of man's physical constitution, and those which regulate his susceptibility of excitement. And these laws were all intended to promote the great purposes of morality. The natural and uniform result, in due season, of suffering and wretchedness from immoral causes, only shows the wisdom and immutability of God's moral constitution, and

how subservient natural causes are made to its great interests. Impenitent men have proof enough of God's respect for his law in their sorrow and anguish, in the keenness of their self-reproach, and the discontented, fretful state of their minds consequent on their sins. They who live in the habitual violation of the law of God, pursue the very course to subvert the natural economy designed of God, and calculated to promote human happiness; and are, themselves, the authors of their own misery and ruin. Their painful convictions, and secret fears, and torturing reproaches of conscience, and restless inquietude, and dissatisfaction with every thing around them, are but the voice of God, assuring them, that it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail.

VII. THE RETRIBUTION OF THE GREAT DAY WILL CLEARLY AND FULLY DEMONSTRATE THAT GOD HOLDS THE ENTIRE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBSERVIENT TO HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT. Then the heavens and the earth shall literally pass away;—the elements shall melt with fervent heat; and the earth, and all things in it, shall be consumed with the fires of his wrath; but his law shall abide forever. The flames of an expiring world shall prove to his rational universe, how impossible it is for God to set aside his law. To its honor he once sacrificed the world,—for its vindication, he poured down the lightnings of his fury from heaven, and consumed the cities of the plain. One nation after another has he swept with utter destruction, and caused their very name and memorial almost to perish, because they kept not his law. His own beloved Son, too, must be sacrificed, before ample atonement could be made, and he could impart forgiveness. And the heavens and earth, which are now, are kept in store reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men.

The scoffer does, indeed, smile at such declarations, and turns away from the warning voice that calls men to repentance: but the history of the past affords presumptions of truth too strong to be resisted by a rational mind. The laws of nature are no guarantee for absolute and everlasting safety. The very elements, so essential to life, can be easily converted into the sources of death, and often have been, where God has sent his wide-spread and desolating judgments through the earth. He wants not agents in nature to accomplish his will, for he knows all its constituent elements, and can touch at will the springs of life or death. The chemist knows full well that it

would be an easy thing for God to set fire to our globe. All that would be needed, would be to increase the proportion of one or two of the ingredients of our atmosphere. The naturalist can descry, in the volcanic craters which afford vent in different parts of the globe for the terrible agents that are struggling within, the vast reservoir of internal fires, which, at the Creator's will, can rend and melt this globe of ours. There is no want of the agents or supporters of combustion. The very laws of nature, if disturbed, as they sometimes have been, though now they work for its safety, would just as easily work for the world's destruction. It is the will and the hand of God that holds them in abeyance, and makes them subserve the purposes of life and happiness. They possess no necessary perpetuity. But the moral government of God is immutable, like himself; and he has declared, that it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail. The word of the Lord shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure. But it is his will, that his moral law and constitution should remain forever inviolate.

In view, then, of this important truth, how unspeakably foolish and delusive are the sinner's hopes! God declares that salvation is far from the wicked, and that escape is forever impossible for those who persist in violating his laws, and reject the only remedy which heaven has provided to obviate the consequences of their past rebellion. Yet what multitudes indulge hopes and schemes of bliss which are sustained and prosecuted in direct wanton violation of the law! Their sensuality and selfishness, their profanity and impiety, their falsehood and treachery, their avarice and cruelty, demand punishment, and will secure it, if they reject the boon of heaven, and refuse to return as humble penitents, and submit to the divine sway. On the basis of personal merit they can never stand, having once violated the law. However trivial they may allege their offence to have been, God will not allow one tittle of his law to fail. Another method of salvation is impossible. If the righteousness of Christ be rejected, there is no remedy, and there can be none other than delusive hopes.

The benevolence of God also appears distinctly in view of this subject. His law was made wisely, and was designed and adapted for the happiness of his subjects. Just in proportion to the strength of his benevolence, therefore, must he adhere to that law and enforce its provisions.

How utterly insecure and dangerous, too, must be the state of

that nation which throws off the restraints of God's good and wise and holy law, and whose rulers and governors will not recognise his authority and its prescriptions in their legislation and administration of justice! Egypt, and Nineveh, and Babylon, and Greece, and Rome, and other nations of ancient and modern ages, afford illustrations of the stability of God's word, and of the utter insecurity, yea, certain eventual destruction, of that people who will not give glory to God, and reverently observe his laws. We have had examples of his retributive justice already in the history of our own country; and if these United States will, by their constituted authorities and their popular habits, set at nought his will, and trample his law beneath their feet, desecrate his Sabbath, profane his name, disregard the solemn sanctions of his oath, violate public faith, disrespect obligations, and substitute their will and wisdom for his, we too shall learn, in our sad history, that there is a God which judgeth righteously in the earth, whose sway extends as well to nations as to individuals.

It will be but a poor pretence to urge that, as the God of nature, he may be treated with respect; but that the very genius of our government prevents us, as a people, from recognizing and honoring him as the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The God of nature is the God of grace; and he is Governor among the nations. To distinguish between these revelations of the same Being, and that for the purpose of treating his mediatorial scheme with practical contempt or neglect, will only secure the merited vengeance of that dread Being, who will not allow the violations of his law and the rejection of his counsels, to pass unpunished.

Whether as individuals or nations, the reason and the means of destruction will be found the same, and the result as sure. Opposition to, or neglect of the constitution of God, will and must prove fatal. It is madness, for either the private individual, or the public functionary, or the authorities of a nation, or the mass of a people, to expect that God will annul his law. Few, if any, would dare to avow such an expectation. But what says their conduct? Examine that,—not only the conduct of the openly profane and vicious, but of those whose behavior is the most externally correct. Penetrate their secret thoughts, which they wrap up in darkness to conceal the horror of them from themselves, and it shall be seen, that there are not wanting those who madly hope to overcome God. Is it

asked who they are? It is the fool-hardy soldier that braves danger, affronts death, and marches with undaunted step amidst fires and flames, but has never repented of his sins and committed his soul to Jesus Christ.

It is the foolish maddened votary of false honor, the miserable slave of cowardly fears which prevent him from manly independent exercise of his own judgment and will, and from submitting to the dictates of his own conscience, who ventures in single combat with his fellow man, and seeks by shedding blood to atone for the dishonor or the injury which he thinks have been done to him. It is the statesman, who pursues the suggestions of party wisdom, tramples the law and Sabbath of the Lord beneath his feet, and fears not to be guilty of state crimes, and to disclaim all practical respect for Jesus Christ and his religion. It is that proud philosophical stoic, who conceits himself to be superior to all the ills and vicissitudes of life, and lives in neglect of the law and worship of God. It is that luxurious son of wealth, who trusts in his riches and felicitates himself in their abundance. It is that voluptuary, who scoffs and sneers at all denunciations of divine vengeance, and turns away from all representations of heaven and hell, of eternity and damnation, and seeks to drown reflection in his cups, his company, his amusements and diversions. In a word, they are all who live in the violation of the law of God, and promise themselves escape from wrath, and bliss hereafter; when God hath said, "It is easier for heaven and earth to pass than for one tittle of the law to fail."

ARTICLE VI.

EXPOSITION OF JEPHTHAH'S VOW, JUDGES 11: 30-40.

By Rev. Xenophon Betts, Vermillion, Ohio.

THIS vow of Jephthah belongs to the class which Moses describes (Lev. 27) as "singular vows," i. e., vows which were not prescribed particularly or required; something of the nature of free-will offerings. Jephthah was moved by the Spirit

of God to stir up the children of Israel, and lead them to war against their oppressors, the children of Ammon. As he, with his host, was ready to go against their enemies, "Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt, without fail, deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and (margin, *or*, Heb. *ו*) I will offer it up for a burnt offering," 30, 31. He went out, was successful; and on his return to his house, his daughter, an only child, came out first to meet him, and it is said, he "did with her according to his vow which he had vowed: and she knew no man," 39.

The question arising on this passage is, What was the import of Jephthah's vow? This being settled, it settles the question, what he did with his daughter, for it is expressly said, he "did with her according to the vow which he had vowed."

The import of the vow depends on the manner of rendering the conjunctive particle *ו*, whether it is used copulatively or disjunctively. It is well known that the structure of the Hebrew language admits of either. This particle has the same force as the Greek *καί*, which may signify either *and* or *or*, *both* or *either*. Its meaning is to be determined by the subject with which it is connected. Hence the margin of our Bible gives the disjunctive rendering to the particle in this case. The vow will then read, "Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, or I will offer it up for a burnt offering." With this rendering, the fulfilment of the vow will imply that Jephthah, in some peculiar way, devoted his daughter to the Lord (probably to some such service as led to, or required, a life of celibacy).

The design of this article is, by establishing the marginal reading as the correct one, to remove a difficulty from the passage which strikes many minds with horror, and throws a dark shade over the character of Jephthah. With the marginal reading, the passage does not teach that Jephthah immolated his daughter, but that he devoted her to the service of God in some peculiar way, and thus to a life of celibacy. We are led to adopt the marginal as the true reading from the following considerations:

1. *From the nature of singular vows.* The account and reg-

ulation of singular vows, or voluntary devotements, is found, Lev. 27. Such vows respected persons, clean and unclean beasts, houses, and lands. In respect to persons, the rule was, "When a man shall make a singular vow, the persons shall be *for the Lord* by thy estimation," v. 1. Then follows a rate of estimation according to the age and sex. In respect to clean beasts, "whereof men bring an offering unto the Lord, all that any man giveth of such unto the Lord shall be holy," v. 9. There was no estimation put upon such devotements, and no condition of redemption. If it was an unclean beast, it was to be presented before the priest, and by him valued. It might then be redeemed by adding one-fifth to the value of it. Of the rules and conditions of other devoted things, it is not necessary to speak, as they could not be embraced in the condition of Jephthah's vow, "Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me." This could respect only the persons of his household, or the beasts of his possession. Now, by adopting the marginal reading, the language of the vow was exactly adapted to the rule respecting singular vows. A person, or an unclean beast, was to be the Lord's, i. e., for his service; but clean beasts, those whereof men bring an offering unto the Lord, were to be holy, i. e., should be offered in sacrifice. His vow was, it "shall surely be the Lord's, or I will offer it up for a burnt offering." This embraced all the possible alternatives. If it should be one of his household, or a beast, which it was not proper to offer in sacrifice, it was to be separated to the Lord's service: but if it should be a beast, whereof men bring an offering to the Lord, then he would offer it up for a burnt offering.

2. *The context favors the marginal rendering.* There is nothing in the context, aside from the language of the vow, which would lead us to suppose that Jephthah put his daughter to death. All that is said in relation to his vow is, that he "did with her according to the vow which he had vowed," which, as we have seen, necessarily signifies no more than that he, in a peculiar manner, according to the conditions of the singular vow, gave her to the Lord, probably including, devoting her to a life of celibacy. This is all that is required to explain the context; and some parts of it are better explained by this interpretation, than by supposing that he offered her up for a burnt offering. This will fully explain Jephthah's grief at meeting her. The context specifies that she was his only child. His

devoting her then in this manner would be the blotting out of his name and family. This, in Israel, was regarded as a peculiar calamity. This interpretation better explains her conduct with her companions, in spending a season previous to the fulfilment of the vow in "bemoaning her virginity." It certainly strikes the mind rather singularly, that this should be the subject of their lamentation in prospect of the speedy violent death of one of their number. But, adopting the proposed interpretation, it is just the course we might expect them to pursue. She was about to be separated from them to spend her life of celibacy, either in retirement, or somewhere in such employment as would remove her from their society, and cut her off from the most animating hope of a daughter of Israel, that of becoming a mother, and possibly the mother of the promised Messiah. "She went with her companions, and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains" two months. This interpretation agrees better with the language of the historian, in recording the fulfilment of the vow, than the received translation, which must signify that he offered her up for a burnt-offering. The record is, "And it came to pass, at the end of two months, that she returned unto her father, who did with her according to the vow which he had vowed; *and she knew no man,*" v. 39. This last clause seems rather uncalled for, on the supposition that she was at that time offered up for a burnt-offering; but, taking the marginal reading, it is perfectly natural. This closing remark shows in what manner the vow was fulfilled. He did to her according to his vow; and, instead of giving her to a husband, and thus perpetuating his family by her, he gave her to the Lord, and she remained unmarried for the sake of his service, that she might care for the things of the Lord, how she might please him. There is a marginal reading of the 40th verse, also, which becomes significant and appropriate, by adopting the marginal reading of the 31st, and the interpretation proposed. It is said, "The daughters of Israel went yearly *to lament* (margin "*to talk with*") the daughter of Jephthah, the Gileadite, four days in a year." On the adoption of the proposed interpretation, the marginal reading of the last verse becomes perfectly consistent and natural. It is the very course that would be expected from her companions, that they should, at suitable times, visit and commune with her. This course is rendered the more probable, as it might be expected that, by her retirement and devotions, she would become distinguished

for her wisdom and piety, and thus would become a person of interest, not only to her immediate companions, but to the "daughters of Israel" generally.

Here the question may arise, with regard to the fact of such devotements. Without entering fully into that subject, it cannot be denied, that some passages favor the idea. 1 Cor. 7: 32—34, clearly implies such a practice, and more than intimates, that it was regarded with complacency, as favorable to piety in those who could adopt it. Our Saviour's remark, that there are some who have *made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God's sake*, implies the same thing. It is evident, also, that there were many female as well as male servants employed in the service of the Jewish religion; and some things favor the idea that they lived in celibacy. Repeated mention is made of singing men and *singing women*. Ezra mentions a large company that claimed to be children of the priests, who had lost their register, and who were consequently excluded from the priesthood until their origin could be settled. He says, "The whole congregation together was forty and two thousand three hundred and threescore. Besides their servants and their *maids*, of whom there were seven thousand three hundred and thirty and seven: and there were among them, two hundred singing men and singing women," Ezra 2: 64, 65.—In Numbers, chap. 31st, we have an account of a war of the Israelites with the Midianites. They slew all the men and saved the women and children. The Lord directed further, to slay all the women that had been defiled by carnal intercourse with men, and all the male children, and to spare the remaining females. Of these there were thirty-two thousand. These were equally divided with the rest of the spoil, between them that went out to war and all the rest of the congregation. Then, from the warrior's half, one in five hundred was to be a heave-offering for the Lord: of the people's half, one in fifty was to be given to the Levites, which kept the charge of the tabernacle of the Lord. The Lord's portion therefore of these, was thirty-two persons; and these, among the rest of the Lord's portion of the spoils, Moses gave unto Eleazar the priest: from the other half, there were three hundred and twenty, which he gave with the rest of their portion of the spoils to the Levites, which kept the charge of the tabernacle of the Lord. It is very plain, that widows sometimes remained in their state of widowhood from a regard to the service of the Lord. Anna, the prophetess, is an

example; and the company of widows in the primitive Christian churches shows also the same custom. All these considerations go to make it appear that devotements to the service of the Lord were not uncommon in Israel.

3. *The character of Jephthah favors the marginal reading and the proposed interpretation.* Aside from this one act which is the subject of inquiry, there is nothing which leaves any reason for suspicion in regard to his piety, or even any thing which appears like rashness. He was, indeed, an illegitimate child; and by the pride and rashness of his brethren he was thrust out from his father's house; but nothing is said of him in this transaction prejudicial to his character. It is said, indeed, that certain vain fellows joined themselves to him in his banishment; but that was true of David also in like circumstances. It shows only that he was a man looked up to in whatever company he was found. This appears still farther in the fact, that when his brethren were in trouble, they were glad to recall him, and that also with the promise to submit themselves to him as their leader. The whole narrative, except this misconstruction of his vow, goes to establish his claim to be ranked as the apostle has ranked him among the crowd of faithful witnesses. Take this view of his vow, and his whole character appears consistent. He made a vow perfectly in accordance with the nature of the dispensation under which he lived, and for the regulation of which, rules had been prescribed which would cover every possible alternative; and he fulfilled the vow which he had made at a great personal and domestic sacrifice. Take the other view of this passage, and you have one who is ranked by inspiration among the faithful witnesses, offering a human victim in sacrifice to Jehovah, an abomination of which one of Jephthah's rank and intelligence could not possibly be ignorant. Another alternative, no less absurd, is, that his vow, if interpreted according to the received reading, might have bound him to offer some unclean thing in sacrifice to God, which he must have known was expressly forbidden. The marginal reading removes this difficulty.

4. *The providence of God in the case favors the marginal reading.* Is there any other instance in which God was so solemnly appealed to in behalf of his own cause, for a result, where, by the result, he involved a servant of his in so decided an act of abomination? Herod's oath to his niece is not an analogous case. Herod was not pledging himself to God's ser-

vice. He was the slave to his lusts, and God ensnared him in his own rash vow; he no doubt also held him responsible for the consequence. Neither was God's command to Abraham to offer up Isaac a parallel case. He tried Abraham's faith, but saved him from any result which would leave the suspicion of cruelty on his character. The case before us, on adopting the received translation, is a perfect anomaly in the providence of God.

From all these considerations, we regard the marginal as the true reading; and suppose that Jephthah, instead of offering his daughter in sacrifice as a burnt-offering, devoted her in some special way to the service of the Lord and to a life of celibacy. He "did with her according to his vow which he had vowed: and she knew no man."

ARTICLE VII.

CHRIST THE PREACHER'S MODEL.

By Rev. ASA D. SMITH, Pastor of the Brainerd Presbyterian Church, New-York.

It is not the design of the present article to dwell on our Lord's more private excellences. We touch not, except in the way of brief and incidental reference, on the blamelessness of his general life, his meekness and lowliness of mind, his ever active benevolence, his zeal for God's glory, his devotional habits, his self-sacrificing spirit. We consider him not even, so to speak, as a theologian—but simply as a Preacher. It is doubtless proper thus to regard him. There are certain limitations, however, with which his example should be copied, and, to preclude all misapprehension, it may be well just to glance at these in the outset.

The circumstances of his ministry were in some respects peculiar. This remark might be illustrated by many a reference to the character of the age in which he lived, and to the genius and habits of the people among whom he labored. And it has an important relation to his preaching considered as a model. Forms, both of speech and action, change somewhat with circumstances. They are seldom, therefore, to be exactly copied,

however worthy of adoption the unchanging principles they embody. Our Lord's example, indeed, in all its departments, is to be followed rather as to its principles, its elements of excellence, than as to its outward shapes; accommodated as those shapes were to surrounding circumstances, and different, in many points, as those circumstances were from ours. Again, our Lord's character was unlike that of his servants in respect to his perfect holiness. It was altogether natural and proper that this should in some degree modify his preaching. He could say, fearlessly, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" It was quite becoming in him, therefore, to reprove with a severity, and to denounce with a sternness, which would hardly befit those who are themselves transgressors,—who adopt, every one of them, the confession of Paul, "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." And further, divinity was in Christ united with humanity. He could properly speak, as God does in the Scriptures generally, with an air of authority which a worm of the dust may not assume. And so he did speak, at certain times especially, Deity shining out through the veil of flesh. We may add, that during our Lord's ministry, anterior at least to his death, the work of redemption was incomplete. Of consequence, the great system of gospel truth could be but partially exhibited. Many things pertaining to it, even his disciples could not bear till he had risen from the dead. Our Lord was straitened, even as to his teaching, till his baptism of blood was accomplished. It was reserved for the Apostles and their successors in the ministry, to preach Christ crucified with a distinctness and fullness which that doctrine could not well assume, while, as yet, the cross had not been erected.

But these limitations affect not our general position. As to all the great points of excellence in pulpit discourse, our Lord's preaching may still be regarded as a perfect model. To some of its main characteristics, as thus apprehended, we propose to advert, attempting, of course, in a single article, but an outline.

We notice first its *spirituality*. Of this there are various aspects. It is one of the most obvious, that he kept aloof from all secular topics. He declared, emphatically, that his kingdom was "not of this world;" and with this announcement all his preaching corresponded. He delivered no political discourses. Political evils there certainly were around him—evils unfriendly

to the progress of the gospel, and which the spirit of the gospel was suited to eradicate. But he meddled not with them directly. It was impossible to draw him into a discussion of them. Cæsar might be a tyrant—he doubtless was. His government was little better than a system of slavery. He made sad havoc of human rights. Yet all our Lord could be induced to say of him, even when artfully and earnestly interrogated, was but to suggest certain great and efficacious principles, which he left it for his hearers to apply: "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's." When requested, on a certain occasion, to assume, as it were, judicial functions, to settle a question of heirship, his ready response was, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?" And he proceeded to expose the inward evil, which formed, doubtless, the chief difficulty in the case: "Take heed, and beware of covetousness." As if he had said, "It is the main object of my ministry to promote inward purity. This attained, all secular evils will either pass away or become tolerable." In accordance with such views he seems to have always acted. Slavery existed in the world, and that of the most revolting kind, during his whole ministry. It existed in the very empire to which Judea was attached, yet he never made it the object of a specific attack. He knew full well that the best way to extirpate it, was to establish his kingdom in human hearts. The apparatus of war was around him, and "wars and rumors of wars" were predicted by him. Yet he never preached "a peace sermon," as that term would be understood by some. If the peace of God should but pervade the spirits of men, he was well assured they would have peace with each other. What a lesson have we here for the gospel minister! He may not close his eyes to the secular grievances of the times, to the disorders of the social system, to political abuses, and international evils. But he should ever remember, that his chief reformatory agency, as to all these matters, is the simple preaching of the gospel, the winning of soul after soul to Christ. And this, he may be assured, is the mightiest of all agencies.

The spirituality of our Lord's preaching was apparent, also, in his manner of exhibiting divine things. It was seen in his treatment of religious forms and ceremonies. These he did not, indeed, wholly repudiate, but he made them, comparatively, of little account. To the Jews, burdened not only with the Mosaic ritual, but with superadded traditions of the elders, he said,

"Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." In reproof of their formality, he quoted the declaration of God by the prophet, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." "God," he taught them, "is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." He cast no contempt on rites divinely appointed, but he laid no undue stress upon them. He gave not the slightest countenance to those who contend for certain ceremonies, as if the salvation of the world were at stake, and who exclude from their fellowship all who differ from them. The circumstantials, the drapery, the mere appendages and symbols of religion, he ever represented as of very inferior consequence. In all his preaching, the weightier matters of the law, and the great essentials of the gospel, were the all-absorbing topics. In all his inculcations of religious duty, we may add, he had respect chiefly to *the inward life*. At an early period in his ministry, he refuted the superficial interpretations of the law current among the Jews. He taught them that God's commandment was exceeding broad, and that it had respect primarily and mainly to the inner man. He was always chiefly intent on the rectification of the spirit. "Out of the abundance of the heart," his doctrine was, "the mouth speaketh;" "out of the heart" proceedeth all manner of wickedness. He aimed at the reformation of the whole man, by setting right the foundations and elements of character, the sources and springs of action.

In all this how wise and salutary was his example! How vain are all attempts at reform, which are chiefly directed to the outward life! If ever so successful, they would still come far short of God's standard—they would fail to fit the soul for heaven. But in the nature of things, they must be comparatively powerless. The farther you depart from the spiritualities of religion, the less you have to do with conscience. She seconds your efforts but feebly, when they have little respect to her chief sphere of jurisdiction, the world within. And if, by other means, you succeed in producing some external change, it will probably prove but temporary. You have been cleansing the stream, while the fountain is still foul and turbid. The lava has been pent up for a little season, and flowers have been scattered around, but it will soon burst forth, the more terrible and destructive for the very restraint it has suffered. Who has not observed, how utterly inefficacious that preaching has soon become, whose expositions and injunctions reproofs and horta-

tives, have had to do chiefly with the outward conduct? A congregation under such training will soon remind the most superficial observer of "the heath in the desert." The noise, and stir, and bustle, to which clerical empiricism at first gave rise, will soon subside into the stillness and quietude of death. A sort of galvanic treatment may produce startling spasms for a time, but even these will soon cease. To drop the figure, it will come to pass, ere long, that though the preacher stand up in the holy place, and utter the most earnest entreaties, and the most awful rebukes and denunciations, he will yet seem to himself and to others, "as one that beateth the air." How different the result of eminently spiritual preaching, such as our Lord's! It bids streams gush forth in the desert. It forms not merely the cold and lifeless statue, but animates it with fire from heaven. If the heart be right, all will be right. If the life of God be but begun in the soul of man, you shall see in all the visible character the outgoings of that life. Let the gospel minister, then, imitate most carefully the spirituality of his Lord's teaching.

We may further illustrate the point in hand, by reference to the motives with which Christ was wont to enforce his teaching. His preaching in this respect was at a great remove from that mawkish *sentimentalism*, which may suit well enough the pages of an album, or an annual, but has little effect on man's higher susceptibilities, and is miserably out of place in the pulpit. Nor were his persuasives drawn, as is sometimes the case, from the twilight region of natural theology—from the cold and cheerless sphere of the heathen moralist. He had no resemblance, he afforded not the slightest countenance, to the preacher of whom it has been well said,

"How oft when Paul has served him for a text,
Hast Plato, Tully, Epictetus preached?"

The morality he inculcated was enforced by highly spiritual motives. It was in this respect eminently evangelical. It was closely linked with the cross. Its sanctions and incitements were mainly gathered from the great scheme of redemption.

Another prominent excellence of our Lord's preaching, was its *simplicity*. This was a very natural result of its spirituality. He is most likely to be simple, who concerns himself chiefly with the great fundamentals of duty, with the inward elements of character. Hence the whole Bible is thus distinguished, and no part of it more so than the discourses of Christ.

This characteristic of his preaching may be considered in two points of light, in respect both to language and thought. His language was exceedingly simple. Not that it was low, or even inelegant. In more beautiful costume thought was never arrayed. The quotations so often made from his discourses, even when connected with the highest strains of human eloquence, are, to say the least of them, and to speak of their style alone, "like apples of gold in pictures of silver." They are beautiful in all their simplicity—yea, they are beautifully simple. This characteristic of language has, of itself, a charm. It not only brings truth down to the level of common minds, but makes that truth more attractive. And while it involves nothing of vulgarity or coarseness, we may truly say, that it is compatible with the very highest adornment.

But simplicity of *thought* is still more important, as to all the best ends of discourse, than simplicity of speech. Yet the one, obviously, may exist without the other. Nay, if we mistake not, the one has sometimes been the subject of much attention and solicitude, while the other has been little regarded. In our Lord's preaching, however, both these characteristics were combined. His trains of thought were marked by great simplicity. His illustrations were all borrowed from the objects of nature and the common affairs of life. Nor were they, on this account, the less clear and impressive; the reverse rather was true. It is a wise remark of Bacon, "They be not the highest instances that give the securest information, as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher, that while he gazed upwards to the stars he fell into the water; for if he had looked down, he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft, he could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and small things discover great, better than great discover the small." In simile and allegory, we may add, the preaching of Christ abounded. It may almost be said of his whole ministry, "without a parable spake he not." Truth was thus made palpable to the plainest understanding. Never did he exhibit it in an abstract way. His preaching was replete, if we may so say, with simple concretions. He dealt chiefly with masses of thought, with organic forms, rather than dissected members. He might be likened rather to the painter or the sculptor, than to the chemist or anatomist. He avoided utterly that excess of analysis which renders the preaching of some so

dry and unprofitable. Illustrations of these remarks we might draw from all his discourses. It will suffice to select but one.

On a certain occasion a lawyer "stood up and tempted him." He begged to know how he could secure eternal life. Jesus, in reply, referred him to the divine law, and questioned him as to his knowledge of it. He answered discreetly, giving a summary of the decalogue, and our Lord made application of it to his conscience. Willing, however, to justify himself, and troubled especially, it would seem, by the second great commandment, he began to question Jesus in respect to the duty it enjoins. "Who is my neighbor?" What is the nature and extent of the benevolence required? A great question this—a grand point in theology, proposed, too, by a learned and subtle man, and addressed to one "in whom are held all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." How, think you, did he reply? Let conjecture, for a moment, take the place of memory, and the thought-worn theologian answer after his kind. "He defined true benevolence, doubtless," methinks I hear one say, "as the love of being in general." "Whatever else, he said," another replies, "he made this point clear, unquestionably, that of all specific, voluntary action, happiness is the ultimate end." "Whatever view he took," says another, "he doubtless entered deeply into the nature of moral distinctions, and the ground of moral obligation; into the relations of man to his fellow-man, and the origin and scope of the social affections. His definitions, it may be presumed, were the most exact, his analysis profound and perfect, and his exposition of the whole subject—of its metaphysical aspects especially—clear, logical, and systematic." Turn we now to the record, and not a single definition do we find, not a solitary analytical process, not one abstract statement, not the merest shadow of metaphysics. His response was but a simple allegory: "A certain man came down from Jerusalem unto Jericho, and fell among thieves." We need not repeat the rest, it is fresh in the reader's recollection. Instead of defining, or analyzing, or abstracting benevolence, he painted it, he bade it live and move, in human form, as it were, before his cavilling auditor.

The great importance of simplicity in preaching, is apparent from various considerations. It is impossible without it to interest deeply the common people. By abstract and excessively analytic discourse, they are little moved, and less profited. They may admire, vaguely, the preacher's profoundness, but they

understand him not, and weariness soon ensues. They care much less, indeed, for the recondite qualities of things, than for their obvious and practical nature. If truth interests them at all, it is in the living and palpable forms which the Bible gives it. If the water of life allures them, it is not as *decomposed*, but as it flows from the throne of God and the Lamb. And the common people, be it remembered, are the great mass of the people, the great majority of our hearers, and withal the most hopeful subjects of ministerial labor. It was so in the days of Christ. His ministry was chiefly attended by the plain people, and of that class were most of his followers. He had good reason, then, for adapting his preaching to such. And so have his ministers now. He of whom it cannot be said that the common people hear him gladly, may look for little success as a preacher of the gospel. He may be distinguished as a poet, or a critic, as a historian, an antiquarian, or a metaphysician, as deeply versed in theology even—but not as winning souls to Christ.

The wisdom of our Lord's example, in respect to the point in hand, may be still further evinced. Simplicity of discourse is quite as effective with the truly intellectual, as with the common people. It is no indication of feebleness or poverty of mind, but the very reverse. It is easy enough to make a plain subject dark, by pedantic and profitless distinctions and definitions; but it is one of the highest achievements of intellect to make a dark subject so plain, that all shall wonder it ever seemed otherwise. Never is learning so magnified, as when she passes over her processes, and gives you her simple results. So the truly learned judge. Hence they respect most highly the preacher who, other things being equal, is most eminent for simplicity of discourse. And the preaching of such a man, is to them, as well as the common people, the most impressive. The truth is, the commonest sympathies of our race, the most ordinary springs of action, are ever the mightiest. Ascertain what chord is of deepest tone in the hearts of the multitude, and you have learned what chord will vibrate most powerfully in the bosoms of the intellectual few.

Another leading characteristic of our Saviour's preaching was its *directness*. It is possible that pulpit discourse should fail in this point, even when in some good degree spiritual and simple. We mean by directness, such a manner of exhibiting truth, as makes the audience feel that they themselves are concerned in it.

It is quite possible so to present human depravity, that even the attentive hearer shall hardly be reminded that *he* is depraved ; so to insist on penitence, that he shall hardly once think of it as a duty which *he* should perform. You may so speak of "the sinner," or of "sinners," that you shall scarcely be suspected of the slightest reference to the persons present. And though your teaching be orthodox, and your announcements of coming wrath distinct and emphatic, every heart before you may be as quiet as if your discourse had related to the dwellers in some other planet. It was eminently otherwise with Christ. He always made his hearers feel, not only that his speech was to them, but that they were interested in the truths he uttered. He not only declared to Nicodemus the general doctrine of the new birth, but he said also, "Ye must be born again." "Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?" To one who was curious to learn whether few or many would be saved, he said, "Strive to enter in at the strait gate;" thus reminding him that it should be his main object to secure his own salvation. In addressing the Scribes and Pharisees, his application of truth was often most pungent and terrible. "Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men; for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye them that are entering to go in." "Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness." As on a certain occasion he was uttering reproofs like these, one of the lawyers said to him, "Master, thus saying thou reproachest us also." But so far from retracting or qualifying what he had uttered, our Lord promptly replied, "Wo unto you, also, ye lawyers!" It is said, in a certain place, that "when the chief priests and Pharisees heard his parables, they perceived that he spake of them." He so shaped his discourse on a particular occasion, that "they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last." And the testimony of the woman of Samaria was, "Come, see a man which told me all the things that ever I did."

In all this he exhibited great fearlessness. For he knew full well it would give offence to many, and provoke, at times, the most violent opposition. And such, doubtless, to some extent, will be the result of a similar strain of preaching at

the present day. It will be unhesitatingly adopted, however, by the wise and faithful minister. He can hope, otherwise, for but little success. A general statement of truth—a statement of it as relating to the world at large—the deceitful and self-flattering heart will be likely to disregard. It is only as “thou art the man,” rings in the perishing sinner’s ear, that preaching does its perfect work. We are not, indeed, at liberty, as we have before remarked, to adopt the air of majesty, or the tone of awful severity, which sometimes marked our Lord’s discourses. But our speech may, like his, abound in the *second*, rather than the *third person*. We may rest not till each hearer feels that *he* is intended. And as subservient to such a result, we should beware, as our Lord did, of needlessly qualifying truth. How broadly and boldly did he state it—in what paradoxes sometimes! “I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I if it be already kindled?” “I came not to send peace, but a sword.” How unlike was his manner in this respect to a certain cautious and circumlocutory way of preaching. It is quite possible to utter the great verities of the gospel, with such qualifications, exceptions, limitations, provisos, and reserves, that though they may still retain in some sense their identity, they not only lose much of their appropriate force and beauty, but what is specially to be deplored, their application to individual cases is much less likely to be felt.

The excellence of our Lord’s preaching is further manifest as we advert to its *symmetry*. By this we intend, generally, that every thing pertaining to his discourses was in due proportion. There was, in his ministry, no improper magnifying of any one doctrine or duty, no exclusive dwelling on any one topic. Nor was any one class of hearers regarded to the overlooking of others. He rightly divided the word, giving to every one a portion in due season. It would be a pleasant and edifying work, to review our Lord’s discourses with reference either to the variety of topics presented, and the symmetrical development of each, or to the varieties of character and condition to which his instructions had appropriate reference. We shall confine ourselves, however, to another and somewhat less obvious view.

Our Lord’s preaching may be regarded as of perfect symmetry, in respect to its wise adaptation to the whole nature of man, its due regard to all the departments of his complex being. Considered as the subject of pulpit ministrations, he may be describ-

ed as made up of *intellect, conscience, and heart*. And preaching may be characterized from its bearing on these several parts of his compound nature. It is not affirmed, of course, that it is possible to address human beings on religious subjects without appealing, more or less, to all these conjoined capacities. But it is quite possible—as facts have abundantly shown—to give some one of them disproportionate attention. There are those who preach chiefly to the intellect, to the comparative neglect of the conscience and the heart. There are others who discourse mainly to the conscience, to the neglect of the heart and the intellect. And there are others still who address the heart chiefly, to the neglect of both the other departments of our being. Such faults, however, receive no countenance from the Saviour's ministry.

Preaching may be addressed, we have said, too exclusively to the intellect. Dry and unprofitable will such discourse be, whether of the topical or textual sort. Even when it keeps closest to the divine word—with its green pastures and still waters—it fails of furnishing appropriate spiritual nutriment. It is not under the attenuated, plodding metaphysician alone, that

“The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed.”

In like unhappy plight may be the flocks of some who value themselves greatly on their exegetical skill. Preachers we have certainly heard, who reminded us forcibly of a quaint remark of Ralph Cudworth. “There is,” says he, “a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul,” in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of divine truths that is printed upon paper, which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them.” But let us not be understood to decry the exercise of intellect in the pulpit, or the fullest appeal to the mental capacities. The human understanding is tasked to the utmost by the religion of Christ. And the gospel is eminently conducive to vigor and enlargement of mind. The wise preacher will beware, however, of that sort of discourse which

“Plays round the head, but comes not to the heart.”

He will beware of addressing the intellect to the neglect of

the conscience—that regent *de jure* of all the soul's faculties. So his Lord's example teaches him. While the discourses of Christ were highly intellectual, they dealt most faithfully with the moral sense; they kept the heart in continual and vigorous action. It is only thus, indeed—as it would be easy to show at large—that gospel ministrations are of highest advantage to the mental powers. It is only thus, of course, that the soul's salvation can be secured. Let a minister so preach, that truth becomes with his hearers the object of mere intellection, and his discourse, however applauded, will be to them but “a savor of death unto death.”

It was said, also, that the conscience may be too exclusively addressed. However important, in some respects, its functions, it has no power of itself to purify the heart. It may be roused to intensest action, while depravity still rages and rules. It convinces of sin, but it melts not the soul into penitence; it produces of itself, neither faith, nor hope, nor charity, nor the peace of God. To this latter result, other appliances are essential. You must appeal to the heart. The fragrance of the divine goodness must be diffused around it—it must be bedewed with the tears, and bathed in the blood of Christ. The symphonies of heaven must steal sweetly over it. Thus, too, is the piety of God's people most advanced. How powerless, even as to them, is discourse mainly objurgatory! How often do they remain cold-hearted under it, and barren, and unprofitable; how often does it seem even to sear the conscience itself! Against the error now referred to, the preacher would be effectually secured by a close observance of his Lord's example. Christ did, indeed, as has been remarked, address the conscience most pun- gently; but knowing what is in man, he appealed not to that alone. While he reproves, he allures; while he holds up with one hand the condemning law, he points with the other to the cross on which he hung, and to the mansions he has prepared for his followers.

The wisdom of his example is further manifest, as we recur to the suggestion, that even the heart may be disproportionately addressed. Deal with it to the comparative neglect of the intellect, and fanaticism is the natural result; a religion of mere feeling is engendered, of blind and bewildering impulses, of endless and perilous vagaries. Address it powerfully to the overlooking of conscience, and a miserably *selfish* piety will be likely to ensue. In place of self-denial, there will be real,

though perhaps covert, self-gratification ; and a specious but sinister *utility* will wear the honors which belong only to *rectitude*. How admirable were Christ's appeals, in that they were so happily balanced—to the heart, indeed, as we have said, but to the heart in fitting proportion ;—to the intellect and conscience in due measure also. To all the departments of our complex nature, but to all in perfect symmetry.

There is another, and that a crowning excellence of Christ's preaching, which we may not fail to notice. We refer to its *affectionateness*. Our readers are familiar with the ancient and oft-quoted maxim,

— " Si vis me flere dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi."

"If you wish me to weep, you must first manifest emotion yourself." Most felicitously has Goethe expressed this same sentiment :

"Persuasion, friend, comes not by toil or art ;
Hard study never made the matter clearer :
'Tis the live fountain in the speaker's heart,
Sends forth the streams that melt the ravished hearer.
Then work away for life ; heap book on book,
Line upon line, and precept on example :
The stupid multitude may gape and look,
And fools may think your stock of wisdom ample :
But all remain unmoved : to touch the heart—
To make men feel, requires a different art.
For touching hearts the only secret known,
My worthy friend, is this :—to have one of your own !"^{*}

To secure the highest ends of sacred eloquence, however, regard must be had to the kind, as well as the degree of emotion. It is very possible for the preacher to be highly excited, in view not so much of the truth he unfolds, in itself considered, or in its momentous applications, as of the intellectual processes to which he subjects it ; the nice discrimination, the profound analysis, the lucid arrangement, the strict and conclusive ratiocination. He may be like the hireling painter, who feels little interest in the countenance before him, but is delighted with his own imitation of it, with the rapidity and perfectness with which he transfers it to the canvass. Emotion of this sort will have little effect on the mass of hearers. The preacher's sympathies must pass beyond his subject, considered simply as such, to the

^{*} Translated by A. H. Everett.

souls he seeks to save. He must show himself interested in their fearful state—not merely as a theme of discourse, but as an object of affecting contemplation—if he would hope to preach successfully. In other words, he must manifest in his preaching deep and unaffected love for souls. With what a charm does love invest even the simplest forms of speech! It makes the severest reproof comparatively grateful. Let a frown becloud your brow, and angry words fall from your lips, and however pointed and just your censure, however cogent your arguments for reform, they will be all in vain. You will meet with a cold, and perhaps disdainful repulse. But go to an erring fellow-man, under the strong impulses of benevolence, let your tones be tremulous with compassion, and the dew of kindness glisten in your eye; let your words be fraught with tenderness, and your whole demeanor bespeak deep and disinterested regard; and if the case be not utterly hopeless, your pleading will be prevalent. Oh, there is nothing like the eloquence of love! The doomed man in his dungeon, all blood-stained and hard-hearted, is melted by it, and becomes, the while, like a little child. You may sit by his side, and open before him the dark catalogue of his crimes; you may expatiate upon them, you may appeal most powerfully to his slumbering conscience; all this you may do, though many a cold-hearted intruder has been driven with curses from his cell, if your tears do but fall while you speak. You can say to men, indeed, just what you please—you can do with them, we had almost added, just what you will—if they do but see evidence that you love them.

Now in the blessed and potent quality of kindness, the speech of Christ was unrivalled. He is in this respect, as well as others, a perfect model for the preacher. God is said to be love itself: and Christ was love incarnate. The savor of that same compassion which led him to the cross, was diffused through all his discourses. Well might the people wonder “at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth.” Even with his most fearful rebukes, what expressions of tenderness were often linked! It was on the same occasion when he said to the Jews, “Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell,” that he exclaimed also, “Oh, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings!” How does the example of Christ forbid in

his ministers all harshness and bitterness of speech ! How does it frown on a denunciatory spirit ! With what sweet enforcement does it call for kindness and gentleness, for " bowels of compassion," and pleadings fraught with love.

Such are some of the leading characteristics of our Lord's preaching. Such is the perfect and delightful pattern which the Bible holds forth to every minister of the gospel. How important to every preacher, we remark in conclusion, is intimate acquaintance with Christ ! How desirable that he should so study the record of our Lord's ministry, as to catch the very spirit and manner of his preaching, just as by familiarity with some loved and venerated friend, we acquire often his very tones, and gestures, and forms of speech. Of other models of eloquence, he need not, he should not be ignorant. He may listen to the orators of ancient time. He may linger a while even in the heathen forum, and may give his ear to the more eloquent of the Christian fathers. He may seek improvement in the study of the more modern pulpit. No little advantage will he gain from familiarity with such eminent preachers as Baxter, and Howe, and Leighton, and Edwards, and Whitefield. But they are all imperfect models. He should turn from them all, at last, to him who spake as never man spake. With him he should commune, till as he opens his lips in the sacred desk, the very manner of his preaching shall remind his hearers of Christ, and they shall take knowledge of him that he has been with Jesus. The word of such a man is seldom in vain. It contains within itself the most potent elements of moral suasion : and according, as it does, with the mind of Christ, he delights to crown it with his blessing.

ARTICLE VIII.

REVIEW OF LIFE AND WRITINGS OF EBENEZER PORTER MASON.

By Rev. William B. Sprague, Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Albany.

Life and Writings of Ebenezer Porter Mason, interspersed with Hints to Parents and Instructors on the Training and Education of a Child of Genius. By Denison Olmstead, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College. New York: Dayton & Newman.

WE are free to acknowledge that our interest in Biography has been, in these latter years, not a little diminished by the flood of insipid and trashy productions that has come in upon us in this department of our literature. It is within our recollection that a new biographical work was comparatively a rare thing; and the fact that an individual had a book written about him was regarded as some evidence that he was not a mere common-place character: but the aggregate amount of excellence belonging to these works has not increased in proportion to their number. If there are still some beautiful monuments erected to departed merit, there are not wanting pens that are ready to immortalize departed mediocrity, if not departed dullness. The reasons of this are various. Sometimes it is to be traced to the indiscreet partiality of friendship; sometimes to the commendable wish to aid some young man in his education by the sale of the book; and possibly sometimes to a mistaken desire to figure on a small scale in the character of an author. There are some stars of this kind taking their places from time to time in our literary horizon, which we trust will shine for ages; but not a small part of these publications, instead of being stars, are mere fire-flies of the night, which shine only long enough to let us know they have existed.

We have two or three grounds of objection to this as it seems to us characteristic feature of the times. In the first place, admitting the character to possess no special interest, it is an act of injustice to the subject of the narrative that he should be dragged before the public after he is dead, just to receive a verdict of having done nothing and been nothing, that should

justify an attempt to blazon abroad his name or perpetuate his memory. And next, such a book is necessarily an imposition upon the public ; for those who buy it from their love of biography, with the impression that it is a good book, get cheated ; and those who read it to find out what it is, provided they are persons of intelligence and good judgment, are very likely to get vexed that they have thrown away their time as well as their money. Or if, for the sake of making an interesting volume, a tame character be metamorphosed under the biographer's hand, into something which it never was and never could be, why here again there is manifest deception ; and no wise man wishes to be gratified by receiving falsehood as truth. And last of all, we think this sort of book-making objectionable on the ground that it is fitted to inspire the sober and reflecting with a disrelish for biography in general ; and that in consequence of this, many a gem in this department of literature will be comparatively overlooked because its brilliancy is obscured by the immense quantity of rubbish into which it is thrown.

While, therefore, we have no lack of interest in well executed biography, where the subject is worthy of such a notice, we acknowledge that there is nothing specially attractive to us in the announcement of the biography of an individual of whom we have never heard ; and hence, when we took up the life of Ebenezer Porter Mason, we should probably have never looked beyond the title-page, if the name of Professor Olmsted had not caught our eye—a name which would be regarded by every body as a sufficient pledge that the book was worth reading. And we had not advanced far in it, before we ceased to feel the need of the biographer's name to carry us forward ; and when we had read it once we read it again ; and now, upon the most sober view we can take of it, we feel justified in saying that the character which it delineates is in some respects among the most remarkable that have come within our knowledge. The book is well written of course—is characterized throughout by good taste, good judgment, and good feeling, but we are sure that Professor Olmsted will agree with us that it derives its highest interest from the remarkable facts which it details. We subjoin an outline of the life of this youthful prodigy, not as a substitute for the book itself, but as an inducement to our readers to possess themselves of the work, as exhibiting a more ex-

traordinary development of some of the faculties than almost any to be found on record.

Ebenezer Porter Mason was born at Washington, Connecticut, December 7, 1819; and we presume was named for the excellent Dr. Porter, who was formerly minister of that parish, and subsequently Professor and President of the theological institution at Andover. His father was the Rev. Stephen Mason, Dr. Porter's successor as minister of the parish in which he was born. In his very infancy, his precocious powers began to discover themselves; and he was scarcely less distinguished from other infants, than in childhood he was distinguished from other children, and in more advanced youth from other young men. His powers of observation especially began to develop themselves at what would seem an almost incredibly early period; and his father states that "he had seen him while a little creeper on the carpet, before he could walk, amusing himself with an examination of colors, textures and configurations; and seemingly to find exquisite delight in the graceful coils of a hair, and in the variety of changes which his little fingers could effect in its appearance." His fondness for books began to discover itself before he was yet two years old; and even at that early period, he evinced his love of knowledge, by finding matter for inquiry in almost every object that came under his observation. His parent, however, aware of his unusual precocity, with great good judgment, forbore to hasten the development of his powers, in the hope that a more leisurely growth might better subserve not only the consistency of his intellectual character, but the vigor of his physical constitution.

At the age of about three, this interesting child was visited with one of the greatest of all earthly calamities—the loss of an excellent mother. This loss, however, it pleased a kind Providence in a great measure to make up, by the kindness of another mother, and especially by the assiduous and devoted attentions of a beloved aunt, Mrs. Harriet B. Turner, who had much to do with his intellectual and moral training, who followed him through life with an affection truly maternal, and who ministered to his last wants before he went down into the valley of death.

From the time he was eight years old he was much under the care of Mrs. Turner, whose residence was in Richmond, Virginia; and it is chiefly from the memoranda which she has furnish-

ed, that his biography, especially through the period of his childhood, has been made out. The book must be read before any adequate idea of his capabilities at this early period can be formed: *our* limits only permit us to say that he had gained a thorough knowledge of the steam-engine, that his play-things were globes and philosophical instruments, that he could calculate, especially in fractions, with astonishing facility, and that he had a perfect passion for that most sublime of all sciences, the science of astronomy.

During his residence at the South, his remarkable powers attracted the attention of many distinguished individuals, and especially of the late excellent Dr. John H. Rice, who expressed the highest admiration of his genius, and the deepest interest in his future welfare. But notwithstanding all the attention that he excited, and all the caresses that were lavished upon him, he lost nothing of the simplicity and modesty appropriate to childhood. He was a child in his appearance, and in dutiful respect towards his superiors; but in his aspirations, and to a great extent in his pursuits, he was a man.

It does not appear that at this early period, he was the subject of any very strongly marked religious impressions; and yet we find that he was a most diligent and interested attendant on the Sabbath school, and was foremost in his zeal for acquiring a knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. Indeed his father remarks that "the clearness and strength of his intellectual faculties, were no less perceptible in his biblical than in his mathematical investigations; and while he fully believed in the inspiration of the Bible and the doctrines which it contains, his faith was not merely a prejudice, but a sober, enlightened conviction.

In 1829, the Rev. Mr. Mason removed from Washington to Nantucket, where he was settled over a congregational church. Shortly after this, his son returned from the South, and went to live again under the parental roof. A letter addressed to his aunt shortly after his arrival at his new home, containing an account of his first impressions of Nantucket, is preserved in the memoir; and any person who has ever visited that singular spot, will, in reading the letter, be struck with a description entirely true to his recollections, and will marvel when he considers that it came from the pen of a little boy but ten years of age.

His residence at Nantucket continued for about two years;

during which period he enjoyed the best advantages for intellectual culture, not only from his connection as a pupil with an excellent school, but from his constant intercourse with parents and other friends who had formed a proper estimate of his powers, and were earnestly bent upon his improvement. The memoir introduces several interesting facts illustrative of the rapidity and extent of his acquirements at this time, and shows that he had already become at home in profound investigations. But with the strength of his reasoning faculty, he gave evidence also at this early period of a vigorous and brilliant imagination; for though it does not appear that he wrote *much* poetry, he wrote *some*, which, if he had been nothing *but* a poet, would have given him a reputation. His "Farewell to Nantucket" and some other pieces, are conceived and executed with inimitable tenderness and beauty, and show that he was as capable of soaring among the stars for the indulgence of a luxuriant fancy as for purposes of scientific investigation.

In the autumn of 1832, Mr. Mason sent his son to an excellent school that had been established at Ellington, Conn., under the superintendence of Judge Hall. Here he continued nearly two years, his mind rapidly unfolding, and giving new promise of the highest intellectual distinction. Some of his compositions while at Ellington, both in poetry and prose, are given us by his biographer; and they so far exceed any thing which his age might lead us to expect, that one might well require the most ample testimony to be satisfied of their genuineness.

On leaving Ellington, young Mason returned to his paternal residence at Nantucket, and became an assistant teacher in the school in which he had formerly been a pupil. Shortly after this, his father finding his labors as a minister at Nantucket too severe for his constitution, resigned his pastoral charge in that place, and removed with his family to Collinsville, a small manufacturing village on Farmington river. His son passed the ensuing summer with his friends in Richmond; and in the following August was admitted a member of the Freshman class in Yale College. His examination on that occasion attracted the attention of the professors who conducted it, and satisfied them that he possessed a mathematical genius of the highest order.

Our limits do not permit us to go minutely into the history of his college life. It is a history of lofty aspirings and wonderful acquisitions, on the one hand, and of struggles wit

poverty and disease on the other. Scarcely had he joined college, before Professor Olmsted discovered that his ruling passion was for astronomy, and that he had no common genius for the pursuit to which his inclination prompted him; and notwithstanding the delicacy which the professor has observed in his biography, it is manifest that young Mason found in him a friend and a father, as well as a professor; and that it was especially owing to his fostering care and attention that his wonderful genius for astronomy was so rapidly and successfully developed. In the progress of his college course, we find him here making a long series of the most accurate and difficult observations upon the heavenly bodies, and there constructing telescopes of great power, and bringing out the most exquisite astronomical drawings—and all this in connexion with the ordinary routine of college studies. With a frail constitution at best, it was to be expected that his nightly watchings of the stars, with the necessarily attendant exposures persevered in for years, would affect his health; and accordingly, we find that at several different periods of his college life, disease seemed to be making its inroads upon his constitution; and there were signs which he overlooked, which yet announced to his anxious friends that he was probably destined to a premature grave. In addition to this, the unexpected failure of some pecuniary resources to which he had been permitted to look, subjected him to great embarrassment, and obliged him to make the most vigorous efforts to sustain himself to the close of his college course; but through the kindness of his excellent friend, Professor Olmsted, he was furnished with employment more congenial to his taste, by which he was enabled to continue in college, and relieved in some measure from the painful reflection of being dependent on charity. Before he left college, his attainments in astronomy were such as to command the respect of the first astronomers of the country; and the results of many of his observations have been carefully treasured up to be transmitted to posterity. In his senior years he seems to have resolved on devoting his life to his favorite science; though, notwithstanding his eager pursuit of this branch, he was highly accomplished in general literature, and not unfrequently invoked with much success the favor of the muses.

Shortly after he was graduated he visited Philadelphia, where he had an opportunity of making the acquaintance of many distinguished men of science, from which he derived a

fresh impulse in his astronomical pursuits. From this visit he returned to New Haven as a resident graduate, and was for some time occupied, partly in preparing a treatise on practical astronomy, and partly in completing an article on the nebulae, which was afterwards published in the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. This article, which Professor Olmsted reckons as its author's greatest achievement, makes about fifty pages quarto, and is regarded as one of the most valuable recent contributions which our country has furnished to astronomical science. At this period, owing to the immense amount of labor which he had assumed, and the constant exposures to the night air to which he subjected himself, his health became alarmingly impaired, and he reluctantly yielded to the importunity of Professor Olmsted to relax from his severe application to study. From this time, however, his health seems to have become an object of more solicitude with him, and he felt the importance of making his course of life, so far as possible, subservient to its establishment and preservation.

Early in the summer of 1840, he received an invitation from the Western Reserve College to a tutorship in that institution; and as, besides other advantages, the place was likely to offer some peculiar facilities for the prosecution of his astronomical researches, he was much inclined to accept the invitation. But while he was hesitating between this offer and a half-formed purpose to give up all literary and scientific pursuits for a year, and spend that time on a farm in Michigan, for the benefit of his health, a new proposal was made to him which seemed far more advantageous than either of his other plans, and which he determined without hesitation to accept. The proposal was that he should join the expedition under the government of the United States, for exploring the disputed boundary between Maine and Canada. Nothing could have been more accordant with his tastes and wishes, than this; for while it would secure to him a constant intercourse with kindred spirits, and furnish him with an opportunity to prosecute his favorite astronomical observations under a new and peculiar form, it would give him all the physical exercise he would need, and would be just the thing, as he imagined, to restore vigor to his enfeebled constitution. Accordingly, having received the appointment in due form, after a few days of hurried preparation, he set out for Portland on the 24th August with a view to join the expedition.

After an absence of about two months, during which he

seems to have been actively employed, and to have acquitted himself with much credit, he returned to New-York, with his health in no wise benefitted by the hardships to which he had been subjected. Nevertheless, his interest in his astronomical pursuits had suffered no abatement; and he was especially concerned to complete the system of Practical Astronomy which he had undertaken at the instance of Professor Olmsted, and had left in an unfinished state at the time of his joining the expedition. Within a few days after his arrival at New-York, he made a short visit at New-Haven, where he was cordially welcomed to the hospitalities of Professor Olmsted's house, and had every thing done that Christian kindness could do, to render him comfortable. But the friends who had loved and cherished him so long and so tenderly, and who had hoped so much from his eminently useful life, could no longer resist the conviction that he was laboring under an incurable disease, and that his earthly labors would soon be ended. In accordance with their recommendation as well as his own convictions, he determined to try the effect of a southern climate; and with a view to this, immediately set out to visit his favorite aunt, Mrs. Turner, who still resided in Virginia.

Professor Olmsted gives a touching description of the scene of parting with his young friend, with the full expectation that the separation would be succeeded by no future meeting in this world. On his journey, he stopped a few days in New-York and Philadelphia, and in each place was occupied chiefly with his astronomical friends. On his arrival at Richmond he was not a little exhausted by the fatigue incident to his journey, and his friends, who received him with the fondest affection, the moment they beheld him, saw that he had come to them to die. Professor Olmsted received a letter from him dated the 19th of December, giving an account of his journey, and another from one of his friends dated the 27th, giving an account of his death. He was confined to his bed but a day or two, and in the act of being raised from his bed died without a struggle or a groan.

It will naturally be inquired what were the views and hopes of this young man in the prospect of death, and what evidence he left behind him that he had made provision for the coming world. The data which the memoir furnishes in relation to this subject are more scanty than we could have desired; and yet this seems to be owing not to any fault in his biographer, but rather to the

cautious reserve with which he communicated his feelings. From his earliest childhood he manifested great tenderness of conscience, the utmost respect for parental authority, and an uncommon interest in the study of God's word; and his father early expressed the hope, as he himself did tremblingly towards the close of his life, that he might have experienced the renovating operations of the Holy Spirit while he was yet in his infancy. And during his whole life, so far as appears, his character was marked by the strictest regard to moral rectitude. In reply to a letter from his father, informing him of the hopeful conversion of his sister, he expressed a deep interest in the intelligence, seeming at the same time to recognize the fact that he was himself much less devoted to his highest interests than he ought to be. There are many passages in his writings that indicate his full conviction of the vanity of all human pursuits without reference to the interests of another life, and of the greatness and dignity of man as an accountable and immortal being. During the last few months of his life, his mind evidently became more intensely fixed on religious subjects, and Butler's *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion* and his *Bible* seem to have been his constant companions. In his last conversation with Professor Olmsted, in which the Professor communicated to him honestly his impressions in regard to the fatal and rapidly approaching result of his malady, he expressed his determination to devote himself more earnestly and decidedly to his immortal interests, and then it was he remarked that he had sometimes ventured to hope that he had been the subject of an early renovation, though he added that his subsequent coldness in regard to religious things had led him greatly to doubt whether he could have experienced such a change. On his arrival in Richmond, at the house of his beloved and devoted aunt, Mrs. Turner, religion became still more the all-absorbing object of his thoughts; and perhaps no one could have been found more capable than this excellent relative of giving his last thoughts a right direction. In an account of his last days Mrs. Turner writes to a friend thus:—"A day or two after his arrival, he said to me, 'Aunt, it is gratifying to see my friends, as an expression of their kindness, but I am very desirous, and I feel it to be of great importance to me, to be left alone. I wish you would place here for my use Scott's Bible, Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, and Alleine's *Alarm*.' I remarked, 'My dear, you are very weak, and not able to read much: here is your Bible,

where you know there is ample provision made for all you need.' He said, 'I am sensible of that, and all I can do is to cast myself at the footstool of divine mercy, and I trust I shall not be cast away.' I immediately presented to his mind the case of the leper, mentioned in the seventh chapter of the second of Kings, which he appeared fully to comprehend and to feel. At another time, while reading to him the fourteenth chapter of John, he took the words from me and repeated them from memory. I remarked, 'I am rejoiced, my dear, that this passage is so familiar to you in this season of trial.' He said, 'I know it all, but I want to feel it more;' and when I asked if these chapters had fastened on his mind from Sunday-school instruction, he replied, 'No, but from reading them so much.' He seemed to take a deep interest in my reading to him *Mrs. Graham's 'Passage over Jordan,'* which you know is a collection of portions of Scripture, adapted to these solemn circumstances with appropriate remarks. In this manner his thoughts were occupied, when he was suddenly taken from us."

The estimate which Professor Olmsted forms of the intellectual character of the subject of his memoir, seems to us to be fully sustained by the history of his life which precedes it. The crowning attribute of his mind seems to have been a versatility which enabled him successfully to adapt himself to any thing. His powers of observation, of reflection, of reasoning, of fancy, were all of the higher, if not of the very highest order; and though he will be remembered chiefly as an astronomer, he might have been, for aught that appears, equally distinguished as a mechanician, and in a high degree as a poet. His biographer institutes an interesting comparison between his powers and those of the lamented Professor Fisher; and concludes—and we think justly—that while the former had far more versatility than the latter, he would not, if he had lived to the same age, have been inferior to him in soundness and depth of intellect.

We sometimes see great vigor of mind associated with moral qualities which almost give us a disrelish for what is admirable in the intellect; but in the case of young Mason, the heart and the head seem to have been in delightful keeping. He was a gentle, docile, unpretending youth, full of affection to his friends and of gratitude to his benefactors; and while he accommodated himself most readily to the circumstances in which Providence placed him, he possessed an invincible perseverance to overcome any obstacles that might lie in his way. Those

who knew him best seem to have given him the greatest amount of affection as well as of admiration.

We should forbear an inherent prying into the secrets of Providence ; and yet one can hardly help asking wherefore it is that He, who orders all things according to the counsel of his will, sends here and there a great spirit upon the earth to exhibit its marvellous powers for a little season, and then to our view prematurely closes the present scene of its exercises and improvements. We may, perhaps, find a solution of this problem partly in the fact, that things out of the common course strike the mind with the greatest power ; and that notwithstanding all the advantages of the general uniformity of the Divine government, some apparent variation from the track in which Providence ordinarily moves, may occasionally be necessary to arrest and direct the thoughts of men. The history of such a mind as that of Mason, is fitted to exalt our conceptions, more than the history of a thousand ordinary minds, of the grandeur that pertains to the human soul—the grandeur of its faculties—the grandeur of its destiny. In contemplating men of only a common intellectual stature, such as we meet with in our every-day intercourse, we are but little impressed with the greatness of the human spirit. But let us see the giant mind towering above all others with which it is associated ; let us see the youth sinking into the profound of mathematical science ; or exploring other worlds by instruments of his own construction ; or soaring away on an eagle's wing in fields of fancy—and it must be no common degree of stupidity that will suppress in our minds the feeling of reverence for our own spirits, and the feeling of concern that they may fulfil their appointed end. If the mind, even in this early stage of its existence, can achieve so much ; if, while subject to the influence of flesh and sense, it can make itself at home in the distant regions of immensity ;—what will it not effect, as it shall expand under purer influences, and in brighter worlds, in the illimitable progress of its being ? How vastly important that this great and immortal principle should receive a right direction ! and how foolish and guilty are they who trifle in any way with their own souls ! And while the appearance of a youthful prodigy upon earth must impress us with the inherent dignity of the mind, his removal from the earth, if his powers have been rightly directed, is equally fitted to impress us with the grandeur and glory of heaven. For *there* are assembled a host of illus-

trious minds, and their employments are worthy of their faculties ; and every object which occupies them renders the impress of heavenly beauty more deep, and thus they are undergoing a perpetual transition from glory to glory. When a youth of exalted intellect is removed from earth to heaven, it suggests the reflection that in that world of light, all flourish in immortal youth ; and even those who have descended through the vale of age, into the yet deeper valley of death, have come out of that valley in the glory of a complete intellectual and spiritual renovation.

But while the occasional appearance of these intellectual prodigies doubtless has its important uses in the government of God, let it not be forgotten that every such case is attended with some peculiar dangers. We will notice two of the most important.

There is danger to the bodily health. It often happens that a mind of the highest order is found inhabiting a tenement of unusual frailty ; and unless the tenement be carefully guarded, it will inevitably go prematurely to ruin. There is an inward fire in the spirit that consumes the vital energies ; and while we are yet gazing at some glorious young genius, we are called to write his epitaph. Mason from his earliest childhood had a feeble frame ; and while the operations of his mind were most vigorous and intense, his ruling passion led him to the most imprudent exposures, and what was little better than trifling with his delicate constitution ; and under this double influence, it was not strange that he came so early to his grave. Young men of superlative genius are under special obligations to guard their health ; partly from the greater ability which they possess to render good service to their generation, and the consequently increased value of their lives, and partly from the fact, that they have to encounter some untoward influences arising from the more intense action of the mind upon the body, from which others are exempt. There is a voice from the grave of Mason charging every highly gifted young man, and indeed every one who is bent upon the highest cultivation of his powers, sacredly to guard his health, and to take care that his intellectual pursuits are not at the expense of an emaciated frame and a broken constitution. It is a debt which he owes to himself, to his friends, to his country, to his race—that so far as it is in his power, he preserve his physical vigor unabated ; for, so long as the mind is connected with the body and acts through bodily

organs, it must depend in no small degree on the health of the body for the success of its operations.

And there is yet greater danger in reference to his spiritual and immortal interests,—greater, as the interests at stake are more momentous. There is reason to hope that Mason was no stranger to the influence of eternal things; and that the mind which was here trained to such sublime excursions, is now prosecuting its researches into the works of God in a brighter light, and on a nobler field of observation. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the intensity of his devotion to scientific pursuits, lessened his general spirituality of character, and that a portion of the time which he spent in gazing at the visible heavens, had better have been spent in communion with his Heavenly Father. True, indeed, there is nothing in science in itself considered that is adverse to the influence of Christianity,—on the contrary, science supplies to a rightly disciplined spirit the materials of devotion; and this is pre-eminently true of astronomy, which has in it every thing to exalt the Creator, and to abase man at his feet. And yet science, even astronomy, may so engross the whole man that God shall be forgotten in the pursuit; or if he be not entirely forgotten, shall receive but a partial and divided homage. If we mistake not, the fact to which we here refer is often illustrated in the experience of religious students in our colleges. They suffer themselves to be so engrossed by their daily studies, that they find less time than they ought for daily devotion; while at the same time, they apologize to their consciences that necessity constrains them to be diligent, and that they are occupied in preparation for future usefulness. If the secrets of many a pious student's heart were revealed, we doubt not that it would appear that his best religious enjoyments were previous to his entering college; and that in proportion as the fire of ambition had kindled, the fire of devotion had gone out.

We have made these remarks, not with an intention to repress a suitable zeal on the part of religious students in the pursuit of science and literature, but only to put them on their guard against perverting the advantages of their situation to the neglect of their higher interests. Let them remember that it is altogether at too great an expense that they become accomplished scholars, and bear away the highest collegiate honors, if they thereby lose in any degree their evidence of the divine favor or their interest in eternal things. Let them study dili-

gently, earnestly, but in all their studies let God be acknowledged, and let every new attainment be consecrated to his service. And let those who make no pretensions to Christian character, remember that this character must become theirs, else neither the purpose of their lives is gained, nor the salvation of their souls secured; and let them bear in mind that science, literature, any thing that takes complete possession of the soul to the exclusion of eternal things, will operate as a barrier between them and heaven. Learning in itself is a noble endowment, but unsanctified learning, ill directed learning, can never be a blessing to its possessor.

In taking leave of this book, we feel that we have done it but imperfect justice in the brief sketch which we have now given. We have been able to deal only in generals, whereas the book deals in particulars; and those who will estimate the character as it deserves, must not be contented with any thing short of Professor Olmsted's description of it. It is well that the writing of the memoir was confided to such hands; and we doubt not that the manner in which he has done his work will secure to him the approbation and gratitude, not only of his own generation, but of posterity.

ARTICLE IX.

CONFLICT OF LAWS—OF CHURCH AND STATE.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

WE are obliged, in the present case, either to depart from our rule as to giving the author's name, or to deprive our readers of the valuable thoughts of our respected correspondent. We reluctantly choose the former, after vain efforts to overcome the extreme modesty of the author and his reluctance to write for the public in any other way than anonymously.

His legal acquirements, however, are such as to secure for him a high judicial station, and to qualify him for speaking by authority on the points discussed in the subsequent article. The views are striking, and worthy the consideration of every

citizen, and more especially of every minister of the gospel in this country, of every denomination.

This, and the discussion of the biblical question in the last number of the Repository, have thrown up a munition of rock around the right of a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife, which it will require a strong battery to demolish. ED.

UNION of Church and State is a partisan alarm-cry, frequently raised without cause, in apparent stupidity, for sinister purpose. The success which nevertheless attends it, proves the extreme sensitiveness of the public mind to the slightest indication of danger from this quarter. Frightful indeed must have been the mischief which has left such an indelible impression of dread upon the memory of mankind.

Conflict of Church and State has made no such impression; it is not among even our imaginary perils: but history teaches us, there have been evils from this source, and wisdom admonishes us to be guarded against them. Power over conscience, is a tremendous power; it has been employed sometimes through ignorance and delusion, sometimes through sincere conviction, often through unprincipled, calculating selfishness, for effecting great wickedness.

In this country, although fanaticism has not been wanting in zeal or effort to excite, under pretence of religion, the energies of conscience against state institutions, the church has discreetly confined itself within its own province. Having for its great work, the salvation of men, it has wisely refused to suffer any obstacle to be placed in its way of access to them; it has not sought, for the sake of its own greatness, to exercise lordship or authority; but it has, to a greater or less extent, recognised the vital principle of usefulness,—to become the servant of all, if by all means it may save some. With respect to the civil power, it keeps in view its divine Teacher and his doctrines—“Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?”—“My kingdom is not of this world.”—“The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors; but ye shall not be so.”—“Let every soul be subject to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God:” “wherefore ye must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake.”—“The servant of the Lord must not

strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth, and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil who are taken captive by him at his will."—Who would suppose, that there had ever been lust and strife of the church for power? Yet, looking in this direction, what havoc do we see of the rights and welfare of man! what desolation of intellect, and morals, and all good! It is not by conflict of laws, nor by acts of power, that the church can expect to promote just government, but by enlightening and purifying, through a preached gospel, the minds and consciences of men: it is through "supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks made for all men, for kings and for all that are in authority;" its members must "lead quiet and peaceable lives in all godliness and honesty."—"Seek the peace of the city, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof ye shall have peace."

An occurrence some years ago at Princeton illustrates this point. A groundless complaint was made that the wagon conveying the United States mail, had been stopped at that place on the Sabbath by virtue of a law of New Jersey; implicating certain distinguished individuals of the Presbyterian church, known as steadfast maintainers of the sanctity of the LORD'S DAY. These individuals felt it to be their duty not merely to absolve themselves from the implication, but to inquire, and give a public account of the transaction, refuting the complaint. The ground of the complaint was, the putting of the law of a state in conflict with a law of the United States, being of superior authority; it was intended through this complaint covertly to assail the church as instigating to this course; the refutation was designed to remove all surmise of this kind. Here was more than an acknowledgment, that the church should not permit itself to have law in conflict with the law of the land; it was acted on, as principle, that the church could not, with propriety, abet the putting of a law of an individual State in conflict with a law of the United States, but must take knowledge, and acquiesce in the superior authority of the latter; although conscientiously approving the state law, and disapproving the law of the United States, as a palpable violation of the divine commandment, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy."

The church will not intentionally come into collision with the state :—with understanding of the case, it will not allow a conflict of law—its own law with that of the state. This evil can be introduced, only when unperceived. Yet so blinding is prejudice, and so perverse is inveterate opinion, that it may be introduced and become flagrant, and still its existence be positively and obstinately denied.

These reflections have arisen upon examining the decision of the General Assembly in McQueen's case, that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is incestuous, and therefore liable to the penal consequences of incest : a decision of far greater concern than appears to a superficial view. This remark has no allusion to any matter of Biblical criticism or interpretation, involved in the case ; although in these respects very extraordinary positions must be taken to sustain the decision : but the point of special regard is, that it was not deemed material in the case, that the marriage in question was lawful in the state where contracted ; that under the laws of that state the parties had the right to contract it ; that it was celebrated by authority of these laws, and thus received the highest sanction of legality and propriety according to the principles of our institutions, securing our lives, liberties and property ; and that these laws require the faithful observance of it. It is surprising indeed, if a church existing under the structure of government formed by the laws, dependent upon them for protection and safety, for that distinguished blessing religious liberty, in judging of actions as right or wrong, may disregard the stamp of the law upon them, and treat its deliberate sanction as of no effect. When a church by its solemn sentence condemns and punishes as criminal an act which the state authorizes, and seals as lawful and binding, there is certainly a conflict of laws—of church and state.

To make plain the remark, that it is surprising, if a church (or its judicatory) in judging actions as right or wrong, may disregard the stamp and sanction of law upon them, it will be useful to recur to certain established principles held by all civil courts. Suppose a resident of Massachusetts marries there the sister of his deceased wife. In Massachusetts the marriage is lawful and binding. He with his wife removes to Virginia, and settles there : they are subject to the laws of Virginia. According to these laws, it is incestuous for a man to marry his deceased wife's sister : the marriage is forbidden, it is void. But if the marriage of these persons is drawn in question in

Virginia, her courts will pronounce them husband and wife, and hold the marriage valid; giving to it all the legal effect and consequences of a lawful marriage.—On what ground?—the lawfulness of the marriage where contracted; holding it to be a principle of universal justice, that the laws where an act is rightfully done, determine its character and legal effect. The argument upon this point applies with greater force to a church judicatory than to a state government. Virginia is a sovereign state: in her independent power of legislation she has prohibited marriage with a deceased wife's sister; making it unlawful and void: those who remove and settle within her limits, by their own act, of their free will, subject themselves to her laws. Yet with respect to such persons, she holds as principle because of justice, that their acts shall be judged according to the laws where they were done, not merely to exempt from penal consequences, but to sustain as valid for all legal purposes. But the church has no independence analogous to state sovereignty: it exists within the structure of government, is dependent upon the laws for protection, and owes allegiance to them; and it acknowledges, in the principle discarding union of church and state, the right of legislation to be in the state exclusive of any participation on its part. The obligation and propriety requiring the church to pay deference to the laws to which it owes allegiance, and from which it receives protection, are more obvious, than any principle requiring one independent state to respect the laws of another in relation to acts done under them. How then can it be sustained, that the church judicatory in this case shall not only refuse to allow the validity of the marriage in question according to the law under which it was contracted, but shall go beyond this, and although the marriage has the full sanction of these laws, condemn it as an offence and visit it with punishment?

Marriage necessarily is the subject of law:—who may marry; what are impediments to marriage including prohibitions on account of kindred and other disabilities; what constitutes a valid marriage; what are its legal incidents and effects; in what manner and for what cause it can be dissolved; are all matters of law, involving all inheritances and transmissions of property, the character and legal capacity of all persons as legitimate or illegitimate, and all the rights and duties, obligations and responsibilities arising from the relation of husband and wife:—law most extensive in its operation, continually called for, vital

to society. This law, in these United States, must proceed from the CIVIL POWER: there can be no law on the subject except what this power pronounces and administers. In the Old World ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS have jurisdiction over matrimonial causes; taking cognizance of marriage and divorce. In this country, the fundamental principle of our government securing social order and civil and religious liberty, discards union of church and state: of course, the state alone, exclusive of the church, makes and administers law.

In our Union, the law of marriage belongs to the municipal codes of the individual states: it is enacted by their legislatures, and pronounced and administered by their courts. The states are in the common exercise of this jurisdiction; every matter in respect to marriage or divorce is determined by their legislatures or courts. If in any state the legislature have made no enactment, and a question of marriage arise, it must be decided according to general principles recognised by the structure of government, which it is the province of the judiciary to investigate, pronounce and apply. In 1820 a case under such circumstances came before the chancellor (Kent) of New-York. Remarking "the singular situation" of that state, "probably unexampled in the Christian world," in "having no statute regulating marriage, or prescribing the solemnities of it, or defining the forbidden degrees," he says, there must be a tribunal to apply "the principles of jurisprudence" to these matters, "otherwise there would be a most deplorable and distressing imperfection in the administration of justice;"—and he determines, that in New-York the Court of Chancery was the tribunal. Since that time the legislature of New-York have enacted a law upon this subject.

The six eastern states, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; the five middle states, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware; of the southern states, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama; and of the western states, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri and Michigan, (eighteen out of twenty-six,) have legislated concerning marriage, and prescribed the prohibited degrees evidently in view of xviiith Leviticus: in neither of these states is marriage forbidden with a deceased wife's sister; but in every one of them that marriage is lawful, the right of the citizen, as fully established and as well secured as any other right. Virginia has enacted a law of marriage; and a deceased wife's sister is a prohibited

case. The other seven states cannot be spoken of with absolute certainty. It is confidently believed from researches made, that in all of them with at most one exception, there is a law of marriage enacted by the legislature, and that in all of them marriage is lawful with a deceased wife's sister. Virginia is believed to be the single exception to the law of the states upon this point; an exception obviously attributable to the entire predominance of the Episcopal church in that state, as shown by the Memoirs of President Davies, and other notices of its early history, and the usual insertion formerly in the book of Common Prayer and the authorized Bible, of the table canonically established by that church of the prohibited degrees in marriage. This table, part of such books, prohibiting marriage with a deceased wife's sister, the prohibition became an article of religious belief, pervading the common mind; the marriage was thus associated with incest—an opprobrious name: it is not necessary to suggest how strong and lasting would be a prejudice so formed, even if utterly groundless. The following passages quoted in a late able "*View of the doctrine and practice of the ecclesiastical courts in England relative to marriage and divorce*," from a work in 1674, of Dr. Dixon, Doctor of Divinity of the Episcopal church in England, place this table in a point of light proper and useful to be regarded. He says, "In respect of marriage, the Levitical degrees do, in fact, bind us; yet they do not bind us by Divine authority; because their obligation by Divine authority ceased, expired and died at the death of Christ; and therefore all Christian churches were left to their several liberties to follow such rules, orders, measures and degrees, as by right reason and Christian prudence should be established. For the determination whereof, the church of England conceived it the most prudent course to make the Levitical laws her precedent and pattern; and at last assumed them, and adopted them into her own canons and statutes; reviving with them an obligation, not of Divine authority, as once they had from God, but of human authority, by the secular and ecclesiastical power of our princes and bishops after the reformation." Of similar import is the authority of Paley, a name entitled to no common respect: "Upon this principle the marriage as well as other cohabitation of brothers and sisters, and lineal kindred, and of all who usually live in the same family, may be said to be forbidden by the law of nature. Restrictions which extend to remoter degrees of kindred

than what this reason makes it necessary to prohibit from inter-marriage, are founded in the authority of the positive law which ordains them." •

According to this doctrine of Paley, all prohibitions of marriage between kindred beyond the direct line, ascending and decending (as parents and children, grand-parents, &c.), and the first collateral degree (brothers and sisters), are matters of positive law; and of course it belongs to the power invested with authority to make law upon the subject, to determine what prohibitions there shall be. This is fully corroborated by the quotation from Dr. Dixon, which by its plainness and reasonableness approves itself to every considerate mind. It might be added that, in a leading case upon the subject in England, much discussed there, in which there was strenuous, even irregular exertion on the part of the church to establish and constructively extend the Levitical degrees, one of their best and greatest judges, after consultation with all the other judges, declared, that the ground of these degrees being in force in the nation, was that their laws had adopted them: their laws were the governing principle, giving existence to the rule that applied these degrees. But we need no aid from authorities to support our state legislation. We have seen, indeed no one looking to the many vital interests and concerns arising from the marriage relation can doubt, that there must be law upon this subject; it is indispensable: and it is equally undeniable, that in the structure of our government, the power to make and administer this law is in the state, exclusive of the church. According to the very nature of government, upon first principles of polity, that which the proper authority of the state enacts or pronounces to be the law, is the law, and must be allowed all the attributes of law. Upon any other principle we legitimate that spirit of misrule, so fearful in this country, to which, that it may be treated with levity, a slang name has been given (*Lynch law*), and which works in secret and disguise, in the hearts of many who tremble at its gross manifestation. Therefore the law of each state upon the subject of marriage is authoritative rule for adjudicating all marriages regularly solemnized within its jurisdiction. Persons contracting marriage under this law, have its sanction and protection; and their act must be treated as lawful and valid. We have seen, that all civil authority in all places, even where a different law prevails, recognizes this principle. Can the church

repudiate it? Can the church visit with condemnation and punishment persons under protection of the laws of the land, for their obedience to these laws, and acts in conformity to them?

It may be answered that the church proceeds spiritually in this matter; that it imputes no secular offence, and awards no secular penalty; but being the rightful expositor of the word of God, and determining the marriage in question sinful according to that word, it convicts of the sin and inflicts spiritual punishment. It is presumed that this is the ground on which the proceeding and sentence in McQueen's case are placed and vindicated; and it is a bold one—probably more so than those who take it imagine. One of the strongest arguments against the Roman Catholic church in this country, is, that it has spiritual laws that may contravene the laws of the land. Some of the severest and most earnest measures in England against that church, were directed against it on this very point, receiving and acknowledging spiritual laws inconsistent with the laws of that kingdom. Is the position admissible, that in our system of government, securing equally civil and religious liberty, the church can have its spiritual laws repugnant to the municipal law, and by its judicial proceedings and sentences, so far as it can make its spiritual power felt, invalidate that law?—requiring its members to forego or renounce the benefits thereby secured to them, or in the alternative, depriving them of their spiritual comforts, and if ministers, of their ministerial office and their livelihood! On the contrary, is it not inherent in our polity as a principle, that the church equally with others, individuals or bodies, is subject to the municipal law, and that it can have no rule nor pursue any proceeding inconsistent with this law; such rule or proceeding, from the nature of the case, being void. But the inquiry may be made: Suppose the municipal law to be contrary to the word of God, must not the church obey God rather than man? Neither our Saviour nor his apostles make any such supposition, although living under Tiberius and Nero. Decency does not allow the supposition. It is presumed that our legislators make just laws;—one of the highest and most estimable sanctions of law, respect, arises from this presumption. Whether a law liable to no constitutional exception, can be declared void on any other ground, is a question, in relation to which it is sufficient at present to say, that in all probability there will never be an occasion in this country to determine it.

It is not true, that the church is an authoritative expositor of the word of God. We acknowledge no such functionary. It belongs to the legislative bodies in our country, in their proper spheres to determine, whether proposed laws contravene the divine law; and this determination, so far as concerns their act, is conclusive upon all, within the regular operation of this act.

It may be further answered, that the church is a Body upon the voluntary principle, receiving and retaining its members through their free will; and that therefore for the regulation of their lives, and the promotion of charity, truth and holiness, it may exercise discipline according to the revealed will of God, determined by its own conscience and judgment irrespective of human laws. The Roman Catholic church could not desire a better place to stand upon to move the world. Except in that church this principle has never obtained, and as already remarked, it is its most objectionable feature. It would be most perilous in the governments of the United States, free governments resting upon the opinions of the citizens, to admit a body directing and wielding the power of conscience to act upon rules and enforce sentences paramount to the municipal law, and subversive of the rights it confers. All bodies permitted to exist under our polity, enjoy the privilege upon the principle, that they can have no rules repugnant to the law of the land. So vital is this principle, that although a Body be constituted by the most positive and unqualified terms without condition or modification, the restriction is implied.

It is to be remarked, that the exercise of discipline, the judicial declaration of rules and principles for the adjudicating of cases, the passing of sentences, are very different matters from the preaching of the word. Every citizen may discuss the laws, argue against their propriety, justice or expedience, petition against them, and use all proper measures for repealing or changing them. The church may hold forth its doctrine, and by all the talent of its ministry and members, enlighten and persuade the public mind, and thus contribute its powerful aid to effect desired reformation of laws or manners; but it is not reconcilable with Scripture or reason, that it should proceed judicially against a person, and condemn and punish him as guilty, for an act conformable to the municipal law, and stamped with its sanction. This *divisum imperium*, the church adjudging criminal and penal, what the state authorizes as right and proper, would be an incongruity under any system of gov-

ernment. The Roman Catholic church in the times of darkness and superstition usurped jurisdiction over marriage; but it was exclusive; marriage was declared a sacrament, the state was allowed no cognisance of it. In England, in their partial reformation from popery, the ecclesiastical courts retained jurisdiction of marriage cases, and the canon law (*the law of the church*) is their rule of proceeding and judgment. But there is also statute law of that kingdom, like the enactments of our legislatures, concerning marriage. Now although the ecclesiastical courts, upon questions of marriage, have the canon law for their rule, they must regard the statute law as paramount, and not infringe it: if they proceed, upon ecclesiastical law, against a marriage valid according to the statute, the courts of law interpose and prohibit them. The law of the land is maintained; nothing is suffered to be done to prejudice what it sanctions. In Scotland, the law of the state (this term is here used indistinction from church) governs upon this subject. It is true, this law is contained in the Article of Marriage and Divorce in the *CONFESSION OF FAITH*, and was prepared by the Westminster Assembly of Divines; it however does not derive its authority from that Assembly, or from the church of Scotland, but from the Parliament of Scotland, who, upon the application of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, ratified it by statute, and made it the law of the land. That general assembly did not consider that their ratification of the *CONFESSION OF FAITH* gave it requisite efficacy; but after their ratification of it, they applied to the Parliament, the legislative power of their country, for an act of legislation to impart this efficacy to it. In this application they solemnly acknowledge the paramount authority of the legislative power of the country and its act. Upon this principle can a General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in these United States disregard the acts of the constitutional legislative power in these states? The principle obviously requires the observance of the municipal law. If the General Assembly of the church of Scotland deemed it requisite to apply to the *LEGISLATURE* of that kingdom for a law to complete the *CONFESSION OF FAITH* as a rule in that country, certainly our General Assembly cannot proceed upon it as a rule in this country in direct conflict with the law enacted by our *LEGISLATURES*. Those familiar with the precedents in the church of Scotland, must consider, that those precedents cannot be applied here; because in Scotland the *CONFESSION OF*

FARTH is attended by statute passed by the Parliament of the kingdom, and is adopted as the law of the land; there can, therefore, be no conflict of laws in Scotland, for that church has taken for principle that it must have the sanction of the laws of the land: while in this country the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church having adopted the *Confession of Faith*, as approved by the General Assembly of Scotland and ratified by the Parliament of that kingdom, the church judicatories proceed upon it without reference to the law of the land, and in the present case have formed and affirmed a decision in contradiction to it.

One consequence, a very serious one, of this *divisum imperium*, the church condemning a marriage as incestuous and convicting the parties of incest, when the marriage was contracted according to law, with its authority and sanction, is, that there can be no repentance. In England or Scotland, when there is a decision that a marriage is incestuous, and a consequent conviction of incest, the marriage is annulled; the parties are put in a condition for repentance, and on repentance they will be received again into the church. But in this country, the church has no power over the marriage; the whole power is in the state; and when the marriage is sanctioned by the law of the state, the parties must continue in it; the state, so far from divorcing, will compel the faithful observance. How then is repentance possible? Its first step and its whole course must trample upon the law. For suppose they yield to the decision of the church, and by mutual consent absolving themselves from the marriage, treat each other as unmarried. In this they violate solemn obligations legally subsisting, and set not only an example of insubordination, under the sentence of the church holding up the law to public odium, but the immoral example of persons in the marriage state living regardless of its bonds; and they are subjected to all the inconveniences of a single state; for they can contract no other marriage. An article in the *Princeton Review* of July last, justifying the decision of the General Assembly, seems to feel, that perpetual deposition from the ministry and exclusion from the church would be too severe a sentence for the sin. It says, therefore, "This suspension must continue until the party gives evidence of repentance. What evidence is, in this case, to be deemed satisfactory, rests with the discretion of the Presbytery. No one will doubt that incest is an offence which admits of various degrees." Remark-

ing the difference between marriages with a mother, and with an aunt, with a sister and sister-in-law, it proceeds: "As therefore the offence differs, so should the penalty. We find that in the ancient church the penalty for the marriage of a man with his wife's sister was excommunication for a term of years; for marriage with his own sister it was final excision from the church." The allusion in "excommunication for a term of years," is to a canon of a Provincial Council, A. D. 314, which ordains, "if any one after the death of his wife took her sister, he must abstain from the communion for five years." This part of the article is well worthy of examination. Separation of the parties when united in lawful matrimony, would be a scandal to society, a dangerous example, and a deliberate contempt of the laws. That such a separation should be requisite under a sentence of the church, for a restoration to its communion, would not only be a gross reflection upon the civil authority, but would exhibit a countervailing influence incompatible with the spirit of our institutions. The course, related in the History of England, of the monk Dunstan and the Archbishop Odo, toward the beautiful Elgiva and the unfortunate Edwy, could not be endured in this age. The quotation from the Review will not allow, that the sentence in this case, shall extend to the separation of the parties or to their final excision from the church, and it will avoid these consequences by adopting the principle to which it alludes,—that exclusion from church fellowship for a proper period, such as shall be satisfactory to the Presbytery, shall be the punishment. This is a very good suggestion for a Roman Catholic church; but it is not seen how it can be admitted in a Protestant, evangelical one. "As therefore the offence differs" (says the Reviewer), "so should the penalty." The proposition is, that the punishment must be proportioned to the offence, and that when that punishment has been borne, there is an end of punishment; of course, the offender is restored, for there can be no further punishment of the offence; its full punishment has been inflicted. If five years exclusion from communion be the punishment proportioned to the offence, to continue this exclusion longer would make the punishment excessive. This is penance, the true Roman Catholic penance: the sin of the soul cancelled through the suffering of the body: punishment working the restoration of the offender. Five years abstaining from communion, blots out the sin of incest. In our understanding of spiritual punishment, its purpose is to lead to repentance: upon repentance there is forgiveness and restora-

tion; not that the sin is cancelled because it has borne its proportionate punishment, but forgiven on the ground of repentance, and until repentance, no matter how small the sin, there can be no forgiveness nor restoration. In a most flagitious case of incest, a man having his father's wife in his father's lifetime, when he had put away the wife, and was evidently penitent, although he had not been excommunicated more than a year, Paul directs the church to forgive and comfort him, lest he "should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." "Wherefore I beseech you that you would confirm your love to him:"—suggesting the warning, "lest Satan should get an advantage of us; for we are not ignorant of his devices." (2 Cor. ii. 5—11. 1 Cor. v. 1—5.) What advantage would it not give Satan in such a case, to exclude, for five years, from church privilege and fellowship! Would not this penalty which the Reviewer finds in the "ancient church," and suggests for precedent, be a convenient instrument for the adversary? Can we avoid noticing the marked difference between the spirit of Paul's instruction, and that of the precedent of the ancient church? This would admonish us to be distrustful of these precedents, even if history were not so full of warning. To invalidate the allegation, that through the early corruption of Christianity, which came to such head in the Romish church, false rules were adopted as well in relation to marriage as other subjects, the article just quoted from, remarks, "the marriage in question was forbidden before there was a Pope in Rome." We do not suppose, the Pope introduced these corruptions; but the corruptions introduced the Pope. Paul says, "the mystery of iniquity doth already work." The first error we see in the church is effort to depreciate and corrupt the New Testament by engrafting upon it the Old.

But to return to our examination of the ground on which in the case in question the offender can be restored to the church. No one can suppose, that the doctrine of penance can obtain in the Presbyterian church during this generation: restoration, therefore, must be through forgiveness upon repentance. In order to repentance there must be a sense of the sin, so that there shall be a turning from it with grief and hatred, with full purpose of, and endeavor after new obedience. The marriage, therefore, must be treated as a sin, and consequently there must be a separation of the parties:—subjecting themselves to discomfort and danger, and society to the bane of their example. Restoration upon any other ground, supposes that there can be no

repentance of sin while continuing in the wilful practise of it; unless indeed abstaining, for a period, from the communion of the church, have transforming, moral efficacy upon guilt, so that what was incest at the beginning of this period, shall cease to be so at the end of it.

As, therefore, in this country the church cannot exercise effectual jurisdiction over marriage, and its proceeding in spiritual cognisance of it upon any rule distinct from the law of the land must involve itself and the parties in difficulty, it ought to pay deference to the Civil Power, whose jurisdiction upon the subject is complete. Indeed, to this power jurisdiction over this matter is appropriate. Municipal regulations, according to the nature of things, proceed from the civil power: the law of marriage is a municipal regulation: the xviiiith Leviticus is so. True, that law was given to the children of Israel by God; but it was because of their government being a Theocracy; he, their lawgiver, prescribing all their laws. In the council of Trent it was stated and admitted, that jurisdiction over marriage had come to the church from the secular power partly by commission, and partly through negligence of the civil magistrates. Under the Theodosian code, compiled toward the close of the fourth century, and the Justinian about the middle of the sixth, this jurisdiction was in the secular authority. Chancellor Kent, after his usual thoroughness and ability of research in the case before mentioned, says: "All matrimonial and other causes of ecclesiastical cognisance belonged originally to the temporal courts." In Scotland the General Assembly of the church by soliciting and obtaining from Parliament a statute ratifying the Confession of Faith, as we have seen, acknowledged the paramount authority of the law of the land, and their proceedings in marriage cases according to the Confession of Faith, are grounded upon it as law enacted by the civil power. In England the Westminster Assembly presented the Confession of Faith to the Parliament of that kingdom, not as having any binding force, but as their advice for the legislative action of that body to make it obligatory. This was no common Parliament. It was elected in troublesome times, the most perilous and interesting period of English history, when, under well grounded apprehension of the despotic disposition of the king and the arbitrary tendency of his measures, there was a general cry for reformation. The occasion was felt by the nation as involving its liberties and happiness; and men of the highest

and most trustworthy character were sought out to represent the people in the House of Commons. Even Clarendon, an adherent of the royal family through close alliance, allows, that "there were many great and worthy patriots in the house, and as eminent as any age had ever produced: men of gravity and wisdom, of great and plentiful fortunes, all members of the established church, and almost to a man for Episcopal government." In this house, so constituted, the Confession of Faith was presented, December 11, 1646; came up for discussion, May 19th, 1647; and afterwards, from October 2d, to the following 22d of March, was debated every Wednesday. Upon this debate the greater part of the chapter of Marriage and Divorce, including all in controversy in this case, was referred to the law of the land. We have thus the deliberate, solemn judgment of such a body, upon such examination, that the laws of the land are the proper rule upon this subject.

We have seen, that in this country the law of marriage must proceed from the civil power, the state legislatures and the state judiciaries; the first enacting, the last pronouncing and administering it: that this is an essential result of our institutions for the maintenance and preservation of civil and religious liberty. We not only see this as matter of fact, but on examination we find, that it is correct in principle according to the wisest codes of antiquity, of Theodosius the Great and Justinian, held in reverence at this day. This argument is rendered more forcible by the circumstance, that the latter emperor made theology his study, so that it became a prominent feature in his character, was disposed in all things to favor the clergy, by his code, especially his Novels, confirming and enlarging their privileges, and in all disputes between them and laymen seemed to regard it as a settled point, that truth, innocence and justice, were always on the side of the church. That this result of our institutions is correct in principle, is further sustained by the judgment of the very Parliament under whose appointment the Confession of Faith was prepared, and to whom it was presented for ratification, and is corroborated by the fact, that jurisdiction exercised by the church came to it by partly commission from the civil power, and partly through the negligence of its magistrates.

In any light it would appear extraordinary for the church, in deciding a question upon marriage, to refuse to receive the laws of the state of which the parties were citizens as the rule

of decision : but the view that has been presented, shows that there is not a pretence to countenance such a course. Now, whatever may be claimed for the church as a voluntary society, making rules for its own regulation, binding only those who choose to be in its communion, it is utterly incompatible with the essential character of civil authority, that any Body, lay or ecclesiastic, within the pale of our institutions should have rules derogatory or opposed to the laws. Allow this, and the principle is settled, through which carried out in its legitimate consequences, men may be absolved from allegiance to their government. The church in the proper discharge of its functions may instruct, enlighten and persuade, in order to produce a change of laws by the constituted authorities ; but it cannot impair or infringe the duties, rights, or immunities which its members owe or hold, as citizens, under subsisting laws. For the church to impugn by its discipline the laws enacted, declared and administered by the constituted authorities, reproaches the gospel, and disregards propriety. When, therefore, the article referred to, in view of the solemn, legal enactments, it is believed of all but one, certainly of more than two-thirds, of the States in this Union, in order to maintain the decision of the General Assembly, advances the position,—“ Men may legalize such marriages, but they never can cease to be violations of the laws of nature, that is, to be inconsistent with the order and constitution of nature as established by God ;”—the church is placed upon a ground and in an attitude from which all who desire to see its ordinances crowned with salvation, should unite to remove it.

The article of the Princeton Review, before referred to, places its justification of the decision of the General Assembly upon two grounds :—it is against (1st,) the law of nature, (2d,) the word of God, for a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife. The position is laid down,—“ A parent and child, a brother-in-law and sister-in-law cannot intermarry without doing violence to the feelings which, of right and necessity, belong to the relations, and without undermining the foundations of Christian Society.” Is there fairness in joining, as in this position, brother-in-law and sister-in-law with parents and child ? The tendency in common reading is to carry the judgment formed upon one part of the same sentence over the other, especially when in immediate, intimate connection ; and as in this sentence there can be no necessity in respect to parents

and child, most persons will pass along with the sentiment thus produced without stopping to inquire how far brother-in-law and sister-in-law are within the same reason. The phraseology, too, a legal fiction expressing in sound what does not exist in fact, and which seems to have been brought into use in the case we are considering, favors this fallacy, the name of the nearest kindred, brother and sister, being used, because allowed by usage as descriptive of a condition into which kindred does not at all enter. There is certainly no similarity or analogy between the relationships of parent and child, and brother-in-law and sister-in-law, to lead to their being associated. Is not the effect of the association, to connect the feeling which revolts at marriage between parent and child with that between brother-in-law and sister-in-law? The article strongly asserts the impropriety of marriage with a sister-in-law,—the sister of a deceased wife, or the widow of a deceased brother: supposing probably the last the clearest case, and as in another sophism, “*juncta juvant*.” Metaphysical morality easily forms reasons; but common capacities require something substantial and intelligible as ground for opinion. When the article says, “All experience teaches, that habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must exist among members of the same family, between young persons of different sexes who are allowed to intermarry, is, among the mass of men inconsistent with the preservation of purity,”—the proposition is not disputed; but what application has it to marriage with a brother's widow or a wife's sister? . When a man marries, he forms his own separate family: his wife does not become a member of the family of his brother, nor does he become a member of the family of his wife's sisters. Neither case presents the “habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must and should exist among young persons of different sexes, members of the same family.” Besides, the married ones have reached a time and condition of life, when this principle guarding young persons, brothers and sisters, in their free intercourse by a sentiment shrinking with abhorrence from a thought of impurity, has no place, but is superseded by other principles adapted to a more advanced stage of mind and morals. For the reviewer is mistaken, if he supposes that there are not other principles besides this law of incest, sufficient to render the intercourse of the sexes safe and decent. The article adds, “If a wife's sister is not to look upon her brother-in-law as a brother, then she cannot allow

him a brother's rights, nor receive a sister's privileges. She will shrink from him as from every other man. She will become a stranger in her sister's house and to her sister's children."—"Is she to have all the rights and privileges of a sister, without a sister's protection? Is she to be a sister in all the relations but one, and as to that one, a stranger?" The natural inquiry upon these quotations is, What is the practical answer of society to the suggestions? It is believed, that every state of the Union but one, it is certain that in eighteen of them, comprehending a large proportion of the oldest and most populous, the law sanctions marriage with the sister of a deceased wife. This law has been enacted and approved by those intrusted with legislative power; it was prescribed, and it has been sustained by public opinion. These states will certainly bear advantageous comparison with any other people of modern or ancient time with respect to morals and religion, and decency, refinement and intelligence. Is it found, that a wife's sister shrinks from her sister's husband? that she becomes a stranger in her sister's house, and to her sister's children? that she suffers through want of protection? These questions answer themselves, affording a practical and complete refutation of the reviewer's doctrine. The makers of these laws were more competent for their office, than the reviewer. Not only did the institutions of the country commit this subject to them, making their action conclusive; but they were selected from the walks of men, where intercourse with society and practical knowledge acquired among the experiences of life naturally would qualify them for the proper discharge of their duty. The reviewer's notions pushing even prudery to extravagance, might suit oriental customs, immuring females to save them from pollution, but they do not correspond to the manners of Christian communities, where men and women freely associate in full reliance upon the common proprieties of decorum, never surmising that there is peril or indelicacy in their intercourse.—"She will shrink from him as from every other man."—Certainly; for it is not discernible by common sense, how with propriety she can associate with him in any other way than with every man worthy of her acquaintance. The suggestion, however, is, that "she will shrink from every other man:" an idea that cannot have been formed in the world, among its people and their ways, for nothing can be found there of which it is the image. Indeed, prohibition of marriage, if there were no other

adequate security, would be most precarious and vain protection ; to trust to it, would invite instead of obviating ruin.

The reviewer appeals to the sentiments of parents as universally requiring the separate education of males and females. His conclusion is deemed a mistake. In the parts of our country where the writer of this article passed the first twenty-two years of his life, males and females were educated together in the common schools and in the academies. In these schools and academies were both sexes, from early childhood to ages above twenty years. One consequence was, their acquaintance with each other, so that their intercourse was easy and agreeable. In all companies of the young, would be both sexes in nearly equal numbers, enjoying each other's society. He removed to another part of the country, where he has since dwelt, and where he found a different custom in these respects ; the sexes being educated separately, the males by themselves and the females by themselves in appropriate schools. The regulation thus begun, formed the subsequent habits ; the young men associated together, entering the company of females in refined society with embarrassment, and preferring to be anywhere else. The reason is apparent. Separation of the sexes for the purpose and in the course of education, occasioned awkwardness in each other's company. From long and careful observation the writer of this article is convinced, that this estrangement of males from female society, the natural result of this separation of the sexes in education, has been the most copious source of noxious immorality that has wasted our youth, like a frost in spring, nipping almost every blossom of promise ; and that the habit of males associating with females for the enjoyment of agreeable society, was the most pure and beneficial moral influence he has ever observed.

The summary of this argument is : On this subject the church ought to pay deference to the civil power in the exercise of its just constitutional authority, and of course receive the law of a state where a marriage is regularly contracted, as the rule in relation to it. This argument rests on two grounds :—(1st,) legally, morally, and scripturally, it is the duty of the church to obey the laws of the land, constitutionally enacted and administered, and it is insubordination to set up its discipline paramount to them :—(2d,) those intrusted by our civil institutions to make and administer the laws upon this subject, are better qualified to discharge these functions, and can be more safely

confided in, than those who administer church discipline. What has been the history of church discipline?

The article in the Princeton Review, so often referred to, contains what may be quoted as pertinent in reply to the summary just stated. Consideration of it in this connection, will conduce to a fuller understanding, and a juster appreciation of the argument, that has been used. The research to which it will lead, will discover the origin and nature of the principle on which the decision of the General Assembly is grounded. The reviewer says, "Now there is *prima facie* evidence, that this view of the subject is incorrect, from the fact, that the Christian world, for so many ages, and with so much unanimity, has regarded this marriage as an evil of such magnitude as to require its prohibition, both by the civil law and the canons of the church." "We are not so much wiser than all other men." "If the great mass of Christian men, in all ages, have united in thinking such marriages wrong, then the probability is, that they are wrong." "It will not be denied, that the earliest records of the ancient church, relating to this subject, condemn the marriage under consideration. By the apostolic constitution, no man who had married the sister of his wife, could ever be admitted to the ministry; and by the early councils, the parties to such connections were excommunicated from the church; so that this became as settled a point in ecclesiastical law as any other connected with the whole subject of marriage. Indeed, the language of our Confession is a literal version of the old canon law on this point. As the law was of authority in all the western churches before the reformation, so all the Protestant communions adhered to its provisions so far as our Confession retains them." "We are not only adhering to our own laws, and to our own usages, but we are standing up for the common law and practice of Protestant Christendom, against modern innovations." (*)

(*) The law of Pennsylvania was enacted in 1705, that of Maryland 1777, Connecticut 1793, New Jersey 1795. The dates of other laws cannot be here stated, they being found in revised editions; those of both Massachusetts and New Hampshire are believed as old as those of Maryland, and probably older. Not *modern*, according to the acceptance of the term, in this new world. Appealing to precedents of the ancient church in derogation of changes—[reformation it has been called] is not in unison with the spirit which peopled this country and founded its institutions of freedom.

Here is a retrograde movement, a going back into former times and establishments, of a bold character—a church upon our own free soil, fled to as an asylum from the abuses of these former times and establishments; this church, a part of our social system, within the pale of our institutions formed for ourselves to secure our civil and religious liberties, to claim for its own, and avow its adhering to, and standing up for the laws, usages and practices of those times and establishments “against modern innovations,” being no less than the laws of our own states, made according to our constitutions! “We are not so much wiser than other men.” Must the conclusion be, that the laws of other men shall supersede our laws upon our own soil? But what is this wisdom of the ancient church, before which our laws are to be despoiled of both character and power; of the character of law, to determine the innocence or guilt of acts done under their regular cognisance, of the power of law to protect the citizens in their conformity to them? “But this law was of authority in all the western churches before the reformation.” And why was the reformation? Because there were abuses, corruptions, and errors in the laws, usages and practices of the churches. It is, therefore, nothing in favor of a law, usage or practice, that it existed before the reformation; because it was, in all human probability, at least tinctured with the abuses, corruptions and errors, which required the reformation. We know that, in the laws relating to marriage, there were gross abuses. It is said, however, “the Protestant communions adhered to the provisions” of this law. Do we not know that many errors were adhered to? Can we suppose, that men educated in inveterate errors, which had been impressed with their first conceptions as truths, in connection with all they held holy, should not retain very many errors? Did not Luther himself adhere until death to the doctrine of transubstantiation? Even Queen Elizabeth could hardly be persuaded to part with images, or consent to the marriage of the clergy. In the great doctrines of salvation, there was remarkable light in the reformation. In this respect the minds of the reformers seem to have been peculiarly under the unction of the Holy One. But upon church government, discipline, law of marriage, and divorce, men were left to evince the infirmity of their nature. Do we not consider, do not liberal Episcopalians admit, that their church is prejudiced by “a literal version” of that which was retained in the reformation? And shall we hold it as imparting authority to our con-

fession on the subject of marriage, that it "is a literal version of the old canon law upon this point?" In England, did not the Parliament find it requisite to interpose a statute, and her courts to render their solemn judgments, to prohibit the church courts from proceeding in relation to marriage upon laws and usages to which they as "Protestant communions adhered?" One of the best law reporters thought it a matter of consequence, requiring the subjoining of a special memorandum to his report, that a high dignitary of the church had labored with the judges to produce a decision different from that which was the result of their judgment, and by which they determined, that the church court was illegally extending prohibition of marriage, and restrained its proceeding. This was more than a century after the reformation. When we consider the strong inclination that was in the church before the reformation to enlarge the prohibitions against marriage, and observe the tenaciousness in this respect of the Protestant church since, and take into view its power through its union with government and its being arbiter of conscience, it would be surprising, indeed, if very questionable law and usage upon this subject had not been retained. Certainly we cannot cease to remember, that abuses left by the reformation in Protestant churches, drove the Pilgrim fathers first to Holland, and afterward to this new world; their recorded motive, "by separating from all existing establishments in Europe to form the model of a pure church free from the admixture of human additions." What is it but to condemn and impugn this motive and its principle, to cite "the earliest records of the ancient church," "the apostolic constitutions," and the very establishments referred to by these devoted adherents of civil and religious liberty, and in deference to them reject our own laws as "modern innovations?" Let it be noted, that these "earliest records of the ancient church," are not the Scriptures of the Old or New Testaments, but the writings of that obscure period, which, within our memory, used to be styled "the dark ages," when there seems to have been just light enough to bewilder and lead astray. These writings have been the storehouse of proofs, to sustain unfounded pretensions in the church. The apostolic constitutions, Mosheim says, "are the work of some austere and melancholy author, who designed to reform the worship and discipline of the church, which he thought were fallen from their original purity and sanctity, and who ventured to prefix the names of the apostles to his precepts and regulations, in

order to give them currency." It is a new thing in these states to cite such matters as authority. Our whole system of civil and religious liberty is a modern innovation. How long has it been deemed proper to adhere to the early records of the ancient church, and stand up for the common law and practice of Protestant Christendom in the old world, against such "modern innovations?" It is the very excellency of *Puseyism* to supersede modern innovations, by bringing back the tenets and usages of the ancient church. It is remarkable, too, that *Puseyism*, repelled in England with unmingled discountenance, has received no inconsiderable favor in these United States; and if heed be not taken, it will prevail in efficiency, though not in form, elsewhere than in the Episcopal church. The special approbation that has been bountifully bestowed on this decision of the General Assembly, and those who advocated and pronounced it, should admonish them of the principles esteemed in that quarter worthy of commendation.

Our Institutions deem so highly of man as immortal and responsible, that under them it is the duty of every one to investigate and think for himself, forming his own judgments in the free and conscientious use of his own faculties, as he is personally answerable for the results. "So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Men are endued with intelligence, that they may exercise it; and because of their intelligence our institutions invest them with privileges requiring its exercise. We pay deference to precedents: the opinions of good and wise men deserve deliberate regard: but we cannot blindly follow any man, and be guiltless. Hence there is originality in our laws, that may be miscalled innovation; for it can rarely be said of them as of "our Confession" in the preceding quotation, that it "is a literal version of the old canon law." Let us examine the law, usage and practice, on which the reviewer insists, of the ancient church and Protestant Christendom, and fairly estimate their value.

The Theodosian code, about A. D. 385, included within the degrees prohibited from intermarriage, first cousins. This is one degree beyond the canonical tables of the Episcopal church, and the Confession of Faith, according to each of which first cousins may lawfully intermarry. Theodosius the Great, under whom this code was compiled, was a Christian emperor zealously orthodox, and powerfully influenced by ecclesiastics: on the requirement of St. Ambrose, he submitted to do public penance.

—This prohibition was sanctioned by St. Ambrose, who declared such marriage contrary to the divine law. St. Augustine admits the divine law does not forbid the marriage, but justifies the prohibition as necessary for the maintenance of public decorum. By the 10th canon of the Council of Arles, A. D. 538, and 31st of the Council of Autun, *second* cousins were prohibited. By subsequent canons the prohibitions were enlarged so as to include *fourth* cousins; and the mode of computation according to the canon law being substituted for that of the civil law, added several degrees. In these facts we see the disposition of the church to extend the prohibitions; and the approbation by the most eminent Fathers of the ancient church of an extension of them, now acknowledged universally not to be maintainable: the one pronouncing this extension to be according to the divine law, and the other declaring it necessary for the maintenance of public decorum. All these laws and canons extending these prohibitions, even the remotest, like our Confession on this point, professed to be grounded on xviiith Leviticus, and to be mere declarations of the degrees prohibited by that chapter. The fact, that some of these prohibitions have been universally abandoned, proves the disposition of the ancient church to amplify the Levitical law on this point, leading it into manifest error. The cause is the same which gave Paul so much trouble in preserving his infant churches from adopting the law. It has always been a favorite plan to do works, and in the letter go beyond the letter. Ceremonial purity, abstaining from marriage, will-worship, things that God never commanded, neither entered they into his mind:—these have always been favorite substitutes for evangelical piety. It was the natural inclination and reasoning of men, taking the law for their rule, to augment holiness by stretching its requirements or going beyond them. To enlarge God's law, was to abound in the merit of obedience. In the "View" before referred to is the following passage citing Grotius: "It has been surmised, that in the first ages of Christianity, the ardor of the Gentile proselytes was not satisfied by a tacit renunciation of their Pagan customs which tolerated marriage condemned by the Levitical text; and that being desirous of manifesting to the world the superior purity of their new profession, by a corresponding sanctity of life, their zeal in reprobating those alliances which they were taught now to view with abhorrence, led them to carry the opprobrium of incest beyond the limits with which the Hebrew nation was satisfied; or

which were required by more civilized societies for the maintenance of public decorum.”

The laws and usages of Protestant Christendom (the part of the Old World where the reformation has prevailed) are liable to exception of the same nature as those of the ancient church. We have adverted to the influence of that church running into the reformation, through the power of opinions long entertained and associated with every thing deemed holy, to escape from which was motive strong enough to drive the Pilgrim fathers from the comforts of civilized life, and settle them in a savage wilderness. We could not suppose that the rank and vigorous growth of error, where it had struck its roots deep and wide, would ever be wholly eradicated. We have seen the Protestant church more than one hundred years after the reformation insisting, with unyielding pertinacity, upon prohibiting a degree forbidden now by no canonical table. Even the Pilgrim fathers could not divest themselves of the influence from which they fled. Besides, there were strong circumstances to rivet errors on this point. Henry VIII., one of the most wicked of men and powerful of monarchs, had become weary of his amiable but sickly wife, Catharine of Arragon, and had fallen in love with one of her maids of honor, the beautiful Ann Boleyn. To marry the one he must divorce the other. He seized upon the pretence that Catharine was widow of his brother, who had married her at the age of sixteen, and died in a few months afterward. This matter had been deliberately and solemnly discussed, and determined in favor of the marriage of Henry with Catharine. The Pope refusing to grant him a divorce, he separated from the church of Rome, which he had zealously defended, and placed himself on the side of the reformation which he abhorred. Determined upon a divorce, he applied to the universities of Europe, and obtained their answer that it was not agreeable to the law of God for a man to marry his brother's wife. This answer is cited by the reviewer as authority to sustain the decision of the General Assembly. It is wonderful, in this country and age, that authority can be accepted from such a source. As well may the judgments by which Ann Boleyn's head was cut off, by which Sir Thomas More was led to the block, by which another queen was beheaded, and another divorced, and the best blood of England was shed, all by solemn decisions of competent tribunals, under the influence of this unyielding man of power, be adduced as precedents for the promotion of truth, charity and holiness. But

these proceedings have another bearing upon this subject. The reviewer says, "From the reformation to the present time the general law of Christendom has remained unchanged:"—(by Christendom still meaning the Old World under the reformation, to the exclusion of this country.)—These proceedings show, that in the dawn of the reformation, extraordinary power was in operation to settle in a particular manner, for a special, wicked purpose, the great and commanding point relied on in the discussion before the General Assembly.—This point was, that it was unlawful to marry a brother's widow, and therefore unlawful to marry a deceased wife's sister, being relationships of the same nature and degree: the inverted argument being just as good, it is unlawful to marry a wife's sister, therefore a brother's widow. Accordingly we find a statute of Henry VIII., in which the wife's sister is expressly inserted as a forbidden degree, and in the case in which this point was finally settled in England, in opposition to a precedent opinion most elaborately formed upon consultation of all the judges, this statute was cited by the chief justice as conclusive. It is deserving of observation, in order to understand the character of the times, that it is cited as the reason of this statute, "that many inconveniences have fallen by reason of the marrying within the degrees of marriage prohibited by God's law;" when by another statute four years afterward the inconveniences that had been experienced are recited to have arisen from the interposing of "other prohibitions than God's law admitteth." There was a convocation of the English clergy, and two hundred and fifty-three were in favor of the divorce, and only nineteen against it. What the influence of Henry was in respect to these proceedings may be understood from the fate of the great favorite Wolsey, who failing to effect the divorce, was ruined: the distinguished patron of learning, the most eminent statesman of his time, a cardinal of the church, a man of consummate ability and unbounded wealth, utterly destroyed. Under such circumstances, the determinations referred to, not only are divested of all power to convince us; but it is made manifest, that the law has been settled in the Old World upon the very point in discussion, under the strongest sinister influences. With respect to the opinions of the foreign Universities, we cannot be ignorant, that the influence of so powerful a king as Henry VIII., whose alliance was courted by the highest monarchs in Europe, could make itself felt in those institutions as well as in England; and besides, the learned doctors in those

universities had all been educated in the church of Rome, and had a full persuasion of the right of the church to expound and fix the meaning of the word of God. To understand what probability there was, that these men would lay aside their professions arising from enlarged construction of the Levitical text, which they had imbibed with their first impressions in the matter, and make up opinions upon the plain, unadulterated word, we refer to another article in the same number of the Princeton Review. There is this passage—"It is indeed a fruitful source of error and its perpetuation, that men are ever more prone to follow a leader than to pick their own way, to pin their faith upon a particular author rather than think for themselves. This is especially the case in schools, where the teaching falls into a beaten track, in which it remains until admonished, that the world has moved on and left the college far behind."—So that, after all, the charge of innovation is not so decisive against our laws, and when taking the ground, "from the reformation to the present time the general law of Christendom has remained unchanged"—the reviewer might with propriety have deemed this country within the limits of Christendom, and excepted every state but one of our Union from the scope of his assertion.

We think it manifest, that in the pursuit of truth in this case, the precedents relied upon are not safe guides. Neither the early records of the ancient church, the apostolic constitutions, nor the laws and usages of Protestant Christendom (confined to the Old World), deserve confidence. We must learn by the word of God, what that word is. We admit, "we ought not," as the reviewer insists, "to approach the investigation of the Scriptures on this subject, as though we were searching for something which ought not to be there." But we positively deny his position, "that the *reverse* is true." No one can doubt that it is perilous to truth, to approach this investigation of the Scriptures, searching for something which ought not to be there. The churches have standards, and to exalt their credit, maintain, that they exactly conform to the word of God; it then becomes the purpose of investigation to establish this conformity. The doctrinal part of the Confession of Faith is remarkable for its soundness: upon full debate the English Parliament readily concurred in it; but they had good grounds for not agreeing to other parts, and, among these, the chapter of Marriage and Divorce. It is believed that the whole difficulty of this subject has arisen from a determination to find in the Scriptures what is

plainly expressed in the Confession. Men have been educated in such reverence for the Confession, that they will not allow themselves to hesitate on this point. For the doctrinal part, setting forth the great gospel truths of salvation, we sympathize in this reverence; but we are confident there is no ground for it with respect to the exposition of the law of marriage and divorce: the Parliament was right in referring this subject to the law of the land: for it is matter of law. The position of the Confession is, "The man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own, nor the woman of her husband's kindred nearer in blood than her own," This proposition is not in the Bible; nor only so, no proposition can be found in the Bible, bearing resemblance or analogy to it. The consequence is, that those whose prepossessions will not suffer them to give up this sentence, are reduced to the necessity of searching the Scriptures for something not expressed there; but because expressed elsewhere, to be found there unexpressed—*understood*, as the grammarians say; but at any rate to be found there. Hence we have labored arguments, pages upon pages, volumes to prove that to be the law of God, which if it were the law of God, would be written in a short verse. All this labor, all this learning put in requisition to make out that marriage is prohibited with a deceased wife's sister, by words which neither mention, nor allude to a deceased wife's sister. The verse most insisted upon as containing this prohibition (Lev. 18: 16), "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness," is particular, explicit and unequivocal; meaning a brother's wife and nothing more; precisely defining that special relation and nothing else. No two things are more distinct and unlike to perception and expression than the wife of your brother, and the sister of your wife. It is absurd to say the expression "brother's wife" either means or alludes to "wife's sister;" any person intending to convey the meaning of "wife's sister," or to be understood as alluding to her, could not make use of the single phrase "brother's wife." The expression "daughter-in-law" occurs in this chapter, the expression "mother-in-law" occurs in another of the books of Moses, and the expression "sister-in-law" is found in the book of Ruth: if in this verse of Leviticus, the intention had been to express *sister-in-law*, would not the proper term have been employed? The other verse referred to for aid to make out this prohibition (Lev. 18: 17), "Thou shalt not

uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter, nor her daughter's daughter, to uncover her nakedness, for they are her near kinswomen: it is wickedness"—obviously to common sense, and upon the clearest principles of sound interpretation, has the opposite effect. For when the lawgiver explicitly specifies the wife's kinswomen, that are prohibited, his not mentioning her sister, is conclusive that he does not mean to comprehend her in the prohibition. The case excludes the supposition of inadvertence. But is the sister omitted? Examining the paragraph (Lev. 18: 6—18), we perceive that the lawgiver being very explicit in his prohibitions, and having accurately specified the kinswomen of the men, and the kinswomen and wives of his kinsmen, within them, in the verses preceding verse 17, proceeds in like manner to specify the kinswomen of his wife, also within them, and uses for this purpose the language in verses 17 and 18: the prohibition being of her daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter absolutely, because "it is wickedness," and of her sister during her life, because it would vex her. The verses are connected in language, forming one simple passage. This is the plain sense of the passage; and it carries in itself no slight evidence of the correctness of our English translation. Is not this the best translation that has ever been made of any book; has it not been the more approved the more it has been scrutinized with a view to make a better; and has not every attempt to improve it been consummated in versions universally pronounced to be inferior? Why then prove its correctness? Simply, because to find what must be found in the xviiith Levit. in order to sustain the position quoted from the Confession of Faith, it is necessary to change the 18th verse of that chapter. For however slightly those insisting upon the unlawfulness of marriage with a deceased wife's sister may speak of the effect of that verse, while it stands as in our translation it is impossible to maintain their point: the prohibition is limited expressly to the wife's life, and therefore expressly after her decease there is no prohibition. The translation is of the highest credit; there is strong internal evidence specially supporting that of the 18th verse: on what ground can a different translation be substituted? The substitute proposed is, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to another;" using the word *another* instead of "sister." The first objection to this substituted translation is, one of the best Hebrew scholars of our country says, it is not correct;

that upon principles of just Biblical criticism, our present translation is accurate. The second objection is, the verse in this substituted translation is not homogeneous with the passage in which it stands. The general import of the passage is prohibition of sexual intercourse in certain relationships: in our translation the 18th verse expresses a prohibition of that kind, in correspondence with the preceding verses: in the proposed substitute, it expresses no such prohibition:—the matter of relationship, the vital principle pervading the whole, is utterly abandoned. Besides, we know, the division into verses was wholly arbitrary: no principle governed in it. Verses 17 and 18 are connected in language; evidently forming a simple passage: in the first part three relatives of the wife, her daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, and in the last another relative her sister, are mentioned. In the substitute no relation is mentioned. The third objection is, according to the proposed translation, verse 18 expressly prohibits polygamy, and is inserted for that purpose alone. Now we know that the laws of Moses expressly allowed and regulated polygamy, Deut. 21: 15, Exod. 21: 10. It was practised by the men most distinguished for piety and by blessing, and is never reprov'd: Gideon, the parents of Samuel, David, Solomon, also 2 Chron. 24: 3. Can we take verse 18, from its proper connection, divert it from the leading subject of that connection, and make it an isolated clause transformed into a law against polygamy, which was allowed and regulated by the same code of laws, and practised without an intimation of reproof by the holiest men? The answer to this question is obvious: it admits no other.

We ought to take a further view of verse 16, against sexual intercourse with a brother's wife. Without some examination, it may be deemed clear that this verse prohibits marriage with a brother's widow. In the preceding argument, this verse has been taken in this sense; for it has been considered clear, that either phrase, "brother's wife" or "brother's widow," must signify a relative of the brother, and could not be construed to mean a relative of the wife, although no relative of her had been mentioned in the chapter. The proposition, that the prohibition of marriage with a brother's widow directly forbids marriage with a deceased wife's sister, has been so solemnly advanced as to conceal, even from those who advance it, its absurdity: it is nevertheless absurd. For upon the plain principles of interpreting language, departure from which would bring again the con-

fusion of Babel, we must understand a particular expression as used for the very purpose of conveying its particular meaning. When a lawgiver composing and publishing laws, under a sense of the importance that they should be readily and rightly understood, uses the term "brother's," it must be held, that it was his intention to confine himself to "brother's," and that if it had been his intention to comprehend a *relative of the wife* also, he would have used some word to signify that intention. When, further, in the same chapter, relatives of the wife are mentioned, the argument, if its force is susceptible of increase, is corroborated; because there is a violent presumption, that when mentioning the relatives of the wife, he will mention all he intends: and when, still further, the wife's sister is named, no one can hesitate to receive that as the clause governing this question, entirely excluding the other.

But there is no substantial ground for maintaining that this verse (16th) does mean a brother's widow. The expression is, "thy brother's wife." It is admitted, that the term *wife* may signify either wife of the living or deceased—wife or widow. What the signification is in this verse, must be gathered from the manner of its use, and the circumstances applying. To the argument that "wife" in this verse cannot mean wife of a living brother, because the offence then would be adultery, and adultery was punished with death under this law, there is a full answer, which not only satisfies this argument, but also evinces, that we are very incompetent expositors of this old law, given more than thirty-three hundred years ago, for a people in a state of society of which we have no proper knowledge or understanding. For example, it is believed that the most impressive part of Dr. Breckinridge's very able and ingenious argument was that, by which he showed that by determining verse 18 to prohibit taking the sister of the wife in her lifetime, they would establish the principle that a man might lawfully have two wives. This was a startling proposition, felt as a *reductio ad absurdum*, and the interpretation involving it shrunk from, because the hearers were under the influence of our present condition of society, and their sentiments were at once formed, without entering upon the investigation leading back to the people for whom this law was made, and disclosing that among this people the same law in another part provided for the case of a man's having two wives: even the priest to whom the administration of the law belonged, took two wives

for a king under guardianship, (2 Chron. 24 : 3) ; and those most competent to communicate information say, that this verse (18) had direct allusion to the eminent patriarch and servant of the Most High—the ancestor of this people—who had two wives that were sisters. To return to the position, that verse 16 may signify wife of a living brother, and still the offence not be adultery. Marriage among the Jews was extremely loose ; divorce at the arbitrary will of the husband (Deut. 24 : 1—4). It is to be presumed, a wife might leave her husband (1 Cor. 7 : 15). If the husband who had sent away a wife, took her again, it was abomination before the Lord (Deut. 24 : 4). She might marry again ; but for his brother to marry her, would be worse than for him to take her again : the thought to us is vile ; it would obviously be a root of bitterness between the brothers. The brother's taking or cohabiting with her is not forbidden, except in this 16th verse. Besides, there was an allowed state of concubinage. The curse was upon Reuben, for an offence with his father's concubine. The threatening in respect to David's wives, was fulfilled with his concubines (2 Sam. 12 : 11 ; 16 : 21). In the case in the New Testament, of a condemnation by John the Baptist under this prohibition, Herodias the wife had left her husband Philip, and afterward in his lifetime, his brother Herod married her. We thus find, that the manners of the Israelites and their condition of society, rendered this prohibition with respect to the wife of a living husband, proper and expedient ; and that the only case on record in the Bible of its application, is to a wife so circumstanced. There are objections, believed insuperable, to holding the prohibition applicable to a brother's widow. The reason given for the prohibition, " it is thy brother's nakedness," is incompatible with such application. If the brother be dead, the wife " loosed from the law of her husband," how can this reason be true ? It is true of the living brother, not of the dead. The character of the offence (Lev. 20 : 21) " it is an unclean thing," connected with the law (Deut. 25 : 5—10) requiring, in case of a married brother dying childless, his surviving brother to take his widow, makes it manifest, that the prohibition is confined to the wife of the brother while living. Can we admit, that the God of truth and righteousness, whose language to his people is, " ye shall be holy ; for I the Lord your God am holy," would enjoin by law " an unclean thing ?"

The passage (Lev. 18 : 6—18) is very plain upon common,

well-established principles of interpretation. No principle is more clearly established nor obviously just, than that a general clause followed by specific cases, becomes special—limited by the specifications. The reason is apparent to common sense,—indeed, grows out of it. It is the lawgiver puts the cases, that you may understand his application. Upon this ground, as the general prohibition in verse 6, is followed by sixteen specific prohibitions, and as the sister of a deceased wife is not within either of them, there is no prohibition with respect to her. The article in the Princeton Review admits this conclusion: "If the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances which exclude all others, then this marriage is not prohibited." But the article proceeds: "But if those cases are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place, then this connection is forbidden. As every thing at last turns upon this point, it is obvious, that we must have better authority than our own, to decide upon the rule of interpretation." The ground on which we are willing to stand with the reviewer, is described by the inquiry, "whether the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances, or are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place." We agree that the rule which we have stated does not apply, unless specific cases follow the general clause; when examples are given merely to illustrate the clause, they are not specific cases within our meaning. But it must be easy to determine, whether matter is set forth by way of example to illustrate a prohibitory clause, or to express direct prohibitions of particular things. In the present case, it is certainly very easy. Who ever heard of sixteen specific, carefully defined cases, each the distinct subject of a full, positive prohibition, being put as examples to illustrate a general preceding prohibition? No one can read Levit. 18: 7—18, without seeing, that here is a series of special prohibitions, each clearly defined, and full in itself, in which care has been used to express plainly each case. In each case, there is explicit particularity. When such care has been used, and so much explicitness and particularity to express clearly each case, is it not strange construction to add something wholly omitted, not alluded to in any thing expressed, because in certain tables devised by men, according to certain rules of computation established by them, it is to be found in the same degree with something expressed, totally distinct and different? As if the

lawgiver who has said so plainly, particularly, and explicitly, what he has said, did not know all he ought to say, and has therefore left defects for us to supply. "We are not so much wiser" than he. We will also stand with the reviewer upon his other ground:—"We must have better authority than our own, to decide upon the rule of interpretation." We have it. "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shalt thou diminish ought from it; that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you."

The remark in the Article referred to relative to Lev. 18: 6, "by kin, we are to understand relationship in general; because nearly two to one of the specifications which follow relate to affinity and consanguinity," should not pass without examination. The word "kin" signifies relationship by blood—the same kind. The Hebrew term, as is manifest from the phrase in the margin, "remainder of his flesh," another version of it, is more definite and precise in the signification of relationship by blood than our word kin: like the expression, near of kin, which excludes relationship by blood if not near, and of course, that by affinity, devoid of the element of kindred. In Lev. 21: 2, we have a definition of the phrase, "kin that is near unto him; that is, for his mother, and for his father, and for his son, and for his daughter, and for his brother, and for his sister." It is an established rule of construction, to consider a lawgiver as using the same phrase in the same sense; and when he defines his terms in one place, to apply that definition to the same terms in other places: there may be exceptions, but for good reason. Upon what ground, then, can we attach to the phrase "near of kin to him," a more enlarged meaning than is warranted by its proper signification, either in our own or the original language, or than the lawgiver attaches to it in another part of his law? Is there not manifest impropriety in construing the words "near of kin," as signifying "relationship in general?" The error that has been just shown, of holding the cases in verses 7—17 to be examples given of verse 6, in violation of all principles of language, instead of specific prohibitions according to the natural import of the terms used, occasions this misconstruction. Why give this enlarged and forced meaning to the words "near of kin?" The reason assigned is, because the cases in verses 7—17 are given as examples, and to comprehend them the meaning of the words must be enlarged. Is it not the more obvious and correct

course, as these cases do not come within the proper signification of the words "near of kin," to hold that they are not examples, but according to the natural import of the language, distinct prohibitions, or in other words, the declaration of the lawgiver of the cases which he intended to prohibit? Some are within the proper scope of verse 6, and some additions resting on other ground. When we accurately examine the language, this becomes clear to us. Thus father's sister, and mother's sister are *kin*, that is, relations by blood; but they are not *near of kin*, as the lawgiver has used the phrase in the passage cited; and in verses 12, 13, he does not prohibit these relationships as near of kin to the man prohibited, but as the kinswoman of his father and mother. This identical remark applies to verse 17. In verse 15, the prohibition in respect to the daughter-in-law, is not because she is near of kin, but because "she is thy son's wife;" and verse 16, in respect to brother's wife, the ground expressly stated is the injury to the brother—"it is thy brother's nakedness:" so with respect to the father's wife, mother-in-law, the prohibition is grounded on the injury to the father—"it is thy father's nakedness" (8). With respect to father, mother, sister, properly within verse 6, according to the lawgiver's use of the same terms, there is no distinct, additional ground to what is contained in that verse (7, 9, 11). With respect to son's daughter, and daughter's daughter (10), one remove from the lawgiver's own definition of near of kin, there is no distinct ground, but an explanatory observation—"theirs is thine own nakedness." This verse when deliberately considered, will be deemed to afford useful instruction; for when the lawgiver would not rest the prohibition with respect to a son's daughter and daughter's daughter upon the general ground in verse 6, of "near of kin," without an explanation; how shall it be extended to "relationship in general?" In the only remaining case, the wife of the father's brother, neither being within the terms "near of kin," the special ground of the prohibition is, "she is thine aunt." The Jewish writers, entitled to full credit with regard to their own laws and manners, say, that the aunt is in the same degree as the father and mother, as to natural superiority over the nephew, and that his approach to her would invert the order of nature. Whatever may be the reason, it is sufficient that the lawgiver assigns it as the specific ground of that prohibition. We may confidently lay it down, that when a lawgiver assigns a special reason for a prohibition, the reason

assigned is the true reason, and he intends that the prohibition should be held to proceed from, and rest upon it; and of course, that all the prohibitions in Lev. 18: 6—18, for which special reasons are assigned, are to be considered as distinct prohibitions for the reasons assigned, and not as parts of verse 6. A few of the prohibitions come under this verse; the others are such as the lawgiver, in view of the reasons given, has seen proper to ordain.

This subject is by no means exhausted. It presents other important points for remark. It has been discussed upon the ground, that Levit. 18: 6—18 is a regulation of marriage. It is not a law for that purpose. It is confined to the prohibition of sexual intercourse. It is admitted, that it is a restraint and preventive of marriage; but this is a result and consequence. The law may be violated without marriage; and there may be a contract of marriage legally solemnized without transgressing the law. This false position of the subject is a source of error in discussing it.

Putting the Levitical law, or any part of it, upon the same ground on which we place the ten commandments, is utterly inadmissible. It is new, and it is dangerous. The reason, "the precepts in Leviticus are the declaration of God as to what is right"—would establish the entire judicial law with all its penalties. "We may differ from Confucius, we dare not differ from God." Very true. We dare not maintain, that the laws given to the nation of Israel by their and our Maker, were not suitable to their condition, and good laws for them in their circumstances. But who will say, that those laws have been given to any other people, or that they were not made for a state of things that is past, or that the whole frame of polity which they constituted was not intended to be temporary, and has not ceased according to the design in its construction? There are very wise things in these laws: but that any part of them retains the force of law is positively denied. Wisdom of laws depends upon the state of society for which they were made, and the evils to be corrected. We can form no just opinion now of these things. The law we have been considering is a positive law; it has nothing in common with the decalogue, the moral law. We consider it clear, that the church is bound to respect and obey the laws of the state where it is situated, and where its members receive protection and owe allegiance, far more than the laws that were given Israel in their ancient theocracy, terminated long since by its own appointment. Even

in the time of Paul, when the minds of men were not prepared to consider the Mosaic dispensation as terminated, he does not place the case at Corinth of a man's having his father's wife (the father was living, 2 Cor. 7 : 12), upon the Levitical law, but the law of nature (1 Cor. 5 : 1, not even named among the Gentiles).

The question is gravely proposed, Can you say that you have not a doubt that this marriage is forbidden by the word of God, and will you then hazard the sin? This is the device of superstition: the very proposal of the question to the timid produces the fear it suggests: follow out the course, and you can establish the Inquisition. It should be our warning, that this dreadful institution was founded in Spain, with all its horrors full grown in its very inception, by the wisest and best of sovereigns, and the most amiable and excellent of women, Queen Isabella. The proposition, therefore, can be by no means assented to, that it is material at all, whether a man may marry the sister of his deceased wife or not, there will be always others equally eligible;—it is of great importance, that a false principle should not be adopted, and that the church should in no case by latitudinarian construction interfere with the rights of men. This is not the way of salvation; the gospel has other views: this going to the law is not in its spirit. Especially should not the church stand in opposition to the laws upon a ground that is not solid, and in a matter in which it is wrong and they are right: even if it could for a moment allow itself in the determination to take such an attitude under any circumstances.

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF DR. EDWARDS'S "DISSERTATION CONCERNING LIBERTY AND NECESSITY."

By Rev. Samuel T. Spear, Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church of Lansingburgh, N. Y.

As intimated by its title-page, this Dissertation was intended by its author as a reply to the Essays of Dr. West and others, on the subject of Liberty and Necessity. Indirectly it is a defence of the doctrine of Moral Necessity adopted by the Elder Edwards, as well as an exponent of the views entertained by its

distinguished author. Upon its first publication, during the lifetime of the author, it was by many regarded as an unanswerable refutation of the system of his opponents. That it presents clear and decisive marks of strength in argumentation, tact and ingenuity in metaphysical criticism, as well as candor both in the statement of principles and their legitimate deductions, must be acknowledged. It is much to be regretted, that this Dissertation, with the other productions of the same respected writer, should so long have been inaccessible to the great proportion of the ministers and students of our country. The editors and publishers of Dr. Edwards's Works are entitled to the lasting thanks of the community for the service they have now rendered to the general cause of truth.

It is proposed in this article to examine so much of these works as may be found in the Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity. It is not judged important to decide the comparative merits of the arguments of Dr. Edwards and those of his opponents. On some points victory seems to have been on one side; and upon others, on the other side. To judge of the truth of a system by the skill displayed in its defence would be a very unsafe dictum in philosophy. Truth at times may be committed to incompetent hands; while error may be fortified; not only by great names, but by great adroitness in making "the worse appear the better reason."

The system of Necessity, as stated and defended by the elder and the younger Edwards, has for years been regarded as entirely established. No man, until recently, has dared to intimate even a doubt of its truth. Authority little less than *axiomatic* has been assigned to it. It has imparted its own peculiar type to the theological philosophy of our country. In the providence of God, however, it seems destined to undergo a re-examination; minds of much worth and power are enlisted in this investigation; it can no longer be said, that it carries with it the conclusiveness of a mathematical demonstration, at least in its relation to the existing state of opinion. Nothing is to be feared from this *new* movement. If Edwards was wrong, the fact ought to appear; if he was right, a re-examination of his arguments will not be of disservice to the system. Philosophy is now in a better state to review this question, than when it was originally argued. The science of psychology has made great advances since the days of Edwards. On every account it is desirable that this philosophical movement should go for-

ward, until truth is ascertained, or the impracticability of its knowledge shall be fully demonstrated. In itself the subject is one of great importance; it is a part of the philosophy of the human mind; in its relations to other branches of truth, it is perhaps not less important. Let the discussion then proceed, begun, continued and ended, as a simple inquiry after truth.

On the one side of this question will be arranged the *Dissertation* of Dr. Edwards. Although dead, by the republication of his arguments he will yet speak. By many they will be regarded as conclusive;—with all it is hoped that they will receive that attention and confidence, which are proportionate to their merit. In constructing a review of this *Dissertation*, our intention is not to follow in the exact sequence of chapter or title; but to make a selection of points, ascertain the views of Dr. Edwards on these points, and aim to compare them with truth. To this undertaking the attention of the reader is now solicited.

I. *The Statement of Moral Necessity.*

Upon careful examination it will be found, that Dr. Edwards was by no means consistent with himself in his exposition of Moral Necessity. He gives not *one*, but *three* definitions, which are not identical. Let us proceed to confirm this proposition.

1. In the first place he defines it to be the *previous certainty of the existence of moral actions*. He says, "But concerning my own meaning, I have a right to speak more peremptorily, that I mean all necessity, or *previous certainty of the volition or voluntary action* of a rational being, whatever be the cause or influence, by which that necessity is established," Vol. I. p. 305. "But moral necessity is the previous certainty of a moral action," p. 306. "For antecedent certainty of moral actions is all we mean by moral necessity," p. 399. This definition he has repeated a great number of times in the course of his *Dissertation*. It prevails throughout his chapter on Foreknowledge. Here he assumes the foreknowledge of Deity, and reasons correctly in supposing that such knowledge of a future event implies the previous certainty of its existence. Moral necessity in this sense is fully established; no argument could be more conclusive. Moral necessity, then, is the simple affirmation of a fact, which may be demonstrated, as such, without any reference to its *ground or cause*. Foreknowledge proves this fact

and nothing more. What is the cause of this certainty, and indeed whether it have any cause, are points to be disposed of by other processes of reasoning. The argument which proves this simple certainty, terminates at this point, it does not necessarily decide the question of cause. Dr. Edwards does not claim this; he does not hold that foreknowledge *causes* the certainty; he concedes that it has no other than a *logical* connection with the certainty—e. g., *it proves it*. In this sense of Moral Necessity Dr. Edwards has no antagonist, not even in Dr. West himself.

2. In the second place he defines Moral Necessity, *as the certainty of connection between moral actions and their cause or causes*. "Moral necessity is the real and certain connection between some moral action and its cause," p. 306. "Moral necessity is the certain or necessary connection between moral causes and moral effects," p. 300. This is a new definition, as contrasted with the former. The other was the certainty of the *action*; this is the certainty of its *connection* with some cause. The first certainty is proved by foreknowledge; the second certainty, however true, is not proved by the same means. This kind of certainty is self-evident, for it is but a specification of the axiom, *that for every event there must be some cause*. This is not the place to inquire into the use of the word "*connection*" by Dr. Edwards; whether he meant connection in the sense of certain antecedence, or in the true sense of cause. Upon either construction, he affirms nothing more than the general axiom of causality, as applied to a specific case. Here again Dr. Edwards can have no antagonist in this sense of Moral Necessity; for surely no man would admit the certainty of an event and deny that it had a cause.

3. We proceed to the third exposition of Moral Necessity. It is the certainty of connection between *volition as effects, and motives as their cause*. He quotes the definition of President Edwards. It is "that necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such *moral causes*, as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is, in many cases, between these and certain volitions and actions," p. 299. "There is nothing in this inconsistent with the influence of motives on the will, to produce volition; or with the dependence of volition on some cause, extrinsic to itself, extrinsic to the power of will, or to the mind in which it exists. What if motives do excite to volition?" p. 311. Much of Dr. Edwards's reasoning relates to necessity according to this construction.

It is important to observe, that in this sense, moral necessity is different from either of the other two. In the first, we had certainty of existence;—in the second, certainty of connection;—in the third, we have the *terms* of this certain connection, e. g., volitions on the one hand, and motives as their cause on the other. The last, besides including the two former, defines the ground of the certainty. It is also important to notice, that the arguments, which establish necessity in the two former senses, do not prove it in the latter; for to prove the certainty of a future event, and that it must have some cause, is not to prove what that cause is;—not to tell *why* the event will or must be. It is true that Dr. Edwards says, that he does not regard motives as the efficient causes of volition;—he equally denies that mind is the efficient cause; hence God must be the efficient cause, if there be any. His theory of the connection of motive and volition, will receive attention in its proper place. For the present, it is sufficient to say, that he speaks of motive as the cause of the certain existence of future volitions. This assumption lies in the third exposition of moral necessity. It is not peculiar to him; it was abundantly affirmed by President Edwards; it has been the doctrine of every writer upon that side of the question.

Dr. Edwards is chargeable with having neither stated, nor argued moral necessity always in the same sense. The same is true of President Edwards. Sometimes they are defending necessity in the sense of simple certainty. This is the case especially with the first-mentioned writer in his chapter on foreknowledge, where he repeatedly asserts, that previous certainty of volitions is "all the necessity for which we plead." This was not true; for at other times he pleads for necessity in the sense of the previous certainty of volitions, founded on the certainty of their connection with motives as causes. Here are two certainties, that are by no means identical; the first does not imply the second, neither is the latter proved by arguments which establish the former. His opponents do not deny necessity in all the above senses;—it is only in the last sense, and in that branch of it, which makes motive the cause of volition. To prove necessity in any other sense, is to prove what nobody denied; the issue must be made on the disputed ground, or there is no issue.

Moral Necessity then, as a subject of debate between its advocates and opponents, presents this proposition: *that motive,*

"which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest," determines the will. This proposition being proved to be universally true, moral necessity is then proved as the true theory of the will. By *determining*, the advocates of necessity define themselves to mean, "causing, that the acts of the will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise." In proving this proposition, they must prove three other positions, viz., that the will or mind is determined—that it is determined by motive—and that it is determined by the strongest motive. In the execution of this work, they must fix on some correct standard of measuring the comparative strength of a motive, besides the fact of its prevalence; for this being taken as the rule of measurement, gives us nothing but an identical proposition. The evidence must go directly to the establishment of this proposition, the one in debate, and not some other. This sets aside the arguments from foreknowledge, unless it can be shown, that foreknowledge is not consistent with any other hypothesis of volition. Two methods of proof may be adopted. In the first place it may be *psychological*, which is an appeal to universal consciousness and experience. It may be *logical*, which is a deduction of the proposition in question from others, either previously proved or admitted. The advocates of necessity have taken their stand chiefly in the logical department. Here three or four syllogisms would contain a formal statement of their whole argument. It is of the following character, viz., that to deny the proposition of necessity, leaves no cause for volition; or that it involves the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions; or that the invariableness of motive, as an antecedent, proves it to be the cause of volition; or that if motive be not the cause of volition, it cannot be previously certain, as proved by foreknowledge. These are the germs of as many syllogisms, which have been used on the one side, and replied to on the other. It is not proposed to examine the validity of this reasoning; my purpose having been to state the point to be proved, and designate the character of the argument, which has any appropriateness to the point. Had these things been always kept in view, the opponents in this discussion would have been confined to a much narrower field, and had less occasion to complain of mutual misunderstanding.

II. *The two Necessities, Moral and Natural, distinguished.*

It is admitted to be "a very plain dictate of common-sense, that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or

blame." Hence the advocates of Moral Necessity, at least many of them, have strenuously insisted on a distinction between the two systems of necessity. Dr. Edwards is among this number. The piety which prompts the effort, deserves our respect, whatever be the fate of the effort. Let us then attend to the lines of distinction, as drawn by the pen of Dr. Edwards. This will be best secured by obtaining his answer to the four following questions: e. g., In what sense does he use the term Natural Necessity? In what sense does he use Moral Necessity, when making the distinction? What are the points of agreement, if any, which he admits? What are the points of distinction which he alleges? It is proposed to obtain and examine his answer to these questions.

I. What is the conception which he gives us of natural or physical, necessity?

He says "Natural necessity is the connection between causes and effects, which are not of a moral nature," p. 300. He here consents, that it is a connection of causes and effects, but interposes a single negative qualification, e. g., neither the effect nor the cause is of a "moral nature." By causes and effects of a "moral nature," he means "some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding," and "some inclination or volition of the soul or voluntary action." In a note, p. 301, he is careful to say, "By inclination, disposition, or bias, I mean something distinct from volition." It must be confessed, that if nothing farther had been said of this kind of necessity, we should be left in great doubt as to its positive nature; we could tell very definitely what it is not; but our conception of what it is, would, at best, be very indeterminate.

The subject however is not left at this point. In allusion to the views of President Edwards, Dr. Edwards says,—"*By natural necessity* he explains himself to mean, 'such necessity as men are under, through the force of *natural* causes, as distinguished from what are called *moral* causes; such as habits and dispositions of heart, and moral motives and inducements,'" p. 299. This is certainly an advance upon the former definition. By "*natural causes*" he means all causes, but those of "*a moral nature*." By these causes the necessity is created. In reference to whom or what? This is answered by the fact, that it is "*such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes*," etc. Here both the causes and the subjects of the necessity are defined. And according to the principle stated, men or voluntary beings are the only subjects of natural

necessity. This idea is confirmed, when he quotes President Edwards, as saying, that it always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient," p. 299. He endorses this sentiment on the next page,—
"Natural necessity admits of voluntary, but ineffectual opposition from him, who is subject to the necessity." It is certain that no such opposition is possible, unless to *agents* invested with the power of will: hence, if this be the universal reference of natural necessity, it will follow that voluntary beings are its only possible subjects. The illustrations which he adopts, as the case of a man being dragged to prison "in direct opposition to every act of his will," involve and imply the same view. We have then gained Dr. Edwards's conception of natural necessity; it is this,—*it is a necessity created by the force of natural causes; it always has voluntary beings for its subjects, and refers to some supposable voluntary, but ineffectual opposition in those beings to the result.* No element is omitted, none added to his statement. We have it precisely as it came from his pen. I propose now to pause a moment at this point, and with some care examine this interpretation of natural or physical necessity.

1. In the first place, although intended to be such by its author, it is not an exact representation of President Edwards on this point. An important qualification of the Elder Edwards is overlooked in this statement. His language is the following,—*"By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean such necessity as men are under through force of natural causes,"* etc. Again, *"That necessity, which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural necessity."* Upon a comparison of these passages with the language of Dr. Edwards, no man can fail to see that the latter does not do entire justice to the former. In both passages President Edwards speaks of natural necessity "*as applied to men,*"—"*as intelligent beings are the subjects of it.*" This carries his remarks into a limited and specific sphere, and leaves the question undecided, whether natural necessity has any other applications. Dr. Edwards in quoting the President, omits to notice this attitude of the question; he defines natural necessity in a *generic* sense; his terms are universal and include a definition, not in *one*, but in *all* the applications of natural necessity. His

language clearly implies, that it always has voluntary beings for its subjects, and refers to some supposable, but insufficient opposition in those beings; whereas President Edwards stated the case so far, and so far only as it is "applied to men,"—"as intelligent beings are the subjects of it." It is true, that this is the form of natural necessity, which prevailed in the mind of President Edwards; he seems scarcely to have thought of any other; but it is not true, as it is of Dr. Edwards, that his formal definition commits him to this view, as the only kind of natural necessity that is possible.

2. I observe again that this interpretation of natural necessity is incorrect, by being *defective* and *partial*.

It will be granted, that Dr. Edwards has succeeded in presenting a case of natural necessity;—necessity in relation to voluntary beings, where the event is made certain, notwithstanding any supposable or actual opposition of will to it; it is certain, while the mind chooses a different event, which choice is insufficient to prevent the real event and secure the one chosen. The event is clearly by a natural necessity in relation to its subject. The mind chooses a certain consequent, while *something else*, not only prevents it, but makes another consequent both certain and physically necessary in relation to the mind. This decides not, whether that *something else* is also subjected to a physical necessity; it settles the question only so far as the mind is involved.

Is this then the only province of physical necessity? We are shut up to it by the definition. Is the definition true? What shall be said of those cases, which have no reference whatever to *the will of an agent*, where the subject of the necessity is not a voluntary agent, where indeed it is doubtful, whether the subject be an agent in any sense? When a stone falls to the ground, is not the phenomenon by a natural necessity in relation to the stone? Is not every physical phenomenon an instance of such necessity in relation to its subject? This necessity embraces not only the certainty of the phenomenon, but a total want of power not to fall or to any other phenomenon, as resident in the stone. It has not a voluntary being for its subject, neither has it any reference to any supposable, but insufficient opposition to the consequent event; the case by its terms is one of total want of power to the contrary, and therefore of all supposable opposition. In the light of this illustration the defect in the above exposition must be

apparent. In the language of logicians, we should say, that it employs the term, *natural necessity*, in an *undistributed sense*; states what it is in reference to a single class of objects, and omits to notice it in other applications, where it holds equally true. In the two references it is not precisely the same. In the one it is modified by relation to the will of an agent;—there is a certainty of the event with supposable, but inefficient power of resistance. In the other it has no relation to the will of an agent; there is an equal certainty with a total want of all power of supposable resistance or opposition to the event. These cases are not in all respects identical; yet both are clear and decisive instances of this kind of necessity. Physical necessity is a *genus* of which the two illustrations constitute *distinct species*. The point of *generic* resemblance is the certainty of the event with the impossibility that it should not be. The *specific* differences are these: in one the necessity has reference to the will of an agent, where ineffectual opposition is supposable; in the other it has reference to a physical subject, where no such supposed opposition is allowable. Now Dr. Edwards has the merit of defining one of the species of this genus; his mistake is, that he treats it as the genus, a very important mistake in this discussion, as will be shown in the progress of these observations. His definition is true in a single application, but entirely false in another, which is as legitimate as the one he contemplates.

3. I observe in the third place, that this defective and partial construction has an important bearing upon the question, whether the two necessities *moral* and *natural*, are distinct.

Dr. Edwards contended, that in moral necessity any opposition of will to the event was insupposable—that it implied an absurdity. Whereas, natural necessity always had reference to such supposable, but insufficient opposition, and hence it was clearly distinguished from that which is called *moral*. This reasoning works very well, so long as we allow him to mean by moral necessity, simple certainty of the existence of volition, and to construe natural necessity in the manner already defined. But suppose we take natural necessity in its application to physical subjects; here we shall find, that it does not in its nature differ materially from moral necessity in application to causes and effects of "a moral nature." In the one case you have certainty of the *moral* sequent with opposition as insupposable; in the other you have an equal certainty of the *physical* sequent

and an equal insupposableness of opposition to the existence of that sequent. If it be absurd to suppose the power of willing opposed to itself, in the very act of willing, is it any the less absurd to suppose opposition where there is no power of opposition? In both sequents, therefore, there is no supposable opposition; in both there is an equal certainty of existence. What then becomes of the pretended distinction between the two necessities from which the sequents arise? Does it not seem at best to vanish into emptiness? But the distinction is a point too momentous to be given up. Here is a difficulty. What is the mode of obviating it? This is done by contracting the field of philosophical vision, and fixing the eye upon a partial and defective view of natural necessity. Having taken this view he leaves the field of argument, bearing in his hand the laurel of a successful contest; it however withers in his grasp the moment the sphere of vision is so enlarged as to include natural necessity in all its applications. This is the very thing which Dr. Edwards did not do. Had he turned his attention to physical necessity in relation to objects purely physical, as well as to voluntary agents, he would have found it difficult, if not impossible to escape the charge of confounding the two necessities. His mistake was exceedingly opportune; it served the interests of his cause admirably well; it enabled him to distinguish natural necessity as applied to voluntary agents, from that which is moral. It made no provision, however, for any such distinction, when natural necessity is taken in application to physical subjects. It is to be regretted that Dr. Edwards should have confined his attention to a single reference of physical necessity: how he would have disposed of the difficulty attending its application to physical subjects, it is impossible to imagine.

4. Finally, I observe that Dr. Edwards seems to me to have somewhat entangled himself, even upon his own construction of natural necessity.

Recollect that it always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient." If then the will be supposed in any case to oppose the will, there is an insufficient opposition of the volition not prevalent to the prevailing one, and consequently the volition that prevails will take place by natural necessity, since there is voluntary, but ineffectual opposition to its existence. Has Dr. Edwards anywhere admitted the reality of such a case? He says—"He

may from prevailing motives and from moral necessity choose virtue. He may *at the same time* from weaker motives and ineffectual temptations choose vice, and so far feel reluctant or indisposed to virtue." "Yet there is a mutual opposition between the forementioned different acts of choice, the choice of virtue and the choice of vice," p. 302. "They may in particular cases be equal, or so nearly equal, that neither of them, at the instant, appears to prevail, and the man 'is in a strait betwixt two.' In other instances they may, for a time at least, *alternately* prevail, and exhibit a man of very inconsistent conduct. In other cases one may *generally* prevail," p. 302, 303. It is important to notice these concessions of Dr. Edwards; they are these: that the choice of virtue and the choice of vice may exist in the mind "at the same time;" that between these two volitions there is "mutual opposition;" that sometimes they are equal or nearly so; that sometimes they alternately prevail; that at other times one generally prevails. What then is the characteristic which he assigns to natural necessity? It is, that there should be voluntary, but insufficient opposition to the consequent event. In every such case the event is one of natural necessity. Do not the above concessions bring at least one of the volitions in question within the range of this category? Two volitions are admitted to be in the mind "at the same time," and to be opposed to each other. Hence the prevailing volition would seem to be by a natural necessity, since there is "the voluntary, but ineffectual opposition" of the volition that does not prevail.

But lest we should do injustice to the views of Dr. Edwards, let us hear him fully on this subject; let us see how he solves this difficulty. He says—"But though a man who is determined by moral necessity to choose a virtuous course, cannot ~~in~~ *the act* oppose that choice or the cause of it; yet he may ~~in~~ *other acts* of his will oppose both the choice and the cause, and thus in different acts choose and act differently." "And this weaker choice is no more opposed to the moral necessity, which causes it, than the stronger choice of virtue is to the moral necessity which causes that," p. 303. This is one solution. Recollect the concession, that there may be "*at the same time*" the choice of virtue and the choice of vice—that between the two there may be "mutual opposition," and that one may be prevalent. By the prevalence of one he cannot mean the non-existence of the other;" both exist "at the same time," but one

prevails over the other, and governs the conduct. Now in this solution he tells us, that the choice of virtue is not opposed to itself, nor the choice of vice to itself, e. g. that a single act of choice cannot be two acts and two opposing acts at the same time. Suppose this to be granted, yet if they may both be "at the same time," then there may be a mutual opposition, and if one prevails, then it exists contrary to the ineffectual opposition of the one not prevalent, and of course has the characteristic given to natural necessity. Let them both exist by their respective moral necessities—let neither be opposed to the moral necessity which causes it; yet there is "a mutual opposition" between the two volitions originating from their respective necessities, and the one that prevails is a phenomenon of natural necessity by the principles and concessions of Dr. Edwards. He has conceded too much to be consistent with himself. He must retract the concession, or change the characteristic given to natural necessity, or be logically compelled to allow that some volitions exist by such necessity.

He has another solution of the difficulty. "Now it will not be pretended, that this opposition of one act of the will to another is parallel to the *entire* opposition of the will, which there is or may be to natural necessity," p. 303. It will be perceived, that the fact of opposition is here a point conceded—that the former admission of opposing acts "at the same time" is not denied, and that the ground of distinction, which he assumes, is that the two oppositions are not *parallel*:—in the one case it is *entire opposition*;—and in the other it must be something different from "entire opposition."—Now, if I mistake not, he has here introduced a *new* element in the conception of natural necessity. He said, that it refers to *some* supposable, but ineffectual opposition. Here he substitutes the word *entire*, meaning, "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will," and meaning by this again, that there is but one act of choice, and this is opposed, though ineffectually, to the resulting event. He concedes the case of *some* supposable and real opposition of one will to another; and when pressed with the argument, that one of these wills must upon his own construction be by a natural necessity, he modifies the idea of such necessity, and makes it have reference to "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will."—Dr. Edwards is entitled to the full benefit of his own explanations. What is "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will" in any case?—It is plainly nothing more than the

simple fact, that the mind chooses, and chooses contrary to the resulting event. Every act of choice is by its nature "an entire and perfect" act of choice, and when it is against the resulting event, it is "an entire and perfect opposition" of the act to the event. How then does the "entire and perfect opposition of the whole will" differ from the "opposition of one act of the will to another," as conceded by Dr. Edwards?—In the one case you have *one and but one* "entire" act of choice contrary to the event;—in the other you have *two* entire acts of choice contrary to each other, between which there is "an entire and perfect opposition." So that, after all, the cases are more nearly parallel than Dr. Edwards supposed. One event exists contrary to one entire act of choice; in the case of "opposition of one act of the will to another" the volition prevalent exists also contrary to the "entire and perfect opposition" of the volition not prevalent. Both cases certainly present "entire and perfect opposition;" and hence both terminate in the same kind of necessity. If this criticism be deemed severe, it is believed not to be unjust;—it forces no unnatural interpretation upon the language of Dr. Edwards;—it simply assumes that he wrote as he meant.

II. In the next place let us inquire, in what sense he uses Moral Necessity, when insisting on its distinction from Natural Necessity?

This question is rendered important by the fact, that he uses moral necessity in three different senses. In a passage where the distinction was the very point that he was elaborating, he says that moral necessity "is a previous certainty of the existence of a volition or voluntary action." p. 300. He quotes President Edwards as presenting the same conception—it "is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." I have already shown, that in this sense moral necessity is not a subject of debate, as well as that Dr. Edwards is not consistent with himself in this use of it. To distinguish it in this sense, is to employ it in a sense in which it is not denied, and to leave the question of its distinction in other senses entirely unsettled.

III. In the third place, what are the points of agreement, if any, which he has admitted?—It will be conceded that in reference to the certainty of the sequents, it is equal in both cases. Dr. Edwards says,—"*The difference between these two kinds of necessity lies chiefly in the nature of the two terms connected by it,*" p. 300. He quotes the language of President Edwards

on this point,—“the difference between these two kinds of necessity does not lie so much in the *nature of the connection*, as in the two terms connected.” This is a very obvious concession, that “in the nature of the connection” they agree. Here he attempts to make no distinction; all his reasoning fixes on another point of distinction. Agreement in this respect is then acknowledged. What is the nature of this connection, in respect to which the identity of the two necessities is a point conceded? It is a connection between a certain cause and its effect in one case, and then it is a connection of natural necessity; and between a certain other cause and its effect in another case, and then it is a connection of moral necessity. In the one case, it is a physical cause connected with its physical sequent; in the other it is a moral cause or motive connected with its moral sequent or volition. However different the *terms* may be in the two connections, still the nature of the connection is the same. The prior terms in both secure their respective sequents with equal certainty; in both they are equally causes and act in the same way, so far as they are causes at all.

Omitting to examine the assumption, that motive is properly a cause, I wish to propose this question: *Is not the identity of the two necessities admitted in every material respect?* In two cases of natural necessity the connected terms differ, not as causes and effects, but in other respects consistent with this identity. Were it said that two instances of natural necessity differ, the inquiry would be,—In what? If it were answered, *in their terms*; the answer would be, that this difference has nothing to do with the simple question of necessity; and therefore they might equally be instances of such necessity. It is the very nature of necessity, not to give a history of the terms connected, but to treat of the nature of the connection, to inquire into the ground or reason of the certainty of this connection. If we adopt any other view, we should have as many different kinds of necessity as there are terms—all equally disagreeing with each other;—that would be a *mechanical* necessity, a *chemical* necessity, an *electrical* necessity, a *galvanic* necessity, a *vegetable* necessity, an *animal* necessity, &c. Every effort to identify these as cases of natural necessity would fail; for in every instance it might be replied, that the terms of the connection differ. It is true, that they differ, but not in any respect which affects the question of natural necessity. Here they are one, because the nature of the connection is one. If then na-

tural and moral necessity be admitted to agree in the *nature of the connection*, we have an agreement, which essentially confounds the two necessities. They disagree, not in the respect which identifies them as instances of necessity;—they differ only as different cases of natural necessity differ from each other, e. g., in the *terms* connected. There is no distinction in the certainty, with which sequents follow, for in both cases it is absolute; there is none in the nature of their connection with their respective antecedents. What is the fundamental element of natural necessity?—It lies in the nature of the connection between the two terms, e. g., the physical antecedent and the physical sequent; this creates all the necessity, by which the sequent exists; it is the ground of its certainty. To identify the two necessities therefore in the nature of the connection, is to make them alike in that respect, in which necessity has any meaning. Hence it is not strange, that the advocates of physical necessity should sometimes appeal to President and Dr. Edwards, as being on their side. The truth is, they have, without intending to do it, conceded the identity of the two necessities in the very respect where they should have proved a difference, if they meant to insist on a distinction between the two. This however was the best they could do, after having assumed that motive causes volition, and that the mind does not.

IV. We come then in the last place, to the points of distinction between the two necessities. President Edwards held that the distinction "does not lie so much in the nature of the connection, as *in the two terms* connected." Dr. Edwards held the same sentiment, that it "lies chiefly in the nature of the two terms connected by it." In reply to the charge, that this "is a distinction without a difference," the latter writer says, "it is manifest that there is that very difference in the two cases which President Edwards's distinction supposes. To say that this is a distinction without a difference, is to say, that an habitual disposition or a motive is the same with something which is not an habitual disposition or motive; and that a volition or voluntary action, is the same with what is not a volition or voluntary action, p. 300. This reasoning confirms the idea, that the distinction of terms was the great distinction on which Dr. Edwards intended to issue the question.

What then are the *two terms* of the connection in moral necessity? They are of "a moral nature,"—e. g., "some previous habitual disposition, or some motive" as the antecedent

and cause; "volition or voluntary action" as the sequent and effect. These are not the terms of a connection by natural necessity. Hence, there is a "difference in the two cases." This is the argument, and the whole argument on the point: and so far as it goes, it is a conclusive argument. There is a distinction with a difference;—difference in respect to what? In respect to the terms of the sequence in the two cases—this is all; it is all that is pretended. Let this distinction be allowed, and let the terms be subjected to a careful analysis.

In the first place, let us examine the *antecedents* in the two cases: in both they are admitted to be causes. Viewed simply as causes, they cannot be distinguished from each other; for President Day very properly observes, that "one cause cannot be unlike another in the very property, which is common and essential to all causes." To classify causes, is not to distinguish between them simply as causes, for in this respect they must be alike; but to distinguish between them in some other respect, which is perfectly consistent with the supposition that they are all causes, as when we speak of *proximate* and *remote* causes,—*first* and *second* causes,—*mental* and *physical* causes,—*moral* and *natural* causes. In these distinctions we have the *generic* idea of causes, associated with *specific* differences, which differences contain no allusion whatever to the simple idea of cause, this being exhausted in the generic idea. Suppose, then, the antecedent terms in the two necessities differ; the question is, How do they differ? Not as causes merely, but in other respects having no sort of relation to their nature as causes; they differ as a *proximate* does from a *remote* cause, by having dissimilar attributes or accidents, none of which pertain to their nature as causes. The cause in moral necessity and the cause in natural necessity are alike in the respect in which either is cause. We have, then, the identity of the two necessities in the nature of the connection acknowledged; we have proved the identity of the two prior terms, so far as their nature as cause is concerned; we therefore have an identity of the two necessities in all the respects in which the word necessity has any import: to contend for a distinction in other respects, is mere verbal trifling; it is to go beyond the range of the whole subject in search of distinctions. The conceptions of necessity are exhausted in the affirmation of a previous certainty in the nature of the connection of two terms, which is the basis of that certainty, and in the causal nature of the prior term, which

is the basis of the certainty of the connection. To reverse the order of statement;—the prior term is a cause; its nature as a cause is the ground of the certainty of its connection with a sequent; that certainty of connection is the ground of the certainty of the existence of that sequent. What other conceptions can be found in any consequential necessity? They exhaust the whole idea: they are either admitted, or proved to belong to moral necessity. How, then, do the two necessities differ, in respect to the prior terms of the two connections? As necessities, I am unable to see any distinction between them.

In the second place, we may institute an examination of the *posterior* terms of the two connections, e. g., the *sequents*;—What are they? A "volition or voluntary action," and something which "is not a volition or voluntary action." In the order of sequence, they are *consequents*—resulting phenomena. They are more; they are *effects*, and as such, alike; for no effect can differ from another in that property which is common to all effects. Suppose, then, that they differ in other respects, which are consistent with their common character as *consequents* and *effects*; will this make a distinction in the two necessities from which they arise? Obviously not; for here, as in the former case, the distinction would be laid beyond the range of the subject. If a man were describing phenomena, such a distinction would be proper; but if he be reasoning on the subject of necessity, it is not pertinent.

Before leaving this subject, it may be well to advert to another ground of distinction, e. g., that natural necessity always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient;" whereas "no such opposition or contrary will and endeavor is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself," p. 299. It is a sufficient reply to this, to say that natural necessity, as already shown, does not always have reference to such supposable opposition, and that moral necessity is here used in the sense which is not a subject of debate. This distinction, therefore, would amount to nothing.

From the preceding criticism, the reader will of course draw his own conclusions. I have aimed to do full justice to the arguments of Dr. Edwards, both in stating them and in replying to them. Has he made out a satisfactory distinction between the two necessities? I am compelled to reply in the negative.

III. *The Dictum Necessitatis.*

The above title is shown to characterize a certain species of argument, on which much stress is laid by the advocates of moral necessity. It is the great element of one of their most formidable demonstrations against their opponents. Its efficacy seems to have been ever regarded as equal to the famous *Dictum Logicum* of Aristotle. It is much relied upon, both by President and Dr Edwards, in their arguments on the Will.

What is this Dictum? The following extracts will answer. "Liberty in the sense of our opponents is not possible or conceivable. By liberty they mean a power to cause all our own volitions, and to cause them freely. But that we should thus cause them, is neither possible nor conceivable. If we should thus cause a volition, we should doubtless cause it by a causal act. It is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act. And, as it is supposed that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a free act, e. g., an act of the will, or volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal act must be caused by another, and so on infinitely, which is both impossible and inconceivable," p. 323, 324. President Edwards before him had reasoned in the same manner. He says, "An active being can bring no *effects* to pass by his activity, but what are *consequent* upon his acting." The inference was, that if the mind causes action, it must do it by a causative act, which being an act, requires another causative act, and so on *ad infinitum*; and thus we become involved in an endless series of actions or volitions. This argument is one of the strong-holds of necessity;—the fate of much that has been written by President and Dr. Edwards turns upon its validity. It assumes a certain principle in regard to cause, e. g., *that a cause cannot act but by first acting to produce that act*;—this is the Dictum Necessitatis. When applied to the mind, it was agreed, that the mind cannot cause its own volitions, but by first acting to cause them, which supposition leads to an endless series of acts; if the mind be the cause, the reasoning is unanswerable, if the dictum be allowed.—I propose, therefore, to make it the subject of the following remarks.

I. It is an assumption in regard to all causes. Dr. Edwards has not stated it in the general form adopted above: his sentiment was made in view of a specific cause, e. g., the mind as

cause of volition; but as he has said nothing to show why it should be true of the mind any more than of other causes, it is legitimate to test its validity as a universal category of cause. The conclusiveness of the reasoning based upon it, depends upon its universal truth.

II. The reasoning offered in its support proceeds upon a doubtful, if not a false analogy. It is true that bodily sequents are caused by the mind (if caused by it at all) by a volition prior to those sequents. If I will to walk, I cause the motion of my limbs by a previous volition. Dr. Edwards reasons correctly in regard to a ship-carpenter being the efficient cause or builder of a ship, when he supposes that it would be absurd to say, that the carpenter builds the ship without the intervention of exertions or volitions for this purpose. The bodily sequents connected with the building are caused by the mind through the medium of volitions prior to the sequents. But does it hence follow that the volitions are caused by the mind in the same way, if caused by it at all? Can you reason conclusively from one case to the other? Not unless they are entirely parallel. Dr. Edwards does not know, that the mind in fact causes the bodily sequents at all. It may be cause of the volitions, which volitions are known only as the stated antecedents of the sequents. It will not do to assume, that the sequents and volitions have a parallel relation to the mind, and then reason from the causation of the one to that of the other. If the sequents are caused by the mind through the medium of volitions, it does not follow that these volitions must equally be sequents of other volitions, and so on *ad infinitum*. Indeed neither Dr. Edwards, nor any body else, knows that a finite cause ever causes by a causative act. What is known is simply this, that acts of causes have stated sequents,—but the *efficiency* which connects the sequents and the acts is not known to be in the acts or in the causes of those acts. I may will a motion and be the cause of the will, when something else may be the cause that connects the willing and the motion in the order of a stated sequence.

III. The plausibility of the assumption and of the reasoning to which it leads, rests mainly on an *ambiguity* in the use of the word cause. It is sometimes used for *that which by acting produces effects consequent upon the acting*. In this sense, it is always used by those, who seek to press their opponents with the absurdity of an infinite series of acts. It is also used for *that*

which acts, which is itself the originator of phenomena. In that sense it causes action without prior action. Now if we use cause in the first sense, it is absurd to say, that mind is cause, or indeed any thing else, for it is impossible to escape the charge of infinite succession. If we use it in the second sense, no such consequence will follow. If proof of any cause in the last sense be demanded, it will be presented in the course of this article; for the present I reply, by demanding proof of cause in the first sense, and promise to make that cause an absurdity by bringing against it the charge of an infinite series, the very charge which Dr. Edwards has brought against the mind as cause.

This ambiguity in using the word cause served a valuable purpose in the hands of Dr. Edwards. His opponents asserted that the mind *determines* the volition. Dr. Edwards responds, that if by "*determines*," they mean simply that the mind is a *subject* of volition, then he agrees with them; but if they mean that it *causes* volition, then he does not agree with them, for it then must cause by a previous causative act. Now it is obvious, that by the word "*determines*" Dr. Edwards does not mean a volition, but the fact merely of being a subject of volition. When he speaks of motive as *determining*, then also he does not mean a volition, but that motive causes volition. On the other hand, his opponents by the same word do not mean volition, nor simply that the mind is a subject of volition; but that it also causes volition. But this is neither "possible nor conceivable," replies Dr. Edwards, using the word cause in the first of the above senses. His opponents reply, it is both possible and conceivable, using the word cause in the other sense. They do not contradict each other, for they use cause in two senses. Dr. Edwards assuming, that by "*determines*" his opponents meant a volition, and taking advantage of an ambiguity in using the word cause, found no difficulty in convicting them of an infinite series.

IV. This assumption undertakes to decide *how* a cause acts. No man is competent to answer the question;—How does a cause act? Who can tell how a physical cause produces effects? If motive be a cause, will Dr. Edwards pretend to tell how it causes? If mind be a cause, we can never tell any thing about its *mode* of causing. We may say that it causes, as any cause causes; but how does any cause cause effects? Here we are profoundly ignorant. Among our intellections we

find disclosed the nature of a cause, and the principle of causality;—by experience, including observation and consciousness, we ascertain the phenomena of causes; by reasoning we refer those phenomena to their causes. Beyond this we can never pass to the *mode* of causation by any cause. Yet Dr. Edwards by the assumption undertakes to decide this very question. If the mind causes volition it must do it by a previous volition, is his proposition. How does he know this when he knows nothing of the mode of causation? The mind is a *thinker*. Will any man pretend to say that it cannot think without a prior act of thinking, by which it thinks? It is also a *knower*. But who will say that it cannot know without some prior phenomenon of knowing? Suppose we say that it is also a *willer*. Can Dr. Edwards be certain that it cannot will in the sense of causing, without some antecedent act of willing? In this point of view, this famous dictum degenerates into a mere assumption.

V. It is an assumption which necessarily leads to the doctrine of an infinite series. If we apply it to the human mind, it works very well for the cause of necessity. But it proves that volitions are not caused at all, which is an absurdity; or an infinite series if caused by the mind, which is an equal absurdity; or that they are caused by *something else*. Very well. Let us take that *something else*; we will suppose it to be motive. If it causes volition, it must be by a previous act of causation, and here again as in the former case you have an infinite series, or no cause, or some cause more ulterior. You may take this ulterior cause and go through the same round; there is no end to the process; you have an eternal succession, or no cause in the universe, or you must come back to some cause, which does not cause by prior causative acts. If all these suppositions be absurd, then we may as well bid farewell to all philosophy. The two first are admitted to be absurdities. Is the idea of a cause, causing without prior causative acts, an equal absurdity? It is not *known* as such, for the very reason, that we do not know how any cause acts. That it is not, is manifest from the fact, that it is the only mode of escaping one of two absurdities—viz., infinite succession or no causality. Some cause therefore there must be, competent to cause without preceding acts of causation. What that cause is, is not the question; but the logical necessity of supposing

such a cause. This logical necessity is inconsistent with the dictum. Hence we have no alternative but to reject it: this at once unsettles the validity of all the reasoning based upon it; and the strong fortress of necessity against the mind's self-determination in the sense of causing volition falls to the ground.

It is not to be supposed, that an argument, which has so long and so faithfully served its masters, will be given up without some efforts to save its life. Dr. Edwards seeks to preserve the dictum, and at the same time evade the force of the last objection to it. He says, "We maintain, that action may be the effect of a divine influence; or that it may be the effect of one or more second causes, the first of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here there is not an infinite series of causes, but a very short series, which terminates in the Deity or first cause," p. 385. He stops the series and makes it a "very short series," by resorting to the Deity as the first cause. Among finite causes you have a succession of causative acts, which stops short of infinite by terminating in the first cause. This is the argument.

A volume might be written in reply to this position. My remarks must be condensed, as much as possible. One of the following suppositions must be true,—viz., *Either God is the cause of his own acts, or he is not the cause of them.*

Let us then assume the first supposition to be true. God created the world by the causative act of creation. Is He the cause of the creating act? We will suppose the answer to be in the affirmative. Let us then bring the dictum to bear on this phenomenon of the Divine mind,—*No cause can act and thus produce effects without prior action.* It follows, that this creating act needs a prior act to account for its existence; and this latter for the same reason needs another, and hence you have an infinite series of Divine acts causing each other, on the supposition that God is cause. The series so far from being a short one, when it reaches the Deity, enters upon a new theatre and there proceeds *ad infinitum*. If it be said, that the dictum is true of all second causes, but not of the first cause,—that God may cause without prior causative acts;—I reply, that this is giving up the whole question; it is disallowing the universal truth of the dictum. If the Deity be such a cause, may He not create another in this respect like Himself? If the conception of God as such a cause be no absurdity, then is the conception of man as such a cause no absurdity. We

have then a question, not of logic, whether any such cause can be, for one is admitted; but of psychology, whether man is such a cause, against the presumption of which no objection can be drawn a priori.

Let us examine the second supposition,—viz., *that God is not the cause of his volitions or acts*. If this be assumed, then they are caused by some other cause, or they are not caused at all. If we take the first supposition, we not only subject the Deity to fate, but involve that other cause in an infinite series. If we take the second, then we must say, that the *Divine volitions or acts are uncaused—they have no cause*. Now which of these suppositions does Dr. Edwards adopt? He says,—“The divine volitions were no more caused, whether by God himself, or by any other cause, than the divine existence was,” p. 321. The series of causes is therefore not infinite, because it terminates in the *uncaused and self-existent volitions or acts* of the Deity. It is admitted, that this avoids an infinite series and preserves the dictum; but it removes one difficulty by involving another quite as fearful,—*that the Divine volitions have no cause*. On this I shall submit the following observations:—

(1.) If it be admitted, that to say, that God causes his own acts, involves some philosophical difficulties as connected with Divine immutability, still the question may be asked, Does not the denial involve difficulties in another direction equally as great? I think Dr. Edwards or any other man will see some serious difficulties along the path of denial. Suppose the difficulties of affirming or denying be just equal to each other, then this position of Dr. Edwards will at least be neutralized, and the question will stand, as it would, had the position never been presented.

(2.) Again, Dr. Edwards seems to have supposed, that the Divine volitions were uncaused, because he judged it inconsistent with Divine immutability, that God should cause them. This is the only reason he gives for the opinion. He allows, that the effects of divine acts take place in succession and time, but contends that with God there is no succession, in respect either to knowledge or acts. Now we propose this question:—*May not Dr. Edwards have assumed a view of Divine immutability as true, which is inconsistent with the nature of intelligence, cause, or agency, finite or infinite?* That, indeed, would be a strange hypothesis of Divine Immutability, which contradicts

the nature of God as an Intelligence and a Cause. It is an immutability of such an Intelligence and Cause, not one that is inconsistent with these ideas. Without pretending to fix the lines of demarcation, let us reason for a moment on this difficult point.

It will be granted, that the Divine knowledge is a knowledge of things as they are. To view a thing as existing, when in fact it did not exist, would be viewing things, not as they are, but as they are not. Did God know the world, *as existing*, before it did exist? He knew it as about to exist in some future time, but certainly he did not know it *as existing*, when in fact it did not exist. This is not possible in the very nature of intelligence. To say, then, that there may be succession *out* of the Divine mind, but none *in* it, is a self-contradiction. Time, or duration, has the form of an infinite conception; in time, or duration, events occur; they occur in certain portions of time; they do not all occur in the same portions, but in different, and therefore they are necessarily successive, one before the other, not so merely in our view, but so in fact. This succession God knows when it is yet to be; this is foreknowledge. He knows it as it comes to pass; this is present knowledge. Now to make the foreknowledge and the present knowledge the same acts of knowledge, is to say that the knowledge of a thing as yet to be, is the same as the knowledge of a thing as being,—it is to make both acts of knowledge contrary to each other and contrary to the fact. The doctrine of no succession in the Divine mind, but of "an eternal now," is pregnant with this absurdity: there is and must be in the very nature of things, some succession in the Divine acts of knowing, not that God is wiser at one time than another, for what may now be the subject of present knowledge, because now existing, was the subject of foreknowledge, when it was yet to exist; but still the act of present knowing is necessarily successive to that of foreknowing. Such succession is involved in the very nature of intelligence, finite or infinite.

Now, to assume an hypothesis of the Divine immutability inconsistent with such succession, is to make immutability inconsistent with God's nature as a being of intelligence. May not Dr. Edwards have done this very thing in relation to the Deity as the cause of his own acts or volitions? It might be affirmed, that Deity is the cause of his own volitions, and Dr. Edwards might be challenged to show his immutability in any

sense, that is inconsistent with the truth of this proposition. If the Divine volitions be the efficiency which causes events, and if there be no succession in those volitions, how comes it to pass that there is an actual, not merely an apparent succession in the events? If there be succession in the volitions, then all the difficulty in supposing God to be their cause, as founded on immutability, is at once removed; for the supposition of any succession in the Divine mind presents as great a difficulty as that of his being the cause of his own acts.

(3.) Again, if God be not the cause of his own acts or volitions, then it will follow, that he is not the cause of any thing. If God be the cause of the world's existence, then He must be the cause of the creating act or acts; if He is not the cause of these, He certainly cannot be the cause of their sequences. How can Deity be the cause of the sequences of acts, when He is not the cause of the acts? The thing is inconceivable. The acts cannot cause the sequences; and if Deity cause the sequences, it must be by causing the acts; but the acts are uncaused according to the supposition; therefore Deity is caused neither of the acts, nor of the sequents, nor of any thing else. If we adopt the hypothesis, we must carry along with it this logical consequence; it sweeps away Divine agency, and indeed all agency from the universe. To reason from Divine immutability to the destruction of all Divine agency, is a most mighty march in logic.

(4.) Dr. Edwards himself abundantly denies his own hypothesis. He speaks of Deity as being influenced by reasons, and good reasons, for all his purposes and acts. This is the moral necessity to which the Deity is subject. What! the Deity influenced by reasons to acts and purposes, which are absolutely uncaused!—influenced to acts which have no cause, neither *in*, nor *out of* Himself! No man can state a greater paradox. To say nothing of the absurdity of calling *acts* self-existent and uncaused, it is manifestly impossible, that a being should be influenced to acts which have no cause. Influenced to what and for what?—Not to cause them, for this is inconsistent with the supposition. Indeed, neither Dr. Edwards, nor any one else, can write or speak on this subject without contradicting this hypothesis. When we speak of the *purposes of God, the acts of God, etc.*, we must mean, if we mean any thing, that He is the cause of those purposes and acts. Upon any other hypothesis

the language of the Bible, as well as of men, on this subject must go for nothing.

To affirm therefore that God causes his own volitions and retain the dictum, is to involve an infinite series. To deny that He is the basis of his own volitions, is to involve a difficulty, between which and an infinite series there is little ground of choice. The only alternative is to abandon the dictum as a necessary conception applicable to cause. Dr. Edwards made a bold sweep in his effort to save it, but failed of success. Some cause there must be, which does not cause by prior acts of causation.

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Complete Duty of Man: or a System of Doctrinal and Practical Christianity.* By the Rev. Henry Venn, A. M., Rector of Yelling in Huntingdonshire in A. D. 1763. A New Edition, revised and corrected by Rev. H. Venn, B. D. of St. John's Holloway. New-York: American Tract Society. 1842. pp. 430.

THIS valuable work of practical theology first appeared in 1763, and since that time has passed through several editions. The author was an evangelical minister of the Church of England, whose labors were much blessed in the diffusion of wholesome views of truth, and in promoting among the younger ministry of the established church an evangelical standard of preaching and living. He rested from his useful labors after having served his Master in the ministry of the gospel for half a century. But a blessing remained behind in the publication of his 'Complete Duty of Man.' Many a wanderer has been recalled by it to the love and service of Christ; and now that it will go out extensively among the people through the agency of the American Tract Society, we trust that many more will be led by it to the foot of the cross, and bring forth fruits meet for repentance.

The book is well adapted to popular reading, and treats in a plain style of—The Soul—God—Man—The Law—Faith in

Christ—The Holy Spirit—Repentance—Christian Graces—Relative Duties—Self-denial—Prayer—The Scriptures—Christian Joy. Christ is the centre of all—his atonement the grand means of holiness as well as the only ground of a sinner's pardon.

2.—*Notes, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Leviticus: designed as a general Help to Biblical Reading and Instruction.* By George Bush, Prof. of Heb. and Orient. Lit. N. Y. City University. New-York: Dayton and Newman. 1843. pp. 282.

Professor Bush is doing a good service to the church, in publishing brief commentaries on the books of the Old Testament, in volumes of a convenient manual size. Those, which have appeared prior to the present, have met with a favorable reception, and this on Leviticus is equally worthy the attention of Sabbath School teachers, members of Bible classes, and others who are interested in the study of God's word. It is the best study on earth, and our gratitude is due to the man, who devotes his days and nights to its elucidation, making God's revelation plainer to the common mind, and placing before the reader such facts and suggestions as enable him readily to apprehend what otherwise might be obscure.

The author has in this volume given the view of the scape-goat, which he had before published in the Am. Bib. Repository. He also enters, at some length, into the discussion of the question of marrying the sister of a deceased wife, and on the whole entertains the opinion that it is not unscriptural.

We commend the book to the attention of those who would make themselves familiar with the Levitical rites and ceremonies, and can promise them a clear and generally satisfactory interpretation of the laws recorded in this part of the Old Testament.

3.—*The Sacred Seal; or the Wanderer Restored; a Poem.* By Rev. N. Emmons Johnston. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 80.

Those who love poetry will here find some verses worthy of the name; and we are glad to see the poetic Muse summoned away for a little while from brooding over scenes of love and folly, to inspire one who consecrates his gifts to so holy a subject as that of the seal of the covenant.

Nor is there any attempt here, to throw a sombre shade of holy awe and reverence around the mere uncommanded rites of our religion ; to win the sympathies of tender hearts towards that external pomp which is adapted to strike the imagination,—but poetry is consecrated to a great practical subject, the powerful influence of early instructions around the fireside, as connected with the simple ordinances of the Gospel.

The author selects a young man piously educated for his hero ; permits him to break away from the holy restraints of home,—follows him to the gambling-table, the infidel-club, the havoc of war ;—in all the scenes through which he passes, unable still to drown the voice of conscience and of God, until he at last bows his stubborn will and proud heart, and returns a lost one found, to the bosom and embrace of his parents, brothers and sisters, coming in silently upon them, just as the good old man is kneeling in family prayer, and pouring out his whole soul, in believing, submissive supplication for the wandering son. This scene is well and touchingly described. We quote a part of it :

"The group was silent, as the eldest son
The story of the Prodigal begun :
Sobbing, went through the room. The patriarch bowed ;
And there, before his Saviour wept aloud :
At last, composed, his quivering accents fell,
Like genial dews upon the flowery dell.
He thanked his covenant God, whose grace had made
At night his sunshine, and at noon his shade.
* * * * *
* * * * *

While he spoke,
(And one sweet voice beside him, said amen,)
Silent a stranger entered, and unseen,
Knelt on the vacant chair with humble mien ;
And as the patriarch ended, once again
Broke forth in stronger tone that word, *Amen !*
That circle started—from their knees they sprung,—
'Twas LINCOLN GRAY that o'er his father hung ;
Poured his warm tears amidst the whitened hair,
And raptures mingled more than hearts could bear."

4.—*The Lost Sister of Wyoming. An Authentic Narrative. By Rev. John Todd.* Northampton : J. H. Butler. New-York : Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 160.

The Rev. John Todd, author of this simple and beautiful story, is well known to possess qualifications for interesting

the young : and, we doubt not, many a youth has before this time read this entertaining little volume. To any who have not, we can safely recommend it. It contains some good descriptions of scenery, especially in the Wyoming valley on the beautiful Susquehanna ; some entertaining historical incidents in the early settlement of that celebrated vale, and some excellent reflections on the providence and care of God.

Among other interesting events, we find here a particular account of the capture, by the Indians, of little Frances Slocum, in 1778, when five years old, and her recent discovery by her friends, among the Miami tribe in Indiana.

5.—HARPERS' FAMILY LIBRARY, 156. *Education. Part I. History of Education, Ancient and Modern. Part II. A Plan of Culture and Instruction, based on Christian Principles, and designed to aid in the right education of Youth, physically, intellectually, and morally.* By H. J. Smith, A. M., Prof. of Mod. Languages in the Penna. College, and of German Language and Lit. in the Theolog. Seminary at Gettysburg, Penna. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1842. pp. 340.

We are pleased to see the above work. It gives us a history of education from the beginning of time down to the present day, and brings within a small compass, valuable information on this subject, in respect to the Hebrews, Chinese, Babylonians, Egyptians, Grecians, Romans, etc.

The second part, 'Plan of Culture and Instruction,' embraces important considerations on physical, intellectual and moral education. The plans proposed we think excellent, and could they be carried out in the family circle would make more healthy and better children in every respect. Until some such principles are generally acted on, we shall not have the stamina requisite for sustaining our republican government, nor for conducting the great benevolent movements of the age.

Under physical culture, we find some admirable suggestions for the improvement of the senses, of sight, hearing, etc., and for the proper cultivation of the voice to various and distinct intonations : and under moral, excellent modes of training the juvenile heart in those lovely dispositions, which will assimilate it to the divine pattern of moral beauty exhibited by the Lord Jesus Christ.

- 6.—*Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art ; comprising the History, Description and Scientific Principles of every branch of Human Knowledge ; with the Derivation and Definition of all the Terms in use. Illustrated by Engravings on Wood.* General Editor, W. T. F. Brande, F. R. S. L. & E. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1842.

This work is to be completed in twelve parts, of 112 pages each, and to be sold at 25 cents a number. We have received Parts I. and II. The type is of course small, but clear and good, and will answer better for a book of reference like this, than for one requiring continuous reading. We have already expressed our opinion of the work, and confidently expect, from the talent displayed in it, that it will become a standard work of its kind.

- 7.—*History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789, to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.* By Archibald Alison, F. R. S. E., Advocate. In four volumes. Vol. I. New York : Harper & Brothers.

This is another of the Harpers' publications to be issued in parts, and completed in 16 numbers, making four volumes of about 600 pages each. The execution of the first part is good, and promises well for the work. Alison's is undoubtedly one of the most elegant histories of the day, and will be extensively read. It is not free from errors, however, both of language and fact. In respect to the United States, so gross are the mistakes of the learned author, that it might be well to correct them in the American edition, by appending suitable notes, if not in the text.

The part before us embraces six chapters, treating of Progress of Freedom in France and England—Causes in France which predisposed to Revolution—Constituent Assembly—From Revolt at Versailles to the conclusion of the Constituent Assembly—From the Legislative Assembly to the Fall of the Monarch—French Republic, from the dethronement to the death of Louis.

- 8.—*A Pictorial History of France. For Schools.* By S. G. Goodrich, Author of *Peter Parley's Tales*. Philadelphia : Samuel Agnew. 1842. pp. 347.

A good school book is a good thing, and rather rarely

to be met with. It ought to contain truth, facts; and for juvenile pupils should be attractive. Peter Parley has afforded much instruction and entertainment to the young, for many years, and has been very successful in the preparation of some of his school books. His Common School History, especially, has been very extensively adopted as a text-book: and where histories of particular countries are subjects of study in a school, we should think this pictorial history of France would be well adapted to the purpose. It presents a clear and brief account of that interesting country, and carries its history down to the existing state of things under the reign of Louis Philippe. At the close we have tables of the Bourbon, Bonaparte and Orleans-Bourbon families.

The History of France is to be followed by pictorial histories of the United States, England, Rome and Greece, by the same author.

9.—*The Church's Best State ; or Constant Revivals of Religion.* By Rev. Simeon W. Harkey. Baltimore : Publication Rooms ; Boston : Tappan & Dennett, and Crocker & Brewster ; New York : D. Appleton & Co. and Dayton & Newman ; Cincinnati : E. Lucas ; Pittsburg : C. H. Ray. 1842. pp. 172.

This book emanates from a minister of the Lutheran Church ; is written in an excellent spirit, under a high sense of responsibility, and with the intent to benefit that portion of Zion, to which the author belongs, by promoting revivals of pure and undefiled religion. The subject is treated under the following chapters. 1. What is true religion ? 2. What is a genuine revival of religion, considered negatively ? 3. What is it, considered affirmatively ? 4. Are genuine revivals the Church's best state ? 5. Constant revivals possible. 6. 'New Measures' — 'Old Measures ;' Means to be employed for the promotion of revivals. 7. How to conduct revivals. 8. Conclusion and application of the whole subject.

We are much pleased with the author's views as expressed on these several topics ; and while he is careful to guard against fanaticism and undue excitement, and the injudicious and untimely resort to protracted meetings, he is not unfriendly to these meetings at proper times and properly conducted. On this subject much must be left to the judgment of pastors of the churches. There are doubtless seasons, when to withhold extra efforts would be sinful, because the Spirit of God evidently leads the way. Then they are always safe, conducted in the spirit of the gospel.

- 10.—*Julia of Baia; or The Days of Nero. A Story of the Martyrs. By the Author of "The Merchant's Daughter," "Virginia," "Christmas Bells," etc., etc.* New-York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1842. pp. 260.

This is an interesting book of fiction, interweaving much that is fact, and conveying to the mind of the reader many beautiful impressions of the scenery of Italy, and many striking incidents in the history of the times of Nero. That cruel monster is appropriately depicted, and the sufferings of the Martyrs under his reign graphically portrayed. The book will undoubtedly be acceptable to the youthful portion of the community, and where fiction is employed to attract, we prefer that it shall be used to throw a charm around such and kindred subjects, as the author of *Baia* has selected.

- 11.—*The Salem Belle: A Tale of 1692.* Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1842. pp. 238.

The design of this little book is to exhibit some of the prevalent superstitions of the 17th century, and to caution the public mind against the prevalence of others equally to be deplored. We seem not to have advanced far enough yet in civilization and Christianity to be exempt from the most ridiculous superstitions and most flagrant fanaticism.

- 12.—*A Grammar of the German Language. By George Henry Noehden, LL. D. From the eighth London edition, by Rev. C. H. F. Billoblotzky, Ph. D. With alterations and large additions, chiefly from the Grammars of Dr. Becker. By Rev. Barnas Sears, D. D., President of the Newton Theological Institution.* Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. 1842. pp. 452.

We have before us the grammar announced as forthcoming in our October number of 1842. We expected a good, well digested grammar, and we are by no means disappointed. In the first place, Dr. Noehden's grammar has deservedly sustained a high reputation both in England and in this country. Few men were better qualified to prepare a grammar of the German tongue. Educated at Göttingen, having thoroughly studied the principles of the German language, and of universal grammar, and afterwards spending many years in England as an instructor in German, he possessed himself of the knowledge requisite for the preparation of a grammar adapted to the wants of English students. Then, Dr. Becker has greatly contributed to simplify a knowledge of the syntax of the Ger-

man language, and this syntax has very properly been substituted for that of Dr. Noehden in the present edition. And again, Dr. Sears is one of the very few men in this country qualified to do justice to a German grammar. He is intimately acquainted both with the structure of the German language and with his own, and in the preparation of this grammar has shown himself to be not a mere compiler, but an original thinker.

We consider it decidedly the best German grammar for students of that language yet published in this country. The list of irregular verbs is very convenient and complete; whilst that of grammatical terms, that of abbreviations, and the index, add greatly to the usefulness of the work.

The book is well and accurately printed.

- 13.—*Lucilla; or the Reading of the Bible.* By Adolphe Monod. Translated from the French. New-York and Brooklyn: Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 240.

Adolphe Monod is so well known to us by report as a Protestant minister of fine talents and ardent piety, that this little book from his pen will be welcome to many households. It is intended to meet the infidelity and Romanism of France; but is adapted also, in many respects to our own land. We have here a secret and widely-spread infidelity, as well as bold efforts of Papists, to overcome. It may be said of the author that he knows that, whereof he affirms; and whilst his reasoning is forceful and conclusive, his spirit is meek and lowly.

The book is written in the style of dialogue, and the interest is well sustained: we hope it will be extensively read, and that the excellent author shall yet live to write many more such books.

- 14.—*Christ our Law.* By Caroline Fry. New-York and Brooklyn: Robert Carter. 1842. pp. 72.

This is a delightful book, full of important matter. Christ is held forth prominently, and made, as he ever ought to be, all in all. Christ is our law: in his sovereign Love—his Incarnation and Substitution—his justifying Righteousness—in our Responsibility to him—in his regenerating Spirit—in saving Faith—in the obedience of Faith—in Repentance unto Life—in his sanctifying Grace—in his holy Ordinances—in our Union and Communion with him. These are the subjects of the successive chapters, and they are treated with great good sense, and in a vigorous style.

In her preface, Miss Fry says: "The time seems at hand when we shall all have to retreat upon the strongholds of our faith; when they that teach, and they that learn, and they that keep the watch-tower, or go forth to the battle-field, will be compelled to do for a declining church, what for an advancing one the Apostle forbids to be done: to maintain 'the principles of the doctrine of Christ,' instead of 'going on unto perfection;' to 'lay again the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God;' in order to preserve and strengthen and encourage those that stand, if we may not renew again to repentance those that have fallen away."

- 15.—*The Writings of Jane Taylor. In three Volumes, Containing Memoirs and Correspondence; Poetical Remains; Essays in Rhyme; and Contributions of Q. Q.* New-York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce.

Jane Taylor is so well known and so highly appreciated, that we presume the publishers of these volumes will find themselves compensated for their outlay, in the ready sale of the work. True, many are in possession of some of her fugitive poetical effusions, and of the Contributions of Q. Q., yet those who admire her writings will wish to have the three volumes in uniform binding. The Memoir and Correspondence, digested by her brother, Isaac Taylor, also favorably known to the public, must greatly enhance the value of these volumes.

For the young, Jane Taylor has written much that is entertaining and instructive. Parents will find in these volumes wholesome sentiments, clothed in chaste and appropriate language—such as they can safely instil into the minds of their children. Many, now grown to manhood and womanhood, probably remember some of her choice lessons, early committed to memory, under the direction of a fond and judicious mother.

16. *Universalism examined, renounced, and exposed, in a series of Lectures, embracing the experience of the author during a ministry of twelve years, and the testimony of the Universalist ministers to the dreadful moral tendency of their faith.* By Matthew Hale Smith. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1842. pp. 396.

The author of this book has been himself a Universalist minister, and has recently announced his conviction of the truth as it is in Jesus. He now undertakes to reason with his

former friends, and to show them the instability of the foundation on which they build. For although he once built on the same, he now feels satisfied that it must have been swept from beneath him at the day of judgment, and left him a wretched soul on the shores of eternity. We consider him a qualified witness in the case, and hope his book may fall into the hands of many of those with whom he once walked to the place of worship in company. And as in the cause of temperance, the testimony of those who were once besotted is of more avail towards the reformation of others, than any other means, we may hope that the argument of Mr. Smith will be successful in convincing multitudes of Universalists of their error, and leading them to the acknowledgment of the truth.

The volume embraces several lectures, giving an account of Mr. S.'s early life, and of the means of his conversion, with a refutation of the reasonings on which Universalists rely : and although not evincing a mind of uncommon acuteness, it is written from such a stand-point as gives the author a great advantage over those who may have written on the same subject with more acumen and learning. We think the book adapted to do much good, and we trust the day is not far distant, when those who disbelieve in the doctrine of a Hell, will see that they, at the same time, deprive us of a Heaven. Both rest on the same basis—the same principles of interpretation.

17.—*Old Humphrey's Addresses. By the Author of Old Humphrey's Observations.* New-York and Brooklyn : Robert Carter. London : Religious Tract Society. 1842. pp. 252.

We have seen and read this book before, in another form : but we think Mr. Carter is doing the community a good service by republishing it in a new dress, and so as to make it easily purchasable. Old Humphrey, with his 'stump of a pen in the infirm hand of an old man,' writes, nevertheless, in a very lively, interesting style. And he that is won to read the book, we doubt not, will rise from the perusal profited. We knew a young man who, after reading the essay on blankets, in the beginning of winter, was prompted at once to set about raising funds for the purchase of blankets for the poor of his own vicinity, and succeeded, to the great comfort of many destitute families. Let old Humphrey be read and re-read, and the heart will be moved, and prompt the reader to deeds of benevolence, and lead him, like his master, to go about doing good.

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18. *Puseyism ; or the Errors of the Times.* By the Rev. Robert Ferguson, Minister of Brickfield Chapel, Stratford, London. London : J. Snow. 1842. pp. 72.

This is a small volume, written in a popular style, intended to guard the mass of the community against the evils which threaten the church, from the spread of Puseyism. It is eminently adapted to do good ; and the time has certainly come, in England, if not in our own land, when Protestants must be prepared for the inroads of superstitious error. This Puseyism is but a modified form of Romanism, and ere long they will probably discover that they are twin sisters, too long estranged, and will rush to each other's embrace with enthusiastic delight : and it may be, with fanatic hate of all who are without the pale of the mother church—the church, by emphasis.

We did hope the day had gone by, when vain rites and pompous ceremonies should come to be considered as the very essence almost of Christianity—as that without which there is no church, no ministry, no sacraments, no safety. But it seems not. Well ! Jehovah is on the throne, and before him darkness will become light—clouds of most portentous gloom, those of most refulgent glory.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

Just at the last moment we have received :—

- Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans.* By James Murdock, D. D. Hartford : John C. Wells. 1842. pp. 201.

We of course cannot now speak of the book from personal inspection, but doubt not it will contain much interesting matter to scholars.

- The Perpetuity of the Earth ; A Discourse preached before the Premillennial Advent Association, in the City of New-York, Jan 1st, 1842. With Notes on the Millenarian Controversy, and Strictures on Professor McClelland's "Manual of Sacred Interpretation."* By John Lillie. New-York : John Moffet. 1842. pp. 240.

- Emma, or the Lost Found ; or Reliance on God Rewarded.* New-York : Dayton & Newman. 1843. pp. 193.

- The Scripture Alphabet of Animals.* By Mrs. Harriet N. Cook. *The Children of the Bible ; As Examples and Warnings.*

Robert Carter, New-York, has issued new editions of *Romaine on Faith*, and *Brown's Concordance*.

Essays on the Philosophy of Vitality, and on the modus operandi of Remedial Agents. By Martyn Paine, A. M., M. D., etc., etc. New-York: Hopkins & Jennings. 1842. pp. 68.

The End of the World not yet. A discourse delivered at Newburyport, Mass. By Rev. L. F. Dimmick. Newburyport: Charles Whipple. 1842. pp. 48.

The Ambassador of God; or The True Spirit of the Christian Ministry. A Sermon, by Rev. John W. Nevin, D. D. 1842.

ARTICLE XII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Prussia.

PROFESSOR MOSER of Königsberg, says Alexandre Von Humboldt, has obtained daguerreotype impressions in a dark room—one of the most marvellous discoveries of this day of discovery and invention.—Five works of Schelling are about to be published, comprising the History of Philosophy since Descartes—Positive Philosophy—Philosophy of Mythology—Philosophy of Revelation—and Natural Philosophy.

Germany.

A new *Literaturzeitung* has been commenced at Jena, by Prof. Hand.—An exegetical manual of the first three gospels is promised by H. E. G. Paulus.—Neander is engaged on a new edition of his 'General History of the Christian Religion and Church.'—Hengstenberg is publishing a Commentary on the Psalms.—Dr. Tuch, commentator on Genesis, etc., has left Halle to enter on his professorship of Oriental languages at Leipzig.—The number of students at Berlin, by the last account, was 1757—Bonn, 558—Breslau, 639—Göttingen, 728—Halle, 705—Heidelberg, 572.—Ludwig Tieck has left Dresden and taken up his residence at Berlin.—A statue of Jean-Paul Richter has been erected at the Gymnasium of Baireuth.

Prof. Krug of Leipzig, author of a "History of the Philosophy of the Ancients," and Kuinöl, well known by his Commentary on the New Testament, have both departed this life.—The University of Halle has suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Professor Gesenius, well known to biblical students. He died in the 57th year of his age.

France.

In 1841, 8036 works were printed at Paris.—The Volnian prize in philology has been awarded by the Academy of Sciences, to Dr. Theodore Bensley, of Göttingen, for his *Etymological Lexicon of the Greek language*.

Italy.

The design of publishing, at Rome, a uniform edition of the works of the Fathers, from the apostolic times to the 13th century, and in connexion the best writers in patristic theology, has been abandoned.

England.

Dr. Solomon Herschel, Chief Rabbi of the Jews in England, died at his residence recently, in the 83d year of his age. For forty-one years he had been Chief Rabbi of the Great Synagogue.—Allan Cunningham died October 29th, 1842.—A complete edition of the works of the venerable Bede is to be published under the superintendence of Dr. Giles. It will contain the original Latin, with a new translation of the principal works.—K. O. Müller's "*Attica and Athens, with a map and plan,*" translated by J. L. Lockhart, is a valuable work, which has recently appeared.—Also, a Historical outline of the book of Psalms, by the late J. Mason Good, M. D.

United States.

We have to record the early decease of Professor Isaac Nordheimer. He was a ripe Oriental scholar, surpassed by few, if any, of his years. He, of course, left his Concordance incomplete; but it may be taken up by some other hand.

Jonathan Leavitt and John F. Trow, 194 Broadway, will publish this month **THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PRESIDENT EDWARDS**, being a faithful reprint of the "**WORCESTER EDITION,**" with valuable additions, and a copious **GENERAL INDEX**, prepared expressly for the work—bound in handsome sheep, at a reduced price.

THE
AMERICAN
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

APRIL, 1843.

SECOND SERIES. NO. XVIII. WHOLE NO. L.

ARTICLE I.

CHARACTER AND THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY ROMANS.

By Rev. Albert Smith, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature, Middlebury Col., Vt.

It is a remark of Aristotle, that excellence in man depends on his acquaintance with something higher and better than himself. The truth and importance of this idea are illustrated by the whole history of our race. Nations never rise in their moral character above the qualities ascribed by them to the divinities they worship. If these are represented as virtuous and noble, a corresponding excellence and greatness of soul will be produced among the people, and this in proportion to their reverence for the objects of their adoration. But wherever the gods are imperfect or base, imperfection or baseness will belong to the worshippers. Nor is it by the force of example only that the influence of the higher nature is exerted. Truth, or that which is received as truth, rendered sacred by a connection real or supposed between man and some superior being, acts with moulding power on the character of nations. The religion of a nation is decisive of its character, because the combined impressions of divine example and theological belief on the human mind are more efficacious and controlling than any, and all other causes. The superiority of Christianity over every other form of religion consists in the adaptation of the double nature and the perfect character of our Saviour to the wants of man ;

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in the necessity, purity, and authority of the peculiar doctrines of his religion; and in the truth of the system of philosophy and natural theology which in the Holy Scriptures is everywhere *implied*. So far as the character of Christ and the peculiar doctrines taught by him and the Apostles are concerned, there is in respect to an approach to the true religion very little ground for a comparison of heathen systems among themselves, but ample room for a contrast of them all with Christianity. But in regard to a true *natural* theology there is a wide difference between the systems of error which have constituted the creeds of nations. No religion is wholly false, for a system composed entirely of error could never secure belief. In proportion as religions have been free from the worst abominations of idolatry and the crudest absurdities of superstition, and have embraced more or less of the fundamental doctrines of a right theology, the destructive influence of heathenism has been neutralized, and the salutary impressions of truth secured. That this was to a certain extent the case among the early Romans it is the object of this article to prove. That the Romans had at any period orthodox notions of the Deity, that they admitted into their creed in its purest state no debasing errors, and that they conceived in their minds and practised in their lives the distinguishing virtues of Christianity, we neither assert nor believe. At the best as well as the worst periods of their history the Romans were a heathen people, and their religious system was a heathen system. But while this is admitted, it may at the same time be maintained that there was an important difference between the religious views of the early and those of the later Romans, that there was as great a difference in their characters, and that the latter difference was to a great extent the result of the former. This is what we affirm and shall endeavor to establish. It is by no means our purpose to draw a full length portrait of the ancient Roman, to state at length the articles of his theological belief, or to give a description of the rites, ceremonies, and symbols of his religion. Our object is much more humble and restricted. We propose in the present article, to point out some of the excellencies in the noble character of the early Romans, to establish the fact of their belief in certain theological truths, and to show that there was a connection between this belief and the moral character which was, we think, its fruit. The contrast between the character and theology of the early Romans and those of their

descendants may be exhibited by a description, in a future number, of the condition in later times of both morals and religion.

I. Credibility of the Early History of Rome.

The early history of all ancient nations is necessarily obscure. It is a mistake, however, to imagine that it is midnight with antiquity because it is not noonday. It is the obscurity of the twilight, and not impenetrable darkness, that rests on the primeval days of Rome. The assertion that "the early history of Greece and Rome is deserving of no credit whatever," is much too sweeping, and cannot be maintained. It may be improbable, that in a period of nearly two hundred and fifty years the Roman monarchy was governed by only seven kings. The dates connected with the reigns of these sovereigns may be wholly supposititious, and many of the legends related of them sheer fabrications. But the probability that there were other kings does not disprove the existence of those of whom we have accounts.

Nor do the chronological impossibilities, and the interpolated fictions of a heroic age, destroy the historical foundation on which the common belief rests. Among others Niebuhr has been referred to as having annihilated the credibility of the early Roman history. But this writer states expressly that "there is no rational ground for doubting the personal existence of Tullus Hostilius." He thinks that from the commencement of the reign of this prince very few of the characters mentioned in the history are imaginary, and that many of the chronological statistics taken from the yearly records are as definite as could at so remote a period be expected. At the same time he supposes that some poetical legends are added to the true account of his reign, and that it is only in the reign of the fourth king, Ancus Martius, that the public records assume the character of an unvarnished statement of facts. "The lay of Tullus Hostilius is followed by a narrative of a course of events without any marvellous circumstances or poetical coloring." This historian seems to regard the received accounts of the first two kings either as fictions purely poetical, or as traditional tales in which truth and error are confounded beyond hope of separation. He classes Romulus with Hercules and Siegfried, and thinks the legends respecting him and Numa belong to religious

poetry. "Romulus was a god, the son of a god, Numa a man, but connected with superior beings." And yet in another place he says that Numa was not a theme of song like Romulus; nor does he, whatever particular expressions may seem to imply, appear to be prepared to deny the existence of either. "If the tradition, however, about them both is in all its parts poetical fiction, the fixing the pretended duration of their reigns can only be explained by ascribing it either to mere caprice, or to numerical speculations."

It would not comport with the design of this article to enter upon an examination of the opinions and arguments of those historians whose authority, in connection with that of Niebuhr, has been appealed to in proof of the uncertainty of the early Roman history. Of Niebuhr it may be affirmed that his investigations have not always been able to abide the test of critical examination, and respecting the most distinguished of the other writers he has himself observed: "The soul of his book is skepticism: he does nothing but deny and upset." That much of what is related of the early Roman heroes and events is fabulous no one doubts. It was evidently regarded as such by the most judicious of the ancient historians. That Romulus ascended to heaven on the wings of the lightning, that Numa received divine revelations from a goddess, that Jupiter thundered from the right or left at the bidding of an augur, that an ox spoke, or that a priest cut through a flint-stone with a razor, is of course incredible.* Such stories evidently originated in that love of the marvellous which is native to the human mind, and which exists in a high degree among every rude and superstitious people. Like other heathen nations, the Romans were disposed to connect their ancestors with the gods, and to ascribe to them supernatural power. But this disposition cannot convert the walls of their city into air, nor annihilate the civil and religious institutions which existed among them, and which can be proved to have descended from the earliest times. The admis-

* Respecting the credibility of Livy, Müller has the following remark. "The relation of prodigies proves nothing against his judgment: he reports what the ancient world believed, and what he perhaps was willing the Roman people should continue to believe." *Allg. Geschichte*, I. 182. Heeren's *Handbuch*, 386, 382.

sion of Niebuhr at the commencement of his work, that long before any historical record of particular individuals occurs in those ages, the forms under which the commonwealth existed may be recognized with certainty, is both true and important. Whatever views may be entertained respecting the early periods of Roman history, there are certain points which cannot be questioned. Rome had a beginning. The city itself, with its civil and religious institutions, must have had a founder, or founders. The popular belief ascribed the origin of the city and its government to a man by the name of Romulus, while holy Numa was celebrated, first in poetical lays, and then in sober history, as the author of the national religion. If it is contended that the names of those chiefs are not genuine, that the hero who built the walls of the city was not called Romulus, and that his successor neither bore the name of Numa, nor received the additional title of Pompilius on account of the religious processions which he instituted, it may be replied that a name is of small importance. If it is affirmed that no such men existed, still the city and its institutions remain, and neither sprang spontaneously out of the earth. Their existence must be accounted for, and until some more plausible conjecture is started, it is safe to speak of Romulus as the founder of the city, and of Numa as the author of the national religion. Accordingly this has been the practice of the most judicious historians, even of those who have been often skeptical in regard to the narrations of the ancient writers. The following remarks respecting the sources of the first periods of Roman history will commend themselves to the good sense of the reader. "The earliest history of Rome is as incapable as that of Athens, or of any other city of antiquity, of being reduced to strictly historical truth; since it rests for the most part on traditions which were delivered by the poets and orators. That in connection with fiction they contain also truths, is proved in the clearest manner by the political institutions whose origin they relate, and which reach back with certainty to those times. To wish to draw a well defined boundary line between the mythical and the historical periods, is to misunderstand the nature of mythology." "The traditions of the fathers were in part preserved in historical songs; (of a larger epic we hear nothing;) in this sense there existed a poetical history; but the history is by no means on this account to be regarded as merely poetical. Even at so early a period, the traditions respecting the institu-

tions of Numa have no poetical characteristics.”* For an obvious reason, our brief examination of the Roman history in reference to the subject of discussion, has been commenced with the preceding remarks on the credibility of the sources from which the earliest portions of that history are drawn. A suspicion that the whole had been founded on a false assumption was certainly to be forestalled or removed.

II. Character of the Early Romans.

In all inquiries respecting the character of the early Romans, it is doubtless necessary to make allowance for that veneration for antiquity, and that pride of ancestry, which dispose men to lavish indiscriminate praises on their forefathers. After every reasonable deduction, however, it will still remain a truth as well established as any in history, that under the monarchy and in the first ages of the republic, the Romans were remarkable for their morality. Laudatory as the expression is, it was not without some reason that Ammianus called ancient Rome ‘the home of all the virtues.’ The character of the early Romans was almost the very opposite of that of the Greeks, and altogether diverse from the refined degeneracy of the modern Italians. Stern integrity, incorruptible love of justice, simplicity of life, and sincerity of manners—these are the qualities which we admire in the ancestors of Rome. The tribute of Sallust to the fathers of Rome, in which he affirms that in peace and war good morals were cultivated; that justice prevailed among them not so much by means of laws as from natural impulse; that quarrels, discords, and animosities found a place only in

* This writer returns to Niebuhr the compliment on the score of skepticism which the latter had paid to Beaufort. Of Niebuhr’s work he remarks: “Rather a critique than a history, with a constant effort to overthrow what had been previously received. Acuteness is not always acute in discerning truth (*Scharfsinn ist nicht immer Wahrheitsinn*); and we do not so readily give credit to a work which is not only opposed to the prevailing view of Antiquity itself; (occasionally inferences from particular passages do not carry this opposition so far as the general spirit of the work;) but also, as the author himself confesses, (II. S. 5,) contrary to all analogy in history.” *Handbuch*, 384.

regard to enemies; that citizens strove with citizens only in virtue; that frugality, and fidelity to friends reigned at home; and that their magnificence was displayed only in the sacrifices to the gods;* may perhaps be suspected of having had its origin in love of country, and a natural veneration for his ancestors. But the testimony of Polybius to the excellent character of the Romans is not liable to the same charge. This historian had thoroughly studied the character of the Roman people and the genius of their institutions. It has been affirmed that he understood them both the better for having been obliged to learn them as a foreigner. But however this may be, his judgment respecting them is worthy of the more confidence inasmuch as it was not biassed by the unavoidable partiality of a native. "Such is the impulse to noble deeds," says that writer, "and the virtuous emulation, which are produced by the institutions that exist among them. Moreover, in regard to the acquisition of wealth, the manners and customs of the Romans are superior to those of the Carthaginians. For with the latter nothing is base provided it is likely to be attended with gain; whereas in the estimation of the former, nothing is more disgraceful than to receive a bribe, or to acquire property by any unfair means. While they esteem wealth an honor to him who obtains it in a proper way, they consider gain secured by unlawful practices as a reproach. This is proved by the fact that among the Carthaginians offices are obtained by the unconcealed use of bribes, while among the Romans, the penalty for this is death. Since, therefore, different rewards of excellence are proposed by the two nations, it were reasonable to expect that the method of attaining these rewards would likewise be different."† The Roman senate was the refuge of nations, the arbitrator of causes, the avenger of wrongs, and the deliverer of the oppressed. "The Holy Spirit," says Bossuet, "has not disdained to praise, in the book of Maccabees, the distinguished prudence, and vigorous counsels of this wise assembly, in which no one arrogated to himself an authority not warranted by reason, and all whose members labored for the public good without partiality and without jealousy."‡ The simplicity ac-

* Bell. Cat. § 8. 9.

† Hist. VI. 54.

‡ Discours sur L'Histoire Universelle, II. 269. It is not necessary to quarrel with the bishop respecting the canonical authority of the books of Maccabees; any more than it was

accompanied by morality, energy and dignity, which characterized the earlier Romans are described by Müller in several passages.* The tragical story of Lucretia shows clearly what were the early Roman ideas of conjugal fidelity. Matrons enjoyed peculiar honor. According to Plutarch it was two hundred and thirty years before a divorce occurred at Rome. Other writers say five hundred and twenty. The virtues of the Roman women are traced by Plutarch to the regulations of Romulus and Numa. "Romulus also enacted some laws; amongst the rest that severe one, which forbids the wife in any case to leave her husband, but gives the husband power to divorce his wife, in case of her poisoning his children, or counterfeiting his keys, or being guilty of adultery. But if on any other occasion he put her away, she was to have one moiety of his goods, and the other was to be consecrated to Ceres; and whoever put away his wife was to make an atonement to the gods of the earth."† "But Numa, though he preserved entire to the matrons all the honor and respect that were paid them by their husbands in the time of Romulus, when they endeavored by kindness to compensate for the rape, yet obliged them to behave with great reserve, and to lay aside all impertinent curiosity. He taught them to be sober, and accustomed them to silence, entirely to abstain from wine,‡ and not to speak even of the most necessary affairs except in the presence of their husbands. When a woman once appeared in the *forum* to plead her own cause, it is reported that the senate ordered the oracle to be consulted,

for Burke to defend the inspiration of Ecclesiasticus, which he quotes against the French revolutionists on the ground that it furnished at least the authority of "a great deal of sense and truth."

* Allg. Geschichte, I. 177, 178, 240, 241.

† Langhorne's Plutarch. Life of Romulus.

‡ "Romulus made the drinking of wine as well as adultery a capital crime in women. For he said, adultery opens the door to all sorts of crimes, and wine opens the door to adultery. The severity of this law was softened in succeeding ages; the women who were overtaken in liquor were not condemned to die, but to lose their dowers." To this note of Langhorne add the following: "In the Samnite war wine was still sprinkled upon the altars *by drops*, and Mecianus was not blamed for putting his wife to death because she drank without his knowledge." Mullers Allg. Geschichte, I. 243.

what this strange event portended to the city. Nay, what is recorded of a few infamous women is a proof of the obedience and meekness of the Roman matrons in general. For as our historians give us an account of those who first carried war into the bowels of their country, or against their brothers, or were guilty of parricide; so the Romans relate that Spurius Carvilius was the first among them that divorced his wife, when no such thing had happened before for two hundred and thirty years from the building of Rome: and that Thalea, the wife of Pinarius, was the first that quarrelled, having a dispute with her mother-in-law Gegania, in the reign of Tarquin the Proud. So well framed for the preserving of decency and a propriety of behavior were this lawgiver's regulations with respect to marriage." "Yet farther, Numa's strictness as to virgins tended to form them to that modesty which is the ornament of their sex."*

In connection with the domestic virtues resulting from the family institutions of the Romans may be mentioned the absence of a heinous crime, examples of which are not uncommon in almost every other. To the crime of parricide Romulus appointed no punishment, because, as Plutarch affirms,† he called all murder parricide, and regarded the murder of a parent by his child as impossible. And in fact no instance of the kind occurred at Rome for nearly six hundred years. Of the specific virtues which contributed to the prevalence of general morality among the early Romans, none was more important than that sacred regard for the preservation of public and private faith, especially for the solemn obligations of an oath, for which that people were distinguished. Its salutary influence was felt in all the relations of private life, and in all the affairs of state. To say nothing of the many illustrious examples of individual fidelity, and of the punishment not only of perjury, but even of an artful evasion of the real meaning of a contract, two or three instances of a more general character will show the hold which this feeling had on the public mind. At one time, in the midst of a sedition, the army having determined not to follow the Consuls, proposed to kill them in order to free themselves from the oath by which they were bound to obey them, and were only prevented by being shown that it

* Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa.

† Life of Romulus.

was not by a crime that they could expect to rid themselves of the obligations which an oath imposed.* At another time, when the troops had mutinously refused to pursue the flying enemy, Fabius persisted in his determination not to lead them to the conflict, for which they were afterwards clamorous, till they had first *sworn* to leave the field of battle victorious. "Once in the field," said he, "the soldiers have failed in their duty to the Roman Consul; their obligations to the gods they will never violate."† "We have no need of a levy," said the Consul Quinctius, who had been elected in the room of Valerius slain in battle, "since, at the time when P. Valerius armed the people for the recovery of the capital, they all took the oath that they would assemble at the command of the Consul, and would not depart without his order. We decree, therefore, that all who took the oath appear in arms to-morrow at the lake Regillus." In vain the tribunes urged that the people were absolved from the oath, since Valerius was dead, and Quinctius, now in his place, was then only a private man. The consciences of the people were not to be so satisfied. For that disregard of the gods, which Livy testifies prevailed in his own time, had not yet commenced; nor had they yet learned by ingenious devices, and verbal quibbles, to shun the performance of the thing promised.‡ So great was the force of the early institutions, and so permanent the habits resulting from them, that even in the midst of the corruptions of later times which had overthrown the republic and were ruining the empire, the oath, always the nerve of the military discipline, is called by the Emperor Maximus, in his address to the army, "the sacred mystery of the Roman government."§ Without accumulating a redundancy of evidence in favor of the early Romans, the testimony may be closed with the following tribute to those stern prototypes of the Puritans. "The austere frugality of the ancient republicans, their carelessness about the

* Liv. II. 32.

† *Consulem Romanum miles semel in acie fefellit, Deos nunquam fallit.* Ib. II. 45.

‡ *Sed nondum haec, quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Deum venerat: nec interpretando sibi quisque iusjurandum et leges aptas faciebat; sed suas potius mores ad eos accommodabat.* Ib. III. 20.

§ *φυλασσοῦντες τὸν στρατιωτικὸν ὅρκον ὃς ἐστὶ τῆς Ρωμαίων ἀρχῆς σεμνὸν μυστήριον.*

possession and the pleasures of wealth, the strict regard for law among the people, their universal steadfast loyalty during the happy centuries when the constitution, after the pretensions of the aristocracy had been curbed, was flourishing in its full perfection—the sound feeling which never amid internal discord allowed of an appeal to foreign interference—the absolute empire of the laws and customs, and the steadiness with which, nevertheless, whatever in them was no longer expedient was amended—the wisdom of the constitution, and of the laws—the ideal perfection of fortitude realized in the citizens and in the state—all these qualities unquestionably excite a feeling of reverence, which cannot be equally awakened by the contemplation of any other people. Theirs was no state of unnatural constraint, such as existed under the laws of Sparta, where, in the opinion of other Greeks, the contempt of death was natural, because death burst an intolerable yoke: it was a system, on the contrary, which fostered a rich growth of true individual happiness, of manly enjoyment free from sensuality. Other constitutions, perhaps no less perfect, produce a less imposing effect upon us from the honor they pay to wealth: nations of manifold capacities and buoyant spirit cannot escape faults, from which singleness of aim is the only preservative: and in the events of times past we are more sensible of faults than of deficiencies. Thus it is quite natural, that, even setting aside the splendor wherewith power and victories are always surrounded, we should look up admiringly to the Romans of the good times of the republic.”* It is undoubtedly true, as the same writer affirms, that the virtues of the early Romans were carried to excess. Strength of development was a prominent characteristic of their moral qualities. Hence their bravery bordered on presumption, their frugality on parsimony, and their temperance on the extreme of rigorous self-denial. They were just even to severity, and their piety was ready to degenerate into superstition. Their faults too, as might be expected of such a people, were strongly marked. But their virtues were virtues still. They were noble qualities, which, clustering as they did in masculine beauty and strength around the Roman character, imparted to it a dignified and commanding excellence. When it is asserted that these virtues prepared the way for their own destruction, more is said than can be proved. The Roman

* Niebuhr's *Rome*, p. XXII.

virtues remained while the causes which produced them continued to operate ; when these causes were removed, it was a matter of course that the effects which had followed from them should cease.

III. Source of the Roman virtues.

When effects like those which have been pointed out are contemplated, it is natural to ask for their origin. What gave to the Roman character that strength and vigor whose stern and rugged features during the prosperous days of the republic everywhere appear ? From what source did the Roman institutions derive whatever of superiority they possessed ? Was it from the diffusion of knowledge among the people ? Was the foundation of Roman greatness laid in a superior system of common school education ? That the virtues which adorned the Roman character were not produced, fostered, and perfected by a well digested scheme of intellectual instruction accompanied by lectures on moral philosophy is certain, because at Rome no such system existed. The Romans were never distinguished for their love of learning, and in those periods of their history when the people were most virtuous, they were not instructed even in the rudiments of science. Plutarch blames Numa for making no provision for the education of children. According to that writer the object of this prince was to change the fierce and warlike disposition of the people, and to induce them to live in a state of peace. But whatever good effects his institutions may have had, this primary object of the law-giver was not accomplished. The failure, his biographer thinks, was occasioned by the want of a thorough system of general education.* It is true, that as the extent, the power, and the

* " However, in the education of the boys, in the regulation of their classes, and laying down the whole method of their exercises, their diversions, and their eating at a common table, Lycurgus stands distinguished, and leaves Numa only upon a level with ordinary lawgivers. For Numa left it to the option or convenience of parents to bring up their sons to agriculture, to ship-building, to the business of a brazier, or the art of a musician. As if it were not necessary for one design to run through the education of them all, and for each individual to have the same bias given him ; but as if they were all like

wealth of the republic were increased, the subject of education, as was natural, attracted more and more attention. In the number and the intellectual qualifications of teachers there was a great advance, and useful information became more generally diffused.

But it must be remembered that the virtuous habits of the Romans were established, and the foundations of their empire laid, long before any considerable amount of knowledge existed in the nation. It was therefore neither to the cultivation of the arts and sciences by the higher classes, nor to the general diffusion of knowledge by means of popular education, that this noble people were indebted for their moral greatness, and their political supremacy. To what then shall the superiority of their character, with its magnificent results, be traced? It is not enough to say with Niebuhr that Roman greatness was owing for the most part to *fate*. For, the nobleness of the Roman character, the integrity, the fidelity, the patriotism, the general morality which prevailed in the early periods of the republic, are not to be resolved, any more than other effects, into the absolute sovereignty of God. Indeed the same writer remarks, that one great object of Polybius in composing his history was to convince the Greeks that the greatness of Rome was not founded on any fatality, but was the result of wise institutions, and a noble character. Shall we then suppose with De Pauw,* that the chief source of the prosperity of Rome was the Grecian

passengers in a ship, who, coming each from a different employment and with a different intent, stand upon their common defence in time of danger, merely out of fear for themselves or their property, and on other occasions are attentive only to their private ends. In such a case common legislators would have been excusable, who might have failed through ignorance or want of power; but should not so wise a man as Numa, who took upon him the government of a state so lately formed, and not likely to make the least opposition to any thing he proposed, have considered it his first care, to give the children such a bent of education, and the youth such a mode of exercise, as would prevent any great difference or confusion in their manners, that so they might be formed from their infancy, and persuaded to walk together, in the same paths of virtue?" Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus.

* *Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs*, II. 65.

laws? It may be true, as he affirms, that without these laws the Romans would never have made any sensible progress. Nor is it to be denied that when they neglected them they became "the basest of slaves, and the most corrupt of men." Cicero declared that in his estimation that one little book of the twelve tables was of more value than all the libraries of the philosophers.* It is altogether probable that in this case his judgment is correct. But it may still be asked, 'How came the Roman people to obey these laws?' In Athens, where the code chiefly originated, the laws were unable to produce subordination. At home they were far from establishing general morality, rendering the government stable, and securing public happiness. Is it then to be supposed that, by a transfer to Italy, the same principles of justice, when adapted to the circumstances of another people, acquired such power that they created a virtuous national character and secured all the blessings of permanent freedom? It is obvious that for the primary sources of national prosperity we must look to something more efficacious than ordinary civil laws. The Roman character was formed by the institutions of Numa. The precise period at which this prince lived is uncertain. It is impossible, among a rude and uncultivated people, to fix with precision the chronology of so remote an age. In regard to the period to which the reign of Numa is to be assigned, there appears to have been among the ancients themselves a great diversity of opinion. Some affirmed that Numa was a scholar of Pythagoras, while others believed that he was entirely unacquainted with Grecian learning. Among those who maintain the last mentioned opinion are Polybius and Livy, the latter of whom thinks,† that even if Numa had flourished in the time of Pythagoras instead of two centuries earlier, it would have been impossible in so barbarous an age, that any communication should have been opened between Rome and Magna Grecia. Cicero‡ supposes the current report that the Roman lawgiver was a Pythagorean, to have arisen from the fact that Italy was formerly filled with philosophers of that sect from the schools of Magna Grecia. But Numa, he remarks, who lived many years before Pythagoras, is to be regarded as the greater man, for having shown so much wisdom in laying the foundations of an empire nearly two centuries before the Greeks gave proofs of

* *De Oratore*, I. 44. † *Liv.* I. 18. ‡ *De Oratore* II. 37.

any such skill. Plutarch, after enumerating many circumstances which seemed to indicate that Numa must have been acquainted with the doctrines of Pythagoras, cuts short the argument by observing: "But as these matters are very dubious, to support or refute them further would look like the juvenile affectation of dispute."* The example of Plutarch in passing over this disputed point may be followed with advantage; for it is much more important to know what the views and institutions of Numa were, than from what source he received them. In common with some other legislators, this prince laid claim to inspiration, by which means he secured for his laws the sanction of divine authority. His institutions are distinguished above all others (if we except those of Moses) for their strong moral and religious tendency. The object which he had in view, and the means which he adopted to accomplish it, are pointed to in the following passage of Plutarch. "Numa having settled these matters with a view to establish himself in the people's good graces, immediately after attempted to soften them, as iron is softened by fire, and to bring them from a violent and warlike disposition, to a more just and gentle temper. Persuaded that no ordinary means were sufficient to form and reduce so high spirited and untractable a people to mildness and peace, he called in the assistance of religion."† The character and influence of the institutions of Numa may be best seen by a reference to some of the prominent features of his religion.

1. One of the most remarkable of these is *his views of the Deity as indicated by the absence of image worship*. On this point no writer is more explicit than his biographer Plutarch. "His regulations concerning images seem likewise to have some relation to the doctrine of Pythagoras; who was of opinion that the First Cause was [is] not an object of sense, nor liable to passion, but invisible, incorruptible, and discernible only by the mind. Thus Numa forbade the Romans to represent the Deity in the form either of man or beast. Nor was there among them formerly any image or statue of the Divine Being: during the first hundred and seventy years they built temples indeed, and

* On the question whether Numa and Pythagoras knew each other; Drachenborch's Livy I. 18, Bucheri Instit. Hist. Philos. 95, Niebuhr's Rome, I. 181.

† Life of Numa.

other sacred domes, but placed in them no figure of any kind, persuaded that it is impious to represent things divine by what is perishable, and that we can have no conception of God but by the understanding. His sacrifices too resembled the Pythagorean worship; for they were without any effusion of blood, consisting chiefly of flour, libations of wine, and other very simple and unexpensive things."* The testimony of Plutarch, in regard to the absence of images and the simplicity of the religious rites, is strengthened by other authority. "Although some superstitions were introduced by Numa," says Tertullian, "nevertheless at that time the worship of the Deity among the Romans was not yet attended with images, or performed in temples. Religion was chaste, and the rites without ostentation. There was then no capitol ascending to heaven, and as yet the altars were hastily made of turf, and the vessels earthen. But little splendor appeared, and God himself was nowhere seen; for the ingenuity of Greeks and Tuscans had not yet inundated the city with images.† Another witness is Varro, as quoted by Augustine. "He says also that the ancient Romans worshipped the gods more than one hundred and seventy years without an image. If this, he adds, had continued till the present time, the gods would receive a purer homage."‡ These passages might seem to be sufficient to prove that the early Romans were not worshippers of idols. But the truth of this representation has been denied by distinguished men, and assertions supposed to be at variance with these have been found in other ancient writers. The objections to the statements of Varro, Plutarch, and Tertullian are exhibited in the following extract from Meiners *Historia Doctrinae De Vero Deo*. "For I have observed that distinguished men have been induced by a certain passage of Plutarch to believe that Numa strictly prohibited all images of the gods formed in human shape, because he believed that the divine nature is uncompounded and indivisible, and that it is to be discerned only with the mind. It is not at all wonderful that Plutarch fell into this opinion; for since he desired to ascribe his own doctrines or those of Plato to almost all ancient people and men, he would do this the more readily in respect to Numa, because he falsely thought that this Roman king had at some time or other been instructed by Pythagoras. But it is easy to see

* Life of Numa.

† Apologet. IV. c. 25.

‡ De Civ. Dei. IV. 31, cf. I. 131.

from the sacred rites instituted by this founder, and reformer of the Roman religion, and from the gods which he introduced, that such noble ideas concerning the divine nature as Plutarch attributes to him, never entered his mind. For the Roman nation owe to Numa not only the worship of fire and the society of vestal virgins, but also their gods of stone, Terminus and Jupiter, by whom the *Feciales* swore, and *Libitina*, and *Jupiter Elicius*. (Dion. Halicar. II. 74, Liv. I. 20, 21.)

The same man appointed a constant priest of Jupiter, and connected with him two others, one of Mars, the other of *Quirinus*. He also chose twelve priests to Mars *Gradivus*, and the *Pontifex Maximus*, whose duty it was to instruct the people both in celestial ceremonies, and in funeral rites, and the mode of appeasing the manes, and how certain prodigies given by lightning or in some other form (I use Livy's own words) were to be taken up and investigated. He moreover consecrated a grove to the muses, because their interviews with his wife *Egeria* were held in that place. To this grove he frequently retired without witnesses, as if to a meeting with the goddess. Even granting, therefore, that this Roman king, who set up stones to be worshipped by his subjects, dedicated no shrines and images to the deities, we can only infer from this, that among rude and half-civilized men, no one was capable of making images of the gods. Pliny favors this conjecture, affirming that *Demaratus*, the father of *Priscus Tarquinius*, employed the statuary *Euchira* and *Eugrammus*, and that these men first introduced the plastic art into Italy (XXXV. 12, (43). But if any one should think Pliny more worthy of belief in another passage (XXXIV. 7, (16), then the idea which generally prevails that Numa prohibited all images of the divine nature, must certainly be false. For the learned writer not only declares that a very ancient statue of *Hercules* was consecrated by *Evander*, but also that "Janus with two faces was made a god by King Numa, and wrought out, rudely indeed, but yet with much labor."* The object of this writer is to prove that, with the exception of the Israelites, Greeks, and Christians, and the nations whose literature and religion may be traced to these, there has never, from the earliest ages, been any people who have had correct ideas of the true God.† It was the opinion of Cudworth, founded

* Page 225.

† "Except these illustrious nations, of whom mention has
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chiefly on a passage in Seneca, that the Etrusci (from whom the Romans early received religious impressions) had orthodox notions of the Deity. If Meiners, without affirming that images were worshipped in the infancy of Rome, had confined himself to an exposition of the defectiveness of the ideas of the divine nature prevalent in the earliest periods of Italian history, it would not be necessary to enter into a controversy with him. The idea, however, which runs through his book, that, aside from the Jews, the further back into the childhood of the nations of antiquity the history of religion is carried, the more puerile and imperfect the prevailing views of the Divinity will be found to be, is not altogether accurate. It leaves out of view the traditional religion received from the first parents of the human race, and supposes (what indeed is elsewhere asserted by the same writer*) that the only source of religions is the inability of the human intellect, in the infancy of society, to account for the phenomena of nature without referring to some higher power. But if the ideas of the Deity become more and more crude and erroneous the higher they are traced towards the origin of the race, it might be expected that the more cultivated and intellectual any nation should become, the more pure would be the prevailing notions of the Deity. Whereas, if those nations whose theology is derived from revelation are left out of the account, with the exception of a few philosophers, the fact is just the contrary. It were indeed natural, from the gradual progress of the arts and sciences from rude beginnings to higher

just been made, no other ever existed, which had made such progress in observing and interpreting nature, or so investigated the illimitable universe, and the immensity of the heavenly bodies and of the forces by which they are impelled; their amazing velocity and eternal permanence; the courses of the seasons, and the use and adaptation of all vegetable and animal life, as to draw from them the conclusion, that such a mass of material objects, harmonizing with each other, never could have been created and organized by chance, nor even by necessity, or the contrivance of several architects, but only by the energy and design of one mighty mind." Meiners, *De Vero Deo*, p. 17.

* "The only cause of the origin of religions, was the want of a correct knowledge of nature, or the inability of rude men to investigate the true causes of natural phenomena."—Meiners *Geschichte der Religionen*, I. 16.

and higher degrees of excellence, to infer that the same must be true of religion, that as nations become civilized, intelligent, and refined, their views of the divine nature were in proportion corrected and elevated. But this a priori inference is contradicted by the testimony of history. "Superstition and idolatry," says Dr. Leland, "instead of being corrected and diminished, rather increased and gathered strength among the heathen nations as they grew in learning and politeness. If we consult fact and experience, we shall find, that the religion of the Gentiles in the most ancient times was in several instances more pure and simple, less incumbered and corrupted with idolatry, than in succeeding ages, when the arts and sciences had made a considerable progress."* In accordance with this view is the opinion of Müller. "It is a striking fact, that the most ancient and in other respects entirely uncultivated nations, had very just conceptions, and a correct knowledge of God, of the world, and of immortality, as well as of the motions of the stars, while the arts which relate to the conveniences of life are much younger. On the most important subjects the fathers of the human race formed correct judgments; in the affairs of life they were children. There are preserved among most nations obscure, perverted, misunderstood traces of these primitive ideas."†

The fact that the early Romans were less cultivated than

* Leland's *Advantage and Necessity of Revelation*, Part I. chapter xx. He adds, "This seems to show that the knowledge men had of God and religion in the first ages, was originally owing not merely to the efforts of their own reason, which was then little cultivated and improved, but to a divine revelation made to the first of the human race, and from them communicated to their posterity. It might have been hoped that this tradition, which when duly proposed is agreeable to right reason, would have been preserved with great care, especially when learning and knowledge were improved: but it soon began to degenerate, and became the more corrupt, the farther it was removed from the original. The true primitive theism, which was the most ancient religion of mankind, became soon adulterated with mixtures of polytheism, still preserving for the most part, amidst all their corruptions, some obscure idea of one Supreme Divinity, till at length it was almost lost and confounded amidst a multiplicity of idol deities."

† *Allg. Geschichte*, I. 24.

some other nations of their own age, or than they themselves afterwards became, is not of itself conclusive proof that they must have been idolaters, or even that their religion did not approach more nearly to truth and reason, than when at a later period they had become more intellectual.

The authority on which Meiners rests his assertion that the early Romans worshipped images, is that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and Pliny. The first two, if the characteristics of each are kept in view, may be regarded as excellent writers. The former had for his stand-point the reference of every thing Roman to Greece for its origin. Whatever may be the value of Livy's history in other respects, he is not to be depended on in regard to the religion of the early ages, because he did not choose to disturb the prevailing belief of his own times. The passages cited from Pliny by Meiners, are not sufficient to prove what is contradicted by the express and concurring testimony of writers of good authority. In the strongest of these passages (XXXIV. 7 (16.)) Pliny states that Numa caused a statue of Janus to be made. But this would not prove that the worship of images was established. In the other (XXXV. 12 (43)), he affirms that Tarquinius Priscus first introduced the plastic art into Italy, the inference from which would seem to be that the former statement is incorrect. It is suggested by Meiners, that even if it were proved that Numa did not authorize the use of images, nothing more could be inferred from this fact than that, in so rude an age, there were no artists to carve them. It would seem that this writer had never seen the rough and uncouth idols of the South Sea Islands and other savage heathen of our own times. These hideous and misshapen blocks prove conclusively that the low state of the arts is not a sufficient defence against image-worship.

The difference between the views of the Deity which prevailed in Rome at an early period, and those which were current in Greece, are exhibited in the following passages from Kreutzer's *Symbolik*: "It were a great misapprehension to confound these and similar traditions with those epic histories of the gods which sprang from the Grecian Anthropomorphism. The religious feeling of the old Italian was removed to the farthest extent from this loquacity in the rehearsal of fables, from this childish simplicity. Even the Grecian Dionysius pays this just tribute to the Romans. In a remarkable passage (*Antiqq. Romm.* II. 18, p. 273 Reisk) he speaks of the wisdom of the reli-

gious institutions of Romulus, and shows the great superiority of the old Roman religion over the Grecian. The former has its temples, consecrated places, altars, images of the gods, and symbols; it brings into view, also, the influence of the immortal gods, and the benefits which they bestow on the human race; it consecrates, moreover, festivals and sacrifices, has, in common with the Greeks, assemblies for divine service, days of rest, and means of atonement. On the other hand, the fables related by the latter, with all the blasphemous accounts of the contests of the gods—the mutilations, wounds, death, imprisonment, and slavery of those divine beings, the religion of the Romans utterly rejected. If this passage is understood, according to its connection, of the original features of the old Roman religion, the view which it gives of the peculiar character of the religious belief of the first Romans, is altogether correct.* Those pious, noble fathers of the quiet, mild, thinking Latium were not to be charmed away from the native circle of the paternal religion by the excitable fancy of Greek poets. A hundred and seventy years the pious old Roman served his divinity without needing any images.† And even at a later period, when idols had already obtained a place in the sacred niches, in the important service of the lofty Vesta, he preserved the memory of the old law. Thenceforward the glowing flame of the pure fire in her still, sacred house, satisfied him without any image or external

* II. 992, 993. Compare the passage in Hegels *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte*, referred to in Vol. VIII. p. 50 of the Repository. "In the preceding part a closer view has been taken of the Greek religion, and according to the common idea, the Roman religion, with a change of name only, was the same as the Greek. Upon a nearer inspection, however, the most striking difference shows itself." "In all circumstances the Roman was pious," etc.—*Werke*, IX. 297.

† "Plutarch in Numa, Cap. VIII. § 4, p. 65 B. p. 287 Leopold. Vergl. Augustin de Civ. D. IV. 31. It is not unknown to me that Heyne (*Opusc. Acad.* II. p. 71) has raised certain doubts respecting this representation of the old Roman religion. But that distinguished man was not then in possession of those original helps which have placed us at the present time in an entirely different point of observation, the same, to wit, to which I am endeavoring in this book to conduct my readers," etc.

sign. And when, in the earthquake, the mysterious energy of the dark powers showed itself in terrific manifestations, then the mind of the Roman continued in this region of darkness and awe, and prayed to no definite, to no known God.”*

2. But whatever opinion may be held respecting the views of the divine nature entertained by the early Romans, that *religious feeling was one of the most deeply seated, and strongly developed of the elements of the Roman character*, can be

* II. 993. It has been already remarked that Dionysius is disposed to assign a Grecian origin to every thing Roman. The temples, sanctuaries, altars, statues, festivals, and other religious institutions, he thinks, were all copied from the best Greek models. But while he attributes to the Greeks the merit of having, by their intellectual superiority, given laws and religion to the greatest of nations, he praises the founders of the Roman state for the important improvements which they had made in these borrowed institutions, and especially for the superiority of their views respecting the divine nature. “Among the Romans,” he says, “we hear of no Uranus castrated by his own children, no Saturn murdering his own offspring, through fear of their conspiring together, no Jupiter destroying the power of Saturn, and confining his own father in the prison of Tartarus, no wars, wounds, bonds, or slavery of the gods with men. Among them no festival is celebrated with black apparel, or funeral solemnities amid the wailing and the tears of females, on account of the disappearance of gods, as is done among the Grecians in reference to the rape of Proserpine, the sufferings of Bacchus, and other things resembling these. Among them, in spite of the corruption already prevalent, can be seen no inspired ravings, no tumults of the Corybantes, no processions of mendicants, no bacchanalian frenzy and secret mysteries, no watchings of men with women throughout the night in the temples, no jugglery of the kind; but all things in reference to the gods are done and said in a reverential manner, unlike the customs both of the Greeks and the barbarians.” “But supposing the accounts circulated about them, in which there are certain calumnies or accusations against them, to be malicious, useless, indecent, and unworthy not only of the gods but even of good men, he rejected the whole, and accustomed men to entertain and express the best ideas concerning the gods, attributing to them no propensities unworthy of their blessed nature.”—Antiq. Rom. II. 18, 19.

doubted by no one who knows any thing of the subject. To the testimony of the writers already adduced, may be added the following striking sentiments of Polybius, whose judgment, means of information, and impartiality, give great weight to his opinion. "But the greatest superiority which the Roman political constitution possesses, seems to me to consist in their belief respecting the gods. In fact, the very thing which is reprobated among other men, seems to me to hold together the Roman commonwealth—I mean superstition. Its influence has been introduced among them both into the private lives of individuals, and into the public affairs of the state, and carried to the highest possible extent. To many this may seem surprising; but it appears to me to be an expedient adopted on account of the populace. If, indeed, it were possible to assemble a state composed wholly of wise men, perhaps no such contrivance would be necessary. But since the multitude are always fickle, full of unlawful desires, and violent passions, and liable to unreasonable excitement, there is no way but to restrain the populace by the dread of things unseen, and such like terrific inventions. It was not in vain, therefore, or by chance, as it seems to me, that the ancients infused into the minds of the people the notions respecting the gods, and a belief in the punishments of the infernal regions. On the contrary, I think that the present generation have rejected them without reason, and to no good purpose. Omitting on this point other examples, (of the good effects of a belief in these doctrines) if among the Greeks those who manage the public funds are intrusted with but a single talent, it is impossible by making use of ten bonds, as many seals, and double the number of witnesses, to secure fidelity. Whereas those who, in the Roman magistracies and embassies, handle a large amount of money, discharge their duty faithfully through the single obligation of the oath. Thus, while in other states it is a rare thing to find a man who, not having laid hands on the public treasure, is pure in this respect, among the Romans it is seldom that any one is convicted of such a crime."* Most of the writers who have been quoted, represent the religion of the early Romans as more or less different from that of Greece, and as superior to the latter. In one point they all concur. They unitedly regard the Roman character and Roman great-

* Hist. VI. 54.

ness as intimately connected with religion. Can it be supposed that they are all mistaken? Such is the opinion of some. "There is no doubt," remarks Buchholz, in his observations on the passage from the historian just cited, "that Polybius, in what he has said respecting the superstition of the Romans, and respecting their honesty, is altogether correct. Nevertheless, in regard to the causal connection into which he brings them, he may easily have erred; for, in nothing do men deceive themselves more readily than when they undertake to assign the causes of phenomena."* If then the admitted honesty of the early Romans did not grow out of their religion, if their conscientious performance of private contracts, their sacred regard for the solemnity of an oath, and their faithful discharge of the offices of the state,—all of which indicate a high and unusual tone of moral feeling,—are not to be traced to the religious belief of the nation, in what manner are these facts to be accounted for? We need not, observes Buchholz, deny altogether to the popular superstition (for he will not, he says, dignify such a system with the name of religion,) any influence on morality; but we shall do well to search for the causes in more influential principles. And what are these? He suggests, in the first place, that it was for the interest of the patricians, who constituted a distinct order, and in whose hands the offices were, to prevent all abuses which would have injured their reputation, and weakened their influence. And besides this, after the institution of the tribuneship, detection (he thinks) was so certain to follow all abuses in the public offices that it is not strange that there were few or no breaches of trust, since publicity is the most dreadful scourge which men without conscience apprehend. It is hardly necessary to remark, that these reasons are wholly insufficient to account for the state of morals at Rome in the early periods of its history. Public and private virtue is not the natural offspring of party spirit. The *esprit du corps* leads to very different results. That the fear of detection is a very poor defence against crime, is proved by the history of the same people at a later period. But what shows conclusively, continues this writer, that Polybius was mistaken, is, that had he lived fifty years later he would have been altogether of another opinion. For then the superstition of the Romans remained, while their virtues no longer existed. In

* Philosophische Untersuchungen Ueber die Römer, I. 35.

the seventh century from the building of the city, the Romans, he affirms, were as regardful of the gods as at any former period, and yet their morality was gone forever. This proves, he thinks, that the connection between the two was always loose, as is the fact at the present day with the inhabitants of modern Rome. This argument would indeed be conclusive if the premises were admitted. But while it is true that the morality of the Romans was corrupted, it is not true that their religious faith remained the same. That there was a change in the religion of the nation, and that this change exerted a powerful influence in debasing the public morals, we propose to show hereafter. A similar view of the moral tendency of the ancient religions is maintained by Meiners. Polytheistic and corrupt monotheistic religions, he thinks, are no more useful than ignorance and vice, anarchy and despotism. He supposes, therefore, that when Bailly undertook to prove that superstition is more injurious than skepticism, the divines who regarded his proposition as a dangerous paradox, and maintained that even false religions are better than none, were much mistaken. "National religions will not become the friends of human virtue and happiness, until they teach that the Deity is not only an inconceivably powerful, but also an inconceivably wise and good being; that for this reason he gives way neither to anger nor revenge, and never punishes capriciously; that we owe to his favor alone all the good which we possess and enjoy; that even our sufferings contribute to our highest good, and death is a bitter but a salutary change; in fine, that the sacrifice most acceptable to God consists in a mind that seeks for truth, and a pure heart. Religions which announce these exalted truths offer to man the strongest preservatives from vice, and the strongest motives to virtue, exalt and ennoble his joys, console and guide him in all kinds of misfortunes, and inspire him with forbearance, patience, and active benevolence towards his brethren."* To this it may be replied in the words of this writer himself,† that no religion *as received by the people*, consists of pure truth. It is manifest that in every religion of ancient and modern times, not excepting Christianity itself, as these religions have existed, or do exist, in the public mind, there is a mixture of truth and error. It is not necessary therefore to affirm with the opponents of Bailly, that as truth itself

* Meiners Geschichte der Religionen, I. 78, 79. † Ib. I. 6.

is sometimes injurious, so also, under certain circumstances, falsehood may be useful. A religion is likely to be useful to society in proportion to the amount of important truth, which in connection with freedom from errors of injurious tendency, it inculcates. If, therefore, it can be shown that the religion of the early Romans contained truths of great importance and of salutary tendency, and that the most corrupt features of the later national superstition, together with the general skepticism, belong to a subsequent period, it is reasonable to believe that religion, as it existed at first, was favorable to morality. It has already been shown to be highly probable, that when the foundations of the national religion were laid, idolatry did not exist. The religious ceremonies were then fewer and more simple than they afterwards became, and whatever may have been the prevalent views in theology, it is certain that the religion as a whole diverged much less from a system of truth than at a later period.

The great object which the religious institutions were designed to accomplish was, according to Plutarch and Dionysius, to soften the roughness of the national temper, to cherish a reverence for sacred things, and to promote the observance of public and private faith. In addition to the characteristics which have been already mentioned, another important feature of the religion of the early Romans is worthy of notice.

3. In the first ages of the state, *the Romans believed themselves the subjects of a moral government administered by super-human power.* It is obvious that next after the existence of a Supreme Being, the question whether the affairs of this world are under his control, is of the highest practical importance. That the heathen philosophers were fully aware of this is proved by the remarks of Cicero on the subject. Speaking of the notions on this point prevalent among the philosophers of his own day, he says: "There have been and are philosophers, who maintain that the gods exercise no supervision over human affairs. If their opinion be correct, how can there be any piety, any devotion, any religious reverence? For these sacred and pure acts of homage are due to the majesty of the gods, if they are taken notice of by them, and if any thing has been bestowed by the immortal gods on the race of men. But if the gods neither can nor will assist us, nor exercise any care over us, nor perceive what we do; and if no influence from them can pervade the lives of men,—why should we offer to

the immortal gods any worship, honors, or prayers? But piety, like other virtues, cannot exist in mere hypocritical forms. Along with piety, devotion and religious reverence must also be removed; and the consequence would be great disorder and confusion. And I am not sure that if piety towards the gods were taken away, fidelity and the ties which bind society together, and justice, that pre-eminent virtue, would not also be overthrown.”* In his treatise *De Legibus* also, the same writer expresses similar sentiments respecting the influence of a belief in the reality of a divine government. “But who can deny that this belief is useful, when he sees how many things may be confirmed by an oath, how salutary are the religious rites of covenants, how many have been withheld from crime by the fear of divine vengeance, and how sacred is the union which binds citizens together, when the immortal gods are invoked, not only as judges, but as witnesses.”† It has been affirmed by those who do not regard it as a compliment, that in the early ages the Roman government was almost entirely religious. “Perhaps,” says Buchholz, “the assertion is not too bold, that the Romans in the first centuries of the republic, were governed entirely by a theocracy.” “But here, where the discourse respects the constitution and law, it should not remain unobserved, that while the religious institutions formed the keystone of the constitution, the Romans were governed far more by influences drawn from religion than from temporal authority.”‡ There is no doubt that religion was made use of at Rome to a considerable extent as a political engine. But whatever may be thought of the use to which it was applied, there can be no doubt that the religious belief of the people had a large share in the formation of the national character. “These *religiones* which Numa instituted, were his way and means of governing the state. He himself, as *Pontifex Maximus*, was neither more nor less than a ruler of the state, who, because a public sentiment was yet as much wanting as a public authority, could rule only by stepping forth as the servant of the gods. What was useful to him was followed by the most important consequences in relation to the development of the Romans.” “It was a distinguished benefit that he

* *De Natura Deorum*, I. 2. † *De Legibus*, II. 7.

‡ Bei weitem mehr theokratisch als kosmokratisch. Ueber die Römer, I. 49, 52.

gave opportunity to this gloomy, misanthropic people to form connections with each other, to lay aside their old roughness, to learn to feel new wants, etc. What was done in the middle ages for the Germans, and other barbarous nations by the spread of the Christian church, this Numa did for the rude Romans of his time, who could much more easily be divided into parties than united."*

The manner in which Dionysius accounts for the prevalence of public and private faith among the early Romans, is worthy of notice. "Numa," he says, "made use of a means unknown to the founders of other celebrated constitutions. He built a temple and instituted religious ceremonies, for the purpose of consecrating fidelity in the eyes of the people as a divine quality." This measure he thinks was followed by the most beneficial consequences. "A pledge was therefore considered as a thing so sacred and inviolable, that a man's word was equivalent to the greatest oath, and stronger than all testimony; and whenever any doubt arose about a contract which had been made between two individuals without witnesses, the word of one or the other of the parties settled the dispute, and permitted the lawsuit to proceed no further. The magistrates and the tribunals adjudged most controversies by means of oaths of fidelity. These things affording indeed encouragement to integrity, and giving efficiency to justice, were devised at that time by Numa, and rendered the civil polity of the Romans more perfect than the best regulated family."† There is a remarkable sentiment of Cicero respecting the religious character of his countrymen, and its results. The Romans, he says, were the most religious of all people, and excelled other nations in this one particular, that they acted under the firm conviction that all things are under the supreme control of a divine providence. By this single piece of practical wisdom, he affirms, they conquered the world. "We may think of ourselves, Conscript Fathers, as highly as we please; yet we have neither surpassed the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in cunning, nor the Greeks in the arts, nor, in short, even the Italians and Latins themselves, in the native and peculiar characteristics of this nation and country; but we have excelled all nations in piety and religious reverence; and in this one proof of discernment, that we have

* Ibid. I. 32, 34.

† II. 75.

perceived that all things are controlled by the will of the immortal gods.”* Respecting the practical influence of a belief in the existence of superior beings, and of a divine providence, Lord Bolingbroke has the following observations: “The good effects of maintaining, and the bad effects of neglecting religion, had been extremely visible, in the whole course of the Roman government. Numa, the second founder of Rome, contributed more to the prosperity and grandeur of that empire than the first founder of it, Romulus, and all the warrior kings who succeeded him; for Numa established a religion, directed it, as others, both kings and consuls, did after his example, to the support of civil government, and made it the principle of all the glorious expectations that were raised in the minds of that people. His religion was very absurd; and yet by keeping up an awe of superior powers, and the belief of a providence that ordered the course of events, it produced all the marvellous effects which Machiavel, and writers more able to judge of them and their causes than he was, Polybius, Cicero, Plutarch, and others, ascribe to it. The inward peace of that government was often broken by seditions: Rome was in distress at home whilst she triumphed abroad; and at last, the dissolution of the commonwealth followed a long and bloody civil war. But the neglect of religion, not religion, was a principal cause of these evils. Religion decayed, and the state decayed with her. She might have preserved it; but even in her decay she gave it no wounds, nor festered like a poison in any.”†

4. Whatever may be thought of the truth or importance of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, its antiquity cannot be doubted. A consciousness of accountability is so deeply inwrought in human nature, that the belief of the immortality of the soul is with difficulty separated from the idea of some species of retribution. And as it seems evident to most men that the awards of justice which they feel to be due to human character and action, are not administered in this world, it is natural that the period of retribution should be referred to that which is to come. The separation of future retribution from future existence appears to be rather the result of the repeated efforts of men to rid themselves of apprehension, than the dictate of nature. Cicero says of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, that all the ancients (those who in his day were called ancients) were agreed in it, and that they received

* De Harusp. Responsa. § 9.

† Works, IV. 427, 428.

it rather from the teachings of nature than the reasonings of philosophy.* Seneca also represents this universal agreement as a strong argument in favor of a future existence.† The great antiquity of the doctrine not only of future existence but of future retribution, is admitted even by those who are least of all disposed to receive it as a truth. Respecting the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, it is confessed by Lord Bolingbroke that "it began to be taught before we have any light into antiquity, and when we begin to have any we find it established."‡ It is evident from many passages of the ancient historians, and indeed from the very structure of the ancient religions, that wise men and legislators were sensible that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is necessary to the welfare of society. It is even contended by those who admit its importance while they deny its truth, that it was invented by ancient lawgivers for political purposes. "To give an additional strength to these motives," [regard for the good of the whole] says Lord Bolingbroke, "the ancient theists and polytheists, philosophers or legislators invented another; that, I mean, of future rewards and punishments, represented under various forms, but always directed to the same purpose."§ That this was the general opinion at Rome in the time of Cicero, may be gathered from several passages in the writings of that orator, together with the speeches of Cato and Cæsar in the Roman senate, in the debates respecting the Catilinian conspiracy.|| It is evident from these passages, as well as from that before cited from Polybius, that the doctrine of future punishment was taught and believed among the early Romans. "In the ancient and most virtuous times of the Roman republic," says Dr. Leland, "the doctrine of a future state, and particularly of a future retribution, seems to have been generally received, and believed among the people."¶ The same thing appears from the representations of the poets,** who were the popular divines of antiquity, and whose works exerted a much stronger in-

* Tusc. Disp. I. 14. "But if the agreement of all is the voice of nature; and if all everywhere agree that there is something which belongs to those who have departed from life, we also ought to be of the same opinion," etc.

† Epist. 117. ‡ Bolingbroke's Works, V. 237, 4to.

§ Ibid. IV. 288. || Sallust. Bell. Cat. 52, 53.

¶ Leland's Advantage and Necessity of Revelation, II. 386.

** Virgil's *Æn.* VI. 556 seq.

fluence over the people than the labored speculations of the philosophers. It is worthy of remark also, that those who believed, or wished the people to believe, the doctrine of future retribution, thought the punishments would not be sufficient to restrain from crime unless some of them were eternal. It is the opinion of Cicero, that the influence of this doctrine while it was held was highly salutary.* Nor is the utility of this belief denied even by the most distinguished of the infidels of modern times. Mr. Hume, in reply to the objections which he puts into the mouth of his skeptical friend, makes use of an unanswerable argument in favor of the doctrine. "Whether this reasoning of theirs [of the people, on which the belief in future punishment is based,] is just or not, is no matter; its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same: and those who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians, since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement of the laws of equity and society in one respect more easy and secure."†

And Lord Bolingbroke observes that, "Reason will neither affirm nor deny that there is to be a future state: and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in it has so great a tendency to enforce the civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that reason, which cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide against it on principles of good policy."‡

An appropriate comment on this admission of the necessity of the belief in future retribution with a denial of its truth, is found in a remark of Neander upon the passage before quoted from Polybius (VI. 56.—See page 276). "This penetrating observer of human nature, to whom nothing but the light of divine wisdom was wanting, though he saw only with the natural eye, perceived clearly that the constitution of civil society existing on the earth, if it should not be held together by some higher bond connecting human affairs with heaven, could not maintain itself as something independent; but how wretched would human nature be if this bond could be maintained only by a lie, if there were need of falsehood in order to hold back the greater part of men from evil!"§

After the proof which has been exhibited, it is not too much

* DeLegibus, II. 7 (see p. 278). † Hume's Essays, II. 170.

‡ Works, V. 322. § Kirchengeschichte, I. 11.

to affirm that the *religiones* of the earliest Romans, which some writers regard as a foolish and useless system of superstition, embraced the essential elements of religion. The worship of a Deity (whether one or more) without images; a deep and settled reverence for the Divinity, and for sacred things; a belief in the doctrine of providence and human accountability; an undoubting conviction of the immortality of the soul; with the expectation of rewards *to be bestowed on virtue*, and punishments *to be inflicted on vice* in the future world;—these are the first great principles of true religion. And it can hardly be supposed that when they are deeply fixed in the public mind, an influence should not be exerted for the suppression of crime, and the encouragement of morality. Such, accordingly, is found to have been the effect among the Romans. “Besides the advantages which the republic derived from the prevailing religion, that religion had an efficacious influence also on morality and national virtue. For although it had already degenerated in most of its features into superstition, yet along with it had been received the belief that the gods abhor vice and love virtue. Moreover, the reverence and awe which the Romans felt towards the gods, was increased to an uncommon extent by the prosperity of their government, the victorious success of their arms, and the imposing characteristics of most of the religious ceremonies, which they knew how to clothe in a dignified and fascinating dress. The religious disposition of the Romans showed itself not only in the conscientious discharge of their duties as citizens of the state, but also in the affairs of common life, and especially in the conscientiousness with which they observed an oath. But the decline of morals at Rome in process of time relaxed this mainspring of political and moral power, which had formerly operated so beneficially on the character and morals of the Romans.”* The principles from which originated the lustre of the Roman name, and the boundless extent of the Roman conquests, were *domestic morality, love of country, and the fear of the gods*; these three, and the greatest of these was the last. It was the bond and security of the others, and therefore the grand procuring cause of all the results of the combination. While reverence for the gods remained, freedom and public happiness continued to be enjoyed, even without the diffusion of knowledge to more than a very limited extent.

* Meyers Lehrbuch der römischen Alterthümer, 201.

But when religion declined, morality declined with it. When the fear of the gods was weakened, morality gave way before the violence of passion, and patriotism was displaced by private interest. And when the Epicurean philosophy began to remove all faith in the gods, and they ceased to exist in the estimation of the people, morality and patriotism perished with them. This we propose to show in a succeeding number.

ARTICLE II.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE DECREES.

By Enoch Pond, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine.

It is the object of this paper, not to *prove* the doctrine of Divine decrees or predestination, but to present a brief account of opinions and discussions in the church of Christ respecting it.

I assume, therefore, in the outset, that the inspired writers held and taught the eternal and universal purposes of God. "He doeth according to his will *in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth*, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?" "Being predestinated according to the purpose of him *who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.*"

Such, indeed, are the teachings, not only of the Bible, but of *nature* and *reason*. We may infer as conclusively, from the light of nature, the eternal and universal purposes of God, as we can that there is a God of infinite wisdom and goodness. For in the possession of infinite wisdom, he must have discovered in eternity the best end, and the best means or plan of accomplishing it. And in the possession of infinite goodness, he must have preferred this plan, rather than any other. And this boundless plan of providence for accomplishing the noblest end, is but another name for the eternal and universal purposes of God.

But how has this doctrine been held in the church? What diversities of opinion, what discussions have been had respecting it?

From the days of the Apostles to those of Augustine and Pelagius, there seems to have been no great dispute, no controversy on the subject. The early Greek Fathers were strenuous advocates of the *freedom of the will*; but they held this idea in close connection with another, to which they often refer, that God had before him, from eternity, a perfect plan of all future contingencies and events. It must be admitted, however, that several of the Greek Fathers, as Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Chrysostom, insisted more frequently and earnestly upon the unembarrassed freedom of the will, than did the Latins of the same age; and probably for this reason: they were brought more directly in contact with a class of philosophers, as the Stoics, the Gnostics, and the Manichees, who denied human freedom and responsibility, and bound the whole moral world, as well as the natural, in the chains of resistless necessity and fate. The philosophical tendencies of the age, more especially in the East, were all adverse to human freedom; and from this circumstance, the early Christian writers were led to insist more upon the freedom of the will, and less upon the Divine predestination, than they might otherwise have done. Still, as I said, they seem never to have doubted that God saw the end from the beginning, and had before him, in eternity, a perfect plan of all future circumstances and events.

The tide of worldly prosperity which flowed in upon the church after the accession and conversion of Constantine, had, as might have been anticipated, a disastrous influence upon its spirituality. The honors which were heaped upon the higher dignitaries of the church, were such as they were ill able to bear. A spirit of worldly ambition was infused, which spread through the several ranks of the clergy, and deeply contaminated the church. The consequence was, that there was a manifest decline of vital piety, through all the latter half of the fourth century. Christians were not as humble, as spiritual, as dead to the world, and as deeply engaged in the things of religion, as they had been while passing through the fires of persecution. There was much now to tempt worldly men into the church, and into the ministry; and in too many instances the temptation prevailed. During this period of declension, the great doctrines of grace, such as the entire corruption of the natural man, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, justification by faith, and others of a kindred character, were lost sight of or discarded.

But God had promised not to forsake his people, and in due time his gracious promise began to be fulfilled. Appropriate instruments were raised up, and the slumbering church was revived and quickened. Among the instruments of this revival, which occurred in the early part of the fifth century, the first place is due, unquestionably, to the celebrated Augustine of Hippo. This man was born at Tagaste, an obscure village in Numidia, A.D. 354. His father was a pagan till near the close of life; but his mother was an eminently devoted Christian. His advantages of education were good, and his talents of the highest order; but his early life was one of continued debauchery and wickedness. In philosophy, he was a Manichee, and in profession a teacher of rhetoric and oratory. In the exercise of his profession, he came, at length, to Milan; where, under the searching and powerful ministry of Ambrose, he was brought to repentance. His convictions of sin were deep, painful, and abiding. In his own experience, he learned effectually the solemn lesson, that the heart of the natural man is full of evil, and fully set in him to do evil. His conversion was eminently satisfactory—very like those which frequently occur in our best modern revivals. Old things passed away with him; all things became spiritually new; and he was prepared, at once, to devote his cultivated and brilliant powers to the service of God and his church. He was thirty-three years of age at the time of his conversion. Subsequent to this, he lived more than forty years, and was, under Christ, the great luminary of the church. He was specially instrumental in reviving and diffusing spiritual religion. He brought out the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel, gave them prominence and power, and defended them against the errorists of the times. His controversy with Pelagius was no other than a struggle for evangelical religion against one who impugned it, and was secretly laboring to subvert it.

Among the great doctrines which were taught by Augustine, was that of the Divine purposes, or predestination. This was a necessary part of that system of truth which he had learned in his own experience. If mankind in a state of nature are universally and totally corrupt, then the reason why some are saved, rather than others, cannot be that in themselves they are better than others, but must be owing entirely to the sovereign grace and purpose of God.

It has been often said, that Augustine was led to adopt his

peculiar sentiments respecting predestination and grace, in consequence of his controversy with Pelagius. But the truth rather is, that he was led into this controversy, in consequence of his holding and revering these sentiments. It may be proved, historically, that he publicly taught them, at least ten years previous to the Pelagian controversy:

I would not be understood to adopt or approve all that Augustine wrote on the subject of predestination. He may have expressed himself too strongly, in particular instances. My impression however is, that taking all he has written on the subject together, and qualifying one statement by another, he has left the matter very nearly as it was left by the Apostle Paul, and as it is now understood by our best Calvinistic writers. It may be further added, that perhaps no individual has lived since the days of Paul, the influence of whose writings upon the religious world has been so great, and happy, and enduring, as those of the celebrated Bishop of Hippo.

It happened to Augustine, as it often has done to other master spirits of the ages in which they lived, that his disciples did not understand predestination so well as he did, and did not express themselves with the same care and caution respecting it. The doctrine was so represented by certain monks of Adrumetum and Gaul, that Augustine himself was constrained to cry out upon them, and defend himself against the statements of his too ardent and officious friends.

The doctrine of Augustine respecting predestination was confirmed by several councils, and became the general belief of the church, more especially in Africa and the West, for several centuries. There were those, undoubtedly, who did not receive it; but there was little more controversy respecting it, till the time of Gotteschalk, who flourished in the ninth century.

Gotteschalk was of Saxon origin, and was educated in the monastery of Fulda. When arrived at manhood, he wished no longer to lead a monastic life, but was compelled to it, on the ground that his father had devoted him to such a life, and that no human power could vacate the transaction. He now removed to Orbais, where he was ordained a presbyter, and so distinguished himself as a scholar that he was surnamed Fulgentius. Augustine was his favorite author, and he freely advanced the opinions of Augustine respecting Divine predestination and grace. Many favored these views, but others opposed them; among whom was Hincmar, archbishop of

Rheims, to whose diocese Gotteschalk belonged. Through the influence of Hincmar, Gotteschalk was arraigned before the synod of Chiersey, was condemned, degraded, publicly whipped, and shut up in prison, where, after a confinement of twenty-one years, he died. He persevered to the last in his opinions, and because he would make no retraction, was denied Christian burial.

Gotteschalk was a learned, able, conscientious, good man, and deserves to be enrolled in the catalogue of martyrs. But though he died, the cause which he espoused did not die with him. Numerous and powerful advocates were raised up for it during his imprisonment, and after his death, and it was confirmed by several provincial councils.

From this period, the doctrine of predestination was almost continually agitated in the Romish church, during the next eight hundred years. It found a powerful advocate in the celebrated Thomas Aquinas, in the 13th century; and an opponent equally subtle and powerful in Duns Scotus, in the century following. From this time, it furnished a standing topic of inquiry and controversy between the Scotists and Thomists for a long period—a topic on which all the subtleties of scholastic logic and ingenuity were expended in vain. Nor was the controversy confined to the Scholastics; but as Aquinas was a Dominican and Scotus a Franciscan, it embroiled and agitated these two great rival orders of monks—the Dominicans and Franciscans—down to the time of the Reformation. The Dominicans and Augustinians were the decided advocates of predestination; while the Franciscans, and subsequently the Jesuits, opposed it with all their art and strength.

The controversies respecting predestination and grace were rather evaded than decided in the Council of Trent. Consequently, soon after the termination of the council, they broke out again in the Romish church, with renewed violence. The Jesuits were now the leading opponents of the doctrines in question, while the Dominicans and Jansenists were their advocates. With regard to these disputes, the Pontiffs were slow to decide any thing. They were often appealed to, but as often put off the parties with fair promises, which were never intended to be fulfilled. At length, however, about the middle of the 17th century, Alexander VIIth, the reigning Pope, being overcome by the numbers and clamors of the Jesuits, consented to issue a formal condemnation of the Jansenists, and of the doctrines

which they espoused. From this time the Jansenists, among whom were some truly pious and devoted, as well as learned men, became the objects, not only of opposition, but of relentless persecution. They were miserably harassed with banishments, imprisonments, and other vexations; and the church of Rome at length settled down in a quiet rejection of the doctrines of predestination and grace. While the members of this church professed to revere Augustine and Aquinas, and to regard their opinions as of almost equal authority with holy writ, they formally rejected these opinions, and miserably persecuted those who embraced them.

But it is time that we turn from the Romish church, and contemplate the history of the doctrine under consideration among the Lutherans. Luther, while a Catholic, was an Augustinian monk, and was converted during his residence in the monastery at Erfurth. He had a deep sense of his entire sinfulness and helplessness while out of Christ, and the work of grace upon his soul was thorough and abiding. Next to his Bible, he best loved the works of the great Augustine. He read them with intense interest, entered into the spirit of them, and was prepared to become their advocate and defender. When his sentiments as a reformer began to be made known, he was a decided believer in the doctrine of predestination. But Melancthon, with whom he was intimately associated, hesitated on this point, and would not receive it without material qualifications. And as Melancthon was chiefly concerned in drawing up the Augsburg Confession—which has ever been the symbol of the Lutheran church—the doctrine in question was left out of it. In consequence of this omission, the subject became one of controversy among Protestants of that age; and most of the Lutheran clergy since, not excepting the more evangelical of them, have failed to hold and teach the doctrine of predestination.

In recent times, there have been indications of change in respect to this doctrine, in the Lutheran church; whether for the better or the worse remains yet to be seen. It is now generally admitted by the more learned of the Lutheran clergy, that their standards are not quite consistent with themselves. Many do not hesitate to acknowledge that they must either reject (what their standards inculcate) the entire corruption of the natural man, and his inability, of himself, to perform any thing good; or that they must receive (what their standards re-

ject) the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. In this dilemma, some are for steering one way and some the other. The late Dr. Bretschneider preferred the former course, and discarded the doctrine of native depravity ; while Schleiermacher adopted the latter alternative, and frankly acknowledges that, as a Lutheran, he can no longer sympathize with most of his cotemporaries, in condemning the doctrine of predestination as irrational and unscriptural.

Among those who, in the 16th century, separated from the church of Rome, all the communities not Lutheran were commonly classed together under the appellation of *the Reformed*. These constituted, not one church, but a great many churches, scattered over the north and west of Europe, having almost no bond of union, except their opposition to the religion of Rome. In these reformed churches, the man who, of all others, exerted the widest and most enduring influence, was the celebrated Calvin.

Calvin was a Frenchman by birth, and was educated as a Romish priest ; but becoming disgusted with the superstitions of his church, he early abandoned it, and devoted himself to the study of law. In this profession he made rapid progress, and published several works of distinguished excellence. He could not be satisfied, however, to spend his life as a civilian, and when about thirty-six years of age, he began to preach openly the Protestant doctrines. The providence of God soon directed him to Geneva, where, with slight interruptions, he spent the remainder of his days. He greatly distinguished himself, not only as a pastor, a scholar, and a preacher of the gospel, but as an author, and theological teacher. His school of theology was the most celebrated at that time in the world, and was the resort of students from almost every country in Europe. I hardly need say, that Calvin was a strenuous advocate of what are commonly called the doctrines of grace, including that of predestination. By means of his school, and of other channels of influence which were opened around him, he was the means of disseminating these doctrines through all the reformed churches. The doctrine of predestination was incorporated in the standards, not only of the Swiss churches, but of those of England, Scotland, France, Holland, and of several of the Protestant states of Germany.

For the first half century after the death of Calvin, his peculiar sentiments continued to be taught with little contradiction

in most of the reformed churches. But in the early part of the next century (the 17th), a powerful antagonist arose in Holland. This was James Arminius, Professor of Divinity at Leyden. In his published writings he expressed himself cautiously; but in his more private instructions, he was understood to depart widely from the teachings of Calvin, and from the standards of his own church. His pupils carried out his principles farther than he did, and a lamentable schism was occasioned in the churches of the Low Countries.

After various fruitless attempts to adjust the difficulty, it was concluded to convene a Synod, to be composed of delegates from all the reformed churches. This Synod, which was called by the authority of the States General of Holland, assembled at Dort, A. D. 1618. Delegates were present, not only from the United Provinces, but from England, Scotland, Hesse, Bremen, and the churches of the Palatinate. The Synod held, in all, one hundred and eighty sessions; near the close of which the Arminians were condemned, and deprived of their ministerial and academical functions, until they should renounce their errors and return to the faith of the church.

The civil authorities proceeded much farther than this. They banished the leading Arminians, and suppressed the assemblies; and when found assembled in disobedience to the laws, they were dispersed, in some instances by force of arms, and punished with fines and imprisonments.

These violent proceedings brought great reproach upon the Synod of Dort, and destroyed all the good effects which might otherwise have resulted from it. Very soon there was a reaction in favor of the Arminians. They were recalled from banishment, restored to favor, and were in a situation to spread their peculiarities even more rapidly than before.

As a distinct sect, however, the Arminians have never been numerous. They have sought to prevail, not so much by setting up for themselves, as by silently mingling with other sects, corrupting their churches, and (without changing their name or form) bringing them over to their views.

In this way, the originally Calvinistic church of England became substantially Arminian, under Archbishop Laud. The articles remained as before—essentially Calvinistic—while a majority of those who subscribed them, and promised to defend them, were Arminians. The infection was slower and later in its operations in the kirk of Scotland, but we fear it has not

been less pervading or sure. The Protestant churches of France became first Arminian, and then Socinian; and the same has been the melancholy issue, even in Geneva. There has been a reviving, indeed, in most of these countries, since the commencement of the present century; but the revival, for the most part, has not been carried forward through the instrumentality of the old Protestant churches. On the contrary, it has sprung up *without* these churches, while its advocates have been opposed and persecuted by them.

The first settlers of New England were strict Calvinists. They held the doctrines of predestination and grace, much as these were taught in the original school at Geneva. And for more than a hundred years after the settlement of this country, there were no important changes of religious opinion. The Arminian errors began to appear here, and to be the occasion of alarm to serious Christians, about one hundred years ago. These errors received a check by the great revivals which were enjoyed in New England, near the middle of the last century; but at the close of these revivals they sprang up afresh, and assumed a more alarming aspect than ever. During all the latter part of the century, not a few of the churches of the Pilgrims, or more properly the ministers of the churches, especially those in the eastern part of Massachusetts, were Arminian. They have since become, in most instances, Unitarian.

The forms of Arminianism of which I have spoken were generally cold, barren, and lifeless. The abettors of the doctrine were decided opposers of evangelical truth, and of every thing which had the appearance of warmth and eagerness in religion. They discountenanced special religious meetings, and of all things were most afraid of what was called by the bad name of enthusiasm.

There is a form of Arminianism, now prevailing in this country and in England, which is of quite a different character. It is embodied chiefly among the General or Arminian Baptists, and the followers of Mr. Wesley. These are proper Arminians, so far as opposition to predestination and some other connected doctrines is concerned; while they retain in their system enough of truth to give it life, warmth and vigor, and to entitle them to be classed with evangelical Christians. They have been, in general, much engaged in religion, and have undoubtedly carried the salvation of the gospel to many souls.

A history of the doctrine under consideration would be im-

perfect, did it not include some account of the more common *abuses or perversions* of it.

This doctrine is continually perverted by its opposers. They seldom, if ever, represent it fairly. They draw conclusions from it which its friends would reject with as much abhorrence as themselves, and then reason from these conclusions as though they constituted an essential part of the doctrine. In short, they state the doctrine as no one believes it, and thus contend, not against the real doctrine, but only a fiction of their own imagining.

But there are other perversions of the doctrine of Divine decrees, besides those which proceed from its avowed enemies. It has been often misstated and abused by erring and inconsistent friends. In some instances, it is so held and taught, as to be of a decidedly Antinomian character. "There were those in England, in the time of the Commonwealth, who denied that it was necessary for ministers to exhort their hearers to *obey the law*; because those whom God, from all eternity, had elected to salvation, would of themselves obey the law; while those who were destined to eternal punishment, though admonished and entreated ever so much, could not obey it. Others, at the same period, insisted that the elect, because they cannot lose the Divine favor, do not truly commit sin, or break the law, even when they go contrary to its precepts;—that adultery, for instance, in one of the elect, though to us it appears a sin, is in reality no sin in the sight of God." I quote here from the history of the times, to show to what lengths of perversion and abuse erratic minds have sometimes wandered, in their reasonings on the doctrine of election.

By a portion of its advocates, the doctrine of Divine purposes has been perverted in another way. They not only admit but insist, that this doctrine is opposed to human freedom, and that there is no such thing as free agency or moral accountability in the universe. "One man," they say, "does the will of God as truly as another; and the distinction between right and wrong, holiness and sin, is merely nominal or conventional." Of this stamp are the Necessarians and Fatalists of modern times—the abettors of a philosophical mania, which is hardly less to be dreaded than downright atheism.

Those abuse the doctrine of Divine purposes who make it a means of inducing sloth and discouraging effort on the part of Christians. Abuses of this sort, there is reason to fear, are not

unfrequent. Christians believe that God has purposes respecting the salvation of individuals; that those purposes will certainly be accomplished; that all his elect will be gathered in; and in these views they find a pillow for their consciences, and an excuse for their sloth. While they are engaged and active for the securing of other objects, which they believe equally settled in the purpose of God, they quietly resign a world lying in wickedness to be disposed of according to his pleasure.

Of a similar perversion of the doctrine in question, impenitent sinners are perpetually guilty. How many are there, and among these not a few who ought to know better, who, when pressed on the subject of religion, are ever ready to reply, "Why should we give ourselves any trouble about it? If it is God's purpose to save us, we shall be saved, and if not, we cannot be, let us do what we may."

The moral tendency of the doctrine of God's purposes, when held in its just connections, and stated with proper qualifications, has been uniformly happy. And this has frequently been acknowledged, even by its opposers.—A learned infidel, while expressing a decided preference of the Arminian to the Calvinistic system, admits that "the modern Calvinists have, in no small degree *excelled their antagonists* in the practice of the most rigid and respectable virtues. They have been the highest honor to their own age, and the best models for imitation to every succeeding age."

A writer some years ago in the *Edinburgh Review*, who was probably an infidel, asks, "What are we to think of the morality of Calvinistic nations, especially the most numerous of them, who seem, beyond all other men, to be most zealously attached to their religion, and most deeply penetrated with its spirit? Here, if anywhere, we have a practical and decisive test of the moral influence of predestinarian opinions. In Protestant Switzerland, in Holland, in Scotland, among the English Nonconformists, and the Protestants of the North of Ireland, and in the New England States, Calvinism was long the prevalent faith, and is probably still the faith of a considerable majority. Their moral education was at least completed, and their collective character formed, during the prevalence of Calvinistic opinions, yet *where are communities to be found of a more pure and active virtue?*"

I add one more testimony to the good moral tendencies of Calvinistic predestination. It is that of Tholuck, a Lutheran,

and not a professed believer in the doctrine. In his Treatise on Oriental Mysticism, he says, that "the doctrine of predestination, so far from producing the despondency and inaction often ascribed to it, on the contrary, *moves and excites the inmost soul*, by the self-surrender which it demands to the all-prevailing will of God." To the influence of this doctrine, he attributes whatever of seeming religion there is among those who receive the sensual dogmas of the Koran. "And Calvinism," he allows, "*is incomparably more favorable to the deeper religious life*, than that doctrine, by which the will of God is limited or conditioned by the human will."

From these concessions, as well as from other and more obvious considerations, it appears that the doctrine of God's universal and eternal purposes is not one of idle and unprofitable speculation. It is rather one, when properly stated and explained, of high practical influence and importance. It gives us the most exalted ideas of God and his truth. It humbles the pride of the sinner; tries the feelings of the human heart; sustains and comforts the people of God in seasons of darkness and affliction; and stimulates and encourages them in the performance of painful self-denying duties. It gives them a deep sense of obligation to God for his distinguishing goodness and mercy, and thus promotes their gratitude, their humility, and their growth in grace. In short, when properly represented and urged, the influences of the doctrine are *good—all good*, and so they have showed themselves, always and everywhere. It becomes Christians, therefore, to hold the doctrine fast, and to rejoice in it, as an important branch of that holy system of truth by which they are to be sanctified and made meet for heaven.

ARTICLE III.

REVIEW OF DR. EDWARDS'S "DISSERTATION CONCERNING LIBERTY AND NECESSITY."

By Rev. Samuel T. Spear, pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Lansingburgh, N. Y.

[Continued from page 240.]

IN resuming this work of examination and comparison with truth, it may be well to remind the reader, that in the former Article, the criticism upon Dr. Edwards was directed to the three following points, viz., *the nature of Moral Necessity,—the distinction between the two Necessities, moral and physical,—and the Dictum Necessitatis*. In the present inquiry we shall seek to indicate and examine the grounds of Dr. Edwards in relation to the *cause of volition*.

The question, *What causes volition?* is the main question to be proposed and answered in every theory of the will; it is the Gordian knot which has puzzled the philosophic world; it is indeed the only question, that is fraught with much difficulty. The answer indicates the school of philosophy to which its author belongs. If we adopt the canon, that the mind can bring no effects to pass but in consequence of acting, and hence infer that it cannot itself be the cause of the acting; and hence again infer that the willing must have some cause *ab extra*, our position is fixed in the school of necessity. If we take the opposite grounds, the Dictum Necessitatis must be rejected, mind becomes the cause of the phenomenon, and our position is fixed among the advocates of what has been termed Free Agency or Philosophical Liberty. That philosophers have not been agreed on this subject, needs no better proof than the history of this discussion. Both parties have been about equally confident as to the merits of their cause, and the success of their argumentation; both charge each other with maintaining the grossest absurdities; neither seems to have been satisfied with the reasoning of its opponents. If we were to judge of this question by the confidence with which different advocates have defended

their respective positions, we should almost be inclined to allow the possibility of demonstrating contrary propositions. On the one hand Collins, President Edwards and the Son, think they have proved, beyond successful contradiction, the truth of moral necessity. On the other, Buffin, Reid, Stewart, Dr. Clarke and Professor Tappan, claim to have fully replied to the arguments for necessity, and made out a complete demonstration of the opposite scheme.

The question, beyond a doubt, is one of great difficulty. No man can penetrate its interior without making this discovery. Its importance is not less than its difficulty; it is a vital question in its bearing on responsible agency, and man's relation, as a subject, to any religious system, whether natural or revealed. The attack has been made at this point more frequently than at any other, by those who have sought to upturn the foundations of all religion. It is the Thermopylae of religious disputation. The skeptic has here brandished his intellectual armor, and attempted to foreclose the subject of religion by the force of "the previous question." Piety may treat him with contempt; common sense may laugh at him; but philosophy must be serious, and conduct this warfare by argument, or leave the whole ground in the undisputed possession of the skeptic.

It deserves special notice that the ground of President Edwards on this subject has been differently understood by different writers. Some suppose him to deny *mental causality in toto*; some understand him to make motive *the sole cause* of every volition; others regard him as asserting the causality, both of mind and motive. The fatalist and the atheist have claimed him as being on their side of the question; the philosophical and pious theist vindicates the reputation of Edwards from this aspersion, and insists that he has taken no such grounds, either by implication or concession. This discrepancy of interpretation is not a little remarkable; it argues, either great ambiguity of style, or great obscurity of view, or numerous self-contradictions, or much complexity in the subject, or a most extraordinary concurrence of contingencies, leading so many competent minds to such dissimilar interpretations. President Edwards is not now under review; if he were, it might easily be shown that he is not always consistent with himself or with truth.

Dr. Edwards prepared his Dissertation with his eye upon the work of the Elder Edwards. Having adopted the system of the

latter, his purpose was to explain and defend it, and especially to reply to the Essays of Dr. Samuel West. His Dissertation, therefore, contains not only *his* construction of the father's system, but also a statement of his own views. He stands before us in the attitude of an interpreter as well as an original author. If any one may be supposed to have had signal advantages for this work, that man was Dr. Edwards. He lived, thought, and wrote at the time, when this discussion was in progress. Gifted with unusual talent in metaphysical reasoning, and incited by the strong impulse of filial feeling, he doubtless searched this subject, as he supposed, to its very bottom. He had every motive to understand the "Inquiry" of President Edwards, and being an honest believer in its positions, to defend it against the attack of its opponents. He addresses himself to this work with great skill—suggests no doubt as to the truth of the father's system—intimates no wish to modify its features—gives substantially the same explanations, and repeats the same general arguments. The system of the son and the father is one system. It matters but little, which work you read; both contain the same arguments, and aim at the same general conclusions; both must stand or fall together. A criticism, therefore, upon the Dissertation of Dr. Edwards, is indirectly a critique upon the great "Inquiry" of President Edwards.

Having made the reader acquainted with the main design of this Article, and submitted several suggestions upon the attitude of the question before us, I propose the following *synopsis* of discussion:

1. Whether volition be an effect?
2. Whether the knowledge of *what* causes an effect supposes the knowledge of *how* it causes?
3. Whether the mind be the cause of volition?
4. Whether motive be its cause?
5. Whether God be the cause of every volition?—These inquiries cover the entire ground,—they lay open the whole field. Let us proceed to examine Dr. Edwards on these several points:

I. *Whether Volition be an Effect?*

Alexander Smith, in his "Philosophy of Morals," does not grant the position that volition is properly an effect at all. In allusion to the arguments on the side of necessity, he says—

"The fallacy in the reasoning here employed appears to me to lie in this, that it confounds an *effect* (as a change in the subject operated upon, from one specific state to another) with the specific mode of operation belonging to a cause, (as producing one change rather than another,) and assumes a volition or act of will to be of the former, instead of the latter description."—Vol. II. p. 92. Here the preliminary position, that volition is an effect, is not admitted, and of course any subsequent inquiry after its cause is a work of mere negation. Does Dr. Edwards assume this ground? In chapter v. he criticises Dr. West severely for saying, "that volition is not properly an effect, which has a cause." He does not understand him to mean "that it is an effect, which has no cause," but "that it is not an effect at all." Having complimented the doctor for "originality in this part of his system," he proceeds to examine and overthrow the reasons for this position. I need not detain the reader to recite this argument, for with the conclusion of Dr. Edwards I am entirely satisfied. Volition is undoubtedly an effect. *What is an effect?*—Any event, any thing which comes to pass, whether it be the production of existence or any modification of that existence. That which once was not, but now is, or which is not now, but will be in future, is an effect, and demands for its existence a cause. Volition is of this nature; and it is not the less an effect though it be the *mode* of a cause, even the most ultimate mode that can be supposed. We cannot suppose an infinite series of *modes* following each other—we must in the last analysis come to the ultimate mode between which and the cause there is nothing intermediate. That ultimate mode, however, must always come under the title of an effect. The fallacy of Mr. Smith was not in supposing volition to be a modification of a cause, even though it be ultimate, but in supposing such modification not to be an effect. A volition existing at the present moment, did not exist at a prior moment; hence it has the only character, which can be given to any effect; it must be an effect or be eternal.

II. *Whether the knowledge of WHAT causes an effect supposes the knowledge of HOW it causes?*

I am not aware that Dr. Edwards has in any instance formally said, that one kind of knowledge supposes the other; but the assumption is implied in much of his reasoning, *ex hypothesi*,

to which concealed element the reasoning is indebted for its apparent conclusiveness. It was the doctrine of Dr. West, that *we* are not merely the subjects, but the causes of our own volitions. He had admitted that, "no agent can bring any effects to pass, but what are *consequent* upon his acting." This admission contains the Dictum Necessitatis, in regard to which the reader is requested to recur to the observations of a former Article. Upon this admission Dr. Edwards seizes and recoils upon his antagonist with great power. He understands the term "*acting*" in the sense of volition, and reasons conclusively from the premises, when he supposes the "*acting*" cannot be an effect of the agent, since the "*acting*" is the indispensable condition of the agent, producing any effect. Agreeing with Dr. West in the admission, he turns it against him, and compels him to grasp the blade of his own sword. There is no escape, when once this canon of necessity is allowed; it is omnipotent in demonstration; it has power sufficient to make every cause in the universe the very grossest absurdity. If we say, that no cause or agent can bring any *effect* to pass, but what is consequent upon its *acting*; if we then distinguish between the *acting* and the *effect* brought to pass; if we make the *acting* prior to, and separate from, the *effect*—it then follows that the cause of the effect cannot be the cause of the acting; the acting must have some other cause. If we generalize this mode of reasoning, we drive every cause out of the universe.

Now let it be observed, that this is the very species of reasoning repeated over and over again, in the works of both the Elder and Younger Edwards. Neither of them grants the possibility of an agent in the sense of a pure and simple *originator of action or modification* in its own bosom; the agent can bring effects to pass only in consequence of prior acting. Dr. Edwards says, "If we cause our own volitions at all, we cause them, either by a previous volition, or without such volition." The first supposition involves an infinite series. In regard to the second supposition, he says, "Now I wish it may be inquired, whether such a causation of volition as this, *if it be possible or conceivable, as I contend it is not*," etc. Works, Vol. I. p. 334. An originator of action is, then, impossible, according to Dr. Edwards; every cause, if it cause at all, must cause by prior action. In the present connection I shall institute no controversy with these positions, my object having been to show that Dr. Edwards, without a formal announcement of such an

intention, undertakes to decide *how* an agent must cause, if it cause at all. He tells us *how* it cannot be, i. e. without a previous volition; he tells us *how* it must be, if at all, i. e. by a previous volition. But this last hypothesis is an absurdity; therefore the agent does not cause the volition at all. Now in every step of this process the knowledge of the *how*, the ultimate *modus operandi* of a cause is assumed; the reasoning derives all its validity from this assumption.

The question before us, then, is this: *Is it possible for man in the last analysis to know the mode of a cause in causing?* Suppose we take our stand in the physical world, what do we discover? Nothing but simple succession of events. By a necessary law of the mental constitution, valid *within* us and *beyond* us, we infer a cause of that succession. For the purposes of physical science we call the antecedent, the cause; but whether it is in fact the cause, we can never know; much less *how* it causes.—If we come to ourselves, we are in the same predicament. When we *will* or *think*, we are conscious of the phenomena at the moment of their existence. If we analyze this consciousness, we shall find, that it gives us the phenomena, the subject, and a relation of cause and effect between the two. It gives us no more. How the subject of the willing or thinking passes from the state of *not* willing or thinking, or from some other state of willing or thinking to the specific modification in question, does not appear. Whether there be a succession of modes or none at all, is what we do not know. If we be causes at all upon any hypothesis, the question of the mode passes entirely beyond the range of our cognitive powers. If we ascend to the First Cause, we shall be as unsuccessful in disposing of this question. The question ought to be ranked with the idle disputations and endless jargon of the school-men; there is no place for it in modern philosophy. The true course is at once to confess entire ignorance on the point. Had Dr. Edwards contemplated the question simply in itself, he doubtless would have adopted the same course. In his mind it was mingled up with other points;—he had a battle to fight, and hence, without perceiving it, he seizes a weapon too heavy for him to wield. He wished to demonstrate that mind cannot cause its own volitions; in carrying out this demonstration he involves himself in the whole question of the *mode*, decides how it cannot be, and how it must be, if at all. One single sentence precipitates this whole argument overboard, e. g. *he makes the issue*

dependent upon that about which he knows nothing. We must know the very essence of the soul, before we can safely travel along the line of the Edwardean logic. If we know not this, how can we know its *mode* as a cause, on the supposition that it is a cause?—And if we know not the mode, how can we say that an originator of action without prior action, is an impossibility, or that no agent can bring effects to pass, but what are consequent upon his acting?

The inference from the above reasoning is a very plain one. Either we have no knowledge of cause at all, or such knowledge is perfectly consistent with ignorance of its mode. The first alternative not being admissible, the last necessarily follows.

III. *Whether the Mind be the Cause of Volition?*

In reference to the opinions of Dr. Edwards on this point, the following extracts will be amply sufficient to indicate his ground:

In allusion to the positions of President Edwards, he says: "He holds that we ourselves determine; but he does not hold, that we are the *efficient* causes of our own determinations."—"President Edwards holds, that we ourselves will or choose; that we ourselves act and are agents. But he does not hold, that we *efficiently cause our own mental acts.*"—"President Edwards does not hold that we are mere *passive* beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills."—"Though we hold, that our volitions are the effects of some extrinsic cause, and that we are passive, as we are the subjects of the influence of that cause; yet we hold, that we are not *merely* passive; but that volition is in its own nature an act or action, and in the exercise of it we are active, though in the causation of it we are passive, so far as to be the subjects of the influence of the efficient cause. This we concede; and let our opponents make the most of it. We fear not the consequence," p. 318.—"We deny, that *causing our own volitions* and acting by chance, are either realities or possibilities," p. 325.—Again, in allusion to his opponents, he says: "Let them honestly confess, that all they mean by self-determination, is what we all allow, that they are the *subjects* of volition, and as Dr. West expresses it, that they *themselves will and choose,*" p. 332.—Again: "Yet from the supposition

that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cause of it; because it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it," p. 339.—"The evasion of Dr. Clarke and others, that the mind itself is the cause of its own volitions, has been already considered; beside other absurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite series of volitions causing one another," p. 372.—Again, in allusion to the position "that in determining the mind determines," he says, "Whether it convey any other idea, than that *the mind does determine and has a volition*, without touching the question concerning the cause, extrinsic or intrinsic; I submit to the reader," p. 333.

It would be a very easy task to multiply quotations of this character to an indefinite extent. They are not accidental slips of the writer's pen, mere *lapsus verborum*; the expressions are accurate; they are often repeated; the positions they enunciate, penetrate his whole system. Dr. Edwards is no antagonist veiling himself in doubtful phraseology; he marches up to his positions with a boldness that bespeaks the honesty of the man; he cuts off his own retreat, and challenges his combatant to a contest on a field, which he has not feared to indicate. Let us then pause a moment, and make ourselves certain of the ground on which he stands.

We have in the first place a distinct denial, that the mind is the *efficient* cause of its own volitions, "that we efficiently cause our own mental acts." Dr. Edwards does not allow this; and he tells us that the same is true of his father. His is not the system, that the mind is the *efficient*, and motive the *occasional* cause of volition, as some of the advocates of the Edwardean doctrine have supposed. It so happens that Dr. Edwards has nowhere defined the word *efficient*, in application to cause. As he was a philosopher, however, it may be presumed that he understood the term, and intended to use it in its correct sense. That sense is very well stated by Professor Upham: "*Effective* causes have power in themselves; while preparative causes only furnish the appropriate and necessary occasions, on which the power that is lodged somewhere else, exercises itself. Both classes are invariably followed by their appropriate results or effects; but the one class, having the whole efficiency in itself, is strictly operative, and actually makes or brings to pass the effect, whatever it may be." Upham on the Will, Chap. II. Sect. LXX. I shall join no issue with the professor on the ques-

tion whether every thing that is really a cause must not be included in the definition given of an efficient cause. If the distinction between *occasional* and *efficient* causes be admitted, then he has stated the common and universal idea of an efficient cause. Dr. Edwards's ground then is, that the mind is not such a cause of its own volitions. He does not hold that volitions take place without *any* efficient cause, but that the efficiency is not in the mind. This is equivalent to saying, that the mind is invested with no *power* to produce such phenomena upon its own theatre. If they exist there, it is by some foreign efficiency, of whose causative influence the mind is merely the subject.

In the next place Dr. Edwards as distinctly denies that mind is the cause of its own volitions *in any sense whatever*. It is not possible to have stronger evidence of this than the passages already quoted. What can be a more perfect denial than to say, "it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it?" He abounds with such expressions; they are universal and without any qualification. If they be taken as an index of truth, the mind sustains no relation of cause whatever to its own volitions; in this relation it has no more to do with them than the planet Jupiter.

Dr. Edwards allows, that the mind *determines, wills, chooses, is the subject of volition; that volition is an act or action; that in the exercise of it we are active*; and had he not so carefully defined his ground, we might have supposed him to grant all his opponents claim. He distinguishes these admissions from the idea, that the mind is cause of volition. Let us not then be deceived on this point. What do these and kindred propositions mean? In the nature of things they are susceptible of but two constructions; one is, that they predicate a *causal* relation between a given phenomenon and the mind as its cause. The other is, that they predicate merely a *subjective* relation between a given phenomenon and the subject in which it occurs. The two relations are not identical, and the latter does not necessarily imply the former. Which of these constructions does Dr. Edwards adopt? Not the *first*, for this he is careful to deny. The second is the only one which is left, and this he avows. These propositions therefore must not pass for more than they are worth in this discussion. They simply affirm, that a change takes place in the mind, of which it is the theatre, but not the cause, the descriptive term of which change is *willing, choosing, acting*, etc. The mind wills in no other

sense than a stone moves, i. e. neither contributes any thing to the production of the changes, only so far as they are the subjects of them. We might with the same propriety say that the motion of a stone is an act or action, and in the exercise of it the stone is active; for all that Dr. Edwards means by these affirmations in application to the mind, is as true of the stone as of the mind. The only conception which survives this philosophical wreck of mental agency, is the bare one of *subjectivity*. All mental causality in the production of volitions is swept away, not by logical deduction from the principles of a system, but by the candid acknowledgment of one of its ablest expounders.

It is of great importance in this discussion not to institute a false or a merely verbal issue. Such a procedure gains nothing in the discovery of truth; it defeats the triumph of argument; for to make and then demolish a man of straw is a work to which the merest tyro is adequate. It may therefore be of service in this stage of the inquiry to entertain and consider certain objections against the above interpretation, which are urged by the defenders of the Edwardean scheme. The general objection is that the scheme is not understood by its opponents. This charge is repeatedly brought against Dr. West by the younger Edwards, and in some instances the criticism is correct. It will not then, I trust, be labor lost to spend a few moments in listening to the admonitions of the objector, and viewing the subject in the attitude in which he may present it.

It may be said, that Dr. Edwards never intended to deny that mind is cause of volition in every sense; that although his language seems to involve this broad ground, still his scheme was, that motive is cause in part, and the mind in part, and that the two made up the complex idea of the cause of volition. The suggestion deserves a hearing. In regard to it I offer the following observations.

(1.) Dr. Edwards himself has presented no such view. The suggestion is not his, thinking and writing for himself, but the invention of some disciple thinking for him, or as he would have him think. Many shrink from going the whole length of the Edwardean system, while they are not satisfied with the opposite ground; hence they retain the name, but modify the substance. The above is the more usual modification. Let it be recollected, however, that it is not the work of Dr. Edwards, but of his successors. He never for once indicated the slightest

misgivings as to his own ground ; he exults there and challenges his opponents to make the most of his concessions.

(2.) Again, what he says on page 372 is of high authority in settling this question. He says—"For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive." He then quotes the definition: "By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly or many things conjunctly." This is followed by declaring the sentiment of Dr. Clarke and others, that the mind is cause of volition, to be an evasion and an absurdity. Every cause of volition being included in the term motive, it follows that there is no other cause besides motive. If Dr. Edwards, then, be supposed to view the mind as cause of volition in any sense, he must be supposed to include mind under the term motive. But this is not allowable by the very definition of motive, since motive is that which expends its efficiency on the mind, and is therefore distinct from the mind. Neither President nor Dr. Edwards ever dreamed of including mind itself in the definition of motive. If they did not mean thus to include mind, then the definition of motive, as including every cause of volition, certainly excludes mind from all participation as a cause.

(3.) Again, it is a favorite argument with both the Elder and the Younger Edwards, that, if we deny motive to be the cause of volition, we involve the supposition that volition has no cause. The latter says—"Yet, from the supposition that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow that there is no cause of it ; because it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it." This was said in reply to a suggestion of Dr. Price, that self-determination did not imply an effect without a cause, since the mind itself was assumed to be the cause. Now this inference does not follow without the previous assumption, that the mind is not in any sense the cause of volition ; for if it might be cause in any sense, in that sense there might be a cause of volition, even if extrinsic causality were denied. The validity of the reasoning depends on the total denial of mental causality.

(4.) It is also argued by Dr. Edwards, that to suppose the mind to cause volition implies the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions. If this absurdity follow at all, it equally attends the supposition that the mind is cause in part, cause in any

sense, as that it is cause entire and complete. The reasoning strikes at the nature of all causation, and is equally good, whether we suppose a given phenomenon to be the product of one or a dozen causes. If we assume the phenomenon to arise from two or more causes, still each cause has its specific sphere in the causation; in that sphere it acts as cause, and in that sphere it must be proscribed as an absurdity by the rule of the *Dictum Necessitatis* considered in a previous Article. Suppose then the mind to be cause of volition in part, what follows according to Dr. Edwards? That so far as it is cause at all, it is an absurdity. Did he intend to allow this?

(5.) This suggestion derives its plausibility from a misconception of terms. Dr. Edwards is ever ready to admit that the mind is an *agent*—that it *acts, wills, chooses, determines, &c.* These may be regarded as admissions of mental causality; but we have seen, that he intended to convey no such sentiment. All he meant was that the mind is the subject of the change or changes thus designated. Suppose we say that the mind is the cause of volition in some sense, the question is, in what sense? In the sense that it wills, chooses, etc. Well, what is that sense? It turns out to be nothing more than the fact, that the mind is a *subject of volition*, without being its cause. In all this we deceive ourselves in the use of terms; we predicate causality of the mind in precisely that sense in which there is none. Cause in this sense is in reality no cause, and it was so understood by Dr. Edwards, for he maintained that it is the mind that wills, while he denied that it caused the willing. These phrases may do as flourishes of rhetoric, but as explained by Dr. Edwards they do not involve the supposition of mental causality in respect to volition.

(6.) Finally, the denial of all mental causality in the production of volitions, is a legitimate deduction from the system of necessity as stated and defended by Dr. Edwards. No man will pretend that the mind can be the cause of that which is made the chronological condition, the necessary antecedent of its being a cause of any thing. Such a pretension would imply, that it is a cause before it is a cause. Volition is made this necessary antecedent on the supposition of Edwards, that if the mind cause volition at all, it must be by the exercise of volition. By the supposition, it cannot in any sense be the cause of this prior volition, since it is the very thing which precedes the possibility of the mind causing any thing. The logic, if valid,

seals up the question; it does not leave the shadow of a shade of mental causation in the production of volition. Dr. Edwards was entirely true to his system in the bold denial of all such causation. He, who maintains for him mental causality in part, must allow one of three absurdities: either that volitions are caused by the mind in an infinite succession; or that it is a cause of that which is the chronological condition of its being a cause, i. e. is a cause before it is a cause; or that it is a cause in part of that which came into existence by some other cause, before mental causation was even a possibility. If those who institute this claim for Edwards will understand him, they will no longer be deceived by the terms *activity*, *agency*, *willing*, *choosing*, *acting*, etc. They involved no admission in any sense of the point in debate.

It may be said again, *that the question is not, who determines or wills, but why that which determines at all determines thus rather than otherwise; and that, although the mind be a sufficient cause of the existence of volition, it can never be a cause of the fact that volition is thus and not otherwise; and hence we must seek for a cause, which causes the mind to choose thus rather than otherwise.* In the statement of this point, I have endeavored to give it all the importance which is attached to it by the advocates of necessity. I proceed to make it the subject of the following critical remarks:

(1.) If the suggestion have any relevancy to the point at issue, it must predicate, of the mind at least, some share of causality in the production of its volitions. If it does not accomplish this, it does not touch the question in debate, however much of truth it may contain. The question is, whether the Edwardean scheme admits the hypothesis that the mind causes its own volitions in *any* sense. To that question I have already replied in the negative, and supported the answer by an extended reference to the concessions of Dr. Edwards, as well as the structure of the system he advocates. This ground remains good, unless the above suggestion put in a plea of some mental causality, and that plea be traced to Edwards as its author.

(2.) Let us proceed, then, to interrogate both the Younger and the Elder Edwards on the question, whether they intended to admit that the mind causes its volitions in *any* sense whatever. In respect to the first mentioned writer, I have nothing to add to what has already been said. If he has not rejected the hypothesis, then language has no meaning. Let us then

recur, for a moment, to the language of President Edwards, and ascertain whether he admitted or denied the causality in question.

President Edwards, in his "Inquiry," joins issue with his opponents on the question, *why* the soul "exerts *such* an act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular determination?" He animadverts upon Dr. Clarke for proposing to answer this, but really answering another question, as he alleges. Now the "*why*" of President Edwards is plainly an inquiry after a cause. The cause of what?—Of the fact that the soul is in *this* specific state of volition rather than *some* other. He very fully grants that the mind *acts, chooses, determines*, etc., but this did not in his view touch the specific question which he had in his mind. To say that the mind is competent to originate action, choice, determination, etc., was an answer which was not at all satisfactory to the mind of Edwards: he still pressed the question, *why* it chooses thus and not otherwise; i. e. he demanded a cause for the specific choice. If his opponent replied that the mind itself was a sufficient cause both of the existence and the particular direction of volition, Edwards was ready with an answer—that an agent can bring no effects to pass, but *what are consequent upon his acting*. Now this *acting*, willing, or determining, call it what you please, was the very thing to be accounted for, and for which he sought a cause. To allow that this *acting* was an effect of the agent in any sense, either involved a prior acting in regard to which the same difficulty must arise; or it was a perfect contradiction of the philosophical canon just stated, which President Edwards had too much discrimination not to perceive. He did not admit the doctrine of an infinite series of volitions, causing each other, which he charges upon his opponents. How did he avoid it? By making the *acting*, the *willing*, which he speaks of as belonging to the agent, not an effect having the agent for its cause, but an effect of something else, of which the agent was the subject. Had he done otherwise, he must have been swallowed up in a vortex of his own creation. This is precisely the attitude of his philosophy, and it cuts up, root and branch, all possibility that the mind should ever cause one of its own volitions. And this is the very point before us—not what is true, but what did Edwards say, is true. As this point has become one of absorbing interest and keen discussion in our own age, the reader will allow me to verify these positions by an appeal to the author.

He tells us, that "an active being can bring no *effects* to pass by his activity, but what are *consequent* upon his *acting*." Part II. Sect. IV. Again: "So the mind being an *active* cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own *acts*; but cannot enable it to be the determining cause of all its own *acts*." Ibid. The "acts" here spoken of are volitions. These being already in the mind, it can produce consequential effects; but how plainly he denies that the mind can cause these acts. This denial he is logically compelled to make, after assuming that a cause cannot cause but by prior causative acts. Again: "So that the will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts; but every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause; which cause is not the will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty." "And therefore the will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or depend on any act of the will at all." Part II. Sect. IX. By *determining* he meant causing the volition to be this rather than that volition. By *will* he meant the mind as invested with a certain power called by this title. Here he plainly denies that the mind in possession of this power can contribute any thing to the causation of volition: this depends on something else. Again: "So to suppose that there are *acts* of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves and acts upon objects, and produces effects, *which yet themselves are effects of something else*, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon and influencing that, does not at all confound action and passion:"—"action may be the effect of some other cause besides the agent or being that acts." Part IV. Sect. II. Now the "acts," the volitions here spoken of, are the very things in question, for which a cause is sought. These "acts" are declared to be "effects of something else" besides the soul. If a man "produces effects" it is in consequence of these "acts of the soul;" the "acts" are not effects of which he is the producer, but their sequents. By the very supposition the soul can contribute nothing in the causation of these "acts," since it produces effects only in consequence of them; and hence Edwards very properly supposed that they must be "effects of something else." What this "something else" was in the view of Edwards, may be learned from the following extract:—"But if every act of the will is excited

by a motive, then that motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives." Part II. Sect. X. To excite the volitions is the same as to cause them; and does he not distinctly indicate, that the "something else" of which volitions are effects, is motive? Does he not in motive cover the entire ground both of their existence and particular direction? His system shuts him up to extrinsic causality as the only alternative. Hence not a passage can be found in his book which implies that the mind, in any sense, causes volition. In this respect he was perfectly consistent with himself.

President Day, in his "*Examination of Edwards on the Will*," presents himself as the expounder and defender of Edwards. After explaining the use of the word *cause*, he observes: "In this sense of the word, neither external motives nor the agent are the *sole* cause of his volitions; but *both together* are truly the cause," p. 120. This he proposes as the Edwardean ground. I am very willing to grant that it may be the doctrine of President Day, but it does not correctly indicate the scheme of Edwards. It would have been gratifying to those who disagree with the commentator, had he produced his proof texts in support of his position. I hesitate not to say that they cannot be found in the "*Inquiry*" of Edwards. Passages in abundance might be cited, where it is granted that the mind *chooses, acts, wills*, etc.; but not one of these, by the very interpretation of Edwards, implies that the mind in the least degree causes the willing, the choosing, etc. Indeed, how could he have admitted this point? It would have been the wreck of his whole scheme, the death-blow to his strongest arguments. If an agent must first act before it can produce an effect—if the effect and the acting be not identical—if the acting also be the effect, then to say that the acting is at all produced by the agent, is nonsense;—we are carried out of and beyond the agent altogether, when searching for the cause of the acting. And bear in mind, that this is the very point,—what causes the *acting*, the *volition*, and not its sequents. President Day was certainly mistaken when he said that motive and the agent "*both together are truly the cause*:" this was not the ground of Edwards; it is nowhere asserted; it is not admissible in his scheme. To say that the mind has an *active*

nature, is to say, in consistency with his scheme, that the mind is capable of having what is called an *act* or *volition* wrought *in* it, but not *by* it—that it may be a subject of the change in question. If a man choose to designate this by the title of cause, I have only to say, that he entirely mistakes the idea of cause.

So far then as President Edwards is concerned, the plea in question does not leave the mind in possession of any causality in relation to volition—the only point I am now seeking to settle. In this respect Dr. Edwards most fully concurs with him. If any one shall enter his protest to this criticism, I have only one request to make; that he confine the protest strictly within the limits of the question.

(3.) I have not yet finished all I wish to say in relation to the above suggestion. I proceed therefore to observe, that it has in view a groundless distinction of questions. It assumes, that the question, *what causes the existence of an event*, is distinct from the question, *why this particular event is caused rather than some other*; and that although the mind should be sufficient to cause the *existence* of volition, still it can be no cause of its specific direction, as being thus and not otherwise. Is this a valid distinction? What is the phenomenon in question? It is a volition. What is the *nature* of that phenomenon? It is its nature to be fixed on, and directed to, some possible object of choice. It must be this, or that, or some object within the range of things possible to be chosen. This is essential to its very nature; *subjectively* it may be viewed as a mere phenomenon; *objectively* it must be directed to some object. Destroy the relation of an object to volition, and volition ceases to be a possibility. What is it for volition to have an object, but for it to be thus, or as it is, and not otherwise? If it exist at all, it exists under this condition; remove the condition, and its existence becomes an absurdity. Can the mind, therefore, have any concern in causing a volition, without having an equal concern in fixing its direction? Can that which causes the existence of an event cause that event, without causing also whatever pertains to its very nature, and makes a part of the event itself? The supposition is not possible from the very nature of the event itself. Whatever causes volition to be *thus* and *not otherwise*, causes it *to be*; and whatever causes it *to be*, causes "*the thus and not otherwise*" of its being. The two things can never depend on separate causes, for they are in fact not two things, but two aspects of one thing. If you explain "*the thus*

and not otherwise" of volition, by resorting to motive as its cause, you have finished the whole question of the cause. If you explain the "*to be*" of volition by referring it to the mind as its cause, you have equally finished the question. Whoever insists upon the distinction, must admit the absurdity of an *abstract* volition, that has no direction. Did Edwards, either the Elder or the Younger, assign to the mind any causality in the matter of "the thus and not otherwise" of volition? This no man will pretend. And if not; here again all causality is carried out of the mind.

The necessity that volition should be in *some* determinate direction decides not, whether the cause of it be necessitated to cause it to be thus and not otherwise. Here is a point where the advocates of necessity have sometimes committed a great mistake in the criticism of their opponents. The keen mind of Locke was at least a little incautious on this very point. He says, "A man, that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no. He must necessarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking." Book II. Chap. XXI. Sect. XXIV. To say, that the mind must necessarily cause in *some* one of the possible directions of events, if it cause at all, is one thing; to say that it is necessitated to cause in *this* particular direction, is quite a different thing. A man sitting must necessarily remain sitting, or move; the necessity respects the alternative; it is not that he must necessarily remain sitting, or that he must necessarily move. The necessity that one or the other should be, is a very different thing from the necessity that he should do this one and not that one. In the one case it respects the *alternative*; in the other it respects the agent. One is consistent with liberty, the other is destructive of it. Those who wish to see this point clearly presented, I refer to Whately's Logic, p. 180-183. Let no one, therefore, suppose that the necessity that volition should have some specific direction, decides its cause to be also necessitated; the necessity grows out of the *nature* of volition, and determines nothing in respect to its cause.

(4.) Again, when the mind is spoken of as *being caused to choose, or to choose as it does rather than otherwise*, we are in danger of deception and mistake in the use of terms. President Day says, that the question with Edwards was, "whether there is any thing which *causes the man to will as he does*?" Dr. Ed-

wards says, "We see, hear, feel, love and hate, in the active voice; yet we are, or may be, caused to see, hear, etc. And when we are caused to love or hate, we are indeed the subjects of the agency or influence of some cause extrinsic to our will, and so far are passive. Still the immediate effect of this agency is our act, and in this act we are certainly active," p. 319.—Now these modes of expression carry with them an air of plausibility, which disappears upon a close and analytical inspection. They seem to imply that the mind as cause contributes somewhat to the existence of choice. *What then is the analysis of being caused to choose?*

One construction would be, that the mind is caused to cause the volition or choice. This would make *two* causes; the mind would be one, and something else would be the other; both causing together, whether simultaneously or successively, would constitute the causation of volition. The mind is the *subject* of the influence of a cause, and so far is *passive*; upon that instant it also causes, and is so far *active*. The supposition, I trust, is understood. Now is this the scheme of Edwards? It evidently is not. According to the reasoning of Edwards, mental causality in reference to the thing in question, would be an impossibility even upon this construction, since his fundamental position is, that an agent viewed as a cause, can cause nothing but what is consequent upon its acting, and therefore cannot be the cause of the acting. This reasoning turns not upon the supposition, whether the agent is caused to cause, or is not; it applies to the question, whether he causes at all? To place another cause before the causation of the agent, does not in the least degree relieve the difficulty. The great argument of Edwards must be given up, before the mind can be cause upon this hypothesis. If a cause causes another to cause, the first produces in the second some change; after which, and in consequence of which, the second produces some other change, but not the one which the first produces. What is the change produced by the first cause in the supposition before us? Volition. Where is it produced? In the mind. What is the change produced by the second cause? Some sequent of volition. What is the question? It is, whether the mind causes volition at all. How plainly the Edwardean system replies in the negative. President Day is right, when he says, "present acts cannot, according to Edwards, be the *effect* of present agency." 4

The other construction of *being caused to choose*, is, that the

mind is simply the subject in which choice is produced by some cause. If this be the meaning, it is a concession of the very point for which I am contending. Grant this, and it matters not what follows in the train of sequence; the position that the mind causes choice at all, is given up. This comes at once to the ground which Dr. Edwards openly avows, and on which his father equally stood. They may say, that in volition "we are certainly active," if they wish to retain this form of expression. With equal propriety another might say, that a tree in falling to the ground is "certainly active." The one is just as active as the other, and no more so. Volition may be called "an act." It is as much an act in relation to the mind, as the motion of a stone is an act in relation to the stone. To say, that the mind chooses, or a stone moves, is, upon this hypothesis, to predicate of the two subjects kindred relations.

Behind all this philosophical furniture, there is a concealed conception in relation to cause, that deserves a moment's attention. It is, *that every cause, when it causes, must be caused to do so*. This conception is manifested, when the advocate of necessity for the sake of argument admits, that the mind may cause volition, but asks, *why it causes then and thus?* This "why" occupies a large place in his field of vision. It is an inquiry after some other cause besides the one he has admitted, and to which he looks to explain the causation of the admitted one. Now this question borrows all its importance from the conception that lies beneath it—the conception just stated. To press this question as an argument, is to assume the truth of the conception. I shall reply to it in a single sentence, which the reader may expand at his leisure: allow the conception, and you have an infinite series, not of modes of a single cause, but of successive causes. The distinction between *occasional* and *efficient* causes will not save you from this absurdity, for if you admit them both to be causes, (and if you do not, the distinction is groundless,) you will find yourself upon a road which has no end.

(5.) Finally, it deserves to be considered, whether the question, *why this event is, or this rather than some other*, in the sense intended by the advocate of necessity, does not transcend the legitimate boundaries of all human investigation. If this be the fact, it would be well to pause a moment and first find out where we are. The question is certainly an ambiguous question; it admits of more than one interpretation.

When proposed in relation to any event, it may mean, *who* or

what caused that event? An event is; an inquirer asks, why it is? i. e. he asks for its cause, and asks for nothing more. This being discovered, his inquiry having reached its object, terminates. All this is legitimate; it lies within the range of our cognitive powers. This disposition of the question, however, does not meet the design of the defender of necessity, for it does not touch the point he has in view. This being the question, the controversy might very soon be closed up.

Again it may mean, *how* came the cause of the event to cause? It assumes, that the reputed cause of the event must have something going before it, as the proper explanation of its own causation. I have just said, that this assumption involves an infinite series of successive causes; but let us waive this objection; let us give the question a hearing in this sense of it, and ascertain whether in the last analysis philosophy is competent to give any answer. What is this *something* preceding and explaining the causation of the cause supposed? It is *some* other cause. Upon its discovery the advocate of necessity rests his inquiry, having solved, as he supposes, the whole problem. He stops just in season to conceal the difficult point in his own question. Now I propose to take it up where he leaves it, and institute another question still more ulterior. Granting the whole hypothesis, it still remains to be answered, How comes it to pass, that the cause in view did commence the process of causation even upon this hypothesis? Give me an explanation of this. If some other cause be proposed, then the question may be renewed in regard to that, and so on forever. If it be said, that the cause, whose causation is to be explained, is in fact no cause, then the whole question is given up, its meaning is changed; we in fact have no question, and come back at once to the ground charged upon Edwards. How plain is it, that the ultimate *how* and *why* of a cause must forever escape human discovery? Here the advocate of necessity has no advantage over his opponent; he at last leaves the question just where he found it, and there every man must leave it. He may state the *when*, the historical circumstances both before and after the event; and so can his opponent do the same; but when they come to the ultimate *how* and *why*, they are lost, and lost forever. The system of necessity has gained much by starting this question; and then it has gained more by not following it out to its last analysis. In the latter respect it has been very wise by being cautious, and thus saved itself from the reactions of its own inquiry.

It may be said, that the definition of cause given by President Edwards is a very broad one, so broad as to include the historical antecedents or circumstances, which go before an event, whether they have "any positive influence or not," and that the question, *why is this volition rather than that one?* may refer to these antecedents. It is not pertinent to my present design to give a critique on this definition. Were it so, it might easily be shown, that it is not sufficiently broad to reach the proper idea of cause; neither is it sufficiently narrow, to exclude that which cannot be cause. Passing this point, however, I wish to advert to a marked discrepancy in the movements in the mind of Edwards on this subject. In giving his definition of cause his language is so general, as to include motives, whether they be causes in fact or not. Motives may be all that his opponent allows them to be, and no more, and yet be causes according to his definition. He sets out with a very ambiguous and defective definition of the term. This he felt himself, for he says, "and agreeably to this, I *sometimes* use the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an *occasion* than a cause, most *properly* speaking."—Agreeably to what? To his definition. Well, in following out his definition he "*sometimes*" confounds an occasion with a cause, "*properly* speaking." Is a discussion upon the difficult problems of human agency the place for improper speaking and vague phraseology, where the looseness of a term may be the garb which conceals a thousand fallacies? Mark, also, that he tells us that he "*sometimes*" uses the word thus and so. Now when he entered upon the discussion of the subject, he has not in a single instance informed us, that the term included in the general idea of "*sometimes*" has come; he speaks of motives, he describes them, and reasons upon them as causes all through his essay; but not once does he put the reader on his guard by informing him, that he uses motive as cause, understanding cause not in its true sense "*properly* speaking." This is not all, his reasoning assumes the causality of motive in the true sense of cause. Speaking of motive and volitions he says, that it is "*the cause of their existence.*" He follows this statement by saying, that, "*motives do nothing as motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence, is the effect of them.* For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else." Part II. Sect. X. He criticises Mr. Chubb

severely for speaking of motive as a passive occasion of choice ; and did he mean to use motive under the title of a cause in the same sense, and thus make himself an object of his own criticism ? The truth is, the "sometimes" of President Edwards, never came in the course of his logic. Motive is really and properly a cause in his whole system ; you reduce it to a mere occasion, and the scheme of Edwards is gone. He never intended to allow that motive is a mere occasion, while the mind is the efficient, the real cause of volition. When he put the question, Why does the mind choose thus rather than otherwise ? he understood both the question and the answer. He meant a cause by the "why" and he gave motive as that cause. The guarded sentence in question, has been a convenient refuge for his disciples, but it served no purpose in his own system. To infer that he may have meant by motive, when spoken of as cause, nothing but a mere occasion, leaving the mind to be the efficient cause of volition, is to teach a very different system from his.

The issue with Dr. Edwards may be considered as fairly stated ; mind is excluded altogether from the category of cause in the production of volitions. The language of President Edwards is less marked and definite ; but he stands substantially on the same ground. This position will now be made the subject of the following observations.

1. It is not consistent with the definition of cause which he adopts. According to this definition, a cause is, "any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposition which affirms that event is true ; whether it has any positive influence or not," p. 343. This is borrowed from President Edwards ; and it is a little remarkable that its author should have contended that motives are causes of volition, *only* as they have influence to produce it, when he allows, that an antecedent may be a cause even though it has no positive influence. Can the mind be a cause by this definition ? To be such, it is not necessary, that it should have "any positive influence" in the production of the "consequent event." It must however be an antecedent to that event. Volition is the event ; and is not the mind an antecedent to this event ; before the mind wills, does it not exist ? So far then it may be a cause. It is farther necessary, that it should be an "antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposi-

tion which affirms that event, is true." Volition again is the event in question. Now that belongs to the reason, why the proposition affirming this event, is true, *without* which it could not be true; it comes under the idea of being "so connected." Is not the mind an antecedent of this character? To deny it is to affirm, that there can be a volition without a mind for its subject. Hence the mind is that without which the proposition affirming the event, cannot be true; hence it belongs to the reason, why the proposition is true. This gives it the character of being "so connected," which is defined by the idea, "that it truly belongs to the reason," etc. No proposition in mathematics can be better established than mental causality, according to this definition. Dr. Edwards may be left to settle the controversy with Dr. Edwards. Either he was not right in his definition of cause, or in denying the mind to be cause, or he has used the word in two different senses, mutually excluding each other.

2. This position is not consistent with his admissions in regard to natural power. He concedes that the mind has natural power to choose otherwise than as it does. "If by *power* he mean *natural* or *physical* power, I grant that we have such a power to choose not only one of several things equally eligible, if any such there be, but one of things ever so unequally eligible, and to take the least eligible," p. 319. In regard to Judas's betrayal of Christ, he says, "he was under no natural necessity to betray him, but had a full *natural power* to do otherwise," p. 404. He concedes the natural power of an agent to choose otherwise, as perfectly consistent with the certain futurity of his actions, p. 410. Now I conclude that Dr. Edwards by *natural*, means *real* power, that he is not amusing himself, or his readers, with a mere verbal fiction. This power is predicated of man, as an agent. It is admitted to be a "power to choose" otherwise, and not simply to act otherwise, in consequence of having chosen. How do these, and parallel admissions, comport with his great position? That has natural power not only to choose, but to choose otherwise than it does, which has no concern in the causation of any choice! That which is not the cause of the event in question, nor of any event of the same class, has natural power to produce that event not only, but also any other one belonging to the same class! If this be not a contradiction, I desire to know what is. How Dr. Edwards could have given birth to both positions, it is diffi-

cult to see. Like the author of the "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," who in his system of philosophical necessity, contended that liberty was impossible, and yet allowed, that we are so constituted as necessarily to view ourselves as being free agents; so it may be, that the common sense of Dr. Edwards announced one position, and his philosophy the other.

3. To be consistent, Dr. Edwards must deny that mind is the cause of any thing whatever. If it cause any thing, it must cause either its own existence, or certain modifications and states within itself, or certain changes without itself. The first supposition is an absurdity: the second is both false and absurd according to Dr. Edwards. Here his scheme is entirely at issue with that of his opponents. One involves the causality of motive; the other of mind. They have different points of departure; move in different directions; end differently, and mutually exclude each other. Moral necessity as a *consequential* necessity, predicates a causal relation between two terms, of which motive is the prior and causal term, and willing, the posterior term or effect.

Let us then accept this conclusion and institute the question: *Can the mind be the cause of any thing?* If so, it must be the cause of certain sequents of its own states, or modifications. These are connected in a chronological order with these states. Does the mind cause this connection? If so, then it must act to do so, by the reasoning; but this acting to cause the connection is but another mental state, and therefore the mind cannot be the cause of it. Suppose volition to be the first link in a chain of sequents, each depending on the preceding, and all dependent on the first link; suppose it to be said, that the mind is the cause of all but the first, and of this it is not possible that it should be the cause; I ask, would not the supposition be self-contradictory? It is self-evident, if all the links depend on the first, and the mind has no relation of cause to the first, that it has none to any of them. If I do not cause the *willing* with which motion is connected as a sequent, then I do not cause the motion, whether it have for its sequent the death of a man, the revolution of an empire, or the destruction of the universe. It is not possible for a thing to be cause of events *without* itself, unless it originate and cause the changes *within* itself, whatever they may be, which are antecedent to the changes without. A cause must have causality in its own bosom, in

respect to its own modifications, before it can possibly be cause in respect to any thing connected with those modifications; every cause must have its primordial theatre of causation in itself. But as we have seen, Dr. Edwards does not allow the mind to be cause of its own volitions. After this it is nonsense to speak of it as being cause of any thing. If it be an agent, it is such an agent as causes nothing; if it produces, it is such a producer as produces nothing. No event *within* or *without* it can be traced to it as cause. This must be allowed, or Dr. Edwards must recede from his position; it is an unavoidable deduction. The atheist, the pantheist, and the skeptic, will welcome the deduction, and use it for the vilest of purposes; but Dr. Edwards is not the person to sit down quietly under such a view of man. He has truly made a man which "nature never made," and which all his views of morality would lead him to unmake.

4. This position absolutely destroys all basis for any responsible agency in man.—This charge has often been brought against the scheme of necessity. It has been cordially adopted by some, and as heartily denied and rejected by others. The leading purpose of President Edwards in his work on the Will, was to reply to this imputation. Simply to renew the charge is therefore not sufficient; it must be shown to be a legitimate deduction, or it becomes a mere *argumentum ad invidiam*, alike unpropitious to the discovery of truth, and unfair in philosophical discussion. Let us for a moment attend to the confirmation of this position.

Responsible agency supposes the following postulates;—the existence of a subject—that that subject is a *free moral agent*—that he exists in certain moral relations—and that he has actually produced moral actions. These are deducible *a priori* from the nature of the term; they are what would be termed in the Kantian philosophy *analytical judgments*, affirmations of intelligence derivable from a simple analysis of the term. The first three must be supposed to make such agency even a possible hypothesis; the fourth must be added to reduce that hypothesis to reality. The necessity of these postulates is self-evident; some have denied their reality, but they have generally been consistent enough to deny also the doctrine of responsible agency.

The position of Dr. Edwards is destructive of two suppositions; that man is a free moral agent, and has produced moral

actions. I am aware that much, so far as consistency of argument is concerned, depends on the definition of a free moral agent. Dr. Woods tells us that "a *moral agent* is one who performs actions which are of a *moral nature*, and are related to a moral law." Bib. Repos. July, 1840, p. 228. How much we gain by such a definition will appear if we transpose its terms; "one who performs actions which are of a moral nature, and are related to a moral law, is a moral agent." It might as well have been said, that a moral agent is a moral agent, for the predicate of the proposition is not more intelligible than the subject. It is a mere *nominal* definition. Speaking of freedom as "necessary for those who are the proper subjects of law," he says, "we *do* what we *choose*, and we *choose* as our *heart is inclined*," p. 229. He does not of course mean by the word "*do*," choosing, for this would make him say, that *we choose what we choose*, or that we choose to choose. The word "*do*," therefore, means some sequent of choosing. By the phrase, "as our heart is inclined," he does not mean choice, for this makes him to say, that *we choose as our choice is*. He must mean some involuntary antecedent or state going before the choice; and if he be a faithful expositor of the Edwardean creed, producing or causing the choice. A free moral agent, according to this exposition, would be one who, in the performance of moral actions, does what he chooses, and chooses as his heart is inclined. This is perhaps a fair exposition of such an agent, according to the Edwardean system. Dr. Edwards tells us, that he holds to freedom in the sense of "power, opportunity, and advantage to execute our own choice," p. 326. The idea is, not that freedom pertains to the choice or the agent in making the choice, but to its sequents; when they are not interfered with by co-action or restraint, we have freedom, and all the freedom that is possible. President Edwards occupies the same position. His idea of freedom is, "the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases." If the term "*pleases*" mean a volition, then freedom is power to do as one chooses or wills. What then does the word "*do*" mean? It means either a volition, and then freedom is power to choose as one chooses; or some sequent of volition, and then freedom is the absence of any "hinderance or impediment" to the existence of that sequent. But if by the term "*pleases*" he means some antecedent of volition, and by the term "*do*," a volition, then liberty is the power to choose, as is the antece-

dent. President Edwards was not always clear in the use of this phrase descriptive of liberty. In some instances he seems to use the word "pleases" in the sense of volition, and "do" in the sense of its sequent; in others he uses the word "pleases" in the sense of the antecedent of volition, and "do" as the volition itself. The two modes of use make out very dissimilar schemes of freedom. The first is the absence of "hinderance or impediment" to the existence of a chosen sequent; the second is but another form of saying, that volition is caused by the antecedent motive.

In this connection it is not proposed to examine these notions of liberty, as it would carry me beyond the compass of my present design. The reader is desired to fix his attention on a single point. It is admitted that freedom is "the property of an agent"—that it belongs to an agent—that there must be an agent before freedom is a possibility. *Moral* freedom belongs to an agent, who is capable of moral distinctions. Place it where you please, either in the proximate antecedents of volition, in the volition, the agents of volition, or somewhere on the ground between the volition and its sequents; give it what characteristics you please; and on all hands it is conceded that there must be an agent somewhere, before freedom is possible, and that a being who is not a free moral agent in *some sense* cannot be a responsible subject. There is no debate on these points.

Now I affirm that, according to the scheme of Dr. Edwards, *agency* is no reality in respect to man, that he is no *agent*, and therefore the epithets "free and moral," if applied to him, are applied to a nonentity. In what respect can Dr. Edwards allow man to be an agent? Not that he causes his own volitions, for this he denies; not that he causes their dependence on, and connection with, their proximate antecedents and causes, for this he also must deny; not that he causes their connection with their sequents, for this is equally inadmissible. The system absolutely sweeps all causation from the mind in all possible relations. Mind does nothing; it is the bare *subject* of efficiency foreign to itself. What kind of an agent is that which does nothing, never did any thing, and never can do any thing? It causes no modification *within* itself, and consequently none *without* itself, and yet it is an agent! If men choose to retain the term, we have no objections to gratify their rhetorical taste; but as philosophers let them understand what they mean, and let

others understand them also. If we say with Dr. Woods, that a "moral agent is one who performs actions, etc.," the question arises: What do we mean? If by "actions" be meant the sequents of volition, and by "performs" the relation of cause between the volition and those sequents; then the question arises: *Is the mind the cause of the volition?* If the reply be negative, (and this is the reply of Dr. Edwards,) then the mind does not cause the "actions"—it does not *perform* action in the sense of cause. But if by "actions" be meant volitions themselves, then in what sense does the agent *perform* them? Not that he causes them, for this is denied. In what sense then, we beg to know? In the sense that the so called agent is a mere subject of those phenomena. There is plausibility in the mode of expression, "who performs actions;" it chimes in well with the common sense of mankind; it implies causality in the agent; but before the searching scrutiny of the Edwardlean metaphysics it vanishes like the morning cloud and early dew. The language would have been more consistent with the system had it been, *a moral agent is one who is merely the subject of changes, which men call actions*; such in fact is the only kind of agent that can be picked up among the *membra disjecta* of humanity thus unrobed by philosophy. If any one still insist that such a being is an agent, he uses the word *agent*, and qualifies it by the epithets, *free and moral*, in precisely that sense in which it has no meaning. In this sense a block of wood may be an agent; indeed, nonentity may be such an agent. If it be demonstrable that no other agency is possible, it is as demonstrable that such an agent is in fact no agent at all. To call it an agent is contrary to the *usus loquendi* of the word—a total blotting out of all the ideas which in ordinary acceptation it conveys; what in common parlance would be termed "a clean sweep;" not a wreck is left behind.

Logically, therefore, although not in fact, man's agency is destroyed. To ask, whether man is a *free, moral, and responsible* agent, is to ask a question which is forestalled, and cut off by the answer of a previous question. The question cannot be entertained even as an hypothesis, for you have blockaded all inquiry in respect to the characteristics of agency, at its very threshold. Attach what ideas you choose to the words, *free, moral, and responsible*—let them be true or false in themselves—and they are but the adjuncts of an airy nothing, the attributes of a dream—in *re*, in connection with reality they have no existence. This

philosophy upturns the subject to its very basis, *ab origine*, by disallowing all mental causality in the production of volitions; it scatters by the fury of its power all the possible incidents of agency, such as freedom, morality, responsibility, blameworthiness, or praiseworthiness. Where then is the basis for responsible agency in man?—Nowhere.

It may be said that man is admitted to be an agent, since it is admitted that he *acts, chooses, wills, determines*, etc. I have already considered the nature of these admissions. In the scheme of Dr. Edwards, they imply no relation of cause on the part of the mind to the resulting volitions; but that it is simply the subject of the phenomena thus called. With this interpretation it is not strictly true, that the mind wills or chooses, for this affirmation contains more than the idea of a mere subject. What is it to act, but to cause action? What is it to choose, but to cause choice? What is it to will, but to cause the willing?

It may again be said, that the virtuousness or viciousness of a volition inheres in its very nature, without any consideration of its cause, and therefore, although the mind be not its cause, it may be responsible-blame, or praiseworthy on its account. This view is presented by President Edwards. Without intending a full reply, I give a single answer; viz., the denial of mental causality absolutely precludes the question of moral distinctions, so far as the mind is concerned. If it be granted that volition has its nature of right or wrong in itself, still the question of moral distinction in actions, involving both the fact and its grounds, can never be a question, except in bare hypothesis, without certain *logical conditions or antecedents*. One is, that the subject should be able to discern between right and wrong. If we deny this, as in the case of idiocy or infancy, we preclude the moral problem by cutting off its logical antecedent. Another is, that the subject should be the cause of the volition, claimed to be virtuous or vicious. What is volition, but that subject in a given state? How then can desert of reward or punishment attach to the subject on account of the volition, in whatever way we explain the fact of its having a moral nature, when that volition is absolutely uncaused by the subject? The volition abstractly is not the legitimate subject of reward or punishment. These ideas attach to the agent, if any where. But the being in question is not the agent in any true sense by the supposition—the phenomenon takes place *in* him, not *by* him. Whatever then may be its moral features—in

whatever way we derive them; it is certain that they have no sort of relation to man as a responsible subject. Volitions and not their sequents have a moral nature. We blame a man for *willing* wrong—we praise him for *willing* right; but if the *willing* be no effect of his, then it is neither his right, nor his wrong; if it be no effect of any being, then it is neither the right nor wrong of any being: in other words, the moral problem is shoved out of the universe, as completely as if the phenomenon had never been. Who will pretend, on the supposition of an event coming to pass without any cause, that it could have a moral nature, so as to involve any being? If volition be an event coming to pass in the mind, without any causality on the part of the mind, it is impossible that it should involve that mind in any just liabilities on its account. There are no data by which to connect the two. The fact, that the mind happens to be its theatre, is nothing to the purpose; the case would not be altered, if a fixed star had been that theatre. The fact that the mind is capable of moral judgments and emotions, does not alter the case, for it only makes its misfortune the greater, and its very constitution an object for sympathy rather than blame. Besides, all these judgments and emotions, take for granted what the theory in question denies. The moral problem, therefore, is repealed and entirely annihilated, so far as humanity is concerned, by an exclusion of one of its logical conditions. This is the reply I offer to the view presented by President Edwards.

5. The position of Dr. Edwards renders both the idea and the knowledge of cause a complete impossibility. Consciousness is the primordial theatre upon and in which the idea of cause first takes possession of the human mind. Man must know himself, as cause, before he has any idea of any other cause, or cause in general. The process of the mind in discovering and reasoning upon causes, is not from causes without to the mind as cause; it is in a reverse direction. The occasion upon which the idea is first suggested to the intelligence, is a specific act of causation, which has its beginning, its progress, and its end, in the very bosom of the cause itself. That act, upon the instant of its being, is intuitively referred to the mind as its cause. This primitive cognition is the germ from which proceed all subsequent inductions, deductions, and abstractions on the subject. If these positions be denied, then the doctrine of Hume follows: *that the relation of causation is simply a succession of events.* He has shown conclusively, that if we look to experience for

the idea of cause, (understanding by experience the simple observation of things without us by the senses,) we can obtain nothing but a simple succession. This is demonstrably not the true idea, and therefore there is a defect in the process of discovery. If we pass to the theatre *within*, we find that the idea becomes a positive intellection of the mind upon a single condition; i. e. that a self-conscious cause actually originates an event in its own bosom. The idea of cause is not possible upon any other condition. A thing must be a cause, and be conscious of itself, as such, else it can have no such idea. A man can have no conception of a sensation, whether of pleasure or pain, but on the condition that that sensation has been a matter of *mental experience*. The same is true of thought, of color, etc. Hence, if the observation of external things gives us nothing but succession, as Hume has shown; if that succession be not identical with the idea of cause, as is certain, it follows that we must go to some other theatre for its discovery. What is that theatre? But one is possible;—the mind itself. Now can the mind discover or receive the idea of cause, when as yet no cause has gone into operation and actually caused? Plainly not. Hence if it has not caused, it can never have the idea, since it derives it originally from itself, upon the condition of its own causation. Having thus gained the idea, it subsequently generalizes it by abstraction, and *universalizes* it by application to the events of the physical world.

I am happy in being able to corroborate these views by a reference to the language of the critical reviewer of Whewell's History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. He says: "The direct personal consciousness of causation which we have, when we either exert voluntary force or influence the train of our own thoughts, has been much and singularly lost sight of by many writers on this subject. Whatever be the essential nature of that relation, or whether even it be in all cases the same, we are no more left in doubt of its being a real relation *when we experience this consciousness*, than we are of our own reality or of that of an external world. When once *suggested*, as we conceive it to be, by *such experience*, as a kind of *mental sensation*, it is seized and dwelt upon with a force and tenacity which strongly indicates its real importance to our knowledge and well-being." American Eclectic, No. 6, Nov. 1841, p. 418. This writer was by no means favorable to all the philosophical views of Whewell; yet he speaks of the idea of cause as being

first suggested by a certain "*experience as a kind of mental sensation.*" Now what is that experience? It is "the direct personal consciousness of causation which we have," when we ourselves cause. This is identical with the above view of the *genesis* of the idea. It is the ground of Victor Cousin; it is without doubt the true ground. It has been frequently charged against Locke, that he taught a different view; that he laid the basis of the sensual school of philosophy. In Book II. Chap. XXVI. Sect. I. he inclines very clearly to the sensual origin of the idea; but in the same Book, Chap. XXI. Sect. IV. he indicates a different origin of the idea. So that all that can be justly charged upon Locke is, that he was not consistent with himself.

How then stands the position of Dr. Edwards, that the mind cannot possibly be the cause of its own acts, its own volitions? In the following attitude, viz., that the indispensable condition of having the idea of cause, some fact of causation by the cause so having the idea, does not proceed from, and is not originated by the cause. The idea must first be suggested by a "direct personal consciousness" of our own causation, and yet it is not possible that we should ever have any such consciousness, for it is not possible that we should ever cause any thing upon the theatre of consciousness! It would be gratifying to know whence Dr. Edwards derived his notion of cause, upon which he reasons so largely, and with so much ability. One feels a little temptation to fly to the transcendentalism of Innate Ideas, created by God, stored away in the mind, slumbering in some dormitory of the soul, existing in full perfection, prior to all mental action, and ready to be evolved as chance may direct. Indeed Dr. Edwards ought to have disallowed the idea of cause altogether. Upon the hypothesis that the mind originates none of its own changes, the idea is an impossibility; and the position of Dr. Edwards is a branch of this general hypothesis.

6. This position is against the consciousness and common sense of the world.—If it be a dictate of philosophy to adopt it, it certainly is not one of common sense. The remarks of Dr. Price on this subject are so appropriate, that I shall take the liberty to transcribe them. He says: "A being who cannot *act* at all, most certainly cannot act well or ill, virtuously or viciously. Now so far as it is true of a being that he acts, so far he must *himself* be the cause of the action, and therefore not necessarily determined to act. Let any one try to put a sense on the expressions, *I will, I act*; which is consistent with sup-

posing, that the volition or action proceeds not from myself, but from somewhat else. Virtue supposes determination, and determination supposes a determiner; and a determiner that determines not himself is a palpable contradiction. Determination requires an efficient cause. If this cause is the being himself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longer *his* determination; that is, he is no longer the determiner but the motive, or whatever else any one will please to assign as the cause of the determination. To ask, what effects *our* determination, is the very same with asking, who did a thing, after being informed that such a one did it. In short, who must not *feel* the absurdity of saying: my volitions are produced by a *foreign* cause, that is, are not mine?" Price on *Morals*, Lond. edition, 1758, p. 315, 316. When unsophisticated minds say that a *man wills*, they mean that he does the willing; is its cause. No one dreams of any other construction, till philosophy, in her effort to make the subject clearer, envelopes it in darkness. How the man causes is never asked—it can never be answered; but this does not invalidate the reality of his being the cause. The advocates of necessity are constantly falling into these popular modes of expression. They say, the *mind determines*; they say also, that *motive determines*. What do they mean? Not the same thing by the two affirmations. Mind determines, as it is the subject of volition; motive determines, as it is the cause of volition.

IV. *Whether Motive be the Cause of Volition?*

The fourth chapter of the Dissertation is devoted to the consideration of "Motives and their Influence." This chapter abounds with numerous strictures upon the views of Dr. West, Dr. Clarke, and others. On the justice of these criticisms we offer no opinion. What is the ground taken by Dr. Edwards, as respects the relation of motive to volition? This is the question before us; and let us proceed to hear and examine his answer.

1. He maintains that motives have *influence* in the production of volitions, and charges his opponents with great inconsistency in admitting this point, and yet denying moral necessity. President Edwards insisted that motives can be causes only as they have influence, although he had admitted that an antecedent might be cause, even if it had no "positive influence." In the first part of this position the son is true to the system of the

father. As did the father, so does the son maintain, that unless the strongest motive determine the volition to be thus rather than otherwise, there is no cause for the volition. Having adopted the definition of motive given by the Elder Edwards, he says: "Now if any act of choice be without motive in this sense, it is absolutely without a cause," p. 372. It is not necessary to enlarge on this point, since Edwards, and all his defenders, are ready to grant it in the fullest degree.

2. He farther asserts, that motives comprehend the *entire* and *whole* cause of volition; not only that they have influence, but all the influence in the way of cause, which is concerned in the production of volition. This is no misrepresentation of the ground which he assumes and endorses in at least one passage: "An act of choice, without a motive in the large sense of motive, as defined by President Edwards, is an event without a cause. *For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive.* 'By motive,' says he, 'I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.' Accordingly in his further explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable objects and views, all reasons and arguments, and all internal biases and tempers which have a tendency to volition; i. e. *every cause* or occasion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence, or any other extrinsic influence be the cause of volition, it may be called a *motive* in the same sense that a bias is," p. 372. Now it will be observed, that in "every cause or occasion of volition," Dr. Edwards does not include the volition itself, for this is the effect; neither does he include the mind, for this he denies. "The whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, comprehends the whole idea of motive; the whole idea of motive comprehends *every cause* of volition, so that if volition be without motive, it is without any cause." This is plain English. Had Dr. Edwards dropped his pen at this point, we should infer that he never supposed any other cause.—But let us hear him still farther.

3. He states, defines and defends the doctrine of "the infallible connection between motive and volition." He says—"By infallible connection between motive and volition, we mean that volition never takes place without some motive, reason, or *cause* of its existence, either in the views of the mind of him who is the subject of the volition, in the disposition, bias or appetite of

his mind or body, or from the influence of some extrinsic agent," p. 344. The *infallible connection* here spoken of, is a connection between one thing and another, without which the first never exists:—this is its distinctive characteristic. This connection as applied to the subject under discussion is between "volition" and "some motive, reason or cause"—all these three terms being used synonymously. The theatre where this "motive, reason or cause" is to be sought, lies in "the views of the mind," or "its disposition, bias, or appetite"—or "the influence of some extrinsic agent." In arguing this point on page 346, he asks, if this connection be not "a connection just as infallible as that between cause and effect?" It is not only as infallible, but upon his own showing it is the very connection itself, and the only connection as an effect, which volition ever has, so far as we have yet presented the views of Dr. Edwards. In every specific volition he maintained that the connection is between that volition and the *strongest* "motive, reason or cause."

A full exposition of this doctrine must be postponed until I examine another part of his scheme, the introduction of which now would confuse the order of discussion. In passing, I wish the reader specially to notice a particular view, that is very common among writers on the side of necessity; viz. *that when one thing will not exist without another thing, the relation of cause and effect exists between these two things*. Had Dr. Edwards simply said, that the infallible connection is between volition and some cause, without defining the cause, his opponents could not have disagreed with him. But his argument is, that motive is that without which volition will not exist by the concession of his opponents and the verdict of common sense;—hence he infers the truth of moral necessity, or the infallible connection between motive as the cause, and volition as its effect. This reasoning assumes, that when one thing will not exist without another, the two are related as cause and effect. Let us try this assumption for a moment. Space is that without which body will not exist; therefore space is a cause of its existence. The position of a body in the line of another moving body is that without which the first will not move; therefore the position, simple *vis inertiae* is a cause of the motion. The existence of an agent is that without which he cannot sin; therefore the existence is a cause of sin. The reality of moral distinctions is that without which wrong cannot be; therefore the reality is a cause of the wrong. These enthymemes might

be multiplied to any extent. President Day saw the difficulty of this assumption. He says—"Every material substance must occupy a certain portion of space. But space has nothing to do in bringing matter into existence. It is not in the *proper* sense the *cause* of matter. A body cannot *move* except in space. But space though a *condition* of the motion is not the cause." See his Examination of Edwards, p. 33. Who must not feel the unsoundness of the assumption in view of these illustrations? To confound a condition, even though it be infallible, a *sine qua non*, with cause, is a great mistake in philosophy; it has done much to embarrass this discussion, and give an air of triumph to one side of the question.

If it be said that cause is to be taken in this general sense, and that it is so used by the advocates of necessity, I reply, that some things must then be included under the idea, which have not, and cannot have the nature of cause. Whatever space may be, let any man invest it with the idea of cause if he can. Non-existence of a thing is the logical condition of its creation,—that without which its creation cannot be. Is non-existence therefore a cause of its creation? Those who would use cause in so large a sense, cannot have explored their own consciousness on this subject. It is a serious error in classification by which the same term is appropriated to two ideas, between which there is nothing in common. No one can complete the idea of cause without that of power; and the idea of power is not possible without the idea of a subject in which it inheres. Remove these conceptions, and you have no cause—that which does not exist, and which has no power, certainly cannot be cause. How different these conceptions from that without which some other thing will not be!

4. But let us proceed with the work of interpretation:—Dr. Edwards denies that the mind is the efficient cause of volition; and we now propose to show that he makes the same denial in regard to motive. Hear what he says:—"I do not pretend that motives are the *efficient* causes of volition."—"When we assert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cause of it," p. 344.—"For moral necessity is a mere previous certainty of a moral action; and this is no more the efficient cause of the action, than the persuasive motive, which is the occasion of an action," p. 375.—"If it should be said, that motive in this case is not the efficient cause of the action or doing, this is granted," p. 381.

The reader who recurs to the ground over which we have already passed, is hardly prepared to expect such concessions from the pen of Dr. Edwards. As yet we have no efficient cause of volition. Mind is not ; and he now tells us, that motive is not. Does he mean to leave the ground without such a cause ? At the proper time we shall see.

It is very manifest, that Dr. Edwards contradicts himself, in the positions which he takes in regard to motive. But little skill in dialectics will be needed to convict him of self-contradiction. Standing on the platform raised by the Elder Edwards, he tells us, that "every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive ;" and yet he says, that motives are not the efficient causes of volition. Now "every cause of volition" must mean all cause. The term is fully *distributed*. What follows, when we compare his two positions ? That in "every cause" of an event, the *efficient* cause is not implied. Surely Dr. Edwards could not have thought of one passage when he wrote the other ; they make a palpable contradiction, not the less real, because they are found in separate parts of his work. What is an efficient cause, if it be not found under the category of "every cause" of an event ? It may be said that Dr. Edwards uses the word motive in two senses in the different passages, which seem to contradict each other ; that when speaking of motive as inclusive of "every cause," he meant the efficient cause also ; but when denying the efficiency of motive, he uses the term in a more limited sense. My reply is, that Dr. Edwards has not said a word to indicate any such intention, and no man, in the absence of all evidence, has a right to assume it for him.

Again, these positions are not consistent, in view of the definition of cause which he adopts. That definition is intended to be so broad as to include all cause ; it is the only one given in his dissertation ; it is substantially the one adopted by every writer on the side of necessity. It is "any antecedent, with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposition which affirms that event, is true ; whether it has any positive influence or not." Motive he holds to be such an antecedent, and therefore it is a cause of volition. The phrase, *infallible connection between motive and volition*, is but another form of asserting this very doctrine of antecedence, as stated in the definition of cause. Now observe, that the doctrine of such antecedence contains the necessarian

doctrine of cause ; infallible connection is but another mode of stating this doctrine of antecedence ; and yet Dr. Edwards says, that motives are not efficient causes of volition, although he maintains the fact of infallible connection, and although this connection exhausts the whole necessarian idea of cause. The result is, that efficient cause is not included in the only definition he gives of cause ; or the word *efficient* has no meaning ; or infallible connection is the relation of efficient causation, which Dr. Edwards denies, by having said that motives are not efficient causes, although infallibly connected with volitions. Neither horn of this dilemma will be sufficient to save his consistency ; he does not agree with himself at all times any more really than with his opponents.

His positions, when thus brought together, make out a system of incongruous and repellant elements. At one time, motive exhausts the whole cause ; at another, it does not. Both cannot be true ; motive cannot be the whole cause, without being the efficient cause. For the purposes of this review, it is not necessary to go into a full account of the relation between motive and volition ; my design having been to show that Dr. Edwards's account of the matter is not satisfactory, and prepare the way for introducing another of his positions, which closes up the whole question of the causation of volition. The reviewer agrees with the reviewed in the denial, that motive is the efficient cause of volition. What is the *true nature* of the relation of motive in the sense of an antecedent, whether *subjective* or *objective*, to the resulting act of an agent, presents one of the gravest and most difficult questions in philosophy. It is no place for hasty assumptions, for vague and doubtful terminology. All agree that the relation is not identical with that of the mind. The advocate of necessity describes the two relations under the epithet "*determines* ;" but he does not after all identify the relations, for in one case he means that motive determines in the sense of *causing*, and in the other, that the mind determines in the sense of being the *subject* of a change, not caused by itself. His opponent uses the word "*determines*" in a more definite sense ; by it he means that the mind causes the volition, and in this sense he denies that motive *determines*. Both agree that the relation of motive to volition, and that of the mind to it are not the same : they disagree in the account which they give of the difference ; here hinges the subject matter of the whole controversy. The advocate of necessity seems to me to have lost

sight of a very important point in his whole process of argument, i. e. *that the phenomenon, for which he assigns motive as a cause, has its existence in the bosom of an agent, the incompetency of which agent to cause that very phenomenon, it will not do to assume.* He reasons in regard to motive, just as he reasons in regard to other causes, that act upon simple recipients of efficiency. Now suppose the mind to be something more than a mere recipient; and the whole subject is placed in a new attitude, and all the previous logic is set afloat. The nature of the mind itself, the nature of its relation to its own acts, form very material inquiries—inquiries of the first importance in deciding upon the nature of the relation of other things to those mental acts. The very definition which is given of motive is a *petitio principii*. "*By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves,*" etc. Here it is assumed, that the thing intended is something "which moves;" then that something is called motive. This begs the whole question, and decides a controversy by the mere force of a definition. Would not the logical course be, to define the thing without involving the matter in dispute, and then prove that the disputed characteristic holds true of that thing? This would place the question upon fair and open ground. The nature of mind, and of so much of motive as is undisputed, would come up for examination, and in the opinion of the writer a very different theory from that of moral necessity would be the result. It would be found exceedingly difficult to invent *media* by which to connect the predicate of necessity with motive as its subject. I indicated to the reader the design of not going extensively into this subject; I must therefore leave it, and pass on to the next inquiry—

V. *Whether God be the Cause of Human Volitions?*

Having admitted that motive is not, and denied that mind is, the efficient cause of volition, Dr. Edwards says, "He who established the laws of nature, so called, is the primary cause of all things. What is meant by efficient cause in any case, in which an effect is produced according to established laws? For instance, what is the efficient cause of the sensation of heat from fire? If it be answered, fire is the efficient cause; I also answer that motive is the efficient cause of the volition and doing aforesaid. If it be said that the Great First Cause is the efficient cause of the sensation of heat, the same Great Agent is the effi-

cient cause of volition in the same way, by a general law establishing a connection between motives and volitions ; as there is a connection between fire in certain situations, and the sensation of heat," p. 381. "The cause, or series of causes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an effect, is so far from excluding the first cause, and any efficient cause, as Dr. West says, that it inevitably leads to the first cause, and implies, that there is an efficient cause of all volition in creatures, as well as of every thing else, short of the first cause," p. 385. "We say, that fire is the cause of the sensation of heat ; that rain and sunshine are the causes of vegetation, etc. Yet they are no more than the stated antecedents. In the same sense motives, according to Dr. West (to which sense Dr. E. assents) are causes of volitions. Besides, all second causes are the effects of the first cause. Therefore ultimately, volitions are effects of the Great First Cause," p. 393. In speaking of moral necessity as constituted by God, he says, "that the connection between all causes and effects, and particularly the connection between motives and volitions, is established by the same Supreme agent," p. 439.

Here we have Dr. Edwards's theory of the Will, traced to its last analysis. He explains the philosophical ground of the fact of *infallible connection* between motives and volitions, on which he insists. This fact is a stated order of sequence ; its existence demands an efficient cause. That cause is neither the prior nor posterior terms of the sequence ; neither is it the mind in which the sequence occurs. Fire is nothing but the stated antecedent of the sensation of heat ; so motive is infallibly connected with volition ; this is but the invariable concomitancy of two things. The motive is nothing but the anterior of two connected terms ; it is not the cause of its chronological position as an antecedent. Where lies the efficiency by which the connection is established ? Dr. Edwards tells us that it lies solely and simply with the Great First Cause. God is the cause, and the only real cause of the event. All causes but the First are only modes of causation by the First. In relation to volition, neither motive nor mind is the cause ; God is its sole cause. This divine cause causes, by what is termed "a general law." What then is "a general law ?" It is not itself a cause ; it is the affirmation of an universal and invariable rule of divine causation. All the countless volitions of men are produced and caused by God, not in the sense that he created, sustains and gives men power to cause them, for this last idea Dr. Edwards rejects ; but in the sense

that he efficiently causes them, not in Himself as their subject, but in human minds as their subject. The phrases, "*infallible connection*" and "*general law*" simply state the rule of this divine causation; i. e. when what is called motive is presented to the mind, then God invariably causes the resulting volition; this constitutes the connection or law; the connection is infallible, in virtue of the infallible and constant causative energy of the Deity.

This is the theory to which Dr. Edwards finally comes. It has the merit of being simple. Man is created by God capable of a modification called volition, not of *originating* it, but of *being in* it. What is termed motive is an infallible antecedent of this mental state. The connection is not the cause of itself; neither are the terms its cause. God is the cause by "a general law;" that law is but the universal rule according to which God causes. This is the whole theory. We see precisely the relative positions of mind, motive, and the First Cause. Stated in a single sentence, it would be, *that God is the sole cause of every human volition.*

This theory has the merit of being a logical deduction from the system of Dr. Edwards. The system of moral necessity must in the end terminate at this point. Others may not have pursued it so far; but they differ from Dr. Edwards in being either less candid or less logical. If the logical condition of the mind's being a cause of any thing be, that it should be in a state of *willing*, it obviously cannot be the cause of the willing. If we turn to the antecedents of the willing, it is obvious that their connection with it cannot be self-constituted, self-originated; that upon strict analysis they cannot be the real cause. The mind travels on, and in its very next step arrives at the First Cause who established this connection, and is therefore the only real cause of volition. Here it stops; here ends moral necessity as a theory of the will; to this point it must always come. It is sometimes covered by a cloud of words, but analysis will always bring you to the goal. The speculator may go on, and undertake the difficult task of philosophizing upon the divine volitions, which cause the human. He has entered a new field of inquiry; he cannot find another cause before the First to meet the wants of his philosophy. We do not propose to pursue him there.

Again, this theory is substantially identical with the philosophical doctrine of Dr. Emmons. His was the scheme of Divine Efficiency. He, however, never contended that the Divine Agent caused volitions without any connection with motives. He says,

"Accordingly, when he works in us both to will and to do, *he first exhibits motives before our minds*, and excites us to act voluntarily *in the view of the motives exhibited*. And in thus acting voluntarily *in the view of motives presented* to us, we exercise the most perfect liberty, or moral freedom. For we can frame no higher idea of moral freedom than acting voluntarily, or just as we please *in the view of motives*." Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. p. 351. Here the doctrine of infallible connection, or co-presence of motives is allowed, and the necessarian idea of liberty is presented with perfect accuracy. The reader, however, must not suppose, that when Dr. Emmons speaks of men as *acting voluntarily*, he meant to admit that men cause their own volitions; he meant just what Dr. Edwards did, i. e. that men are the *subjects* of volitions. His doctrine was, that God is the efficient cause of every human volition, whether good or bad. This we have seen to be the position of Dr. Edwards. Dr. Emmons openly avows, that God causes the wrong as really as he does the good volitions of men. This has contributed to render his system odious. Against Emmonsism numerous caveats have been put on record. But what is it? Nothing but the system of necessity in real life. It is not to be blamed for the inference, for the fault lies in the premises. Dr. Edwards comes to the *generic* conclusion: Dr. Emmons affirms it in both of its *specific* branches, in relation to the bad, as well as the good volitions of men.

Pantheism is a term deservedly in bad repute among Christian philosophers. The term to a Greek scholar suggests its own definition. Of Pantheism there have been various expositions or schemes, which have been united by one common feature, i. e. *that God is the only cause in the universe*. Now let it be granted, for perhaps it is true, that all physical causation is by divine efficiency; that in reality a physical cause is not a cause at all, but a mere vehicle or mode of divine efficiency. Is this true also of the phenomena of the mind? Dr. Edwards's answer is unambiguous. What follows? That of all the events of this world, there is not, never was, and never can be but one cause, and that cause is the First Cause. Generalize this position, and you have a Pantheism that sweeps over the universe. It matters not whether you metaphysically confound the essence of God with other things, or distinguish between the two; one thing is certain, that there is but one cause.

Again, this position of Dr. Edwards, besides being liable to all the difficulties mentioned in relation to his denial of mental causation, states many others equally formidable in a new direction. Upon his hypothesis a divine government is possible; the events of that government may be certain; but the distinction between a *physical* and a *moral* government is annihilated, and the essential incidents of the latter are totally swept away. A moral government is not possible unless it be applied to *agents*. But an agent that causes nothing, no modification of itself, and consequently none beyond itself, all the modifications and changes of which are caused by the *first cause*, is not only a contradiction, but at war with common sense. The subject of these modifications may be called a *mental subject*; it does not therefore approximate to the idea of a cause or an agent; it is no agent in any correct sense. Leibnitz in his *Theodicæa*, called the mind a "spiritual automaton." What if it be spiritual? Does it come any nearer being an agent? Certainly not on this account. To set up a government of commands, rewards, and punishments, over a being that causes no phenomenon *within* himself, and none *without* himself; to make that being immortal, and endow him with the susceptibility of eternal pain; to make his destiny, whether of joy or wo, dependent on certain phenomena passing within him, to which he contributes nothing as cause, any more than if he did not exist; this contradicts all our notions of justice; it is a farce, which, if not so solemn, might be treated with ridicule. Between this supposition and atheism there is little ground of preference. The only just foundation for administering rewards and punishments, is the *rightness* or *wrongness* inherent in moral actions. But if a being cannot *act at all*, then it is manifest that he can act neither right nor wrong. If he cannot cause, then he cannot act, for no man can separate the idea of causing from the idea of acting. The remarks of Pere Buffier on this point are worthy of being mentioned: "For if it be a cause, it has an effect, and every thing that has an effect of course *acts*; as *to act* and *to have an effect* is precisely the same thing." "The action as impressed on or received by any being is called *passion*; and as received in an intelligent being *who produces it himself*, is termed *act*." Buffier's First Truths, p. 225, 229. If we deny that the mind acts in this sense, we deny action altogether; we might as well then go to the theory of Dr. Harteley, and generate all mental states upon the mechanical principle of vibrations.

Whatever causes, acts, and vice versa ; it must begin and originate the primordial movement, so far as it does either. As in the theory of Malebranche in respect to sensation, it may have historical occasions ; but after all, the efficiency to begin action or causation must be in itself, or that which is said to act does not in fact act at all. If volitions then are not caused by us as well as *in* us, the hypothesis of moral government as exercised over us, is an absurdity. No man can reconcile the two suppositions without interlocking them by another absurdity equal to the one in question.

It is farther to be observed, that moral evil is in the world. The question has been started, *Who is the sinner?* It has been urged against the Edwardean scheme, that the *divine authorship* of sin would be the true answer to this question. Both the son and the father deny this consequence : " If by *the author of sin* be meant the *sinner*, the *agent*, or *actor* of sin, or the *doer* of a wicked thing," they tell us, that God is not the author of sin, but man is. This by itself looks very well ; is sound both in philosophy and theology. But the question is, How could Dr. Edwards hold such language after divesting the reputed sinner of all causality in the matter, and investing the entire causality with God in the same matter ? I confess myself unable to see. That which is no cause is not a "doer" of *any* thing, and of course, not of a "wicked thing," and certainly is not the sinner or the author of sin. This absolutely forecloses so much of the question as pertains to man's authorship of sin ; he is rendered incapable of sinning ; the doing of a "wicked thing" is not and never can be *his* doing. One of two suppositions must follow : either there is no moral evil in the world, or if there is, God is the sole agent of that moral evil, by being the sole cause of the volitions, of which it is the predicate. The first is contrary to Scripture and experience ; the second supposition can be entertained by no consistent theist. There is some defect in an argument which necessitates the existence of such a dilemma. It lies in the position, that God is the sole and efficient cause of every volition. This is a very unpropitious world for such a theory ; there is too much sin in it ; it might do better in heaven. If it be said that this is the *best* account which can be given of the existence of moral evil, my answer is, that the position is not true, and if it were, then we had better have no account than to have this. If it be said, that man is the author of sin, as he is the *subject* of the wicked voli-

tion; I ask, in what sense is God its author? In the sense that he is the cause of it, although not its subject. Now which idea comes the nearest to proper authorship; to have a change wrought in a being by another, or to be the being who works and causes that change? The former is all that Dr. Edwards can predicate of man; the latter he must predicate of the Deity, to be consistent. He is logically shut up to this very point; there is no getting away from it; he must accept the necessary deduction of his own system, or abandon the system. The idea may be dressed in milder and more palatable terms; but it is still there—the latent poison penetrates the whole scheme.

I have now completed the outline of thought which was proposed in the commencement of this Article. If the discussion has been somewhat prolix, I have only to say, that it grew out of the nature of the subject. Charges made upon a writer by the *wholesale* system, without appealing to his own language, are very likely to do injustice to his views. Hence I have sought to discuss no position as being that of Dr. Edwards, without first showing that such was the fact. Both in statement and argument I have endeavored to do justice to his views. That he did much to carry this question upon one side, is very freely granted. The whole subject, however, which the father and the son were supposed to have settled, is destined to be placed a second time in the crucible. Perhaps a second Edwards will immortalize himself on the side which the first defended; and possibly a greater than Dr. Clarke is yet to untie the Gordian knot, which has long been the puzzle of philosophers. The intellectual world will probably settle down on a system, in many respects at least, unlike that of Edwards. In its present form it cannot survive the investigation of present and coming generations. Whether it will be succeeded by a system having more merits and fewer faults, remains to be seen.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN TRACT SOCIETY.

By Rev W. R. Williams, D. D., Pastor of the Amity-street Baptist Church, New-York.

The Christian Library, 45 vols., 400 pages each. *The Evangelical Family Library*, 15 volumes. *The Youth's Christian Library*, 40 volumes.

THE American Tract Society has been for years a familiar and cherished name with our churches. But many, even of intelligent Christians, have probably scarce made themselves conversant with its varied publications, or considered duly the influence it was likely to wield over the religious literature of our own and other lands. They have thought, perhaps, of the Institution as furnishing a few excellent Tracts in the form of loose pamphlets, and supposed these, with some children's books, to constitute the entire sum of its issues; while, in truth, the Society, noiselessly following the beckonings of Divine Providence, has been led to undertake the publication of volumes, and to furnish libraries for Christian churches, schools, and households. These heedless observers have thought of it mostly in connection with a few favorite Tracts written in our own vernacular language; while, in fact, the Society has come to be engaged in the circulation of books and Tracts in more tongues than the richest Polyglott comprises, and is extending its operations through lands more numerous and remote than any one probably of the most widely-travelled of its readers has ever traversed. The moral and intellectual character of the religious literature thus widely diffused deserves some thoughts.*

* It was made recently the subject of examination. At a special meeting of the Society and its friends, convened in the city of New-York a few months since, several subjects were presented for consideration, as bearing on the character, plans, and duties of the Society. Amongst these was "THE EVANGELICAL CHARACTER OF THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SOCIETY, AND THEIR ADAPTATION TO THE WANTS OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF MANKIND, AT HOME AND ABROAD." Upon the subject so assigned to the writer, the following remarks were prepared.

The various publications of the Society in our own land, if we include its issues of every form and size, from the handbill and the broad sheet, up to the bound volume, already number one thousand. In foreign lands it aids in issuing nearly twice that number, written in some one hundred of the different languages and dialects of the earth. Amongst ourselves, in the seventeen years of its existence, it has already, by sale or gift, scattered broad-cast over the whole face of the land, in our churches and Sabbath-schools, through our towns and villages, among the neglected, in the lanes of our large cities, where misery retires to die, and vice to shelter itself from the eye of day, and amidst the destitute, sparsely sprinkled over our wide frontiers, where the ministry has scarce followed, and the church can scarce gather the scattered inhabitants, some two millions of books and some sixty millions of Tracts. This is no ordinary influence. It must find its way into nearly every vein and artery of the body politic. Whether it be of a pure and healthful character, is an inquiry of grave moment to the churches who sustain this enterprise, and to the country which receives this literature. If baneful, it is a grievous wrong to the community; if merely inert and useless, it is a fraud committed upon the benevolence of the churches.

I. Whether these publications deserve the confidence of Christians, may be ascertained by the answer which is given to one question: Do THEY PREACH JESUS CHRIST AND HIM CRUCIFIED? He must be the theme of every successful ministry, whether preaching from the pulpit or through the press. The blessing of God's Spirit is promised only to the exaltation of the Son of God, the Saviour of the world. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." When Paul describes the peculiarities of his own successful ministry—a ministry that shook the nations—a ministry that carried the blazing torch of its testimony from Illyricum to Spain, he compresses these into a very brief space. He was determined to know nothing but *Christ Jesus and him crucified*. In Christ he found the motive which stimulated all his fervid and untiring activity, and the model upon which was moulded every excellence of his character. "To me to live is Christ." Only so far as the issues of this Society cherish this same principle does it ask, and only so far can it deserve, from the churches of our Lord Jesus Christ, that cordial support and that large extension of its labors which it solicits at the hands of the religious community.

And not only is it necessary to the success of such ministry of the press, that it should make the crucified Saviour the great theme of its teachings; it should also present this theme, as far as possible, in a scriptural manner. By this we mean, not a mere iteration of the words of sacred writ, but that the mind of the writer should be so imbued with the spirit of the Scripture, and so possessed by its doctrines, and so haunted by its imagery and illustrations, as to present, naturally and earnestly, the great truths of the scheme of salvation, in that proportion and with those accompaniments which are found in the inspired volume. His thoughts must all be habited, as far as it may be, in the garb, and breathe the spirit of that only book to which we can ascribe unmingled truth.

That the works of the American Tract Society are thus evangelical in their character, would seem scarce needing proof, since none, as far as we know, have yet questioned it. Amid the fierce and embittered controversies, from which the church has never been exempt, (and certainly not in our own times,) we know not that any, among the several bodies of Christians generally recognized as evangelical, have arisen to impugn in this respect the character of the Society's issues. This has not been because these books have been secretly circulated. They have been found everywhere, dropped in the highway and lodged in the pastor's study, distributed in the nursery, the rail-car, the steam-boat, and the stage-coach, as well as exposed on the shelves of the book-store, and they have challenged the investigation of all into whose hands they have come. Denominations of Christians, divided from each other by varying views as to the discipline and polity of the church of Christ, and even holding opposite sentiments as to some of the more important doctrines of the Gospel, have yet agreed in recognizing in these publications the great paramount truths of that Gospel, and have co-operated long, liberally, and harmoniously, in their distribution and use.

The names of the authors whose volumes are found in friendly juxtaposition, standing side by side on the shelves of the libraries the Society has provided for the Christian household and school, seem to furnish another strong pledge to the same effect. Doddridge, Baxter, Edwards, Owen, Flavel, and Bunyan, are names that seem to belong less to any one division of the Christian host than to the whole family of Christ. They are the current coin of the church, which have passed so freely from

hand to hand, that the minuter superscription of the sects to which they may have belonged, the denominational imprint, seems to have been worn away in the wide, unquestioned circulation they have received. And they have been acknowledged by evangelical believers, wherever the English language and literature have gone, as faithful and most powerful preachers of the Gospel of Christ. They have received higher attestation even than that of having their "praise" thus "in all the churches." The Head of the church has not withholden his benediction and imprint. The influence of His Spirit has long and largely rested on the written labors of these his servants; and, while the authors themselves have been in the grave, their works are yet following them in lengthening and widening trains of usefulness. Multitudes have been converted, and thousands of others have traced to these books their own growth in Christian holiness. Some of these writers were, while upon the earth, not inactive or unsuccessful as preachers with the living voice; yet it may be questioned whether all the seals of their living ministry would equal the tithe of the seals which God has continued to set to their posthumous ministry in the volumes they have bequeathed to the world and the church.

II. But how far are they adapted to the wants of THE PRESENT GENERATION OF MANKIND? We know that in the varying tastes and habits of society, and its ever-shifting currents of feeling, new channels of thought are scooped out, and new forms of expression become popular; and the writer whose compositions present not these forms and move not in these channels, may find himself deserted as obsolete. His works are consigned to the unmolested and dusty shelves of the antiquarian, while other and fresher rivals grasp the sceptre of popularity and usefulness that has passed from his hands. New conditions of society and new institutions also, may require another style of address and another train of instruction than those which, once indeed, were most salutary and seasonable, but are so no longer. If other classes of literature become antiquated, and the old give place to the new, may it not be so with religious literature? may it not be so with much of the literature from which the American Tract Society is seeking to supply the Christians of the present age?

1. What then are *the wants of the present age*? Religion, it should be remembered, if true, must be in its great principles unchangeable, and the same in all eras of the world's history.

"Can length of years on God himself exact,
And make that fiction which was once a fact?"

A revelation, from its source and the nature of its contents, possesses, therefore, a fixedness and constancy that can belong to no science of merely human origin. The Bible stands apart from all the literature of man's devising, as a book never to be superseded—susceptible of no amendment, and never to be made obsolete whilst the world stands. The book of the world's Creator and the world's Governor, the record of the world's history and the world's duty, the world's sin and the world's salvation, it will endure while that world lasts, and continue to claim its present authority as long as that government over the present world may continue. Religious works, therefore, the more profoundly they are imbued with the spirit of the Bible, will the more nearly partake of its indestructibility. Hence the Confessions of Augustine, written so many centuries ago, are not yet an obsolete book, nor can be while the human heart and the Christian religion continue the same that they now are. In their religious literature, the church and the world in the nineteenth century must, therefore, in most respects, have the same wants as the church and the world in earlier ages.

It will be allowed, however, that there are certain peculiarities in the history and character of an age that may make one form of address and one style of discussion much more useful and reasonable in its religious literature than another. Has our country at this period any such peculiar wants? We might refer to many circumstances in its government and its people, their pursuits and their character, which distinguish, and as it were, individualize our land and our age. But to sum them all in one word, we suppose the main distinction and boast of our people is, that they are a *practical* race. Others theorize; they act. Visionary reforms and schemes of society, that might in other regions be nursed for centuries in the brains of philosophers, and be deemed practicable only because they have never been reduced to practice, if they find proselytes amongst us, are soon brought to the test of actual experiment; their admirers here *act* upon the theories, which, elsewhere, are but reasoned upon, and the system, exploding in the trial, refutes itself. Our countrymen, the colonists of a wide and fertile territory, the mariners whose keels vex every shore, and whose sails whiten the remotest seas, inherit the solid sense, the sober judgment, the energy, daring, and perseverance of the Anglo-Saxon race;

and their political institutions and the broad territory yet to be subdued and peopled, here give full scope to these traits of character. We are as yet, though a nation of readers, not a nation of students; but much more a nation of seamen, farmers, and traders. Our very studies are practical; and the cast of character which distinguished the Roman from the Greek mind, and which made the former the masters of the world—the practical character of the mind and its pursuits—belongs, in all climes and on every shore, to the Saxon race. If we, as a nation, have in this era of our history specific wants, we want then a *practical* literature in religion, as in other branches of knowledge—a religious literature, adapted, with practical wisdom, to the peculiar duties and snares, the prevalent errors and the popular institutions of our time. Has this Society furnished such?

That portion of its publications which are of American origin, and which its exertions have been the means of calling out, or of diffusing more widely where they already existed, all its books that are of recent and domestic origin, may be supposed naturally to possess some tolerable degree of adaptation to our own national wants, the prevailing sins and follies of the times, and the peculiar responsibilities and privileges of Christian churches in the United States, in the nineteenth century. The writers are of us, and wrote for us, and we may suppose that these productions at least are not wanting in such adaptation. Their currency and their usefulness, the souls which, by the blessing of God, they have converted, and their influence on the faith, zeal, and purity of the churches, afford evidence of the same kind. Of the 430 pamphlet Tracts in the English language, issued by the Society, more than one half are of American origin. It was not so in the earlier years of the Society's history. Of the first one hundred Tracts on the lists of this Society, more than two thirds were republications from works of British Christians, of the richest character indeed, but they were the siftings of a rich religious literature more than two centuries old. Of the last one hundred of these 430 Tracts, on the other hand, more than three fourths were by American Christians. We have not pursued the investigation into the bound volumes of the Society; but we suppose that there a similar result would be reached, although the proportion of American authorship is not yet as large, perhaps, as in the pamphlet Tracts. Here also it is increasing, however, and one third of the volumes may

be regarded as of domestic origin. It would be found, we suppose, that the Society, in the brief period of seventeen years, has done much to create a national religious literature.

To effect any literary changes, seventeen years, it should be remembered, is a very brief period. As far then as adaptedness to the special wants of this country can be decided by the domestic or foreign authorship of its publications, it would appear that the Society has, with great rapidity, exerted a most perceptible and powerful influence on the writers and readers of our churches. It has elicited and diffused a literature that is emphatically *for* us, inasmuch as it is *from* ourselves. The intelligent Christian can never wish to see his denomination or his country confining its sympathies and its studies to the literature of the sect itself, or of that one country, thus shut up in the narrow circle of its own writers. Christianity is free, genial, and philanthropic. It loves the race. Christianity is the only true citizenship of the world, and it hails the writings and the history of all lands and all kindreds, when imbued with the spirit of the common Saviour. But yet there may be certain evident advantages in having, for some purposes and within certain limits, a denominational and also a national literature in our churches. For this object of a national literature the American Tract Society may claim to have done much, and to have done it well. They have furnished a body of Tracts, popular in style, pungent and faithful, pithy, brief, and striking, that are singularly adapted to the moral wants of our community, and many of which, from their high excellence, would bear transplantation into the literature of almost any other Christian country.

2. As to the *adaptedness for usefulness* amongst our churches and people of those volumes and Tracts which the Society has derived from the rich Christian literature of Great Britain, it may be deserving of remark, that the more distinguished of these works are derived mainly from three memorable eras in the religious history of that country.

The first of these was *the age of the Puritans and Nonconformists*. Into the merits of their controversy with the Established Church of England it is no part of our design here to enter. They were, by the admission of the candid in every party, men of powerful intellect and ardent piety, whose principles had been tried and strengthened in the fierce collisions of their age, and whose character received in consequence an energy it might else have wanted. The measures of govern-

ment, that threw the Nonconformists out of their pulpits, were fitted to produce an admirable class of writings, such as the church has not often enjoyed. Many of these devout men, mighty in the Scriptures and incessant in prayer, had they been left to the quiet discharge of their pastoral duties, would have kept the noiseless tenor of their way, and the world would probably have heard little or nought of their authorship. Preaching would have absorbed their minds and consumed all their strength. The mere preacher has little leisure, and often little fitness to be a successful writer. Thus the published remains of Whitfield are of little value compared with the writings of many men far his inferiors in the pulpit and in its immediate results of usefulness. Had then the edicts and policy of the Stuarts left the Nonconformist fathers to their own chosen course, they would, many of them, have died and bequeathed no literary remains; or those remains would have been comparatively meagre and jejune, from the want of leisure in a life of active and unremitted pastoral toil. But, on the other hand, had the rich and varied writings of that class of men, who, from the prison or beside its very gate, sent out their treatises to their peeled and scattered churches, been composed by mere students, men of the lamp and the closet, they would have been deficient in their popular style, their earnestness, and their apt familiar illustrations. None but pastors, acquainted with the people and familiar with the popular modes of communicating religious truth, could thus have imbued the deepest truths of theology and morals with a racy vivacity, and surrounded them with such simple and every-day imagery.

Thus, only men who had been bred pastors could have written some of these works. And, on the other hand, had they continued pastors, they could not have written them for want of leisure, inclination, and even perhaps mental power. But when the prison and the pillory shut them in, and the pulpit had shut them out, these resolute and holy men resorted to the only channel left them for communicating with the hearts and consciences of men. It was the press. Had Baxter been a mere student and not a pastor, he would probably have made all his writings thorny, abstruse, and sterile, as the works of those schoolmen, whose writings he seems to have loved so fondly, and studied so closely. And, in that case, where had been the usefulness of the *Saints' Rest*, and the *Call to the Unconverted*? Had he continued always a pastor, he would have preached much more

to the men of the 17th century; but it is very questionable whether he would have preached as well or as much to the men of the 19th century as he now does. Here then is a class of writers, in whose history God seems to have made special provision that they should be trained to become effective as the practical writers of the church, bringing to the experience of the pastor all the leisure of the scholar, and grafting upon the meditations of the study all the unction, the simplicity, and the popular tact of the pulpit.

In addition to these peculiar preparations for general usefulness, the writings of the Puritans and Nonconformists come to us, as Americans, commended by considerations of singular force. The fathers of New-England were of that class of men. The Adam and Eve of those regions were fashioned of Puritan clay; and many of our peculiar institutions and our distinctive traits of national character may be traced, through that New-England ancestry, to the character of the Puritans of England. We have an hereditary right in their works and memory. Their writings are moulded by peculiar influences, that have yet left their traces upon our mental idiosyncrasy as a people. Connected then as the Puritans of the mother country were with our progenitors by every tie of piety and blood, their voice comes upon the ears of American Christians like a testimony from the graves of those revered forefathers, who planted upon our rugged northern shores the germs of our freedom, our knowledge, and our arts, while seeking only in the desert a refuge from persecution, and freedom to worship God; but who left, where they sought merely a shelter, the foundations of a new empire, stretching its territories already from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and shedding the influence of its commerce and its freedom over either continent.

The second of these eras, which have contributed to the Christian literature of this Society, is that of *the great revival of religion, under the labors of Whitfield and the Wesleys in England, and the elder Edwards and the Tennents in our own country*. It was a great religious movement, awakening from lethargy and recalling from perilous errors a portion of the English Establishment, infusing a new life of piety into the English Dissenters, as in our own country it supplied the destitute and awakened the formal from Georgia to New-Hampshire. It was an era, both here and in the parent country, of bitter controversy. The truths, recalled from their long con-

cealment and urged with new zeal, were to be defended from the press as well as from the pulpit, or the open field, where so many of those preachers delivered their testimony. To this day it is that we owe the works of Doddridge and Edwards, that work of Venn which the Society has very recently republished, and the memoir of Edwards's disciple and friend, the glowing, suffering David Brainerd. In the necessities of that time we see, though to a less extent, a combination of the same causes which made the Nonconformists' writings what they were. The preacher was grafted on the student. Had not Edwards had the experience of those glorious revivals God permitted him to witness and to record, he could perhaps still have written the work "On the Religious Affections;" but it would have been a very different book. Without the resources of his rich pastoral experience it might have been as profound as the immortal Analogy of Butler, and as little fitted as that work to be generally popular with the great mass of readers.

The third of these memorable eras may be designated as the era of *modern Christian enterprise*. We know no fitter epithet to describe its varied activity, and its aggressive action on the ignorance of nominal Christendom and the wide wastes of heathenism. It began shortly after the breaking out of the French Revolution. It was an age when God seemed for a time to allow a new "*hour and power of darkness*," akin to that which brooded over the world when its Redeemer was about to suffer. Then boiled up from the lower deeps of the human heart floods of corruption, that, in ordinary ages, slumber on, dark and unseen, in their quiet concealment. Then steamed up, as it were from the nethermost abysses of hell, strange and hideous errors, that generally avoid the light of day, and the world was aghast at the open appearance of atheism, and the rejection by a great nation, as in mass, of their old ancestral faith. But, as if to illustrate his own government of the universe, then, to meet this revolt, rose up, from quarters the most distant, and some of them the most obscure, designs for good and enterprises of benevolence, of which the world had long seen no parallel. The Foreign Missions of the Christian church, the Sabbath School, the Tract Society itself, and the Bible Society, burst up, as in quick succession, and ere the carnival of the pit was ended, and while Satan seemed yet triumphing in his anticipated conquest of the world to impiety, the Christian faith received a fresh impulse, and the cause of the Saviour assumed an aggressive energy

it has never since lost. To this period belonged Buchanan and Pearce. In this period Wilberforce published that *View of Religion* in the higher classes, which was, in the judgment of the commentator Scott, the noblest protest in favor of the gospel made for centuries—a book that consoled and delighted that eminent statesman Burke on his dying bed, and gave to the church of Christ the lamented and beloved author of that immortal Tract “the Dairyman’s Daughter,” Legh Richmond. Parr, who could have, unhappily, little sympathy with its spirituality or its orthodoxy, pelted it with learned Greek, as a book, the beginning of which he had forgotten, the middle of which he could not understand, and to which, as a whole, he could not assent. Belsham assailed it, amongst other reasons, because its excellent author had spoken of Unitarianism as “a sort of half-way house between orthodoxy and infidelity.” But the attacks thus made upon the work of the Christian senator, proved comparatively powerless, and the book held on its way of widening and enduring usefulness. Its influence was most decisive, under God, in aiding the great work of reform, the effects of which are visible in the middle and higher classes of England. Then, too, wrote and labored Hannah More, and to the same period may be added Henry Martyn.

All these three were periods of conflict. In the first and in the third, political contentions were intermingled with religious controversies. Wars and rumors of wars exasperated the fierce collisions between rival sects, or the strife that was waged between Christianity and those who cast off all fear, and mocked to his face their Maker and Judge. The second was indeed exclusively a period of *religious* controversy; but the points at issue were so momentous, and the zeal exhibited so ardent, that England and America were filled with the noise of inquiry and dispute, as the Gospel went on winning new and glorious triumphs amid fierce opposition. There was, as in the apostolic history, a wide door opened, and there were also “many opposers,” and both Whitfield and Wesley were more than once, in Christian Britain, on the eve of a summary and ferocious martyrdom.

All these three eras were then eras of moral revolution. It is a familiar fact that revolutions produce great characters. Their great emergencies, awaken feeling and develop talent. Some mighty crisis paralyzes the weaker crowd, and summons forth the master spirit who can meet its demands, and reveals thus to the world his merits and his powers. And it is also

true, that, although the highest works of science do not issue from such times, the most stirring and popular books are often the progeny of such an age of turmoil and conflict. These orgasms of feeling, that shoot through the whole frame of a nation, may bring out much that is crude and extravagant, but they also lead to exertions of more than wonted power, and results of more than vulgar splendor. The best efforts of the best writers are sometimes traceable to the excitement of some such stirring era. Pascal's Provincial Letters, in which wit, argument, and eloquence are so splendidly blended, and, leaning on each other, group themselves around the cross of Christ, could not have been produced in the holiday leisure of some peaceful era. It needed the fierce controversies in which Jansenism lay bleeding under the feet of triumphant Jesuitism, and struggling as for life, while it testified, as from the dust, in behalf of many of the great truths of the Gospel—it needed, we say, such a conflict and such a peril to draw out a production so powerful even from the mighty heart and the massive intellect of a Pascal.

There are works that seemingly can exist only as the birth of the throes and death-pangs of some great era of change and moral renovation. Such were the three eras to which we have alluded, and their character was imprinted on many of the works they produced, and which this Society reprints and disseminates. No other age, no lighter emergency could have called forth such intellectual strength and such depth of feeling, and made the volumes so well fitted as they are to tell upon the heart of an entire nation. Works then written have the energy of the conflict and breathe for ever its strong passions. Their words are often battles. Had Bunyan never inhabited a dungeon, there to pore over the martyr annals of Fox's Acts and Monuments, we question whether the Pilgrim's Progress would have had its beautiful pictures of the Land of Beulah, a land of freedom, light and beauty, and we doubt whether that allegory had ever existed. Had Baxter never been an army-chaplain, who must talk strong truths in plain terms, we question whether his works would have had all their passionate energy and their strong simplicity.

With regard, therefore, to those portions of the Society's publications which proceed from American authors, their origin is some evidence in favor of their adaptedness to our peculiar wants. With regard to all those works of *British* origin that

came from either of the great eras upon which we have remarked, we have in favor of their influence not only the character of the writers, but the character of the age in which they wrote and did battle for the truth of God as they believed it.

Taking now the literature of the Society, as prepared for this country in mass, we find in it evidently a variety and fullness of subjects that would seem to meet the varied demands of the church and the nation. For missionary literature, it has the memoirs of Brainerd, Buchanan, Schwartz, Henry Martyn, and Harriet Winslow. Does a pastor seek to train his flock to higher devotedness, where could be found a better manual than Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest*, written, as it would seem, under the golden sky of the Delectable Mountains, and in full sight of the Celestial City? Where better companions than the biographies of Leighton, and Payson, and Pearce, and J. Brainerd Taylor? Against infidelity we have Bogue, (the work that was read, and with some considerable impressions of mind, by Napoleon in his last days,) and Morison, and Keith, and the treatises of Leslie and Watson, while others, on the same subject of Christian Evidences, commend themselves as the works of writers who were themselves recovered from infidelity, as the writings of Lyttleton, West, Jenyns, and our countryman Nelson. There is provision for every age. For the child, the Society has furnished the touching biographies of Nathan Dickerman, John Mooney Mead, and Mary Lathrop, with the juvenile works of Gallaudet, and some of those by the Abbotts. For those who love profound thought it has Foster, and for the lovers of brilliant imagination and glowing eloquence, the German Krummacher. Of the Nonconformists and of the contemporaries of Edwards we have already spoken. Few writers of our time have caught so successfully, on some pages, the spirit of Baxter as J. G. Pike, three of whose works the Society republishes. As models of usefulness in the various walks of life, and in either sex, we have the biographies of Normand Smith, the example of the Christian tradesman; and of Harlan Page, the private church member laboring for souls; of Kilpin, of Hannah Hobbie, and of Caroline Hyde. The child just tottering from its cradle is met by the Society with the half-cent Scripture Alphabet, while, for the last stages of human life, they have Burder's *Sermons to the Aged*, printed in type that suits it, for the dimmer eyes of old age. Furnished at every variety of price, and in every form and size, as are the Tracts

of the Society, the Christian traveller who would scatter the seed of truth as he journeys, and the Christian father who would furnish his children with a library of devout and wise authors; the Christian minister who would train himself and others to higher devotedness and usefulness; the Christian mother desiring aid to order her youthful charge aright, and the young disciple requiring a guide to the formation of a character of intelligent and consistent piety—all find their wants met. Against Romanism and intemperance the Society have furnished a quiver of polished arrows in their bound volumes of Tracts on each subject, in addition to the separate volume of Beecher on the one, and of the lamented Nevins on the other. They have Mason's Spiritual Treasury for the family altar and the closet; and for the pilgrim gathering up his feet into his couch to die, they have the Dying Thoughts of Baxter. They leave behind, after the funeral ceremony has been performed, the Manual of Christian Consolation, by Flavel the Nonconformist, and Cecil the Churchman. They instruct the active Christian with Cotton Mather's "Essays to do Good," the book that won the praise and aided to form the usefulness of our own Franklin. They assail the covetous and hard-handed professor with the burning energy and eloquence of Harris's Mammon. But the time fails to review separately all the varied themes of their publications, and the varied channels through which they are prepared to pour the same great lesson of Christ the only Saviour, the Sovereign and the Exemplar of his people.

3. But what evidence have we that these volumes are fitted for the present generation of men *in other lands*? Many, then, of this class of publications are written by missionaries abroad, conversant with the field they till, and anxiously and prayerfully addressing themselves to its wants. In Burmah and Siam, in India and in China, the Society is thus assailing the favorite idols and delusions of the heathen, in the manner which men who have given their lives to the work deem most suitable. The Society is thus, at the same time, proclaiming the Gospel before the car of Juggernaut and around the Areopagus where Paul preached; and many of their Tracts have already been blessed, to the conversion of the readers, and to shake, in the minds of thousands besides, the old traditional idolatry received from their forefathers.

Others of these compositions are translations of works written in England or America, and many of them are in the number

of the Society's *English* publications. It may to some minds seem very doubtful that any work prepared originally for the Christians of Great Britain, or our own land, can, by any possibility, be intelligible or useful to heathen nations trained under different influences and strangers to our modes of thought and expression.

But it should be remembered that the good effects of some of these translations have been put beyond doubt by the testimony of missionaries as to the interest they have excited, and even by the conversion of some of the heathen. One of the works of Baxter, we believe it was his *Call*, was translated in his lifetime by our own Elliot for the use of his Indian converts; and a youth, the son of one of their chiefs, continued reading the work with tears on his death-bed. The pastor who talked to the carpet-weavers of Kidderminster could, it seems, speak as well to the savage hunters and fishermen of Natick and of Martha's Vineyard. The *Dairyman's Daughter* was early translated into Russian by a princess of that country, and has been acceptable and useful. The free-born English maiden that lived and died amid the delightful scenery of the Isle of Wight has told her tale effectively to the serfs and amid the snows of Russia. Fuller's *Great Question Answered*, another of the Society's Tracts, was crowned with striking success in a Danish version, and it was found that the pastor of the inland English village of Kettering was still a powerful preacher in the new garb and tongue that had been given him for the inhabitants of Copenhagen. Others have gone yet farther. We name the *Pilgrim's Progress* of Bunyan as an illustration, because none of the religious works of Europe has been so widely translated. In English the Society has printed it not only in the ordinary style but in the raised and tangible characters used by the blind. Little did the tinker of Elstow ever dream that his matchless allegory should be translated into the tongue of the false prophet Mahomet. Yet it has appeared in Arabic; and Joseph Wolff, in his travels in Yemen, distributed copies of the version in that ancient and widely-spoken language. In seven at least, if not in more, of the dialects of India and the neighboring countries it has made its appearance; in the Oriya, the Tamul, the Hindustani or Urdu, the Mahrathi, the Malay, the Bengali, and very recently in the Burman.

Fears, at the time when an Indian translation was first proposed, that its European ideas and imagery would be unintelli-

gible to the native of the East, led a popular female writer to prepare in its stead her *Pilgrim of India*, with its Hindoo phrases and metaphors. But the original *Pilgrim* has been permitted now to speak, and he has spoken not in vain. The number of the *London Evangelical Magazine* for the present month, (Oct. 1842,) contains the memoir of Daniel, a Hindoo convert, written by himself. From this it appears that the work of Bunyan was a powerful instrument in his conversion: "At this period a gentleman put into my hand a book called the *Pilgrim's Progress*, which I read. Partly by reading this book, and partly by the remembrance of all the labor which had been expended on me at Coimbatour, I began to feel that the Christian religion was the only true religion, and that Christ was the only sinless Saviour." This was, probably, the *Tamil* version.

A translation was made by the British missionaries into the *Malagasy* language, for the use of the Christian converts whom God granted to their labors in the island of Madagascar. Of the hold which the volume took upon their hearts we may judge from the language of the letters addressed by some of these converts to their missionary pastors when expelled from the island:—"We are impressed and delighted when we read the *Pilgrim's Progress*." And at a still later day, when the storm of persecution beat yet more heavily upon them, and some were executed for the profession of their faith, it is said that while awaiting death they felt inexpressible peace and joy, and said one to another, "Now are we in the situation of Christian and Faithful, when they were led to the city of Vanity Fair." An European book, thus quoted by African martyrs about to die, must be of singular merit.

The same book has been translated into *Finnish*, for the use of the region verging on Lapland, and printed in Dutch for the use of the missions in South Africa. A version has been made into Hawaiian at the Sandwich Islands; and one in Tahitian for the Society Islands, though we do not know that the latter has as yet been published.

A book which could thus interest the fur-clad peasantry of the frozen North in their smoky huts, and the tawny Caffer and Hottentot in the midst of his sandy, sunburnt plains; which delights, in the cabins of our own West and in the far Hindustan, must have some elements that fit it for use everywhere. The nature of man is one in all climes. Conscience may be

drugged and mutilated, but its entire extirpation seems impossible, and it lives under the pressure of error and amid torpor to witness for truth, and right, and God, in quarters where our unbelief and fear would expect to find it, if not utterly wanting, at least utterly inert. The same heart beats under the tattooed skin of the New Zealander as under the grease and ochre with which the Tambookie or Bechuana of South Africa delights to adorn his person, under the silks of the Chinaman and the furs of the Laplander. It has everywhere the same depravity, that no grade of civilization or refinement can so adorn as to lift beyond the need of the renewing gospel, and that no brutalism can so degrade as to put below the reach of the same efficacious remedy. Religion, it should be remembered again, is not mere abstract speculation; it is also emotion. With the heart man believeth. Now science and literature (strictly so called) may be an affair of certain civilized nations, and of them only; but poetry and passion are of all lands and of all kindreds of the earth. And how largely do these enter into the structure of the Gospel, of the book revealing that Gospel, and of all Christian writings modelled upon that Bible. There are, it must be allowed, in the production of Bunyan's genius, excellencies and peculiarities that do not exist to an equal extent in many of the other publications of the Society, adapting it to interest mankind in every grade of civilization and under all the varieties of custom and taste, that culture or neglect, error or truth may have produced. Yet it will, in all probability, be found, when the trial shall have been made by competent translators, that many other of the favorite books of British and American Christians are fitted to become nearly as much the favorites of the converts whom the grace of God shall gather in the ancient East or in the islands of the seas.

Our hope that much of the literature of European or American origin may thus become at once available for the spiritual wants of the converts from heathenism rests not on the peculiar talent of the works so much as on their subject and structure. Their theme is Jesus Christ, the character and the history devised by infinite wisdom, with the express intention of winning its way to the sympathies of man, under all the varieties of complexion, caste, language, laws and literature. This theme has proved its power to exorcise superstitions the most foul and inveterate, and to raise from the deepest and most hopeless degradation. Pervaded and saturated as so many of the Soci-

ety's works are with this subject, we have confidence that the divine grandeur of the theme will, to some extent, compensate for the defects of the human authorship. The idols of all lands shall totter from their shrines, and yet be broken before its might; and we look for the shattering of all by the faithful and full presentation of this truth—Christ and him crucified—a truth that is to be the great Iconoclast principle of the age; for it is God's own device, and carries with it God's own promise, and the irresistible energy of his benediction.

We have reason, again, to expect the adaptation of much of the religious literature of our own country and Britain to the wants of the foreign missionary, from its close assimilation to the character of the Scriptures. This is a book carrying one of the evidences of its divine origin upon it, and its power of interesting all grades of society and all ages of mankind. Far as any religious writer becomes penetrated by its spirit, and transfuses, as many of the Society's authors have done, its imagery and train of thought, into his own compositions, so far he prepares them for acceptableness and favor among every tribe of mankind. If the Scriptures look with special favor on any class of our race, it is on the Eastern portion of the world. The Bible is an Oriental book, as far as it is the book of any one region or race. It would have been, in style and imagery, a very different volume had the Anglo-Saxon race been left to prepare it. And as far as it should have partaken of their marked peculiarities it would have been less fitted for one great errand it has in this age to accomplish. The missions of our times are pouring back from the favored West and from the tents of Japheth the light of salvation on the long-neglected habitations of Shem, its original seats, and upon the millions of the East. It is some advantage, then, that we go to them with a book that, if it favor any class, is more Eastern than Western in character; and that we carry with the Bible a biblical literature that, from the book on which it has been founded, has, in many of its specimens, caught a tinge of similar feelings, and imagery, and style.

In that body of religious literature whose evangelical and practical character we have thus imperfectly examined, the Society have done much. But it would be doing them and their objects gross injustice to suppose that they present it as a complete body of religious reading for all the wants of the age. Its publications may have some inequality of merit. What

collection is otherwise? The lingering and fitful charities of the churches may forbid their enlarging it as they desire, and as the wants of our own and foreign lands require. The Non-conformist literature has many volumes they would gladly add to their existing collection. There are two other great eras of religious conflict and effort, from the literature of which the London Tract Society has drawn largely, and this Institution as yet not at all. We allude to the era of the stormy infancy of the Scottish National Church, and the works of its Rutherford, its Guthrie, its Binning, its Andrew Gray, and its Durham. The other greater and earlier era is that of the English Reformation. Of the works of the English reformers our British brethren have published several volumes. As to the present availableness of this latter literature we are aware that there is division of opinion; but its history would be valuable, if not its remains.

Nor is the American Tract Society to be judged as if it had completed its own designs, or finished its mission as respects a *native* religious literature. Its power to elicit works drawn up with peculiar reference to our position and habits as a people, has as yet been shown but in a small degree. The churches of this country are capable of much more, and need much more; and, if duly sustained, the Society may proceed in this work to a point far beyond the limit of its present attainments. Will the churches afford this aid? Here at least they will have—if they choose, by prayer, and effort, and liberality, to secure it—they will have a literature all that they can wish, as to its national adaptation.

And if our country and others that have been long favored with the serene and pure light of the Gospel are yet to know days of dark and stormy controversy with error; if over the once peaceful encampments of our churches is spreading the hum that betokens an approaching combat; if, as some fear, we are entering in our times upon a stern and close conflict with Romanism or with skepticism, or with both; or are to stand up for our national morals and national existence against the floods of a frivolous and profligate literature that now drowns the minds of our youth as beneath a rushing deluge of inanity, and filth, and venom, we have little fear as to the result. We cannot distrust the powers and the triumphs of Scripture, the safety and ultimate victories of the church. In the God of the Bible and the Head of the Church we need not fear to place

the most unquestioning and imperturbable confidence. He who gave the Bible will guard the gift; and He who built will watch, as with a wall of fire, around the city of his own chosen Jerusalem. And, from all the past history of the church, we augur that out of this or any other conflict that may be awaiting us in the interval between our times and the final glory of Christ's kingdom, there may grow some of the richest productions of that literature which the church is yet to enjoy; a literature as yet unwritten, and which this Institution, we trust, will, with others, aid in educing, diffusing, and perpetuating. Some of the richest legacies which sanctified genius has ever bequeathed to the Christian church are like that more cherished portion which the dying patriarch gave to his favorite son, his Joseph, "One portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite with my sword and with my bow;" the spoils plucked as out of the very teeth of the Destroyer, the trophies of a late and hard-won victory.

ARTICLE V.

MORAL AND LITERARY INFLUENCE OF NOVELS.

By E. D. Sanborn, Prof. of the Latin Language and Literature, Dartmouth College, N. H.

WHEN the human mind is in a healthy condition, there is a pleasure in mere intellectual activity. But it is the cultivated student only who can derive intense enjoyment from long-protracted and patient thought. To the undisciplined mind severe application is always painful. Hence a large proportion of mankind seek pleasure in novelty and variety. Any change is preferable to monotony. The more rapid the succession of strange events, which pass before the eye, the greater is the satisfaction experienced. In the gratification of this natural curiosity of untutored minds, the memory and imagination are chiefly employed. The other faculties are liable to remain weak and infantile from mere inaction. The imagination needs less stimulus than any of the other native powers of the soul. It

is usually most active in children, and of course the most difficult to control. It seems to occupy a middle ground between sense and the understanding. Its pleasures are not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding. This faculty is peculiarly active among rude nations that are just breaking the fetters of sense, and aspiring to intellectual freedom. Imagination then has a boundless range of action, and an exhaustless supply of materials. With memory for her ally, she subdues and governs the whole empire of mind. Hoary tradition and youthful history alike wear her livery, and obey her behests. The most common events are clothed with mystery, and the ordinary exploits of heroes, under her magic touch, become feats of superhuman power. Every event, whose cause is not apparent to the untaught barbarian, is ascribed to the immediate interposition of a god. Mythology is the product of this unrestrained activity of the imagination. It requires ages of improvement to subdue this fondness for fiction, and to reduce the monstrous exaggerations of a youthful people to the just proportions of history. Invention always precedes judgment and taste in the progress of civilization. Passion appears before reason. Men feel and enjoy before they reason and judge. Hence poetry, which is the language of emotion, precedes prose. Romance is earlier than history. Every nation, in its infancy, has its age of miracles, and its tales of wonder. We need not, therefore, resort to northern Sagas, to Oriental fable, or to the fragments of classic superstition, to find the origin of romantic fiction in Europe. It is the natural product of the soil where it is found. "In reality," says Mr. Southey, "mythological and romantic tales are current among all savages of whom we have any full accounts; for man has his intellectual as well as his bodily appetites, and these things are the food of his imagination and faith. They are found wherever there is language and discourse of reason; in other words, wherever there is man. And in similar stages of civilization, or states of society, the fictions of different people will bear a corresponding resemblance, notwithstanding the difference of time and scene." These tales lose their hold upon the popular mind only through the influence of refinement and intellectual culture. The stories which please the child, become insipid to the youth, and offensive to the man of years. The traditions of a youthful people lose their charms when the higher faculties are developed, and are finally rejected from history as unworthy of credit.

Among the ancient Greeks fiction usually wore the poetic dress. Except the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, we find nothing resembling the modern romance in the palmy days of Grecian literature. Fable and allegory were often used for the purpose of imparting instruction or admonition which might be offensive to the hearers. Epic and dramatic poetry was the ordinary vehicle of didactic instruction and romantic fiction. The ancient drama and epic afford but little *variety* of character and incidents. The materials were wanting for a complete delineation of human nature in all its phases. What we call *society* was scarcely known among the Greeks and Romans. Females were degraded, and, of course, the domestic virtues were not appreciated. Refined love, which is regarded as an essential element of the modern novel, was scarcely known. There was no middle class in the community from which the most interesting *originals* are usually drawn. Poetic characters were mostly taken from the higher classes. Persons of low rank, to be sure, were often brought upon the stage, yet they had nothing to distinguish them from other individuals of the same class. They generally acted as slaves or low buffoons. There was nothing in them decidedly attractive and *original*, as in the characters of "ancient Pistol," or "mine host of the Garter." Such characters as these become the personal friends of the reader, and he highly prizes their acquaintance. The old poet depended for success rather upon the *striking exploits* or bold *adventures of his heroes*, than upon their *peculiar characteristics*. *Time and place* were of more importance than *thought and sentiment*. A great variety of character could not be expected, where the persons represented were confined to one class, and mostly to one sex; and where there was no press to perpetuate, by memoirs, epistles and history, the peculiarities of individuals. Hence there is a certain air of uniformity and stiffness in the ancient drama. The exhibition of private life and the play of domestic affections, which give grace and interest to the modern drama and novel, were wanting. When classic literature declined, works of romance became more numerous. These also exhibited the peculiar characteristics of the age in which they originated. But few of them give evidence of profound thought or originality of invention. Indeed we could expect nothing more from an age of mental and physical decrepitude. In the dark ages monks and minstrels were the chief representatives of the literary world. In Italy, literature first revived. Her authors

first dared to break the trammels of the classics, and to clothe their thoughts in the language of the people. "It was there, too," says an English writer, "that those novels or tales were first cultivated which are fitted to attract every class of society, because they reflect the manners of all classes. This species of writing reached great perfection in Italy, before literature had attained that maturity, in any other country of Europe, which could enable it to emulate the excellence which that country so early reached in poetry. At that time, the poetry of most countries of Europe was confined to the rude though occasionally vigorous effusions of wandering minstrels, and their metrical tales were afterwards extended into voluminous romances, in prose, which reflected those notions of love, war and chivalry, that were universally prevalent, from the existing state of society." The age of chivalry abounded in works of fiction, or rather in monstrous histories of real adventures, embellished by fancy. Every thing, in literature, as in real life, was wild and extravagant. Romance ruled the world. One mighty spell rested upon society. Men dwelt in fairy-land. Their castles were enchanted; their strong-holds guarded by dragons. Fair ladies were imprisoned, and brave knights encountered unheard-of perils, to deliver them. There was a strange commingling of passions. Love and valor were wedded. The weaker passion became the master, and proud and turbulent warriors submitted to its dictates. Of course, love and heroism were the principal themes of literary discussion. Poetry and romance united to celebrate feminine charms and masculine prowess. From this hybridous union of passion and folly arose the countless romances of chivalry. They were read, admired and imitated till the world was flooded with extravagant fictions, and men went mad with the delicious intoxication. The peculiar state of society and manners gave birth to these frivolous, absurd, and, in some instances, licentious productions, and they, in turn, reacted upon society and contributed materially to the continuance of those institutions which had already become useless and burdensome. But as the institutions of chivalry lost their hold upon the popular mind, this species of literature declined. The matchless wit and irony of Cervantes finally brought it into utter contempt, and restored men to the use and guidance of the understanding. When the romances of chivalry lost their popularity, authors sought a different species of entertainment for the public. As society

changed, new tastes were developed and new amusements became popular. As romance declined, the drama arose. The mightiest geniuses of Europe were devoted to it. It soon reached its acme. The success of a few gifted minds, in this department of literature, attracted a multitude of feeble writers to the same employment. The drama passed rapidly through all the stages of decline, from the loftiest tragedy to the lowest and most vulgar farce. The modern novel did not appear till the drama had passed the meridian of its glory. "It had ceased to be the mirror in which the age could contemplate itself and exhibit the license of a masque or the extravagance of a caricature, much more than the sobriety of actual life or the fidelity of a portrait." The novel was a new expedient to interest the populace and save public taste from utter abasement. The multitude had grown somewhat weary of their old idol. It had lost its power to excite. All the changes had been played upon it which human ingenuity could invent. The taste of the higher classes had become too refined to relish the entertainment which mercenary dramatists furnished for the rabble, and a change was demanded. A literary revolution was commenced. The English led the van. No very remarkable works of pure fiction appeared before the days of Richardson. This author seems to be at once the herald and representative of this new era in literature. He is certainly *primus inter pares*, among the early English novelists. He was the first who took the reading community by surprise and commanded their undivided attention and applause. The publication of his "Pamela," in 1740, commences a new epoch in English literature. It is probable that no work was ever published that was received with such unbounded enthusiasm by all classes of readers as this. It was recommended from the pulpit and lauded, in unqualified terms, by poets and literati. It was pronounced by Mr. Pope to be better than volumes of sermons; and another scholar observed, "that if all other books were to be burned, the Bible and *Pamela* should be preserved." The other works of this author were probably more extensively read than any contemporary publication. These same works, which were once the reigning amusement of the fashionable, the gay and the learned, are now almost forgotten. They are seldom read except by professed scholars. Like old portraits, whose dress and style of execution have become unpopular, they are rather forced into some dark closet than exhibited in the drawing-room.

It was once universally admitted that these works exerted a salutary moral influence on the community. It is now as universally *doubted*, to say the least. Those pictures which were then regarded as true to life, perfect in coloring and delineation, are now said to be stiff, overdrawn, unnatural caricatures. "There is," says a reviewer, "a certain air of irksome regularity, gloominess and pedantry attached to Richardson's most virtuous characters. His good people are too wise, too formal, to appear in the light of desirable companions, or to excite, in youthful minds, a desire to resemble them." This is by no means the opinion of mere puritans and bigots. Some of the warmest advocates of novels, express similar views. Charles Lamb remarks of this author, as follows: "The precise, strait-laced Richardson has strengthened vice, from the mouth of Lovelace, with entangling sophistries and abstruse pleas against her adversary, *virtue*, which Sedley, Villiers and Rochester wanted depth of libertinism sufficient to have invented." Talfourd observes: "He had the power of making any set of notions, however fantastical, appear as truths of Holy Writ to his readers." Still this critic thinks the *general* impression made on us by his works is virtuous. It is acknowledged that the author himself was a man of high moral worth, and that he desired and intended to promote virtue and happiness by his writings. It is now very apparent that his works were better adapted to secure transient popularity to the author, than to improve the public morals.

This new path to fame, which he had so successfully struck out, was soon thronged with hungry authors. Few excelled him in talent; most fell far below him in morals. The genius of Fielding is unquestioned. The demoralizing tendency of his novels is equally unquestioned. "Fielding introduces us to the common ways of this bright and breathing world." His delineations of human nature are unrivalled; and it is precisely on this account that they are so *pernicious*. This is not a common fault of novelists. They are generally censured for drawing unnatural pictures of real life. It is not, however, a sufficient vindication of a character that it is drawn *as it really exists*; for many characters ought never to be drawn. The conduct of some men is too gross to be described, and real life affords many a vicious scene which common minds ought never to be acquainted with. It will not always justify a narrative, to say that it is true, or that it has verisimilitude. There is much of

the world's real history, which a virtuous mind cannot describe or contemplate with impunity. A knowledge of the world, as it is, rather tends to make men cunning than good. A minute knowledge of the worst vices of the world, cannot but taint the youthful mind. Fielding has chosen to represent human nature in its worst forms, and has thus lent to vice the aid of his mighty genius. His *Tom Jones* is perhaps the most perfect prose epic in existence. It is unrivalled in plan and execution; in the development of its subject, and in the originality and truthfulness of its characters. It is one of the most fascinating, and, at the same time, one of the most corrupting books in the English tongue. When Hannah More once alluded to a witty passage in *Tom Jones*, in the hearing of Dr. Johnson, the great moralist (who, by the way, was no enemy to novels,) replied, "I am shocked to hear you quote from so vicious a book; I am sorry to hear you have read it; a confession which no modest lady should ever make. I scarcely know a more corrupt book."

The few *virtuous characters* which Fielding has portrayed, are as amiable and winning as his ordinary characters are gross and corrupting. The existence of such an ideal as Parson Adams, only makes us regret the more the prostitution of his noble genius to purposes so vile.

The novels of Smollet exhibit less talent than those of Fielding, while they are, if possible, more vulgar and licentious. They are chiefly admired for their oddity and low humor. There is scarcely any thing in style, sentiment or character to redeem his numerous pages from the charge of obscenity and immorality. The works of the authors above noticed, were much sought after during the latter portion of the eighteenth century, and exerted a very injurious influence on the manners and morals of the last generation. They are now little read, not because they are less worthy of attention than more recent productions, but because the public, like a fickle mistress, is always most captivated with a *new favorite*. And the candidates for popular favor have not been few nor undistinguished. Novels have been multiplied indefinitely. They have been made the vehicles of every diversity of opinion and sentiment in philosophy, politics and religion. Some of them display genius, some wit, and some ribaldry. Some are remarkable for the high moral tone that pervades them; some are negative in their character, and others are positively infidel and licentious. Some exhibit in their heroes the finest traits of humanity; others exalt the cri-

minal to a hero, and endeavor to render vice attractive. The heroes of fiction, like the conscripts of Napoleon, have been taken from every class in society, from the footpad, who lies in ambush for the solitary traveller, to the mighty Autocrat, who aims at universal dominion. The subjects illustrated are as various as those of the ancient lays of Brittany :

"Some beth of war and some of woe,
And some of joy and mirth also,
And some of treachery and guile,
Of old adventures that fell while,
And some of bourdes and ribauldry,
And some there be of Faery ;
Of all things that men seeth,
Most of love, forsooth, there beth."

It is probable that there are more pages of ephemeral novels published yearly, throughout the civilized world, than of all other literary productions united. They are not only published, but *circulated* and *read* ; read too by that very class of persons who have no moral strength to resist their vicious influence. "Since 1814," says Menzel, (speaking of the German novel alone,) "there have been not less than 5 or 6000 new novels manufactured. Were they all good, they were too many, for the plain reason that nobody could read them all ; and if they are bad, then they should never have been written. They are, in fact, for the most part, *bad* ; probably there are not a hundred of them which a rational man can lay down without blushing for the people that produce such novels. There remain, therefore, more than 5000 novels, which, within a short time, have not only uselessly consumed a great capital of money and time of authors, publishers, printers, readers, etc., but by their demoralizing, at least enervating effect, have essentially injured the nation." The French press has been nearly as prolific as the German in this species of literature. There the moral standard is still lower than in Germany. Fifty years ago, a competent critic said of the French novelists, "they not only seduce the heart through the senses, and corrupt it through the medium of the imagination, but fatally strike at the root and being of all virtue, by annihilating all belief in that religion which is its only source and seminal principle." English novels, though less abundant, are still as numerous in proportion to the issues of the press, in that country, as in France or Germany. The facilities for printing and distributing cheap works of fiction, render them a very important agent in working out the

destiny of society in our own country. Their influence cannot be overlooked by the statesman, moralist, or philosopher. They are made the advocates of any sentiments in religion or politics which the authors wish to propagate, or which they suppose will be acceptable to the multitude. The unwary may imbibe the poison of vice or infidelity, when seeking only for amusement. Yet few seem to question the utility of such compositions. Most men commend them, or at least silently acquiesce in the arguments adduced in their favor. It may not be a profitless expenditure of time to examine some of these arguments. They are, frequently, defended upon the same ground as poetry.

1. It is said, *they are to be prized as works of art.* *Many of them are equal to the best poems in plot and execution, and some of them may even vie with Homer or Shakspeare.* "It is the object of the novel writer," says Scott, "to place before the reader as full and accurate a representation of the events which he relates, as can be done by mere force of an excited imagination, without the assistance of material objects. His whole appeal is made to the world of fancy and of ideas, and in this consists his strength or his weakness, his poverty or his wealth. He cannot, like the painter, present a visible and tangible representation of his towns, his woods, his palaces and his castles; but by awakening the imagination of a congenial reader, he places before the mind's eye landscapes fairer than those of Claude, and wilder than those of Salvator." As a work of art, the novel is composed upon principles similar to those which guide the statuary and painter. Individual traits are selected from different models to form the beau ideal of the artist. His design is to improve upon nature, to present an agreeable union of excellencies, without those apparent defects and blemishes which are usually found in all natural productions. The elements of any work of art or poetic description may all exist separately in different individuals or objects, and yet exist nowhere in combination, except in the imagination of the artist. Hence a picture, a statue or a poem may be true to nature, and yet false in point of fact. The statue of Apollo Belvidere never had an archetype, and yet every individual feature may have had its living representative. The same is true of works of fiction; the scenes portrayed, the characters described may all be *natural*, and yet not *real*, because the author, by the aid of fancy and taste, selects the materials from a wide range of observation, and from them *creates* a new whole. The entire his-

tory of any man's life cannot be interesting. Many passages in it must be commonplace. But by selecting the striking incidents of the lives of many men, or by feigning those which have a resemblance to reality, and weaving them into one harmonious narrative, the novelist may furnish a biography more entertaining than that of any real hero. A novel, therefore, becomes a species of Epic, and as such may be criticised by the same rules. It is acknowledged that the highest powers of genius are often displayed in the creations of the imagination. *Invention* is the noblest prerogative of genius. So far as works of fiction, whether in verse or prose, display great talents, *devoted to the best ends*, they justly command our respect and admiration. It should be remembered, however, that *prose fictions* exert a far more extensive and powerful influence upon the public mind than *poetry*. They are vastly more numerous, and they are more generally read. Besides, a prose narrative will produce a more complete *illusion* in the mind of the reader than a poem. It resembles real history, and wears the semblance of truth. The measured movement and dignified air of poetry, constantly remind the reader of its *artificial* structure. Men seldom mistake poetic embellishments for facts. Not so with the novel. They portray human life, if not as it is, at least, as it might be. The reader generally gives himself up to the impositions of genius, and derives real pleasure from the temporary belief of the truth of what he reads. There is force, therefore, in the objection that novels mislead and corrupt the young by presenting false views of life, and exhibiting characters such as never did and never *will* exist. When the painter or sculptor embodies his ideal creations in a material form, no one mistakes the picture or the statue for a real person, yet every individual feature may have its living original. So of the characters of a work of fiction. A real Falstaff probably never existed. Yet all his individual peculiarities might be found in different men. A real Caliban never had a being; still the superstitious notions of the age would furnish the materials for his formation. The genius of the author is displayed in the judicious selection of these materials. It must be admitted that the cultivated mind derives real pleasure from the contemplation of such ideal personages. When once acquainted with them, we become attached to them. They become our familiar friends. If such interesting associates as Sir Roger de Coverly, Monkbarns, or My Uncle Toby, were snatched from us, we should sincerely mourn

their loss. We should find our intellectual pleasure essentially abridged by their absence. Scott has drawn many characters that cannot fail, when properly studied, to refine and elevate the reader. Almost any person may derive pleasure and profit from the contemplation of the lofty enthusiasm of Flora Mac Ivor, the Christian purity and heroic daring of Jeannie Deans, or the angelic tenderness of Rebecca. The same is true of "little Nell," that ethereal vision of loveliness, portrayed by Dickens. If such fruit always grew upon this tree of knowledge, the tasting could never impart the knowledge of *evil*. We must admit, therefore, that *some novels* are defensible as works of art. But this class of novels is so *small*, that, as in the case of the cities of the plain, it may be doubted whether ten unexceptionable specimens could be found, in all the domains of pure fiction, for whose sakes the multitude should be spared. Some of the creations of Scott's prolific genius, will probably continue to be admired as long as the English language is read. But a great proportion of the popular novels of the age are miserable imitations of original works. The landscapes and beautiful sunsets of Scott have been copied for the thousandth time. His characters have been repeated, revised, and reproduced so often, that they have lost their identity. His strong good sense has been so often diluted with the feeble thoughts of wretched scribblers, as to become rapid and offensive to rational minds. The offspring of his princely intellect, dressed in the livery of others, have lost their nobility, and are compelled to do plebeian service for the multitude. The mass of novels now most read, are not valuable as works of art. They owe their popularity not to their merit, but to their *want of it*. They minister to the lowest tastes of the vulgar, and afford an unhealthy stimulus to the worst passions of human nature. The republic of letters has become a turbulent democracy, and authors no longer address "the learned reader," but humbly sue for the favor of the reading public. With such patrons, the noblest creations of genius cannot be appreciated. To please the public, works of fiction must be characterized by strong excitement, high-wrought passions, splendid crimes, wild adventures and bloody feuds, rather than by virtuous sentiment, vigorous argument, and elevated affection.

2. *It is often argued that novels are useful in imparting lessons of morality, inculcating virtue and preventing crime.* If this were always true, or true in a majority of cases, their

utility would be established beyond a doubt. Some novels are written with a direct reference to their moral bearing. But even when the intentions of the author are good, he often fails in the choice of means. This was true of Richardson, to whom allusion has been already made. When the ideal characters which genius has portrayed impersonate noble virtues, and are always made to act consistently with their professions, the study of them undoubtedly tends to lead the soul away from unworthy pursuits, and prompts to a virtuous life. When crime meets with its just reward, the tempted soul is sometimes deterred, by such exhibitions, from a course of vice. It cannot be denied, therefore, that works of fiction may be made useful aids to morality. But where one man writes fiction to correct the public morals, a hundred others write to feed the vices of the community. The labors of wickedness are always better rewarded by the world than those of virtue. Besides, the great mass of readers care very little for the moral bearing of a tale. If the story furnishes excitement, they seldom seek for any thing higher. "The professed moral of a tale," says Scott, "is usually what the reader is least interested in; it is like the mendicant who cripples after some splendid and gay procession, and in vain solicits the attention of those who have been gazing upon it." The moral of a tale depends more upon the conduct of the narrative than upon the catastrophe. It is not enough that virtue should ultimately triumph and vice be punished. There may be so much that is forbidding in the life of the good man, and so much that is attractive in the life of the bad man, that the reader will wholly sympathize with the latter. "If," says the writer above quoted, "the author introduces scenes which excite evil passions, if he familiarizes the minds of his readers with impure ideas, or sophisticates their understanding with false views of morality, it will be an unavailing defence, that, in the end of the book he has represented virtue as triumphant." If tried by the standard presented here by the great luminary of the modern world of fiction, few popular novelists would escape censure. Fielding, Smollet, Sterne and Swift seemed to think a large seasoning of vulgarity and filth necessary to render their works palatable to the reading public. No man can contemplate their obscene pictures without moral degradation. The virgin purity of an unsophisticated mind is soiled and polluted by them. The contagion of vice which thus enters the soul upon the wings of an idle thought, may fix

a plague-spot there which will ultimately prove its ruin. It is not good to be made familiar with vice. We soon learn to "*pity, then embrace.*" When highwaymen and courtesans are made the heroes and heroines of popular tales, who will be sponsor for the security of the public morals? The immoral tendency of Bulwer's novels is, I think, justly maintained. His heroes are generally great criminals, violating all the laws of God and man, and yet exhibiting in their conduct so much generosity and magnanimity that they inevitably enlist the sympathies of the unreflecting reader. His earliest work, called *Falkland*, is the history of an adulterer, the most noble and kind of his race, who was led, *by the force of circumstances*, to violate the sacred rights of hospitality and ruin the wife of his friend. Paul Clifford, the hero of another of his novels, is the commander of a band of robbers in Berkshire. He is conducted safely through his career of villany and escapes "unwhipped of justice." In *Devereux*, an amiable gentleman murders his brother's wife and afterwards becomes an interesting religious enthusiast in Italy. Eugene Aram was a veritable culprit, whose history is here embellished with the choicest ornaments of wit and fancy, and the very gallows is ennobled by the martyrdom of a *high-minded, large-souled, intellectual hero*. "*The Disowned*," professing the noblest creed, boasting of the purest philanthropy, becomes the murderer of his benefactor. Bulwer seems to delight in portraying the unsocial passions of men, and dragging out to view every thing that is dark, unlovely and misanthropic in the human soul. If his object is to make these vices odious, why does he exalt what is diabolical and elevate what is mean, by surrounding his robbers and murderers with a halo of glory? Why not leave the burglar to rot in his grave? Why attempt to rescue a real hero of the *Newgate Calendar* from merited ignominy? If he wishes to benefit the world, why does he hold true virtue so much in the background, and make mere selfishness, flattery and intrigue the chief means of success in life? "*Bulwer's novels*," says an eminent critic, "show us the virtues caricatured, vices seductively garnished, generous qualities degraded by paltry motives, petty objects magnified, vulgarities glossed by passion, and manners tinged with affectation. Whatever is veritable, honest, useful and truly noble, finds little place in this bizarre, fictitious world." We do not pretend that Bulwer vindicates the crimes he has so graphically depicted, in express

terms, yet the whole complexion of the plot is such as to leave the impression upon the reader's mind, that a man may commit such enormities and yet deserve our love and admiration. This covert method of teaching immorality is worse than open and avowed profligacy. But other novelists are less heartless. We may not include them all in one general category. The works of Maria Edgeworth, Scott and our own Cooper furnish perhaps a less objectionable entertainment to the lovers of romance, than almost any other authors of fiction. Scott has but little that is censurable in regard to morals, not because he directly inculcates virtue, but because he does not draw it in caricature, and cast reproach upon it by the oddity, bigotry and vulgarity of those who practise it. Wilberforce complained of Scott's novels, that they had so little moral and religious object. "They remind me," said he, "of a giant spending his strength cracking nuts. I would rather go to render up my account, at the last day, carrying with me 'the Shepherd of Salisbury Plain,' than bearing the load of all these volumes, full as they are of genius." It was impossible that an author whose chief object was the pecuniary reward, could entertain any very exalted notions of *doing good*. So far as religion and morality are concerned, we are rather indebted to him for what he has refrained from doing than for what he has actually done. "He is," in the words of Hannah More, "rather a non-moralist than an anti-moralist." Except a few bacchanalian scenes, which he has described apparently *con amore*, little can be said against the moral bearing of Scott's novels, while he is unrivalled in his descriptions of natural scenery, and in the originality and truthfulness of his characters.

Dickens is now the popular favorite. But few question the purity of his principles or the permanency of his reputation, and yet it would not be among the wonders of the times, if he should outlive his own celebrity. Some of his writings look like literary ephemera, abounding in genuine humor to be sure, but like a comic annual, doomed to oblivion, when a successor appears. Some good men hope that his unmerciful satires upon the English poor laws and upon English schools, will direct the attention of the great and the powerful to the abuses of those systems and gradually effect a reform. If the English overseers and schoolmasters really resemble Squeers and Bumble, their hope may be justly grounded. If the official personages portrayed in *Nicholas Nickleby* and *Oliver Twist* be any thing

but gross caricatures, then it is not strange that Lester should write of the *shame* as well as of the *glory* of England. It cannot be supposed that the statesmen and nobles of Great Britain want information respecting the true condition of their country; or if they did want it, that they would resort to the pages of a popular novel to find it. Dickens has drawn some few characters of high moral worth, but he never draws a religious character except it be in caricature. Does he design, by this means, to cast contempt upon genuine piety? Who could infer from his novels, whether he were a Christian, Jew or Mohammedan? Indeed, from the picture he has given us in *Barnaby Rudge* of the sour, fanatical and ferocious spirit that characterized Protestantism, at the period of the London riots, we should infer that he is a Catholic or Jew. But in his notes on America he has revealed his real opinions. His flippant remarks upon orthodoxy, his contempt for temperance, and his oft-repeated allusions to "brandy and water," prove him to be a heartless freethinker, and, at least, a prospective inebriate. I will quote but one passage in confirmation of this opinion:—"Wherever religion is resorted to as a strong drink, and as an escape from the dull monotonous round of home, those of its ministers who *pepper* the highest, will be surest to please. They who strew the eternal path with the greatest amount of *brimstone*, and who most ruthlessly tread down the flowers and leaves that grow by the wayside, will be voted the most righteous; and they who enlarge, with the greatest pertinacity, on the difficulty of getting to heaven, will be considered by all true believers certain of going there." He also takes occasion in his notes to sneer at temperance societies and temperance hotels, and at the principled opposition of good men in New England to theatres and other kindred amusements. Such miserable jesting will not increase his reputation for sound morality, or serve to perpetuate his present celebrity.

"The primary cause of this author's success," says an English writer, "we take to be his felicity in working up the genuine mother-wit and unadulterated vernacular idioms of the *lower classes* of London—for he grows comparatively commonplace and tame the moment his foot is off the stones, and betrays infallible symptoms of Cockneyism in all his aspirations at rurality." Those who seek only *amusement*, in a novel, will find it in his works; those who seek for instruction, for elevated thoughts elegantly expressed, will be compelled to resort to other sources.

3. *Novels are often defended as an agreeable method of inculcating truth.* An unpleasant truth may be conveniently taught by fiction. In ancient times fable and allegory were much employed for this purpose. The ear of despots was sometimes reached in this way, when the bold assertion of the undisguised truth would have cost the teacher his life. Some minds may be reached by the moral of a romance, or captivated by the loveliness of virtue, as it is exhibited in some faultless character, when they would turn, with loathing, from the same doctrines communicated in a didactic form. Such cases, however, are very rare. Who ever heard of the conversion of a profligate by the reading of a religious novel? Indeed it is only religious persons who read religious novels. To "the lawless and disobedient" for whose benefit they were expressly prepared, they are dull, uninteresting books. The propriety of thus diluting religious truths for squeamish appetites, is now generally doubted. Menzel censures the practice in no measured terms. Speaking of religious paraphrases and poetical versions of portions of the Bible, prepared by German authors for boarding-schools, he says: "These sentimental people think that, because they have young girls in view, towards whom one should always be polite and tender, God's word too must be spoiled by softening down, diluting and sweetening it for them. The language of the Bible seems to them too rude and unmannerly; and so they extract from it as from the powerful forest plants, a little drop of essence only, mingle it with sugar, put it up in fine post paper, with a neat device, and give it to the dear little babe of grace to swallow, as a godly sugar-plum. In this way the whole of religion is conveyed, smooth and sweet as sugar, to the delicate Flora of the city, the boarding-school or the court. The God of terror, the Thunderer from Sinai must not frighten the dear girls; and therefore he folds up his lightnings prettily, and muffles his thunder in an easily flowing, poetic measure. The terrors of the grave and the torments of hell must not frighten the dear girls; they are covered by an antique sarcophagus, with Mathison's bass reliefs, and a beautiful genius, with graceful attitude, holds his torch reversed." In another place he adds: "The half educated multitude have allowed themselves to be cheated into the notion that the old and vigorous language of Luther is indelicate, by these self-sufficient enlighteners and babblers about feeling, who wish to see the religious sentiment widely spread, in fine and fashiona-

ble forms of speech; and who finally become too much at ease to have any thing to do with religion otherwise than as a thing of habit; to whom consequently it must be desirable to have at hand a devotional ass's bridge, which in all cases thinks for them, feels for them—a religious machine which one needs only to wind up to play on it all favorite emotions—a book which one needs but to read in order to imagine he has thought or felt something himself." Those sentimental authors, in our country, who pant to do good, by writing religious novels, moral tales, and children's biographies to render the truths of the Bible palatable to the natural heart, may derive some useful hints from the vigorous good sense of this Hercules of modern criticism. Though we freely admit that such works may sometimes be profitable to the young, by arresting the attention and captivating the heart through the imagination, yet when we remember that false philosophy, bad morals and infidelity are far oftener disguised in fiction than genuine evangelical truth, we should be very cautious in commending novels as teachers of moral and religious truth.

4. *Novels are frequently recommended as valuable illustrations of national manners.* This is one of the strongest pleas that can be urged in their behalf. It is this which gives them some degree of permanency as literary productions. Works of fiction can, with propriety, describe the minute details of every day life, dress, customs and manners, which are too trivial for dignified history. Had we a novel written by Plato, descriptive of real life, in his own age, it would be invaluable to us in illustrating the domestic manners of the Greeks. It is now quite common for modern authors to write fictitious narratives, purposely, to illustrate the private history of the ancients. Many of these works present false or exaggerated views of their real life, and are worse than useless as guides to truth. Others may be read, with profit, by the student who is already well versed in ancient history. Such are the illustrations of Greek and Roman life, by Becker, Lockhart's Valerius, Bulwer's Last Days of Pompeii, and the "Letters from Palmyra" and "Probus" by Mr. Ware. All works of fiction are valuable which contain faithful pictures of the manners and domestic life of any people. It is this trait which renders the Homeric poems so captivating, and diffuses an inexpressible charm over these graphic pictures of living, acting heroes. For the same reason Don Quixote, apart from its inimitable wit, has acquired a title to

immortality. It will never cease to be read, till men forget or entirely neglect that portion of European history which it illustrates. The Arabian Nights are also valuable to us as pictures of Arabian life, modes of thinking and acting. But the value of such works diminishes as our knowledge of the age and country they represent, increases. In recent times the necessity of such works has been almost entirely superseded by improvements in our popular histories and biographies. Dress and manners are not only described but literally *delineated*. In the recent pictorial history of England, the dress of every age is portrayed from the "top-knot" to the shoe-latchet; and the amusements and occupations of the people are faithfully sketched, from the dignified diversions of monarchs, to the nursery sports of children.

5. *The historical novel has been much commended.* It is said to throw great light upon dark passages of history, and to render what was once a severe study an agreeable recreation. The dramatic exhibition of real personages and real events is, undoubtedly, more captivating to young readers than the most elaborate rehearsal of the *mere facts*. For, if such works were confined simply to the truth, they would become *histories*, but just so far as they vary from the truth they become useless, or positively pernicious as historical aids. They are acknowledged to be more interesting than dry chronicles, and so are fictions generally. Their falsity constitutes their charm, and the errors they contain usually make a stronger impression than the truth which is associated with it. It is the drapery which is thrown around the real character, which strikes the fancy and captivates the heart. Facts are often distorted, misquoted or exaggerated. Dates and names must yield to the emergencies of the author. An anachronism of centuries is a mere trifle, in working out the mazy web of fiction from scraps of true history. Many of Scott's novels are professedly *historical*, and yet he pays little regard to historical accuracy either in facts, dates, names or characters. For instance, in the "Talisman," the romance of the "Squire of Low Degree" is quoted as familiar to English readers before it was written. In the "Betrothed," Gloucester is raised to a bishoprick more than three centuries before his actual existence. In his "Tales of the Crusaders," Edith of Plantagenet is married to Saladin, not only contrary to the Christian faith, but contrary to the fact. It may be said that these are slight discrepancies, and no one is so credulous as to

regard his tales as veracious chronicles. Let them not be commended then as true guides to historical truth. In the instance last alluded to, Scott not only introduces the falsehood into the text but confirms it in a note. Mr. Mills, in noticing this fact, remarks: "If this can possibly be done merely to heighten the illusion of his romance, it is carrying the jest a little too far; for the preservation of historical truth is really too important a principle to be idly violated. But if he seriously designed to unite the province of the historian with that of the novelist, he has chosen a very unlucky expedient for his own reputation; and thus, in either case, he has rather wantonly led his readers into error, and brought against others a charge of ignorance, which must recoil more deservedly upon himself." False impressions made, when the mind is intensely excited by the progress of the narrative, are not easily eradicated. They are seldom displaced by the truth. Hear "the great Magician" himself on this point. In his *History of Scotland*, speaking of Shakspeare's *Macbeth*, he says: "The genius of Shakspeare having found the tale of *Macbeth*, in the Scottish chronicles of Holinshed, adorned it with a lustre similar to that with which a level beam of the sun often invests some fragment of glass, which, though shining at a distance with the lustre of a diamond, is by nearer investigation discovered to be of no worth or estimation. Early authorities," he adds, "show us no such persons as Banquo and his son Fleance, nor have we reason to think that the latter ever fled farther from *Macbeth* than across the flat scene, according to the stage direction. Neither were Banquo and his son ancestors of the house of Stuart. All these things are now known; but the mind retains, pertinaciously, the impression made by the impositions of genius. While the works of Shakspeare are read and the English language subsists, History may say what she will, but the general reader will only recollect *Macbeth* as a sacrilegious usurper, and Richard III. as a deformed murderer." Men are always more strongly impressed by feeling than intellect, by passion than argument, by the imagination than reason. When once the wizard spell of fiction has clothed an historical character in an unnatural or unearthly garb, no power of truth can disenchant the victim.

6. *Novels are defended as valuable helps to the acquisition of a good style.* If the generality of readers ever thought of style, when in pursuit of the story, this argument would deserve more consideration. The most elaborate style is usually least inter-

esting to most readers. Few persons, under the excitement produced by strange incidents and an intensely interesting narrative, ever stay to contemplate beauties of style or sentiment. The work is usually hurried over, with the utmost rapidity, to reach the catastrophe and be relieved of suspense. No one can read a well-told story without becoming interested in the actors, and this interest increases as the plot becomes more complex, till, at length, it becomes even painful. In such a state of feelings the amateur novel-reader heeds not the beauties of style, or thought. He omits the long and prosy introductions which usually embody the grave reflections of the author, and are exhibited in his best style, and hastens on to the narrative. An *exciting story* is the *first, second and third* requisite of a popular novel. Style is a secondary consideration. It is a rare thing to see a polished style in prose works of fiction. Such attractions are far less sought than stirring incidents, unexpected reverses, hair-breadth escapes and triumphant love. In most of the popular novels we find a loose, slipshod style, adapted to the ephemeral character of the work. Barbarisms, anomalies and solecisms constitute the law of such compositions rather than the exception. When a large work is thrown off, in a few weeks, and volumes succeed each other as rapidly as articles of merchandise from a mechanic's shop, we can expect nothing better. Men who write so rapidly must write *carelessly*.

The works of Dickens are celebrated for their "matchless wit," and yet there is scarcely a repartee or *jeu d'esprit* of his that one would wish to repeat in a drawing-room. As he has generally chosen his characters from humble life, his most amusing descriptions and his best displays of humor, *his Wellerisms*, are better suited to the bar-room than the parlor. He is decidedly the most popular novelist of the age, and yet he has less to recommend him, *in point of style*, than most of his contemporaries in the same department of literature. The truth is, men care very little about style, if they can find stimulus for the passions, strong excitement. Novel-readers never ask whether a new work is *well written*, but the first inquiry is, *is it interesting?* If it can soothe sorrow, make the debtor forget his duns, the voluptuary his pleasures, and help the idle "*to kill time*," it is pronounced *good*, though it be no better than the "Pirate's Own Book" or the "Three Robbers." "The young," says Mr. Alison, "judge of composition not by its merits when compared with other works, or by its approach to any abstract

or ideal standard, but by its effects in agitating their imaginations, and leading them into that fairy land, in which the fancy of youth has so much delighted to wander. It is their own imagination that has the charm, which they attribute to the work that excites it; and the simplest tale or the poorest novel is, at that time, as capable of awakening it, as afterwards the eloquence of Virgil or Rousseau." While the attention of the reader is absorbed in the conduct of the story, the incidents and the fate of the actors, the beauties and blemishes of style and thought are forgotten. After Richardson had published the first four volumes of his *Clarissa*, which were devoured with the utmost eagerness by the famished crowd, it was reported that the catastrophe, in the forthcoming volume, would be unfortunate. The reading public were greatly excited by it. They had become so interested in these imaginary persons that they could not bear to part with them in a tragical manner. Remonstrances were poured in upon him from all quarters. Old Cibber, says Scott, raved about it like a profane bedlamite, and one sentimental young lady, eager for the conversion of Lovelace, implored Richardson *to save his soul*, as though there were a living sinner in the case, and his future destiny depended upon the decision of the author. This incident shows how strongly the sympathies may be excited for fictitious characters, and how greatly young affections may be modified by the contemplation of such unreal beings. In this lies the secret of the novelist's power. He sits enthroned in the feelings. The feelings are blind, and yet they either *lead* or *drive* a majority of the human race. Females are generally supposed to possess warmer hearts and keener susceptibilities than males, hence novelists find their warmest admirers among women. They are the first to kindle with the fires of love and sentiment, that glow upon the pages of romance. Their incense feeds the flame; and the author and his readers continue to act reciprocally upon each other. Richardson had unknown female correspondents who secretly lavished upon him the most fulsome panegyrics. Richter frequently received the most flattering communications from unknown ladies: indeed one young lady actually committed suicide under the excitement of a maddening passion conceived for this author simply from reading his books. An event very similar to this occurred also in Goethe's history. Richter owed his success, in Germany, to the applause of ladies. He was first encouraged by them to write, and afterwards elevated,

upon the wings of their love, to the very pinnacle of fame. He was first invited to Weimar by an unknown female friend. "Immediately upon his arrival," says his American biographer, who, by the way, is a lady also, "he visited his unknown correspondent, Madam Von Kalb, and through her was his presence made known to the distinguished literary characters of the day. All wanted to see this wonderful man. The men received him with open arms, the women *with beating hearts*. They vied with each other in their attentions to him; even the Dutchess Amelia, who had given orders that they should immediately inform her of his arrival, flattered him by many expressions of sympathy and admiration." "This wonderful man" wrote somewhat less than one hundred volumes of novels and miscellanies, all in a style which none but a madman or transcendentalist would imitate; and, *in a language which native Germans cannot understand without a new dictionary or glossary*. In all his novels, he has repeated the changes of his own variegated life, and made himself, his relatives and friends the heroes of his epics; so that the Germans, with the help of a new lexicon, and foreigners, by learning a new language and wading through half a hundred volumes of fiction, may learn what a *strange* and "wonderful man" Jean Paul Richter was.

7. *Novels, it is said, ought to be encouraged because they increase the sum of human happiness, by the real pleasure which they afford to the reader.* To the cultivated mind, the best novels, when viewed as works of art, furnish a high intellectual treat. The pleasure is of the same kind as that derived from the contemplation of a finished statue, a beautiful picture, or a sublime poem. This pleasure is innocent. It is also invigorating to the intellect and taste; but to the reader who seeks only excitement from the story, the perusal of the most unexceptionable novels is enervating and demoralizing. It is not desirable to excite strong sympathy for imaginary beings. The mind having nothing to act upon, like a surcharged musket, recoils upon itself. When the heart is warmed with pity for real woe, it is made better; when its best feelings are wasted upon mere phantoms, it either becomes callous, or prematurely sensitive. When there is no real object for the excited affections to cling to, the moral constitution is usually enfeebled and the sensibilities blunted, and a more pungent stimulus is required at every successive excitation. The effect of this unnatural activity of the emotions upon the soul, is similar to that of narcotics upon

the body. In both cases, the nervous energy is exhausted. Constant attendance upon the theatre, where the strongest passions are appealed to, or habitual novel-reading, destroys all genuine sensibility. No heart is so cold as that of the languid sentimentalist, who has often wept for unreal wo. One single pulsation of pity, accompanied by the smallest act of beneficence to a real sufferer, outweighs all the factitious sorrow and unavailing tears which a life of devotion to the tragic exhibitions of the theatre can produce. Sympathy and affection, like faith, are only valuable *in action*. It is in vain to *talk* of human suffering, or even *feel* for it, if we do not *act*. Real life demands our best affections. It is not *right* to lavish them upon fancied distress. Besides the injury done to the heart in the loss of sensibility, occasioned by familiarity with imaginary sufferings, many novels fill the mind with groundless fears and absurd superstitions. Those authors who choose for their favorite themes the varieties of the supernatural,

Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnas lemures portentaque,

distress the young reader with imaginary terrors. When we read Mrs. Radcliffe's wild and fearful tales, the real world seems to disappear, and we live in an enchanted region of her own creation, "where mouldering castles rise conscious of deeds of blood," where deep vaults and lonely halls echo with the tramp of the disturbed dead. Few men can enjoy quiet slumber after reading, late at night, the "Mysteries of Udolpho," or the "Romance of the Forest." The timid reader trembles, in his solitary couch, at the creaking of a shutter, expecting, every moment, to see the midnight assassin enter from some concealed passage. The spectres and ghosts, with whose history he has become so familiar, come uninvited to the dormitory of their new acquaintance. They clank their chains and utter their dismal groans in his hearing, to confirm the truth of the horrid history to which he had devoted his waking hours. Few young persons can read tales of such terrific interest, without being haunted with "thick coming fancies," by day, and troubled dreams, by night.

8. *Novels, it is said again, afford to the mind a relief from severer employments.* This is sometimes true. But it is far oftener the case, that the novel-reader neglects all his appropriate duties for this amusement. The class of minds which absolutely need re-

laxation from severe application is very small. Such men seldom read novels. They have no time to devote to such recreation. They generally seek their solace in works that can *instruct*, as well as *please*. The sober, strong-minded man has little love for fiction. Those scholars who are passionately fond of novels in their youth, generally lose all relish for them when they have acquired a taste for solid learning. There is so much to be learned, and so much to be done, in this short life, that few men who justly appreciate their duties, and the worth of time, will come down from their high vocations to seek pleasurable excitement in fictitious tales, or turn aside from the wants of the suffering poor, "who are always with them," to shed unavailing tears over imaginary woe. It is the excitable, the gay, the idle, the devotees of fashion, who seek new stimulus for their exhausted sensibilities in works of fiction. It is not those who "think too much," but those who think too little, the absolutely *thoughtless herd*, that waste time in this species of beggarly day dreaming, in which, says Mr. Coleridge, "the mind of the dreamer furnishes nothing but laziness and a little mawkish sensibility; while the whole materiel and imagery of the doze is supplied, ab extra, by a sort of mental camera obscura, manufactured at the printing-office, which, pro tempore, fixes, reflects, and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of a hundred other brains, afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite purpose." It is sometimes regarded as a sufficient vindication of novels, that they furnish employment for vacant minds; that they occupy the thoughts of the idle and dissolute, who would else be plotting mischief. Theatrical amusements, public spectacles, and games of chance, have probably served the same *noble end*. Miller, in his "History Philosophically Illustrated," has shown us that card-playing, when it was first introduced, was greatly useful in quelling the turbulent passions of ferocious knights, and turning their thoughts from lust and sensual indulgence. Will Christian philosophers advocate the continuance of *card-playing* and *gambling*, to prevent crime, and refine libertines and epicureans? When men have become so debased as to derive an *upward impulse* from reading Paul Clifford or Jack Shepard, or any of those numerous "splendid fictions," which show to the astonished world that an adventurous warfare upon all that men hold dear, is the most glorious, as well as the shortest road to romantic immortality, then it is

time that the schoolmaster and missionary "should be abroad," in our own land. Many of our most popular modern novels, in which there is a miserable effort to excite curiosity, by giving fame, or at least notoriety, to the meanest and vilest of our kind, cannot furnish an innocent recreation to any class of readers, least of all to those who are already inclined to desperate deeds. They stimulate the worst passions of our nature. They give new interest to great crimes, and rouse the fainting courage of abandoned youth to deeds of reckless daring. The American Tract Society, in their recent report, speaking of such works, uses the following language: "It became a grave question how far the increasing catalogue among us of shameless crimes whose names are "*Legion*"—of speculation, of murder, and of suicide, was traceable to the corrupting influence of such publications! Corvosier, the murderer of Lord William Russell, confessed, and wished the sheriff to let it be known to the world, (and the murderer's dying message has reached our land,) that the *idea* of his work of blood was first suggested to him by reading and seeing the performance of "*Jack Shepard*." This book was lent to him by one of the servants of the Duke of Bedford, and he lamented that he had ever seen it. Oxford, too, who sought the Queen's life, it is said, made substantially the same statement respecting the influence upon his mind of the "*Bravo of Venice*." Jack Shepard has been dramatized and acted, many nights, at "the Adelphi," in London, with great applause, and the exploits of this gay highwayman were represented before the eyes of a *brilliant* and *sympathizing* audience. The story of Madame Lafarge, who was convicted of poisoning her husband, has also been translated from the French, dramatized and exhibited for the edification of the sentimental ladies of England and America. Her autobiography will furnish all the stage directions as well as hypocritical disguises, which even an amateur female assassin could desire. But, for the present, theatrical exhibitions and novel-reading have been cast somewhat into the shade, in our large cities, by popular lectures. By this means, those weak minds which cannot endure the fatigue of thinking, are furnished with a small capital of information for a small pecuniary reward, and those highly sensitive souls that cannot resist temptation, are, for the time being, restrained from the commission of crime by the presence of respectable society. For a time, this mode of occupying those who could not rationally and virtuously employ

themselves, seemed to promise great good to the community. But it is to be feared that this system, like every thing else *human*, is destined to degenerate, and that infidelity and quackery will soon find more champions in the lecture-room, than religion and science.

The evils of novel-reading are confined principally to the young and thoughtless. The old hack, whose sensibilities are dead, can scarcely be made worse by false rhetoric, bad taste, or corrupt morals. But when a passion for romance seizes a young mind, it is ruinous. It destroys all relish for the serious duties of life, and renders its victim unstable and giddy. His reason is subjected to feeling. He lives in an unreal world. He dreams of Elysian fields amid the very deserts of life. He speaks and writes in the borrowed sentiments of the novelist. Affectation takes the place of ingenuousness. His manners are artificial, his plans a mere dream of romance. He imagines himself a hero, and the object of his young affections a heroine. Nothing but sad disappointment can enlighten such an enthusiast. All, to be sure, are not equally injured by promiscuous novel-reading, but very few escape unscathed. It requires the strongest minds, the very highest order of intellect, to resist its enervating influence; for there is no mental discipline in it, no mental nutriment is derived from it. It is only the profound critic, who studies a novel as a work of art, analyzes its plot, and duly estimates its characters, that derives intellectual improvement from it.

The common reader is excited (perhaps wrongly) and pleased for the hour, then left in a state of languor and mental imbecility. The understanding, thereby, loses its healthy tone, and the young romancer becomes a sickly sentimentalist. No man could appreciate the influence of novels better than Sir W. Scott. It may be supposed that he would certainly view them in the most favorable light. I conclude in his words: "Excluding from consideration those infamous works which address themselves directly to the grosser passions of our nature, we are inclined to think, the worst evil to be apprehended from the perusal of novels is, that the habit is apt to generate an indisposition to real history and useful literature; and that the best which can be hoped is, that they may sometimes instruct the youthful mind by real pictures of life, and sometimes awaken their better feelings and sympathies by strains of generous sentiment and tales of fictitious wo. Beyond this point, they are

a mere elegance, a luxury contrived for the amusement of polished life, and the gratification of that half love of literature which pervades all ranks of an advanced stage of society, and are read much more for amusement than with the least hope of deriving instruction from them."

ARTICLE VI.

LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WORKS OF JOHN WESLEY.

By Samuel G. Brown, Professor in Dartmouth College, N. H.

MORE than twenty years ago, the Poet Laureate of Great Britain, somewhat to the surprise of all parties, wrote "The Life of Wesley, and the Rise and Progress of Methodism." The work was variously criticised. By some it was condemned, as much too favorable to Wesley; by others, as being quite unjust. Some were surprised at its liberality; others at its narrowness. From the censures of parties so widely sundered, we might with some safety conclude, that its virtues are very great. It would however be quite out of place to criticise, at this late day, the merits of the very comprehensive and interesting work of Dr. Southey, but we hope it may not be amiss to review again the life of so singular and distinguished a man as Wesley with such aids as subsequent publications may offer.

The latter part of the seventeenth and the first part of the eighteenth centuries were distinguished in England, for a general declension of spiritual religion. It is not necessary here minutely to inquire the reasons of a fact which no one denies. It was owing in part, perhaps, to the loose morals of the court, subsequent to the restoration, which, after infecting the higher classes, sent down the streams of its poisonous influence to the very dregs of the populace. In part it was owing to the violent convulsions of the civil wars, which unsettled the minds of the people; in part, to a natural opposition to all priestly influence, induced by years of ecclesiastical tyranny; and in part, to the

inefficiency of the clergy and the inadequate provision for the religious instruction of the people. Some of the wisest and best of men lived during these times, but they are single stars in the overcast firmament. The irreligious spirit had pervaded the universities; and the cloisters of Oxford and Cambridge, which the church had founded for the diffusion of religion and learning, were filled with men, destitute of faith themselves, and intolerant of it in others. The Chancellor of Oxford was obliged in a program to exhort the tutors to discharge their duty by double diligence, and had forbidden the undergraduates to read such books as might tend to the weakening of their faith; but fashion and wit drove the tide against argument and authority. So late as 1736, Bishop Butler wrote in the advertisement to the "*Analogy*," "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world."

Meanwhile Providence was preparing an agency destined to exert a marvellous and permanent influence upon those great bodies of the people which were not refined enough to be carried away by the gay and licentious skepticism of the day, nor learned enough to be much affected by the logical treatises of learned prelates; an agency destined ultimately to startle from their spiritual lethargy all classes in the kingdom.

Had a stranger visited Oxford about the year 1732, he would probably have been called to notice a small company of young men, singular in their manners and their dress, studious and exact in their habits, strict in obeying the injunctions of the Rubrick, economical and devout. They went to receive the sacrament at St. Mary's, through a crowd of ridiculing fellow-students, but the laughter only united them more closely to each other, and drove them to a more cautious and earnest study of the Bible and books of practical piety. They were called Bible-bigots, Sacramentarians, the Holy Club. Every day increased the bitter scorn with which they were assailed; every day cemented more strongly their mutual attachment, and made wider the chasm between them and their fellows. They became

more methodical in their lives: they watched, and fasted, and prayed; they waited more carefully on the sick and the prisoners, and gave money to the poor. "One of them had thirty pounds a year; he lived on twenty-eight and gave away forty shillings. The next year he received sixty pounds; he still lived on twenty-eight and gave away thirty-two. The third year he received ninety pounds and gave away sixty-two. The fourth year he received one hundred and twenty pounds; still he lived as before and gave to the poor ninety-two." This one was John Wesley, the great statesman of Methodism. In this company too was his brother Charles, the "sweet singer" of the sect that was to be, and Whitefield, its eloquent preacher, who had come up from washing mops and cleaning rooms at the Bell Inn in Gloucester, to enter as a Servitor at Pembroke College.

It could not be presumed that such a band would restrict themselves within the limits of the utmost prudence. They were compelled to learn by experience what no one was able or willing to teach them, and that experience was sometimes bitter, as their course was sometimes erratic and visionary. They determined to live for another world and to mortify themselves in this. They multiplied their good works, and bound themselves by rules which Loyola or St. Francis would have been pleased with. They journeyed on foot in order to save money to give to the poor. Wesley would not have his hair dressed, for the same reason. They framed minute questions for self-examination, such as, whether they prayed with fervor on Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday at noon; whether they used a collect at nine, twelve and three o'clock; whether they meditated on Sunday from three to four on Thomas à Kempis, or mused on Wednesday and Friday from twelve to one on the Passion. They regularly visited the sick and the prisoners; they fasted two days in the week and sometimes three; they received the sacrament every Sabbath; during the six weeks of Lent they ate no flesh except on Saturdays and Sundays. Whitefield chose the worst sort of food in order to humble himself the more; he went out in stormy nights, into the walk of Christ-Church and prayed for two hours; sometimes kneeling, sometimes lying on his face, because Christ was tempted in the *desert*. He thought it unbecoming a penitent to have his hair powdered, or to wear a clean dress, and his gown was patched, his shoes were dirty, his whole apparel mean.

The enthusiasm of such men would not be likely to be checked by the ridicule of wittings from whose society they had the courage to break off, nor even by the arguments of more sober men who had never experienced such depths of sorrow as were stirred up in their own bosoms. Their growing asceticism, however, which opposition might only have strengthened, was rebuked in a more effectual way. Whitefield became so emaciated that he could scarcely creep up stairs, and finally a fit of sickness confined him for seven weeks. Others of the company suffered in like manner, till their number, which was never more than twenty-five, was reduced to five or six. Although Wesley was not the originator of the austerities which they thought fit to practise, yet from his age, experience, learning and office, (he was at this time Fellow of Lincoln College,) no less than from his natural fitness for the place, he became the head of the company.

The father of Wesley was Rector of Epworth, a man of considerable learning, great force of character, and devout piety. His mother was a remarkable woman; well educated, at a time when to be well educated implied a knowledge of Latin and Greek, independent in her opinions, when independence required sacrifices, of strong understanding and fervent piety. During the absence of her husband from his parish, she used to assemble her family on Sabbath evening, and read prayers and a sermon. When some of her neighbors wished to join the circle, she did not object, for, in the absence of the proper minister, "she could not but look upon every soul which he had left under her care, as a talent committed to her trust by the great Lord of all the families of heaven and earth." "If I am unfaithful," she wrote to her husband, "to him or to you, in neglecting to improve these talents, how shall I answer unto him, when he shall command me to render an account of my stewardship." Mr. Wesley was, however, somewhat alarmed by the report which reached him, that a conventicle was held at his house, and he wrote to her a decided disapprobation of the meetings. She replied to him with a representation of the good effected in this humble way, and of the evil which would follow if they were broken up, and concluded in these forcible words: "If you do, after all, think fit to dissolve this assembly, do not tell me that you *desire* me to do it, for that will not satisfy my conscience; but send me your *positive command*, in such full and express terms, as may absolve me from guilt and

punishment for rejecting this opportunity of doing good, when you and I shall appear before the great and awful tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ." How much influence such a mother must have had on the future leader of a great sect, no one can fully estimate. The same energy, good judgment and earnestness remained with her through life, and made her the wise counsellor of her son when he was assailed at Oxford, and still later, when thousands regarded his will as law.

The early life of Wesley was attended with more than common dangers and prodigies. When he was six years old, he was rescued from the flames of their burning house a single moment before the roof fell in. He was the last of the children saved, having been forgotten in the hurry of the midnight escape.

When he was at school, his father's house became the scene of disturbances so singular as to be considered supernatural. Although not included in the common histories of demonology, they are among the most remarkable and well attested of those events which have so frequently satisfied the credulity (not to say sober judgment) of men. The supernatural visitants made their presence known, by appealing, as usual, to the sense of hearing, rather than to that of sight. Now there was a knocking on the table, on the shelves, about the beds, a heavy footstep was heard in a room which had long been locked up. Now the sound seemed as though the pewter had been hurled into the middle of the room, but not a platter had been moved; now as though a basket of glass bottles had been shattered at once; now as though a quantity of silver fell into Mrs. Wesley's lap and ran jingling to her feet; now it was like the creaking of a saw or a windmill. The iron casements of the windows rattled; the door-latches moved up and down, though no one was near; the hand-mill whirled swiftly, though no one touched it; the trencher danced on the table, and, on these occasions, the wind rose and whistled about the house. The elder Wesley, who had no fear of the devil, on one occasion rated their unknown tormentor soundly for his contemptible conduct in trying to frighten the children, and dared him to come into the study to him who was a man. Old Jeffrey (so they had named him) immediately gave a loud and peculiar knock, as if to say, "with great pleasure, sir," and the next evening when Mr. Wesley went to the study, of which he alone had the key, the door was thrust back upon him with great violence. He pressed in, however, and

there was nothing there ; but the knocking began now on one side and then on the other. Wesley adjured the imp to speak, but there was no reply. One of his daughters was with him. "Nancy," said Mr. Wesley, determined to be fair with the spirit, "two Christians are an over match for the devil. Go all of you down stairs ; it may be, when I am alone, it will have courage to speak." They went. Wesley repeated the adjuration, but the devil remained deaf and dumb. They soon lost all fear of their mysterious visitor, and the children had no pleasanter frolic than to chase the knocking about from room to room. For two months this continued by night and by day, and no clew to its real cause was ever discovered. All the family believed it to be supernatural. The credulity which John Wesley sometimes showed in after life, may be in part ascribed to his firm belief in the agency of spirits in the affairs of men, so early and forcibly impressed upon him. Nor should we smile with too much self-complacency on the folly of that good family, when we remember their devout spirit, their serious view of life, their habitual communion with the invisible and the future, or the general belief of even many fine scholars of the time, in that last "lingering fiction of the brain."*

Of the bearing of John Wesley at the Charter House School in London, we have very meagre accounts. He was starved and fagged by the older boys, according to the custom of the English schools at that time, while by his quietness, regularity and application, he became a favorite with the master. At seventeen years of age he was transferred to Oxford, and subsequently became fellow of Lincoln College. It was to the discipline of the university, and especially to his duties as Greek lecturer and moderator of the logic classes, which obliged him to attend the disputations of the students six times a week, that he owed much of that thorough scholarship, and that power of clear and subtle discrimination, and expert argument, which fitted him for the great employment of his future life. Here he began that diary which acquaints us with the feelings and opinions and daily employments of one of the most active men, for nearly seventy years. Here he began to apportion his time. Every day had its fixed occupations. Monday and Tuesday were allotted to the Classics ; Wednesday to Logic and Ethics ;

* See Scott on Demonology and Witchcraft.

Thursday to Hebrew and Arabic ; Friday to Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy ; Saturday to Oratory and Poetry ; Sunday to Divinity ; and a good deal of time somewhere to Mathematics. He soon learned, however, the sorrowful lesson, that to know some things well, we must be contented to be ignorant of a great many more. Over his pupils he exercised a stricter control than had been common at the university, and showed the germ at least of those "disciplinary habits," for which he became so famous. He obliged them to rise early in the morning ; he superintended their reading ; he regulated their morals ; he controlled their general conduct.

But Oxford was to be remembered by him for still weightier reasons than for the sound scholarship she gave him. His brother Charles had joined him as member of Christ-Church, and the religious feeling of both became most thoroughly aroused. Their earnest and awakening minds were deeply affected by the writings of Thomas à Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, and William Law. The Imitation of Christ, the Holy Living, and the Serious Call, left them in no doubt as to the great duty, the great labor of life, without directing them with sufficient plainness to the only means through which man can "be just with God."* The world was nothing to them ; eternity, every thing. With their own hands they must painfully work out their own salvation ; with their own hands they must roll up the huge Sisyphean rock which every moment recoiled upon them with new weight. Hence their seclusion, their rigorous self-denial, their pharisaical peculiarities, which the friendship of Law and the fellowship of Whitefield and Hervey and Morgan only exasperated. It was not the age of asceticism, or Wesley would certainly have gone to the wilderness and lived a hermit : it was not an age of religious enthusiasm, or he

* "When I observe," wrote one of them, "how fast life flies away, and how slow improvement comes, I think one can never be too much afraid of dying before one has learned to live, I mean even in the course of nature. For were I sure that 'the silver cord should not be violently loosed ;' that 'the wheel should not be broken at the cistern' till it was quite worn away by its own motion ; yet what a time would this give me for such a work ! a moment, to transact the business of eternity ! What are forty years in comparison of this ? So that were I sure what man never yet was sure of, how little would it alter the case !"

might have preached another crusade. England was not a country for monks, or he would certainly have founded a new and rigorous order.

In 1732, the charter of the province of Georgia was granted by George II., and in 1735 Oglethorpe, the leader of the colony, returned to England for a reinforcement. The enterprise was everywhere regarded with favor, and the trustees sought for men to go out as ministers to the colonists and the Indians. They turned their eyes to the Wesleys. Who else had so much of the missionary spirit? After some hesitation the brothers concluded to accept the invitation. Two years before, a band of Moravians, amid hymns and prayers, had left the little community of Herrnhut, and "floating down the Maine, and between the castles, crags, the vineyards and the white-walled towns that adorn the banks of the Rhine," had embarked at Rotterdam, and settled in freedom and hope near Savannah. On board the vessel in which the Wesleys embarked, they found a number of Moravians going to join their brethren. The whole company might honestly have adopted the seal of the corporation of the colony, "a group of silk-worms at their toils," with the motto *non sibi sed aliis*, not for themselves but for others. The leaven of selfishness was not mingled with their motives. "Are you one of these knights-errant?" said an unbeliever to Wesley. "You have a good provision for life, must you leave all to fight windmills?" "Sir," replied the missionary, "if the Bible be not true, I am as very a fool and madman as you can conceive, but if it be of God, I am sober-minded; for he has declared, "There is no man who has left houses, or friends, or brethren, for the kingdom of God's sake, who shall not receive manifold more in the present time, and in the world to come, everlasting life."

The conduct of the Moravians during the voyage, full of patience and forbearance under vexations, full of confidence in danger, exhibited to Wesley a new feature of the Christian life. A sudden storm came on as they were singing the psalm at the commencement of their worship. The sea broke over the ship and rushed down between the decks. A dreadful screaming was heard among the English: the Moravians calmly sang on. Wesley asked one of them if he was not afraid,—if the women and children were not afraid? "No," he replied, "thank God, no; our women and children are not afraid to die."

The labors of Wesley in Georgia were the least prosperous

and satisfactory labors of his life. John was stationed at Savannah, and Charles acted as secretary of Oglethorpe at Frederica. Both were honest and faithful, both spent their time in works of charity and mercy,—both were unsuccessful. They were better fitted for stirring up the minds of various classes in the old country, than for ruling the rather independent spirit of the infant colony. The mind of Oglethorpe became prejudiced against Charles through the misrepresentations of his enemies, to such an extent, that the unfortunate secretary was left actually to suffer for want of the bare necessities of life. He lay upon the ground in a corner of the hut, and could not obtain the luxury of a few boards for a bed, and at last fell into a fever. This alienation between himself and the governor was subsequently healed, and in a few months he was sent to England as bearer of despatches. John came near being married to a lady in the colony; but the negotiation was somewhat abruptly broken off. The attachment on neither side seems to have been very extravagant, since we find the lady shortly marrying another, and Wesley soon after excluding her from the communion table, according to certain rules of ecclesiastical discipline which had long lain dormant. He does not appear to have chosen the happiest moment for reviving them, nor to have done it with an excess of Christian courtesy. This ecclesiastical proceeding produced a difficulty which ended in his leaving America for England, after having spent in the new world a year and nine months.

But though so little was effected for the colony, a great influence was exerted on Wesley. He began to perceive that there were most important religious feelings which he had never experienced. He began to conjecture that the path which he was painfully pursuing was delusive and vain. His intercourse with the Moravians strengthened these convictions. They had a faith unfelt by him: he never had the serenity in trouble, the joy even in great perils, the lively hope “full of immortality,” which they had. His voyage home afforded him time for a solemn review of his religious experience, which ended in the painful though salutary conviction that he had “no such faith in Christ as prevented his heart from being troubled.” He had labored with some fidelity to convert others, but now he had to be converted himself. In London he met with Peter Bohler, a Moravian minister. The conversation turned on “saving faith.” Wesley pressed his objections. “My brother,” said Bohler to

him, "that philosophy of yours must be purged away." Another day brought another conversation, and fresh amazement to Wesley, as Bohler assured him of the "fruits of a living faith, the holiness and happiness which attend it." The next morning he began his Greek Testament anew, determined to abide by the law and the testimony, and confident that a humble and honest inquirer would not seek in vain. He listened with wonder to the testimony of living witnesses. He read Luther on the Galatians, and learned to his astonishment that the English church "was founded on this important article of justification by faith alone." The two years which followed his return from America were painful in their experience, but rich in their fruits. He had the sentence of death in his own soul, and struggled by a perfect obedience to reverse the terrible doom, till he found the law too high for him, and that by its deeds shall no man living be justified; till he found too another great doctrine which gradually revealed itself to his groping mind, "*Believe*, and thou shalt be saved." The whole current of his thoughts was changed. "Now, sir," says he in a letter to his former friend and adviser, Mr. Law, "suffer me to ask, how you will answer it to our common Lord, that you never gave me this advice? Why did I scarcely ever hear you name the name of Christ; never so as to ground any thing upon faith in his blood? I beseech you, sir, by the mercies of God, to consider deeply and impartially whether the true reason of your not pressing this upon me was not this, that you had it not yourself?" He proceeds with a tone of equal vigor and more asperity, which would seem to indicate that he had some other spirit quite as active as the "catholic charity" which in after life he was inclined to. But his mind had evidently been undergoing a deep change. He called it *conversion*. "Oh what a work," said he, "has God begun! such a one as shall never come to an end, till heaven and earth pass away!"

No one ever produced a great moral revolution whose heart was not the seat of painful struggles and a glorious victory: who did not feel in the profoundest depths of his soul, the life-giving truths, which it were better to die than not to publish. Luther did not go forth on his mission, was not *fitted* for his mission, till he had suffered the agony of a soul, struggling in blindness and doubt onward to salvation: till he had prayed and wept over the word of God, and had rested his buffeted and weary spirit on that foundation rock of the Reformation, the

doctrine that man is justified by faith in Christ. After that, his whole duty was clear before him as noonday. He had but one thing to do, and that he must do,—to bear the flaming torch of truth through the world, to proclaim from every housetop everlasting liberty to those who are bound in the chains of the law. So it was with Wesley. He must preach the gospel: necessity was laid upon him; a bitter experience, a joyful hope had enlightened his way and made the rough places plain.

In the year 1722 a company of Moravians under the guidance of Christian David, had left the country of their fathers where nothing remained for them but persecution and distress, and sought the protection of Count Zinzendorf, in Lusatia, one of the Protestant provinces of Germany. The Count assigned them a spot on his estates for their settlement, to which they gave the name Herrnhut, 'the watch of the Lord,' a name which has become famous in the history of their community. They came poor indeed in the wealth of the world, since the little which they had in Bohemia they were for the most part obliged to abandon; but they were rich in the recollection of an ancestry, who through many dark centuries had cherished on their altars the flame of a pure religion, who had suffered all that men can suffer for the liberty of conscience, and were at last borne down by the brute force of their enemies. They remembered the spirit awakened among them by the writings of Wickliffe. They remembered how the gentle and heroic Huss had been treacherously betrayed, and made to lead the van of the "noble army of their martyrs:" how the intrepid Jerome had sung a hymn in the midst of the flames. They remembered the bloody wars which followed the Council of Constance, and the relentless persecutions which forced some to a denial of their faith, and more to meet in secret at midnight to encourage each other and receive the sacrament. Some of them had come out of Moravia singing the same hymn which their fathers had sung a hundred years before, on *their* exodus for the same reason, from the house of bondage. This little community, "persecuted, but not forsaken! cast down, but not destroyed!" chastened and humbled by their trials, lively in faith and peculiar in their manners and discipline, Wesley determined to visit, that he might learn something more of a people whose daily life illustrated the great doctrines which he had begun to feel.

The intercourse of Wesley with the Brethren (as they were called) was interesting, and to him very profitable. He ad-

mired the simplicity of their character, their meekness and love, and charity and contentment. He gathered many hints from their policy which were of considerable use in the future organization of his own societies. But it is impossible not to suppose that the germ of that dissatisfaction was at this time implanted which led him at a future time to withdraw entirely from the Moravians. Count Zinzendorf was the patron of the community, and wished to receive Wesley as a pupil. The self-confidence and spirit of authority in the great Methodist were just shooting out into a vigorous maturity, and the Count was to him but a man, subject to the same rules of logic and argument with other men. Our sympathies are more subtle and swift than the deductions of the understanding, and probably the two great and good men found their enthusiastic admiration of each other somewhat tempered by the free intercourse of a month, though neither might be willing to acknowledge it. But nothing prevented Wesley from feeling that he would willingly "have spent his life in Herrnhut, if his Master did call him to labor in another part of the vineyard."

The work to which he was destined was indeed far greater than he or any one could anticipate. He returned to London to engage actively in preaching and other religious labors. He joined his brother Charles, who had visited the prisoners at Newgate and accompanied them to Tyburn. The effect of their efforts was decided, and the poor prisoners were brought to a state of penitence and faith. Their fame spread as holy men: the sick desired their prayers, and were healed by them. Frenzied lunatics became calm under the kind words which they spoke, and the impressive language of their petitions. Their meetings in Fetter-lane—the central point of their operations—became larger, and the scenes exhibited there tended to increase the enthusiasm of Wesley, to strengthen his confidence in his own resources, and render him skilful in controlling the increasing body of his followers. He gradually yielded to the conviction that he was selected under Providence for a great work, and though he may not have looked far into the future, still he was probably revolving those plans which fourscore years found him consummating. Here too began those singular physical results which have clung so tenaciously to Methodism, wherever preached, but which will be better noticed hereafter.

In the history of Methodism, Bristol deserves a prominent place, and will ever be remembered with interest. Whitefield

had returned from Georgia full of zeal for his new orphan-house at Savannah, and was preaching to crowded houses. A thousand stood about the doors of Bermondsey church, and could find no admittance. Shall all these (thought Whitefield) hunger for the bread of life and not receive a crumb, because the stone walls are too narrow to contain them? Does the Most High dwell only in temples made with hands? Are not the disciples authorized to go into the highways and hedges? Did not our Saviour preach on the mount and in the desert? These inquiries show whither was tending the current of his thoughts, and how the multitude of his hearers was suggesting to him a wider theatre for his eloquence. Near Bristol was a rough tract called Kingswood. Once a royal chase, it had fallen into disuse, till the discovery of its coal-mines converted it at once into the inexhaustible treasury from which the city drew its stores of fuel. The colliers were a wild and savage set, who seemed almost to belong to another race. Upon them the first experiment of field-preaching was made. The heart of Whitefield was moved by the thought of the heathen at his own door when he had gone so far to preach to the Indians. He stood upon a mount called Rose Green, and a few hearers gathered around him, attracted and astonished by the novelty of the message. His second audience numbered two thousand, the third, four or five thousand, and so on to ten, fifteen, and twenty thousand hearers at once. This example of field-preaching was soon followed by Wesley, though somewhat reluctantly, for he (and yet more his brother Charles) still clung with affectionate respect to the time-hallowed usages of a venerable church. The die however was cast; the step was taken which inevitably led to such important results. Pulpits were shut against them for their irregularity, but they never lacked for church-yards or open fields. One of the most affecting scenes of Wesley's life occurred some years later than this on one of these occasions. He came in his journeying to the little parish of Epworth, where he was born; where his venerable father had spent his long and useful life. Years had passed since he had been there: his friends and acquaintances were mostly gone, and the curate refused him permission to preach in the church. He could not endure to depart from *that* place without delivering his message. Notice was given that he would preach in the church-yard at six o'clock. "Accordingly," he says, "at six I came, and found such a congregation as I believe

Epworth never saw before. I stood near the east end of the church upon my father's tombstone, and cried, 'The kingdom of heaven is not in meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.'" John Wesley preaching on his father's grave presents an almost unequalled subject for the pencil that would portray the early scenes of the rising denomination. The time, the place, the people, kindled his ardent enthusiasm to the utmost. Upon that hallowed spot he was inspired, as Southey says, "like the Greek tragedian, who, when he performed *Electra*, brought into the theatre the urn containing the ashes of his own daughter." The most affectionate, the holiest, the profoundest feelings of his nature were touched. "Seven successive evenings he preached upon that tombstone," with a power and effect nowhere ever exceeded.

But we return to the order of the narrative. Kingswood became a very prominent and important theatre of the labors of Wesley, and the scene of certain exhibitions which it is much easier to describe than fully to explain. We refer to those convulsions, and agonies, and paroxysms which attended the preaching of Wesley, and unfortunately were not exhibited here alone. Men were suddenly struck down to the earth as if dead; they were thrown into violent fits; they were attacked with pain so excessive that they could not help crying out in agony; they were seized with trembling and sunk down powerless. Wesley had seen fits of epilepsy and hysteria, but these were unlike, and his ready faith ascribed them to the power of the devil,* and sometimes to the miraculous agency of the Most High. They did not come upon the followers of Wesley alone. 'A Quaker who was present, and inveighed against the dissimulation of those affected, was himself seized, even while biting his lips and knitting his brows, and fell as if struck by lightning.' A stranger passing by stopped to listen to the preaching, and suddenly felt himself grasped by the unknown power and fell prostrate. An honest weaver, 'zealous for the church,' and against dissenters, went about 'to convince his acquaintance that it was all a delusion of the devil,' but as he was reading a sermon he changed color, fell from his chair, and screamed so terribly that the neighbors were alarmed and ran into the house; 'his breast

* In this he was not altogether peculiar. We find the same opinion suggested by Ralph Erskine, of Scotland.

heaved as in the pangs of death, and great drops of sweat trickled down his face. These things were not the result of dishonesty in the sufferers. They were no doubt in part owing to the amazing power of the speaker over his audience, many of whom regarded him, from his commanding attitude, his imposing appearance, and his awful message, like an inhabitant of another world. A part of the effect may be ascribed to the erroneous doctrine which led the hearers to *expect* some visible token or some sensible effect, as a sign of their conviction and conversion. A part may be ascribed to the power of enthusiasm, of fear and sympathy, and general nervous excitement; and a part, no doubt—though a small part—to a desire of attracting the notice of the great preacher, and even to deception. Wesley's frank and generous nature allowed him to be deceived by his friends much more readily than by his enemies. Still, some things we may suspect to remain unexplained, and destined to illustrate a chapter in physiology or psychology, not yet fully written. The personal influence of the preacher is exhibited by the undoubted facts that these appearances showed themselves under Wesley much sooner than under Whitefield; that Wesley did not discourage them, while Whitefield did; and that under the later preaching of Wesley, when he had, to a considerable degree, changed his opinion of them as indications of a spiritual power, they diminished very much, if they did not entirely cease.

Wesley's enthusiasm was now at its height, and not as yet tempered by experience. The scenes which he was passing through were so strange and exciting, that he did not always stop to 'examine the spirits, whether or not they were of God.' That the sick were healed, that devils were cast out, that the lunatics were brought to their right mind, when he stretched out his hands over them in prayer, he does not seem to have doubted. His journal is filled with examples of cures wrought upon himself, upon his friends, upon his *horse* even, in answer to his petitions. Almost every day witnessed some surprising intervention of Divine Providence for his safety or his happiness, and the most remarkable of these supernatural events are related with a simplicity, and sometimes quaintness, worthy of good old Isaak Walton, or George Herbert. We are not careful to pick out the little flaws in the character of such a man, but it must be confessed, his credulity is no inconsiderable one. We have no sympathy with the harsh vituperation of Warburton

however vigorous and witty, but there were some things which provoked it. We are very far from that cold, mechanical philosophy which removes God from all concern with the world, and sees in all events only the agency of second causes, but Wesley was apt to see a special providence in almost every wind that blew, or drop of rain that fell. We do consider a 'believing spirit,' far, very far better than a skeptical spirit, but Wesley believed when the evidence was chiefly his feelings. We condemn this enthusiasm and credulity as wild and mischievous—perhaps in after life he regarded them somewhat in the same light—but we may question whether they were not needful to him, absolutely essential for accomplishing the work he had in hand. He never could have labored as he did, to effect an earthborn or selfish project. Nothing but a divine work 'which should never come to an end, till heaven and earth pass away,' and a belief in the favor of the Most High daily communicated to him, would have urged him, in the absence of all worldly honor and emolument, to his long, laborious and self-denying service. A calm philosophy, carefully analyzing the mysteries of truth and falsehood, exactly adjusting the righteous balance, whatever great good it may accomplish, does not impel men to such courses. Zeal has its work to do in the renovation of the world as truly as prudence.

Wesley was far too vehement to plod along in the old path. His sympathies might cling to the past, but his mind rushed on to some new order of things in the future. He deceived himself when he thought or said otherwise. His determination was now made up for the course of his life, and occasional extravagances, even when he felt them, would not deter him from what on the whole seemed a great and necessary work. He had suffered too much and reflected too deeply, not to have opinions of his own, which the opposition of clergymen and the authority of bishops could not overthrow, and he was too active to allow those opinions to become a dead letter in the statute-book of his soul. No family confined him by domestic wants and responsibilities; all his time was cheerfully devoted to the duties of his weighty calling. Societies were everywhere formed, but as yet he meditated no separation from the established church. He only urged his followers to live like immortal beings, to be faithful servants of the Most High God. He asked no man for his creed, demanded no subscription to articles, no forsaking of a former mode of worship. "I am sick of

opinions," he said some time afterward, "give me solid and substantial religion: give me an humble and gentle lover of God and man: a man full of mercy and good faith, without partiality and without hypocrisy: a man laying himself out in the work of faith, the patience of hope and the labor of love. Let my soul be with these Christians, wheresoever they are, and whatsoever opinion they are of. * * * We may die without the knowledge of many truths, and yet be carried to Abraham's bosom; but if we die without love, what will knowledge avail? Just as much as it avails the devil and his angels!" No one could accuse him of idleness. He built chapels, holding the right to them vested, not in trustees, but in himself. He appointed, or as he said, *tolerated* lay preachers, not to administer the ordinances but to preach the word. To this he came reluctantly, but he could not help it. The spirit which he had raised he could not allay, but only guide, and the great crowd which he sent out looked up to him for counsel as to a father. He demanded in them first of all, zeal. This covered a multitude of faults, and if it cooled, or Wesley became for other reasons dissatisfied with his preachers, he found another service for them, or they dropped back noiselessly to the common herd. Thus he had the great advantage of easily getting rid of the troublesome or weary spirits. He sought to improve the singing of his congregations, and in this, his brother Charles, with the beautiful melodies of his hymns, rendered him the greatest assistance. Sternhold and Hopkins were banished. Their famous (or infamous) compositions were a part of the service of the establishment, for which he retained not a particle of lingering attachment. He fitted up a large building in Moorfields, London, which had been used during the civil wars as a foundry for cannon, and henceforth the Foundry became the centre of the meetings in town. In the mean time the 'doctrine and discipline' spread through every county from Cornwall to Newcastle upon Tyne, and extended into Wales, Scotland and Ireland, so that in the year 1765, there were thirty-nine circuits in these countries.

It must not, however, be supposed that "all went merry as a marriage bell." Many were the perplexities, and bitter and dangerous sometimes the persecutions with which they met. All sorts of calumnies were heaped upon the head of Wesley and his associates. He was charged with being a Papist, a Jesuit, a follower of the Pretender. He was assailed by mobs who used freely the weapons best suited to them, stones and dirt,

while he replied with weapons most familiar to him, expostulation and argument. Sometimes one prevailed and sometimes the other. At one time he was pelted from the town, bruised, wounded, and half dead. At another, his mild manner, his dignified and fearless address awed and delighted even his rude assailants. The magistrates themselves encouraged the mob now by their pusillanimity, and again, through worse motives, by assurances of forbearance. The congregations fared almost as hard as the preachers. They were stoned, and thrown into ponds, and rolled in the mud. Women and children were exposed to the brutalities of an ignorant populace. They sometimes received indignities where they might have expected kindness. Dissenters even—themselves under disabilities for conscience' sake—joined with virulent churchmen to oppress the rising community. Dr. Doddridge was subjected to severe criticism and unworthy suspicions from his familiarity with Whitefield.

Notwithstanding all, Wesley pursued his way without hesitation. The history of his itinerancy is replete with scenes of romantic and fearful interest; full too of marked and strange effects of his preaching and that of his followers. He was thrown into contact with men of all classes, the high and the low, the learned and the ignorant, and always showed his ability and self-possession. We can give but a very brief account of a few circumstances among a thousand, which show his own power, and illustrate the force of truth upon minds excited to feel it. He was attacked at Bath by Beau Nash; but the king of the gay watering place found it one thing to direct festivities, and quite another to interfere with men engaged in the most solemn business which mortals can attend to; one thing to decide matters of honor and etiquette, and a far different thing to control the liberty of conscience and the laws of God. "By what authority are you preaching?" said Nash to Wesley. "By that of Jesus Christ," replied the priest, than whom no one ever better knew his position; "by that of Jesus Christ, conveyed to me by the present archbishop of Canterbury, when he laid his hands upon me and said, 'Take thou authority to preach the gospel.'" "What do these people come here for," said Nash. "Let an old woman answer him," cried one of the congregation. "You, Mr. Nash, take care of your body, we take care of our souls, and for the food of our souls we come here." The master of ceremonies had nothing more to say.

A preacher said in his sermon, "There are two witnesses dead and buried in dust, which will rise up against you. These are the two witnesses," he continued, holding up the Bible, "the Old Testament and the New, that have been dead and buried in the dust upon your shelf." "I remembered," said John Furz some time afterward, "that my Bible was covered with dust, and that I had written my name with the point of my finger upon the binding. I thought I had signed my own damnation on the back of the witness." He went home in terror. The struggle was a strong one, but he became a preacher for the rest of his life.

A party met at an alehouse in Rotherham, to amuse themselves by mimicking the Methodists. They preached for a wager. John Thorpe jumped on the table last in great glee, opened the Bible, and his eyes fell on the passage, "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish." He became serious and preached in earnest; "his hair stood erect at the feelings which came upon him, and the awful denunciations which he uttered." When he ceased, the wager was forgotten: he left the company and went home an altered man, and subsequently became an itinerant preacher.*

* Were we seeking for *curious* conversions, the annals of no sect would furnish more. A young man at Norwich, with a number of his gay companions, had his fortune told by a wandering fortune-teller. According to the usual style of such predictions, he was to live to a great age and see about him grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The prophecy so far affected him that he determined to lay up a rich store of entertaining knowledge for his future posterity, and to begin by hearing the wonderful preacher Whitefield, who was then in the city. In the course of the sermon, Whitefield paused, burst into tears, and lifting up his hands and eyes, exclaimed, "Oh, my hearers, *the wrath to come, the wrath to come.*" These words sank into his heart like lead in the waters, and resulted in his conversion. Still more odd was another instance which is recorded. An innkeeper fond of singing, went to hear the music, and in order not to hear the sermon sat with his fingers in his ears. Suddenly a fly stung his nose, and just as he took down one hand to brush away the intruder, the preacher thundered out the text, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The impression was irresistible; this was the beginning of a new life to him. Music was as serviceable in another singu-

From one of his busy circuits, Wesley was called home to the death-bed of that excellent mother to whom he owed so much for counsel and sympathy. His account of the last scene and of the funeral service is very characteristic, and affords another insight into his character. "I sat down on the bedside. She was in her last conflict, unable to speak, but I believe quite sensible. Her look was calm and serene, and her eyes fixed upward, while we commended her soul to God. From three to four the silver cord was loosing, and the wheel breaking at the cistern; and then without a struggle, or sigh, or groan, the soul was set at liberty. We stood round her bed and fulfilled her last request, uttered a little before she lost her speech: 'Children, as soon as I am released, sing a psalm of praise to God.' * * * Almost an innumerable company of people being gathered together at the funeral, about five in the afternoon I committed to the earth the body of my mother to sleep with her fathers. The portion of Scripture from which I afterwards spoke was, *I saw a great white throne, and Him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away, and there was found no place for them. And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened, and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the book, according to their works.* It was one of the most solemn assemblies I ever saw, or expect to see, on this side eternity."

We may here pause a moment to inquire the cause of the rapid and extensive spread of Methodism in England; so ex-

lar case. At Wexford in Ireland, the Catholics sought to annoy the Methodists who met in a barn. One of them endeavored to secrete himself in the barn, in order that he might open the door to his companions at a proper time, but could find no hiding-place except a sack near the door, into which he crawled. The mob collected, but the singing of the Methodists was so good that Pat thought he would not disturb it, and when the hymn was done, he felt a curiosity to hear the prayer; but during the prayer he became so confounded and distressed that "he roared out, and not being able to get out, lay bawling and screaming, to the great dismay of the congregation, who supposed that Satan himself was in the barn. Somebody at last let him out, and he confessed his sins and cried for mercy." The change seems to have been genuine and the account well attested, though the circumstances of the case are probably unique.

tensive, that in a few years its followers were numbered by thousands, and there was hardly a considerable town in England or Wales which did not have its chapel. They were everywhere spoken against; they were everywhere more or less successful. Neither ridicule nor persecution, neither the neglect of the magistrates nor the opposition of prelates, neither the authority of Lavington nor the learning and asperity of Warburton, could stop the advancing opinion. The tide flowed up to the very foot of the frowning rocks, and insinuated itself into almost every hamlet in the kingdom. The causes are several, and some of them not difficult to be detected.

The class of people from whom the first converts were gathered, was a very ignorant class, unaccustomed to preaching of any kind; hence the word which they heard at fairs and market-places, in the fields and the collieries, startled them like a new revelation. They were heathen in a Christian country. A few words of truth at long intervals had come to their ears, just enough to awaken their suspicions and fear of a future wrath, just enough to afford a ground for the appeals of the preacher, but for not much more. They were as if under an enchantment, and when the terrible shell was shattered, they came out in all the bewilderment and fear of men who had been ignorantly sleeping on the brink of eternal destruction. 'It was the misfortune as well as the folly of the English church, to be bound so strictly by the customs of the fathers. To the poor the gospel was *not* preached, because the poor could find no room in the parish churches, which were not by any means sufficiently numerous for the population. There was little of that zeal for church extension which now animates nobles and prelates, and yet to preach elsewhere than within consecrated walls, shocked all their notions of order and propriety. The consequence was unavoidable, that great masses scattered over sparsely populated regions, or clustering about the centres of commerce, and in the mining regions, were left to ignorance and degradation. But this was one great class for which Wesley and his associates labored. Moorfields, "a royalty of the rabble, a place for wrestlers and boxers, mountebanks and merry-andrews," and Kingswood near Bristol, Kennington Common and Blackheath, were prominent scenes of their labors. The lawless and brutal inhabitants of the collieries, the dissolute and reprobate who resorted to the fairs to be trained up in vice, were their bearers. It should not then be wondered at, that

when Whitefield first preached to the colliers, ignorant, but too careless to be prejudiced, they stared upon him in utter astonishment, nor that they trembled as he warned them, with his awful power, of 'temperance, righteousness and judgment,' nor that the tears made white grooves down their sooty cheeks, as he told them of the love which Christ had for *them*. From these circumstances it happened that many societies were formed, not from the ordinary worshippers in the established church, but from those who worshipped nowhere.

Another reason is to be found in the nature of the doctrines preached. The great truths that men must be born again, and that conversion is instantaneous; that they must be justified by faith; that none who come to God through Christ will be cast away, were the cardinal points in their creed. Some doctrines were in dispute, such as free will and predestination, but these were not dwelt upon in their sermons. The burden of their exhortation was "flee from the wrath to come;" flee from the city of destruction; awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee life. They felt the absolute necessity of *regeneration* as something entirely different from resolutions, from Pharisaical obedience, from external humiliations and the performance of ceremonies, from a sombre countenance and a monkish life; of regeneration, as a mysterious change of the heart, wrought by the Spirit of God, which no one can explain, for none can comprehend, but as real and undeniable as our own existence. The liturgy and the creed were as full as ever of sound and wholesome doctrine. The Articles still read that "every man is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh always lusteth contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation," and "that we are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, and not for our own works or deservings;" but these comfortable truths were to a great extent a dead letter in the Prayer Book. Ministers resorted to the church for a living, with not even an intellectual apprehension of the truths they professed to teach. But these truths came to many a suffering and panting soul, like bread to the famished, like cold water to the dying of thirst. There were many who were travailing and groaning in bondage, and freedom could not be more delightful to the captive, than the liberty of Christ to them.

Another reason may be found in the character of the early Methodist preachers. The most remarkable and gifted of these was Whitefield, whose popularity renders it hardly worth the while to speak of his eloquence. In winter mornings he gathered a crowd at five o'clock, to hear his discourses in the Tabernacle. At night when he preached in the open air, "Moorfields was as full of lanterns as the Haymarket is of flambeaus on an opera night." A thousand notes were sometimes sent to him during the week by those whom his appeals had awakened. These surprising accounts may render us in some danger of judging a little unfairly of his real merits, when we find in his printed sermons so little to account for these effects, so little profound thought, so little argument, so little even of what we should most expect to find, bursts of feeling, a rush of startling imagery, an excessive vividness of appeal. He was emphatically a speaker, not a writer; a speaker whose instruments were not only his thoughts and words, but his eye, his hand, his unequalled voice, his whole frame; a speaker the most plain and direct, and simple to the comprehension of the meanest, of the liveliest sympathy, of the quickest perception, wise to conform to the peculiarities of his various audiences, and adroit to avail himself as by instinct of every casual circumstance which could enhance his power. To judge of such a man by the *remains* of his discourses will not do at all. "The books do *not* preserve the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them." The same may be said, though not perhaps with equal force, of other great orators, whose *just* fame would be belied by the record of their speeches. Neither the speeches of Patrick Henry nor the sermons of the late Dr. Mason, admirable as they are, would bear such a partial scrutiny. The man who could charm Dr. Franklin and Garrick, Hume and Doddridge, Bolingbroke, John Newton, Chesterfield and the rabble of Moorfields, must have had a virtue in him, which remains no more upon earth. It was the depth of his heart which spoke; hence when he first preached to polite audiences, accustomed to fine discourses,—that is, to lifeless ones,—his familiar language, his earnest tone, his genuine feeling, his plain exhortations, without learning or art but full of sincerity, caught hold irresistibly of the feelings of his audience. They perceived that he was speaking to *them*, on very serious matters, and their

whole sympathies flowed out towards the preacher. They flocked to hear one who told them such new things, new in fact to many, and in the manner of the telling, new to all.

Wesley himself, though better known to us as the founder of a sect, was no mean preacher. His labors in this part of his vocation were prodigious, and no one knew how to turn them to better effect. His earnest address, his self-possession, and his logical acuteness, sometimes carried conviction when the appeals of Whitefield were entirely ineffectual. "As soon as he got upon his stand," said one of his hearers in Moorfields, who afterwards became one of his preachers, "he stroked back his hair, and turned his face towards where I stood, and I thought fixed his eyes upon me. His countenance struck such an awful dread upon me, before I heard him speak, that it made my heart beat like the pendulum of a clock; and when he did speak, I thought his whole discourse was aimed at me."

Charles Wesley too, by his great fervor and sincerity, by his rich thoughts and copiousness of expression, attracted hearers of education and refinement, while the fervor of his devotion went to the deepest hearts of the serious. A dissenter who heard him thus described the effect: "Never did I hear such praying; never did I see such evident marks of fervency in the service of God. At the close of every petition a serious amen, like a gentle rushing sound of waters, ran through the whole audience, with such a solemn air as quite distinguished it from whatever of that nature I have heard attending the responses in the church service. * * He was standing on a table board in an erect posture, with his hands and eyes lifted up to heaven. He preached about an hour in such a manner as I scarce ever heard any man preach: though I have heard many a fine sermon, according to the common taste or acceptation of sermons, I never heard any man discover such evident signs of a vehement desire, or labor so earnestly to convince his hearers that they were all by nature in a sinful, lost, undone state. * * * And though he used no notes, nor had any thing in his hand but a Bible, yet he delivered his thoughts in a rich variety of expression and with so much propriety, that I could not observe any thing incoherent or inanimate through the whole performance. * * * * * If there be such a thing as heavenly music upon earth, I heard it there. As for my own part, I do not remember my heart to have been so

elevated in divine love and praise as it was then and there for many years past, if ever; and an affecting sense and savor thereof abode in my mind many weeks after."

Besides these, was a chosen company of preachers selected by Wesley himself, than whom no one ever judged more wisely of the fitness of the men for their office. Napoleon could not better select his generals than Wesley his preachers. Both were sometimes deceived, but not often. Whatever be the faults of democracy it usually has the virtue of giving "the tools to those who can use them." It may be foolish, may be passionate and rash, may be ungenerous and ungrateful, but seldom weak. In Wesley's scheme of government, there was a skilful mixture of freedom and constraint, of authority and independence. He himself was amenable to no man. He did not appoint himself the head of the sect, but came to it by the providence of God, and he bore himself like a King and Priest. His preachers did not choose him but he chose them. They were not obliged to bear the burdens which he laid upon them. Were they grieved at his measures? there was an easy remedy: when they entered the society they gave no pledge, and they might leave it without opposition. Did they become restless under his orders and seek to subvert his plans? they *must* leave the society. He gave them permission to preach in his chapels, and when they abused that permission, he withdrew it. His magnanimity never descended to annoying restrictions, nor to a capricious exercise of authority for the sake of authority, but neither would it allow the great plans which he had formed to be thwarted by the folly or pride of those who had no plans at all beyond the present day, and their own congregation. No dictator was ever more jealous of authority, yet none ever assumed it with a stronger feeling of his divine right to rule, nor used it more wisely. He did not justify himself by arbitrary determination, but by appeal to the course of Providence, and he sustained his measures by unanswerable arguments, by the power of a strong mind over weak ones. He selected his preachers wherever he could find them. Did a man who gave evidence of conversion find himself gifted with the power of speaking and feel impelled to call his fellow men to repentance, he had an opportunity to display his gifts before Wesley, and if approved, was forthwith sent to some of the widely extended circuits. No pride of birth, no previous education, no want of it, stood in the way or prejudiced the ca-

reer of the candidate for these irregular orders. He who was unfit for one service, was found useful in another.

It is doubtless one mark of the profound policy of the Roman Catholic church, that it affords to individuals in all classes, who are moved to devote themselves to the extension of the faith, an appropriate sphere for their labors, and each is sure of honor according to what he does. The monk who goes barefoot, and wears nothing but a gown of coarse serge, may be doing a great duty for which the benignant mother smiles upon him. Though born in poverty, he may aspire to the Papedom.* The passion of every man and every woman is turned to a wise account. Every one feels a personal interest in the triumph of the faith. Thus are secured the distinguishing virtues of despotism and democracy, unity and perseverance in design, vigor and self-devotion in execution.

This was the plan of Wesley. He was the head and heart of the association, but his instruments, chosen wherever and whenever presented, were directed with consummate prudence, inspired by the most untiring zeal. Hence the most earnest and sincere and self-devoted flocked to his standard. Their own experience was many times most affecting, sometimes terrible. They seemed to be expressly called of God; they had been snatched from the jaws of the bottomless pit; they had been mysteriously turned from courses of desperate and heart-hardening sin; they had felt the terrible burden of a wounded conscience; they had bent under the prostrating load for months or years; they had agonized in prayer; they had wrestled with the angel even till break of day; they had rejoiced with joy unspeakable; they had heard and seen and felt what no man could tell to his fellow-man. Why should we doubt the reality of such joyful or bitter experience? Its truth and their honesty were sometimes attested by a laborious and almost uncompensated career of twenty years. The self-devotion, the enthusiasm, the fidelity and boldness of some of the early preachers would have secured them, in the Papal church, honors, authority, and perhaps a saintship. They sought and obtained only a decent (we should think scanty) subsistence, a humble and useful life. Their own experience made them ardent and fearless. They warned men of dangers which they themselves had seen; of sorrows which they themselves had

* See on a kindred subject Macaulay's review of Ranke.

felt. There was no affectation, no illusion. They did not gather their feelings at second hand; all was real and most painfully personal to them. They were like the man whom Christian saw at the house of the Interpreter, just rising from his bed all shaking and trembling, for he had dreamed of the day of judgment, of the flames of a burning world, and the yawning pit of hell. They had more than dreamed of them. They had hung over the gulf of despair, expecting every moment that the brittle thread would be cut and they fall forever. But now they were saved, and while they walked soberly, as in constant remembrance of the fearful past, they could not help calling upon men with tears to save themselves from a doom whose bare anticipation was so terrible.

The power of Wesley's preachers was economized by the system of itinerating. They must be emphatically pilgrims, without an abiding place. At first he allowed them to preach at one station but one or two months; subsequently, one, or at the utmost, two years. They must always stand ready to be sent to the barren wastes of Cornwall, or the mountains of Wales, or the great Riding of Yorkshire. We might suppose that such a restless and harassing life would deter men from the office of preacher. It did no such thing. It afforded the very trial into which many an enthusiastic mind was ready to leap. He afforded them very little which would allure a selfish heart, but very much to stimulate a magnanimous one. "Do you ask me what you shall have?" he had once written to Whitefield; "Food to eat, and raiment to put on; a house to lay your head in, such as your Lord had not; and a crown of glory that fadeth not away." The honor of the conquest is proportioned to its difficulty. The same lofty feeling of self-devotion animated his preachers, which would prompt the soldier to volunteer as one of the forlorn hope. Many a soldier has applied the torch to the mine which would destroy him as well as the enemy, not from a fear of punishment if he failed, but under the deep impulse of the heroic self-sacrifice to which his duty called him. Many a missionary, among the mingled feelings which find a home in his bosom, has been somewhat sustained by a high sense of the perilous service in which he has enlisted, and a conscious freedom from all the ordinary forms of selfishness. There is a peculiar joy in being truly disinterested; in undertaking any service, however severe, which we know to be uncontaminated by the bane of selfish-

ness. We very much mistake, if we suppose that a luxurious and effeminate life will attract the best minds. A sense of degradation attends a life of mere pleasure, that few can submit to, while intrepid exploits and laborious services bring with them a satisfaction which is their greatest reward. Danger itself has a charm. We rush into it, not to risk our lives or our happiness, but to conquer it, and enjoy the glory and delight of victory. Make the object difficult of attainment and worthy of effort, if you would excite ardent and lofty minds. Ease and comfort would no doubt seduce many, but they were not the sort which Wesley wanted. His followers must shrink from no labor, and be deterred by no danger. He himself avoided nothing which he imposed upon others. After his eightieth year he used to travel four or five thousand miles annually.

Besides this, the system of itinerating was necessary both for the success of his measures and the real advantage of his preachers. It was necessary for the preservation and extension of the sect. Like many other of the peculiarities of the order, it had sprung from the necessities of the case, and when time had proved its usefulness was incorporated into the rules. The preachers must be itinerants, for otherwise the founder of the order would soon lose control over his subordinates. They would become independents and schismatics, instead of useful parts of one grand whole. The great design would thus be entirely frustrated. No less useful and important was it for the preachers themselves to improve their resources by the opportunities which change of place would necessarily offer. For the most part, men of no education, men who trusted to their feelings and the plainest truths of the Bible, they could not be expected to interest or instruct any congregation for many years in succession. It was well for them to exchange the listless countenances of an old audience for the curious faces of a new one. Thus they would feel that they were doing good, and their sermons were unquestionably improved by repetition. Franklin tells us that he heard Whitefield repeat the same discourse to different audiences, and could witness the progressive improvement in thought and delivery, in metaphor and illustration. Not till after he had preached it twenty times did he rise to the highest pitch of fervor and freedom; and so far were his high-wrought pleadings and expostulations, and his consummate action from appearing theatrical though heard a score of times, that they were expected and received with as much delight the

twentieth time as they were listened to with surprise at the first. The process of re-preaching was like that of re-writing, correcting and enlarging a composition. It might not, in the case of the ministers generally, greatly multiply the weapons of their armory, but it would render those which they already possessed more highly polished and doubly effective.

Perhaps in no other country than England could Methodism have been established in the form which it first took. In no other European country would the necessary liberty of conscience and of worship have been allowed; and in none but a European country would the requisite spirit of obedience, and habits of submission, have remained in the minds of men, who by breaking off from the established church, seemed to become the freest of the free.

The middle and later life of Wesley were spent in directing the continually increasing affairs of the circuits. In 1751 he married a shrew, and fared even worse than the majority of similar unfortunates, for, as his life was a very public one, his wife, besides opening a very vigorous domestic battery on his peace, intercepted his letters, and having interpolated them, read them openly to his enemies, and even published some in the public prints. He entertained the most ancient and approved notions on the respective duties of husband and wife, which he did not hesitate to express very explicitly. 'It is the duty of the husband,' he thought, 'to keep his authority and to use it. It is the special duty of a wife to know herself to be inferior, and to behave as such.' These pleasing propositions, which some married men are not active to discuss, he maintained and elucidated with all the prudence and ingenuity of one who daily *felt* their importance. Mrs. Wesley seemed to have quite a different view of the subject, and she exercised her skill in practically refuting his doctrines, with an energy and perseverance which left few discoveries in the art of teasing for the future Katharinas who may choose to exercise so estimable a calling. Wesley seems to have borne all with much good nature and inflexibility, and to have contented himself with administering reproofs and exhortations rather generously, and, when at last she left him, with briefly recording in his journal, *Non eam reliqui, non dimisi, non revocabo.*

Shortly after his return from Germany, Wesley had separated from the Moravians. A later period brought a more trying

disunion between 'himself and his early friend Whitefield. Personal causes for a while estranged them, but such men "carried anger as the flint bears fire." In their confiding and generous hearts was no room for continued resentment, their differences were soon reconciled, and they continued warm personal friends to the last. On points of doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, however, their paths divided. Whitefield became a Calvinist, Wesley an Arminian. Whitefield, free from the ambition, as well as the ability of ruling, looked to the Countess of Huntingdon, as patroness of the Calvinistic Methodists, who then assumed the name of Lady Huntingdon's Connection. Wesley, receiving his authority as in the course of nature *his* and nobody's else, acknowledged no patron and gave his own name to the sect. Wesley sometimes ventured unguarded assertions respecting full assurance of faith, and Christian perfection, which Whitefield did not dare assent to. Wesley wrote against the "horrible decree of predestination;" Whitefield defended the doctrine. Hardly a passage in the whole range of theological literature can be found of such tremendous vehemence (we by no means say *truth*) as a portion of Wesley's sermon on Free Grace. He brought the whole concentrated energy of his mind to bear on a subject in which his heart was most deeply interested. After a course of powerful remarks, he appeals in a strain still more vivid and terrible to "all the devils in hell." "This is the blasphemy for which I abhor the doctrine of Predestination; a doctrine, upon the supposition of which, if one could possibly for a moment suppose it, call it election, reprobation, or what you please, (for all comes to the same thing,) one might say to our adversary the devil, 'Thou fool, why dost thou roar about any longer? Thy lying in wait for souls is as needless and useless as our preaching. Hearest thou not, that God hath taken thy work out of thy hands, and that he doth it more effectually? Thou, with all thy principalities and powers, canst only so assault that we may resist thee; but he can irresistibly destroy both soul and body in hell! Thou canst only entice; but his unchangeable decree to leave thousands of souls in death, compels them to continue in sin, till they drop into everlasting burnings. Thou temptest, he forceth us to be damned, for we cannot resist his will. Thou fool! why goest thou about any longer, seeking whom thou mayest devour? Hearest thou not that God is the devouring lion, the destroyer of souls, the murderer

of men? Moloch caused only children to pass through the fire, and that fire was soon quenched; or, the corruptible body being consumed, its torments were at an end; but God, thou art told, by his eternal decree, fixed before they had done good or evil, causes not only children of a span long, but the parents also, to pass through the fire of hell; that fire which shall never be quenched; and the body which is cast thereinto, being now incorruptible and immortal, will be ever consuming and never consumed; but the smoke of their torment, because it is God's good pleasure, ascendeth up forever.

"Oh, how would the enemy of God and man rejoice to hear these things were so! How would he cry aloud and spare not! How would he lift up his voice and say, To your tents O Israel! flee from the face of this God, or ye shall utterly perish. But whither will ye flee? Into heaven? He is there. Down to hell? He is there also. Ye cannot flee from an omnipresent, almighty tyrant. And whether ye flee or stay, I call heaven, his throne, and earth, his footstool, to witness against you; ye shall perish, ye shall die eternally! Sing, O hell, and rejoice ye that are under the earth! for God, even the mighty God, hath spoken, and devoted to death thousands of souls, from the rising of the sun, unto the going down thereof. Here, O death, is thy sting! They shall not, cannot escape, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it. Here, O grave, is thy victory! Nations yet unborn, or ever they have done good or evil, are doomed never to see the light of life, but thou shalt gnaw upon them forever and ever. Let all those morning stars sing together, who fell with Lucifer, son of the morning! Let all the sons of hell shout for joy: for the decree is past, and who shall annul it?"

This fearful passage illustrates Wesley's power better than his general spirit. He was not eager for controversy, and for many years after his opinions were fixed, wrote very little on the subject, and Whitefield still less. Indeed an agreement was entered into between the most distinguished of the two parties, to avoid the disputed points as much as possible in their sermons, and when speaking of them to adopt a temperate phraseology, if not the express language of Scripture. It was vain, however, to expect a permanent peace when the differences were so radical, and some unguarded expressions in the minutes of the General Conference of 1770, fanned the smouldering embers into a vehement flame. Fletcher and Berridge,

Toplady and Thomas Oliver, exhausted their store (and it was not small) of sarcasm and irony and argument and entreaty, and Wesley himself now and then hurled an anathema and appeal, but little less powerful than what we have already quoted from him. A great deal of acrimony, and some wit was shown on both sides, on a subject where Christian courtesy and charity would have availed much more to heal the breach, or, if that were impossible, calmly to define and settle the differences. One unlearned in the history of theological controversies, would suppose that a knowledge of many of them would tend to assuage the violence of religious parties, especially when remembering the extremes to which almost any doctrine may be driven by a partisan theologian, when that theologian, at the best, is an erring and short-sighted mortal.

Another disunion still was before Wesley, more marked and more trying, the separation of the sect from the established church. On this point Charles Wesley could not agree with his brother, jealous although he was of his honor. Men of foresight had long seen to what the previous measures must necessarily lead. The schism was not fully accomplished till after Wesley's death. An urgent demand was made in America for men to administer the sacrament to the widely spread community of Methodists. That community had once elected three of the elder brethren to ordain others by the imposition of hands, though the conference afterwards declared this ordination to be unscriptural. The moment was critical. It was evident that all the Methodists in the colonies would become independent, unless their reasonable wants were supplied. No ordination could be obtained in England from the bishops, or, if any were ordained, they would be under the *control* of the bishops. Wesley had studied Lord King's account of the primitive church, and now became convinced that bishops and presbyters were the same. He was himself a presbyter. The next step followed of course. "The apostolical succession was a fable," the "Wesleyan succession," of the utmost importance. With the assistance of one or two others, he ordained presbyters for America. What was done for America was done soon after for Scotland; but Wesley refused still to ordain presbyters for England, moved by a love of peace, and a desire not to violate unnecessarily the order of the church to which he belonged. Even after this time, the conference voted

not to separate from the establishment; but the radical step was already taken.

Never since the days of Paul, was a man more assiduous in labor than Wesley. Not a day was given to repose, not an hour to unnecessary leisure. For more than sixty years, he rose at four in the morning, preached at five and frequently in the evening. In his eighty-fifth year, he speaks of that day as a day of rest, in which he preached only twice. Before the latter years of his life, he usually journeyed on horseback, and read poetry, history, and philosophy as he rode, having no other time for such employments. "Leisure and I," he said, "have taken leave of one another. I propose to be busy as long as I live, if my health is so long indulged to me," and fortunately he was always well. For seventy years, he did not lose a night's sleep. He attended the conference; he directed the preachers; he kept a steady eye on Scotland and Ireland, on the West Indies and America; he founded schools; he inspected the circuits; after his eightieth year we hear of him in Holland, in Guernsey and Jersey, in Wales, in Scotland, in Ireland, and every considerable town in England; he systematized the rules of his order, and established that discipline which shows his foresight and energy and wisdom; he purchased ground and erected chapels; he wrote sermons, and essays, and tracts, treatises on Primitive Physic and on Theology, memoirs of good men, and notes on the New Testament, besides his numerous letters and copious diary. Sixteen octavo volumes of his works were published some time after his death. Always calm and cheerful, curious and acute, he read new books, and looked upon novel and strange things to the very last with all the interest of youth. At the age of eighty-five, we find him criticising new works in his brief and acute manner, visiting the wax-work at the museum in Spring Gardens and "the man who played so wonderfully on the glasses."

Amid these complicated labors the solemn drama of that earnest, cheerful, and laborious life drew to its serene close. Already had one and another of his earliest and best friends lain down to his eternal rest. The affection of Charles Wesley for John was most sincere and profound. It never lost the freshness of youth. "My heart is as your heart," were his words in a letter; "what God hath joined, let no man put asunder. We have taken each other for better, for worse, till

death do us—part? no, but eternally unite. Therefore, in love which never faileth, I am your affectionate brother.” This loving brother, blessed to the very end of his fourscore years, in the church and in his family, had calmly and joyfully met the change whose last pangs he had always dreaded. Mr. Fletcher too had gone. So gentle and pure a life as his, so cheerful and holy a character, so tranquil an end, the world has rarely seen. He was born at Nyon, on the shore of lake Geneva, and the many vicissitudes of his early life, seemed to indicate that Providence was guiding him to an object that he knew not. Unsatisfied with the clerical profession to which he was early devoted, he left Switzerland and entered the military service of Portugal, destined for Brazil. What a beautiful soul seemed on the point of being lost! An accident (so men call it) changed his whole destiny. On the eve of embarkation, a servant overturned a kettle of boiling water upon his leg. He was left behind on the sick list. Recovering, he sought active service in Holland, but peace was declared and he passed into England. After a time he took orders in the Episcopal church, joined the Methodists, and by his holy life has made the little parish of Madeley, to which he was appointed, a name always to be heard with joy. His account of himself as he drew near the close of his useful but not protracted life, is too “beautiful,” as Southey justly calls it, to be passed over. “We are two poor invalids,” he says of himself and wife, “who between us, make half a laborer. She sweetly helps me to drink the dregs of life, and to carry with ease the bitter cross.” “I keep in my sentry-box till Providence removes me. My situation is quite suited to my little strength. I may do as much or as little as I please, according to my weakness; and I have an advantage which I can have nowhere else in such a degree; my little field of action is just at my door, so that if I happen to overdo myself, I have but to step from my pulpit to my bed, and from my bed to my grave. If I had a body full of vigor and a purse full of money, I should like well enough to travel about as Mr. Wesley does; but as Providence does not call me to it, I readily submit. The snail does best in his shell.”

A man averse to authority and the honors of office, but full of gentleness and benevolence, after a life of self-sacrifice, was now about to end his connection with the world and seek his home in heaven. ‘His death was as remarkable as his life.

The hand of disease arising from previous exposure pressed heavily upon him. As he was performing the services of the Sabbath, he nearly fainted, but recovered and insisted on going on. After the sermon he walked to the communion table, saying, "I am going to throw myself under the wings of the cherubim, before the mercy-seat." "Here," says his widow, "the same distressing scene was renewed, with additional solemnity. The people were deeply affected while they beheld him offering up the last languid remains of a life which had been lavishly spent in their service. Groans and tears were on every side. In going through this part of his duty, he was exhausted again and again; but his spiritual vigor triumphed over his bodily weakness. After several times sinking on the sacramental table, he still resumed the sacred work, and cheerfully distributed with his dying hand, the love memorials of his dying Lord." From that long service, made longer to him by hymns and exhortations, he retired to his chamber, never to leave it again. The next Sunday, the whole parish were in mourning: the poor whom he had befriended, and many of whom had come from a distance, wished once more to look upon their beloved pastor and friend. Permission was granted, and they passed along by the open door of his chamber, and looked in upon the sick man, who sat supported in bed "unaltered in his usual venerable appearance." A few hours later his earthly career was ended. "I was intimately acquainted with him," says Mr. Wesley, "for above thirty years. I conversed with him morning, noon, and night, without the least reserve during a journey of many hundred miles, and in all that time I never heard him speak one improper word, nor saw him do an improper action. Many exemplary men have I known, holy in heart and life, within fourscore years, but one equal to him have I not known, one so inwardly and outwardly devoted to God; so unblamable a character have I not found, either in Europe or America. Nor do I expect to find another such on this side of eternity." "Wesley," adds Mr. Southey, "had the temper and talents of a statesman; in the Romish church he would have been the general, if not the founder of an order, or might have held a distinguished place in history as a cardinal or a pope. Fletcher, in any community would have been a saint."

And now the messenger came for Mr. Wesley himself, and brought the token that he was a true messenger. "Those that

look out of the windows shall be darkened, the grasshopper shall be a burden." Fourscore years found him still active, travelling four thousand miles annually, preaching, writing, and directing the extended business of the society. Six years more, and he began to feel that the machine was wearing out, that the "weary wheels of life must stand still at last." He could not well preach more than twice a day. His service at five in the morning, continued for so many years, was given up. He wrote in his cash account book with a tremulous hand, "For upwards of eighty-six years I have kept my accounts exactly. I will not attempt it any longer, being satisfied with the continual conviction, that I save all I can and give all I can, i. e. all I have." Thus closed the accounts of one, who, never being rich, gave away during his life thirty thousand pounds! "Time has shaken me by the hand," he said in the words of his father, "and death is not far behind." The second day of March, 1791, came at last. Sixty-five years of his ministry had passed away. The horologe had pealed out the eighty-eighth year of his life, and the hands of the dial stood still forever.

The body, dressed in his clerical habit, with gown, cassock, and band, lay "in a kind of state" in the plain chapel of the denomination, and multitudes flocked to look once more upon the mild and venerable features. The mourners were many, and at the funeral, early in the day for fear of a crowd, when the preacher read that part of the service, "Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God to take unto himself the soul of our dear brother"—his voice changed and he substituted the word *father*. The whole congregation burst into weeping. Thus ended the life of one of the most influential men of his age; whose authority at the time of his death, extended over more than a hundred and twenty-five thousand followers; and whose influence will reach down a thousand years.

ARTICLE VII.

BAPTISM.

By the Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[Continued from p. 109.]

At the close of my last article I made the following remarks. "It was my intention to finish the discussion in this article; but the reception of Mr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of one article." I proceed, therefore, to complete the discussion thus announced.

§ 59. *Reasons for a further notice of Mr. Carson.*

It may perhaps be alleged by some, that it is needless to take any further notice of Mr. Carson. For if his fundamental principles are false, as I have shown, then all that grows out of them is false, and therefore there is no need of exposing his errors in detail. Besides, the spirit of his work is so bad, that it cannot exert any power over a candid mind: indeed Mr. Carson has completely exposed himself, and totally destroyed his own power by the manner of his reply. Besides, it is humiliating to argue with an antagonist who so far forgets the laws of honorable controversy, as to indulge in such assumptions of superior wisdom, and such gross personalities as fill his reply. Such an antagonist is more properly answered by a dignified silence.

Such things may be said, and I freely admit with much plausibility; indeed such considerations have often occurred to my own mind in reading Mr. Carson's reply.

But it must be remembered that no organized body of men is willing to see the truth of principles which are at war with the fundamental principles on which they are organized; and if principles which they are unwilling to see are established, they are always more desirous to overlook and forget them than to apply them and carry them out to their ultimate results. And if we would correct errors which are kept alive not by logic,

but by organic power, we must not only develope principles, but seek from God the discretion and energy needed in order wisely and efficiently to apply them. Then by his aid may we hope to see such errors finally and thoroughly destroyed.

Moreover, the fact that a work is written in a bad spirit, is not always a sufficient reason for not giving it a thorough and detailed answer. The bad spirit of a work may operate in two ways. It may either react upon the author, and destroy his power, or it may infect and corrupt the body in whose behalf it was written, and bring them down to its own low standard. But so strong are the temptations of party spirit, and so powerful is the unsubdued pride of organized bodies even of good men, that a zealous partisan, though he writes in a bad spirit, is notwithstanding applauded and hailed as a leader if he seems to argue the cause of the party with power. In short, organic bodies are always in danger of preferring intellectual power and the victory of their own peculiar principles to holiness and truth. And if they do, a work written with intellectual power, but in a bad spirit, will corrupt the whole body: like poison it will diffuse itself through the whole system. Hence, to write in a bad spirit is the highest sin which a man of great intellectual power can commit, for it is throwing poison most malignant into the very springs of spiritual life. Nor can any one body of Christians be corrupted without endangering the spiritual life of others. For pride in one body tends to beget both pride and anger in all others, and to lead to a spirit of bitter and malignant recrimination, by which the Spirit of God is grieved and provoked to take his flight.

In all such cases it is our duty to seek for grace and wisdom from God, not only to resist in ourselves the infection of the bad spirit which is poisoning the body politic, but also to destroy its malignant power, by stripping off the garb of piety in which it seeks to veil itself, and exposing its true and pestilential nature. Then, by the blessing of God, will its infectious power be destroyed by the fire of divine truth and holy abhorrence, and thus will the moral nature of the community be restored to soundness, and the plague be stayed.

Had any person in the Baptist denomination undertaken to do this work in the case of Mr. Carson, it would have indicated a moral soundness in that body which would have been cheering to any holy heart. It is therefore with no small grief that I have noticed the fact, that on both sides of the Atlantic some

of the leading Baptist presses have bestowed on Mr. Carson's works on baptism, and especially on his reply to me, absolute and unqualified praise. Nor have I ever seen or heard even a subdued whisper of censure, or even a remote intimation that fully to sympathize with the spirit of his works would create the least danger to individuals or to the denomination. Indeed some have written as if they were so thoroughly infected and pervaded by that spirit, that no standard was left by which a bad spirit could be detected, and no moral energy remained by which it could be resisted or abhorred.

Indeed if it were now the design of the admirers of Mr. Carson on both sides of the Atlantic, to recognise and exhibit him as the great leader and champion of the Baptist cause on earth, the great incarnation, so to speak, of the Baptist spirit and Baptist principles, they could not use towards him language of higher praise than they have already used.

The following piece exhibits the opinion of the Christian Watchman, the leading Baptist paper in New England, in connection with the opinion of the London Baptist Magazine.

DISCUSSION ON BAPTISM.

"The London Baptist Magazine for May notices a late pamphlet from the pen of Alexander Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, entitled "Baptism not Purification," in reply to Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, who has undertaken to show that the word *baptize* is synonymous with the word *purify*. Mr. B.'s article, which was originally published in the Biblical Repository, was published in a separate pamphlet in England, and the reviewer, referring to this newly-received theory says: 'Mr. Carson has seized it with both his hands, divested it of every particle of covering, torn it limb from limb, dissected it with the minutest accuracy, and then, without the slightest token of tenderness or pity, committed the fragments to the flames. If its admirers who extolled it so loudly in its prosperous days, now look on in silence, pronouncing no funeral panegyric, and leaving its relentless destroyer unpunished, it will give the public a poor opinion of the value of their friendship. We cannot follow Mr. Carson through his triumphant course. He shows, to use his own language, that Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of the language as-

certained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability as to the thing related, independently of the testimony of the word.'

"Mr. Carson, with his vast critical resources, is the very man to perform such a work as this, and we have no doubt he has done it thoroughly; and, perhaps, it was needed in England, as quite a flourish of trumpets was made when this new theory was broached there, but it is scarcely needed in this country, for Mr. Beecher's theory is a very harmless thing here. It is probable that it would hardly have been noticed at all but for the respectability of the periodical through which it appeared."

In the preface to the American edition of his work on Baptism it is stated, "No one, it is believed, has made that deep and thorough research into the writings of the Greeks, in order to settle the *unus loquendi* of the words βαπτω and βαπτίζω, as has Mr. Carson."

In the Scottish Guardian the following character of Mr. Carson is given: "As a profound and accurate thinker, an able metaphysician, a close reasoner, a deep theologian, Mr. Carson can stand the ground against any rivalship." It is also stated in the papers, that in England the Baptist convention or general association has requested Mr. Carson to prepare a work on the Ecclesiastical Tradition of Baptism.

Mr. Hague, also, in his reply to Messrs. Cooke and Towne, speaks of Mr. Carson's acute mind in a manner adapted to convey high praise entirely unmingled with censure.

I have not the least disposition to depreciate the original powers of Mr. Carson. On the other hand, I think he does possess uncommon powers, of a certain kind. I would only remark, that the greater his powers, the greater his responsibility to use them aright, and the greater the danger to the Christian community if he employs them to disseminate false opinions and malignant emotions; and this, I am fully satisfied, he has done.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the bad spirit of his works, and the extreme weakness of his arguments, I think there are sufficient reasons for a further notice of his reply. Indeed, to treat it with contempt is virtually to treat with contempt the Baptist denomination itself.

Not that I suppose that there are not in that denomination many Christian brethren, whose spirit is entirely unlike Mr.

Carson's, and not that I hold my Baptist brethren individually responsible for all that Mr. Carson has said and done, but after all that has been so publicly said by leading organs of the Baptist denomination, giving him a prominence as the advocate of their cause such as is given to no other man, and uttering no word of censure, I am authorized to regard him as the leading representative and expounder of Baptist principles in the present age. And he plainly writes as if this were his own view of the case.

Besides this there are other reasons for still more thoroughly examining Mr. Carson's grounds. He is so perfectly confident of his own correctness, that his statements are made in a bold, palpable, and definite form. He seems to be deterred by no fear from making assertions the most rash and unlimited, if they are needed to carry out his principles logically to what he deems the true results. Indeed his great power as a leader lies mainly in this, taken in connection with the fact that he really does know more than those whom he leads.

In his works there is a great show of learning, and as we have seen he has, at least among his own denomination, the highest reputation as a learned man, and his assertions are made with an energy designed to be overwhelming and annihilating, and on his own partisans they have certainly exerted and still exert vast power. Thus it is that he carries his party with him. Now although this characteristic of Mr. Carson is productive of much evil, still it is not without its beneficial results; it tends to place the real points at issue in the clearest possible light, and to concentrate the whole energy of the mind on them. They become focal points of illumination and burning points of discussion.

His universal affirmations as to the use of the word βαπτίζω in the whole range and history of the Greek language, we have already noticed p. 78, Jan. 1843. No less definite and remarkable are his specific assertions as to the use of the word in the Fathers. I shall proceed to notice these, and then consider more in detail his reply to my argument from Scripture and from the Fathers.

§ 60. *Mr. Carson's attack on the Patristic argument.*

These relate to two points, their accurate knowledge of the scriptural usus loquendi of βαπτίζω and the sense in which they actually understood and used it.

On the first point he states explicitly, that they could not be mistaken as to the apostolic *usus loquendi*. His words are these: p. 56, "They knew the meaning of the language which they spoke." p. 57, "To suppose that persons who spoke the Greek language might understand their (i. e. the apostles') words in a sense different from that in which they used them, would be to charge the Scripture as not being a revelation. Whatever was the sense of the word must have been known to all who heard them or read their writings." The truth of this position I freely admit. It is clear that Patristic Greek is based upon the Septuagint and the writings of the New Testament, and it is no less plain that they had minutely studied every thing in the Greek Scriptures that seemed to have any relation to the subject of baptism, so that nothing could be more interesting or instructive than a philosophical analysis of the formation of all parts of the language of the Fathers on the subject of baptism from various passages in the word of God, supposed by them to allude to it, but which to us convey no such allusion. Inasmuch, therefore, as the Scriptures were written in the living language of the Greek Fathers, and all their idioms were by them so carefully studied, there can be no doubt that they used the word in its true and apostolic sense. Still further, the Latin fathers who understood and read Greek, must also have used it in the same sense; and therefore the Latin Fathers, if any such there were, who did not understand the Greek well enough to judge originally and independently, must also have received it in the same sense, for the *usus loquendi* would be fixed by those who did understand it. Still further, all writings composed in the Patristic age and ascribed to the leading Fathers in order to gain authority by their names, must have used it in the same sense, for it was their aim both to be understood, and not to be detected by those for whom they wrote, and of course they must have used the word in its current and usual sense. For example, though the list of some baptisms ascribed to Athanasius is probably not his, yet as it was written in his age and name, it truly represents the *usus loquendi* of that and also of preceding ages. Indeed all of it can be found in substance in the authentic works of preceding fathers, and in later days it re-appears in the authentic writings of John of Damascus. So also whether the commentary on some of the first chapters of Isaiah, found in the works of

Basil is the real work of Basil, or whether it was written as Garnier judges by some Cappadocian ecclesiastic in the name of Basil soon after his death, and was taken chiefly from the works of Eusebius of Cæsarea and of Basil; still as it was written in the name of Basil, and in the age of Basil, and was universally regarded as the work of Basil and quoted as such, it must have correctly exhibited the *usus loquendi* of that age on the subject of baptism. In quoting it I follow the universal ancient usage in speaking of it as Basil's work, though in truth the opinion of Garnier seems to me most likely to be correct. Still, however this question is decided, the worth of the testimony of the work as to the *usus loquendi* of βαπτίζω is not at all affected. Indeed, as is the case in the work ascribed to Athanasius, it but represents and embodies the usages of previous writers, such as Origen, Eusebius, and Basil, if the writer was not Basil himself.

Hence, if these views are correct, and of their correctness there can be no reasonable doubt, the materials are ample for settling the apostolic usage of the word in question, including all the Greek and Latin Fathers, and all the works written in their name in their age; and my only wonder is that Mr. Carson did not resort to them first of all, instead of laboriously examining the writings of authors who knew nothing of the rite in question, and had, so far as appears, never seen or read the Greek, either of the Old Testament or of the New.

Let us now consider Mr. Carson's statement as to the sense in which the Fathers understood and used the word βαπτίζω. After attempting to answer my biblical argument, he thus proceeds: p. 48, "Mr. Beecher next professes to find proof in the Fathers. Proof from the Fathers that βαπτίζω signifies to purify! As well might he profess to find in them proof for the existence of rail-roads and steam-coaches. There is no such proof. There is not an instance in all the Fathers in which the word or any of its derivations are so used. Without exception, they use the word always for immersion." This surely is sufficiently definite and explicit, but it is not all, for he afterwards teaches that to assert otherwise is not only false, but also an act of presumptuous hardihood: p. 58, "What is the hardihood of men who can presume to allege the Fathers on the other side?"

Those who have carefully examined the evidence which I have already adduced on this point might be amused by the ex-

treme ridiculousness of these assertions, if the subject were not too serious for ridicule. But assertions of this kind have a moral as well as an intellectual character, in the sight of God. Can any one believe that Mr. Carson had ever made the investigations necessary to qualify him to make such assertions? And is this the way in which he is wont to make statements on subjects so momentous? An extended circle of minds rely on him for information on topics beyond their reach. Over them his opinions and unlimited assertions have a sway almost absolute. And is this the way in which he uses his intellectual powers, and repays their confidence? I hesitate not to say, that he could not more totally mislead all who rely upon him. Instead of that iron uniformity of use which he claims, there are few words which have in the Fathers a usage more diversified and various. I have hitherto aimed simply at one point, to prove that it has the usage that I claim. To exhibit all the Patristic uses of the word I have not attempted. And yet perhaps the time has come in which it ought to be done, for it will give a more elevated point of vision from which to survey the whole subject, and to study its symmetry and proportions. After adducing, therefore, some further evidence on the main point, I shall attempt to give a general view of the Patristic uses of the word.

§ 61. *Additional facts.*

Compare, then, with Mr. Carson's contemptuous denial of my position, and his unlimited and overbearing assertions, the following passage from Ambrose, a Father who was not only a student of the works of Basil, but drew the materials of many of his own works from them. Apol. David, § 59, "Per hyssopi fasciculum adspersione agni sanguine, qui mundari volebat typico baptismo." "He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb by means of a bunch of hyssop." Compare this now with the passages from Ambrose, Cyril, and others, in § 53, and who does not see with absolute and intuitive certainty that baptism has the sense of sacrificial purification? Sprinkling with blood was a typical purification, but certainly it was not a typical immersion.

Indeed, so far did the Fathers carry the idea of sacrificial purification, that they gave the name baptism to cases in which the expiated person was not touched by the purifying fluid. All that they required was, that it should be so sprinkled or otherwise used, that expiation should be actually made; whenever

this was done in any way, they regarded the person as baptized, i. e. purified, or expiated, or absolved.

Hence when the blood of the Paschal Lamb was sprinkled on the posts of the door, they regarded all in the house as baptized, i. e. purified or expiated by blood. So both Theodoret and Ambrose regard the purging with hyssop in Ps. 51: 7. In the Septuagint it is, Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop. They both applied it to baptizing, i. e. purifying by the blood of a lamb. Hence also one, who wrote in the name of Chrysostom, speaks of the thief on the cross as baptized, because expiation was made for him by the water and blood that came out of the side of Christ. He also intimates in the same passage, that if there had been a shower of rain it would have been sufficient to baptize the thief, but as there was not, he was baptized by the issuing of water and blood from the side of Christ. All this is perfectly plain the moment we assign to βαπτίζω the sacrificial sense to purify. For the actual making of an expiation justified the application of the word to the person expiated, and also by metonymy to that by which it was made. And hence Origen states in general terms that Christ calls the shedding of his blood a baptism. Hence also, as we have seen, the water and the blood that issued from his side were called baptisms. See § 52. p. 93 Jan. 1843; also §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841. Compare now Mr. Carson's positive and contemptuous assertions with all these facts, and what shall we say? It is not the province of the human mind to create facts in history or philosophy, but simply to discover and advance them. But Mr. Carson proceeds as if it were his province, by intense assertions, to create them. But after all his assertions, they stand calmly and simply just as they did before. I find in the Fathers no evidence at all of the existence of rail-roads and steam-coaches, but abundant evidence that βαπτίζω means to purify.

Let me now add some further evidence on the subject of moral purification. Repentance, sorrow for sin, the trials of God's providence, and the truth, all purify the mind from sin. They do not make expiation or atonement, but they purify in a moral sense. Accordingly in the usage of the Fathers all these things are said to baptize. One writing in the name of Chrysostom enumerates five kinds of baptism. Of these I shall notice the baptism by the truth, and the baptism by fire. By fire he understands the trials of life by which God purifies his children, calling and choosing them in the furnace of affliction. In proof

of this he refers to Is. 4 : 4, "The Lord shall purge by the spirit of burning;" and Ps. 66 : 10, "Thou, O God, hast proved us, thou hast tried us as gold and silver is tried." "For," says he, "as gold or silver is purified in the furnace, by consuming the dross, so a man, placed in the furnace of affliction, is sanctified by the removal of his sins." To be thus purified, i. e. baptized, by fire, he regards as a peculiar privilege of the sons of God. "But the servants of the devil are not baptized by fire. Wherefore? Because he who is wholly polluted cannot so lay aside his filth as to be made clean. Begin to wash a brick in water, does it ever become clean? No; but by stirring up the clay it becomes more polluted. For he is made pure in whom is something good, by means of which he can be made pure." Now all this argument is powerless to prove that the servants of the devil cannot be immersed in fire. That can be done whether they are purified or not. The argument proves only that the servants of Satan are not purified by the fire of trial, because they are all dross, there is in them no gold to be purified. But the sons of God are purified by the fire of trial, because in them there is gold, and the fire of trial consumes the dross and leaves the gold more pure. Baptism by the truth he illustrates by a reference to John 15 : 3, "Now are ye clean (*καθαροί*) through the word that I have spoken unto you." Faith purifies, it does not immerse.

Anastasius, Bib. Pat. Vol. IX. 1030, says that he "should dare to call mourning, with reference to God, another baptism." In Op. Isaïæ Abbatis, Bib. Vet. Pat. And. Gallandii, Vol. VII. p. 292, it is said, "Affliction with humility and silence is a baptism, for John was clothed in camel's hair, and had a leathern girdle around his loins, and lived in the desert, which is a sign of affliction and penitence, which purifies a man." In all these cases the idea of immersion is out of the question. The fire of trials, the truth, sorrow for sins as against God, affliction with humility and patience, all purify a man, but they do not immerse him. Hence in all these cases, the idea of immersion is absolutely and unquestionably excluded from the word baptism. No meaning but purification is possible.

I have before me six lists of different kinds of baptism, by six different Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Athanasius, Maximus, Isidore Hispalensis, and John of Damascus. The one passing under the name of Athanasius is probably not his, but is a decisive proof of the *usus loquendi* of the age, and it reappears enlarged in the works of John of Damascus. From it

I take the following passage: *ἐβαπτίσθη Ἰωάννης τὴν χεῖρα ἐνθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν θεῖαν τοῦ δεσπότου κορυφὴν, καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι.* John was baptized by placing his hand on the divine head of his master and by his own blood.

The Fathers held that Christ, by touching the waters, purified them and gave them a purifying power.

So also they held that by touching John he purified him, and this purification by touch he expressed by *βαπτίζω*. Surely all idea of immersion is excluded here. Indeed he expresses the same idea by *ἀγιάζω*, in another part of the passage. Christ was baptized that he might purify (*ἀγιάζῃ*) the baptizer. John was also clearly regarded by the Fathers as purified by his own blood, not immersed in it.

From these lists we also learn that the eternal punishment of the wicked is a baptism, because it will purge the holy universe from sin. The flood was a baptism, for two reasons; it purified the world from sinners and sin; and it also purified and saved those in the ark. But the wicked who were immersed by the flood were not baptized. So also the whole process of legal purification under the law, including the washing of the clothes as well as that of the body, was called a baptism. Viewing it as a complex whole, it was proper to call it a purification, but not an immersion. So too the washing of the disciples' feet by Christ is regarded by another Father as a baptism; and by still another, the anointing of the blind man's eyes with clay and spittle, and his washing in the pool of Siloam, because the spittle of Christ purifies as well as the washing in the pool.

What now shall we say to all these things? If Mr. Carson had asserted that the Mississippi ran from the Gulf of Mexico with an impetuous current towards the cold regions of the north, and there descended by one vast cataract towards the centre of the globe, and had charged all with presumptuous temerity who dared to call in question the truth of his assertions, he could not be more utterly at war with the facts of the case than he is in his assertions as to the Patristic use of *βαπτίζω*.

§ 62. Other errors of Mr. Carson.

It was with reference to assertions such as these that I remarked, Jan. 1843, p. 77, that Mr. Carson had made assertions that I knew not how to explain if he had ever read the Greek Fathers.

Indeed Mr. Carson has elsewhere made assertions as to other words with the same inexplicable disregard of facts. On pp. 22,

23, he thus speaks: "Mr. Beecher's criticism on the word (*περικλυάσθαι*) here (Tobit 6 : 2) employed for washing, is *entirely false*." I translated it to wash all around. He proceeds, "The simple word signifies to deluge, to overwhelm, to inundate, to flow over any thing." "Mr. Beecher criticises from imagination, not from knowledge of the language. Has he justified his criticism by a single example?" He then remarks with great taste and refinement, "The word does not signify that the young man in bathing splashed about like a duck, or rubbed himself like a collier, but that he threw himself into the river, that the stream might flow over him." Again, "There is no friction nor hand-washing in this word. It performs its purpose by running over either gently or with violence." So much learned minuteness and such bold charges of inaccuracy on me would lead an incautious reader to suppose that Mr. Carson must have first made sure his facts before daring thus to commit himself before the learned world. Indeed, when I first read his remarks it produced a temporary impression that I must be wrong, or he would not dare to make such assertions. But the moment I looked at facts the illusion vanished. It is indeed true that *κλύω* has in some cases the meaning that he assigns to it. But it is not true that it has not the meaning that I assign to it. The facts are these: 1. It is applied by Euripides to washing the body with sea water, where *ρίπτω* is applied to the same operation which Mr. Carson admits denotes hand-washing.

2. It is applied to the washing of children, by Aristotle—*τὸ παιδίον ὕδατι περικλύζειν*—to wash the child all around with water.

3. In *Geoponica* 17, 22, it is applied to washing an ulcer by a fluid, *ἐλκος κλύζειν ὕδατι*. Here is no deluging, overwhelming, or inundation.

4. Epiphanius applies it to the purifications of the Jews, *κλυζόμενοι ὕδατι*, where deluging or overflowing is out of the question.

5. By Pollux it is applied to the washing of clothes, and also of cups, and is given as a synonyme of *πλύνειν*, and *ῥύπτειν* and *καθαίρειν* and their compounds with *διὰ*, *ἀπὸ* and *ἐκ*. What can be more decisive?

6. It is applied to the washing of head, hands and body, after an unlucky dream.

7. It is used by Plutarch to denote the washing off blood from armor, *αἷμα τῶν ὀπλῶν ἔτι θερμὸν ἀποκλύζεται*. Plut. 7. 283. 11.

8. It is applied by Lucian to an object wet or sprinkled on all sides with *spray* by rapid motion through water *at rest*. ἀφ' ὧ περιχυόμενον. Lucian, V. H. 1. 31. Here surely is no flowing of water over an object.

9. Like καθαίρω, it has a medical use to cleanse or purge—ἱατροὶ πικρὰν πικροῖς κλύουσι γάμμακον χολήν. Plut.—Physicians purge out bitter bile by bitter medicines. Indeed its medical use gave birth to our English word *clyster*.

10. All lexicographers of any note sustain my use of the word, e. g. Stephens, Scapula, Damm, Hedericus, Ernesti, Passow, Schneider, etc. etc. Hence it is plain that assertions more contrary to fact than Mr. Carson's criticism on me cannot be made, even if I were to say that Mr. Carson criticises from imagination, and not from a knowledge of the language in translating ὕδωρ water or πῦρ fire. And whatever Mr. Carson's talents, they cannot enable his character as an accurate scholar long to survive such criticisms as he has here given.

In like manner when I say that Josephus uses βάπτισις to denote the rite of baptism, Mr. Carson denies it, and says, "The ἡ βάπτισις is the immersing—βαπτισμός is the rite of immersion." And yet it must be notorious to any one who has ever read the Fathers, that they do not hesitate to use βάπτισις to denote the rite, in opposition to καταδύσις, the act of *immersing*, as in Sozomen, μὴ καταδύσει ἐπιτελεῖν τὴν θείαν βάπτισιν. "To perform the *sacred baptism* by one immersion."

Many of Mr. Carson's assertions as to tingo, βάπτω, λούω, and νίπτω, are of the same kind. Indeed I do not remember that I ever read a writer so many of whose most positive assertions were so totally at war with facts. But success in such an assault on facts is hopeless. The highest talents are entirely unequal to such a war.

§ 63. General view of Patristic uses of βαπτίζω.

But enough has been said to show the entire incorrectness of Mr. Carson's theory of the Patristic uses of βαπτίζω. I shall therefore conclude this part of the subject by a brief general view of what that usage is.

1. Of course I need not say that they sometimes use the word in the sense to immerse any thing in water, or to denote the state of any thing that sinks in the water or is overflowed by it. And also that from this are derived metaphorical uses to denote immersion in sorrow, ignorance, darkness, sin, pollution,

afflictions, and misery. All this I have before noticed at large. See §§ 3 and 4, and 10 and 28.

2. To wash, implying an *effort to cleanse*, but not including the effect. In this sense they use it as a translation of the Heb. *רחץ*, just as they use *λούω*. In this case *βάπτισμα* is taken in connection with *κάθαρσις* or *καθαρισμός*; thus, commenting on Is. 1: 16, "Wash you, make you clean," Basil, to denote the idea of washing, uses *βάπτισμα*, and to denote purification, he uses *κάθαρσις*. So in the Apostolic Constitutions we find washings and purifications expressed in the same way.

3. To *cleanse or purify by washing*, i. e. to wash, including the effect.

4. To purify in the most generic sense, either by water, or by truth, or by atonement and expiation, or by trials, or by mourning and sorrow. After what has been said there is no need to offer any proof of the real existence of this sense. But here it is peculiarly important to bear in mind the distinction between sacrificial purification, or expiation, and moral purification, or sanctification, to which I have so often referred. For without a clear apprehension of it, much of the language of the Fathers cannot be understood.

5. *βαπτισμός* and *βάπτισμα* by synechdoche denote means of purification, e. g. water, blood, fire, oil, air, etc.

6. *βάπτισμα* is also used to denote, comprehensively, a system designed to effect purification in various ways, e. g. *βάπτισμα Μωϋσέως*, or *ρομικόν* or *Ἰουδαϊκόν* which Chrysostom interchanges as synonymous with *καθάριον Ἰουδαϊκόν*, to denote not an act, nor one rite merely, but a complex system, involving and comprehending various kinds and modes of purification. So Basil says of the Jewish baptism, it recognised a difference of sins, not forgiving all; it required various sacrifices, it made minute regulations as to purity, it separated the polluted and unclean for a time, it observed times and seasons. In all this he is plainly illustrating a system of purification involving many parts, but having one great end, i. e. to purify, either by expiatory sacrifices, or in some other way. So too, the baptism of John or of Christ is often used in like manner to denote a system of purification.

7. They also used it to denote, comprehensively, the actual processes involved in conferring absolution; e. g. if exorcism, divesting of all clothing, immersion, unction, and robing in white, the pronouncement of certain words, and a benediction,

were supposed to be involved in conferring a legal and valid absolution, then the term *ῥαντισμα* was comprehensively used to include all these processes. Any part of the process that purified was also called by the same name. So Origen speaks of baptizing, i. e. purifying with oil. And the Apostolic Constitutions speak of unction as a type of spiritual baptism, i. e. spiritual purification.

8. The result or effect of these processes they also denote by the word baptism or purification, i. e. absolution, remission of sins. It is in this sense that Zonaras, in his Lexicon, defines baptism as being the remission of sins by water and the Spirit: This remission of sins was effected, in their view, not by any energy of the water in itself, but by some mysterious, sanctifying power given to it when the Spirit brooded upon it at the creation, or when Christ was baptized in it, or when the bishop or priest consecrated it, operating in concurrence with the energy of the Holy Spirit, who, according to a divine constitution, diffused and exerted his mighty energies in and through the water. In this way, in their view, was effected the baptism of the Holy Ghost; and the superiority of the baptism of Christ to that of John lay in the fact that John used the simple fluid water, but in that of Christ, a compound fluid, so to speak, was employed, composed of sanctified water, and the influence of the Holy Spirit. On no topic is the eloquence of Chrysostom so fervid, as when he unfolds the purifying, nay, regenerating powers of this semi-material, semi-spiritual compound. As quick as the ocean extinguishes a spark that falls into it, so soon does this mighty compound extinguish the sins of the sinner that falls into it, and makes him pure as the angels and brilliant as the sunbeams of heaven. To symbolize this spotless whiteness of the soul thus miraculously and suddenly obtained, the baptized person was robed in purest white. His being stripped perfectly naked before was designed to give to the miraculous energies of the fluid full scope to penetrate every part of body and soul. And in the opinion of some of the Fathers, these waters also had a miraculous power even to heal bodily disease, of which they give us some examples, as true, no doubt, as all other of the lying wonders of that age of fraud and delusion. The word baptize, used in this sense, denoted not merely a transient act, but a permanent and abiding moral change effected by the rite. The soul was conceived of as invested in a robe of spotless purity. Hence baptism is likened to spiritual robes, and the Fa-

thers speak of *putting on* the baptism of Christ, and of preserving their baptism unspotted. Origen preferred the baptism of blood to that of water and the Spirit, because few keep this unspotted till death, but the purity gained by the baptism of a bloody death is polluted no more. The leading idea in this usage of the word is a permanent state or character of purity, and not the act of immersion at all. Indeed, what sense is there in such an expression as keeping the act of immersion unspotted till death? The act is soon over; and all possibility of polluting or making it pure is passed by. And yet Mr. Carson again and again asserts that baptism always denotes the mode of an act, and nothing else.

9. The word baptism is also used as the appropriated name of the rite of Christian Baptism. In this case it approximates in its use, towards a proper name, or a technical term, i. e. the attention of the mind is abstracted from the meaning of the word, though it is in fact significant and is fixed upon the rite for which it stands. So the words Fowler, Fisher, Coffin, White, Black, Green, etc. are in fact significant, and yet when appropriated as names of individuals and families, the attention of the mind is withdrawn from their meaning and fixed upon those whom they represent. In this case the things predicated of these persons have no reference to the meaning of their names, but to their own personal qualities and relations which these names recall. So in speaking of Baptism, though the word signifies purification, the object often is merely to call to mind a given Christian rite. And what would seem to be incongruous uses, if referred to the sense merely, are not so if referred to the rite; e. g. to speak of the blackness of Mr. White, or of the whiteness of Mr. Green, or of Mr. Fisher as a hunter, or Mr. Coffin as a physician, would be verbally incongruous, but not in the nature of things. So to speak of the purification of baptism would not be tautology, but would denote the purification effected by the rite bearing that name.

10. Finally, the Fathers gave the name baptism to any transaction regarded by them either as typifying baptism or producing similar effects; e. g. when Elisha raised the axe out of the water by throwing in a stick, Ambrose regards it as a baptism, because as the axe was immersed in the water, so was the sinner in sin—and as the stick raised the axe out of the water, so does baptism, i. e. remission of sins, raise a sinner out of his

sins. The stick, according to him, is of course a type of the cross of Christ. So when Moses, by throwing in the branches of a tree, made the bitter waters of Marah sweet, Ambrose regards it as another kind of baptism, because as the branches made bitter waters sweet, so does baptism make sweet the bitterness of the human heart. Origen regards the passage of Elijah over Jordan, as he was taken up in a chariot of fire, as a wonderful baptism, because he thus passed over Jordan and went to heaven; and baptism does something like this for the pardoned soul. Passing through the Red Sea was a baptism, because it purified the Israelites and drowned Pharaoh by immersion, just as the rite of baptism purifies Christians and leaves Satan and the old man immersed and strangled in the baptismal pool. The flood was a baptism, because it purified and saved Noah and his family—and also purified the world—and immersed and strangled the enemies of God—just as the rite of baptism purifies all who come by it, into the ark, i. e. the church—and as the waters of the flood immersed, strangled and purged off the wicked, so will an eternal baptism of fire purge out the wicked from the kingdom of God. They are the chaff to be burnt up with unquenchable fire, when the Redeemer thoroughly purges his floor.

Hence, in the days of the Fathers, the narrow view that *βαπτίζω* means only to immerse had no being. The great idea before their minds was purification or absolution. This they applied to means of purification, or a system of purification, or to the processes involved in being purified, or to the supposed result of these processes, or to the rites viewed as an ordinance of Christ, or to any supposed or real typical transaction producing what they deemed similar effects.

§ 64. General View applied.

By thus throwing off the shackles of arbitrary canons and leaving the mind perfectly free to watch the actual evolution of the facts of language in the writings of the fathers, we find ourselves enabled to solve without difficulty all their various modes of expression. For example when Photius says *αἱ τρεῖς ἀναδύσεις καὶ καταδύσεις τοῦ βάπτισματος θανάτον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σημαίνουναι*, we see at once that *βάπτισμα* refers to the rite of absolution, and *ἀνάδυσις* and *κατάδυσις* to acts involved in it. Thus "the three immersions and emersions of the rite of purification (or absolution) symbolize death and resurrection."

Again Theophylact says, βάπτισμα ὡςπερ διὰ τῆς καταδύσεως θανάτου οὕτω διὰ τῆς ἀναδυσέως τὴν ἀνάστασιν τύποι. "As the rite of absolution shows forth death by immersion, so by emersion it shows forth resurrection."

Again he says, ἐν τρισὶ καταδύσει τοῦ σώματος ἐν βάπτισμα τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς παραδίδωκε λέγων πόρευθέντες μαθητεύσατε etc. Matt. 28: 19. He gave to his disciples one rite or ordinance of absolution, by these immersions of the body, saying, go ye therefore and teach all nations, etc.

I would here call attention once more to the fact, that to denote the act of immersion *κατάδυσις* is used, reserving to *βάπτισμα* the sense purification or absolution as the name of the rite. But inasmuch as *βάπτισμα* could be used to denote the act of immersion, it was sometimes though rarely so used, of which in § 28. 4, I have given an example from the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L *τρία βαπτίσματα μᾶς μνήσεως* three immersions of one initiation. This was so clearly a departure from common usage, that both Zonaras and Balsamon deemed it worthy of a note. That of Zonaras I have given in the section referred to. That of Balsamon is this, *τὰ δὲ βαπτίσματα ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ καταδύσεως ἐποληπτέον μοι*. This note is still more remarkable and decisive than that of Zonaras—for he merely gives it as his opinion that *βαπτίσματα* means immersions here—"It seems to me that *βαπτίσματα* is to be taken for immersions here." Indeed! If it never means any thing but immersions, as Mr. Carson says, both the note itself and this modest expression of opinion are quite out of place. But Mr. Carson's theory of this word is entirely a modern invention. No one had ever dreamed of it in the patristic age. Balsamon well knew that in common usage *βάπτισμα* meant purification and not immersion.

It may be well here to notice the sophistical reasoning by which the author of this canon endeavored to make out the doctrine of trine immersion. It was this: Christ did not enjoin it upon them to purify into his death, in which case there would have been one immersion, but into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; hence it being assumed that immersion is the mode, there must be one act of immersion for each person. In this reasoning, *βαπτίζω* in the command retains its usual sense, but when from the three persons the inference is drawn that there ought to be three acts of immersion, it leaves its usual sense, and denotes to im-

merse, and this usage was thought by two Greek commentators, to be so likely to mislead as to need an explanatory note to prevent confusion.

In Gregory Nazianzen occurs a striking passage, of peculiar interest, as showing at once that immersion was in fact the usual practice, but not the meaning of the word: *βάπτισμα καλοῦμεν ὡς συνθαντόμενης τῷ ὕδατι τῆς ἁμαρτίας*—"We call it (i. e. the rite) baptism, i. e. absolution or purification, because our sins are buried with us in the water." Whilst this clearly implies that in the rite *THEY* were in fact buried in the water, it no less clearly implies that it was not called baptism for this reason but because *THEIR* sins were buried with them. The burial of sins in the baptismal pool, was a common mode of expressing absolution or purification from sin, taken from Micah 7: 19, Thou wilt cast all their sins into the depths of the sea. So that the sense is plainly this, we call it purification, because when we are buried in the baptismal pool, our sins are buried with us, and we of course come out perfectly pure. If the word had meant immersion, he must have said simply: We call it immersion, because we are immersed.

We now come to a case of inconsistent usage, inconsistent at least with the present systems of philology. In a few cases Chrysostom uses the principle of a double sense in commenting on this word. Inasmuch as both meanings, i. e. purification and immersion coexist in the language, and immersion was the common mode; on this principle the word can be expounded as having both meanings in one and the same place, in order to give greater fulness to the passage. At this we need not wonder in the Fathers. A certain class of modern commentators have not hesitated to do the same thing. On this ground Chrysostom in a few instances gives a two-fold exposition of the passage in which Christ says, I have a baptism to be baptized with, etc.

One exposition is based on the sense purification. As in Hom. 65, al 66, on Matt.—Speaking of his death on the cross, he says he calls it baptism, *βάπτισμα*, indicating that a great purification *κάθαρσιν* should be made for the world by the things then transpiring.—De petit fil. Zebedai. Vol. I. p. 520.

Again he says "he calls it baptism, because by it he *purified* the world, and *not only so*, but on account of the ease of his resurrection, for as he who is immersed *βαντιζόμενος* in water arises with great ease, being nothing hindered by the nature of

the waters, so he having descended into death arose again with ease, for this reason he calls it baptism: and again, on Mark, 10: 39, "he calls his cross baptism, for as we are easily immersed and arise again, so he having died, easily arose again when he would." On p. 34, Jan. 1841, I say, "Nor have I found any evidence that the passages in Luke 12: 50, Mark 10: 37, 39, Matt. 20: 22, 23, were ever understood by any of the Fathers in the sense either of immersion or overwhelming." This usage of Chrysostom is an exception, and it is the only one that I have yet found. He plainly uses the word in both senses, purification and immersion. And yet even in these cases the sense purification can be retained as the name of the rite, and the illustration be taken from the well known mode of its performance, though the view that I have taken seems to me most likely to be correct. I have already twice stated that cases of inconsistent usage may exist, without at all destroying the force of my argument, § 27, Jan. 1841, § 21, April, 1840, p. 371, yet after extended research, my greatest surprise has been that I have found so few such cases. I have been surprised, because when I considered how general was the practice of immersion among the Fathers, and how natural it was that their practice should react upon their language, and that immersion was in fact an existing meaning of the word, it seemed strange to me that this meaning should so rarely be given to the word βαπτίζω in speaking of the rite. But when I reflected that the great idea of purification, i. e. absolution, or remission of sins, was ever uppermost in their minds, and that immersion, though the common mode, was not deemed essential to it, I saw a sufficient reason for reserving to βάπτισμα this great idea, and introducing the terms κατάδυσις and ἀνάδυσις to denote immersion and emersion.

The real nature of this idiom will become clearer by a passage of Gregory Nyssen, in which he uses καθαρισμός so as to show the force of βάπτισμα when used with ἀνάδυσις and κατάδυσις: "omitting things beyond our power let us inquire τίος ἔσται δι' ὕδατος ἢ καθαρισμός; καὶ πρὸς ποίαν χρείαν αἱ τρεῖς καταδύσεις παραλαμβάνονται for what end is the rite of purification by water, and for what use the three immersions are employed?" All see in this case a usage of καθαρισμός exactly equivalent to the use of βάπτισμα just illustrated. The use of the preposition διὰ after καθαρισμός and equivalent words illustrates the use of the

same preposition after βάπτισμα etc. I will by parallel columns still farther exhibit this similarity of usage to the eye.

The following uses of καθαρσις, ἀγνισμός, etc., are taken from Cyril of Alexandria : The following are from Gregory, Thaum. Athanasius—Clemens Alexand. :

τὸν ἀγνισμὸν δι' ὕδατος—
τὴν καθαρσιν δι' ὕδατος
τὴν διὰ πνύος καθαρσιν
τοῦ δι' αἵματος ἀγνισμοῦ—
ἡγιασμένοι διὰ πνεύματος
τὴν διὰ Χριστοῦ καθαρσιν ἢ δι'
ὕδατος τε καὶ πνεύματος
ἀγιαζων δι' ὕδατος

βάπτισμα διὰ δάκρυων
βαπτίζειν δι' ὕδατος
βαπτίζειν διὰ πνύος
βάπτισμα δι' αἵματος
βάπτισμα διὰ μαρτύριον
βαπτίζειν διὰ πνεύματος
βάπτισμα νοητὸν διὰ πνεύματος—
βάπτισμα αἰσθητὸν δι' ὕδατος

This comparison of similar idioms could be extended to other prepositions, as ἐν taken in the instrumental sense as equivalent to διὰ—and also to the use of the dative in the instrumental sense after both words, showing by an extended induction of particulars such an exact similarity in the use of prepositions and cases after βάπτισμα and καθαρσις, etc., as proves them at a glance to be synonymous, for the word καράδρσις, immersion, is never followed by such prepositions and the dative case in such a sense. See also § 56, on the same point.

§ 65. Commission to baptize.

I will conclude this general view by noticing its bearings on a question relating to the commission to baptize. It is this. Why is there a commission given to baptize in Matthew and Mark, and none in Luke and John? This is a question for those to answer who deny the correctness of the view that I have given—for on this view it presents no difficulty at all. The reply is that a commission to baptize is in fact a commission to purify, that is, a commission to remit sins—and in Luke and John, the disciples do receive a commission to remit sins. Luke 24: 47, 48—"That repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations—and ye are witnesses of these things," that is, that repentance and baptism should be preached in his name among all nations—for according to Zonaras and the Fathers, baptism is the forgiveness of sins by water and the Spirit.

This view of the passages in Luke and John occurred to my mind before reading the Fathers, as furnishing a test of the soundness of my views, and on reading them I found that they did in fact regard the commission to remit sins in Luke and John as a commission to baptize as really as that in Matthew and Mark. They regarded it in short as merely another mode of expressing the same idea. In John the phraseology is different from that of Luke: "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained," John 20: 23. In short, Christ died as the Lamb of God to take away the sins of the world, and the great business of the apostles was to publish to the world the great doctrine of the remission of sins, through his death, and the terms on which it could be obtained, and to establish the rite by which this purgation from sin should be shadowed forth and commemorated in honor of the Trinity, and especially of that Spirit by whom this atonement was made effectual to purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God. Go ye therefore, teach all nations, purifying them (that is remitting to them that repent and believe their sins) into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

§ 66. *Mr. Carson's dissertation on λούω.*

A few words ought here to be said on the meaning of the words *λούω* and *λουέσθαι*. I have affirmed that by their own force they denote simply washing or purification, and not bathing. To prove this I referred, in § 16, to the fact that the vessels for washing the hands in the vestibules of ancient churches were called *λουήρες* as well as *νιπτήρες*. Mr. Carson sees fit in view of this, to devote nearly nine pages to a dissertation on *λούω*. He opens his dissertation as follows: p. 66, "The philosophical linguist, Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen, in distinguishing the words *λούω* and *νίπτω*, makes the first signify to wash or bathe the whole body, the last to wash or bathe a part. This distinction has been generally received since the time of Dr. Campbell. Mr. Beecher calls it in question, yet he does not touch the subject with the hand of a master. He merely alleges an objection which he thinks calculated to bring confusion into what is thought to be clear; but he gives no additional light by any learned observations of his own. I shall endeavor to settle this question by evidence founded on the

practise of language as well as the practise of the New Testament." Parturiunt montes! Mr. Carson is about to touch the subject with the hand of a master—and to settle the question!

Let us look at his results. He proves abundantly that *λούω* can be applied to bathing, which I never denied. Does he prove that it cannot be applied to sprinkling? Not at all. He asserts it, but nowhere proves it. I assert the contrary, and this is my proof: Porphyry asserts, in libel. de antro Nympharum, that it was customary for married women to purify maidens by sprinkling or affusion, before marriages, with water taken from fountains and living springs. Photius tells us that the water used for this purpose at Athens, was brought in a pitcher from certain fountains which he specifies, by the oldest male boy of the family. Here bathing is excluded, and yet the water thus used is called *λουτήρον*, or *λουτήρα συμμικτά*, and Zonaras defines *λουτήρα* thus, *τά εἰς λύσειν ἀρόντα τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας*. Those things which produce the removal of impurity, that is, means of purification. The boy who brought the water was called *λουτρόφορος*.

Again, Basil applies the term *λουτήρον* to a clinic baptism by sprinkling or affusion. The prætor Ariantheus, converted by his wife, was also baptized by her on his dying bed. Of this Basil says, letter 386—He washed away all the stains of his soul at the close of his life by the washing of regeneration *λουτήρον παλιγγενείας*. There was no bathing nor immersion; but sprinkling or affusion.

Again, in Corpus Hist. Byzant., Nicephoras Gregoras, Lib. 24, p. 573, Venice, 1729, uses *λουτήρον* to denote the complex rite of purification, including unction and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Since it is customary with men to wash themselves with water and to anoint themselves with oil, God has joined to the oil and the water the grace of his Spirit, and made them (i. e. oil, water and spirit,) the cleansing of regeneration, *λουτήρον παλιγγενείας*—anointing with oil is a part of the process of purification—it is no part of bathing, and here *λουτήρον* must be taken in the most generic sense given to it by Photius, that is, a system of means of purification or a process of purification.

Mr. Carson hints that the *λουτήρες* in the temples might be for bathing the hands, and the *νιπιτήρες* for washing them! p. 73. Here is the force of theory with a witness. Let us then listen to Julius Pollux, Leg. 46, Lib. 10, Cap. 10. The

caption is, concerning vessels used in washing hands and face, *περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νεκτέσθαι σκευῶν.*

It is necessary, he proceeds, for one arising from sleep to wash his face *τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπομιπτεῖσθαι*—here is no bathing as yet. Let a boy, he proceeds, bring an ewer or pitcher, and pour out fresh water, *κατὰ λέβητος ἢ λουτήριον τίτος*, in a vessel or wash-basin. He justifies himself in using *λουτήριον* in this sense by quoting a line from Anaxilas, in which he says, in baths *τοῖς βαλανείοις* there are no wash-basins, *λουτήρια*, i. e. vessels for washing hands and face. Can λούω mean to bathe by its own force, when *λουτήριον* is thus used to denote a vessel in which to wash (*ρίπτειν*) hands and face, and not only so, but is placed in pointed antithesis to bathing vessels? for in baths surely there are vessels for bathing, though there are none for face and hand-washing. Pollux also gives *λουτήρ*, (the word quoted by me from the Fathers), as a synonyme of *λουτήριον* to denote a wash-basin, for washing hands and face. All idea of face and hand *bathing* is therefore excluded.

Mr. Carson says, p. 67, that “λούω, like our word bathe, applies to animal bodies only—we do not speak of bathing cloth.”

Nevertheless Origen applies *λουτρον* to wood, and Gregory Nazianzen applies λούω to clothes and to a couch—and Eupolis, see Pollux, applies *άλουσία* (i. e. want of washing) to a cloak. Surely these are not animal bodies.

Again, Mr. Carson says, p. 67, in order to justify the application of *ρίπτω* to the whole body it must be all successively washed—as *ρίπτω* involves friction or hand-washing. And yet Euripides applies it to bathing a whole herd of oxen in the sea, where friction, hand-washing, etc., are all out of the question. Strabo too applies it to the bathing of Diana in a river, where there was no probability of hand-washing.

Perhaps I have said enough to illustrate the nature of “the learned remarks of his own,” which Mr. Carson has added, and his mode of “touching the subject with the hand of a master.” I could add much more, did my room permit, and the patience of my readers allow. I will not complete the quotation with which I began, by adding “*Nascitur ridiculus mus*,” but only state that I see no reason either to add to or take from my statement, after all of Mr. Carson’s effort to settle the subject.

Mr. Carson says, I added no learned observations of my own. I answer, the case seemed to me too plain to need any. Nothing

is easier than to make a useless parade of learning. But it is of no use to waste time by needless citations to prove points which no one denies, and at the same time to deny points without proof, on which the whole question hangs.

I conclude then by saying, that *λούω* of its own force denotes to wash, or to purify; that in fact it is more generally used to denote a washing or purifying of the whole body, whether by sprinkling, affusion, or immersion—but that it is also applied to washing hands, face, and feet—also to wood, clothes, couches, cloaks, etc., though but rarely in this last sense.

Νίπτω applies generally to washing of hands, face, and feet, also sometimes, but more rarely, to bathing the whole body, in the case of both men and animals. It is also often used by the Fathers, with its compounds, to denote the cleansing of the mind from sin, excluding the idea of hand-washing. Sometimes also it is applied to the washing of cups, vessels, (*σκεῦη*) and tables.

Πλύνω is generally applied to clothes—but also to the body and all its parts, also to cups, metals, and various animal substances. Proof of all these statements is at hand and could be produced if needed. But I think that the case is clear enough as it is.

Mr. Carson's principles and general assertions, as to the Fathers, have passed under review: let us now briefly notice his application of them to the details of my argument. I shall now consider the manner in which he has assailed the Biblical argument.

§ 67. *Mr. Carson's attack on the Biblical argument.*

The Biblical argument is contained in §§ 8—18. The course of the argument is this: (1.) In John 3: 25, the expression, a dispute concerning purifying (*καθαρισμῶν*), proves that *καθαρισμὸς* and *βαπτισμὸς* are synonymous, when applied to the rite of baptism. (2.) This view explains the expectation that the Messiah would baptize, for it was foretold that he should purify, but not that he should immerse. (3.) In the baptism of the Holy Spirit, the subject, the agent, the means, and the effect, demand the idea to purify, and exclude the idea to immerse, for the subject is the spirit of man, the agent the divine spirit, the means spiritual, and the effect purity; and in such relations the idea to immerse is absurd; purify is the only reasonable sense. (4.) The end of baptism is to indicate sacrificial purification,

i. e. the remission of sins. We should naturally expect to find this idea in its name, and we do find it so used as clearly to indicate that it has the sense *καθαρismus*, i. e. sacrificial purification or remission of sins. (5.) In the expression, divers baptisms, in Heb. 9: 10, the word *βάπτισμοι* is obviously taken in a generic sense to denote Mosaic purifications of any kind. (6.) The baptism of couches in Mark 7: 4, 8, and the baptism expected of Christ, in Luke 11: 38, were obviously purifications merely, and not immersions. (7.) In speaking of the nightly baptism of Judith (Jud. 12: 7) in the camp of Holofernes, no doubt a mere purification is spoken of without respect to mode, and not an immersion. (8.) In referring to a baptism from a dead body (Sirach 31: 25) no doubt the word is used in the generic sense to denote purification. (9.) The account of purification from sin in the baptism of Paul (Acts 26: 16), and Peter's effort to guard the mind against the idea of mere external purification, and to direct the mind to the purging of the conscience by the atonement, show that purification was the usual religious sense of the word. (10.) In that part of the Greek language in which alone we ought to look for decisive evidence on this subject, there is no opposing evidence to be found; hence the case is decided in favor of the sense to purify, and against the sense to immerse.

In weighing the force of this argument it is necessary to remember, that whatever the practice was in fact, even if it was immersion, it does not in any sense disprove this argument as to the meaning of the word; but only shows that under a command to purify, they did in fact purify by immersion. But I do not at all concede that in the Apostolic days it was customary to baptize by immersion. The fact I am persuaded was directly the reverse. But I mention this consideration, that no illogical imaginations or associations of ideas may entangle the mind or break the force of the argument.

Let it also be borne in mind that the argument is strictly cumulative, and that its force is to be tested by the coherence and accumulated force of its parts.

How, then, does Mr. Carson attempt to answer it? First, by attempting to break it up into disconnected fragments; then, in each fragment trying to prove that the highest possible evidence of my position is not given; that the sense immerse is possible; and then bringing in what he calls the testimony of the word *βαπτίζω*.

The illogical nature of this whole process I have fully shown. I have also, by evidence most unanswerable, shown that the word βαπτίζω does not in these cases testify as he alleges, but that it testifies directly against him, and most fully and decidedly in my favor. Hence,

1. On the ground on which I first put the argument, i. e. the principles of moral and cumulative evidence, it remains unanswered and with unbroken force.

2. On Mr. Carson's own ground it remains unanswered and with unbroken force. I add,

3. That the truth of every main point in the argument can be sustained by direct philological evidence from the Fathers, and that to any required degree of strength.

To illustrate this last assertion, let us consider the leading points of the argument.

1. Mr. Carson assails my argument from John 3 : 25. He denies that the "question" spoken of had any reference to baptism at all. On the other hand Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa; Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, expressly testify that the question concerning *purification*, was simply and only a question concerning *baptism*. Nor is this all; Theophylact expressly gives βάπτισμα as an equivalent of καθαρισμός. For, after stating the subject of the question just as I do, he proceeds to say of the disciples of John and the Jews, ζητοῦντες δὲ περὶ καθαρισμοῦ ἦτοι βαπτίσματος προσῆλθον τῷ αὐτῶν διδάσκαλῳ, "disputing concerning purification, that is, baptism, they came to their master." Nor are these words equivalent merely as names of the same rite, as Mr. Carson suggests, but they are equivalent in idea, as I have elsewhere often and fully shown. Hence purification is not a mere name of the rite like "illumination," "anointing," "the gift," "grace," "the seal," etc. It is the meaning of the word baptism; and baptism is purification and not immersion.

2. Again, Mr. Carson treats with very great contempt the second point, that this view explains, by a reference to Old Testament prophecies, the expectation that the Messiah would baptize. This I illustrated by a reference to Malachi. He thinks the argument so contemptible that it "deserves no attention." "It requires more than the patience of Job to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feeling." "This argument manifests such a want of discrimination, and confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it

has force must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions."

What, then, are the facts? They are these. The Fathers, in commenting on those passages in the Old Testament, in which it is predicted that the Messiah should purify, do regard them as predictions that he should baptize, and state explicitly that the words βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω mean the same thing. Of this, Basil's comment on Is. 4: 4, § 55, is an unanswerable proof. In the Old Testament it is said concerning the Messiah ἐκπύρει and ἐκκαθάρει. In the New, John says βαπτίσει, and Basil says they mean the same thing; and then defines βάπτισμα as meaning καθαρισμός.

Nor is this all. Eusebius, of Cesarea, sustains the same view. Commenting on this passage, he says that the preposition ἐν is used in the causative sense, when applied to the Holy Spirit, not only in this passage, but in the New Testament too; for he says that the expressions ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καυσῶς, BY the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning, in Is. 4: 4, are equivalent to the expressions ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ, BY the Holy Spirit and fire in the New Testament. Hence he pointedly excludes the idea of immersion in the Holy Spirit, and gives in its place purification by the Holy Spirit. The whole comment of Eusebius is this: "Observe whether this passage is not, to a remarkable degree, coincident in sense with the evangelic testimony concerning our Saviour. He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire; for the expression by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning, does not at all differ in sense from the expression by the Holy Spirit and fire. In the one case (Is. 4: 4) fiery words reproving them, produced a purification (κάθαρσιν) of sins, and in like manner, of our Saviour in the gospel it is said, he shall purify, βαπτίσει, not with water but by the Holy Spirit and fire."

In regarding Is. 4: 4 as a prophecy of baptism, Origen, Eusebius, Basil, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret, all coincide. And just as clearly do Theodoret and Cyril of Alexandria regard Mal. 3: 3, to which I referred, as a prophecy of baptism; and the same is true of other passages in the Old Testament, in which it is foretold that the Messiah shall purify.

Inasmuch, then, as it was foretold that the Messiah should purify, and inasmuch as purify and baptize are, by the testimony of the Fathers, synonymous, it was of course foretold that the Messiah should baptize. And predictions that he should

baptize would of course awaken an expectation that he would baptize. Hence this expectation is accounted for as I stated.

In what manner he should baptize is not foretold, and no doubt all these predictions had primary reference to spiritual purification, and could have been fulfilled had no external rite of purification been ordained. But so soon as a rite of purification was established by the forerunner of the Messiah, it would at once call up to the minds of all the great purifier, so long foretold, so long expected, and raise the inquiry, Is John he? If not, why does he purify?

And when the attention was thus aroused, it would of course lead John to unfold to the people the nature of that spiritual purification, of which his purification by water was but a type.

What struck my mind, was this. The language of the New Testament, as to baptism by the Messiah, is exactly such as is used in the Old Testament with reference to purification by the Messiah. In the Old Testament, a *purification* by the Spirit and by fire was spoken of, in the New, a *baptism* by the Holy Spirit and by fire. An immersion in the Holy Spirit and fire was manifestly absurd; hence I could not resist the conviction that the Old Testament and New Testament modes of expression were equivalent. And it appears that this mode of reasoning led me to the truth, notwithstanding Mr. Carson is pleased to treat it with such utter contempt.

Indeed, I would not fear to risk the whole question on the comments on Is. 4: 4, of the six Fathers named above. In some minor particulars they disagree, some referring the purification by fire to this world, others to the world to come, some to literal fire, others to spiritual, but all agreeing in one point, that to baptize and to purify mean precisely the same thing. Even, therefore, though Mr. Carson should continue to despise this argument, still the truth will nevertheless continue to be justified of her children.

3. The testimony of the Fathers on the third point, the baptism of the Holy Spirit, is no less abundant. All the evidence produced on the last point applies with equal force to this, for it is to the baptism of the Holy Spirit that they refer these predictions of purification in the days of the Messiah. Moreover they saw types of this baptism in the fire that came down from heaven and consumed the sacrifice of Elijah, and in the fire kindled by Nehemiah, according to the 1st book of Esdras, by sprinkling water.

Thus, said they, in the baptism of fire, a divine and heavenly fire descends from above, and enters into the heart, and purges out the dross of sin, and makes us pure.

Nor is this view sustained by the Fathers alone. It originates from the very nature of things. The Holy Spirit is neither figuratively nor literally a river, lake, or pool, but a living, intelligent being, from whom an illuminating and purifying influence goes forth as light and heat from the sun. Hence we are not spoken of as immersed in him, but purified by him; hence, too, it is proper to speak of his influences as poured out or descending as the rain, or going forth as the light or fire.

A few illustrations of these views from Cyril of Alexandria must suffice. He refers, Mal. 3: 1—3, to the baptism of Christ, and thus proceeds: "This divine fire from heaven, that is, gracious influence, through the Holy Spirit, when it enters into the heart, then, then indeed it cleanses away the pollutions of our former transgressions, and makes us pure, *καθαροποιεῖ*. This divine and spiritual fire the inspired John clearly announced, saying, "I indeed purify (*βαπτίζω*) you with water, but he shall purify you with the Holy Spirit and fire." Here the fiery influence is conceived of as coming from the Holy Spirit, and entering and purifying the heart. Moreover Cyril here agrees with Origen, Basil, and others, in considering the language of John as referring to and taken from those passages in the Old Testament which predict of the Messiah, purification, and that alone. And Cyril oft repeats the same ideas in other parts of his works. But his comment on Is. 4: 4, is still more striking. He first refers the passage, as Basil does, to the baptism of Christ, and then explains the spirit of burning thus: "We call it grace which comes into us at the holy baptism, not without the agency of the Holy Spirit. For we are not baptized by mere water, nor by the ashes of a heifer; indeed we are sprinkled for the purity of the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul, but by the Holy Spirit, and by divine and spiritual fire, which consumes all the pollutions of wickedness in us, and melts out the pollution of sin. Such a coming of our Saviour also another of the holy prophets foretold, saying, "Behold he shall come as a refiner's fire, and as fuller's soap, and he shall sit and purify as gold and as silver." His reference to baptizing by the ashes of a heifer I have already noticed; and I now remark that through the whole passage he refers to a divine influence proceeding from God, which he calls spiritual fire,

νογρὸν, which enters the heart and consumes and melts out the pollution of sin. He also in this passage unites both Is. 4 : 4, and Mal. 3 : 1—3, as predictions of the baptism by the Holy Ghost and by fire, to be introduced by Christ.

But how does Mr. Carson hold his ground against my position, that the sense immerse is never transferred in any language to denote effects like the agency of the Holy Spirit ? By giving me a lesson in Rhetoric. Let us hear it. "Mr. Beecher has adopted some of my philosophical doctrines. I will give him another lesson which will prevent him from again alleging such an objection. Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures, but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance. It gives words a new application but does not invest them with a new meaning. It is not then subject to the law of literal language, which for the sense of every word needs the authority of use. This I have established in my treatise on the figures of speech, in opposition to the common doctrine of the rhetoricians. With respect to the point in hand, I would maintain my ground if a single other example of the figurative use of this word could not be adduced." I do not doubt it. Any thing sooner than to admit that *βαπτίζω* means to purify. But with all due deference to my teacher in rhetoric I would say, that this lesson does not exclude my objection. He says metaphor may indulge itself wherever it *finds resemblance*. This is well said : it is the truth. But my objection is that *there is no resemblance* between the operations of the Holy Spirit and immersion. The Holy Spirit illuminates and purifies. Immersion as such does neither. It signifies mode, and nothing else—and it may pollute as well as purify. For this reason I deny the propriety of its application to the Holy Ghost, and claim the sense to purify, for this is his glorious, grand, peculiar work. Mr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric therefore is of no avail. But does he make no effort to illustrate the usage which he claims ? Yes ; his cases are "steeping the senses in forgetfulness"—"steeping the soul in the milk of human nature"—"be not drunk with wine, but be filled with the Spirit." Here I ask, are the verbs to steep, to be drunk, and to fill, verbs denoting the mode of an action, and that alone ? or are they words denoting an effect ? If the latter, and such is the fact, the cases are not in point. Mr. Carson thus virtually confesses that he can find no case parallel with the use of the word immerse, a word of mere mode. If his cases satisfy

any, it can be only those who have an intense desire to be satisfied that βαπτίζω does not mean purify. Hence Mr. Carson's desperate resort to what he considers a new doctrine of figures of speech. Whether it is new or not is of small importance. It is enough, that whether new or old, it is nothing to the purpose.

4. No less clear is the testimony of the Fathers as to the fourth point, namely, that βάπτισμα denotes sacrificial purification, or the remission of sins. Indeed, I have adduced already so much of their testimony on this point, that to add any thing more is needless. See §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841, and §§ 53, 54, Jan. 1843. Mr. Carson is pleased to treat with great contempt my remarks in § 12, Jan. 1840, designed to illustrate the difference between sacrificial and moral purification. "Mr. Beecher," he says, "gives us a dissertation on purification which is no more to the purpose than a treatise on logarithms." That Mr. Carson did not comprehend the nature or importance of the distinction made by me, or its extensive bearings in the discussion of the whole question, I freely admit. But ignorance and contempt of what we do not understand are not arguments.

So far is it from being true that my distinction is nothing to the purpose, that on the other hand, without it, it is impossible that much of the language of the Fathers on baptism should be understood at all. Sprinkling with blood is not an immersion, nor is it a washing, nor is it in the common sense of the term a purification, for blood of itself defiles. But the shedding of blood secures the remission of sins, and the sprinkling of blood is an expiation, that is, a sacrificial purification. And if it were not for this view, the language of the Fathers, when they speak of sprinklings of blood as baptisms, could not be understood. But take this view and all is plain. Indeed, it furnishes an argument against the sense immerse, of irresistible power. And although this is not much to Mr. Carson's purpose, it is very much to mine. Let any one trace this usage out, in all its applications to the baptism of blood, and the Mosaic and heathen expiations, and he will then be able to judge, both of the indispensable necessity and extensive application of the principles laid down in the dissertation, in § 12, of which Mr. Carson speaks so contemptuously.

5. On the fifth point, the divers baptisms spoken of in Heb. 9: 10, the evidence from the Fathers is absolutely overwhelming. As we have seen, they include without hesitation all the

sprinklings of the Mosaic ritual, whether with blood or with the ashes of a heifer. Indeed, one passage from Ambrose, of itself, were there no other, would be enough to settle this question forever. Apol. David, § 59: "Per hyssopi fasciculum adaspergebatur agni sanguine qui mundari volebat typico baptismo." He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism, was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb, by means of a bunch of hyssop. Compare now with this other similar cases in § 53, Jan. 1843, and all occasion for doubt must cease.

These are the leading and most important points in the biblical argument, and on them all, the testimony of the Fathers is as full and explicit as could be desired.

I was peculiarly struck with the commentary of Theophylact on John 3: 25. I had not read it when I gave my view in § 8, Jan. 1840. And yet the coincidence is nearly as perfect as if I had taken his exposition as the basis of my own. It was peculiarly gratifying to me to find the argument from this passage so clearly and fully sustained by the Fathers, as it was by means of this passage, that the Holy Spirit, as I humbly trust, first gave me an insight into the true meaning of this word. Mr. Carson's only argument against this view is a series of unproved assertions; that the question about purifying was not a question about baptism, and that it had no reference to the claims of Jesus or John; and that the disputants said nothing to John as to the question about purification, but stated one entirely different. In all this not only are the Fathers against Mr. Carson, but the most mature results of modern criticism are against him. Schleusner, Wahl, Vater, Rosenmüller, De Wette, Bretschneider, Kuinoel, and even Professor Ripley himself, are against him on these points. They all agree that baptism was the subject of the question; and Rosenwüller, Vater, Kuinoel, and Schleusner give baptism as the translation of καθάρσιον. Doederlin takes the same view. The following translation of the passage will present the true sense and the argument at once to the eye.

"After these things came Jesus and his disciples into the land of Judea, and there he tarried with them and *purified*. And John was *purifying* in Ænon, near Salim, because there was much water there, and they came to him and were *purified*. THEREFORE, there arose a question concerning *purification* between some of the disciples of John and the Jews, and they came unto John and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with

thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou barest witness, behold the same *purifieth*, and all men come to him! As if Christ was improperly drawing men away from John's purification. In reply to all this John clearly avowed the superiority of Christ to himself, and justified his course."

Having considered the chief points, let us now review the remainder.

6. As to the baptism of couches, in Mark 7: 4, we have seen that the Fathers not only speak of this, but of baptizing men on couches; so that all possibility of evading the sense to purify is taken away. Moreover, in the Apostolic Const. 6: 6, a certain Jewish sect is spoken of concerning whom it is said, "unless they baptize themselves daily they eat not, still further, unless they purify—*καθαρῶσι*—with water their couches, and plates, and cups, and goblets, and seats, they will not use them at all." That the author of these words did not believe in the immersion of couches is plain from the fact that he obviously takes pains to use *καθαίρω* in place of *βαπτίζω*. That in this passage there is a direct reference to Mark 7: 4, is too plain to need proof. It is no less plain that in Luke 11: 38, the Fathers regarded the baptism required of Jesus as a purification, and not an immersion, for Theophylact says of Christ, that he was deriding their foolish custom of purifying themselves before they ate, and takes particular pains to substitute *καθαρίζω* in place of *βαπτίζω*. "Deriding their foolish custom, I mean their purifying—*καθαρίζεσθαι*—themselves before eating, he teaches that they ought to purify their soul by good works." He then adds, for washing the hands—*ρίντεσθαι*—by water purifies the body only, not the soul. This use of *ρίντεσθαι* clearly denotes that Theophylact regarded the baptism expected of Jesus as a washing of the hands. More proof could be added, but surely this is enough.

No one can any longer doubt what is meant by baptizing from a dead body, in Sirach 31: 25, after reading in Cyril of Alexandria of a baptism by the ashes of a heifer. Cyril also uses *κάθασις* in the same relations. Ashes with water is a purification—*κάθαρσις*—to the defiled. Here, too, I remark, in passing, is an idiom of the same kind as that noticed in § 52, in which purifying agents are called baptisms. Here ashes with water is said to be a purification, i. e., a baptism. Mr. Carson's objection from *λουτρον* I have fully answered.

Nor is there any reason to doubt the sacrificial sense alleged by me in Acts 22 : 16, and 1 Peter 3 : 21. Arise, be purified or expiated is the import of the command, and refers manifestly to the rite. Wash away thy sins, refers as plainly to the result prayed for when the name of God was invoked, and which is shadowed forth by the rite, and in true believers comes to pass, i. e., the purification of the mind from sin. Mr. Carson says, this makes the pardon of sins to be confirmed at baptism. So it is if forgiveness is prayed for in faith. Sins are washed away by calling on the Lord for pardon, and the same is true of sins committed after baptism. We need forgiveness of sins daily, and daily we pray for it and receive it ; and at the hour of baptism sins are no less forgiven, if the prayer of faith is offered, than at any other time, and the external rite is designed to announce and show forth this fact. This is not baptismal regeneration, nor any thing like it. The *usus loquendi* is plainly on my side. Mr. Carson's philosophical and theological objections are of no weight. As to 1 Pet. 3 : 21, the Fathers are decidedly against Mr. Carson. He says, "Noah and his family were saved by being buried in the water of the flood ; and after the flood they emerged as rising from the grave." Now it is not true in fact that Noah and his family were ever buried in the waters of the flood, nor that they emerged from them, nor did the Fathers ever so regard it. The wicked were buried in the waters of the flood. Noah and his family, according to the Fathers, were purified and thus saved. See § 28, 6. So also Cyprian says "Qui cum Noe in Arca non fuerunt, non tantum purgati et salvati per aquam non sunt, sed statim illo diluvio perierunt." Those who were not in the ark with Noah, not only were not *purified* and *saved* by water, but perished at once by that deluge. According to the Fathers, those in the ark were saved by purification, those out of it were destroyed by immersion. All this perfectly accords with the *usus loquendi* of *βάντισμα* which I have clearly established, and with the obvious import of the passage.

§ 68. *Mr. Carson's reply to the arguments from the Fathers.*

Mr. Carson's mode of meeting my arguments from the Fathers (in § 21.) next demands notice. "Well, how does Mr. Beecher bring out his proof? If the writings of the Fathers prove that they understood this word in Mr. Beecher's sense,

must not Mr. Beecher prove this by alleging examples of the use of the word in this sense? Common Sense, What do you say? But Mr. Beecher *attempts no such thing*. He does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance." And yet my argument stands thus. 1. The earlier Christian writers do not so often use the word βαπτίζω, as some synonyme derived from the sense to purify e. g. ἀναγεννᾶω, as before stated. 2. They often use βαπτισμός in the legal and sacrificial sense so as to exclude any idea but καθαρισμός. 3. They sometimes in describing the rite use καθαίρω or καθαρίζω alone. How then does Mr. Carson dare to say that I attempt no such thing as alleging examples of the use of the word? Do not the three examples from Chrysostom and Theophylact each contain the word βαπτισμός? And do I not argue to prove that it means purification? All this was before Mr. Carson's eyes. Nay, after six pages, he refers to it and tries to answer it. Mr. Carson may be able to explain all this. I frankly confess I cannot. After this false statement of my argument he proceeds: "Now I do charge my opponent with dishonesty in the use of this argument. I do him the justice to believe that he is the dupe of his own sophistry. But it is a sophistry childishly weak. I have already disposed of this argument. It assumes as an axiom that words that apply to the same ordinance are identical in signification." To this I reply, I make no such assumption. My argument is moral and cumulative. If βαπτίζω means to purify, we should expect to find καθαρίζω and other synonymous words used in its place. It would be strange if we did not. It could be used as an argument against us if it were not so. If we do, then this class of facts is as we should reasonably expect to find them. And this in its place and relations is a true and powerful part of a cumulative argument. Another view of the matter is indeed possible, for I never denied that one word *could* be used in the place of another, and yet not be synonymous with it. Thus in arguing on John 3 : 25, there arose a question between some of John's disciples and the Jews about purifying. I first prove by the context that this dispute related in fact to baptism; and inasmuch as καθαρισμῶν is used in its place, I infer *in view of all the facts of the case*, that καθαρισμός and βαπτισμός are synonymous—because all probabilities tend this way. I then remark, "It is of no avail to talk of possible senses. The question is not what is possible, but

what is a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case; and this I do not hesitate to say is that βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός are synonymous." In this language I plainly intimate that another view is possible, but not probable. Hear now Mr. Carson: "I could admit that purification here refers to baptism specifically and still defeat President Beecher. He has labored in vain. He builds on a false first principle. He assumes that if two words refer to the same ordinance they must be identical in meaning. Nothing is more unfounded—palpably unfounded. There are situations in which two words may be interchanged at the option of the writer, while they are not perfectly synonymous. They may so far argue that they may be equally fitted to fill a situation while each has a distinct meaning. This is so obvious a truth, that I am perfectly astonished that it should lie hid from the President of the College of Illinois," pp. 5 and 8. To this I reply, I had well weighed the principle before writing my articles. It is simply the second of Mr. Carson's canons of trial as I have numbered them. No man who had ever noticed the pomp and authority with which Mr. Carson introduced it in his work on baptism as a profound discovery, could ever forget it again. I shall not pretend to decide whether a profound truth had laid hid from the world until Mr. Carson arose. I shall not dare to affirm that I had ever thought of such a thing before reading the pages of Mr. Carson. But surely after a repeated examination of his work on baptism, my ignorance must have been dispersed. And yet in full view of this canon I did dare to affirm, and do still affirm, that a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case is, that βαπτισμός and καθαρισμός are synonymous in John 3: 25, and βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω in the passages from the Fathers. I was not trying to render any other view impossible but *highly improbable*, and this I did accomplish; and I have since shown by other evidence that what is announced as highly probable, in view of all the facts, of these cases is certainly true.

The fact is that, through my whole argument, I avowedly reject Mr. Carson's demands as to the degree of proof needed, and claim decidedly and earnestly that I have proved the sense which I assign to the word, although another view is possible. I refuse to be cut off from using the lower grades of moral evidence. I refuse to give up the aid to be derived from a sense of propriety, beauty, harmony, and verisimilitude. I refuse to

introduce into the world of rhetoric and taste the iron rules of rigid demonstration. I insist that, in the interpretation of language, the mind shall be left open to the full power of all the influences that conspired to form that language. For example, in the exquisite passage quoted from Proclus, to translate βαπτίζω immerse, to a sensitive mind, alive to the beauties of style, would be worse than ten thousand discords in music. I refuse to be haunted by the ghost of an absurd canon of evidence through all the regions of poetry and eloquence, and compelled to reject all probable evidence of secondary senses, however striking, till I can succeed in hunting up one case of the impossibility of the primary sense. Whether I could find one such case or not, I did insist, and still do, that the laws of moral and cumulative evidence shall have their rightful sway, and that language shall not be tortured, wrested, and tormented for party purposes, and under the guise of zeal for the glory of God, and with charges of childish sophistry, or of unitarian or papal reasoning, or even of blasphemy, and giving the lie to the Holy Ghost, merely because I duly regard rational probabilities in deciding the sense of words. As to the passages from Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Gregory Naz., in which I assign to βάπτισμος the sacrificial sense καθαρισμός, I have fully vindicated that sense in my remarks on the baptism of blood, in §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841; and in the present article; and to these remarks I refer the reader.

Let us now consider what Mr. Carson, with his usual urbanity, calls my original nonsense. Concerning this, he says, "He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one, who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim, is that it is original nonsense." With all due deference to Mr. Carson's award of the palm of originality to me, I am obliged to resign it to Basil, Clemens Alexandrinus, Jerome and others of the Fathers; for what I stated as philosophically probable, I find by their writings that they had seen long before me as a matter of fact. My eight lines of original nonsense are these: "In a case where analogical senses exist, one external and material, and the other spiritual, it is natural that they should run into each other, and terms applied to one, be applied to the other. Thus if βαπτίζω means to purify, then there is natural purification and spiritual purification, or regeneration, and there would be a tendency to use ἀναγεννάω to

denote the latter idea, and also to transfer it to the external rite. And at first it would be so done as merely to be the name of the rite and not to denote its actual efficacy."—Hear now Basil: "Since, then, the Lord has connected both baptisms, namely that from water to repentance, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, are there not three significations of baptism, purification from filth, regeneration (*ἀναγέννησις*) by the Spirit, and trial, i. e. purgation by the fire of judgment. Here now the senses are analogical. Purification by water is external and material, purification by the Spirit is internal and spiritual, that is, it is regeneration. Hence also *βάπτισμος* runs into that sense, i. e. regeneration is one of its meanings: so Basil expressly testifies. Again, this name regeneration was transferred to denote the external rite, and yet so transferred as to be merely the name of the rite and not to denote its actual efficacy. Of this the mere fact that it was applied to Christ, is proof enough. That he had no sin, and needed no spiritual purification, they all with one voice affirm, and yet they fully speak of him as regenerated. What sense is here possible but the sense baptize? Clemens Alexand., speaking of the baptism of Christ, says, *σήμερον ἀναγεννηθεὶς ὁ Χριστός*, Christ, being regenerated to-day, etc., and in the context interchanges that mode of expression with *βαπτίζομενος*—so Jerome says of Christ that he was born of a virgin—and born again, (*renatus*) of a virgin—i. e. John the Baptist. All then that I stated is true. *βάπτισμός*, i. e. purification, has analogical senses, one external and material, the other internal and spiritual. Spiritual purification is regeneration. This became a sense of the word baptism. It was also applied to the external rite to denote its name, but not its efficacy. The view that I advocate explains all this. It led me to expect it; and facts are as I expected to find them. Hence to Basil and to the Fathers I must resign the palm of originality. I cannot, however, give them the premium for more nonsense than mine. Their nonsense and mine seem in quantity exactly to coincide. Mr. Carson's a priori reasonings against my views, are therefore merely reasonings against notorious matters of fact. This is as I expected. His principles are at war with facts, and to what else can they lead him? If then his reasoning is good, what has he proved? Simply that the actual facts of language, and the actual operations of the human mind are nonsense. All this may be; and this state of things may call loudly for reform. Let not Mr. Carson

then be discouraged. It merely opens to him a new field of reform. Let him follow his high vocation, and having reformed philology, commentary, rhetoric and logic, let him next reform the human mind itself, and human languages, the offspring of that mind. Then he will have all things to his liking. Then, and not till then, will his favorite principles have full scope. What kind of languages he will form it is not for me to say. I enter not a sphere so high. They may be the tongues of angels: certainly they will not be the tongues of men. As for me, I am willing to take facts as I find them, even at the hazard of being charged with nonsense, for so doing. I leave the tongues of angels to Mr. Carson. I am contented to study the tongues of men.

§ 69. *Result.*

The conclusion of the whole matter then is this. The testimony of the Fathers, according to Mr. Carson, is absolute and decisive, for they must have known the apostolic usage of the word; to say otherwise is virtually to say that the Scriptures are no revelation. But the testimony of the Fathers is as full against his positions and in favor of mine, as is in the nature of things possible; and, therefore, the question is decided in my favor, and that not by the opinions of modern critics, but by men from whose opinion there is no appeal.

But before closing the argument, I desire to repeat what I have often said before, that I appeal to the Fathers simply as witnesses to the meaning of words. Many of their opinions which I have stated, as for example, those on baptismal regeneration, holy water, etc., are clearly false. But this does not at all invalidate or weaken their testimony as to the use of words, or hide the great fact which blazes through their pages like the sun in mid heaven, that they habitually used βαπτίζω to denote purification of every kind. So that with the proposition, which I laid down at the opening of this discussion, I bring it to a close. § 3, p. 46. Jan. 1840.

"The word βαπτίζω, as a religious term, means neither dip nor sprinkle, immerse nor pour, nor any other external action in applying a fluid to the body, or the body to a fluid, nor any action that is limited to one mode of performance. But as a religious term it means, at all times, to purify or cleanse,—words of a meaning so general, as not to be confined to any mode or agent, or means or object, whether material or spiritual, but to

leave the widest scope for the question as to the mode. So that in this usage it is in every respect a perfect synonyme of the word *καθαρίζω*."

This proposition I at first derived solely from an examination of the New Testament usage, and I here repeat it as a true view of the import of the language of that supreme law of the Christian church. And I value the appeal to the Fathers simply as helping us, by their testimony to the *usus loquendi*, to reach a true interpretation of the word of God. Such then, as I have just stated, is the religious usage of the New Testament, and if so, all attempts to enforce on the church obedience to a command to immerse, is a manifest invasion of the great principles of religious liberty. **IT IS TEACHING FOR DOCTRINES THE COMMANDMENTS OF MEN.**

§ 70. Conclusion.

With four remarks I will close.

1. The present position of the Baptist denomination towards the rest of their fellow-Christians on earth, is exceedingly dishonorable to God, injurious to themselves, and injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community.

2. There is no higher duty at this time resting on the church than that of bringing this long-protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close.

3. It can be brought to a close.

4. The responsibility of terminating it rests mainly, if not entirely, on the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.

The truth of these propositions must be so obvious to every thinking mind, that I might almost leave them without remark. But to guard against all misunderstanding, I would remark by way of more full illustration,

1. That to have real Christians, who are alike in all fundamentals, divided in communion and action by a mere question of form, is, and must be, at all times, dishonorable and painful to God—for in practice it treats non-essentials as more important than essentials, and arrays holy men against holy men, to weaken each other's power, and injure each other's character and usefulness. And what more could even the devil himself desire?

It is injurious to the Baptists, for it has injured them. Among them are eminently pious men, but a bad system has ensnared

and betrayed them. How else can we account for it that they should have dared solemnly and formally to arrogate to themselves that they are DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence of THE GOSPEL, and that the heathen world must look to them alone for an unveiled view of the glories of THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST. Has it then come to this? Take away immersion, and is the gospel shorn of all its glories? Yea, is the gospel itself annihilated? Is immersion the gospel? What more can the most bigoted defender of baptismal regeneration and sacramental sanctification say than all this? But do our pious Baptist brethren mean all this? No! a thousand times, no. They know and feel, as well as we, that immersion is not the gospel. These facts only show, what all experience has shown, the danger of holding a system which makes a mere form of so much moment in practice as to outweigh holiness of heart and of life. In spite of all reasoning and professions to the contrary, it will as a general fact concentrate on itself a disproportioned, an unhealthy interest, narrow the range of Christian feeling, chill it and check its expansion, and distort and derange the intellectual perceptions of the mind. Men of uncommon native nobleness of character, as Robert Hall, or men of great piety may hold these tendencies of the system in check. But multitudes will not. Taught to regard themselves as distinguished from the rest of the Christian world by a form, the spirit of formalism will have scope. The pernicious idea of divine favoritism, on the ground of forms, will grow up, and this will breed arrogance, censoriousness, exclusion, and the spirit of proselyting in its highest degree. Nor do I speak of tendencies merely, these tendencies are embodied in public official results. How else can we account for it that even evangelical Baptists, not Campbellites, or Mormons, but even evangelical Baptists, have dared to arrogate to themselves a peculiar divine appointment to defend and promulgate the gospel of Christ, and have dared to charge two leading Christian Bible Societies, the American, and British and Foreign, as "virtually COMBINING TO OBSCURE a part at least of divine revelation," and to say, that in the translations of other denominations "the real meaning of words is PURPOSELY kept out of sight." Is it no injury to pious men to be so ensnared and deluded by a false system as to say and do such things as these? These are not the promptings of their Christian hearts, for that they have

Christian hearts I will not doubt. No ; it is the poison, the delusion of a false system that has done this.

No less is the Baptist system injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community. The implications of the Baptist system, and the proselyting spirit generated by it, and their charges on the rest of the Christian community, tend directly to irritate and alienate, to cherish the spirit of hostility, to nourish unholy controversy, to corrupt the love of truth by the desire of victory, and to breed an unchristian contempt towards our Baptist brethren, as exclusive, narrow-minded and contracted. All this is wrong, and it is an infinite evil. Over it all true Christians ought to mourn ; against it they ought to strive and pray. But the Baptist system tends directly to produce it. For it is based on a mere external act which has in itself no importance, except what is supposed to be created by a positive command. It is not like the law of God, and holiness founded in the nature of things ; and yet it cuts with the sharp edge of exclusion, and with charges of rebellion against God, as keenly as if it were as important as the being of God himself. Now, though to yield to temptation is wrong, and Christian endurance ought to rise superior to every trial, yet it is and ever will be an infinite calamity to the church, to be harassed and tried by a system so exquisitely adapted, both in theory and practice, to irritate and provoke ; and the cessation of an influence so malignant would be to the church almost like life from the dead. Of course,

2. There is no higher duty resting on the church at this time than that of bringing this long protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close. The last great Papal war is coming on ; our own civil and religious liberties are in danger ; and is this a time still more to embitter the divisions of real Christians at home, and to sow the seeds of future discord, by translations unintentionally but really erroneous, in all parts of the heathen world ? The power of Satan's harlot church lies in organic unity on false and worldly principles. But still unity gives power, and till the true church discovers the true law of Christian unity and unites, the power of Satan cannot be and will not be overcome. He knows the full worth of the maxim, divide and conquer. The worth of the maxim, unite and conquer, the church has yet to learn ; and to learn it and reduce it to practice is the great work and duty of the present age.

3. This controversy can be brought to a close. The real issue is one and simple. False issues can be avoided—false principles rejected—and the real issue decided; for it all depends upon a simple question in philology, and with regard to that question there is abundant proof.

The settlement of this question has been greatly hindered by attempts to prove that βαπτίζω means to sprinkle or pour. I have never seen the least evidence that it has either of these meanings, and to attempt to defend the cause of sprinkling or pouring on such grounds is, in my judgment, to make a false issue, and in effect to betray the cause; and yet it has been often done, and is still done. I shall not wonder if Baptists remain forever unconvinced by such arguments as these.

The settlement of this question is also greatly hindered by admitting that βαπτίζω in the command means to immerse, and yet claiming the right, on the ground of expediency, to practise sprinkling, because in our judgment it retains the essence of the command. Especially, if it is at the same time conceded that Rom. 6: 3, 4, and Col. 2: 12, relate to the external rite, and that the early church understood βαπτίζω as meaning immerse, and practised immersion for that reason. When all this is conceded, the whole question is conceded. It is perfect logical demonstration in favor of immersion. But I have abundantly shown that none of these things are so. Hence, to concede them is to give up the whole question, and thus, on grounds of expediency, to claim the right to alter a command of God. This is placing the defence of the right to sprinkle on a false principle, for no such right as is claimed exists. Nor shall I wonder if the Baptists remain forever unconvinced by such reasoning as this.

The real and the only issue is this. Is the command an open command? Is it a command to purify, or a command to perform an external specific act? One or the other it is. Which? If the latter, then let us all obey. If a command to purify, then let us all cease to dispute about forms, and obey in that mode which seems to us most significant, decorous and solemn.

This brings the whole question to an issue definite and simple, and as it regards every point upon which this issue depends, there is abundant proof, and that of a kind which is in its nature absolute and decisive.

4. The responsibility of terminating this discussion rests

mainly, if not entirely, with the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.

It depends upon a question in philology. On such questions original investigation is and must be limited to a few. It extends over a wide field, and calls for nice discrimination, and accurate principles of philology. Hence, the mass of the Christian community are peculiarly in the power of their leaders—and their leaders are exposed to peculiar temptations. By bold and united assertions, and by overlooking or suppressing evidence, they can keep their parties together, and inspire them with zeal even against the truth.

Hence, on no class of men do such responsibilities rest as on the learned leaders in this cause, to make themselves fully acquainted with the evidence on which a decision depends, to avoid all false issues, to reject all unsound principles, and sincerely and honestly, as in the sight of God, to meet the main question, avoiding all personalities, and all unchristian excitement, and suppressing and concealing no part of the truth. If they will do this, and look to God for the illumination and guidance of the Spirit, then he will cause the watchmen to see eye to eye, to lift up the voice together, and together to sing. If not, let them fear lest they become not merely blind leaders of the blind, but treacherous guides of confiding but dependent minds. All error in the discussion of this subject is not on one side. There have been false defences of the truth, which need as really to be abandoned, as positive error. And a supreme regard to the glory of God should lead each to inquire, not how can I prove that all my past positions have been true, but how can I discover all errors which I have incautiously embraced, and retain the truth alone? So soon as leading minds agree on this point, the mind of the community will be at rest, and not till then.

Much evil has been done by speaking of this discussion as a mere dispute about forms, and as unworthy of the attention of an expanded and liberal mind. It relates indeed to a form, but as I have shown it affects immense spiritual interests, and it is in its essential nature a question in philology—to be decided just as all other philological questions are—and the real difficulty has been not that it has been discussed too much, but that the discussion has not been sufficiently radical and extensive, and that much very important evidence has been sparingly used,

if used at all. Let this state of things cease, and the sanctified intellectual energies of the Christian community be brought to bear on this subject with humble prayer for divine guidance, and the clouds of error will pass away.

The present state of things ought not to continue, nay it cannot. The cause of God can never triumph whilst his church is so painfully divided and her energies so paralyzed, and so long as such errorists as the Campbellites and the Mormons are shielded, in their most pernicious formalism, on a point so vital to them as baptism, by the influence of the Evangelical Baptists.

Nor does it seem to me possible that all leading minds, through power of conviction, should ever accede to the Baptist position in all its rigor and extent, giving to the word but one sense, and that to immerse; and making this an iron rule for translation and practice. It is a system more rigid than that of the Fathers, even in the ages of the highest formalism. So rigid a system never did prevail in the church, nor can I believe that it ever will. There are not the elements of logical proof in existence. It disagrees with all of our ideas of fitness; there is no reason to wish it true, and its fundamental position can be logically destroyed.

The position defended by me, takes nothing from any one but the right to think others wrong and to censure and exclude them, and in itself considered there is every thing to recommend it. For

1. It is more adapted to the varying conditions of men, and to all changes of climate, times, seasons, and health.

2. It is more accordant with the liberal and enlarged spirit of Christianity, as a religion of freedom, designed for all countries and all times.

3. It better agrees with our ideas of what is reasonable and fit.

4. It offers no temptations to formalism, nor does it tend to foster arrogance and exclusion.

5. It is perfectly adequate to harmonize the church.

6. It is susceptible of any necessary degree of proof.

I have by no means exhausted the proof that exists, nor even what I have on hand. To much I have not had time even to allude. But what I have produced is sufficient, I trust, by the blessing of God, to secure the end that I proposed, "to furnish some small share of the materials which God may use in producing the unity of his own church." But for faith in God, I

never should have dared to undertake this work. But for his sustaining grace I could not have brought it thus far. Almost exhausted by efforts to sustain the college over which I preside, in a time of unparalleled pecuniary embarrassment, without an adequate library at the college, compelled to visit distant libraries, some more than a thousand miles distant, and to make researches at long intervals, loaded with pecuniary cares and anxieties, compelled often to write on journeys, in steam-boats, and canal-boats, and taverns, no one can be more deeply sensible than I am of the necessary imperfections of my performance. Yet, I have looked to my God to save me from hurtful error, and to guide me into the truth, and it is my humble persuasion that he has heard my prayer. To him, in conclusion, I commend all that I have written, imploring him to pardon all its imperfections, to correct all its errors, and to use all its truth to the glory of his own great and holy name.

ARTICLE VIII.

CHRIST PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.

Ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαυε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἢ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἢ ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε ἀπεξεδίχετο ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε, κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, εἰς ἣν ὀλίγοι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁκτώ ψυχῶν διωσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος· ὁ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα, οὐ σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις ῥύπον, ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν, δι' ἀνυστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.—1 Pet. 3: 18-21.

By Rev. Thomas H. Skinner, D. D., Pastor of Mercer Street Church, N. Y.

THE course of Christianity from the beginning has been one of great conflict. That a religion from God should encounter such opposition was a mystery, and the apostles were not without the apprehension that it might shake the faith of some of their inexperienced disciples, as appears from the care which they show in their writings to guard them against defection on that account.

This obviously is the design of Peter in the preceding context. He is there endeavoring to fortify Christians against discouragement from the sufferings to which they were exposed for the sake of the gospel. To this end, he tells them that it is better, if the will of God be so, that they suffer for well-doing than for evil-doing; assuming that all suffering for adhering to the gospel is suffering for well-doing. He cites, in confirmation of this, the example of Christ, who suffered as a well-doer, the Just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God;—the highest instance that ever was or will be, both of well-doing and of suffering on account of it. What the apostle would have them particularly remember was, that the sufferer in this instance found ultimately no disadvantage from the unparalleled injuries which he endured. Though he suffered to the greatest extremity, even to his being put to death in the flesh, the ignominious death of the cross, yet he was quickened by the Spirit, by which he went and preached to the spirits in prison, etc.

“This place is somewhat obscure in itself, but as it usually happens, made more so by the various fancies and contests of interpreters, seeming or pretending to clear it.” The fact, however, that efforts to explain it have been unsuccessful, will not and should not preclude continued attempts. It is relied upon to support unsound and dangerous doctrines, and it should, if possible, be shown by just exposition, that it lends them no countenance. Its affirmation concerning Christ’s preaching to the spirits in prison, is interpreted to mean that he went after his death to the abode of departed sinners, “the proper hell,” and “that as he revealed here on earth the will of God unto the sons of men, and propounded himself as the object of their faith, to the end that whosoever believed in him should never die; so after his death he showed himself unto the souls departed, that whosoever of them would yet accept of him should pass from death to life.” This and other dogmas contrary to the catholic faith, appeal to this scripture as their warrant, and so long as they do so, the friends of truth, certainly, should not cease looking for the key to its true interpretation. Whether there be any conclusive force in the following remarks, is with deference submitted to the decision of the reader.

We would first ascertain the meaning of the phrase rendered in our version, “quickened by the Spirit.” So far as we know, what we take to be the sense of the original words, has never

been given. If this can be established, we think a new ray of light will be thrown on the passage.

Our translation, it is admitted, is not the only one the original will bear. Nay, much as we desire to honor the received English version, we are constrained to say that it has in this instance given a reading which the original will not bear. The true reading is not, quickened *by* the Spirit, but quickened *in* the Spirit. So it is given by Wickliffe, by Tyndale, by Cranmer, and in the versions of Geneva and Rheims, and so, but for certain theological antipathies, it would probably have been given by our translators. Both the prepositions, in the clause, "put to death *in* the flesh but quickened *by* the Spirit," have been supplied. The words flesh and spirit stand in the original without any preposition whatever, and it is obvious from their antithesis, that if the word "spirit" denote *the active cause* by which Christ was restored to life, the word "flesh" must equally denote *the active cause* by which he was put to death; which, therefore, must have been the flesh of his own body, an interpretation too manifestly absurd to be admitted.*

The important phrase before us must have one of the five following significations. 1. That Christ, after his death, was invigorated as to his human soul as distinguished from his body; that, though as to his body he was dead, he was more vital than before as to his soul. We cannot adopt this as the true sense, though the thing affirmed may have been true, for a reason, which will hereafter be given. It may seem to be required, at the first view, by the law of antithesis, but besides that it is a feeble sense, it does not, as we shall see, fall in with the scope of the context.

2. That Christ, after death, was made more vital as to his deity, as distinguished from his human nature. This sense must be rejected, as being inconsistent with the essential immutability of the Godhead.

3. That Christ suffered death indeed as to his body, but was resuscitated or quickened again into bodily life, by the Holy Ghost. This, however true, is not what the words were intended to express: (1.) Because, as we have shown, the original cannot be justly rendered so as to give this sense; it must be translated quickened, *not by*, but *in* the Spirit. (2.) Because

* Horsey.

the resurrection of Christ was not more the act of the Holy Ghost, than that of the Father; nay, than Christ's own act. It is ascribed to the Father in Eph. 1: 20. It is ascribed to Christ himself in John 2: 19, and John 10: 18. If it is anywhere ascribed to the Holy Ghost, it is not as his act exclusively or peculiarly; and no reason appears from either the text or context for introducing the Holy Ghost here as the agent in raising the body of Christ: nay, (3.) the raising of his body cannot have been referred to in this quickening, for the very reason that the context on that supposition cannot be explained. Indeed all context, i. e. connection, between the parts of the passage is destroyed by it. For where is any connection between Christ's being raised from the dead, and his preaching to the antediluvians?

4. That Christ, after being put to death as to his body, quickened himself into bodily life by his own eternal Deity. This cannot be what is intended, because, to mention no other reasons, the original cannot be so translated as to admit the preposition *by*.

5. The only remaining sense of the phrase is, that Christ, after his death, was quickened in reference to his great work, the salvation of mankind;—quickened as to that efficacious agency, by which this work was to be carried forward:—an agency by which Christ made himself to be felt among men in his power to save; an agency which diffused new and mighty life through his body the church, and, by means of his church, thus vitalized, throughout the world. This agency was specifically that of the Holy Spirit. The propriety of speaking of Christ as quickened, because of the increased influence and exertion of this agency, appears from this, that the Holy Spirit, according to the representations of Scripture, is the Spirit of Christ. So he is called in Rom. 8: 10, and elsewhere, (1.) because, the Holy Spirit, in reference to the accomplishment of our redemption, is possessed by Christ above measure; John 3: 34, Acts 4: 38, Is. 42: 1; and, (2.) because, for the same purpose, the Holy Spirit is given or sent by Christ; John 1: 33, 15: 26, Luke 24: 49. The distinguishing mark of our Lord, as the Messiah, was, *that he baptized with the Holy Spirit*. So he baptized his disciples on the day of Pentecost; and so, by their instrumentality, he baptized great multitudes throughout the world, or in the language of the prophet, "sprinkled many nations," Is. 52: 15.

Thus, though Christ suffered unto death in the flesh, in ac-

completing the redemption of man, yet relatively to that work, he was quickened in the Spirit, became efficaciously vital and life-giving, in the influences of the Holy Ghost, which were thenceforward so abundantly bestowed. In the Spirit, thus understood, he was "straitened" before his death, according to his own complaint, Luke 12: 50; after his death he was "quickened;" life flowed from him, filling his church with vitality, and the world too became conscious of his life-giving energy; agreeably to his own forcible illustration, John 12: 24, "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit;" and agreeably also to his prediction, John 12: 32, "And if I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all men unto me."

We propound this, then, as the true sense of the expression, as being, 1, the worthiest and greatest sense, and on that account preferable, other things being equal; 2, accordant with a manifest and wonderful fact, which was then filling the world with excitement, namely, the outpouring of the Spirit in his divinely vivifying influences; and, 3, coincident with the scope of the place, in connection with which it stands, as follows: No damage comes from well-doing: Christ suffered extremely on that account, and the result is known. To redeem man, he was put to death in the flesh; but his death was the means of life to his cause. Before he died, to use his own simile, he was like an unplanted grain which abideth alone; after his death, he was like a corn of wheat, which having yielded its life in the midst of a fruitful soil, is now producing an hundred-fold increase. To vary the form of speaking, he was *straitened* before he suffered; he was *quickened* afterwards. Filled himself with the Spirit above measure, he poured it out from on high, baptized his church with it, and diffused, through his church, a heavenly life among the nations.

Such is our understanding of this very important phrase "quickened in the Spirit." Irrespective of the light which the remaining part of the text receives from this interpretation, it commends itself, we think, as the only one the place will bear. It will appear, however, as having new claims to our adoption, when it is seen how it elucidates the following context. We proceed with our exposition.

The apostle having mentioned Christ's becoming thus quickened in consequence of his death, as to the life-giving power of the Spirit, goes on to speak of his having exerted himself, in

an office of the Spirit, among those who perished by Noah's flood. He expresses this in the following language: "By which he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." But why does he mention this ancient fact in this connection? What has Christ's ministry to the antediluvians, in the person of Noah, to do with the subject which the apostle has in hand, namely, his being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the Spirit? This, at the first view, seems exceedingly abrupt, and some persons, probably, have been inclined by this appearance of dislocation and irrelevance, to question, if the apostle be in fact speaking of what we have said, namely, the preaching by means of Noah to the disobedient men of his day. The dogma, as we have before mentioned, has been advanced that Christ, after his death, went to the place where the antediluvians were now confined, for the purpose of preaching to them; and in accordance with it this text has been explained; and the explanation has, it may be said, this at least to recommend it, namely, that it makes the apostle less disjointed and incoherent in his discourse. For it is what one would be naturally enough led to inquire about, after being told that Christ, when lying dead in the grave, was, in spirit, more vital and energetic than before. Where was Christ's disembodied spirit, and how was it exerting its invigorated powers during the three days and nights which intervened between his crucifixion and his resurrection? An inquiry which it has been supposed the apostle, in the words following, proceeds to resolve. Is this so?

Was the soul of Christ in fact thus employed, while his body was in Joseph's tomb? If there is any testimony in Scripture in favor of this, it is in the present text. There is no parallel place, no hint, no trace of evidence, direct or indirect, besides. Presumption certainly is against it: for why should these antediluvians, above all mankind who have departed in disobedience, be distinguished by such a privilege as it is said they had? It is moreover fatal to this exposition, that it gives a feeble sense to the great expression, "quickened in the Spirit." The spirit, according to this interpretation, means Christ's human soul; but to say that Christ did not die as to his soul when his body was dead, but was rather more vigorous, were but to make a commonplace remark, and to say what is doubtless true of every one who dies, as well as of our Lord. We shall see yet further reason for not adopting this exposition.

But, after all, is the alleged objection against the commonly received meaning of Christ's "preaching," etc. true? Is it impossible to trace a connection between this interpretation and Christ's being quickened in the Spirit? A connection there doubtless is, if the interpretation be the true one. Confessedly it is not apparent at the first glance, but may not a connection be discovered by close attention to the drift of the apostle's discourse, and by comparing scripture with scripture? We humbly hope we have made this discovery.

The connection in question is, a connection or link of union in the apostle's thought, between Christ's being quickened in the Spirit after his death in the body, and his preaching through Noah to the antediluvians, then disembodied spirits in prison. Can no reason be conceived of, why the apostle should mention these things as he has done, in close conjunction? We know the following fact, namely, that there was an important connection in the mind of this apostle between that flood, in foresight of which Noah, filled with the Holy Ghost, lifted up his warning voice in the ears of his disobedient contemporaries, and that eternal destruction which is now coming upon the world of the ungodly, and in prospect of which Christ, after his death, sent the Holy Spirit upon his disciples, and through them thus qualified for the work, called men to repentance. These two floods, (if for convenience sake we may so call them,) though distant in time—the one long since past, the other yet to come—stood together in the apostle's illumined mind; closely related the one to the other. We see this in the following passage from the third chapter of his Second Epistle. "By the word of God, the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water perished: but the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word, are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." The flood of water, the first flood, pointed in the apostle's view to the second, the flood of fire, by which the world's final destruction is to be effected. He could not therefore well be thinking of the one without being reminded of the other. Now this final destruction held a lofty place in the apostle's present meditation. It was to deliver men from this destruction, that Christ, as quickened in the Spirit, according to the interpretation of this phrase, which we have given, was now employed. This was the end of that movement now go-

ing forward through the ministrations of the apostle and his fellow-laborers in the work of Christ: and that the apostle had this in mind, appears from what he says in our 21st verse. Having remarked that the result of Noah's ministry was the salvation of few, that is eight souls, by water, he adds, "the like figure whereunto, baptism, doth now save us by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Baptism, in its signification and design, was no other than the great work of recovering mercy, which Christ, as now quickened in the Spirit, was accomplishing among men. This baptism, not the outward ceremony so called, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God—this name for the great salvation now everywhere proclaimed, was the antitype of the water of the deluge—that water which, while it destroyed the world, saved, as the apostle affirms, Noah and his house. Baptism, we say, was the antitype (*ἀντίτυπον*—*βάπτισμα**) of that water which floated and defended the ark while it submerged the earth. The antitype baptism, the great blessing which Christ, as now quickened in the Spirit, is giving to men—this baptism, saith the apostle, doth now save us—namely, those of the present generation, who, as did Noah and his house, have obeyed the warning voice of the Divine mercy. As the eight souls were saved in the ark, so we are saved by the antitype baptism, now appointed as the world's only hope. Another flood is approaching—a flood of devouring fire, which is to sweep erelong over the face of the earth, and dissolve the elements with fervent heat. In view of this overwhelming destruction, of which Noah's flood was a foreshadow, Christ, quickened in the Spirit, and exerting himself in the anointed ministers of his grace, is rousing mankind from the slumber of sin, and warning them to make their escape, and proposing to them "baptism" as the means; and they who hear his voice and fall in with his proposal, are saved from this infinite ruin, even as they were saved from the flood, who according to the Divine premonition took refuge in the ark.

We see, then, that this great and terrible destruction, the flood of fire, was in the Apostle's thought. Christ, being quickened in the Spirit, the religious stir and movements of the times—the developments of the saving virtue of the antitype

* See MacKnight's version.

Baptism, implied this : but the flood of Noah stood in his thought, (as we have seen, and as it well might have done, from its prelusive and prefigurative relations,) associated with this other coming storm of wrath ; it was to him a proof and a pledge, that this more dreadful storm was truly coming. How natural was it, therefore, that when he thought of the one, his second thought should have been of the other ; that as he beheld the evidences of Christ's being quickened in the Spirit, in the great exertions which were then made to save men from the infinite destruction then depending,* he should remember that when the first destruction was at hand, the same benevolent Being (not indeed, as now, quickened in the Spirit, not in that fulness of power which he was then displaying, yet) by the Spirit in some measure of his influences, by the same Spirit, by which he was then striving so mightily with mankind, sought, through the instrumentality of his prophet, to bring the infatuated men of that age to repentance, and so deliver them likewise ? And if it was natural for him to be reminded of this, it is not surprising that he spoke of it.

There is one expression in our English translation of the passage, which some persons, probably, would lay stress upon, as being favorable to the interpretation which we reject : "By which, *he went*, and preached," etc. (*πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν*). But there are examples to show, both in the Scriptures and in classic authors, that no special emphasis should be given to this form of expression. Among Scriptural examples see Eph. 2 : 17, "Having abolished—the enmity—and came and preached (*καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐηγγελίσατο*) peace to you who were afar off, and to them who were nigh."—"It is certain that our Lord, after his resurrection, did not go personally to the Gentiles to preach peace to them. He preached to them by his apostles only. But if Christ is said by Paul to go and do, what he did by his apostles only, he may with equal propriety be said by Peter, to go and do, what he did by his prophet Noah." He went and preached, is but a pleonasm, for he preached.

According to the exposition now given of this passage of Scripture, the sense and connection of it may be expressed in the following paraphrase.

* Dr. Owen thinks the Apostle's primary reference was to the approaching destruction of the Jewish Church and State, but that he also embraced in his view the destruction of the world.

Christians should not be discouraged by their sufferings on account of well-doing. No ultimate evil will come to them from their sufferings. They may convince themselves of this by considering the example of Christ. In order to save mankind, to bring us to God, he underwent the greatest extremity of suffering, having been put to death in the flesh. Yet his unparalleled sufferings were no detriment to him in respect of his great undertaking. So far from this, they were the foundation of his success: all thenceforth was life in his body the church, and the world also felt his vitalizing power. By what abundant manifestations of the Spirit, and what glorious triumphs, hath he since then been carrying on his mighty work of saving men from that infinite wrath which is so fast coming on the world? And this reminds me, how this same mighty deliverer exerted himself by the Spirit through the ministrations of Noah, when the deluge was at hand. He then preached, by his faithful prophet, to the disobedient persons of that generation, whose disembodied spirits are now in the prison of hell, bearing the just punishment of their incorrigible impenitence. The great patience of God once waited on those unhappy persons for a long period, even one hundred and twenty years, during which time the ark was being built. The result, though small, was not an entire failure. Eight persons were saved in the ark by that water which bore it up and defended it, while it drowned all the world besides. The salvation of these few was the fruit of that same divine grace, which is now discovering itself in our deliverance from the greater wrath to come, and of which baptism, in its signification and purport, is the compendium;—baptism, the antitype of the water which saved the family of Noah. I do not mean the external rite merely, but the thing thereby represented, the answer of a good conscience toward God, a conscience purified through the blood of Christ, and following its convictions in piously observing the sacramental ordinance of the Christian church: baptism, another name for the influences and effects of Christ, as quickened in the Spirit—this antitype baptism, through the resurrection of Christ, which is the consummation of his work, and the grand proof of his redeeming virtue—baptism, I say, doth now save us from the coming eternal vengeance of God, even as Noah and his household were saved from the flood which drowned the world by the typical ark and water.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*A Residence of eight years in Persia, among the Nestorian Christians; with Notices of the Muhammedans.* By Rev. Justin Perkins. *With a Map and Plates.* Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 512.

WE have received from Mr. Dodd this interesting volume. It can no longer be said, that missionaries are a useless set of men, that money expended on their support is wasted. For, independently of the blessing which accompanies their labors, in fitting immortal souls for an eternal home in heaven, they now stand before the world with claims on its regard for the valuable contributions they make to literature and science. To those, who feel little interest in the conversion of souls to God, by the regeneration of the Spirit, but much in the advancement of scientific and literary knowledge, missionaries must now appear as a class of men highly worthy of respect.

Not to mention others, here is a volume contributed to the literature of the world, of which any one might be proud to have been the author. The colored plates, originally drawn by a Persian artist, under the supervision of Mr. Perkins, are in themselves not without value as specimens of art, and as presenting before the eye the most correct delineations of the costume and features of the various classes of Persians anywhere accessible to us.

No American, before Mr. Perkins, was ever a resident in the ancient country of the Nestorians; and the report he makes has this attribute, wanting in many others, that it can be relied on with the utmost confidence. The materials for the work were collected on the ground, but in respect to their arrangement and filling out, Mr. Perkins says, "I have sometimes written an hour at a public house, while waiting for a stage-coach; at other times in a cabin of a steam-boat, among scores of passengers; and have often revised my manuscripts, while travelling in rail-road cars." Yet, we could not help comparing the result here accomplished with that presented in Dickens's "Notes," who makes somewhat of a similar statement about his opportunities for doing his work. Whilst the latter will soon have passed away as the morning cloud, the former will live, an honor to its author and a treasure to the Christian and literary world.

The volume contains twenty-seven plates, and a rich fund of interesting information in respect to Turkey, Persia, and especially the Nestorians. They who read will find themselves abundantly rewarded. The style is easy, the narrative well conducted, and many of the incidents thrilling. The visit of Mr. Perkins and Mar Yohannan, his companion, will be long remembered; and when they both shall be slumbering in the dust, or rather rejoicing in heaven, the little ones of the land, who have been so eager to see and to hear them, will still talk of them, after they have grown to manhood, and will then inquire for this book, that they may see their portraits and read of their labors to revive the spirit of Christianity among the Nestorians. By that time, too, we trust that ancient church will have returned to the simplicity of the Gospel, and will be going forth as messengers of good to the lost around them.

Our limits in the present number will not permit us to give an analysis of the work: but our hope is that it will be widely circulated.

2.—*The Religious Instruction of the Negroes, in the United States.* By Charles C. Jones. Savannah: Thomas Purse. 1842. pp. 277.

Mr. Jones, the author of this volume, has for years manifested a deep interest in the religious improvement of his colored fellow-men. He is a minister of the gospel, resident in Georgia, and connected ecclesiastically with the Presbyterian denomination.

This is an interesting volume in many respects. The class of people of whose instruction it treats, is an interesting one—the historical facts it contains—the plainness of speech it exhibits—the plans it proposes—its coming from one so personally familiar with the state and relations of those for whose welfare he pleads—its connection with great questions of duty to the slave, and its tendency to direct the attention of slaveholders to topics which they have too much excluded from their circle of thought. It contains an historical sketch of the religious instruction of the negroes from 1620 to 1842—treats of the moral and religious condition of the negroes; of the obligations of the church to improve that condition by giving them the gospel—and proposes plans for securing their religious instruction.

It appears that the Moravians were the first to attempt missions exclusively to the negroes, and that direct and continued efforts for their religious improvement were first made

by Presbyterians in Virginia, encouraged by Pres't. Samuel Davies. The moral and religious condition of the poor negroes in the United States is portrayed in the blackest colors. It is enough to make a Christian weep and pray earnestly for their deliverance from the thralldom of sin, the yoke of a moral slavery. Under the head of the obligations of the church to the negroes, the author speaks out plainly and forcibly, first to the church in slaveholding states on their duties to the slaves, then to Christians in the free states on their duty to afford the gospel to free negroes within their limits. To the former he says: "We cannot cry out against Papists for withholding the Scriptures from the common people, if we withhold the Bible from our servants, and keep them in ignorance of its saving truths, which we certainly do whilst we *will not* provide ways and means of having it read and explained to them."

"John Randolph found a female friend busy, with sem-stresses, making up garments. 'What work have you in hand?' 'O, sir, I am preparing this clothing to send to the poor *Greeks*.' Seeing some of her servants in need of just such clothing, he exclaimed: 'Madam, madam, *The Greeks are at your door*.'"

Mr. Jones weighs well all objections to the course proposed and meets them on Scriptural grounds: so that it must be difficult for a minister of the gospel or a private Christian to read and not be reproved. Oh, if the principles of this book were inculcated and adopted in the Southern States, for which it is principally intended, how much of the curse of slavery would be removed, and how many of our reasons for emancipation would lose much of their force.

Whilst we freely acknowledge ourselves unfriendly to the system of slavery as it exists in the United States, and indeed to all slavery; whilst we deem freedom to be the right and privilege of every son and daughter of Adam, and that no one may compulsorily enslave his fellow man, we think appeals, such as Mr. Jones makes, to the consciences of Christians in the South, adapted to prepare the way, as rapidly as any other preparatory measures, for the ultimate breaking of all the fetters of bondage and letting the oppressed and captive go free. We long for the day, when no slave shall set his foot on Columbia's pure soil, when the shout of *universal* freedom shall go up from all the multitudes of its people, and its star-spangled banner float in an atmosphere untainted by the breath of bondage.

- 3.—*Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans.* By James Murdock, D. D. Hartford: John W. Wells. 1842. pp. 221.

This small duodecimo volume is a valuable contribution to the history of philosophy. True, there are more extended ones in German and French; but this contains a concise and, we think, correct view of the modern philosophies, especially of Germany. Freedom of thought is the birthright of a Protestant German, and he is apt to exercise it; whether always well or not, is another question. For our own part, we find in them volumes of mysticism beyond our ken, and far too ethereal for this common sense world,—much that is transcendently transcendental. By the way, as Dr. Murdock intimates, there is a distinction between *transcendentism* and *transcendentalism*. The latter is that philosophy which goes beyond the boundaries of sensuous, empirical knowledge; the former that which expatiates in the region of imaginary truth, and goes beyond the entire limits of human knowledge. This is unscientific: that strictly scientific. The school of philosophy, therefore, to which Rev. G. Ripley, Rev. O. A. Brownson, Rev. R. W. Emerson, and others of like tissue belong, is not, properly speaking, the *transcendental*, but the *transcendent*. The latter term should be retained and applied to such: for they are truly *transcendentists*, surpassing in their speculations all the landmarks of knowledge, and running wild and unbridled through the airy domains of fancy.

We can do nothing better to recommend the book than to specify the subjects of the chapters:—Two modes of Philosophizing—Empirical—Metaphysical.—First German Philosophy.—Kant and his Critical Philosophy.—The Critical Philosophy.—Anti-Critical.—Pantheistic.—Instinctive.—French.—German Philosophy in America.—American Transcendentalism.—Philosophy of Dr. Rauch. The last chapter deserves to be well pondered by those who have adopted Dr. R.'s Psychology as a text-book for young men. Its tendency is unquestionably to Hegelism and Pantheism, and to the confusion of all right distinctions in morals.

- 4.—*Manhood, or Scenes from the Past; a series of Poems.* By William Plumer, Jr. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 148.

This is the second volume of a series intended to trace the advance of human life from infancy to old age. The first volume

was devoted to youth, and the third, should it follow, will be on age. The volume is dedicated to John Quincy Adams, attributing to him a special influence in rousing the ardor and directing the genius of the author. Among the portraits of celebrated men, written whilst Mr. Plumer was in Congress, there is one of this same celebrated and honored sage, from which we beg leave to make an extract :

"Thy large and liberal nature comprehends
All interests, rights and duties of mankind :
Cold in the crowd, convivial with thy friends,
Gentle and peaceable, to mirth inclined,
Yet prompt, intrepid, stern, where guilt offends,
Or wrong calls down rebuke ;—thy genius blends
In union rare, the rugged and refined,
The light and lofty ; learning, fancy, skill,
Wisdom to guide and courage to fulfil ;
Courage, not merely of the camp and field,
But nobler far, the rarer courage shown
In halls of state.—that, throwing wide its shield
O'er truth assailed, disdains to fly or yield ;
By hosts beset, yet victor, though alone."

There are also sketches of John Marshall, Wm. Lowndes, John Sergeant, John Randolph, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster.

The thoughts of these poems are generally elevated, the sentiments pure, and the tendency good. Those entitled "The Daughter," "The Boy," "Children," strike us as rich in sentiment. The publishers merit commendation for the style of execution.

5.—*The Christian Citizen. The Obligations of the Christian Citizen, with a Review of High Church Principles in relation to Civil and Religious Institutions. By A. D. Eddy, Newark, N. J. New-York, J. S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 164.*

The thoughts contained in this volume were originally presented, by the Rev. Mr. Eddy, to his congregation, 'on the occasion of the last State Thanksgiving.' They are now published, by request, in an expanded form ; and the reader will discover that the author has not spoken unadvisedly with his lips, but confirmed his own statements by well selected appeals to original authorities.

The former part of the work is appropriated to a consideration of government—in its foundation, its principles, its evils, the mode of correcting them, and the duties incumbent on all Christian citizens in respect to governmental matters. Mr.

E. dwells on the rage of party-spirit, its dangerous tendency, and the necessity of the prevalence of Christian virtue, in order to its counteraction—on the importance of sustaining the supremacy of law, the faithful fulfilment of contracts—and on the duty of selecting men of unimpeached moral integrity as rulers. Here, he by no means advocates a sectarian organization, but contends, rightly, that Christian men of all parties are bound to exercise their political rights, and to throw all their influence into the scale of good morals and good order.

On this point we entirely coincide with him, and we believe that good men could compel all parties to nominate only worthy candidates, by simply saying: "If you select men as candidates, who are wanting in moral integrity, and have no regard for the institutions of Christianity, you must not calculate on our support. We cannot vote for such, because we think them not qualified to administer wholesome government."

The latter part of the volume is occupied with the author's views of High Church principles, their bearing on republican government, and consequently on the proper exercise of Christian citizenship. Of course he enters into the questions of "Divine Right," of "Apostolical Succession," "Liturgies and Forms of Worship," etc. etc.

We think he shows up these High Church claims well, and exposes the tendency of Puseyism as it merits. It was our intention to extract some passages on both branches of the subject, but as we expect a review for our pages, we shall not anticipate that, but close by recommending the book to the serious consideration of all Christian citizens.

6.—*The Advancement of Religion the Claim of the Times.* By Andrew Reed, D.D. With an Introduction, by Gardiner Spring, D.D. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 312.

The Author of this volume is well known to American Christians: nor will his labors of love amongst us soon be forgotten. His books, too, so rich in sentiment and beautiful in diction, have been read by many in this land both with pleasure and profit.

We are glad that he thus speaks to us again, and speaks on topics equally interesting to the church in the United States as in Great Britain—the advancement of religion the claim of the times. What greater, what more important claim! Time never was, perhaps, when the advancement of genuine piety was more needful. But Dr. Reed will portray that much better than we should.

He represents the advancement of religion, as desirable—in the person—by personal effort—in the family—by the ministry—in the church—by the church—in the nation—in the world—and concludes with the certainty and glory of the consummation.

In the first lecture we find the following beautiful and forcible passage: "Religion then, as we have to regard it, is not various, but one. It is not a form, or a ritual, or a creed, or a catechism; but the life of truth and of God in the soul of man. It divides nothing with false religions; and it knows nothing of the divisions which men have sought to fasten on the true. It knows nothing of Arminius, or of Calvin, or of Luther. It is not of Paul, or of Apollos, or of Peter. It is not from Jerusalem, or Rome, or Oxford. It is from heaven; it is one. In the Bible it is one; in Christ it is one, in the Christian it is one, undivided and indivisible. Its simplicity is its sublimity; and both are the clear and indubitable evidence of its divinity." How true, but how little heeded! When will the day appear, in which Christians shall be absorbed in the feeling of their unity with Christ and in Christ!

In these times of God's presence in our churches, Christians and ministers of the gospel will find here many admirable and helpful suggestions.

We wish for the book a large circulation, because it is precisely one of those, which call off the attention of God's people from the world and from the mere framework of Christianity, and direct it to the weightier matters of the gospel, holiness, peace and love.

7.—*Missionary Labors and Scenes in Southern Africa.* By Robert Moffat, twenty-three years an agent of the London Missionary Society on that Continent. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 405.

The review of this work, furnished to the readers of the Eclectic Museum, must have awakened a desire to possess the volume itself. Mr. Carter now offers it to the public, and we doubt not his enterprise will, in this case, be amply repaid. We have Campbell and Phillips on missions to Southern Africa, but we have no book on missionary operations in Africa comparable with this. It is written, indeed, in a plain style, but the narrative of events is stirring, and the scenes through which Mr. Moffat himself passed unusually interesting. He became emphatically all things to all men. As Mr. Campbell says, "To master the language, he wandered the de-

serts with the savage tribes, sharing their perils and privations. He *outdid* Paul in accommodating himself to all men, in order to save some. Paul never became a *savage* in lot, to save savages. Many might, indeed, thus stoop to conquer, but few could retain both their piety and philosophy in such society."

Let those, who would follow the vicissitudes of a hero, read Moffat, and they will see a man who, for Christ's sake, dared dangers the most impending, and entered into conflicts the most severe. There are few men in the world as well qualified to be a missionary to the degraded sons of Africa as the author of this volume. Twenty-three years of his life have already been spent in pouring in light upon the darkness of that benighted land, amid self-denials and toils which scarce any else could endure. Yet he is not weary nor worn out. And God has abundantly rewarded his labors in leading many a poor ignorant African to the foot of the cross, and imparting to him the hope and peace of the gospel.

The mere literary and scientific man, as well as the christian, will find a compensation for the perusal of this work, in the new and strange aspects of human society there presented, and its copious contributions to natural history.

We shall soon begin to feel that there is no better scientific corps abroad on the earth, than the corps of missionaries of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

8.—*The Bible in Spain, or the Journeys, Adventures, and Imprisonments of an Englishman, in an attempt to circulate the Scriptures in the Peninsula.* By George Borrow, author of "*The Gypsies of Spain.*" Philadelphia: James M. Campbell. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1843. pp. 232.

This is an extraordinary book of an extraordinary man. Mr. Borrow's *Zincali* met with great acceptance, and was read with great avidity; but this surpasses even that in interest. In style it is vigorous and easy; in narrative, minute, veracious, and vivacious; in adventure, of the deepest, most animated interest; and altogether an exceedingly captivating volume.

Like Moffat of Africa, Mr. Borrow in Spain mixed with almost every class, and passed through almost all sorts of scenes. He talked and associated with gypsies, robbers, priests, and ministers: you can find him in the forest, the field, the posada, the hut, the pulace, the prison; and everywhere the same sincere, good-natured, honest, decided man.

On his way to the prison at Madrid, crossing the court where others had suffered before him, he bethought him thus: "Here am I—I who have done more to wound Popery than all the poor Christian martyrs that ever suffered in this accursed square,—here am I, merely sent to prison, from which I am sure to be liberated in a few days with credit and applause. Pope of Rome! I believe you as malicious as ever, but you are sadly deficient in power. You are become paralytic, Batuscha! and your club has degenerated into a crutch."

Now hear his description of a young American, a native of South Carolina: "His appearance was remarkable: he was low of stature; exceedingly slightly made; his features were pale but well formed; he had a magnificent head of crispy black hair, and as superb a pair of whiskers of the same color as I ever beheld. He wore a white hat, with broad brim, and particularly shallow crown, and was dressed in a light yellow gingham frock, striped with black, and ample trousers of calico: in a word his appearance was altogether queer and singular." He then proceeds to relate the young man's conversation with "a man of the rock," on the subject of slavery, which is quite amusing, but we cannot transfer it to our pages.

- 9.—*The Works of President Edwards, in four volumes. A Reprint of the Worcester Edition, with valuable additions, and a copious general Index.* New-York: Jonathan Leavitt and John F. Trow. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1843.

We think the publishers have done a good deed in offering to the public the complete works of Jonathan Edwards. Some of his Treatises and his Life have been published separately: but the rising ministry will be thankful for the opportunity of enriching their shelves with a reprint of the Worcester Edition of his Works complete. And now is a propitious period for the sale of them, when so many are talking and writing about his philosophical opinions, especially on the Will.

Whatever may be thought of the truth of his views on this subject, it will ever remain an indisputable fact, that he had a giant mind, and that few could equal him in argument. The man, who intends to read his treatise on the Will, must make up his mind beforehand to bend down his powers to the subject, and give it an undivided attention. No superficial thinker can master him, or even hope to understand him. Many probably have misapprehended him, and attributed to him the faults of their own misapprehension.

Yet, the probability is that President Edwards has laid him-

self open to objection by an occasional, at least apparent, inconsistency. But instead of expressing opinions or entering into discussion in this necessarily brief notice, our readers will accept a statement of the general subjects treated in the four volumes. Vol. I. Memoirs of President Edwards—Farewell Sermon—Concerning Qualifications for Communion—Reply to Rev. Solomon Williams—History of the Work of Redemption—Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God—Observations on Important Doctrines—Account of the Life of David Brainerd.—Vol. II. Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will—The End for which God created the World—On the Nature of True Virtue—Doctrine of Original Sin Defended—Divine Decrees in General and Election in Particular—Efficacious Grace—Concerning Faith.—Vol. III. Religious Affections—Surprising Conversions—On the Revival in New England—Explicit Agreement in Extraordinary Prayer—Perseverance of Saints—Pre-existence of Christ's Human Soul—Mysteries of Scripture—On Particular Passages of Scripture—Theological Questions—Six Occasional Sermons.—Vol. IV. Forty Sermons on Various Subjects.

10.—*Puseyism Examined.* By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D. D., author of the "*History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.*" Introductory Notice of the Author, by Robert Baird. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 79.

Dr. Merle, so well known, through his History of the Reformation, again appears before us in this small treatise, as the advocate of a spiritual religion, expressing itself in a few instituted forms, and resting on the basis of justification by faith. The times demand it, as there is a manifest tendency, in certain quarters, to return to the bondage of rites and ceremonies, and bury a crucified Christ in external pomp. How truly does Dr. Merle say: "Man always seeks to return, in some way, to a human salvation; this is the source of the innovations of Rome and of Oxford. The substitution of the Church for Jesus Christ is that which essentially characterizes these opinions. It is no longer Christ who enlightens, Christ who saves, Christ who forgives, Christ who commands, Christ who judges; it is the Church, and always the Church, that is to say, an assembly of sinful men, as weak and prone to err as ourselves. 'They have taken away the Lord, and we know not where they have laid him.'"

The whole lecture merits the attention of the church. It is written in a vigorous style, and well sustains the three great

principles of Christianity. "The Word of God, ONLY"—"The Grace of God, ONLY"—"The work of the Spirit, ONLY."

Dr. Baird, in his Introduction, has made us better acquainted with this defender of the faith than we were before: for which our thanks are due.

11.—*Thoughts for the Thoughtful.* By Old Humphrey. New-York: Robert Carter, 1843. pp. 240.

Old Humphrey paid us a visit in our January No., and we are right glad to see him again amongst us. He is an old man, he says, but seems to possess, notwithstanding, much of the sprightliness and activity of youth. He was once a soldier, we believe, then a merchant, now retired from business, to spend his latter days in doing good—imitating his divine Redeemer in conveying cups of cold water to the parched lips of the poor and thirsty. His "Thoughts" will live after him, and be doing good to others in inciting them to go and do likewise, when he shall be resting from his earthly labors in the paradise of God.

"Thoughts for the Thoughtful" begins with "A Sweet Spirit," intended briefly to illustrate and enforce the cultivation of a spirit much needed in this sinning world—that of kindness, forbearance, charity. If any Christian is murmuring, let him read "The Broken Thread." If any is comfortably housed in a warm, quiet home, on a cold, stormy night, let him read "Sympathy for Sailors." Is any given to fault-finding, he may read "The too hasty Reproof." Does any one too readily yield to indolence, let him read, "Have you wound up the Clock?" If Old Humphrey should take up his "stump of a pen" again, we hope Mr. Carter will not fail to let us know it.

12.—*Greenwood Cemetery and other Poems.* By Joseph L. Chester. New-York: Saxton and Miles: Boston: Saxton, Pierce & Co. 1843. pp. 132.

Mr. Chester's Dedication—"To his Wife, (not knowing a better friend,) the author dedicates this book," speaks well for his heart and for the sweets of his domestic life. It is kindly and becoming. And this is not the solitary beauty of the book. There is poetry in it: some charming. "Greenwood Cemetery" is beautifully conceived and delightfully executed: and he that reads it will wish to see the spot itself, and might well say with the author: "Already am I half in

love with Death." But while the body shall repose in so enchanting and peaceful a retreat, ought not the spirit that leaves it there, to be breathing the pure atmosphere of heaven, that it may be fitted to await its resurrection from a resting-place so sweetly charming? There is sweet poetry in the "Spirit's Communings"—"The Warrior's Prayer"—"The Motherless," and others are emanations of genius.

Nor must we forget to say that the publishers have "got up" the book in a beautiful style, for which, we trust, they will be appropriately compensated.

- 13.—*History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789, to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.* By Archibald Alison, F. R. S. E. Advocate. In four volumes. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1842.

We are indebted to the enterprising publishers for Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, of this interesting and valuable work. We could wish that their presses were exclusively appropriated to works of a similar character, at least to such as would not exercise an unhappy influence on the rising generation. We must say, whilst we rejoice in *very much* which they have done, we cannot but regret that, perhaps inadvertently, they have permitted some things to go out endorsed with their names, the tendency of which is far from wholesome.

Of their Alison's History, we spoke favorably in our Jan. No., and we can only repeat our belief that, notwithstanding its errors, it is one of the most elegant and useful histories extant. With No. 5, commences the second volume: the whole to be completed in four, each comprising as many numbers, 16 in all, at 25 cents each, or four dollars for the entire work.

- 14.—*The Apostacy predicted by Saint Paul.* By Mortimer O'Sullivan, D. D., Rector of Killyman. Part First and Part Second. Dublin: William Curry, jun. & Company. London: Longman, Orne & Co. pp. 340.

This is a work sent to us from beyond the Atlantic, and we thank the donor for it. It is timely; but its chief recommendation to us is, that the first part is entirely expended on a consideration of the precise *language* of the prophecies, as the true and only basis on which correct interpretation can rest. The sense of Scripture is distinguished from the signification of comments, which things are too often confounded.

These essays were originally called forth by lectures of Dr.

Todd, who maintains the literalist view of the prophecies of Paul in 2 Thess. 2: 3—12; 1 Tim. 4: 1—3. Dr. O'Sullivan contends,—and builds his argument on critical analysis and comparison—that neither the Romanist's nor Literalist's interpretation is warranted by a proper view of the passages under consideration, but that what he calls the "Protestant" view is the correct one—that which applies these predictions to the Papacy. We think he shows, with great force, that the attributes of the predicted apostacy are all found in the Papacy, and that they cannot be assigned to any other "falling away," either past or future.

The argument is dignified, generous, lucid, and forceful.

There are many passages we should be pleased to transfer, but must be content with one which we find under the exposition of "forbidding to marry." It is a quotation from an anonymous article in the *Dublin University Magazine*, Nov. 1841, p. 597, written by a Roman Catholic priest, who has given his name to the editor:

"I would most strongly urge on the attention of the rulers of our church—the rescinding of the law of clerical celibacy. I am, as I before stated, 'in the sear and yellow leaf,' and would have little to gain by this change; and I am fully aware that even one sentence spoken or written on this or any other subject may have an influence to be felt at the end of time. Well, then, in the presence of that God who is yet to judge me, I make, after the maturest judgment, the following declaration, which I wish should be proclaimed through the world:—The law of the Roman Catholic church which obliges our clergymen to live single—no matter what advantages may be ascribed to it, I believe to be one which has at all times wrought, and still works, incalculable mischief. It is my unalterable conviction that this rule is, and has ever been, productive of sins most offensive to the Almighty; and that the Lord has often poured out his wrath upon the nations in consequence of those offences against him, which I should almost say have followed necessarily from this unnatural restriction. I have experienced the evils of this system in myself. Many things have I heard of priests in this country, and in other countries, which I did not and do not believe, for taking all things into account they are more moral than what they got credit for; but enough have I known, enough have I heard on unquestionable authority to convince me, forever, that this law has done immense harm in the church, and that the sooner it be removed the better. I believe that no clergy-

man of ours could employ himself better than by seeking through all means in his power to procure its repeal; and finally, I do declare in the presence of Him in whose hands is my lot, by whose indulgence I breathe, and am enabled to pen these lines, that I would be willing at this moment, or at any other moment, to lay down my life in defence and in confirmation of this my opinion.

"The rule of clerical celibacy ought to be rescinded. Time and custom are no arguments for its continuance. The tyranny of zeal was necessary formerly. Rude society should be struck with terror and astonishment in order to effect any great change. The mind of Europe, of the world, has since changed: and in my internal conscience I do believe there never was any law in the church, whose repeal would produce such holiness in the ministers of God. I think our church would be now as much raised in public estimation by the repeal of the law as it was heretofore advanced by its establishment."

15.—*The New Englander*, Vol. I. Number I, January 1843.

This is a new Quarterly, set on foot at New Haven, under the editorial conduct of Rev. E. R. Tyler, aided by a number of highly respectable contributors. Its design is to occupy a field of free and fearless review in the literary world. "Its conductors will utter their own opinions at their own discretion. And if the circulation of the work, conducted on such principles, does not show that there is a demand for it on the part of the public, the undertaking will of course be abandoned." "It will be found on the side of order, of freedom, of progress, of simple and spiritual Christianity, and of the Bible as the infallible, sufficient and only authority in religion." The present No. contains some sprightly and profitable articles, and, if the times permit, the undertaking will doubtless succeed. Why should it not? We cannot but be obliged to the conductors for saying: "That the American Biblical Repository is an honor to the American name." "No well furnished library of a clergyman can be without it." "We heartily commend it to scholars in every profession."

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

We have also received from the same publishers, Parts III. and IV. of "*Brande's Encyclopædia of Science, Literature, and Arts*," which has been already twice noticed in the Repository.

Mr. Carter has sent us his cheap form of *D'Aubigné's History of the Reformation*, ninth edition. Three volumes, bound, for one dollar. It contains all the notes, and is as perfect as the first edition, except in the style of getting up. It was well thus to bring it within reach of all. The first edition was abridged at length.

A Manual on the Christian Sabbath, embracing a consideration of its Perpetual Obligation, Change of Day, Utility and Duties. By John Holmes Agnew, (former Professor of Languages, Washington College, Washington, Pa. Third edition.) Philadelphia: W. S. Young. N. York: Robert Carter. 1842.

It would ill become us to say, any thing of this Manual, except that it was originally delivered in a course of Lectures to the Students of Washington College, and, at their request, committed to the press. The only wish of the author is, that it may promote the sanctification of the Lord's Day. He has no manner of peculiar interest in it.

Capital Punishment. The Argument of Rev. George B. Cheever, in reply to J. L. O'Sullivan, Esq., in the Broadway Tabernacle, on the Evenings of January 27th, and February 3d and 17th. New York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1843. pp. 108.

This Argument, as it merited, is published in a very neat style, with paper-cover: so that while it is cheap, it is also readily readable. There is contained in it a body of argument, both on the biblical and expediency-question, which will require more logic than most men possess to overthrow. The question ought to be settled by it, and, we think, would be, if men yielded to their honest convictions.

Our Country safe from Romanism. A Sermon delivered at the opening of the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia, at its sessions in the Western Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, April, 1841. By Rev. Thomas Brainerd. L. R. Bailey, printer. 1843. pp. 45.

Mr. Brainerd contends: 1. That the political influence of Romanism in North America and elsewhere has greatly waned in the last century. 2. The relative proportion of Romanists to the Protestant population of this country, furnishes no ground of alarm. 3. The moral power of Romanism in

this country does not so transcend our evangelical agencies as to justify alarm. IV. This country, with its present characteristics, furnishes extraordinary and inexorable obstacles to the controlling prevalence of Romanism. Inferences: (1.) If there is no imminent danger, we should be careful not to give Romanists the benefit of such an assumption. (2.) If no cause of fear, then it is unwise, as well as unkind, to employ our influence in denouncing the Romanists.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Russia.

In St. Petersburg, for 1843, seventy German, fifty-one French and twenty-one English journals are allowed to circulate. In Wilna the list includes 192 in all; 104 German, 69 French, 19 English. The number of periodicals in Russia is annually increasing. Fifty-four new ones already announced for 1843; some of which are German, French, English and Polish.

Germany.

Prof. Lepsius is now in Egypt, under commission from his Prussian Majesty, at the head of an expedition of architects, modellers, and artists, for the purpose of further investigations into the antiquities of Egypt.

Dr. Hermann of Marburg has been appointed ordinary professor in the Philosophical Faculty at Göttingen.—Dr. Otto Jahn of Kiel has accepted an extraordinary professorship of Philology and Archaeology in the University of Greifswalde.—At Leipzig W. A. Becker has been appointed professor of Classical Antiquity.—Who is to succeed Gesenius at Halle is uncertain. Hupfeld of Marburg has been written to on the subject. Guericke, author of a Manual on Church History, has published an Introduction to the New Testament.—The first volume of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms, announced in our last number, has appeared: and Tholuck promises a practical commentary on the same.—Umbreit's Jeremiah has also appeared.—Professor Ficht has been transferred from Bonn to Tübingen; and Prof. Ewald has left the faculty of Philosophy for that of Theology.—Havernick, a pupil and friend of Tholuck and Hengstenberg, has met with much opposition in his post, as professor of Oriental Languages, at Königsberg. Von Bohlen, his predecessor, was a rationalist of the muddiest water, and many of the class demanded another like him. Havernick was at first almost deserted;

but the skies begin to wear a calmer aspect, and Hävernicks will probably maintain his position.—Ast, author of the *Lexicon Platonicum*, died at Munich, on the last day of last year. The Universities of Tübingen and Leipzig have received from the directors of the East India Company seventeen works on oriental literature, principally in the Sanscrit.—Of new books in Germany, we have Flügel's Concordance of the Koran. H. E. G. Paulus's Exegetical Manual on the first three Evangelists, announced in our last number. Erdmann's History of Philosophy.—The *Codex Rescriptus* of Ephraem Syrus, of the sixth century, deciphered by a chemical process, is now in press at Leipzig.—The society at Stuttgard for the republication of old works, is publishing the earliest chronicle known to exist, written in German; date 1360.

France.

Professor Liebig has been appointed corresponding member in the Chemical section of the Royal Academy of Sciences.—Count Leon de Laborde, author of a Commentary on the Bible, succeeds his father as a member of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres.—Abulfeda's Arabic Geography, translated by M. Reinaud, is about to be published. A catalogue of Silvestre de Sacy's library, in 3 vols., has appeared.—Messrs. Didot will publish a new edition of R. Stephens's Latin Thesaurus.

Greece.

The Polytechnic School flourishes. The names of 460 applicants for admission are recorded. Prof. Fournet, of Lyons, has presented it with a very valuable collection of minerals.

England.

Dr. Tattam has secured to England between two and three hundred Syriac MSS., on vellum, of the greatest age and interest.—The same gentleman is editing the Scriptures in Coptic and Arabic, the Arabic of which is to be corrected at Cairo from the best MSS. in the country.

United States.

Allen, Morrill and Wardwell, of Andover, will publish Kähler's "School Grammar of the Greek Language," translated by B. B. Edwards, and S. H. Taylor. This will be a valuable acquisition for our students of Greek.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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VOL. X. NOS. XIX., XX.—WHOLE NOS. LI., LII.

NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED FOR THE PROPRIETOR BY E. LITTELL,
OFFICE OF THE REPOSITORY AND OF THE ECLECTIC MUSEUM OF FOREIGN LITERATURE,
NO. 236 BROADWAY.

BOSTON:

SAXTON AND PIERCE, 133 $\frac{1}{2}$ WASHINGTON-STREET.

LONDON:

WILEY AND PUTNAM, 35 PATERNOSTER ROW.

1843.

ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843, by
J. H. A G N E W,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern
District of New-York.

JOHN F TROW, PRINTER.
33 ANN-STREET,
NEW-YORK.

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THE
AMERICAN
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

JULY, 1843.

SECOND SERIES, NO. XIX. WHOLE NO. LI.

ARTICLE I.

PUNISHMENT, ITS NATURE AND DESIGN.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE subsequent article, from one who is familiar with the origin, history and operation of law, will commend itself to the thoughtful and philanthropic portion of the community. In our estimation, exhibiting as it does our own views, it is worth its weight in gold. We hope every reader of the Repository will be deeply imbued with its principles, and we commend it to the attention of editors of weekly papers for extracts, in order that through their more extended influence, the public mind may be called to consider this all-important subject.—What is to become of us as a people; what are to be the consequences to our children, if the perpetrator of crime shall so awaken the sympathies of mankind, that in the morbid tenderness of their feelings for him, they shall forget altogether how much the general weal of society depends on the prompt infliction of proper penalties on the violators of wholesome law? Ed.

THE most important concern of the State, is its Criminal Jurisprudence. Peace and order, the security of person and property, life and its incidents, in great measure, depend upon it. We sleep in safety through its guardianship; we go abroad without peril through its protection; multitudes feel no other

restraint. The abandoned and the brutal acting out their wills, inflicting death, outraging person, robbing property, invading the dead hour of night and making its darkness and repose the facility of wickedness and means of terror, our houses ceasing to be our protection, in the power of burglars with us and all our comforts at their mercy, some suffering, all alarmed, are instances of the criminal law having failed of its first and most valuable office, the prevention of crime; are proofs of the inadequacy of its sanctions. To these may be added a long and foul list of forgeries, cheats and embezzlements, carrying ruin to the unsuspecting, and filching from widows and orphans, from the aged and dependent, bread.

But important as Criminal Jurisprudence is in this view, in another aspect it is of more weighty consideration. It affords the instruction under which the estimate of crime is made, and forms the common mind upon the subject. How shall a particular act be regarded? Is it criminal? Is it flagitious or venial? Is it scandalous or creditable? Is the commission of it imputed with infamy to the malefactor, branding its perpetrator with that character, or is it set down as the excusable failing or positive trait of a man of honor, not diminishing his respectability? To these questions the answers of the community will be in accordance with the criminal law and its administration.

There are, then, two objects of criminal jurisprudence;—the first is, to secure the community from injury by deterring the unprincipled and wicked from the commission of crime through dread of its punishment:—the second, to produce a just moral estimate, connecting crime and infamy, so that the unprincipled with any remains of self-respect or love of character, will not hazard the ignominy, and those yet untainted, and especially the youth in their training, shall receive proper impression, and be imbued with right sentiment with respect to acts of moral obliquity; making the thought of guilt revolting, and the mind to shudder and shrink at a suggestion of it.

The events of the time are sorrowful evidence, that there is relaxation of criminal law in efficacy both for restraining crime, and for instilling moral sentiments rendering the mind incapable of base purposes. It is deplorable to see the extent and extremity of suffering produced by crime, but more deplorable to notice the persons who are the criminals. The daily press, presentations of grand juries, the conversation of all neighborhoods, have for their common topics, want and woe spread through

society by the flagitious conduct of men who still more pitiable, have carried infamy into circles where we should expect nothing but unsullied purity, and where a good name should be of priceless value. Foul deeds, from ruffian violence upon life, through the black catalogue of arson, rape, burglary, theft, and swindling of every degree and contrivance, are common occurrences; and while from the halls of justice a voice proclaiming the fearful increase of crime, is sounding in our ears, the executive informs us, that there is a morbid sympathy with offenders interposing between crime and punishment. It is time for the community to take this subject into their serious consideration: we say *their* serious consideration; that the MEMBERS of the community shall investigate this subject so as to form positive opinions upon it as a practical matter most nearly concerning them. There are some men whose observation and judgment give intrinsic value to their conclusions, who say, that this subject of criminal jurisprudence has been wholly under the direction of notionists in philanthropy; that these notionists coming forward with gratuitous service, in organized and imposing forms, have arrested and played upon the superficial ear with sentimental refinement, and with the assent of the public always pleased to be relieved from duty, taking this subject under their own management, in effect have provided a substitute for punishment, which neither deters from guilt nor makes it abhorrent, and have schooled the common mind into aversion not to the commission of crime but to the condemnation of it. When has there been a murder with more aggravating circumstances than that of Adams by Colt? Yet the periodical, highest in political standing and probably most powerful in our country, represents Colt as the sufferer of vindictive vengeance, and arraigns all before whom his cause came in legal proceeding as its guilty inflictors. The law and its tribunals are condemned: the murderer justified. How much is there of this!—the law prostrated before the malefactor: the tide of sympathy sustaining the offender; justice down-trodden. In one paper we read the presentment of a grand jury, solemnly protesting, that pardons are so readily granted, that the administration of criminal law is a useless expense; in another, we have the message of the governor, the liberal dispenser of these pardons, deploring the relaxation of criminal justice, and complaining, that the court and jury convicting and sentencing one day, recommend to mercy and remission the next.

That there is fault somewhere in relation to this subject, all assert. The prevailing delinquency is shocking. It comes too near us. Where we have been best satisfied of integrity and religion, where the circle of family and friends has been of unstained honor, we are amazed with the astounding intelligence of deep and shameful guilt, involving the victims in ruin and distress, the perpetrators in wretchedness and infamy, all taking place where there was the fullest confidence of prosperity and honor. If property only were affected, if the only consequences were the rich made poor, the affluent reduced to beggary, and widows and orphans, the aged and dependent deprived of the support anxiously provided by the self-denying and frugal foresight of husbands and fathers, or their own stinted savings, it might be endured; but the wreck of innocence, of character, of moral worth is startling: it is a state of things not to be endured: the order of society will be reversed, and the profligate and abandoned form the public morals, direct the legislation, and control the administration and execution of the laws.

There is fault somewhere:—fault of no trifling nature, but debauching the common morals, and jeopardizing the common safety.

Where is this fault? Certainly not in the severity of the laws. The advocates of clemency have been left to institute and perfect their own systems according to their own projects. They differ concerning the merit of these systems, and say hard things. The feature common to their systems is confinement to labor; but some require this confinement to be solitary, while others allow the convicts to do their prescribed work in company, but in silence. More clemency is not suggested except by a class of philosophers, who assert, that the word "punishment" is a brutal, savage expression irreconcilable with humanity, and insist, that the idea and the term ought to be expunged from thought and language. They argue, that crime is the result of diseased or perverted mind; that it can no more be charged upon any one than sickness or insanity; that where there is blame, it rests upon society for suffering the infection that corrupts innocence; and that the least that can be done is to provide hospitals to receive those who transgress the laws, and cure them of this malady. This doctrine has been expounded and enforced by a distinguished and popular lecturer, and received with no inconsiderable approbation. There is plausible reason for holding it to be the carrying out to its just

results of the principle of the prevailing systems ; an advanced position in the line in which these systems are the first stage. At present, however, the public mind is not prepared for this advance ; and it will not be pretended, that the relaxation of criminal justice, is chargeable to the severity of the laws. The only corporal punishment retained in our prevailing codes is that of death for wilful murder. The argument for this has been, that the law should make ruthless violence upon human life dreadful, and put forth its highest sanction to restrain vindictive malice and raging passion from gratifying their thirst of blood. But even this corporal punishment retained in this extreme case for this high purpose, is giving way before the principle which has rejected all others.

May we not then be allowed to inquire, whether the fault is not in the lenity of the laws ? The mere suggestion of such an inquiry raises the cry, "brutal," "savage;" but the times call for it, and no nervous sensitiveness to harsh epithets should hinder or prevent it. Mercy is a noble and exalted virtue : pity and commiseration may be weaknesses : when apparently amiable and seeming to proceed from pious feeling, they are not unfrequently immoral weaknesses, the workings of an artificial and morbid sentimentality. Sympathy with the convict in his guilt is both weak and wicked ; the most merciful of beings is the most inflexibly just. But upon the sight of a malefactor enduring bodily suffering for crime, no matter how ruffian or base, the energy of virtue through infirmity of depraved nature dissolves in sympathy ; and we absurdly misconstrue this failure of virtue, into virtue itself. In this way our laws have been framed, with the eye upon the suffering of the convict undergoing sentence, kindling into indignation because looking upon the punishment only, and seeking for the amelioration of it. In consequence, the laws are destitute of the truth and sternness requisite to exhibit crime and moral obliquity in their true character, and associate them with their just retributions. The natural result is the relaxation of moral principle ; the conscience becomes torpid ; there is a want of sensibility to personal guilt, settling into indifference. Every person of observation who will examine this subject experimentally or speculatively, by the common experiences of life or the true principles of philosophy, without affectation, will come to this conclusion. In the experience of the writer of this article, in cases of great criminality, astonishing when we consider the

standing of the offenders, it has not been practicable to produce in them any proper sense of their guilt; their minds will not receive the impression of the heinousness of their conduct; but they are impervious to the truth. We believe, there is the same reason, why such persons apparently with so little hesitation deeply implicate themselves in crime, and why they cannot be made sensible of the flagitiousness of their guilt.

The criminal law is the highest and most authoritative instruction upon the subject of crime. Moral philosophy is theory; it is reading, very good reading, and that is its principal use: "plays round the head, but comes not near the heart." The criminal law is practical; it comes home to all that is susceptible about us. The penalties it annexes are the standard of guilt. This law is learned in the operations and converse of society; it is a part of the moral light, received as readily as the light of day. Men become familiar with it without perceiving how: it enters with the first rudiments of knowledge, is incorporated with the first opinions and sentiments, and makes a part of the intellectual structure. According to the representation of crime in the criminal law of a community, and the standard of its guilt in the penalty prescribed for it, will be the opinions, sentiments and principles in that community: in their estimation such is the character of crime, and the degree of its guilt. This is not merely just reasoning; it is confirmed by experience. Many years ago the law, in a certain region of our country, prescribed for adultery corporal punishment, of which a part was to sit on the gallows an hour with a rope round the neck. A citizen in that region, of superior ability, wealth, popularity, and prospects, of general upright deportment, was detected in adultery. He was ruined; denounced by unanimous opinion, he fled his state. In another region, about that time, a citizen, to explain facts tending to raise a suspicion against him of a particular offence, publicly confessed to the fact of adultery. The writer then resident in the former region, well recollects his own amazement, and that of all with whom he was conversant, at a man's voluntarily acknowledging such guilt. It was deemed of far deeper turpitude, than that involved in the suspicion. Subsequently in another region, where the penalty for adultery was one hundred dollars to be recovered in an action of debt, the writer learned how little was to be apprehended from the imputation of it. Yet the writer has no doubt, that the actual suffering because of adultery in the first

mentioned region, great as it was in the single case, was far less than in the last mentioned, where the law throwing no restraint, the evils of indulgence were more frequently experienced, producing no small amount of sorrow and ruin.

Upon what principle has our criminal law been framed, and the vital part of it, the punishments, determined? We have before mentioned, what all observers of events must have remarked, that the community, to be freed from the burden of this subject, have suffered it to pass into the hands of philanthropists, who have undertaken it gratuitously for the sake of making their improvements. The subject is perplexing and painful; and society seems willing to enter upon any experiment to avoid what is man's, as well as God's, strange work—punishing man. The principle of the improvement introduced, looks to the malefactor as the prominent object, and requires as the main end to be answered, his reformation. As results of this, he must not be pained by bodily suffering; for this is “brutal,” “savage”: nor must he be marked with ignominy; for this would destroy his self-respect essential to reformation. In the outset, however, these philanthropists fall into the error of judging of the feelings of the culprit by their own, and of supposing that the same things will affect him and them in the same manner. This is a common error: the refined and sensitive shudder at the thought of inflictions which the hardened criminal would scarcely feel, and are well nigh convulsed in agony with imagining infamy to which he would be utterly indifferent. Such is the process of vice through which he passes to conviction of crime, so depraving are the influences to which he subjects himself, so conversant is his life with hardship and wickedness, that he is callous and obdurate. It has been found in the experience of penitentiaries, in cases of release by pardon, that convicts can feign penitent feeling, tender affection and good resolution so as to gain full credit, with so little change of principle, that their first step of liberty is into their former course of wickedness, proving themselves, under all their specious demeanor, radically corrupt. We by no means assert, that there is no reformation in penitentiaries. We have rejoiced over one prominent case. But that case is not an argument against capital punishment, and does not properly belong to the view we are now taking. There may be, we presume there are, other cases; but we are confident that all who have reflected upon this matter, or who will turn their attention to the candid

examination of it, will sustain us in saying that they who have been disposed to make the most of this part of the subject, have used a great many more words than they have adduced facts to frame their argument.

This philanthropy is not only mistaken in investing the culprit with the refinement and sensibility of its advocates, who would be more deeply affected by an unkind word, than he with the pillory; but it is in greater error in becoming so absorbed with his reformation as to lose sight entirely of the proper means to preserve the innocent from guilt. There is obviously something else to be cared for besides the criminal and his comfort, some other concern than merely to contrive how light we can make the penalty of his transgression. He has cast behind his back every consideration that forbade the flagitious purpose of his lawless will: he has trampled, with entire disregard of social duty, upon the comforts, rights and safety of others: it seems inequitable, in providing punishment for his offence, to act upon this same disregard of what is due to the worthy part of society, and look only for what will be lenient to him. We recur then to the proper objects of criminal jurisprudence, and take the position, that instead of the criminal's comfort and reformation being the first concern, they are the last: the first being to produce such an estimate and consequent sentiment of abhorrence of crime in the common mind, that the thought of it shall be loathsome, infamy inseparable from its image: the second, to make such sensible impression of pain and ignominy upon the wicked and unprincipled as to deter them from hazarding the consequence of crime: and the last, so far as consistent with most effectually securing these results, the comfort and reformation of the offender. We disclaim all cruelty; we reject sanguinary laws as defeating their own purpose; but we do not take either our standard or our definition of cruelty or sanguinary laws from persons who have trained themselves to be shocked, and cry "brutal," "savage," at a punishment which the wisest of men, by the pen of inspiration, prescribes for a child (Prov. 19: 18; 23: 13, 14; 13: 24). Crime is brutal, is infamous. The office of law is to make it appear what it is, by punishment stamped with its own character. We do not allow to the men who, under the name of mitigating punishment, frustrate this its proper end, their claim to peculiar benevolence. Is it benevolence so to frame the criminal law, that it is lenient in its restraints upon those

who, regardless alike of mercy and justice, exercise cruelty upon the defenceless, robbery upon the unprotected, knavery upon the confiding, and spoliation upon property, notwithstanding all the precaution that can be used for its security? Especially is it benevolent, so to frame this law, as to make no adequate impression upon those whose minds are forming under its influence of the heinousness of crime, of the sternness of justice, but on the contrary, to imbue them with moral principles so loose that they fall before common temptations into the grossest delinquencies, and then plead, in unfeigned simplicity, that they have done nothing very wrong? Who would not desire to have the salutary impression of punishment, marked with suffering and infamy, upon the mind of his child to deter him from guilt, rather than the influence of this alleviated system which, pervaded with sympathy for criminals, makes easy the descent to crime and impairs the sense of its degradation, but nevertheless, in a manner suited to the taste of speculative refinement equally effects the ruin of its victim? In the first case the parent might enjoy a child worthy and honorable: in the last a malefactor leniently treated by law. We have no taste for this lenity, and no esteem for the benevolence that exercises it. We do not deny, we fully admit, that men of the purest benevolence and most exalted worth, have been, and are zealously engaged in projects for mitigating punishment of crime. What we say is, that what they have done or are doing, may not be benevolent in an enlarged and just view of the subject; for we do not dispute the benevolence of particular cases of mitigation. But we further say, that many who have been zealous in this system of alleviation, and are now zealous in it, are mere notionists in benevolence. The man of energy, who to prevent crime, prescribes law to make it painful and infamous, has tenfold more true sympathy with his race. The energy of his character arises from strong feeling. Refined sentimentality, the great element of much benevolence, often consists of mere description; told in words, represented in picture, exhibiting its own contrast in matter of fact. Sterne, if not the father, the successful fosterer, of this sentimentality, was cruel even in the tenderest relations of man. Robespierre distinguished himself by a treatise against capital punishment; we next see him the bloodiest butcher of the French revolution. Lebon, the commissioner of the National Convention at Arras in the reign of terror, was constrained to pass a capital sentence by the threat

of a dungeon : he rioted in carnage : he was tried, condemned and beheaded for his indiscriminate and inhuman massacre of men, women and children. But for this accidental drawing out of character Robespierre and Lebon would have had their distinguished place among the benevolent mitigators of criminal law.

We may then take the position, that those who advocate lenient retribution for crime, have no just claim to exclusive refinement and mercy. Indiscriminate and sensitive leniency may consist with personal cruelty of disposition as manifested in the men referred to, and unless tempered by practical intelligence and wisdom, instead of being excited by morbid sentimentality, will issue in calamity to the community. What can be more calamitous, than that person and property should be unsafe, our houses insecure, our careful investments for the weak and dependent in jeopardy, through lawless and unrestrained violence, plundering, and embezzlement, unless it be the exposure of our children and friends to be corrupted in principle so as to have no sensitiveness against crime, and be liable in the common courses of life to involve themselves in its turpitude and ruin ?

Observation of the criminal jurisprudence of other countries, their execution of criminal justice learned in the pages of their history, and the reflections naturally arising strengthened by treatises written and efforts made in those countries for reforming this branch of their polity, are productive of much error upon this subject in its relation to this country. In the old world the criminal law is indeed cruel and sanguinary. In England, a few years ago, one hundred and sixty offences were felonies of death without benefit of clergy. With regard to their punishment, Blackstone remarks : "Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English reader and honor to the English law, to compare it with the shocking apparatus of death and torment to be met with in the criminal codes of almost every nation of Europe." It is no wonder, therefore, that in those countries complaint is made of cruel punishments ; and that the kindly properties of our nature are appealed to, to interpose for their amelioration. Besides, these punishments are aggravated often by being vindictive, the dictate of personal malice, for political offences not unfrequently acts of pure patriotism, and the sufferers the noble, the worthy, the accomplished, the beautiful—Sidney, Russel, Jane Grey,

Mary of Scotland. Views of this subject in other countries, have no application to these United States. But our philanthropy must have food; and our philanthropists must be indulged in the same luxury of sentiment and the same fervency of eloquence: and taking our criminal codes for their subject, they have well-nigh divested crime of every thing infamous and dreadful, making it to be pitied as misfortune rather than frowned upon as wickedness. We should consider, that what is just opinion with respect to the criminal codes of other nations, is prejudice in our favored land. We have most sparingly provided capital punishment: only for most atrocious offences, and now rarely allowed except for the highest of all, murder. In our states, punishment can fall only upon determined, wilful violators of law. The jury-trial, public sympathy, the all powerful voice of public opinion, are the safeguard of all others. We know no political offences; we merely see how carefully they are defined on our statute-books, and how fully our people are protected with respect to them. We have no high dignitaries who can imbue the laws or their administration with their malevolence. In our dispensing of penal justice, nothing weighs against the accused but the public consideration; the weights that unbalance justice, are all on his side.

There is another view of this subject which ought to be taken, with great deliberation, in this country. Russia, the first of nations to abolish capital punishment, is a severe and cruel government. It is the kind and circumstances of punishment in the particular case, that constitute cruelty. The persons who are the subjects, their number and condition; the crimes for which it is inflicted, freedom of thought, hasty or misconstrued expressions; the dreary desolation to which they are consigned, from affluence, ease, noble station, family endearments, to hopeless banishment in regions of ice and famine, without a comfort, to endure the pains of personal wretchedness, and the anguish of the wretchedness of all they love. Such is the extolled mercy of this iron power. In Russia, where government is strong, and the principles of its strength inherent, a despotism, it is the course of wisdom as well as mercy to labor to mitigate its rigors, relieve from its hard bearings, and lighten its oppressions; but in these United States, where government being the common voice, having no power but that spontaneously conferred for common safety dependent upon the variable humors of public sentiment, is necessarily weak, the

same course, which in Russia is as useful as it is humanizing, is public cruelty, enervating what is already too relaxed, and breaking down the defences, at best too difficult to be kept up, of social order and personal security. Our whole system of polity is so constructed as to require the aid of public sentiment, and in nothing more than in the administration and execution of criminal law. In our system this law, if it be such as not to impart energy and sternness to public sentiment with respect to crime and its punishment, but to relax and depress it, must subvert itself, and lie a dead letter in the statute-book, annulled by its own moral influence. The sight or the idea of the pale, trembling, convicted murderer, may produce two very different trains of sentiment; and what this train shall be in the particular person, depends upon the manner in which his mind has been formed to regard crime and punishment. In one of these trains, pity of the convict, sympathy with his sufferings, desire to avert his awful doom, and the superficial inquiry, who can be hurt by sparing him? will follow each other, conducting to the conclusion, that the punishment is malicious and vindictive, and the convict the murdered not the murderer. Such are the sentiments and reasoning in the periodical before referred to, in Colt's case. In the other of these trains of sentiment, the feelings are absorbed in the consolation, that the rights of society are vindicated, that justice visits outrage with equal-handed retribution, that in the most solemn sanctions of law, its majesty is revered and its voice obeyed, and that no private considerations avail to divert public duty from its faithful guardianship of the community. Such a view, while it gives a general sense of security, from assurance that the law is vigilant and energetic, rests with a feeling of dread upon the evil-minded from the conviction that there is no escape for guilt, and at the same time it gives firmness and vigor to virtue by manifesting the practice of justice, and the rebuke of iniquity to be alike its attributes, and that it is equally inconsistent with it to justify the wicked, as to condemn the righteous. Under the first train of sentiment, the determination will be to spare the malefactor; under the last, to protect the community, to warn the profligate, and to fortify the innocent by inseparably connecting in their minds crime and infamy.

The course of criminal jurisprudence in this country has been directed by the first described train of sentiment, and as a consequence has extended and fostered it. The profession has

been, not to annul punishment, but to form and graduate it according to the requirements of humanity in the advanced civilization of the age; indeed to change punishment from "brutal" and "savage," to human and civilized: characterizing by "brutal" and "savage" the punishments provided by the pilgrim fathers, Penn and his counsellors, and those patriots and sages, who conducted our nation through the revolution, in their system of civil polity under which the people were imbued with such love of order, fixedness of principle and intelligence of subordination, that (what every other people who have tried the experiment have utterly failed in) they sat down in well-regulated government constituted by themselves, in the full possession of civil and religious liberty. It should be added, that the epithets, "brutal"—"savage," applied to punishments determined by laws enacted before and directly after the Revolution, in the original States of this Union, by men as distinguished by conscientiousness and humanity as by practical wisdom and consummate ability, whose memory is cherished as ornaments of our race, are defined by the delicate feelings and refined taste of those who in pity to the convict have interposed for his relief. The result has been, that in nearly every state the criminal code has been changed, rejecting what had been deemed an essential element of punishment, for a substitute of an entirely new principle.

A prominent reason for this change has been the greater certainty of punishment. It has been argued, that the efficacy of punishment consists in its certainty: that if it is an established thing, that the law will be executed without fail, so that the offender, if detected, must suffer the penalty it prescribes, greater leniency may be indulged; for men will not risk small penalties, when they see little chance of escape: that it is this hope of escape, that leads to crime: that when punishment is severe juries will not convict, or upon conviction governors will pardon: and that these considerations are familiar to those who direct their minds toward the commission of crime, and form important items in their calculation of the probability of eluding punishment. These arguments seem to have been allowed for the purpose of demonstrating the fallacy of human reasoning on this subject. For never was human reasoning more conclusively confuted by experiment. The difficulty of conviction has been more than doubled; and the facility of obtaining pardon increased at least tenfold. With respect to conviction, a

man prosecuting an extensive and prosperous business has shot dead his own daughter, of deliberate purpose and with direct preparation, and has been acquitted of all guilt. Another man has literally hacked to death his own father, and been cleared of wilful murder. A post-master has been convicted of stealing money from the mail by breaking open letters passing through his hands as post-master, a most deliberate, base and dangerous crime, and has been recommended by the jury in their verdict finding his guilt, to mercy. It is deemed a victory, when a verdict is obtained against a notorious swindler with the fruits of his iniquity in his hands; and this victory cannot always be achieved. It is not necessary to pursue this point; all conversant with courts of justice have been convinced by their own observation. With respect to pardons, we have before us a notice of a pardon in December 1842, from the President of the United States, of a sentence passed in April 1840 for fifteen years imprisonment for aiding to abstract money from letters in a post-office: not quite three years of the term suffered, more than twelve remitted. In New York, a statute prepared with peculiar care and solicitude, to prevent the distressing crime of duelling, so fraught with calamity, has been deliberately violated; the violation has been boastfully acknowledged in the very teeth of justice; and it has been pardoned; forming a precedent that sanctions the crime, and prostrates the law. Every kind of crime, the sentence upon which is sufficiently inconvenient to justify the trouble of applying for pardon, is pardoned. Where the law appoints an imprisonment of a few years, the greater portion of the term is reprieved. In Pennsylvania, as we have seen, the public press throws its complaints in relation to this matter upon the governor, and he throws them back upon the courts and juries. In New-York the advocates of the abolition of capital punishment, agreeing that there must be some protection of life, and that imprisonment for life of the wilful murderer was as little security as could be required, admitted, that to effect such a sanction of law, it was necessary to change the constitution so as to take from the governor the power of pardon in this particular: it being found upon investigation, that sentences for life had generally been put an end to by pardon within four or five years: the term which these sentences for the most atrocious crimes had been allowed to run under the pardoning power, not being equal to what the legislature had prescribed for

minor offences. There is no special cause of complaint against courts, juries and governors with respect to these matters; the influence of the laws allowing nothing painful and degrading in punishment, has not only concealed or glossed all that is infamous and flagitious in crime, but in the spirit of the laws producing the same spirit of carefulness of the malefactor lest he should be treated with severity, has formed the common sentiment into aversion to the infliction of any suffering even of imprisonment with abundant comforts, so that the moment it begins, there is a tide of sympathy for the convict, and of indignation against all who have contributed to bring him to justice, no matter how much he has injured them by his criminality. A man noted in the community for practical wisdom, just thinking, sound judgment, in a time of general alarm through the frequency of crimes, was heard to express doubt, whether society had strength adequate to its own protection; whether our system of government by laws could repress crime so far as required for common safety: and that same man within a few months afterward, signed a petition and was active in exertion for reprieve of a burglar. The writer has seen a man with his flesh appearing to creep upon hearing it said, that a hardened felon, old and bold in violation of the peace of society, ought to be whipped; while he listened with entire composure to the relation of the exploits of a midnight robber, breaking into houses in the defenceless hour of sleep, carrying peril wherever he went.

That there is evil, is attested by the common voice. But what remedy can be proposed? We shall not attempt to answer the inquiry. The public mind, if it will make itself master of this subject, will find a remedy. The common sagacity, brought into exercise, is adequate to the exigencies of the community. The fault lies, and the mischief arises, when there is an unpleasant and difficult work to be performed by the body politic, in their consenting for the sake of ease, that those who will take it off their hands may do it in their own way. The discussion of this subject heretofore has been all on one side. Had not the philosophers of leniency insisted upon the total expunging of capital punishment from the criminal code, probably they would have been permitted to retain undisturbed possession of all the rest of the field. As that is a corporal punishment, and depends upon the same reason as other corporal punishments; its being absolutely enjoined by the supreme Lawgiver,

may lead to the investigation, whether all previous time comprehending the wisdom of legislation in all places and ages, has been so very wrong in prescribing this mode of punishment.

We have seen that, in determining punishment, the attention may be directed to society, inquiring what is wise and expedient for its protection and well-being, or to the offender to see how he will be affected by the infliction. In the last case the motive that will be excited, will be commiseration. We may, without hesitation, take the position, that this undistinguishing but powerful principle ought not to be allowed to influence the making or administering of criminal law. It is too much to require, that the only concern shall be for the malefactor. In forming our judgments in this matter, we should be careful to survey the whole ground. Ours is a government of laws. The laws are not vindictive: they inflict pain, not that the wrong-doer may feel, but that the community may learn the character of crime, and be preserved from its baneful evils; that the profligate may be terrified, and the innocent instructed and warned. We have no need to guard against personal vengeance; there is no cause for apprehension that punishment will ever be aggravated from this source; but how can we expect to fortify youth against temptation, to preserve them from allurements to indolence and indulgence, leading them to become plunderers of their fellow men instead of pursuing the toil-worn course of patient, painstaking industry, unless by powerful safeguards? And can we have these safeguards in the completeness requisite for their efficiency, without the co-operation of the criminal code visiting crime as base and rendering it odious? It is very certain, that the form of law which takes the part of the offender, to make his crime sit as lightly as possible, conjuring up the spirit of compassion to show its winning aspect and seek its gratification in the opportunity afforded by the convict's condition, as a case of suffering humanity, will do nothing available for this end. But there is a powerful principle of our nature, which we can call to our aid by judicious legislation, and produce by it most salutary moral effects in this relation. The mind may be trained to connect specific things with such revolting associations, that it cannot endure the thought of them. Upon this principle it has been experienced of the worst of men, that, all abandoned as they are, there are things of which they cannot be prevailed upon to harbor the design. It is a most useful purpose of punishment to produce such associations, to save

men from crime by making it repulsive to their feelings. It is the direct and sure effect of this system of leniency to defeat this purpose, of all others the most efficacious for fortifying innocence and elevating the morals of society. The objection to punishment, that it is degrading, is mistaken: the object is to hold up the culprit as degraded, to manifest that crime does degrade the perpetrator. It is no just objection to punishment as brutal and barbarous, that it subjects the convict to pillory and stripes: because the law in this way holds up the desert of crime, the infamy to which it leads, and the abhorrence with which it should be regarded. Punishment should not be excessive nor disproportionate; but, in its very nature, for infamous crimes it must be painful and ignominious. Take away these attributes and it ceases to be punishment, and crime ceases to be infamous. Whatever may be the self-complacency of the philanthropy that has succeeded in infusing kindness into retributions of justice until there is nothing discernible in them, to which the term "infliction" is applicable, there is no benefit even to the convict, certainly none to society. There can be no benefit from glossing crime. Although the law be ever so refined and delicate in its sentence, the criminal is ruined: his principles are corrupted: he has destroyed his self-respect: he is conscious of baseness; and he must drag out life under the slow torture of self-contempt, unless indeed he be incapable of such feeling, and then he will be the wretched slave of his vices and wickedness. The law raises no sufficient beacon to warn against ruin because of delicacy and kindness toward the guilty; and thus widens the way for the increase of their number, and leaves them to the unseen but bitter fruits proceeding from want of strictness of integrity, and defect of cautiousness with regard to deviation from rectitude.

Those who have devised confinement to labor as a substitute for corporal punishment, have given to it a coloring, the pure figment of their own imagination. There is no essential element of punishment in it. In the mass of cases it produces no suffering: it makes no impression upon the public of abhorrence or dread of crime: it shows the convict in the power and under the treatment of the kind and benevolent, whose business it is to perform toward him the offices of humanity, and by good usage and painstaking expedients school him into virtue: restoring him to society a reformed and worthy member. Whether this is the course of wisdom to deter from crime, either the

abandoned who look to it as a means of profit or gratification, or the innocent allured by temptation, no one who has read, with any advantage human nature or the word of God, can have a doubt. The soldier for the defence of the country, or the sailor in the ordinary pursuits of commerce, is very nearly as much abridged of freedom, and undergoes much harder service than the convict of atrocious crime. Poverty, even in this favored land, makes severer exactions than our criminal codes. In the majority of cases the convict's condition in the penitentiary is greatly preferable to what his own exertions in unrestrained liberty would procure for him: the labor less, the accommodation better. A German gentleman visiting the Philadelphia prison in 1798, and seeing the prisoners at dinner, remarked, "I declare, if the convicts in our country were treated as these men are, people would commit crime to enjoy their fare." The stigma of the penitentiary is obviously wearing out: most of its inmates never had the cultivated sensibility requisite for feeling it. The operation of the penitentiary process is to remove the convict out of sight, the thing most expedient for his comfort, pleasant to his feelings, and judicious for covering his guilt with oblivion, keep him from observation until he is forgotten, and at last restore him to society with the advantage of being unknown, to put in successful practice new schemes of wickedness. There is no impression upon the public mind making crime dreadful or abhorrent; and for hardship and suffering, it would be far severer upon the convict to discharge him from the bar with his guilt made certain and notorious, to return into the community to meet its frowns, and support himself by his own exertions under its indignation and watchfulness. It is about a century, since the English poet wrote

"Her poor to palaces Britannia sends:"

we may say in plain prose, we send our convicts to palaces. The influence of the POOR LAWS in England has been calamitous in the extreme, and in every relation it is deeply deplored. If analogous consequences shall proceed from our Penal Codes, the calamity will be greater and more truly deplorable.

One of the most zealous of the original advocates of that system in Philadelphia, where the Penitentiary system was conceived, produced, fostered, and reared, as is said, to perfection; after trial of it for more than thirty years under most favorable circumstances, says, "The reformation of the Penal Code of

Pennsylvania in the year 1790, was considered by many friends to humanity, as an epoch in the history of the State, and great credit has been given to it by writers and statesmen in Europe, for the wisdom of substituting confinement and hard labor, in place of the disgusting and demoralizing public punishments to which, by the former code, criminals were subjected. The most signal good consequences were expected to flow from the system by reforming the morals of those condemned to submit to it, and by preventing crimes. No one was more sanguine on this subject than the writer of these observations, who heard and read every sentence of praise on the system with great satisfaction. They raised his native state, in the public estimation; they reflected honor upon the man with whom he was connected by strong affection, (Dr. Rush,) and to whose ardent zeal in the cause of humanity the United States are indebted for the promulgation of the plan, and for his steady and able support of it, for several years previous to its adoption, in opposition to the confederated influence and talents of the bench, the bar, many ministers of the gospel, and other individuals of weight in society. Above all, the writer was led to believe from almost daily conversation with him on the subject, for some time after it went into operation, that it would in a few years work an entire reformation among the lower order of mankind. He did not even think it an utopian idea, that crimes would scarcely be known in Pennsylvania after the new system had been a few years tried. We all know, and some of us have felt, that such have not been the effects of it; the records of the prisons and the presentments of grand juries, show that crimes have greatly multiplied, and the fear of hard labor and confinement lost its influence, if it ever had any, upon the vicious, nay upon those who have been repeatedly subjected to them. It may, therefore, be useful to inquire into the causes to which the failure of the system is to be attributed, since, until these are known, the proper remedies cannot be applied; nor can any means be suggested, which would be likely to check the alarming and annual increase of crimes." [*Extract from American Edition of Edinburgh Encyclopædia, published in 1832.*]

The position that there is an increase of crime, is denied by the advocates of the new system. In the last annual report of the Prison Discipline Society, p. 26, is a chapter entitled "DIMINUTION OF CRIME," stating the proof and cause of the alleged diminution. The writer of this article was once an advocate,

and with great sincerity and confidence, of this new system, under full conviction of its efficiency and practical effect to diminish crime, and its supplying the most judicious and effectual means of executing penal justice. He entertains the highest respect for the Prison Discipline Society, and cordial esteem for the very worthy persons connected with it, with some of whom it is his privilege to have a slight acquaintance; but he cannot consider, that a society organized to carry out a particular project, or its agents or members, are well qualified judges to determine the usefulness or success of their chosen measure. The mind becomes engrossed with its favorite subject; its admiration is constantly growing through its continued attention; whatever comes in conflict with its prepossessions appears unreasonable and wicked, and its investigations, perceptions and conclusions must be partial. Can we suppose, that what we have read constantly in the periodical press, in the presentments of grand juries, in governors' messages, heard in uniform conversation on this subject wherever introduced, and felt in the distresses around us, has no foundation? and what ground can there be for this, unless there has been an increase, we may say more, an alarming increase of crime! We have no doubt, that Temperance Societies have produced much effect in diminishing the number of crimes. Assaults and batteries, and the ordinary outbreaks of violent passion under excitement, occasioning at one time the greater number of criminal prosecutions, in most districts have become very rare, and in some have nearly ceased. These societies have also elevated particular portions of the community above other crimes. But must we not confess that, in other classes of society, and other crimes of far more fearful grade and corrupting influence, there have been most deplorable accessions to the number of malefactors. In the statistics of crimes and misdemeanors in Massachusetts the past year, it appears there have been seven hundred and seventy-seven convictions of crimes; that there have been seventeen hundred and sixty-four examinations before the prosecuting officers; that there have been eighty-three sentences to the penitentiary; that there have been two hundred and seventeen trials for offences against person, five hundred and twelve trials for offences against property, and nine hundred and thirty-eight for misdemeanors. The increase in crime is stated as two hundred and forty-seven. The defalcations of men in public trust in New-York city in the year 1842 are set down in the public newspapers of the highest character

as 670,000 dollars. We see, that there is a vast amount of crime, that does not consign to the state prison. The two hundred and seventeen offences in Massachusetts the past year against the person, are of higher grade than assault and battery, which is in the number of misdemeanors. One effect of the new system has been to depress the grade of crime. Stealing in Pennsylvania is punished with short confinement in the common jail : such has been the sentence in all the cases noticed. We can well remember when the crime of stealing was deemed of far higher grade, than that of burglary is now. In New-York a crime of basest turpitude, considering the standing of the culprit, involving large amount, of most pernicious example, has received sentence of like lenity. We will further remark, that the improved state of society tends to the diminution of crime ; and that the increase of it, the deplorable statistics of it in Massachusetts, where, according to the state of society there ought to be very few crimes, is proof of great mistake in criminal jurisprudence.

We propose nothing. We doubt, whether the community ought to rest satisfied with the present state of criminal jurisprudence. In order to any change, there ought to be an investigation of principle. Our sole object is, to bring this subject before the public mind for examination, and to suggest some points on which, we believe, there is radical error. The question how crime should be punished so as effectually and properly to fulfil the purpose of punishment, is of vital importance and most difficult solution. We have seen, that punishment has even a higher aim than the protecting of property or person, in contributing to elevate the common morals and fortify innocence against contamination by imbuing the public mind with a just sentiment of the turpitude of guilt. We think, that the body of the community are convinced, that there have been serious practical mistakes in this matter ; and that benevolence in pursuing its metaphysics of clemency, has not only impaired the defences of social order and security, but enervated moral principle. There is not a proper quickness and keenness of sensibility to the baseness of crime. It is very manifest, that our knowledge of man, and our philosophizing upon his susceptibility of good impression, and the aptness and adequacy of prescribed motives to produce anticipated effects, do not enable us to treat successfully human depravity. We need instruction ; and we have in our power means of instruction worthy of implicit reliance. But the mere

mention of the Bible raises the cry of sectarian, UNION OF CHURCH AND STATE. The Bible is regarded as the book of the church: the church is deemed, and truly, sectarian; for in this country where we have no established denomination, every church consists of a religious sect, and the inference is therefore drawn, that the Bible is sectarian; discarding it from all use but in the church, or in religious concerns, so that to search the Bible for instruction or wisdom in civil affairs, is considered a positive impropriety. The church, by claiming to be the only accredited expositor of the Bible, and paying no deference to any use or construction of it, in any of its bearings, except by its own functionaries, countenances and justifies this view of it. But it is a most hurtful prejudice. We are not Mohammedans nor Budhists: this will be at once conceded; but what is no less true, is practically denied—we have not cast away all religion; we are not an Atheistic or an Infidel nation. We do not, as a nation, reject religion: we are a Christian nation; as a nation we acknowledge God, we acknowledge his attributes, and government as declared in his word, and we receive the Bible as his revealed word. We do not allow the church to interfere in our civil government; but we do not, therefore, disown the Bible to be the word of God, nor disclaim his authority or our duty. We adore his perfect wisdom; and who dares take the ground of directly opposing or deviating from his instructions in any matter to which they are properly applicable? The ground upon which the principle of our Institutions places us in relation to this matter, is, that we admit no infallible expositor of the Bible; but that it is the right and the duty of every man, by the honest and diligent application of his own mind, to understand it, and conduct himself in all his relations, as well public as private, in as out of office, according to this understanding, so far as it affords him a principle of judgment and action; he, and no one else, being responsible. Upon the ground of our civil and religious polity, harmony must result from reciprocal deference of the different parts of society to each other in matters within their appropriate spheres, the church not interfering in matters belonging to the civil government nor the civil government in matters belonging to the church. The notion that the Bible is sectarian, appropriate to the church, and not the instructor of every man, is an essential part of that corruption which built the papal hierarchy; consigning every thing of a spiritual nature to the church exclusively—as a consequence making that

infallible, and destroying all freedom of opinion. The issue has been that, in the establishment of rational liberty, men have left in the church all that had been appropriated to it, and thus through blind prejudice have deprived themselves of the very best help which they could have for the wise use and improvement of their high privileges—the word of God.

What, then, is the instruction of the word of God in relation to this exceedingly difficult matter, determining the punishment of crime? With respect to the crime of murder we can have no doubt. Immediately after the flood, while our Preserver was accepting with special favor the spared remnant of mankind, uttering in the accents of abounding mercy the covenant, that the ground should not be cursed any more for man's sake, but that while earth remaineth seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, and day and night should not cease. He ordained the law—"Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man." This is the primal law of our race rescued from destruction, to replenish again the earth, given upon the inception of the new condition they were entering upon, as the rule for all succeeding generations. It stands unrepealed as the law of God to man. Its principle differs essentially from that which is relied upon to sustain the alleged improvement of our penal codes; it justifies the element in punishment, to which the terms "brutal," "savage," have been so liberally applied in the advocacy of this improvement. This same principle is manifest in all punishment prescribed by our Maker. We have nowhere warrant from him to fritter away penalty of crime through sympathy for the criminal. He visits transgression with uncompromising retribution. He did not spare even his own Son. At the same time He is the most merciful of beings; and this his unyielding course with respect to crime, is in mercy's cause and for mercy's sake; that men may know the character and desert of crime, and through this knowledge be fortified with principle to withstand its allurements, to guard against its temptations:—"that they may hear and fear, and commit no more any such crime."

The law which we have cited was no part of the law of Moses. It was given to all mankind, and is the law of all men who admit the right of their Maker to govern them. It imposes as a duty on mankind to punish murder with death: our Maker, our sovereign lawgiver, solemnly enjoins an imperative

duty upon man to protect, by requiring blood for blood, the life of man, because made in the image of God. It recognizes also, and justifies the principle of punishment by corporal infliction; it further shows, that our creator is not indifferent to our social state; but that he holds the members of society responsible for the public evil of allowed criminality, and exacts of them to institute and make effectual sufficient safeguards to protect and preserve from the defilement of guilt. It is true, that the Mosaic law was given to the nation of Israel specially; and that it is not obligatory as law upon any other people; but it is as true, that these laws do manifest the principle of unerring wisdom in respect to punishment. We say the principle with respect to punishment: not that the particular punishments should be prescribed for the particular offences, or that the punishment of death, for the specified offences, should be transferred into any other code; but when our Maker has prescribed for punishment stripes and corporal inflictions, it is presumption indeed for us to deny that punishment can properly be of such a nature, and worse than presumption to characterize such punishments as brutal and savage. Whom do we brand with savageness and brutality by this charge?

To the argument deduced from the principle involved in the punishments prescribed by the ALL-WISE in the laws ordained by HIM for his own people, the common answer has been, that they were at the time in a state of barbarism, a horde of barbarians, incapable of refined impressions, or of being operated upon except by the grossest means: these gross or brutal punishments were, therefore, adapted to the condition of those for whom they were provided: but that the progress of civilization, elevating to refinement, requires a correspondent change. We have heard this position in relation to that people, very thoughtlessly asserted, and asserted by persons who ought at least to have examined the subject before pronouncing an opinion. We ask the proof of the barbarism of that people when receiving their law. The law itself implies nothing of the kind, but the contrary. "Thou shalt neither vex a stranger nor oppress him." "Thou shalt not afflict any widow or fatherless child." "Thou shalt not revile the judges, nor curse the ruler of thy people." "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind." "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him." Such laws as these, we might add the

laws against incest and others, are not laws of barbarians. We then refer to the history of the people in the wilderness, and aver, that they will compare advantageously with any nation of the present time. It is true, that they were great sinners against their God, and he visited them with sore judgments. But if our history were written by the pen of inspiration, or our sins were dealt with immediately under the direction of God taking cognizance upon the spot, what would be said, or become of us? What would be the effect now, of such a judgment as punished the enviousness and thirst of office of Korah, Dathan and Abiram? Besides, the laws given to them, were ordained for permanent laws, to organize and govern the state as God's chosen people in the land of his promise. There never was a suggestion of the change of these laws while that nation remained. Thou "gavest them right judgments and true laws, good statutes and commandments," is the just character of these laws given by inspired truth. The objection brings itself to the point, that we are wiser than our Maker, and understanding man better than he, can devise a better system of criminal jurisprudence.

Others, to obviate this principle deduced from the laws ordained by God, reply that the New Testament has superseded the Old. But what is there in the New Testament for mitigating punishment? It may be remitted altogether, but only through the death of the cross. The suffering of the highest possible punishment, the amazing infliction of punishment, is the only way of mercy in the New Testament. "If thine eye offend thee pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched:"—"and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth:" "and in hell he lifted up his eyes being in torment:" "and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever:" "and they gnawed their tongues for pain." There is certainly nothing in the letter or spirit of the New Testament requiring or justifying the disconnection of pain from crime, corporal suffering from guilt; nothing to mitigate the penalty of iniquity. Nor can we suppose, that the Old Testament has transmitted to us the mind of the infinitely wise God for no purpose. No part of it has been placed on record, and preserved as his word without design. "Now these things were our examples to the intent we

should not lust after evil things as they also lusted." "For whatsoever things were written aforetime, were written for our learning." "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." If we do not approve the principle which enters into punishment as God prescribes it, it is not because his law was made for barbarians, and what he has preserved in his word as the teachings of his wisdom, is savage and fit only for savages, not adapted to improved society; but because we do not regard crime as he regards it, nor know how, as he knows, to deal with the depravity of our nature. We believe, that some of the worst evils of the great apostacy, are cherished by the churches. One of these we have alluded to, the consigning of the Bible to the church as its special deposit for its peculiar edification, and thus depriving society in its secular concerns, the administration of its legislative, executive and judiciary departments, of the benefit of the knowledge, wisdom and just moral sentiment that would arise from its proper estimate and consequent careful, general study. In this relation people of intelligence do not hesitate to lay down absurdity for practical doctrine. It is taken as a clear proposition, that on morals, and moral questions, the church owes no deference to the law of the land, but decides by its special paramount authority; and that only in things indifferent will it be influenced by the consideration of what the constitution of society makes the rule of every member, and the instruction of inspiration makes obligatory on the conscience. What is morality but conformity to law? and it begs the question, to say that the church ought not to observe the civil law when it sanctions sin. What is sin? Whence does the church derive its infallible authority to determine this point, so as to set aside the adjudication of the civil power in cases within its legitimate cognizance? We have no doubt, that laws may be resisted on the ground of their oppression and wickedness. So may the church: and its history shows more just causes for this extreme resort, than that of the civil power. But let it be considered, that these are exceptions not to be discussed, dangerous to be contemplated. The result of such a condition in the relations of the church and civil power, is mutual aversion, so that appealing to the word of God in matters of highest concern of a civil nature, although it is directly applicable, is repelled by the civil power as inadmissible. There is action and reaction:

the church absolves itself from all duty to respect civil legislation, as utterly incompetent; and civil legislators interdict all reference to religion and its associations as inconsistent with rational liberty and enlightened government.

We should be glad to discuss more largely than our remaining space allows, the incident of reformation. We are aware, that the reformation of a criminal, who has proceeded to the point of conviction, must be difficult under any regimen. We believe, however, that shutting him out from intercourse with men, and in a condition where nothing of interest to him depends upon his exertions, whether in solitary confinement, or under any other prison discipline, is not the way of reformation. Social influence, and the value of character, and the need of character, and the necessity of procuring livelihood, afford motives for amendment, and may lead to it. But repentance is the only principle of reformation: without this, no change for the better contains in itself any promise. To repentance, a just sense of the turpitude of the crime, is essential. Punishment that does not break the spirit, provokes it. To deal leniently with fault or crime, is the direct course to produce irritation; leading to the conclusion that the guilt is venial, and the infliction undeserved. There is neither wisdom nor mercy in daubing with untempered mortar. To repent, a man must have a just sense of the baseness of crime, and of his own baseness as criminal, for an abiding sentiment; the punishment that produces this effect is the punishment of reformation. Nothing is more unphilosophical and unscriptural, than to disallow a punishment because it tends to produce the consciousness of vileness and degradation; for it is the very state of mind that repentance requires. "If they accept the punishment of their iniquity," "thou hast punished us less than our iniquities deserve," are given as indications of this state of mind; it never arises until a man is forced to see and feel the true desert of guilt. Treat a man as unfortunate, let him feel the regrets and condolence of humanity, in his wickedness, and pride and indignation will be the natural fruits: he will not admit the infamy of his crime unless the abjectness of his condition fastens upon him the revolting truth.

[Since this article went to press, another alarming illustration of the truth of some of its statements, has been afforded in the acquittal of Mercer, charged with the murder of He-

berton. The provocation was, indeed, aggravated, but could never justify the perpetration of murder. Men must not be permitted, on any account, to take vengeance into their own hands. The majesty and sacredness of law must be maintained, and the violator of it be made to feel the keen edge of its severest penalty, or we must revert to a state of barbarism, in which each man shall be obliged to wear his own weapon of defence.

The ground of acquittal in this case was insanity. But who believes in the fact of Mercer's insanity? It is a miserable plea: and wo to us when every murderer, who shall perpetrate the awful act under the excitement of passion, amounting indeed to madness, shall be able successfully to urge this now every-day plea. The only safe ground to take on this point is, that no one shall be entitled to the plea of insanity, who is not an unquestionable subject for the insane asylum: and let the mad-house be the future home of every one acquitted on that plea. Friends, also, who claim acquittal on this ground, ought to be, by law, liable to punishment for allowing the insane person to walk abroad in society, to the detriment of its peace.

It is, in the present case, especially to be regretted that, on the return to Philadelphia of the lawyers who plead for Mercer's acquittal, they were welcomed by the shouts of the multitude, and the waving kerchiefs of some of the softer sex, and escorted to their lodgings. Among these were wise and eloquent men, who know the value of law to this republic, and one who has held the high office of governor of New Jersey, bowing deference to the shouting crowd, and, with bare heads, most respectfully expressing their sympathy with those indecent expressions of joy at the result. Better, far better had the ex-governor and his associates decidedly manifested their disapprobation of such proceedings, and gone to their closets to weep over the growing disregard of law and morbid feeling of compassion for the guilty. We are apt to forget that the murdered one has friends, as well as the murderer, and that the former are, at least, much as entitled to our sympathy as the latter.]—Ed.

ARTICLE II.

THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE, CONFIRMED BY THE NATURAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ABORIGINES.

By Samuel Forry, M. D., New-York city.

IN styling the native American race, *Aborigines*, we would be distinctly understood not to regard them as indigenous, as the term in its strict acceptation implies, but merely that the era of their isolation goes back beyond the reach of history. As Americans, no part of Anthropology or the Natural History of Man, can be more interesting to us than that of our Aborigines. From time immemorial, the vast theatre of the western hemisphere has been thronged by numberless inhabitants. While many tribes of these people have lived and died without leaving a trace of their sojourn on the face of the earth; others, as in tropical America, at the period of its Spanish discovery, were a polished and cultivated race, living in large and flourishing cities. There is a third class of Aborigines, still more ancient and more civilized, known only by their monumental antiquities, scattered over the United States, South America, and the intermediate region; but even these, no doubt, belonged to the same great family of the human race. The recent investigations of Stephens, Norman, and others, among the ruined cities of the southern states of North America, (the first having closely examined and studied forty-four sites in the peninsula of Yucatan alone, exhibiting the vestiges of *ancient American civilization*,) have revealed the monuments of a people, who constitute now, perhaps, the most interesting enigma in the history of the world. The eastern continent has been called the *Old World*; but here, in the *New*, are stupendous ruins, which, perchance, may have flourished in their most palmy day, aye, some of them may even have been antiquities, when the seven hills which subsequently sustained the great city of the Cæsars, knew no other habitation than that of the shepherd's hut of Faustulus. When Solomon was laying the foundation of the first temple ever raised by man to the honor and glory of the true God, here may have existed the *ruins* of temples—those vast pyramids which distinguish the primitive history of man in regions the most remote, and apparently the

most widely separated. We do not, however, possess any precise data by which to determine the remoteness of the earliest American civilization; and we are not among those, as will be seen in the sequel, who incline to the opinion of the *extreme* antiquity of some of the now existing ruins. Unlike the decayed and ruined institutions of the Old World, as, for instance, those of Thebes, Babylon, Palmyra, and Petrea, which have left upon the institutions of posterity their sign, thus transmitting their greatness and glory; those of America, on the other hand, have left us nought save the memorials of their existence impressed upon the surface of the earth. It matters not that, in the deserted halls which once blazed with the glory of mighty kings, the wild Arab with his camels should now lie down at night; for the important principles which those nations, in the progress of man's civilization, were destined to evolve, have been, notwithstanding the dissolution of their own social and political institutions, bequeathed to the world.

What we propose to demonstrate in the investigation of this subject, is, that Revelation and Science are both beams of light emitted from the same Sun of Eternal Truth. As truth can never be in opposition to truth, so it has been found that many investigations into the laws of natural science, which were thought at first to conflict with Holy Writ, have been discovered in the end, as will be shown in this inquiry into the *unity of the human family*, to afford confirmation and elucidation of its divine truths. The question now before us is one, the decision of which is not a matter of indifference either to religion or humanity. As the testimony of the Sacred Scriptures is received with implicit and reverential assent by the readers of the Repository, the belief that all mankind are the offspring of common parents, constitutes, of course, a part of their creed; but it is our intention, in the following pages, to establish the same conclusions independent of the Mosaic records, thus showing that the Author of nature speaks the same language as the Author of revelation. This is the more necessary, as there have not been wanting writers who maintain that the declaration, that the Creator made of one blood all the nations of the earth, does not comprehend the uncivilized inhabitants of remote regions; thus excluding the Negroes, Hottentots, Esquimaux, etc., as inferior in their original endowments to those which are now known as the Caucasian variety of the human family, and thus attempting to justify the institu-

tion of perpetual servitude; and hence it becomes requisite, both to meet these skeptical theorists on their own ground, and also to investigate this question upon the strict rules of modern inductive reasoning, to abstract our minds from all extrinsic evidence not bearing directly as matters of fact upon the subject. Voltaire was one of the first to observe that "none but a blind man can doubt that the whites, negroes, Albinos, Hottentots, Laplanders, Chinese, and Americans, are entirely distinct races." Those *μῆθοῖρα*, half-men, half-brutes, as the ruder tribes are designated by M. Bory de Saint-Vincent, are excluded in his classification from the "Race Adamique."

The authors whose writings we have carefully studied in reference to this subject are the following: Blumenbach—" *De Generis Humani Varietate Nativa*," and his *Collectio Craniorum Diversarum Gentium*; Prichard's " *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind*," and his recent work, entitled, " *The Natural History of Man*;" Morton's " *Crania Americana, or a Comparative View of the Skulls of various Aboriginal Nations of North and South America*;" and " *An Inquiry into the Distinctive Characteristics of the Aboriginal Race of America*;" Lawrence's " *Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man*;" Smith's (Samuel Stanhope) " *Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*;" Lyell's " *Principles of Geology*;" Wiseman's " *Twelve Lectures on the Connection between Science and Revealed Religion*, delivered in Rome;" Smith (Rev. John Pye) " *On the Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science*;" as well as Humboldt, Bradford, Stephens, etc., on *American Antiquities*." To James Cowles Prichard, however, we acknowledge our deepest obligations; for to him we stand more indebted for knowledge upon the subjects treated by him than to all the rest combined.

Before considering the physical, moral, and intellectual characteristics of the American Aborigines, we shall here introduce the known facts relative to the *geographical distribution of the human family*, in order to show that there is nothing in the relative position of America that forbids the supposition of an exotic origin of its native inhabitants. The geographical distribution of man is, indeed, one of the most interesting problems in history; and history, if we exclude the Mosaic account, affords no data for determining the great problem of man's origin. Any one who allows himself to speculate upon this

subject, will at first view be inclined to adopt the opinion that every part of the world had originally its indigenous inhabitants—*autochthones*,—adapted to its physical circumstances. By this hypothesis, a ready solution is afforded of some of the most difficult questions presented in the investigation of the physical history of mankind; for instance, the remarkable diversity in figure and complexion observed among different nations—their difference of moral and intellectual character—and their peculiarity of language, and even dialectic differences, observed as far back in antiquity as the days of Jacob and Laban. We might thus explain the fact that the oldest records, ever since Cain went to the land of Nod, seldom allude to an uninhabited country; or the no less surprising fact, that in many parts of the world, as for instance Central America, or even the very soil now pressed beneath our feet, we discover vestiges of a primeval population, who, having dwelt there for ages and brought the civil arts to a comparatively high degree of cultivation, were swept away before the dawn of history. But many of these obscurities will be made to disappear before the light of science, like mist before the morning sun, thus reconciling in many points science and revelation. It will even be seen, as the result of modern ethnographic science, that the four hundred dialects of America,—a multiplicity of languages which was at first deemed incompatible with the Scripture narrative,—all have the most extraordinary analogies; and still further, that *all the languages of men are to be regarded as dialects of an original one now lost!*

But to return to the *geographical distribution of man*. The probable birth-place of mankind—the centre from which the tide of migration originally proceeded—has always been, on the assumption that the whole human race has descended from a single pair, a matter of speculation with many. History points to the East as the earliest or original seat of our species, as well as of our domesticated animals and of our principal food. That this birth-place was situated in a region characterized by the reign of perpetual summer, and the consequent spontaneous production, throughout the year, of vegetable aliment adapted to the wants of man, has always been a favorite conjecture. From this point, with the progress of human population, men would naturally diffuse themselves over the adjacent regions of the temperate zone; and in proportion as new difficulties were thus encountered, the spirit of invention was gradually called

into successful action. In the early stage of society—the hunter period—mankind from necessity spreads with the greatest rapidity; for 800 acres of hunting ground, it has been calculated, do not produce more food than half an acre of arable land. Thus, even at a very early period, the least fertile parts of the earth may have become inhabited; and when, upon the partial exhaustion of game, the state of pasturage succeeded, mankind, already scattered in hunter tribes, may soon have multiplied to the extent compatible with the pastoral condition. In this manner may a continuous continent, in a comparatively short period, have become peopled; but even the smallest islands, however remote from continents, have, with very few exceptions, as for instance St. Helena, been invariably found inhabited by man,—a phenomenon susceptible of satisfactory explanation.

The oft-observed circumstance of the *drifting of canoes to vast distances* affords, without doubt, an adequate explanation of the fact, (on the supposition that the human family has had one common source,) that of the multitudes of islets of coral and volcanic origin, in the vast Pacific, capable of sustaining a few families of men, very few have been found untenanted. As navigators have often picked up frail boats in the ocean, containing people who had been driven 500, 1000, and even 1500 miles from their home, there is nothing in the relative position of America that forbids the supposition of a trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific origin of its Aborigines. A number of such instances are related by Lyell, on the authority of Cook, Forster, Kotzebue, and Beechy. A Japanese junk, even so late as the year 1833, was wrecked on the northwest coast of America, at Cape Flattery, and several of the crew reached the shore safely. Numberless instances of this kind might be cited. In 1799, a small boat, containing three men, which was driven out to sea by stress of weather from St. Helena, reached the coast of South America in a month, one of the men having perished on the voyage. In 1797, twelve negroes escaping from a slave ship on the coast of Africa, who took to a boat, were drifted, after having been the sport of wind and wave for five weeks, ashore at Barbadoes. Three natives of Ulea reached one of the coral isles of Rodack, having been driven, during a boisterous voyage of eight months, the amazing distance of 1500 miles. The native missionaries travelling among the different Pacific insular groups, frequently meet with their countrymen, who have been drifted in like manner.

"The space traversed in some instances," says Lyell, "was so great, that similar accidents might suffice to transport canoes from various parts of Africa to the shores of South America, or from Spain to the Azores, and thence to North America; so that man, even in a rude state of society, is liable to be scattered involuntarily by the winds and waves over the globe, in a manner singularly analogous to that in which many plants and animals are diffused. We ought not, then, to wonder that, during the ages required for some tribes of the human race to attain that advanced stage of civilization which empowers the navigator to cross the ocean in all directions with security, the whole earth should have become the abode of rude tribes of hunters and fishers. Were the whole of mankind now cut off, with the exception of one family, inhabiting the old or new continent, or Australia, or even some coral islet of the Pacific, we might expect their descendants, though they should never become more enlightened than the South Sea Islanders, or the Esquimaux, to spread, in the course of ages, over the whole earth, diffused partly by the tendency of population to increase, in a limited district, beyond the means of subsistence, and partly by the accidental drifting of canoes by tides and currents to distant shores."

Thus has the earth been widely peopled in the earliest periods of society; and in later times, as some nations became maritime, important discoveries were made by accident. In the year 862, Iceland was discovered by some mariners bound for the Feroe Islands, who had been thrown out of their course by tempests. The discovery of America by the Northmen was accidental; and so was the discovery of Brazil, in the year 1500, by a Portuguese fleet, which, in its route to the East Indies, departed so far from the African coast, in order to avoid certain winds, as to encounter the western continent.

In our researches into the origin of the varieties of mankind, it is necessary to dismiss all argument *a priori*. Let us repudiate that speciousness of argumentation which maintains that it is much more consonant with the wisdom of the Deity that each region of the earth should teem *ab initio* with vegetable and animal productions adapted to its physical circumstances, than that immense tracts, while a single species is slowly extending its kind, should remain for ages an unoccupied waste. The question as here viewed, belongs to the domain of natural history, and especially to physiology and psychology, as based upon the observation of facts. Hence, too, it is obviously im-

proper to set out, as most writers on the subject have done, with a distribution of the human family into certain races, as this is in fact a premature anticipation of the result. It is only by proceeding in the analytical method, surveying the ethnography* of various countries, and deducing conclusions from the phenomena collected, that the subject can be legitimately investigated.

Preliminary to the consideration of the distinctive characteristics of our Aborigines, more especially as it is important to have, in every scientific inquiry, a clear idea of all the terms employed, it may be well to state that by the term *species*, in natural history, is understood a collection of individuals, whether plants or animals, which so resemble one another that all the differences among them may find an explanation in the known operation of physical causes; but if two races are distinguished by some characteristic peculiarity of organization not explicable on the ground that it was lost by the one or acquired by the other through any known operation of physical causes, we are warranted in the belief that they have not descended from the same original stock. Hence *varieties*, in natural history, are distinguished from *species* by the circumstance of mere deviation from the characters of the parent stock; but to determine whether tribes characterized by certain diversities, constitute in reality distinct species, or merely varieties of the same species, is often a question involving much doubt,—a doubt which can, however, be generally removed by a comprehensive survey of the great laws of organization.

Species is defined by Buffon—"A succession of similar individuals which re-produce each other." By Cuvier—"The union of individuals descended from each other, or from common parents, and of those who resemble them as much as they resemble each other." He adds—"The apparent difference of the races of our domestic species are stronger than those of any species of the same genus. * * * The fact of the *succession*, therefore, and of the *constant succession*, constitutes alone the *unity of the species*."

* The term *Ethnography*, derived from *εθνος*, nation, and *γραφω*, I write, is generally restricted to mean the classification of nations from the comparative study of languages; or, in other words, it is comparative philology. But, throughout this article, we use it in a more extended sense. We shall speak not only of *philological* but *physiognomical* Ethnography.

As regards the physical characteristics of the American Aborigines, Dr. Morton arrives at the following conclusions:

"Thus it is that the American Indian, from the southern extremity of the continent to the northern limit of his range, is the same exterior man. With somewhat variable stature and complexion, his distinctive features, though variously modified, are never effaced; and he stands isolated from the rest of mankind, identified at a glance in every locality, and under every variety of circumstances; and even his desiccated remains, which have withstood the destroying hand of time, preserve the primeval type of his race, excepting only when art has interposed to prevent it."

From this and other considerations, all of which will be noticed in detail, Dr. M. arrives at the final conclusion, "*that there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new.*" But notwithstanding the high authority of Dr. Morton upon this subject, we shall attempt to show, and as we conceive successfully, the utter fallacy of this inference.

In surveying the globe in reference to the different appearances of mankind, the most extraordinary diversities are, indeed, apparent to the most superficial observer. The Patagonian and Caffre, compared with the Laplander and Esquimaux, are real giants, the stature of the latter being generally two feet less than that of the former. What a striking contrast does the coarse skin and greasy blackness of the African, present to the delicate cuticle and the exquisite rose and lily that beautify the face of the Georgian! Compare the head of the Caucasian, having those proportions which we so much admire in Grecian sculpture, with the flat skull of the Carib or that of the Negro with its low retreating forehead and advancing jaws! Or behold in one the full development of intellectual power, as displayed in arts, science, and literature, and in the other a mere instinctive existence! Hence arises the question:—*Have all these diverse races descended from a single stock?* Or, on the other hand: *Have the different races of mankind, from the beginning of their existence, differed from one another in their physical, moral, and intellectual nature?* This inquiry opens to our view a wide and interesting field of investigation; and although the extreme diversities of mankind just adverted to, would seem, at first view, to forbid the supposition of a common origin, yet we find them all running into one another by such nice and imperceptible gradations, not only in contiguous countries but among the same people, as to render it often impracticable,

independent of the individual's locality, to determine to what family of the human race he belongs. Hence we surely do not despair of disproving Dr. Morton's deduction, that our Indian "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind.*"

In order to present a more general view of the subject, we shall now endeavour to point out the most important diversities by which the human family is distinguished, as we find them separated into different races; and to determine in connection with the main object of this inquiry and as tending to elucidate it, whether these races are merely varieties of one or constitute distinct species.

In the general classification of mankind, we find that nearly every author has some peculiar views. Thus, while Cuvier makes the distinction of three races, Malte-Brun has no less than sixteen. As the division of Blumenbach, consisting of five varieties, viz., the Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, and Malay, is the one most generally adopted, it may be well to present here their general distinguishing characters. Among the principal characteristics, those of the skull are most striking and distinguishing. It is on the configuration of the bones of the head that the peculiarity of the countenance chiefly depends. Although as previously remarked, the various families of man run into each other by imperceptible gradations; yet, in the typical examples of these five primary divisions, a very marked difference is observable.

(1.) In the *Caucasian* race, the head is more globular than in the other varieties, and the forehead is more expanded. The face has an oval shape nearly on a plane with the forehead and cheek-bones, which last project neither latterly nor forwards as in other races; nor does the upper jaw-bone, which has a perpendicular direction, to which the lower jaw corresponds, give a projecting position to the front teeth, as in the other varieties. The chin is full and rounded. This variety is *typically* characterized by a white skin, but we will show that it is susceptible of every tint, and that it is in some nations almost black; and the eyes and hair are variable, the former being mostly blue, and the latter, yellow or brown and flowing. It is the nations with this cranial formation that have attained the highest degree of civilization, and have generally ruled over the others; or rather, as we would show more fully did space allow, it is among these nations that the progress of civilization and the development of the anterior portion of the brain, each exercising on the other a mutual influence, have gone hand in hand. Of this variety of

the human race, the chief families are the Caucasians proper, the Germanic branch, the Celtic, the Arabian, the Lybian, the Nilotic, and the Hindostanic.

(2.) In the *Mongolian* variety, the head, instead of being globular, is nearly square. The cheek-bones project from under the middle of the orbit of the eye, and turn backward in a remarkable outward projection of the zygoma. The orbits are large and deep, the eyes oblique, and the upper part of the face exceedingly flat; the nose, the nasal bones, and even the space intermediate to the eye-brows, being nearly on the same plane with the cheek-bones. The color of this variety is olive or yellowish brown, and the hair is blackish and scanty. This variety of the human family has formed vast empires in China and Japan, but its civilization has been long stationary. It has spread over the whole of central and northern Asia, being lost among the American polar race, the Esquimaux, on the one hand, and the Caucasian Tartars on the other. Extending to the Eastern Ocean, it comprehends the Japanese, the Coreans, and a large portion of the Siberians. On the south, its limits seem to be bounded by the Ganges; while in the Eastern Peninsula, it is only in the lower casts that the Mongolian features predominate over the Indo-Caucasian.

(3.) The *Ethiopian* variety, which recedes the farthest from the Caucasian, presents a narrow and elongated skull, the temporal muscles, which are very large and powerful, rising very high on the parietal bones, thus giving the idea of lateral compression. The forehead is low and retreating. The cheek-bones and the upper jaw project forwards, and the alveolar ridge and the teeth take a similar position. The nose is thick, being almost blended with the cheeks; the mouth is prominent and the lips thick; and the chin is narrow and retracted. The color varies from a deep tawny to a perfect jet; and the hair is black, frizzled, and woolly. In disposition, the negro is joyous, flexible, and indolent. The whole of the African continent, with the exception of the parts north and east of the Great Desert, is overspread by the different branches of this type. Besides which, they are found in New Holland, New Guinea, the Moluccas, and other islands. It is not true as is remarked by M. Cuvier and others, that the people comprising this race have always remained in a state of barbarism. On the contrary, numerous facts might be adduced, showing that many Negro tribes have made considerable advances in civilization, and that

in proportion to this improvement, do they approximate to the physical characters of the Caucasian. For instance, in the ancient kingdom of Bambarra, of which Timbuctoo is the capital, civilization was comparatively far advanced at a time when the Britons, as described by Julius Cæsar, were smeared over with paint and clothed in the skins of wild beasts.

These three varieties constitute the leading types of mankind, the Malay and American being no more than mere intervening shades.

(4.) In the *Malayan* variety, the forehead is more expanded than in the African, the jaws are less prominent, and the nose more distinct. The color is blackish brown or mahogany; the hair is long, coarse, and curly; and the eye-lids are drawn obliquely upwards at the outer angles. Active and ingenious, this variety possesses all the habits of a migratory, predacious, and maritime people. They are found in Malacca, Sumatra, the innumerable islands of the Indian Archipelago and the great Pacific Ocean, from Madagascar to Easter Island.

(5.) The *American* variety, which, as it constitutes the special object of this paper, we have reserved to the last. This variety, like the Malayan in reference to the Caucasian and Ethiopian, may be said to hold a similar relation to the Caucasian and Mongolian. The head, though similar to the Mongolian, is yet less square and the face less flattened. The forehead is low, the eyes black and deep set, and the nose large and aquiline. The skin is dark and more or less red; the hair is black, straight, and long, and the beard deficient. They are slow in acquiring knowledge, and averse to mental cultivation. Restless and revengeful, they always evince a fondness for war; but as regards the spirit of maritime adventure, they are wholly destitute. As exhibiting the highest point of attainable civilization, the ancient empires of Peru, Mexico, and Central America generally, may be considered analogous to those of China and India, which have been for ages stationary.

This race was, when first discovered by Europeans, spread over nearly the whole of the Americas south of the sixtieth degree of north latitude. From this point towards the Arctic Circle, our Indian, it is generally believed, belongs to the Mongolian variety, notwithstanding the analogy of language would warrant an opposite inference. From Greenland we trace apparently the same family of men to the north of Europe, comprising the Finland and Lapland coasts; and thence to the

Polar races of Asia, which are part of the Mongolian tribes, covering the immense region extending from the line of the Ural and Himmaleh mountains to Behring's Straits.

But before proceeding to a consideration of the characteristics of the American Aborigines, as connected with the question of the *unity* of the human family, let us first treat of the *phenomena of hybridity*, which have a close relation with the determination of species. An identity of species between two animals, notwithstanding a striking difference in some particulars, has been inferred, as a general rule, if their offspring has been found capable of procreating. Although this doctrine has been generally maintained by our most distinguished naturalists, yet some have rejected it as a hasty generalization. The production of hybrids is a phenomenon observed not only among mammifers, but among birds, fishes, the insect tribes, and the vegetable kingdom; and when we survey the numerous facts opposed to the generally admitted law of nature that all hybrid productions are sterile, there would seem to be some ground for doubting the soundness of the general conclusion. Thus the dog and the wolf, and the dog and the fox, will breed together, and the mixed offspring is capable of procreating. And that mules are not always barren, is a fact not unknown even to Aristotle. But as hybrid productions are almost unknown among animals in their wild and unrestrained condition, it would seem that there is a mutual repugnance between those of different species; and thus nature guards against a universal confusion of the different departments of organized creation. Notwithstanding the occasional exceptions to the general fact of the sterility of hybrid productions, it has never been observed that an offspring similar to themselves has proceeded from hybrids of an opposite sex. The offspring of these animals is capable of being continued in successive generations only by returning towards one of the parent tribes. It is thus apparent that the *vis procreatrix* between different species, both in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, is very defective, and that the law of nature which maintains the diversity of tribes in the organized world, is not really infringed by the isolated phenomena observed in reference to hybrid productions. That animals generally have the same form and endowments now as at the remotest period of our acquaintance with them, is an opinion confirmed by the oldest historical records, as well as by the works of art and the actual relics found in Egyptian tombs.

The zoological descriptions of Aristotle, composed twenty-two centuries ago, are still faithful to nature in every particular. Hence it would appear that insurmountable barriers to the intermixture of species, at least among wild animals, have been provided by nature, in the instinctive aversion to union with other species, in the sterility of hybrid productions, and in the law of the reproduction of the corporeal and psychical characters of the parent in the offspring.

These facts have an important bearing upon the doctrine that mankind constitutes a single species. It is well known to horticulturists and those engaged in breeding domesticated animals, that, by crossing and intermixing varieties, a mixed breed superior in almost every physical quality to the parent races is often produced; and it has also been observed that the intermixture of different races of the human family has produced one physically superior, generally speaking, to either ancestral race. Now, as it is a law, according to the high authority of Buffon and Hunter, that those animals of opposite sexes, notwithstanding some striking differences in appearance, whose offspring is equally prolific with themselves, belong to one and the same species, it follows that these facts afford a strong confirmation of the conclusion deduced from many others, viz., that *there is but one human species*, for, as just remarked, while the offspring of distinct species, (real hybrids,) are so little prolific that their stock soon becomes extinct, it is found that the mixed offspring of different varieties of the same species generally exceeds the parent races in corporeal vigor and in the tendency to multiplication. This law, however, does not apply to the moral and intellectual endowments; for we find these deteriorated in the European by the mixture of any other race, and, on the other hand, an infusion of Caucasian blood tends in an equal degree to ennoble these qualities in the other varieties of the human family. It is, indeed, an undisputed fact, that all the races and varieties of mankind are equally capable of propagating their offspring by intermarriage; and that such connexions when contracted between individuals of the most dissimilar varieties, as for instance the Negro and the European, prove, if there is any difference, even more prolific. This tendency to a rapid increase is especially obvious among the so-termed Mulattoes of the West Indies. Upon this point the philosophic Prichard arrives at the following conclusion:—

“It appears to me unquestionable that intermediate races of

men exist and are propagated, and that no impediment whatever exists to the perpetuation of mankind when the most dissimilar varieties are blended together. We hence derive a conclusive proof, unless there be in the instance of human races an exception to the universally prevalent law of organized nature, that all the tribes of men are of one family."

It is well remarked by Prichard, that perhaps the solution of the problem of the unity of the human family, might be safely left on this issue, or considered as obtained by this argument. The same law, as is well known, applies to our Aborigines. As we spent upwards of two years, when serving in the Medical Staff of the Army, among the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees, we saw, especially in Florida, the most remarkable intermixtures between the Indian and the Negro, as regards the physiognomy of the individual. Instead of an apparent new being like the Mulatto, the mixed offspring would often exhibit the decided characteristics of the two races, without any obvious blending. Thus, one would have the crisp and curly hair, united with a reddish copper-colored skin and all the other Indian features: and another would present the straight, long, and coarse hair of the Indian upon a true Negro skull; as the low and retreating forehead, the projecting jaws, the thick nose, the narrow and retracted chin, and the jet black complexion.

We shall also here bring under notice what may be designated as *accidental* or *congenital* varieties, these phenomena having a close relation with the diversities exhibited among the various tribes of mankind. Among all organized productions, we find variety of form and structure in the same species, and even in the offspring of the same parents; and what is equally remarkable, we discover a tendency to perpetuate in their offspring all individual peculiarities. This constitutes, in some degree, an exception to the general law that animals produce their like,—an exception by which it were easy to explain the present existence of diversified races, originating from the same primitive species, did not a new difficulty arise in the question, having reference to the extent of deviation of structure that may take place without breaking in upon the characteristic type of the species. There are many instances on record in which these accidental varieties have been perpetuated by hereditary transmission. One of the most extraordinary is the recent origination of a new variety of sheep in the state of Massachusetts, called the "*ancon* or *otter-head*," in consequence of the shortness of

the limbs and the greater proportionate length of the body, the fore-legs being also crooked.

Among instances of variety of structure originating in the race of man, which are in like manner propagated through many generations, may be mentioned the oft-observed fact of supernumerary toes or fingers, and corresponding deficiencies. Hence the names of Varus and Plautus among the ancient Romans. Likewise, those peculiar features by which the individuals of some families are characterized; as, for instance, the singular thickness of the upper lip in the imperial house of Austria, which was introduced, three centuries ago, by intermarriage. These organic peculiarities are often transmitted to children, even when one of the parents is of the ordinary form, for three or four generations. Hence there is reason to believe that if persons of this organic peculiarity were to intermarry exclusively, we might have a permanent race characterized by six toes or fingers. We have a similar fact in the history of the English family of "porcupine men," in whom the greater part of the body was covered with hard excrescences of a horny nature, which were transmitted hereditarily. These remarks apply equally to those peculiarities of organization which predispose to many diseases, as well as to the transmission of mental and moral qualities, all of which are truly hereditary. It is thus seen that varieties of structure are not always transmitted from first parents, and that when they have once arisen, they become, under favorable circumstances, permanent in the stock.

We are now prepared to consider the *characteristics of our aboriginal race*, by which, in the language of Morton, they "*stand isolated from the rest of mankind.*" We shall speak first of *diversities of form or configuration*, the most important of which is doubtless the shape of the head as connected with the development of the brain. The classification of skulls under five general forms already given, is of course entirely arbitrary; and as in every other corporeal diversity, so we find in regard to crania an imperceptible gradation among the nations of the earth, filling up the interval between the two extremes of the most perfect Caucasian model and the most exaggerated Negro specimen. Hence we must conclude that the diversities of skulls among mankind, and consequently in a much less degree the peculiarity of our Indian, do not afford sufficient ground for a specific difference—an inference confirmed, as will be seen, by the variations which occur in animals of the same species.

We might show, as we think, conclusively, did space allow, that there is a connection between the leading physical characters of human races, (and especially as regards cranial formation,) and the agencies of climate and their habits of existence. This is very apparent in the configuration found in our Aborigines, and equally so in all other races in the nomadic and hunter conditions, consisting of the greater development of the jaws and zygomatic (cheek) bones; in a word, of the bones of the face altogether, as compared with the size of the brain. That the development of the organs of taste and smell, is in an inverse ratio to that of the brain, and consequently to the degree of intelligence, is considered by Bichat as almost a rule in our organization. By this principle, as an index to those exalted prerogatives which elevate man above the brute, was the Grecian sculptor guided. Although, upon this point, the facial angle of Camper is not an exact test, yet it may be remarked that in the human race, it varies from 65° to 85° , the former being a near approach to the monkey species. Among the remains of Grecian art, we find this angle extended to 90° in the representation of poets, sages, legislators, etc., thus showing that the relation here referred to was not unknown to them; while, at the same time, the mouth, nose, jaws, and tongue, were contracted in size, as indicative of a noble and generous nature. In the statues of their gods and heroes, the Greeks gave a still greater exaggeration to the latter, and reduction to the former characteristics, thus extending the forehead over the face, so as to make a facial angle of 100° . It is this that gives to their statuary its high character of sublime beauty. Even among the vulgar, we find the idea of stupidity associated with an elongation of the snout.

As regards man's average stature, the size and proportions of his trunk and limbs, and the relations of different parts, it has been inferred by some that these varieties, in connection with other diversities, constitute distinctive characters sufficient to class the human family under several separate species. It has been asserted, for instance, that in the Negro the length of the forearm is so much greater than in the European, as to form a real approximation to the character of the ape. This difference, however, is so very slight, compared with the relative length of the arms of the orang and the chimpanzee, that we are not even warranted in the inference that races long civilized have less of the animal in this respect in their physical conformation than

those in the savage state. No peculiarity of this kind pertains to our Aborigines; but that uncivilized races have less muscular power than civilized men, is a fact that has been often observed, and one that we can confirm from extensive personal knowledge relative to the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees. The experiments of the voyager, Peron, with the *dynamometer*, showed that Frenchmen and Englishmen have a physical superiority compared with the natives of the southern hemisphere. But these diversities are not specific, being merely variations arising from the operation of particular causes; as, for instance, the Hindoos, who live on a vegetable aliment exclusively, are less muscular and have arms and legs longer in proportion than Europeans; and hence, too, the miserable savages, who are never well fed, but are frequently depressed by absolute want, cannot be expected to equal, in physical strength, the industrious and well-fed middle classes of a civilized community. That none of these deviations amount to specific distinctions is apparent from two arguments, as laid down by Prichard:—"First, that none of the differences in question exceed the limits of individual variety, or are greater than the diversities found within the circle of one nation or family; secondly, the varieties of form in human races are by no means so considerable, in many points of view, as the instances of variation which are known to occur in different tribes of animals belonging to the same stock, there being scarcely one domesticated species which does not display much more considerable deviations from the typical character of the tribe."

Among the physical characteristics of our Indian, we shall now consider that of *color* or *complexion*, the usual designation of which is *copper-colored*; but this is considered by Dr. McCulloch as wholly inapplicable to the Americans as a race, having himself proposed the term "*cinnamon-colored*." Dr. Morton thinks that, taken collectively, they would be most correctly designated as the "*brown-race*." He adds—"Although the Americans possess a pervading and characteristic complexion, there are occasional and very remarkable deviations, including all the tints from a decided white to an unequivocally black skin."

In order to show that the complexion, as well as the color and texture of the hair, belonging to the American Aboriginal, are not *distinctive* but merely *typical* characteristics, it will be necessary to take a general survey of mankind. It will be found

that these characteristics become so modified, altered, and evanescent, that to draw an absolute line of demarcation among five, or any other number of varieties of the human family, is totally impossible. The Negro and the European are the two extremes, which, as in every other particular in which the various tribes of human kind differ, pass into each other by insensible gradations. The terms, white and black races, can be used only in the general sense of Caucasian and Ethiopian varieties. The complexion implies no distinction of species; for it can be readily shown that, in this respect, the African tribes vary much, that the American aboriginals exhibit the extremes of white and black, and that even the Caucasians, generally characterized as white, present nations decidedly black. In the frontispiece to the third volume of Prichard's "Researches into the Physical History of Man," we have a striking specimen of a black Caucasian, being a portrait of Rahomun Roy—"a Brahmin of undoubtedly pure race." Among the Arabs, according to the country they inhabit, we discover the extremes of complexion. "The general complexion of the Shegya Arabs," says Mr. Waddington, "is a jet black." He adds—"The Shegya, as I have already mentioned, are black—a clear, glossy, jet black, which appeared to my then unprejudiced eyes to be the finest color that could be selected for a human being. They are distinguished in every respect from the Negroes by the brightness of their color; by their hair and the regularity of their features; by the mild and dewy lustre of their eyes; and by the softness of their touch, in which last respect they yield not to Europeans." As the Arabs on the Nile do not intermarry with the natives, as appears by the accounts given by Burckhardt and Ruppell, the blackness of their complexion can be ascribed to climate alone. In more northern, and particularly in more elevated regions, the hue of the Arab's skin is not less fair than that of the European. "The Arab women," says Bruce, "are not black; there are even some exceedingly fair." Among the Otaheitans, who have been long celebrated for their personal beauty, the skin of the lower orders has a brown tint, which becomes so gradually lost in those of a superior caste, that the complexion in the higher ranks is nearly white, or at least but slightly tinged with brown. On the cheek of the women, a blush may be readily observed. The usual color of the hair is black, but it is of a fine texture, and not unfrequently brown, flaxen, and even red. Of the natives of the

Marquesas, it has been said that "in form they are, perhaps, the finest in the world," and that their skin is naturally "very fair;" while in the color of their hair, all the various shades found in the different tribes of the Caucasian race, are exhibited.

Even among the American tribes, known the world over as the "*red-man*," the most remarkable diversities of complexion are presented, varying from a decided white to an unequivocally black skin. Of so deep a hue are the Californians, that La Perouse compares them to the Negroes in the West Indies. "The complexion of the Californians," he says, "very nearly resembles that of those Negroes whose hair is not woolly." In contrast to these black Californians, we have, on our northwest coast, tribes with skins as white as the complexion of the natives of southern Europe. Captain Dixon describes a female whose "countenance had all the cheerful glow of an English milk-maid, and the healthy red which flushed her cheek, was even beautifully contrasted with the whiteness of her neck; her forehead was so remarkably clear that the translucent veins were seen meandering even in the minutest branches."

So far, then, we can discover no distinctive characteristics, by which the American Aboriginal "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind*." But as difference of color is the most obvious diversity of human organization that meets the popular eye, we will present to our readers the conclusion of the learned Prichard on the same point.

"That the different complexions of mankind," he says, "are not permanent characters, may be sufficiently proved by numerous facts collected from the physical history of particular races of men. It is hardly necessary, in this instance, to appeal to the infinite number of phenomena which are to be found, precisely analogous in all the circumstances of their origin and subsequent propagation and permanence in entire breeds, in the various tribes of animals, there being scarcely any tribe of warm-blooded creatures which are not subject to become thus diversified. The reader will find in the following outline of the history of particular tribes of the human family, instances of this variation of color,—of a change from white to black, and from black to white, or of both complexions actually subsisting in the undoubted progeny of the same stock; and these instances so multiplied and so well authenticated, as to leave no doubt as to the conclusion which we are obliged to draw in this part,

at least, of the investigation before us, as to the great question of the unity or diversity of the human species."

The hair of our Indian presents so little diversity from the rest of mankind, as to require no special notice; but as much stress has always been laid upon the national differences of the human hair, by those who hold that the Negro is of a distinct species from our own, a few general observations will not be deemed out of place. As regards the *hair, beard, and color of the iris*, we observe, indeed, strongly marked varieties, all these having a relation with the color of the skin. While the head of the Caucasian race is adorned with an ample growth of fine locks, and his face with a copious beard, the Negro's head presents short woolly knots, and that of the American or Mongolian, coarse and straight hair, all having nearly beardless faces; and with this diminution of the beard is combined a general smoothness of the whole body. That the coloring principle in the skin and hair is of a common nature, is evident from the fact, that among the white races every gradation from the fair to the dark is accompanied by a corresponding alteration in the tint of the hair. This remark applies equally to the colored varieties of men, for all these have black hair; but among the spotted Africans, according to Blumenbach, the hairs growing out of a white patch on the head are white. These facts in connection with others observed among inferior animals, as the dog, sheep, and goat, prove sufficiently that a distinction of species cannot be established on the mere difference in the hair. Upon this point, Prichard very happily remarks:—

"That if this cuticular excrescence of the Negro were really not hair, but a fine wool,—if it were precisely analogous to the finest wool,—still this would by no means prove the Negro to be of a peculiar and separate stock, since we know that some tribes of animals bear wool, while others of the same species are covered with hair. It is true that in some instances this peculiarity depends immediately on climate, and is subject to vary when the climate is changed; but in others, it is deeply fixed in the breed, and almost amounts to a permanent variety."

But the so-called *woolly* hair of the Negro is not wool in fact, but merely a curled and twisted hair. This has been proved by microscopic observation, upon the well-known law, that the character which distinguishes wool from hair consists in the serrated nature of its external surface, giving to it its felting property.

That the physical characters of nations have certain relations to climate, is an opinion warranted by facts, the erudite arguments of Lawrence to the contrary notwithstanding. Our remarks here, however, will be restricted mostly to the single question relative to the human complexion. The limits of Negroland, properly so called, seem to be confined to the inter-tropical regions of Africa. Now, if we proceed southward of Central Africa, we find the hue of the negro grow less black, as in the Caffres and Hottentots; and, on the other hand, we discover the same law north of the tropic of Cancer. Although some of the tribes in the Oases of the Great Desert are said to be black, yet they are generally brown or almost white; and when we reach the second system of highlands, which has a temperate climate, the inhabitants present the flowing hair and complexion of the southern Europeans. This general law, if the comparison is extended to Europe, is confirmed. On comparing the three elevated tracts bounding and containing between them the Mediterranean and the Great Sahara, we find that the intermediate region, (Mount Atlas,) differs much less from the northern (the Alps and Pyrenees) than from the southern chain, (the Lunar Mountains.) The same law is evident in each, as respects vegetation and the physical characters of the human races. While the mountains of Central Africa are inhabited by negroes, the Berbers of Mount Atlas show but little difference of physical characters when compared with the Spaniards and Piedmontese. For the purpose of more extended comparison, Prichard divides Europe and Africa into eight zones, through which he traces a gradation in the physical characters of the human race. Within the tropics, as just observed, the inhabitants, if we confine ourselves to the low and plain countries, are universally black. South of this region are the red people of Caffreland; and, next to these, are the yellowish-brown Hottentots. North of Negroland, are the "*gentes subfusi coloris*" of Leo,—tribes of a brownish hue, but varying from this shade to a perfect black. The next zone is the region of the Mediterranean, including Spaniards, Moors, Greeks, Italians, etc., among whom we find black hair, dark eyes, and a brownish-white complexion, predominant features. In the zone north of the Pyreno-Alpine line, the color of the hair is generally chestnut-brown, to which that of the skin and eyes bears a certain relation. Next come the races characterized by yellow hair, blue eyes, and a florid complexion, such as those of England,

Denmark, Finland, the northern parts of Germany, and a great portion of Russia. And north of these are the Swedes and Norwegians, distinguished by white hair and light gray eyes.

It were desirable that Prichard had proceeded still farther north, and told us why the Laplanders, Greenlanders, Esquimaux, Samoiedes, etc., have a very dark complexion. This fact has always been a stumbling-block in the way of the advocates of a connection between climate and the human complexion. By them it has been referred to their food, consisting of fish and rancid oil, to the grease and paint with which they besmear the body, aided by the clouds of smoke in which they sit constantly involved in their wretched cabins. The agency of these causes is strongly advocated by Dr. Samuel Stanhope Smith, who also refers to Blumenbach, Fourcroy, and J. F. Meckel, who concur in the opinion that, from the affinity of the bile with the fat or oil of the animal body, nations that subsist chiefly on food consisting of animal oil, not only smell of it, but acquire a very dark complexion. But these northern tribes have the olive complexion, the broad large face and flat nose, and the other features which characterize the Mongolian variety. Hence Lawrence maintains that the distinguishing characters of the German and French, or the Esquimaux or more southern Indians, find no explanation in climate influences. On the contrary, he ascribes the peculiarities of these northern pigmies to the same cause that makes the Briton and German of this day resemble the portraits of their ancestors, drawn by Cæsar and Tacitus. The French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italians, belong, he says, to the Celtic race, whose black hair and browner complexion are distinguished from the blue eyes and fair skin of the German tribes, which include the Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, English, modern Germans, etc.

That climate exercises an influence in causing diversity of color, is an opinion likewise strengthened by the analogy of inferior animals. As we approach the poles, we find every thing progressively assume a whiter livery, as bears, foxes, hares, falcons, crows, and blackbirds; while some animals, as the ermine, weasel, squirrel, reindeer, and snow-bunting, change their color to gray or white, even in the same country, as the winter season advances.

We thus discover a marked relation between the physical characters of nations and climate as expressed by latitude,—a law that obtains equally in the modification of climate induced

by elevation. Thus the sandy or brown hair of the Swiss, contrasts strongly with the black hair and eyes of those that dwell below on the plains of Lombardy. Among the natives of the more elevated parts of the Biscayan country, the black hair and swarthy complexion of the Castilians give place to light blue eyes, flaxen hair, and a fair complexion. In the northern parts of Africa, we observe the same law as regards the Berbers of the plains and the Shulah mountaineers. And even in the intertropical region of Africa, several examples are adduced by Prichard. We surely cannot regard as a mere coincidence the fact, that the intertropical countries all around the globe have black inhabitants; tropical America, from its great elevation, constituting only an apparent exception, and thus illustrating the law that an exception may prove the rule.

Hence it is obvious, that in no point of view can the facts presented in reference to the complexion and the hair, be reconciled with the hypothesis that the Negro constitutes a distinct species, and in a much less degree the American, inasmuch as we do not find in any department of nature, that separate species of organization ever pass into each other by insensible degrees. We will add a few facts in regard to the so-called woolly hair, which, it has been seen, is not wool in fact. Although the shape of the head, among the South African tribes, differs in a degree corresponding to the extent of their civilization, yet it would seem that the crisp and woolly state of the hair, notwithstanding the complexion is considerably lighter than among the tribes of Central Africa, experiences no modification. The Caffres, for example, who have black and woolly hair, with a deep brown skin, have the high forehead and prominent nose of the Europeans, with projecting cheek-bones and thickish lips. This tribe, as well as the Iolofs near the Senegal, scarcely differ from Europeans, with the exception of the complexion and woolly hair. Other tribes, as for instance the darkest of the Abyssinians, approximate the Europeans still more, in the circumstance that the hair, though often crisp and frizzled, is never woolly. Again, some of the tribes near the Zambesi, according to Prichard, have hair in rather long and flowing ringlets, notwithstanding the complexion is black, and the features have the negro type. The civilized Mandingos, on the other hand, have a cranial organization differing much from that of their degraded neighbors, yet in respect to the hair, there is no change.

A similar observation applies to the natives of the islands in the great Southern Ocean.

This peculiarity of hair would be regarded by Prichard as a *permanent* variety, which "differs from species," he says, "in this circumstance, that the peculiarities in question are not coeval with the tribe, but sprang up in it since the commencement of its existence, and constitute a deviation from its original character." The so-termed woolly hair of the negro, may perhaps be, with good reason, classed among the *accidental* or *congenital* diversities of mankind, which are transmitted from the parent to the offspring. This would certainly not be more extraordinary than the phenomenon of the *otter-breed* of sheep, which occurred in New England. Such peculiarities in an individual, at a remote and unknown period, may have readily become the characteristics of a whole nation; for then mankind, few in numbers, were dispersing themselves in detached bodies over the face of the earth; and we can easily comprehend how, in the event of the occurrence of any peculiarity of color, form, or structure, it would naturally, as society multiplied in these detached bodies, become the characteristics of an entire people. Under existing circumstances, however, or indeed ever since the population of the world has been comparatively large, these peculiarities of organization can extend very little beyond the individuals in whom they first appear, being soon entirely lost in the general mass.

It will be observed that we dwell particularly upon the characteristics of the Negro; and to this we are led for the reason that as they constitute much greater deviations from the Caucasian type than those of the American variety, it follows that the reconciliation of the former with the Mosaic account of the unity of the human family, will the more completely disprove the conclusion of Morton, that "there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new." He adds—"Once for all, I repeat my conviction that the study of physical conformation alone excludes every branch of the Caucasian race from any obvious participation in the peopling of this continent." Now, if the principles developed in this essay are founded in nature; such as, the origination of the diversities of man from congenital causes, and the doctrine that there is an intimate connection between physical feature and moral and intellectual character, both being influenced by local causes, then does this

last conclusion likewise prove a mere postulate. That there is a remarkable coincidence between the natural talents and dispositions of nations and the development of their brains, cannot be denied. This is illustrated in the intellectual superiority of the Caucasian race, taken in connection with the development of the anterior portion of the brain. Time was, no doubt, when the present distinction of races did not exist; and hence, at the period when man, in his gradual diffusion, reached America, the Caucasian race may scarcely have been known as a distinct variety.

"This idea [the American race being essentially separate and peculiar] may, at first view," says Morton, "seem incompatible with the history of man, as recorded in the Sacred Writings. Such, however, is not the fact. Where others can see nothing but chance, we can perceive a wise and obvious design displayed in the original adaptation of the several races of men to those varied circumstances of climate and locality, which, while congenial to the one, are destructive to the other." As difficulties, regarded by some as insuperable, have been encountered in tracing back the diverse varieties of mankind to the same single pair, Morton, like others before him, has cut this imaginary Gordian knot by calling in the aid of supernatural agency. He thinks it "consistent with the known government of the universe to suppose that the same Omnipotence that created man, would adapt him at once to the physical as well as to the moral circumstances in which he was to dwell upon the earth." Now this supposed miracle did not, of course, occur until the dispersion of Babel; and, inasmuch as man is endowed with a pliability of functions, by which he is rendered a cosmopolite,—a faculty possessed in the highest degree by the inhabitants of the middle latitudes,—there is not the slightest ground for the belief that it ever did occur, simply because no such special adaptation was demanded. The *chief* characteristics which distinguish the several varieties of man, viz., the comparative development of the moral feelings and intellectual powers, require no particular adaptation to external causes. Least of all, could the American race, regarded by Morton as the same exterior man "*in every locality and under every variety of circumstances,*" have been endowed with an "*original adaptation*" "*to the varied circumstances of climate and locality,*" inasmuch as the region inhabited by them, embraces every zone of the earth, through a distance of one hundred and fifty degrees of

latitude! Is not this an absolute confutation of his own theory?

But for this boasted power of accommodating himself to all climates, man is less indebted to the pliability of his body than to the ingenuity of his mind; for, although naturally more defenceless against external agents than inferior animals, yet, by the exercise of his mental endowments, he can interpose a thousand barriers against the deleterious effects of climate. That man thus modifies the agencies of the elements upon himself, is sufficiently obvious; but there arises the converse question, already noticed—Do not these agencies likewise modify him, thus fitting him to possess and occupy the whole earth? Are we not to attribute to these physical causes, in connection with moral conditions, the very different organization presented in different regions by the same human family? Hence arises the question constituting the leading object of this paper,—*Have all these diverse races descended from a single stock?* Or, on the other hand,—*Have the different races of mankind, from the beginning of their existence, differed from one another in their physical, moral, and intellectual nature?* The labors of naturalists in recent years have demonstrated an admirable conformity between the organic capabilities of each region of the earth and the surrounding physical circumstances. This peculiar adaptation of organic structure to local conditions, is apparent in the camel of the sandy deserts in which he is placed, as his stomach has cells for holding water; and also in the circumstance, that the hooved animals of South America are suited to the precipitous Cordilleras, while the solidungular quadrupeds of Southern Africa are equally adapted to its vast sandy plains. And we may add that a most remarkable instance of similar adaptation has recently come to light, in the fact that there have been discovered, in the Mammoth Cave of Kentucky, fish *without eyes*,—a specimen of which is now in the New-York Lyceum of Natural History.

The natural history of man in regard to his diversities may also receive valuable elucidation from comparative physiology, as well as the laws of the distribution and migration of plants and inferior animals. So similar is the physical organization of man and the brute creation,—so identical are the laws whereby their species are preserved,—and so analogous is their subjection to the operation of natural causes, to the laws of morbid influences, and to the agency of those artificial combinations

resulting from domestication and civilization,—that we have, says Wiseman, “almost a right to argue from one’s actual to the other’s possible modifications.” The geographic distribution of inferior animals as connected with that of man, is deemed of importance, on the presumption that the great diversity and the dispersion of the human race are regulated by some general plan, analogous to that which is apparent in the distribution of the former.

But as regards the *dispersion of animals*, we are unwillingly obliged wholly to forego its discussion; and as respects the *phenomena of variation among plants and animals*, which are most remarkably displayed in the cultivated tribes of the former, and the domesticated races of the latter, we are only permitted to take a glance. The best authenticated examples of the effects produced upon animals by a change of external circumstances, are afforded by the modifications developed in certain breeds transported to the new world. As our space will not allow us to present any details, we cannot do better than give the inferences deduced by Prichard upon this subject.

“1. That tribes of animals which have been domesticated by man and carried into regions where the climates are different from those of their native abodes, undergo, partly from the agency of climate, and in part from the change of external circumstances connected with the state of domesticity, great variations.

“2. That these variations extend to considerable modifications in external properties, color, the nature of the integument, and of its covering, whether hair or wool; the structure of limbs, and the proportional size of parts; that they likewise involve certain physiological changes or variations as to the laws of the animal economy; and lastly, certain psychological alterations or changes in the instincts, habits, and powers of perception and intellect.

“3. That these last changes are in some cases brought about by training, and that the progeny acquires an aptitude to certain habits which the parents have been taught; that psychical characters, such as new instincts, are developed in breeds by cultivation.

“4. That these varieties are sometimes permanently fixed in the breed so long as it remains unmixed.

“5. That all such variations are possible only to a limited extent, and always with the preservation of a particular type, which is that of the species. Each species has a definite or definable

character, comprising certain undeviating phenomena of external structure, and likewise constant and unchangeable characteristics in the laws of its animal economy and in its physiological nature. It is only within these limits that deviations are produced by external circumstances."

Admitting, then, that these phenomena of variation are analogous to the diversities which distinguish the various races of the human family, it follows that the latter should present still greater differences; for, while each species of animals inferior to man is mostly confined to a limited region and to a mode of existence that is simple and uniform, the human races are scattered over the whole face of the earth, under every variety of physical circumstances, in addition to the influences arising from a moral and intellectual nature. It was long ago remarked by Blumenbach, that the difference between the skull of our swine and that of the primitive wild boar, is quite equal to that observed between the crania of the Negro and of the European. That swine were unknown in America until carried hither from Europe, is a conceded point; and, notwithstanding the comparatively short period that has intervened, there now exist many breeds, exhibiting the most striking peculiarities as compared with one another or with the original stock. The pigs carried in 1509 from Spain to Cuba degenerated, according to Herera, into a monstrous race, with toes half a span long. They here became more than twice as large as their European progenitors. Again, we find the breed of domestic swine in France, with a high convex spine and hanging head, just the reverse of that of England, with a straight back and pendulous belly. In Hungary and Sweden, we meet with a solidungular race. It is also observed by Blumenbach, "that there is less difference in the form of the skull in the most dissimilar of mankind, than between the elongated head of the Neapolitan horse and the skull of the Hungarian breed, which is remarkable for its shortness and the extent of the lower jaw."

Returning to the characteristics of the American Aboriginal, we find, as regards physiological laws, no deviation from the rest of mankind. As respects the *duration of human life*, it is evident that there exists no well marked difference among the different families of men. As all nations have the tendency to exist for a given time,—the three-score-and-ten of the Hebrew being also allotted to our Indian,—they appear thus also as *one* species. The duration of human life, however, varies from the

influence of external causes in different climates upon the animal economy; but, at the same time, individuals removed to a new climate acquire in successive generations a gradual physical adaptation to its local conditions. Thus the natives of the western coast of Africa and of the West Indies, notwithstanding the destructiveness of these climates to Europeans, sustain comparatively little inconvenience. As the cells of the camel's stomach, as already remarked, show a wonderful adaptation of organic structure to local conditions, without being referred to climatic agency, so the system of the Negro, as his skin is a much more active organ of depuration than that of the white man, is better adapted, let the remote cause be what it may, to the warm, moist, and miasmial climates of the tropics.

If the comparison as regards the duration of human life, however, is extended to the simiæ, notwithstanding their very close approximation to man in physical structure, the contrast is very great. As the greatest longevity of the troglodyte is no more than thirty years, we thus perceive, more especially when also we consider that all the monkey tribes, in their natural state, are confined almost wholly to the intertropical zone, the close relation of what are generally regarded as extreme diversities among the human races. As we discover no difference in this respect among the three races of the European, our Indian, and the Negro, there is little ground for introducing, as was done by Linnaeus, Buffon, Helvetius, and Monboddo, the ourang-outang into the human family. Moreover, we find as attributes common to the three races just mentioned, the erect attitude, the two hands, the slow development of the body, and the exercise of reason. On the other hand, the whole structure of the monkey, who is four-handed, proves that to him the erect attitude is not natural. The striking characteristics of the predominance of the fore arm over the upper arm, and the great length of the upper and the shortness of the lower limbs, are peculiarly adapted to his climbing habits. How beautifully is the majestic attitude of man, which announces to all the other inhabitants of the globe his superiority, described in the words of Ovid:

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit; cælumque tueri
Jussit; et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

And while all other creatures to the dust
Bend their low look, to man a front sublime
He gave, and bade him ever scan the skies,
And to the stars lift up his lofty gaze.

As regards the progress of *physical development and the periodical changes of the constitution*, such as the frequency of the pulse, the period appointed by nature for marriage, or any other of the vital functions, it appears that mankind, whether aboriginal to the old or the new world, present little diversity; and this little is of course attributable to difference of climate.

The *pathological history* of the different races constitutes as much a part of their physical description, as any feature in their anatomical structure; for there are certain diseases peculiar to man, a list of which has been made out by Blumenbach. From a survey of the facts connected with this question, it appears that the whole human family, making due allowance for endemic influences, are equally subject to those ills which "flesh is heir to," thus confirming the doctrine that a common nature pertains to all human kind.

But there are other facts on the ground of physical characteristics tending to show that the American Aboriginal does not stand "isolated." The affinity of the Americans with the people of Eastern Asia, notwithstanding the very remote period at which man, in his gradual diffusion, reached our continent, is confirmed by a striking physiognomical resemblance, as well as by many customs, arts, and religious observances. As regards a resemblance in physical characteristics, the evidence of many travellers, who were competent judges, might be introduced with much point. "The American race," says Humboldt, "has a striking resemblance to the Mongol nations, which include those formerly called Huns, Kulans, and Kalmucks."—"We observed," says Barrow, speaking of the Brazilian Indians, "the Tartar or Chinese features, *particularly the eye*, strongly marked in the countenance of these Indians." Of the Chiriguano, a Peruvian tribe, Mr. Temple speaks thus:—"Had I seen them in Europe, I should have supposed them to be Chinese, so closely do they resemble those people in their features." The testimony of many others equally decisive might be presented, but it will suffice to adduce one more, viz., Mr. Ledyard, who speaks from extensive personal knowledge. Writing from Siberia to Mr. Jefferson, he says—"I shall never be able without seeing you in person, and perhaps not then, to inform you how universally and circumstantially *the Tartars resemble the Aborigines of America*. They are the same people—the most ancient and the most numerous of any other; and had not a small sea divided them, they would all have been still known by the same name." Among the numerous facts that

might be adduced in illustration of the same affinity, on the score of customs, a single one must suffice. The Scythians, like our Indians, were in the habit of *scalping* their enemies slain in battle, both regarding these scalps as their proudest trophies. This is related by Herodotus, (Melpomene, LXIV.,) who also describes the mode of stripping the skin from the head. Besides, the Thracians are described by Homer as having their hair only on the crown of the head; and this custom, as among our Indians, prevails generally among the Mongol nations, the head being shaved, and only a tuft or tress of hair left on the crown. The Caucasian nations, on the other hand, have, in all ages, cherished an abundant growth of hair.

Let us now consider the *mental endowments* of the American Aborigines. As regards their *moral traits*, Dr. Morton thinks the characteristics quite distinctive; and of these, the following may be considered the strongest. "One nation," he says, "is in almost perpetual hostility with another, tribe against tribe, man against man; and with this ruling passion are linked a merciless revenge and an unsparing destructiveness." But these characteristics can be considered merely as the extreme of passions common to all mankind, not only in the savage state, but, under certain circumstances, in the condition of the highest civilization. Without referring to the barbarous excesses of nations equally uncivilized, behold Rome, even in her most palmy day, when she was wont to drag in chains her barbarian captives from the remotest frontier, to swell the triumphal pomp of a successful general! Britain and Thrace thus yielded up their noblest spirits, that spurned the yoke in vain, to die for the amusement of Roman ladies! Compelled to enter the amphitheatre of wild beasts and the arena of the gladiator, the captives were—

"Butchered to make a Roman holiday."

Behold next the historic page of not only *civilized*, but *Christianized* man. But we would not bring to the light of day the deeds of a nation belonging to our own enlightened age,—a people who, pretending to wisdom and philosophy, established a "reign of terror,"—cannibals who drank the blood and ate the hearts of their victims! These moral convulsions which tear up the elements of society, throw a fearful light on the ferocity of human nature, hidden under the arts and pleasures of civilized nations. They are like the convulsions of

physical nature, which disclose volcanic fires beneath fertile and flowery fields.

It is thus seen that the *cruelty* of our Indian is not without a parallel,—a remark that applies equally to his *love of vengeance*. A Scotch Highlander, wronged by an individual of another clan, for example, retaliated on the first of the same tribe that fell into his power. The feuds of the Corsican become hereditary: vengeance is taken by one family upon another, the actors in which may have been unborn at the period of the original quarrel.

As regards the *intellectual faculties* of our aboriginal race, Morton is of opinion that they "are decidedly inferior to the Mongolian stock; * * and as to their social condition, they are, probably, in most respects the same as at the primitive epoch of their existence." The general inaptitude of Indian character to conform to new laws and customs, it has been shown by experience, presents, however, no insuperable barrier to their gradual civilization. The Choctaws and Cherokees, and the Creeks to a considerable extent, abandoning the venatic life, have become an agricultural people. Advancing in the useful arts, the acquisition of knowledge and property has gone hand in hand; and in proportion as mental cultivation has taught them the value of salutary and uniform laws, they have become capable of enjoying the blessings of free government. The Cherokees live under written laws, one feature of which is the trial by jury. The Choctaws are rapidly advancing in civilization. In an agricultural point of view, their country resembles the new frontier of white settlements. They understand the value of money, and possess the comforts of domestic life, such as the common luxuries of tea, coffee, and sugar. They cultivate Indian corn and cotton, have large stocks of cattle, and have cotton-gins and mills of different kinds, as well as mechanical shops. In these three tribes, likewise, the rising generation have the advantage of schools, a portion of the annuity received from our government being appropriated to that purpose.*

* It has been recently stated in the Natchitoches Herald that the Choctaws, who number 17,000 souls, have raised \$40,000 to build a College for the education of their youth; and that they have a press which last year printed more than three million pages of books and pamphlets. Do these people belong to a race unsusceptible of civilization?

That the American Aboriginal is susceptible of civilization is proved by the single fact, that three contemporary centres of civilization, each independent of the other, existed in tropical America, viz., the Mexicans in the north, the Peruvians in the south, and the Muyscas of Bogota intermediate. Nor did these three civilized states stand isolated from their barbarous neighbors; but, on the contrary, the two extremes gradually merge into each other, some nations in this gradation holding a place so completely intermediate as to render it difficult to classify them with either division. In this relation stood the Araucanians to the Peruvians; the Aztec rulers of Mexico, at the period of the Spanish invasion, to the less fierce Toltecas, whose arts they had usurped; and still later, the Natchez tribes of the Mississippi exhibited, even among many of the rudest traits of savage life, some traces of the refinement of their Mexican progenitors. To what degree of civilization the Mexicans and Peruvians would have attained, had America remained unknown to Europe, it is of course impossible to determine; but even had Mexico and Peru undergone intellectual degradation and gradual extinction from intrinsic causes, there would not be wanting analogous events in the history of the old world. Look upon the present state of Italy and Greece, and contrast them with the people who gave glory to the age of Augustus and Pericles! This state of things did in reality exist in America at the period of its discovery, as is proved by the three great groups of monumental antiquities in the United States, New Spain, and South America. Many of the ancient and cultivated nations had become extinct, or subjugated by the inroads of barbarous or semi-civilized tribes; and even in Mexico and Peru, the civilization of earlier ages seems to have sunk into a state of decadence.

Of all parts of America, the tropical portions are best adapted for awakening the savage man to a sense of his intellectual powers. That the civilization of countries is greatly influenced by climate and physical features, is evident in the fact that the cradles or nurseries of the first nations of which we have any historical records—the people in which the intellectual faculties were first awakened from the brutal sloth of savage life—appear to have been extensive plains or valleys, irrigated by fertilizing streams, and blessed with a mild climate. As the means of sustenance are in such localities easily obtained, the human mind, if man in this primitive state will reflect at all, is

most apt to receive that impulse which leads to the cultivation and development of his nature. It is in such regions that we discover the most ancient centres of population; as, for example, the simple habits of wandering shepherds were exchanged by the Semitic nations for the splendor and luxury of Nineveh and Babylon; and in the fertile valley watered by the Nile, we also find the first foundation of cities, and the earliest establishment of political institutions; and here, too, were invented hieroglyphic literature and those arts which embellish human life. Thus has it, likewise, been in America; for the elevated lands within the tropics afford a delightful climate, the heats of summer and the rigors of winter being alike moderated; and here the earth yields its fruits almost spontaneously. Hence it was in this region that the American Aboriginal first received the impulse of social improvement; here were laid the first foundation of cities; and here, too, as was just remarked of Egypt, was invented hieroglyphic literature.

As the most ancient cities of which we have any record, as Babylon, Nineveh, and Thebes, were founded in the midst of *alluvial* soils, deposited by the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Nile, this agency would appear to have been the means employed, in the economy of nature, to prepare the world for the residence of social and civilized man. Geology would, indeed, seem to demonstrate, that the formation of soils for the support of animal and vegetable life, is one of the numerous evidences of design, by which the external world has, through successive physical revolutions, ultimately become so admirably adapted to the moral, intellectual, and physical condition of man.

From the recent extensive researches relative to American antiquities, we seem fairly warranted in the following conclusions. The first seats of civilization were in tropical America, whence it was gradually diffused north and south. In the history of the civilized tribes, two distinct epochs are observable, the first and most ancient having existed in unbroken tranquillity for a long and indeterminate period; the second being characterized by national changes brought about chiefly by the inroads of barbarous or semi-civilized tribes. The style and character peculiar to the monumental antiquities of the New World, prove that all have proceeded from branches of the same human family.

The relics and monuments found in the United States, which point for their origin toward Mexico, show that the ancient in-

habitants had arrived at a considerable degree of civilization,—that they were an agricultural people, lived in extensive cities, and under regular forms of government,—that they possessed a knowledge of the use of many metals, were skilled in the art of fortification, and were not unacquainted with astronomy and geometry; the last two, as well as a decided system of religion, being in the hands of the priesthood. At the period of the discovery of America, these ancient and cultivated nations had become extinct within the present limits of the United States, with the exception of the Natchez tribes of the Mississippi, who still retained some traces of the civilization of their Mexican progenitors. These extinct tribes were no doubt coeval, if they did not precede them, with the ancient Egyptians and Phenicians. With the ancient inhabitants of that portion of North America lying south of the United States, we are better acquainted. Unlike the latter region, in which the prior existence of civilized communities became a question of inquiry to the antiquary, the former affords the most decisive evidence of having been occupied for many ages by civilized nations. Mexico, Guatemala, and Yucatan, were found by the Spanish invaders occupied by populous nations, distributed in regularly organized states, partaking of the monarchical, aristocratical, and republican forms of government. Here were immense cities, rivalling in the magnificence of their temples and edifices those of the Old World,—a remark equally applicable to roads, aqueducts, and other public works. It has been well said that, as regards civilization, those people were decidedly superior to the Spaniards themselves on their first intercourse with the Phenicians, or that of the Gauls when first known to the Greeks, or that of the Germans and Britons in their earliest communication with the Romans. Indeed, in the knowledge of some of the sciences, these aboriginal Americans equalled, if they did not surpass, their conquerors. They seem to have had a mental constitution adapted to scientific investigation. Their knowledge of arithmetic and astronomy was both extensive and accurate. In architecture and sculpture they had made great advances. The remains of aqueducts and canals for irrigation yet exist. They knew how to extract metals from ores; how to form images of gold and silver hollow within; how to cut the hardest precious stones with the greatest nicety; how to dye cotton and wool, and to manufacture them into figured stuffs. Herrera, in his account of the markets at the Mexican

city of Tlascala, says—"There were goldsmiths, feather-men, barbers, baths, and as good earthenware as in Spain."

A description of the ancient cities and other ruins of the southern regions of North America, would of itself fill volumes. Clavigero, who has collected much important testimony upon this subject, asserts, upon the authority of Cortez, that not only were their cities numerous, but that some of them contained from thirty to sixty thousand houses; and so populous were they in the vicinity of these towns, that "not a foot of the soil was left uncultivated." As regards the present appearances of these monumental remains or vestiges of ancient population, it will suffice to refer the reader to the well-known works of Stephens, illustrated by Catherwood.

The stupendous pyramids, constituting the temples of our aboriginal race, are perhaps their most extraordinary monuments. The number of these in the Mexican empire, according to the estimate of Torquemada is forty thousand; but Clavigero thinks the number was far greater. The ruins of the celebrated pyramid, sacred to Quetzalcoatl, the "God of the Air," supposed to have been the largest in all Mexico, still stand to the east of the holy city of Cholula. The area covered by its base is twice as great as that of the Egyptian pyramid of Cheops, having a length of 1423 feet, and its altitude, which is 170 feet, is ten feet greater than that of the pyramid of Mycerinus.

Notwithstanding all these ruins are completely deserted, it is noway probable that they are the relics of a people now extinct. By the Spanish conquerors, the temples were found still devoted to their original sacred uses, and the magnificent palaces were not without their princes. The finest temple of the city of Mexico was erected but a short period before the landing of Cortez; and the great "Teocalli," we are told, was constructed after the model of the pyramids built by the Toltecs,—a people who preceded those found by the Spaniards, and to whom were ascribed by the Mexicans themselves all edifices of great antiquity. When the Europeans first arrived, it is very probable that many cities, in consequence of the revolutions to which every government is subject, had already been deserted, perhaps for centuries. It is, however, true beyond doubt that the ancestors of the present Indians occupying that region, were the authors of many of the existing antiquities indicative of a comparatively high state of civilization. In view of these facts, the relics and monuments scattered over the United States, in

connection with the uncivilized condition of its inhabitants when first discovered by Europeans, will the less excite our surprise. Like the "middle ages" of the old world, the new has had its still *darker* ones.

We are pleased to add, that in these conclusions we are confirmed by those of Stephens, whose opinions, on the score of extensive observation, are entitled to much credit. From his "*Incidents of Travel in Yucatan*," we make the following extracts:

"It is my belief that within this region, cities like those we have seen in ruins were kept up and occupied for a long time, perhaps one or two centuries, after the conquest, and that, down to a comparatively late period, Indians were living in them, the same as before the discovery of America. In fact, I conceive it to be not impossible that within this secluded region may exist at this day, unknown to white men, a living aboriginal city, occupied by relics of the ancient race, who still worship in the temples of their fathers."

On another occasion, our traveller remarks:—"Who were the builders of these American cities? My opinion on this question has been fully and freely expressed, [alluding to his former work,] *that they are not the works of a people who have passed away, and whose history is lost, but of the same races who inhabited the country at the time of the Spanish conquest, or of some not very distant progenitors.* Some were probably in ruins, but in general I believe that they were occupied by the Indians at the time of the Spanish invasion. The grounds of this belief are interspersed throughout these pages."

And in the following opinion we likewise fully concur:—"Degraded as the Indians are now," says Stephens, "they are not lower in the scale of intellect than the serfs of Russia, while it is a well known fact that the greatest architect in that country, the builder of the Cazan Charch, at St. Petersburg, was taken from that abject class, and by education became what he is. In my opinion, teaching might again lift up the Indian, might impart to him the skill to sculpture stone and carve wood; and if restored to freedom and the unshackled powers of his mind, there might again appear a capacity to originate and construct, equal to that exhibited in the ruined monuments of his ancestors."

It is not true, as is generally supposed, that the chronicles of the conquest are quite deficient in descriptions of the great buildings then existing in Mexico and Yucatan. On the contrary, there is probably no historical question, upon which the

evidence is more specific and abundant. The testimony of Herrera, perhaps the most credible of the Spanish historians, is alone sufficient to establish beyond all controversy, the then existence of an immense number of great buildings, occupied as temples by the natives, and frequently made use of as military quarters by the invaders. "The whole country," says Herrera, "is divided into eighteen districts, and in all of them were so many and such stately stone buildings that it was amazing, and the greatest wonder is, that, having no use of any metal, they were able to raise such structures, which seem to have been temples, for their houses were always of timber, and thatched. In those edifices were carved the figures of naked men with ear-rings, after the Indian manner, idols of all sorts, lions, pots or jars, etc."

To the ancient monuments of South America, we can do no more than merely advert. These also indicate a high degree of civilization, which was not wholly confined to Peru. The tombs containing the preserved bodies of the ancient Peruvians of the upper provinces, we are told by Mr. Pentland, "are monuments of a grand species of design and architecture, resembling Cyclopean remains, and not unworthy of the arts of ancient Greece or Rome." By this people and some of the neighboring nations, cultivation of the soil was carried to a high state of perfection. Even the sides of the steepest mountains were converted, by the aid of stone walls and canals of irrigation, into productive fields. "Upon the sides of some of the mountains," says Mr. Temple, "were the remains of walls built in regular stages round them, from their base to their summits, forming terraces on which, or between which, the Indians, in days of yore, cultivated their crops." In many places, both in Peru and Chili, are still to be seen aqueducts often of great magnificence, constructed of earth and stone, and carried along the most precipitous mountains, with great labor and ingenuity, frequently to the distance of fifteen or twenty leagues—aqueducts that rival the boasted water-works of our own city of New-York. A striking resemblance to the aqueducts of Mexico is apparent in the circumstance that they consisted of two conduits running parallel, the larger being for general use, and the smaller to supply, while the other was being cleansed, the actual wants of the inhabitants. Many of these aqueducts were subterranean, there being at Lanasca a fountain supplied by such conduits, the source of which has never been traced. The very magnificence of some

of these great works, the pipes being made of gold, was the cause of their destruction by the Spaniards, whose avaricious cupidity was thus excited. Many public works were constructed for the encouragement of agriculture. In the vicinity of Santiago, in Chili, for example, an artificial aqueduct, in order to irrigate the soil of the lower plain, was formed so as to draw off a portion of the waters of the river Mapocho. "They cut channels," says Graham in his "Chile," "through the granite rock from the Mapocho to the edge of the precipice, and made use of the natural fall of the ground to throw a considerable stream from the river into the vale below. This is divided into numerous channels, as is required, and the land so watered is some of the most productive in the neighborhood of the city." But many of these lands, thus maintained fertile and productive, are now sandy and arid wastes, scarcely capable of supporting the most scanty population.

Much might be said in regard to the ruins of ancient cities, fortresses, and edifices in South America, as well as the remains of baths and works of sculpture; but we must content ourselves with one or two extracts in reference to their great public roads, which, by no means confined to Peru, still reveal their vestiges in remote regions far beyond the domain of the Inca power. "We were surprised," says Humboldt, in his journey across the plains of Assuary, "to find in this place, and at heights which greatly surpass the top of the peak of Teneriffe, the magnificent remains of a road constructed by the Incas of Peru. This causeway, lined with freestone, may be compared to the finest Roman roads I have seen in Italy, France, or Spain. It is perfectly straight, and keeps the same direction for six or eight thousand metres. We observed the continuation of this road near Caxamarca, one hundred and twenty leagues to the south of Assuary, and it is believed in the country that it led as far as the city of Cuzco." Another writer, (*Long, Polynesian Nation*, p. 78,) remarks, that "at a time when a public highway was either a relic of Roman greatness, or a sort of nonentity in England, there were roads fifteen hundred miles in length in the empire of Peru. The feudal system was as firmly established in these transatlantic kingdoms as in France. The Peruvians were ignorant of the art of forming an arch, but they had constructed suspension bridges over frightful ravines; they had no implements of iron, but their forefathers could move blocks of stone as huge as the Sphinxes and Memnons of Egypt."

In this region, as in Mexico, the ancient monuments indicate two epochs of the arts, one of remote antiquity, and the other of a more modern period. The sacred lake of Titicaca constitutes probably the most ancient locality of South American civilization; but to suppose that all the civilized tribes were comprised within the limits of the Peruvian empire, were an error of no small magnitude. The enterprise and ingenuity of the Peruvian sovereigns, when they established their extensive empire, were always ready to adopt, and reproduce on an enlarged scale, the inventions they found existing; as, for instance, the ancient structures of Tiahuanaco, which were, according to their own admission, the models of those erected by them in their own dominions.

From the foregoing facts, it would seem to follow conclusively that the American Aboriginal is susceptible of civilization. Whether the ancient Mexicans or Peruvians possessed the knowledge of hieroglyphic writing, was formerly a disputed point; but this question, as regards the advancement of their mental powers, is no longer of much importance; for even within the present age, in a tribe recently the most uncultivated, a second Cadmus has arisen in the person of an uneducated Cherokee, ignorant of every language but his own. The name of this Indian who invented a system of "talking Cherokee upon paper," is Se-qua-yah, or George Guess; and as we had the pleasure, during the removal of that tribe west of the Mississippi, in 1838, to become acquainted with a son of this Cadmus the Second, who was in the public service as a "*lingster*" or interpreter, we are enabled to state the circumstances which gave rise to this important discovery, as repeatedly related to us by the son. The thoughts of Guess were first directed into this channel by observing his nephew, who had just returned from a distant school, spelling some words, whereupon he immediately exclaimed that he could effect the same in his vernacular tongue. Building a hut in a retired spot, and thus secluding himself in a great measure from his people, he devoted himself exclusively to this great labor. His fellow countrymen, superstitious by education, grew suspicious of his object, as they viewed him in his solitary study surrounded by his cabalistic figures. Believing that he was engaged in the art of conjuration, peradventure in concocting some diabolical plan to blow up the nation, the populace succeeded in drawing him from his hermitage, when they burned up the cabin, hieroglyphics and

all. But our *second* Cadmus returned to his supposed black art; and he was soon fortunate enough to exhibit to his people one of the greatest wonders of modern times. Thus having, after two years' labor, completed his system, and instructed his daughter in the signification of the characters used, he invited his old friends, the head men and warriors of the nation, to assemble at his house to witness the result. Having explained to them the principles of his system, he then wrote down whatever was suggested by any of the visitors; and now calling in his daughter, she read it off unhesitatingly to the wonder-stricken assembly. His old friends, after repeating this several times to guard against imposition, were seized with mingled feelings of terror and amazement. One called him "*Skiagusta*" (God, or a very great man); another, "*Unantaha*" (God Almighty); and a third, "*Agagheha*" (Jesus Christ).

Like Pallas from the brain of Jove, the system sprang at once before the world complete in all its parts. A newspaper in the Cherokee language was soon published, and the greater portion of the New Testament and Watts' Hymns was translated and printed; and had not the Georgians, in a spirit of Vandalism, destroyed their printing establishment, the whole Bible might for years past have been read in the Cherokee tongue.

The elements of this written language consist of eighty-five characters, six of which represent vowels and the rest syllables. The language is not, like the ancient Egyptian, *idiographic*, that is, conveying ideas to the mind by pictures and resemblances, or metaphorical figures; nor is it, like the Chinese, *lexigraphic*, that is, representing the words of the language; but it consists of vowels and syllables, the various combinations of which have been found to embrace every word in the tongue. For a native to learn to read requires no longer a period, than the time requisite to become acquainted with the characters. The word Cherokee, for example, pronounced by the natives *Tseloge*, is represented by three characters, equivalent to *tse*, *lo*, and *ge*. This may be considered a *syllabic* alphabet, being intermediate to the European and Chinese languages, the characters of the former expressing elementary sounds, and those of the latter designating elementary objects, that is, expressing those ideas required in the infancy of knowledge, a combination of these forming additional words.

George Guess now resides with his nation west of the Mississippi, little distinguished above his neighbors for acuteness of

intellect. *His* mind at least was not, in the language of Dr. Morton, "incapable of a continued process of reasoning on abstract subjects, nor did it reject whatever requires investigation or analysis." Although a stranger to the honors of the world, the name of George Guess is destined to immortality.

Although we have thus considered at some length the *mental endowments* of our Aborigines, yet it will not be without interest and profit, to take a general view of *psychology*,—a term which comprehends not only the history of the mental faculties, but also an account of those faculties in inferior animals, which most nearly resemble the mental endowments of man. Here, again, we must call to aid our favorite author, Dr. Prichard. As it is an admitted law, that the instincts of no two separate species bear an exact resemblance to each other, that is, they do not precisely resemble each other in those internal principles, of which their actions and habits are the outward signs and manifestations,—it follows, that should it appear, on inquiry, that the whole human family are characterized by one common mind or psychical nature, a strong argument, on the ground of analogy, for their community of species and origin, would be afforded. On a first view of this question—when the mind's eye surveys, on the one hand, a Newton in his study or a Davy in his laboratory, and on the other hand, a Bushman or a native American in a state the most savage and morally degraded,—or let the *coup d'œil* take in, at the same time, the brilliant spectacle of the coronation of a European monarch, and that of the dancing and barbarous music known to the Aborigines of America or of Negroland,—under the contrasted view of these circumstances, we say, that most persons would be disposed at once to adopt the negative side of this inquiry; but when we come to trace the history of man from ancient times, we first become aware what changes time and circumstances have effected in his moral and intellectual nature. In this, in truth, lies the grand distinction between man and inferior animals; the latter being characterized by a uniformity of habits in successive generations, and the latter by variations in the same, either tending to improvement, or to alternate periods of improvement, with reverses and retrograde changes. "The Numidian lion and the satyr of the desert, the monarchies of bees and the republics of African termites," says Prichard, "are precisely to-day, what they were in the age of Æsop, and in the kingdom of Juba; while the descendants of the tribe

who are described by Tacitus, as living in squalid misery in solitary dens, amid the morasses of the Vistula, have built St. Petersburg, and Moscow; and the posterity of cannibals and phthirophagi, now feed on pillaus and wheaten bread."

There are in truth fixed principles of human action, which may be regarded as typical of the whole human family. The universal employment of conventional speech among men—the aboriginals of Africa and of America equally with those of Caucasian blood—contrasted with its total absence among inferior animals, is one of the most remarkable characteristics of humanity; and this difference serves to distinguish the two in an eminent degree, implying that mankind, who possess it universally as well as exclusively, are endowed with a common nature and origin. To the same category of exclusive characteristics belong the use of fire and of artificial clothing, and the arts in general; but the use of conventional language, as well as all the arts and sciences which ennoble and dignify human nature, are only certain outward manifestations of that internal agency which constitutes its distinctive attribute. It is in the characteristic phenomena of this principle, as compared with the psychological nature of the lower animals, that we must seek the line of distinction.

This difference is well expressed by Dr. Prichard in the following extract:—"The changeless uniformity which prevails in the habits of one class of beings, contrasted with the variation, equally remarkable when one generation is compared with another, in the higher class, is a more really characteristic difference between the life of instinctive and that of rational agents. This is the distinction most obvious, and the only one that is obvious, to a superficial and casual observer. But those who look more closely into the nature of actions, and into the more recondite history of feelings and sentiments, which are the prime movers and secret springs of actions, are enabled to discover a more important distinction, and this is to be found in the very different scope toward which the active energies of instinct and of reason are directed. The energies of all the lower animals, the whole sum of their activities, excited into action by the stimulus of desire or aversion, according to different laws impressed on each species, are directed toward the present safety and immediate well-being of the individual or of his tribe. But if we survey the whole sphere of human actions, in the

vast field of observation which the entire history of mankind presents, we shall find that the same remark can here be applied, but in a very limited degree. On the contrary, there is nothing more remarkable in the habitudes of mankind, and in their manner of existence in various parts of the world, than a reference, which is everywhere more or less distinctly perceptible, to a state of existence to which they feel themselves to be destined after the termination of their visible career, and to the influence which both civilized and barbarous men believe to be exercised over their condition, present and future, by unseen agents, differing in attributes according to the sentiments of different nations, but everywhere acknowledged to exist, and regarded with sentiments of awe and apprehension."

Amongst the psychological phenomena peculiar to human beings, these are certainly the most remarkable; and they serve, in a corresponding degree, to distinguish man, in his inward nature, from the whole life of the lower orders of creation. Dr. Prichard devotes much attention to these psychological phenomena, believing that they express principles which are common to all human races. He attempts to illustrate the psychological history of the most widely separated races of men; and he attains this end, by bringing under view, in the first place, the most striking and characteristic features relating to the moral and intellectual state, the original superstitions and religious dogmas, of uncultivated nations, prior to their acquaintance with the common acquirements of the civilized and Christianized world; and by showing, in the next place, the extent to which these tribes, when civilization and Christianity were brought within their reach, have been found capable of receiving and appropriating their blessings. To effect this purpose, he finds it sufficient to survey two or three of the most diversified races, viz., the nations of the New World and the woolly-haired races of Africa; and these he compares with the nations of Europe and Asia, by way of testing the truth of his theory.

Without following Dr. Prichard in these researches, the reader must be content with mere conclusions, which rest upon abundant historical testimony. We thus contemplate, in surveying the diversified tribes of the human family, the same general internal feelings, propensities, and aversions, as well as the same natural sentiments of subjection to invisible powers, and of accountableness, in a greater or less degree, to unseen agents

of retributive justice, from whose dread tribunal even the gates of Death are far from promising escape. In the words of the Roman Poet—

Vengeance divine to punish sin moves slow;
The slower is its pace, the surer is its blow.

As respects the institutions of religion and of civilized life, we also find that nations the most barbarous and sensual are susceptible, some more slowly than others, of becoming moulded to them, through those endowments of our mental nature which are universally recognized. We can, indeed, confirm this from our own knowledge relative to the Cherokees, many of whom we have known, as we believed, to be thoroughly imbued with the principles and sentiments of the Christian religion. When we consider that, in all ages of mankind, there have been orders of the sacerdotal and consecrated class, who have made themselves to be respected as the interpreters of destiny and as mediators between gods and men;—when we consider that these vicegerents of the Deity, call them, if you will, pontiffs, have alike exercised unlimited sway in the Vatican of the Tiber and in the temples of the Pagan world,—in the magnificent pyramids of Egypt and of the central regions of ancient America; when we consider that thousands of many nations, Christian and Pagan, white and black, have performed, every year, through long successive ages, the most toilsome pilgrimages, with the view of seeking at the tombs of prophets and saints, atonement for guilt;—when we consider that through zeal for some metaphysical dogma, which the multitude were incapable of comprehending, empires have been desolated by sacred wars; when we consider all these, and many other psychological phenomena of a similar nature that might be enumerated as belonging to the history of all the nations of the earth, barbarous and civilized, it follows as an irresistible conclusion, (more especially when it is borne in mind that every species of animal organization is characterized by specific instincts and separate psychical endowments,) that *all human races are of one species and one family*: and in addition to this deduction, who does not spontaneously feel, from a survey of these facts, the solemn conviction that *there is a God*!

To the five varieties of the human family, according to the classification of Blumenbach, and frequently to three of them,

excluding the American and Malay, it has been customary to refer all the ramifications of the human family. Taking the country of the Georgians and Circassians as the radiating point of the Caucasian race, we may trace out its principal branches by the analogies of language. The Armenian or Syrian division, directing its course to the south, gave birth to the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and untamable Arabs, with their various subdivisions. In this branch, science and literature have occasionally flourished, but always under fantastic forms. Another division embraced the Indian, German, and Pelasgic branch, in whose four principal languages we recognize a striking resemblance. The first is the Sanscrit, now the sacred language of the Hindoos; the second is the Pelasgic, the common mother of the Greek and Latin, and of almost every language now spoken in the south of Europe; thirdly, the Gothic or Teutonic, from which arose the German, Dutch, English, Danish, and Swedish languages and their dialects; and fourthly, the Slavonian, from which are derived the Russian, Polish, Bohemian, etc. This division is the most respectable branch of the Caucasian variety; for among them have philosophy, the arts, and sciences, been carried to a degree of perfection unknown to any other race.

This ethnographic inquiry has been of late years followed up with much industry, tracing out the analogies of languages into their most minute ramifications. Much credit is due to Prichard for his indefatigable researches in this respect in regard to Europe, Asia, and Africa; but it too often happens that the affinities of languages in the last two are not sufficiently known to lead to undoubted results. Prichard thinks, however, that languages, of all peculiar endowments, are the most permanently retained, and that it can be shown that they have often survived even very considerable changes in physical and moral characters. "*Glottology*, or the history of languages," he says, "founded on an accurate analysis of their relations, is almost a new field of inquiry. It has been explored with great success of late, and new discoveries are every day being made in it. Our contemporaries are becoming more and more convinced that the history of nations, termed ethnology, must be mainly founded on the relations of their languages. The ultimate object of this investigation is not to trace the history of languages, but of the tribes of men whose affinity they tend to illustrate. We must at the same time keep in view the great physical dis-

tinctions pointed out in the preceding sections, and particularly the threefold divisions of the forms of the human skull."

One thing, however, is certain, namely, that the researches of modern ethnographers have rendered in the highest degree probable, what all of our readers of course already believe—that *the languages of man were originally one*. "Instead of being perplexed with a multiplicity of languages," says Wiseman, "we have now reduced them to certain very large groups, each comprising a very great variety of languages formerly thought to be unconnected, and thus representing, as it were, only one human family originally possessing a single idiom. Now every succeeding step has clearly added to this advantage, and diminished still further any apparent hostility between the number of languages and the history of the dispersion." We cannot of course do more than give a glance at this subject upon which has been written volume upon volume. Even in Africa, according to Wiseman, "the dialects whereof have been comparatively but little studied, every new research displays connections between tribes extended over vast tracts, and often separated by intermediate nations; in the north, between the languages spoken by the Berbers and Tuariks, from the Canaries to the Oasis of Siwa; in Central Africa, between the dialects of the Felatahs and Foulas, who occupy nearly the whole interior; in the south, among the tribes across the whole continent, from Caffraria and Mozambique to the Atlantic ocean."

More recent researches confirm the same conclusion, as appears by the last No. of Silliman's Journal, in which is presented a condensed view of the results of our Exploring Expedition; and these results, it is said, when published, will equal, in amount and interest, those of any preceding expedition. It has been shown, for instance, that the investigation of the languages of the vast island or continent of New Holland, which had been supposed to be entirely distinct, has resulted in proving such a clear and intimate resemblance, that there is the strongest reason for believing that the inhabitants of this widely extended region, are *one people*, speaking languages derived from a common origin.

Let us now turn to the special object of our researches,—the *American race*, among whose languages, as they are as innumerable as the tribes, (some 400,) it was long believed to be impracticable to establish any analogies, or with those of the Eastern continent. Baron Humboldt's assertion respecting the

multiplicity of American languages was at first doubted by many in Europe, because the fact was deemed incompatible with the Scripture narrative; "for we cannot suppose," says Wiseman, "each of these tribes, speaking a language totally unintelligible to its neighbors, to be lineally descended from one formed at the dispersion, without allowing the strange anomaly, that, of the human families then formed, such countless yet such insignificant tribes should have wandered to that distance." Of the fact of this multiplicity of tongues among our Aborigines, we became acquainted with a striking instance in a camp of friendly Creeks serving in Florida against the Seminoles. An intelligent and educated Creek, named Paddy Carr, commanded a force numbering less than one hundred men, which he had gathered from several neighboring villages in the Creek country; and amongst these, three, if not four, dialects were spoken, each peculiar perhaps to one or two villages and their dependencies; and as regards one of these tongues, (the Uchee, we think,) the commanding officer, Major Paddy Carr, was obliged to keep up his communications through an interpreter.

But the philosophic Alexander von Humboldt, to whom the world is so much indebted in respect to the languages and monuments of our country, early discovered certain relations among them. "However insulated," he says, "certain languages may at first appear, however singular their caprices and their idioms, all have an analogy among them, and their numerous relations will be more perceived, in proportion as the philosophical history of nations, and the study of languages, shall be brought to perfection." It is now, however, known that they all present the most remarkable resemblances,—an analogy which consists mostly in peculiar conjugational modes of modifying the verbs by the insertion of syllables. This peculiarity of the American languages was termed *agglutination*, as a family name, by the late W. von Humboldt. "This wonderful uniformity," says Malte-Brun, "in the peculiar manner of forming the conjugation of verbs from one extremity of America to the other, favors in a singular manner the supposition of a primitive people, which formed the common stock of the American indigenous nations." The existence of some American words common with the vocabularies of the old world, has been proved; and these analogies, however scanty, look towards Asia as the point of migration of our Aborigines. "In eighty-three American languages examined by Messrs. Barton and Vater,"

says Humboldt, "one hundred and seventy words have been found, the roots of which appear to be the same; and it is easy to perceive that this analogy is not accidental, since it does not rest merely upon imitative harmony, or on that conformity of organs which produces almost a perfect identity in the first sounds articulated by children." As regards the affinities between these languages and those of Eastern Asia, Malte-Brun advanced a step farther, in his endeavor to establish between them what he calls a "geographical connection;" and this resemblance between the languages of the two continents, was also regarded by Balbi, as too marked to be the result of accident. By Mr. Gallatin, who has bestowed great learning and research upon the Indian languages, the inference that our aboriginal race dates back to the earliest ages of mankind, was long since drawn. "Whilst the unity of structure and grammatical forms," he says, "proves a common origin, it may be inferred from this, combined with the great diversity and entire difference in the words of the several languages of America, that this continent received its first inhabitants at a very remote period, probably not much posterior to that of the dispersion of mankind."

The decision of the Academy of St. Petersburg upon the general question, was, after a long research, that *all languages are to be regarded as dialects of one now lost*. By M. Balbi, the industrious and learned author of the "*Atlas Ethnographique du Globe*,"—a work consisting of charts classifying languages according to Ethnographic kingdoms, as he styles them, followed by comparative tables of elementary words in every known language,—the following has been recorded as the result of a whole life spent in these and kindred investigations: "The books of Moses, no monument either historical or astronomical, has yet been able to prove false; but with them, on the contrary, agree in the most remarkable manner, the results obtained by the most learned philologists, and the profoundest geometers."

In view of the preceding facts, it is obvious that all our Aborigines, with the exception perhaps of the Esquimaux, have the same descent and origin. The monumental antiquities, extending from Canada to the southern part of Chili, present, in their style and character, indications of having proceeded from branches of the same primitive family. This conclusion is also confirmed by the uniformity of their mental, moral, and physical charac-

teristics, under every variety of circumstances, and from universal analogies in their language, religion, methods of interring the dead, and certain other arbitrary customs. The emigration of the Esquimaux tribes from Asia, is of a comparatively recent date, as is evinced by their Mongolian features, while the period of the arrival of what are considered our aboriginal race, dates back to the earliest ages of mankind.

A primitive branch of the human family, the American Aboriginal race, cannot be said to be derived from any nation, or variety of mankind, *now existing*; but they are assimilated by so many analogies to the most ancient types of civilization in the Eastern Hemisphere, that the character of their civilization cannot be regarded as wholly indigenous. This uniformity is apparent in the monuments of these nations, whose temples were pyramids, and whose traditions are interwoven with cosmogonical fables, retaining the relics of primitive history. It thus appears that the same arts, customs, religion, and social institutions, carried in the earliest ages of man's diffusion into various parts of the globe, as for instance, Egypt, China, Hindostan, and America, were subsequently so modified in each under the influence of causes the most diverse, that we can now discover only an approximation in their general features; and to the agency of these same local causes is to be ascribed, in a great degree, the modification of physical features, and of moral and intellectual character, by which the leading varieties of mankind are distinguished.

The civilization of the American nations may be considered as truly indigenous as that of Egypt. The ruined cities of Copan, Uxmal, Palenque, etc., point to an epoch that may be regarded as the primal seat of American civilization; and from this centre, the march of mental culture extended south as far as Chili, and north to the borders of Canada, as indicated by the mounds and mural remains found in the region of the United States. These civilized nations, as already shown, were rich, populous, and agricultural; they were skilled in the arts of pottery, of dying cotton and wool, and manufacturing them into figured stuffs, and in the more refined knowledge of metallurgy and of sculpture. Their constructive talent is conspicuous in their extensive cities and fortifications; in their pyramids and temples, which are not exceeded by those of Egypt; and in their roads and aqueducts, which rival those of the Romans. They had a mental constitution adapted to sci-

entific investigation, as indicated by their extensive and accurate mathematical and astronomical knowledge; and they were associated under regular forms of government, with a national religion under the direction of a priesthood.

Contemplate, for a moment, the great stone *Calendar*, found near the site of the present city of Mexico, in A. D. 1791, in the spot where it was ordered to be buried by Cortez, when he, with his ferocious Spaniards, devastated that country. They invariably broke and destroyed all images of stone, except those that were very large and strong, which they buried in the ground. As the natives had an ardent attachment to these objects, and as their presence counteracted their conversion to the Roman Catholic faith, they were thus carefully hidden from their view. This *Mexican Calendar*, as it is called by Humboldt, is of basalt, having engraved on it, in relief, a great number of hieroglyphics, signifying the divisions of time, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the twelve signs of the Zodiac, with reference to the feasts and sacrifices of the Mexicans. To the description of the similarity of its representations of astrology, astronomy, and the divisions of time, with those of a great many of the Asiatic nations, Humboldt devotes one hundred octavo pages. This stone, which was three feet in thickness and a fraction over twelve feet square, weighed twenty-four tons. As it was discovered more than thirty miles from any quarry of the same kind, we have evidence of the ability of this primitive people to transport, like the ancient Egyptians, stones of vast magnitude. The entire surface of this stone is intensely crowded with representations and hieroglyphics arranged in circles, the outer one being over twenty-seven feet in circumference; the whole, as regards its order, harmony and execution, evincing no inconsiderable knowledge both of art and science.

Although American civilization survived that of ancient Egypt, Phœnicia, and other Semitic nations, as illustrated in the splendor and luxury of Nineveh and Babylon; yet, like them, the day of its glory is no more. As throughout nature the law of change is everywhere apparent, as manifested in the geological history of organic and inorganic creation on the earth's surface,—as we tread in fact upon the wrecks of anterior worlds, proving that every thing that meets our view is either undergoing the process of renovation or decay, waxing or waning like the beautiful orb of night, the impressive emblem of individual as well as of national destiny,—need we be surprised that

nations are subject to the same law—that they have a period of growth, acmé and decay? In this ceaseless mutation, the time would seem to have arrived, when the Aboriginal race of the American soil, like the savages of New Holland, is destined to be supplanted by a different variety of the human family—one which exceeds all others in its aptitude to accommodate itself to the most extraordinary diversity of circumstances. It is melancholy to reflect that, judging from the past, no future event seems more certain than the speedy disappearance of the American Aboriginal race, when these now broken, scattered, and degraded remnants of a primitive and once cultivated branch of the human family, will be scarcely remembered, save in poetry and tradition. Like the grass of his own prairie before the fire of the hunter, so has the red man been swept away before the mildew-blast of the white man's breath! Blighted to the germ, shall the parent stem no more know the spring of renovation, but wither and die upon its indigenous soil? No: Forbid it heaven! Forbid it humanity! We trust that the time is near at hand when the voice of the Cherokee, the Choctaw, the Creek, and other tribes on our frontier, members of our national confederacy, shall be heard within the walls of the Capitol; and then will the Indian again acquire "*the skill to sculpture stone and carve wood.*"

In consideration of his high authority on this subject, we have referred particularly to Morton's "*Inquiry into the Distinctive Characteristics of the Aboriginal Race of America.*" We shall now leave the question with the reader. On the one side, he has the conclusions of Dr. Morton, who doubtless reconciles them, in his own mind, with the Scripture narrative, that "*the American race is essentially separate and peculiar, whether we regard it in its physical, its moral, or its intellectual relations*"—that the American Indian "*stands isolated from the rest of mankind*"—and that "*there are no direct or obvious links between the people of the old world and the new.*" And, on the other side, supported by the arguments of this paper, he has the authoritative declaration of Moses that all human kind have descended from a single pair.

ARTICLE III.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AS EXHIBITED IN THE GRECIAN POETRY ;
CONSIDERED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ATTRIBUTE OF
JUSTICE, AND THE STRONG IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE PRIMITIVE
BELIEF, UPON THE ANCIENT MIND.

By Tayeir Lewis, Esq., Professor of Greek in the University of New-York.

THE ancient classics should ever be read by the light of the Bible, and with continual reference to their theological bearings. Whatever in other respects may be his critical skill, he who is not familiar with the Holy Scriptures, as a devoted student both of their letter and their spirit, is but poorly prepared to appreciate properly the poetry and philosophy of antiquity. We find this strikingly exemplified in that critical school which was founded by Porson, and which, although it has passed its zenith, is still vigorously maintained by many of his inferior imitators. How barren has it been of all fruit in that higher department of classical literature which is connected with the philosophy of the primitive mind, the truth of a primitive revelation, the elucidation of the Bible, and that most interesting of all inquiries which relates to the early religious sentiments and theology of our race! The school to which we refer, has been ever occupied with mere verbal criticism, which however valuable as an aid, or as a means to a higher end, becomes useless and worse than useless when made the end itself. More importance has been attached to the discovery of some worthless various reading, or some opportunity to exhibit skill in critical emendations never before proposed by others, than to all the intellectual treasures which were suffered to lie unnoticed in the text. Such scholars linger forever in the vestibule of classic knowledge, without ever entering in and taking possession of that rich domain of thought spread out before their keen yet narrow vision.

And how should it be otherwise? When instead of an earnest and deep-souled enthusiasm, there is nothing but an insane *cacoethes emendandi*; when the highest ambition is gratified in expunging forbidden anapaests, in hunting for Cretic endings, in consuming pages to determine the respective claims of a $\pi\omega$ or a $\pi\eta$,—whilst all this time the lofty discourse of the

mysterious Prometheus, the sublime flow of Plato's poetical philosophy, and even the soul-stirring strains of the harps of Orpheus and Homer are hushed in silence awaiting the momentous decision;—how, when occupied with such pursuits, could we expect the soul to be alive to the high bearings of the classics upon theology, or their connection, by way of opposition or resemblance, with the records of Revelation? What a contrast, in this respect, is presented by Cudworth, Gale, Grotius, Jeremy Taylor and other scholars of past generations! They are declared by the Porsons and Elmsleys of our day, to have been destitute of critical acumen; and yet how vast their acquirements, how extensive their reading! It was not confined to the best known writers who flourished in the golden age of Grecian or Roman literature, but embraced all who made those noble languages the media for the communication of their thoughts,—the critics and grammarians of the Alexandrian school, the writings of the later Platonists, the huge tomes of the Greek and Latin fathers, the voluminous commentators on Aristotle, and the long series of authors who adorned what has been styled the Byzantine period. All this they accomplished because they found no time to bestow on trifles. They had a higher motive than the determination of the exact number of oars in a Grecian galley, or the precise length of the straps on a Grecian sandal. They wrote and studied under the influence of that mighty theological stimulus, which the Reformation had imparted, and which had not yet spent its power. With the Bible in the one hand, and the ancient author in the other, they brought all their reading to bear upon the sacred truths of religion. Classical literature was with them a means to a higher end; and hence they carried it farther, and derived from it much more of real value, than those who profess to have made it their sole object of pursuit.

It is in such a spirit we should open the pages of antiquity; and all who faithfully pursue this end, undiverted by critical trifling, will be astonished at the inexhaustible mine of rich thought contained in the ancient poetry and philosophy, their important bearings upon theology, and the frequent occurrence of sentiments approaching the sublimity and moral purity of the Holy Scriptures. The fact of such coincidences is admitted by all who have made this department the object of their special study. Some have endeavored to account for it by supposing a direct communication between the leading minds of

Greece, and the Scriptures and teaching of the Jewish church. This opinion is defended in a work of great extent and immense erudition, by that learned Puritan, Theophilus Gale. His conclusions however are based upon a mass of arguments and authorities, formidable rather by their accumulation than by their individual strength. Another hypothesis on much stronger grounds maintains, that these coincidences were the lingering remains of the light of a primitive revelation, once common to all mankind in the early Patriarchal ages, and afterwards superseded by a more direct revelation to the Jewish nation embodying the essential truths; whilst the ancient traditional theology was suffered gradually to be eclipsed, although never totally extinguished by the vices and depravity of our race. The Apostle tells us "that the heathen did not like to retain the knowledge of God," thereby clearly intimating that they once possessed it. That this was the fact, no careful student of the Greek classics can for a moment doubt. This primitive knowledge of divine things exhibits its remains in almost every department of ancient literature. We recognize these stray wanderers from a holier home, not only in those wondrous thoughts of Plato, which have ever been the admiration of all studious and contemplative minds, and which he himself ever asserts to have been derived from a traditionary origin; they sometimes strangely make their appearance on the pages of the cold and passionless Aristotle, forming a singular contrast with the dry and technical speculations of his own mind;—as when, for example, in one of his least impassioned arguments, he suddenly introduces a distinction between true happiness or *blessedness* (*εὐδαιμονία*) and mere worldly prosperity, declaring that the former is a "*divine thing*" (*θεῖον τι*), that, as its name imports, it consists in the favor of Heaven, being the special gift of God (*θεοδότου*) and not derived from Earth.* They meet us everywhere in the Grecian poets, appearing like the sunbeams struggling through clouds, and often rendered still brighter by contrast with the dark mythology by which they are surrounded. We may find them concealed amid the corruptions of this same mythology, when we have learned to distinguish the more ancient *spiritual* idea from the *physical* hypothesis which was afterwards superinduced upon it. They may be discovered by those who will seek for them, in the Divine names,

* Arist. Nuom. Ethic. Lib. I. ch. 9, § 2.

both Greek and Hebrew, or wrapped up in single terms expressive of moral or religious ideas, whose etymological structure points to a purer primitive period, and to a sense far more elevated than that to which in subsequent use they had degenerated. In many cases, among those to which we shall refer, there is undoubtedly conveyed a more sublime and religious sentiment than the writers intended to express, because these purer primitive terms exercised a conservative influence, not only upon their language, but also upon their thoughts. There is a spirit in these old words, which has, perhaps almost unconsciously, carried up the mind of the poet or the philosopher to an elevation above the usual current of his conceptions. It has made him, like the Hebrew prophets, utter sentiments whose full meaning he may have but dimly comprehended, and which we better understand, because we read them by the light of the Bible.

No department of study is more interesting, and at the same time more truly profitable, than that which leads us to contemplate the gradual moral deterioration which language, like every thing else which is human, suffers from the depravity of man ;—becoming, it is true, improved for the purposes of commerce and the ordinary concerns of life, yet, in its moral, and many of its philosophical terms, ever varying more and more from the piety and clearness of its primitive state. One of the first writers of the age has asserted, that more is often learned from the history of a word than from the history of a campaign. We may go much farther than this, and safely say, that in tracing the course of certain moral terms, more is ascertained of those changes that have taken place in the inner kingdom of the soul, than can be known from all the political or merely external annals of a people. We see in them, how man departs from the simplicity of early morality, as he approaches the refinement of later corruptions ;—how he gradually sinks down from the religious to the atheistical, from that contemplative state which ever forms a marked trait of the primitive life, to what is boastingly styled the practical, and which finally leads, through excess of luxury and its attending vices, to that ultimate savage degradation, which some theorists would place first in their false scale of human progress. This has ever been the case with men, until some new revelation, or some revival of the old, has again shed new life through language, called forth from their graves ancient ideas, awakened ancient associ-

ations of thought, which had long slumbered in the etymological structure of words, and thus again diffused a strange and almost preternatural energy through every department of literature and philosophy.

Without farther preface, we intend at present to illustrate these positions by numerous references to passages from ancient classic authors. As the field however is too vast to be occupied by one article, we propose in this to confine ourselves to those which have a bearing upon some of the most prominent of the Divine attributes, as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and the expressive appellations by which they are set forth.

The epithets applied by the Greeks to their gods, (especially their supreme deity,) and the sublimity and purity of some of the attributes thereby ascribed to them,—so far beyond their mythological actions,—afford convincing proof, that the former were remnants of traditionary knowledge of the true God, which had come down from a remote antiquity, and surviving the source whence they were derived, formed an incongruous mixture with the fables and corruptions of a later age. No student of antiquity can fail to be struck with this strange feature of the Greek religion. Altars and temples were dedicated to the same god under various names and titles, expressive of different attributes, as though each one had characterized a different divinity. Hence we find *Ζεὺς ἐπίστιος* or *ἐπείστιος*, Jupiter who presides over the rites of hospitality and the domestic relations; the same power, although under a different name, in honor of whom the sacred fire was to be kept forever burning,—intimating the never-failing warmth of those hallowed emotions of which he was the special guardian. There was *Ζεὺς ξένιος*, Jupiter the protector of strangers,—*Ζεὺς ὄρκιος*, Jupiter the upholder and defender of the sanctity of oaths,—*Ζεὺς ἑκταῖος*, Jupiter the hearer of prayer,—*Ζεὺς ἑρκεῖος*, the maintainer of bounds, and the protector of the rights of property,—*Ζεὺς φίλιος* and *ἑταιρεῖος*, the patron of friends and friendship,—*Ζεὺς ἰκέσιος*, the god of the suppliant,—*Ζεὺς μελίσσιος*, the god of mercy,—*Ζεὺς παλαμναῖος*, the avenger of crime, especially of murder,—*Ζεὺς καθάρσιος*, the god who demands expiation for sin, and who will have purity in all who approach to worship him,—*Ζεὺς οὐράνιος*, the power that rules in the heavens, and *Ζεὺς χθόνιος*, the same omnipresent deity regarded as appointing and regulating the retributions of the subterranean Hades. Many others might be mentioned, which are found scattered everywhere on

the pages of the Grecian poets. For a full list of them, the reader is referred to the treatise *De Mundo*, ascribed to Aristotle, and generally published among his works (Leip. ed. vol. iv. p. 165.) Thus to the same god, different altars and temples were erected, and a different worship performed, according to the one or the other of these attributes. Could these epithets, we ask, so pure, so sublime, so worthy even of the Jehovah of the Scriptures,—could they have come from the same source, and been coeval with that corrupt mythology, with which we find them afterwards associated, and which ascribes to the gods the worst actions of the worst of men? It is evident that the latter was superinduced upon the former, and that the attributes of the ancient Orphic, or rather Patriarchal *Zeûs* (etymologically *the life and the author of life*,) were afterwards ascribed to the Cretan demigod, whose fabled crimes disfigure so many portions of the ancient poetry. This mythology had a far later origin; and it is no fancy to suppose that these sublime names, so strangely associated with it, are traditionary remnants from a primitive religion,—being in fact originally expressive of the different attributes of the one *True God*, of the ancient universally worshipped Deity.

The epithets *Zeûs epésteios*, *Zeûs xénios*, suggest at once to the diligent student of the Bible and the classics, that attribute of Jehovah so often mentioned in the Old Testament, describing him as the lifter up of those who are bowed down, the avenger of the wronged, the God of the stranger, the widow and the fatherless. In the *Odyssey* we have language which it is not profanity to suppose may have come down from the same source with the Bible, although the dark mind of the heathen poet may have had no conception of the sacred origin of the noble sentiment he had received from ancient tradition.

Ξείν', οὐ μοι Θέμις ἔσσι', οὐδ' εἰ κακίων' σέθεν ἔλθοι
 ξείνον' ἀτιμῆσαι;—πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσὶν ἅπαντες
 ξεινοί τε πτωχοί τε·

I could not harm thee, stranger, nor inquire
 If crime has brought thee here. Jove's special care
 Are all the poor and friendless.

Odyssey, xiv. 56; also vi. 207.

Compare Deuteronomy 10: 18, 19. *Love ye therefore the stranger; for the Lord loveth the stranger.*

How little did the Greek poets understand of the fulness of

meaning contained in that common epithet, *Zeûs êpexeîos*, the protector of the domestic *enclosures*, the god of families, the god of our homes, with all their hallowed associations; and how naturally is this associated with those passages of Scripture, in which the Lord expresses his strong displeasure against such as remove their neighbor's landmarks, who violate any of the domestic relations, or who seek to infringe upon any of the sacred rights of property! We cannot meet with the epithet, *Zeûs êuxxaios*, without thinking of Him who has styled himself the "Hearer of prayer," and under this precious title invites "all flesh to come before him." That sublime name, *Zeûs ôpaktos*,* cannot fail to remind us of the Eloah of the Bible, (the God of the oath or covenant,) and of the frequency with which he is described as the avenger of falsehood and perjury—a covenant keeping God of faithfulness and truth. The thoughts suggested by these epithets, we repeat it, belong to a purer age than that of Æschylus or of Homer. They have about them the savor of patriarchal purity, and of those more spiritual views of God, which were the peculiar traits of the primitive ages of the world. Hence surviving as they did, and mingling with a mythology of a later origin and of a lower grade, they arrest the mind not only by their beauty and their purity, but also by their strange want of harmony with other and more degrading views of the Deity, with which they are so strangely associated.

To a thinking and deeply serious mind, there is no stronger internal evidence of the supernatural origin of the Old Testament, than the unshrinking boldness with which it sets forth those Divine attributes, which, to a superficial view, seem directly opposed to each other. Descriptions of God's holy and vindictive justice, clothed in the most terrific language, are found in the same book, in the same chapter, and sometimes closely united in the same passage, with the most soothing declarations of his overflowing loving-kindness and tender mercy.† No human composition could thus have maintained, in all its awful grandeur, the *equilibrium* of the Divine character. The ten-

* We find some remains of the ancient idea contained in this epithet (and which is so closely connected with the names Elohim and Eloah) in the designation of the Canaanitish god *בַּעַל בְּרִית* (Baal Berith) *The Lord of the oath or covenant*; *Fœderum Præses*, like the Greek *Zeûs ôpaktos* or Latin *Deus Fidius*.

† Compare Nahum 1: 1—8; also Exod. 34: 6, 7.

dency of the human mind, left to itself, is ever to a partial view,—to an effeminate sentimentalism on the one hand, or to a dark fanaticism on the other,—to an unwarranted trust in the Divine mercy, untempered by any regard to that justice which gives mercy all its value, or to those gloomy apprehensions of wrath, which arise from the sole contemplation of the sterner attributes of the Deity. Both alike destroy that balance, which is ever maintained in the Holy Scriptures. The one tendency forms a peculiar trait of modern rationalism; the other characterizes all the religious views of the world previous to the introduction of Christianity. The God of justice, viewed in the relations of lawgiver and judge, possesses a far more prominent place in those systems, than the God of love. In truth, nature left to its own unbiassed workings, could view him in no other light. A consciousness of sin, without a knowledge of the only way of salvation, must ever present the Deity in all the sterner attributes of his character. Hence the deeper impression, on the ancient mind, of justice than of mercy. Hence the perpetuity and universality of the doctrine of sacrifices, although its origin is undoubtedly owing to an express revelation. Hence the great variety of penances and satisfactions by way of expiation for sin, to which men have in all ages resorted.

*Διὸς γὰρ δύσπαράκλητοι φρένες,**

Hard to be appeased is the mind of Jove: such must ever be the aspect, under which the Divine character appears, not only to the dark soul of the heathen, but also to the impenitent sinner in Christian lands, who is brought to entertain any right views of his relation to his Judge. The believer alone truly knows that God is merciful, but he also knows at what a sacrifice that mercy was obtained. How little do they understand of human nature, either in themselves or others, who would represent repentance as the only ground of forgiveness, or who would treat the universal doctrine of atonement as contrary to the reason, and as having no foundation in the true and natural feelings of the soul!

Suffice it for our present purpose to say, that nowhere does this modern heresy find so complete a refutation as in the Grecian poetry. Not only is it more orthodox, but we also hazard nothing in saying, that there may be found in it more of a re-

* Æsch. Prom. Vinc. 34.

ligious Biblical morality, than can be met with in all the sacred melodies and unmeaning sentimentalism of many who are styled Christian poets.

The attribute of justice, as revealed in the Old Testament, and which, as a part of the patriarchal religion, so long continued its impression upon the ancient mind, may be regarded under three aspects, each of them distinguished in the Scriptures by a peculiar appellation. These are, *אל צדיק*,—*אל נקם*, and *אל קנא*, the *righteous*, the *avenging*, and the *jealous God*. The first presents the idea of a *lawgiver* the second of a condemning *judge*. The third unites both, and sets forth that holy care, which as the *executive* of the universe, he exercises towards every department of his moral administration, and especially in regard to those right views of himself, which concern the dignity of his government, and the highest good of all his obedient subjects. This threefold aspect may be traced in the numerous allusions to the Divine Justice, which may be met with in Grecian authors. The two last, and especially the third, seem to have made the deepest impression, although the first is frequently exhibited. All however are marred and divested of that pure sublimity, with which they are set forth in the Bible. They frequently appear tinged with the false coloring of human passion, and sometimes degraded to those low forms in which they are exhibited in the depraved human heart. The justice ascribed to the Supreme Deity, is often a mere human justice; the *vengeance* a human *revenge*; and the jealousy only another name for one of the lowest of earthly passions. In general, however, they manifest distinct traces of that old system of truth, whence they were derived. Amid all the darkness and corruption by which they are surrounded, they exhibit something of their former glory, and not unfrequently approach the purity and grandeur of the representations of the Bible.

—Their forms have not yet lost
All their original brightness—

—As when the sun new risen
Looks through the horizontal misty air,
Shorn of his beams,—so darkened still they shine.

The epithet *אל צדיק*, is more general than *אל נקם*, and refers to the Deity in all his relations to his intelligent creatures as moral governor. It represents him not only as the enemy of sin, but also as the friend of righteousness—the rewarder of the one, as well as the punisher of the other; in short, as just and impar-

tial, yet rather as the legislator than the judge. The other epithet, אֱלֹהֵי נֶקֶם, is confined to what in theological language may be styled, his vindictive or punitive justice. To that aspect of the Divine character presented by the first, frequent allusions may be found in the Greek poets. To this head may be referred their favorite personifications, of *Nómos* (law,) or *Θέμις*, which have both more reference to general legislation, than the special infliction of vindictive punishment. It is the second, however, which occupies the most prominent place. To any one desirous of tracing the traditionary remains of the primitive belief in this attribute, the Greek furnishes the most striking examples, and in greater abundance, than in reference to any other aspect of the Divine character. This seems to have made the deepest impression on the ancient mind, and longer to have retained its force and purity of meaning. From that early period, when the smoking blood of Abel called from the ground upon this special attribute of Jehovah, it has ever held a prominent place in the fears of men, in all their views of the Deity, and in all their systems of religion. It is exhibited in almost every form of which language is capable, and in every variety of manner,—in the dread personifications of the vindictive and all-seeing *Némesis*, in the decisions of the stern judges of Hades, and in the dark mythology of the avenging Furies.

The radical ideas conveyed by *Nómos* and *Némesis*, have about the same difference as the Hebrew צִדִּיק and נֶקֶם. Both Greek words are from the same root, *μεμω*, to *distribute*, *allot*, *apportion*,—derived from the more ancient pastoral sense, to *feed*. *Nómos* or Law, however, has regard to the *distribution* of rights and duties, assigning, in this sense, to each part that duty which arises out of its relation to the whole; *Némesis*, on the other hand, like נֶקֶם, looks to the *distribution* of the penalty for the violation of law, and is in its very nature vindictive;—that is, it regards the intrinsic demerit of sin, (or rather of the state of soul whence it arises,) irrespective of antecedents and consequences. The one has reference to the legislator, the other to the punishing magistrate. The former pertains rather to the department of the intellect, the other makes its appeal to the moral sense. Both have respect to the same general attribute of justice; the one, however, regards it as contemplative, or in the abstract (*σὺ θεωρία*), the other, as existing in action, *ἐν ἐνέργεια*. Aristotle says, most sublimely of the Deity, that his *οὐσία* is *ἐνέργεια*. This, it is true, is said in a physical sense, and yet it is

also applicable to the moral aspect of the Divine character. Here, also, and in a much higher sense, may it be held, that his *οὐσία* is *ἐνέργεια*, his *very essence is energy*. * The attributes presented by עֶזְרָא and נֶמֶס, or by *Nómos* and *Némeis*, although logically separable, must exist together in the Divine Nature. The contemplative or the ideal, *must* exhibit itself in action. There can be no mere intellectual disapprobation of sin in the abstract, without, at the same time, an intense hatred of it for its own sake, accompanied by a disposition to punish, (not sin in the abstract, but the sinner,) irrespective of all consequences, or of its mere social and political bearings. Hence, to represent the Deity without passions, (unless we take the word in its old theological sense, and guard it at the same time with great discrimination,) is to divest him, in our minds, of the highest part of his character, and to view him merely as a being of power and intellect. How far, in its practical bearings, this rises above some species of speculative pantheism, or atheism, it would be difficult to show. All moral emotion implies an antithesis. Love for certain objects, cannot exist without hatred of their opposites. If the one is active, or exists *ἐν ἐνέργεια*, so must the other. We may say, with all reverence, that the Divine *δράγη* is a very different thing from the human passion,—that the holy *Némeis* is infinitely removed from the earthly feeling that claims kindred with it. A difference, there unquestionably is; but this difference must consist in the former being infinitely more pure, more holy, more just, and above all, in that higher burning intensity, which can only be measured by the infinity of the Divine Nature;† not in that radical distinction, involving a complete separation of idea, and which, when carried out, utterly nullifies what it was designed to exalt. Some of the worst errors in theology may arise from the careless statement of this doctrine, that God is not *really* angry with sin, or that he punishes it merely in view of its consequences as a political or social evil, the contagion of whose

* Aristotelis Metaph. Lib. XI. (XII.) Chap. 6, p. 246.

† What is gained by applying the term anthropomorphism to such burning expressions as the Hebrew עֶזְרָא and נֶמֶס? Does not the use of such language imply, that the conception differs from the reality only in falling infinitely short of it? There must certainly be some analogy in kind, if not in degree, between the sign and the thing signified.

example the happiness of the universe requires to be restrained. A true sense of guilt must depart from the heart that harbors this opinion, if there is the consistency to carry it out in all the conclusions to which it leads. The atonement becomes a mere political display, the terms expiation, propitiation, lose all their meaning, and the deepest mystery of the Gospel is made plain to the human understanding, but at the expense of all its value, and stripped of all its essential features. It would not be difficult to show, that even in human government, the punishment of crime must be to a certain extent vindictive; in order that it may have a hold upon the moral sense, and by being thus connected with the Divine, may sustain those lower principles of order and prevention, which are often assumed as the only ends of human law.

In the earliest mythology and poetry of Greece, we find *Δίκη*, or *Θέμις*, *Νόμος*, and *Νέμεσις*, personified and associated, sometimes separately and sometimes together, with the throne of Jupiter. Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and the Grecian dramatists may have been the authors of the poetical drapery with which this is set forth; but the uniformity of manner with which they express it, and its great moral elevation above many other parts of their theology, prove that there must have been some more ancient common source, from whence the ideas themselves were derived. In order to exhibit this in the strongest light, we select some of the most striking passages from the poets. Indeed we can hardly open at random a page of Pindar, Æschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, without meeting with direct or remote allusions to it. In the Greek tragedies, *Δίκη*, or *Νέμεσις*, is ever on the right hand of *Ζεὺς*, and his *ἐκδικτικὸν ὄμμα*, is ever upon the actors presented to us. Their *moral* is ever *religious*. All things are constantly referred, not to a physical fate, but to the stern *μοῖρα* or *decree* of the father of gods and men.

Τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;

Τι τῶνδ' οὐ θεόκρατόν ἐστιν;

Æsch. Agamemnon, 1486.

Sin, however imperfect may have been their views of its nature, is ever punished, not by the mere working of natural causes, (the favorite doctrine of modern works of fiction and quackish systems of ethical philosophy,) but by the direct interposition and vindictive justice of

Ζητὸς

παναιτίου πατεργάτα—

all causing, all doing Jove,—that stern being, who in some of their representations approaches nearer to the Holy and Jealous God of the Old Testament, than the placable, liberal and indifferent deity of our sentimental rationalists.

We do not intend at this time to enter into a discussion of the entire or partial authenticity of the Orphic hymns. Our opinions on this subject have been elsewhere more fully given. Having become settled in the conclusion, that, although there may be great doubt as to the genuineness and verbal accuracy of many fragments presented to us by the Fathers, these hymns do nevertheless represent an ancient system of theology, which formed the great storehouse of the subsequent poetry and philosophy of Greece,—we quote from them without scruple in defence of our positions. What Plato, Aristotle, and Euripides treated as authentic and genuine in their day, we shall not at this late period wholly call in question; although it may be admitted, that the language and prosody of the works referred to may have been modernized, and that they had suffered much from changes and interpolations. In one of these hymns, this attribute of Jove is thus addressed:

ὦ ΝΕΜΕΣΙ κλήζω σε θεὰ βασίλεια μεγίστη
 πανδερχῆς ἑσορᾶσα βίον θνητῶν πολυφύλων·
 Αἰδῖή, πολύσεμνε, μόνῃ χαίρουσα δικάσις
 ἦν πάντες δέδιασι βροτοί—
 οὐδέ σε λήθει
 ψυχὴν ὑπερφρονέουσα—
 Πάντ' ἑσορᾶς, καὶ πάντ' ἐπακόνεις, πάντα βραβύνεις·
 Ἐν σοὶ δ' εἰσὶ δίκαι θνητῶν παντὶέσται Δαίμων

“I invoke thee, Nemesis, thou great all-seeing goddess, ever observing the life of men, Eternal, Holy Power, alone rejoicing in righteousness, whom mortals ever fear. The proud transgressing soul never escapes thine eye. All things thou seest—all things thou hearest—all retribution thou dispensest. To thee belong the judgments of mortal men, most High Divinity.”

In a similar manner, the hymn *To Δίκη*, or Justice,

Ὅμμα Δίκης μέλπω πανδερχίος ἀγλαομόρφου,
 ἧ καὶ ΖΗΝΟΣ ΑΝΑΚΤΟΣ ἐπὶ ΘΡΟΝΟΝ ἱερὸν ἵζει
 οὐρανόθεν καθορᾶσα βίον θνητῶν πολυφύλων

“I sing the eye of all-seeing, bright-robed Justice, who sits upon the sacred throne of Jove the king; from heaven survey-

ing the life of mortal men." Compare Psalm 11: 4: "The Lord hath his throne in the heavens; his eyes behold, his eyelids try the ways of the children of men." It has been made an argument against the genuineness of these fragments, that some of their expressions occasionally approach so near the purity and sublimity of the Bible; and on this account they have been assigned to that common receptacle, (so convenient to a certain class of critics,)—the pious frauds and interpolations of the early Christian Fathers. The argument, however, is divested of all its weight by the fact, that sentiments equally elevated and equally scriptural, may be found in the undoubted writings of those Greek poets, whose existence no German critic has yet dared to call in question. In another one of these hymns, there is a similar address to *Nóμος*, or Law.

*Ἀθανάτων καλέω καὶ Θνητῶν ἄγνόν ἄνακτα
Οὐράνιον Νόμον—*

*Φύσεως τὸ βέβαιον
ἀκλινὲς ἀστασίαστον αἰεὶ τηροῦντα νόμοισιν.
Ἀντὸς γὰρ μόνος ζωῆς ὅηκα κρατύνεις,
ὠγύγιος*

"I invoke thee, Holy King of mortals and immortals, Heavenly Law! ever preserving without declination or disturbance the firm ordinance of nature; for thou thyself alone dost rule the helm of life, most ancient Law." One might almost fancy it the language of the Psalmist. "For ever, O Lord, thy law is established in heaven; all things stand according to thine ordinance."

If such invocations are doubted as being too much in the style of Holy Writ, we meet the argument with unquestioned passages of a similar kind from later Grecian poets. In Æschylus Supplices, 667, we have the same sublime personification.

*Ζῆνα μέγαν σεβόντων
τὸν ξένιον Δί' ὑπέρτατον
ὃς πολιῶ νόμῳ αἴσαν ὀρθοῖ—*

Great Jove adore,
The stranger's God, *with ancient hoary Law*,
All fates on high controlling.

It was an inseparable portion of the most ancient systems of theology and politics, that there was but one source of Law throughout the universe; or in other words, that all Law was

divine, and that all legitimate government among men derived its sanction from this high and holy origin. Nothing came from nature. Even the dominion of man over the animal creation was the gift of Heaven, existing not as a *natural right*, but as the direct grant of an ancient covenant. Thus the old poet Empedocles as quoted by Aristotle, *Rhetorica* I. 13:

Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διὰ τ' ἐνρυνέδοτος
Ἀιθέρος ἡγερέως τίταται διὰ τ' ἀπλήτον αὐγῆς

“The universal institute extends (beyond the earth) through the wide pervading æther, and Heaven’s boundless light.” This, viewed merely as a fragment, might seem to have reference only to physics; but Aristotle, who knew its connection, quotes it in support of the position he is maintaining, viz., the antiquity of positive moral law. Hence, and in accordance with these more ancient views, are those noble declarations of Cicero, so far beyond even the comprehension of most modern statesmen:—*Orta simul est Lex cum mente divina, De Leg. I. 19—Constituendi vero juris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordium, quæ seculis omnibus ante nata est.* This heavenly origin of Law is most strongly and beautifully expressed in one of the choral odes of Sophocles *Œdipus Tyrannus*, 865.

ἔι μοι ξυνείη φέροντι
μοῖρα τὰν εὐσεπτον ἀγνείαν λόγων
ἔργων τε πάντων, ὧν νόμοι πρόκειται
ὑψίποδες οὐρανίαν δι' αἰθέρα
τεκνωθέντες ὦν Ὀλυμπος
πατήρ μόνος, οὐδὲ νῦν Θνατὰ
φύσις ἀνέρων ἔτικτεν οὐδὲ
μὴν ποτε λάθρα κατακοιμάσει·
μέγας ἐν τούτοις ΘΕΟΣ
οὐδὲ γηράσκει

Of which the following is a faithful although not a very poetical translation.

Oh, that it were the portion of my soul,
To cherish holy purity of thought
And deed,—observant of those laws
On high set forth,—of heavenly æther born,—
Whose father is Olympian Jove alone.
No offspring they of grovelling earthly minds,
Nor ever shall forgetful time on them
Oblivious slumber shed. The mighty God
Inspires them ever with immortal youth.

Would we be irreverent in comparing this with the ardent language of the Psalmist, breathing forth his devout desires for greater conformity to the Divine law,—“*Oh that my ways were directed to keep thy statutes.*”—“*Thy law is very pure, therefore thy servant loveth it.*” We are far, however, from comparing Sophocles personally with David. The latter spake as he was directly moved by the Holy Ghost. The Heathen poet used language very remotely derived from the same sacred origin. It had come down from the olden time,—*ab omni antiquitate quæ quo proprius aberat ab ortu et Divinæ progenie, hoc melius ea quæ erant vera cernebat* ;* or as Cicero tells us in another place,—*ab antiquissimo tempore quod ergo optimum est, quia Deo proximum.*† The highest import of these remarkable relics of a purer ancient theology was but dimly comprehended even by the poet himself ; to whose mind they suggested only confused and mystic thought, instead of imparting those clear and vivid emotions which filled the soul of the Hebrew bard, as he meditated on the statutes and testimonies of the Lord.

With the Orphic address to Δίκη, we may compare the Homeric hymn to Jove, in which we have the same representation of Θέμις, or distributive Justice, seated by the side of Jupiter, and sharing his most secret counsels.

Ζήτα Θεῶν τὸν ἄριστον ἀείσομαι ἡδὲ μέγιστον
Εὐρύοπα κρείοντα τελεσφόρον, ὅστε Θέμιστι
ἐγκλιδὸν ἐζομένη πνυκινούς ὄαρονς ὀαρίζει

The same personification is found in Hesiod, except that Δίκη is there called the daughter of Jove, although still described as sharing his throne.

Ἡ δὲ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη Διὸς ἐγγεγαῦνα
αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ Καθεζομένη Κρονίωνι
γῆρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον—

Works and Days, 239.

To the same effect, a fragment from Pindar, quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. v. 613. Pott. Compare also Olymp. VIII. 27.

ἐνθα Σώτεια Διὸς ξενίου
πάρεδρος ἀσκεῖται Θέμις

* Cicero Tusc. Disp. I. 26.

† Cicero De Leg. II. 40. ib. 27. Xen. Mem. I. 4. 16.

Passages of a kind similar to those quoted from Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar, may be frequently found interspersed throughout the Grecian dramas. They are unquestionably fragments of that same Orphic theology, which, amid all its misty pantheism, preserved and transmitted so much of the purity of patriarchal thought. Sophocles introduces this same idea of *Δίκη*, or Justice, seated on the throne of Jove, and refers to it as an ancient and well-known tradition.

Τοιγὰρ τὸ σὸν θάκημα καὶ τοὺς σοὺς θρόνους
κρατοῦσιν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ΠΑΛΛΙΦΑΤΟΣ
ΔΙΚΗ συνέδρος Ζηνός, ΑΡΧΑΙΟΙΣ ΝΟΜΟΙΣ

Œd. Col. 1380.

And therefore to thy throne shall they succeed,
If JUSTICE, as she's famed in ancient laws,
Sits ever at the hand of Jove.

In another part of the same tragedy, there is a beautiful parallel to this, in a sentiment, which, for reasons already assigned, seldom occurs in the ancient poets. Mercy, or Pity, (*Αἰὼς*), is also represented as a partner with Justice in the throne of the Heavenly Majesty.

Ἀλλ' ἐστὶ γὰρ καὶ Ζηνὶ ΣΤΗΘΑΚΟΣ ΘΡΟΝΩΝ
ἈΙΩΣ ἐπ' ἔργους πᾶσι, καὶ πρὸς σοὶ πάτερ
παρασταθήτω· τῶν γὰρ ἡμαρτημάτων
αἴη μὲν ἐστίν.

Œd. Col. 1267.

For gentle MERCY also sits
Fast by the throne of Jove, o'er all his works
Presiding gracious. To thy soul, my sire,
Let her be present now. Forgiveness is
The only cure of sin.

In these two passages we have the Mosaic description complete; "the Lord God compassionate and merciful, and yet who will by no means acquit the guilty." Compare also Ps. 89: 15: *Righteousness and justice are the foundation of thy throne, mercy and truth go before thy face.* The soul of the Greek was too dark to discover that glorious method, by which these two apparently conflicting attributes unite for man's salvation; and hence we so seldom find in the writings of the poets or philosophers any allusion to this milder aspect of the Divine character.

In the *Electra* of Sophocles, we have *Θεμς* personified, and

represented after the usual manner, and in the same connection with Jove.

*Ἀλλ', οὐ τὰν Διὸς ἀστραπὴν
καὶ τὰν οὐρανίαν ΘΕΜΙΝ
δηρὸν οὐκ ἀποίητοι.*

Electra, 2065.

No, by the blast of angry Jove
By *Themis* throned in heaven above,
Not long unpunished shall such crimes remain.

Compare also Soph. *Ajax*, 1389.

*Τοιγὰρ σφ' Ὀλύμπου τοῦδ' ὁ πρᾶβένων πατήρ
μνήμων ἔ' Ἐρινύς, καὶ τελεσφόρος ΔΙΚΗ
κακῶς κακούς φθείρειαν.*

In the *Hecuba* of Euripides, by a strong hyperbole, *Nómos*, or Law, is placed above the gods, (Jupiter probably excepted,) and declared their ruler.

*ἡμεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς ἴσως
ἀλλ' οἱ θεοὶ σθένουσι, χεὶρ κείνων κρατῶν
Νόμος.*

Hecuba, 790.

We may be weak,
But yet the gods are strong, and stronger still,
All-ruling Law.

Plato, in the *Gorgias*, quotes a fragment from Pindar, in which we have the same sublime sentiment.

*ΝΟΜΟΣ ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων.*

Both are evidently derived from the Orphic theology, and are so exactly in accordance with the passage from the hymn already quoted, as to place its genuineness beyond doubt, and to confirm the position we have advanced, that the Orphic poetry was the source from whence all similar expressions in later writers were derived.

In the *Medea*, 211, we have *Ζεὺς* and *Θέμις* associated,

Τὰν Ζηνὸς ὀρκίαν Θέμιν.

Jupiter and *Δίκη* associated, *Orese* 1240.

Σὺν ἔ' ὃ Ζεῦ πρόγονε καὶ Δίκας σίβας

Also *Medea*, 170.

Κλύεθ' οἷα λέγει κἀπιβοᾶται
 Θέμιν ἐνκτάαν, Ζήνα δ' ὃς ὀρκων
 θνατοῖς ταμίας νερόμυσται

Compare also Homer, *Odyssey* II. 68.

Λίσσομαι ἡμὲν Ζητὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἡδὲ Θέμιστος
 ἥτ' ἀνδρῶν ἀγορᾶς ἡμὲν λύει ἡδὲ καθίζει.

For striking passages of a similar kind, which may be selected from a great variety of others, the reader is referred to Euripides *Electra*, 776; *Rhesus*, 342, *Æschylus Choephora*, 242, 946, *Supplices*, 368; and to the whole tenor and spirit of that most sublime tragedy *The Eumenides*.

We meet with the doctrine of vindictive or retributive Justice, and the manner of its infliction, in a remarkable, although somewhat obscure passage from the *Choephora*. We select it as a striking example of the impression this attribute had made upon the ancient mind, and the strong contrast which its scriptural views present to the sentiments of modern semi-Christian rationalists.

Ῥοπή δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ δίκας
 ταχέα, τοῖς μὲν ἐν φάει,
 τὰ δ' ἐν μεταχμίφ σκοτόν
 μένει, χρονίζοντ' ὄχη βούει·
 τοὺς δ' ἀκραντος ἔχει νύξ.

Æsch. Choeph. 59.

Æschylus, in this place, employs the favorite figure of the balance, so often met with in *Homer* and the subsequent Grecian poets; and evidently refers to three distinct grades of retribution for crime. The sentiments are in perfect accordance with the whole range of the sacred writings. He alludes first to sudden judgments, when marked and signal punishment follows immediately upon the act committed,—cases in which there is so manifest a connection between the crime and the retribution, that all are compelled to acknowledge the interposition of Heaven, as in the Scriptural examples of *Belshazzar* and *Herod*. The reference in the second place, is to protracted evils of life visited upon the offender, following perhaps long after the act committed, and producing a wretched old age. The passage closes with a most striking allusion, in the third place, to the retribution after death of the eternal state. The first are said to come, ἐν φάει, in the open light of day; the second, ἐν μεταχμίφ σκοτόν, in the dusky twilight of life,—a

highly poetical expression for old age, or the interval between the full light of life and the darkness of the grave: the third are reserved for the everlasting unchanging night, *νύξ ἀφάρτος*, the night that is never finished, that long, long night that knows no morning, in which the dreary sufferers "look for the day and it cometh not." Such is evidently the meaning of *νύξ ἀφάρτος*, rendered by the scholiast *ἀιώνιος θάνατος*, and yet the same class of Christian commentators, who everywhere seek to unspiritualize the Bible, would also divest this passage of all its deep meaning and sublimity, by rendering *νύξ ἀφάρτος*, *nox intempesta*, without authority, and in defiance of the whole spirit and poetry of these remarkable verses. The authority of the scholiast is rejected with the usual sneer,—unde liquet eum fuisse Christianum. This is one of those striking passages, (so different from much of the mere verbiage of modern poetry,) in which the meaning is too full for the language, and seems to struggle to burst the envelope in which it is contained. Every word is not only emphatic in itself, but seems to draw after it a crowd of associated thoughts. A free rendering would be as follows: "The swift balance of the scales of vindictive justice (*δομή*) is ever watching (*ἐπισκοπεῖ*) its opportunity to descend. To some it comes in the broad light of day. The retribution of other crimes awaits the dark twilight of life, and by delay (*χρονίζονται*) are gathering crowds of woes. Others are reserved for the eternal, never accomplished night, viz. the judgment of the world to come."

On the subject of vindictive punishment after death which is so clearly exhibited in this passage, compare also the Eumenides 175.

ὑπό τας γὰρ πυλῶν
οὐ ποτ' ἐλευθεροῦται.

How much like the language of the Bible: "There is no place where the workers of iniquity can hide themselves." "If they make their bed in Sheol behold he is there."*

* Compare Plato's Laws, Lib. X. p. 386: "For you shall never be neglected by it, (viz., the Divine Justice, or Providence.) You cannot so descend into the depths of the earth, nor being raised aloft so fly up into Heaven, but that you shall receive the fitting recompense, whether remaining in this world, or passing into Hades, or being borne to regions still more wild than these."

So also Job 34: 21: "There is no darkness, there is no

flee beneath the earth, says the Heathen poet, he shall never be free from the demands of Justice ;” for, as we are told in another terrific passage of this same tragedy,

μέγας γὰρ Ἄιδης ἐστὶν εὐθύνος βροτῶν.
ἐνερθε χθονός,
Δελτογράφος δὲ πάντ’ ἐπωπῆ φρενί.

Eumen. 268.

Beneath the earth
Great Hades holds his throne, the gloomy judge
Of sinful men ; and in his awful book—
The soul’s accusing conscience—reads their crimes.

We may have amplified in our paraphrase of the word *δελτογράφος*, but how strongly does it suggest that dread record of uncanceled sin, which the Bible reveals as kept for the impenitent ?—that *handwriting* which is blotted out only by the blood of Christ. Compare also Æschylus Eumenides, 340.

It is to the poets, and not to the philosophers, we must look for the most striking proof of the ancient universal belief in the doctrine of retribution after death. It is to this popular belief, that even the best reasoners among the latter fall back, when they would supply the defects of their attempts to maintain it by direct argument. Although they might endeavor, in this manner, to prove the *truth* of the doctrine, yet did they derive the *origin* of the opinion, not from the light of nature, but from the authority of ancient tradition. “ Hence,” says Plato, in his seventh epistle to Dion, “ Thus ought we always to believe those ancient and sacred words (τοις παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις) which declare to us that the soul is immortal, that judges are appointed, and that they pass the highest sentences of condemnation, when the spirit is separate from the body.” In a still more striking passage from the Republic, he gives us the most express declaration of the common belief. For well know, O Socrates, that when one supposes himself near the point of death, there enter into his soul fear and anxieties respecting things before unheeded. For then the old traditions concerning Hades, (μῦθοι λεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄδου,) how those who in this life have been guilty

land of the shades of the dead (Tsalmaveth) where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves.” Amos 9 : 2, “ If they dig down to Sheol (or Hades), from thence shall my hand take them.”

φυγὴν δὲ ποῦ
μήπω γενέσθαι φωτὸς ἀνοσίον βροτῶν

Soph. Œd. Col. 280.

of wrong, must there suffer the penalty of their crimes, torment his soul. He looks back upon his past life, and if he finds in the record many sins, like one starting from a frightful dream, he is terrified, and filled with foreboding fears.* Compare also with this, the terrific account of the world of wo, contained in the tenth book of the Republic, and of the sufferings of that wretched and incurable class, who, in the emphatic language of the writer, (ρίφθentes εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον οὐ ποτε, ἐκβαίνουσιν,†) never come out, but remain to all eternity πάχοντες τὸν αἰχμόν.‡ From such descriptions as these, (as Plutarch tells us,) Plato was charged by Chrysippus, with adhering too closely to the popular traditions, and attempting to frighten mankind with the fears of Hades.§ The first passage referred to, is alone sufficient to refute volumes of Warburton and Whateley. It is not put forth merely as a speculative tenet of the philosopher, but as the sentiment of the common mind in all ages,—exhibiting just the same views of death, and the same apprehensions of future retribution, as now prevail, and ever have prevailed among mankind; a sentiment not derived from philosophy or reason, (however much it may be supported by them,) but handed down by universal tradition, from that ancient period, when Adam hid himself in the garden, and sin revealed in his conscience the penalty of the broken law. The doctrine of a *Hell for the wicked*, is one of the most ancient, and at the same time the most universal, that has ever been believed among mankind. Whence came it? This is the great and difficult problem for those to solve who assert that it is contrary to the Scriptures, the reason, and the feelings. Whence came it then,—we repeat the question—whence came it in opposition to these mighty opposing influences? Men are not fond of what is irrational for its own sake; they certainly do not love their own misery. Whence then came this τριτόν μῦθος, these awful fears of Hades, Tartarus and Gehenna? Why (if the creed of the modern Universalist be true) have men thus cruelly tortured themselves for nought? Why have they indulged in such terrific inventions of fancy? Why have they passed a sentence so unjustly severe on their own depravity?

*[Republic Lib. I. 10.

† Phædon, Vol. I. p. 191.

‡ Gorgias III. p. 119.

§ Plutarch *Moralia De Contradict Stoic.* IV. 416.

and above all, why did the meek and merciful Saviour of the world,—coming, as they tell us, to do away the fears of hell, and to preach the glad tidings of universal happiness after death,—why did he so often, and with such solemn emphasis use similar language, but of a still more terrific kind, so directly adapted to render still more intense the same tormenting fears, and which for eighteen hundred years has produced an effect so directly contrary to his alleged benevolent intentions? Let those solve the problem who have given rise to it.

That the fear of future retribution did exert a far more powerful influence upon the ancient mind than Warburton and others have supposed, is proved by the writings of the Epicureans themselves. They were the ancient free-thinkers, whose avowed object it was, to free mankind from those superstitious fears, which had made life so miserable. The very efforts of Lucretius and others of that school, to make light of Hades and Tartarus, show how fearfully these apprehensions had pressed upon the human soul.

Numerous are the references in the Greek dramatic poets to the ancient doctrine of expiation, to the primitive law in regard to the shedding of blood, and to the manner of its atonement. Although this has a close connection with our theme, we can only here refer to some of the more striking passages, deferring comment until an opportunity is presented for a more extended investigation of this most important subject. For some of these the reader is referred to *Æsch. Eumenides*, 423. Compare also *Æsch. Choeph.* 319.

Καὶ τῷ κτανόντι ποῦ τὸ τίμα τῆς φονῆς ;
ὅπου το χαίρειν μηδαμῶν νομίζεται.

Oh! where's the boundary of the murderer's flight?
'Tis in that world where joy can never come.

τί γάρ λύτρον πεισόντος αἵματος πέδω ;

What expiation shall be made
When once the earth hath drunk the flowing blood?

The answer is given in a terrific passage of the same tragedy, 398, in which there is an express reference to an ancient law. In reading the three last lines we might almost fancy that we hear the voice of the blood of Abel calling from the ground.

Ἀλλὰ νόμος μὲν φονίας σταγόνας
χυμένας εἰς πέδον ἄλλο προσαιτεῖν

αἷμα. βοᾷ γὰρ λογιὸν Ἑριννὸς
παρὰ τῶν πρότερον φθιμένων αἵται
ἐτέραν ἐπάγουσαν ἐπ' αὐτῇ

There is a law, that blood once poured on earth
By murderous hands, demands that other blood
Be shed in retribution. From the slain
Erinnys calls aloud for vengeance still,
Till death in justice meet, be paid for death.

In another passage, there is a similar reference to a very ancient law or mythus, which the poet styles *τριγέρων*, from its exceeding antiquity.

Ἀντί δὲ πληγῆς φονίας φονίαν
πληγὴν τινέτω· δρᾶσαντι παθεῖν
ΤΡΙΓΕΡΩΝ ΜΙΘΟΣ τάδε φωνεῖ.

Ib. 310.

For blood let blood be shed. *A law by age*
Thrice hallowed, on the guilty murderer's head
This righteous doom demands.

Who can doubt that we have in these and many other passages that might be quoted, an echo of that primitive voice which was heard in the law recorded Genesis 9: 5, 6, and which is so offensive to our modern sentimental rationalists?

Without dwelling longer on this branch of our subject, we would simply remark in passing, that there is one most ancient doctrine of the Bible, which nowhere finds so full an illustration as in the Grecian tragedies. We allude to what may be called the *representative feature* in the Divine government, by which the sins of the parent are declared to be visited on the children, even unto the third and fourth generation;—a doctrine which, whatever view we may take of it, is confirmed by the whole course of Divine Providence, from the first fatal transgression of the head of our race, down through all the following periods of the world's history. There is no disputing against facts. The Greeks derived from some primitive source the belief, that in the Divine economy, parents were thus made the representatives of their posterity, and hence we find it boldly set forth without any apprehension of the cavils of philosophy. In fact, it may be said to form the most striking feature of the ancient drama. To this must be assigned many things which, by Archbishop Potter and others, are ascribed to a blind belief in fate or destiny,—a view which we are able to show, had but

little foundation in the religious creed of the ancient world, except so far as by *fate* was meant no physical necessity, but the sovereign decree (*fatum*) of the supreme God. In the *Œdipus Tyrannus*, *Œdipus Coloneus* and *Antigone* of Sophocles, in the *Phœnissæ* of Euripides, and in the *Septem* of Æschylus, we have constantly this single moral presented,—that an act of wilful disobedience to the Divine command, involves not only the first guilty individual, but also his offspring to the third generation, together with his kindred and country, in a train of the most calamitous consequences,—that sin ever begets sin, and that nothing can stay the plague, or make atonement, but the direct interposition of Heaven. The degrading views of their deities which we find in connection with this lesson, should not diminish the interest of the truth, nor impair our wonder at the power with which this ancient doctrine of retributive justice had been once impressed on the human soul. The story of the house of Atreus strongly presents the same great truth, as it is powerfully exemplified in the sublime Trilogy of Æschylus, consisting of the *Agamemnon*, the *Choephoræ* and the *Eumenides*. It is however worthy of note in these cases, as in the parallel Scripture histories, that the descendants are not merely unfortunate but criminal.* The sin is never absent from the house, but descends with the punishment. There is not only *imputed* but also *intrinsic* guilt,—a propagation not only of the calamities, but also of the crimes of their ancestors.

Τὸ γὰρ δυσσεβὲς ἔργον
μετὰ μὲν πλείονα τίττει
σφετέρῃ δ' εἰκότα γέννα.

Agam. 737.

Sin still breeds sin,
And in its image evermore begets
An offspring like its sire.

We have said that the appellation עֲקִיבָא (the God of Vengeance) differs from עֲקִיבָא בִּלְבָד, not only as denoting the attribute

*Vide this subject discussed by Plutarch in his Treatise "concerning such as God is slow to punish," in which he makes the same exception as the Prophet Ezekiel. *A virtuous son (says he) may by repentance escape the punishment which threatens the whole descent as those begotten in sin ; but otherwise, as heirs to their father's estate, they must succeed to the punishment of their father's iniquity, and Holy Vengeance prosecutes, still pursuing the likeness of sin.*—Plut. *Moralia* IV. 175.

of punitive or vindictive, in distinction from legislative justice, but also as expressing, in a more peculiar sense, the attribute of Justice in action, (*ἐν ἐρέσσει*.) This idea suggests its etymology. There are many examples in Hebrew of verbs *pe nun* having a close affinity with, and deriving their meaning from verbs *ain vau*; and a comparison of places satisfies us, that *עץ* is not an original Hebrew root, (as it is generally regarded by the lexicographers,) but takes its peculiar sense from *עץ* to arise. In punishing sin and avenging wrong, the Lord is said "to arise," to come forth from the "place of the hiding of his power," and manifest himself to the world, as a being of moral emotion, instead of a mere contemplative intellect. For this purpose compare Ps. 10: 12, *קוּמָה עֹזֶר־יְהוָה*, *Arise, O Lord, lift up thy hand, forget not the poor.*—Ps. 12: 5, "From the destruction of the poor, from the groaning of the needy, *now will I arise* (*עָרָם*), saith the Lord."—Ps. 94: 16, "Who will arise for me against the evil doers," &c. It often signifies *surgere adversus aliquem*. Says Gesenius, *sæpe excitantis est, maxime Jehovahm ut auxilium ferat*. The same idea is found in several Greek words of similar import and derivation.

Aristotle in his Ethics makes equality, or *τὸ ἴσον*, the essential idea of Justice; *τὸ ἀδίκον ἀνίστον τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον*. (Ethica Nichom V. 3.) It consists, according to this philosopher, in restoring an equilibrium which has been disturbed, either between individuals, or between individuals and the state; although he does not apply it to the Divine government. The idea is more ancient than Aristotle, as is evident from the fact that it may be traced in the etymologies of most of the ancient tongues. In the earliest Greek, *ἰσότης* and *ἴσον* are used for *δικαιοσύνη* and *δίκαιον*—and with this is evidently connected the Latin *jus* (*I S*) and *justitia*. Another proof is found in that most ancient similitude, such a favorite with the Greeks, by which *Θέμις* or Justice is represented as holding scales in one hand and a sword in the other; a figure which dating from the most remote antiquity is still preserved in the armorial ensign of our own state. We have an allusion to it in the Orphic hymn quoted a few pages back. In Homer, the figure is applied, without any personification of Themis, directly to Jupiter. One of the most striking epithets of Jove in the Iliad and Odyssey is *ὑψιζυγός*, literally, *he who weighs on high*,

Ζεὺς ὑψιζυγός ἀνέρεα νόων.

He is represented as standing on the summit of Heaven, and holding the everlasting golden scales in which are weighed the destinies and actions of men. How vividly does this call to mind the Scriptural declarations, "*Jehovah dwelleth on high, his eyes behold and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. By him actions are weighed. He weigheth the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance. Thou most upright dost weigh the path of the just. The eyes of the Lord are upon the ways of a man and he pondereth all his goings.*" The primary idea here is obscured in the translation, although well expressed by the word "ponder" to a reader who associates with it the original sense of the Latin word. The Hebrew *וַיִּשְׁקָל* literally means *to weigh*, and is so expressed in the parallel passage, Isaiah 26 : 7 : "Thou dost *weigh* the path of the just ;" conveying the idea of a balance nicely poised and representing the most exact and rigorous justice. Compare the Iliad VIII. 68 :

*Ἦμος δ' ἥελιος μέσον οὐρανόν ἀμφιβέβηκει
καὶ τότε δὴ χρόσεια πατήρ ἐτίτανε τάλαντα.*

Compare also Daniel 6 : 27 : Thou art weighed in the balances and found wanting. In Homer, Jupiter sometimes holds the scales of providence and destiny, but the main allusion is to the attribute of Justice.

The political systems of the Greeks were imbued throughout with the sacred spirit of religion. Even terms denoting private compacts, in the daily transactions of life, exhibit in their etymology a fundamental idea derived from the same high origin ; striking examples of which we have in the words for *treaty* and *covenant*, *σπονδή* and *διαθήκη*. Every thing was religious, and the higher we ascend the stream of time the more pure we find it. All legitimate political power was viewed as a delegation of Divine authority. The early kings were all regarded in the language of Homer and Hesiod, as *διογενεῖς* and *διοτρεφεῖς*, divinely constituted and divinely sustained in the administration of justice.

According to Aristotle, who agrees in this with the ancient records of the Scriptures, King and Priest in the earliest ages were one. This view, it is true, has in modern times been degraded in the extravagant doctrine of the *personal* divine right of princes, yet still the fundamental idea is sound and true, in accordance with the Bible and the purest sentiments of mankind in all ages. It is in fact the *Divine right of Government*,

or of the lawful magistrate, whatever be his title or mode of appointment. It is equally applicable to all regularly established governments whatever may be their external forms. In the subsequent republican systems of Greece, although the people were the instruments of designating the *person* of the magistrate, still they never regarded themselves as the ultimate sources of his *power*. The religious feeling, as connected with the state, viewed as a divine institution, was not wholly lost in the change to a more popular form. The authority of the office itself, aside from the person of him who held it, was ever considered as derived from a higher source than the creative act of the popular will, and as in fact a delegation from the supreme majesty of the king of Earth as well as Heaven. Some may regard this as a pious fiction; whether the opposing modern fiction, that all power is derived from the people, can vie with it on the score of utility, (to say nothing of truth and reality,) is yet to be perhaps most fearfully tested. In proof of this ancient religious feeling, we may refer to the laws of Solon and Numa, and especially to the life of the latter as given us by Plutarch. To no single man did Rome owe so much as to Numa. That religious patriotism,—those high-souled deeds, which so adorn her early annals, and which, to those who do not appreciate their cause, appear only as romantic fables, were the direct results of the spirit he infused into her institutions. Hence Sallust, speaking of his early countrymen, might well style them *religiosisimi mortales*. Even in republican Rome, and so late as the age of Cicero, magistrates of all kinds, bore the appellation *sacro-sancti*. Religious rites and ceremonies of a most peculiar kind were used in their installation. The same took place in their deposition, (when accused of any crime,) in order that they might be divested of the sacred dignity of their office, before they could be made the subjects of punishment. No Biblical student need be informed that in the ceremony of anointing, and in the Hebrew terms מָשִׁיחַ (Messiah) and קֹדֶשׁ, the same primitive idea is prominently set forth. In correspondence with this sentiment, we find in the ancient poetry, the most sacred epithets applied to human princes and magistrates. They were deemed to bear the sword not simply of preventive or utilitarian, but of vindictive justice. They were regarded not as the *humble servants of the people*, but as the representatives, however imperfect, of the awful Justice in the Heavens; as the punishers of wickedness, not simply for its pernicious conse-

quences to society, but for its intrinsic demerit. Paul speaks the language of the whole ancient world when he declares, that the magistrate bears not the sword of man but of God. Hence there was also applied to him that same figure of the balance, which was generally regarded as sacred to the Divine Majesty. For examples vide among others Euripides Phœnissæ 74.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπὶ ζυγοῖς
καθεζέτ' ἀρχῆς, οὐ μεθίσταται θρόνον.

The primitive idea of justice, given by Aristotle, (τὸ ἴσον,) is found in the Hebrew root יָשַׁן whose primitive meaning is *straight, rectus*. In a secondary sense it denotes *right, righteous, just, (æquus)*—a preserving the beam of the balance straight, or without inclination. The same idea exists in our own language in the terms *right, rectitude, &c.* Hence, also, in the Hebrew we find preserved the ancient figure of the scales. To be unjust, (not as a private man, but as a magistrate,) is expressed by the frequent phrase מִשְׁכָּלִי מִיָּדַי to decline or turn the balance in judgment, Prov. 18 : 5, מִיָּדַי מִשְׁכָּלִי, Isaiah 10 : 2, Amos 5 : 12, &c.

The same ancient idea is presented in the various figures and comparisons by which the awful doctrine of the atonement is illustrated,—when it is compared to the payment of a debt, a *satisfaction* for sin,—and in the other methods by which that mysterious restoration of the equilibrium in the Divine government is represented. When,—to accommodate the most expressive language of Æschylus,—

ῥοπή δ' ἐπισκόπει δίκας,

Christ, as our *μεσίτης* or mediator, suspended on the cross, balanced the scales of divine retributive justice, which would have otherwise descended with fearful velocity, loaded with the sins of our guilty race. But on this subject all comparisons fail. As sin is something far more than a mere political or consequential evil,—being odious to God, and demanding punishment for itself intrinsically, and independent of its pernicious effects in the universe, considered as a political system; so also its atonement must have been far more than that mere display, held out *in terrorem*, which some theologians are so fond of representing it. Had there been but one sinful subject in God's empire, and no other to be visited by the contagion of his example, or to be profited by witnessing the personal or vicarious

infliction of the penalty, we have reason from Scripture to believe, that the Divine anger would have been no less intense, and an atonement (*καταλλαγή*) to rectify the scales of justice, and to make reconciliation, no less necessary.

That idea of an atonement to which we have alluded, and which regards it as a mere display, is utterly foreign to all those Greek terms which are used to denote propitiation, as well as to the Hebrew words *כִּפּוּר* and *חַטָּאת*. Whether true or false, we contend that it is wholly modern, and is not to be found radically in either of the languages in which the Bible was written.

ARTICLE IV.

ATONEMENT.

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THE Atonement of Christ is the basis upon which the gospel erects the grand scheme of salvation for guilty and condemned sinners. An illustration of this great doctrine is the object of this essay.

In discussing this subject, it will not be attempted by reasoning to construct a mould into which this doctrine must be cast in order to give it a desired form, but we shall allow it to assume that, which a clear scriptural presentation of the subject may require. There will, then, be no occasion for commencing the discussion by instituting the inquiry, "Why was the atonement necessary?" nor to speculate in reference to the design of Christ in assuming the office of Mediator, or any similar abstract proposition. Omitting all discussion of the vicariousness of the atonement, God's justice in it, the necessity of the proper divinity of Christ for its accomplishment, the impossibility of any man's being justified before God without it, the object of this essay will be simply to give a biblical exhibition of the doctrine.

In conducting the examination, the meaning of the word *atonement* will be considered; the characteristics of the typical atonements; the illustrations of atonement derived from the types, and the points of discrepancy between these and the

great antitype. The question, For whom did Christ die? will be examined, the meaning of other scriptural terms employed to express the doctrine of atonement considered, and its practical application shown in obtaining the salvation of condemned sinners.

I. The primitive meaning of the word atonement was to set *at-one* those who had been at variance. It was formerly pronounced at-one-ment, in conformity with its primitive meaning.

The Hebrew word *כָּפַר* translated in our version *atone*, means *to cover, to conceal*. The first passage in which this word occurs in the Hebrew Bible, is in Gen. 6 : 14 ; and it is there translated *pitch*, but in a connection which indicates its original import : " Make thee an ark of gopher wood : rooms shalt thou make in the ark, and shalt *pitch* [cover] it within and without with pitch." The next passage where the word is found is in Gen. 32 : 21, and translated *appease*. Jacob said concerning his brother Esau, " I will *appease* him with the present that goeth before me, and afterward I will see his face." That is, I will *cover* his wrath with the present. Solomon employs the word in the same sense. " A wise man will *appease* [conceal] the wrath of a king," Prov. 16 : 14. While its primitive meaning is preserved, the particular shade of thought, like that of other words, is modified by the connection in which it is found, and the translation often so varied as to express the different shades of meaning in each given case. Thus in our version the land is said to be *cleansed* [concealed] by sacrifice from the pollution of blood shed in it. The pollution of the altar, and of a disease, is said to be *cleansed* [covered] by an offering. So in a religious sense *pardoning* a transgression is figuratively *covering* it, *concealing* it, so that the offender is regarded and treated as if he had not sinned. Atonement, then, when applied to transgression, to moral pollution, to wrath, is that which makes amends for sin and secures its pardon, and thus figuratively *covers, conceals* it.

In this way atonement answers as a kind of substitute for obedience, and for the suffering of the penalty of a broken law. A man who breaks the law of God and has an atonement made for him, stands in the same relation to that law as one does who never transgressed it. It was to this the Apostle alluded when he said, " Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." By this means, a sinner for whom our Lord Jesus Christ makes atonement, escapes the penalty of

God's law, and is received by God and treated as if he had never sinned. "All his transgressions which he hath committed shall not be mentioned unto him," Ezek. 18 : 22. "The priest shall make atonement for him as concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven him," Lev. 4 : 26.

So far, then, as the meaning of the term is concerned, the Bible teaches us that he for whom atonement is made, is forgiven, is cleansed, has his sins *covered, concealed*, and is received, and treated by his God as one who never sinned.

II. This view of the doctrine we shall see developed more clearly, if we examine the characteristics of the typical atonements.

If we seek for *full* and *clear* illustrations of the atonement of Christ, we shall find none, surely, on which we can rely with greater confidence than those furnished by God himself. That the typical atonements were instituted by Jehovah, as illustrations of the Great Atonement, is evident from the testimony of the Scriptures. "Almost all things are by the law purged with blood; and without shedding of blood, is no remission. It was therefore necessary that the *patterns* of things in the heavens should be purified with these, but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these. For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are *figures* of the true, but into heaven itself, there to appear in the presence of God for us," Heb. 9 : 22—24. "Which are a *shadow* of things to come," said Paul, "but the body is of Christ," Col. 2 : 17. Here we see they are called *patterns* or *figures*, and *shadows*, of the atonements of Christ. Yet some very worthy and venerable theologians, because they cannot make these typical atonements accord with that view of atonement which has been formed by some hypothetical deductions, have concluded that we are not to look for a very exact analogy between the type and the antitype, and then practically set aside almost entirely the instruction God designed we should derive from these typical illustrations of this great doctrine.

It is true, in the types there is often only a general resemblance intended. The minuteness of detail, like many strokes of the pencil in painting, is designed only for ornament, or to give completeness to the representation. While, then, we should guard, on the one hand, against attempting to make the antitype answer to the type in every minute circumstance, where only a general resemblance is designed, we should, on the other hand,

as studiously avoid running into the opposite extreme, by rejecting from the antitype the distinct and main parts of the type. If, in the shadow of a human body, we see distinctly, not only the form of the body and head, but also that of the legs and arms, we hesitate not to decide that these members belong to the body which casts the shadow, or are parts of it. So it is with those shadows formed by Jehovah to represent the atonements of our Lord Jesus Christ. The body of those shadows or types must be allowed to find a counterpart in the antitype. Passing by the less important things pertaining to these types, the following we shall find constitute the main parts of the shadow, and are essential to its existence.

In the typical atonements, it was essential that there should be a *transgressor* in whose behalf they were made—the *immolation of a victim*—the *official act of the priest*.

To obtain a full and clear view of the subject, it will be necessary to understand the requirements and directions of God concerning these three things essential to atonement, and the pledge of Jehovah that it shall be followed by pardon.

1. First, then, let us consider the requirements God made of transgressors. These will be found in the following scriptures: "He shall bring his bullock unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation before the Lord," Lev. 4: 4. "He shall offer it of his own voluntary will," Lev. 1: 3. "He shall lay his hands upon the bullock's head," Lev. 4: 4. "And it shall be, when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess that he hath sinned in that thing," Lev. 5: 5. "And he shall kill the bullock before the Lord," Lev. 4: 4.

If the congregation had sinned, and the sacrifice was offered by them, then the confession and killing of the victim were to be by the elders or the high priest, as their representatives. "If the whole congregation of Israel sin, then the congregation shall offer a bullock, and the elders shall lay their hands upon the head of the bullock before the Lord; and the bullock shall be killed before the Lord," Lev. 4: 13—15. "Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and shall confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat," Lev. 16: 21. "Then shall he [Aaron] kill the goat of the sin-offering that is for the people," Lev. 16: 15.

From these passages we perceive that God requires of trans-

gressors, as essential to their having atonement made for them, these three things, viz. :

The voluntary presentation of a sacrifice unto God—a confession over it of their sins, and the killing of their victim.

There could have been no acceptable atonement unless these requisitions had been complied with. The fulfilment of them, then, on the part of the transgressor, was essential to making atonement for his sins. A deviation from these requirements would have exposed him to death. The declaration of God was, "That man shall be cut off from among the people," Lev. 17 : 3.

2. In the typical atonements, another thing essential was, *a victim to be sacrificed.*

The requirements of God concerning sacrifices were, that they should be selected from among the most gentle and useful of animals, should be of those esteemed clean, and these without blemish. Only animals of the herd and of the flock could, with the goat, the dove, and the pigeon, be used in sacrifice. "If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord, ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd of the flock," Lev. 1 : 2. "If he be not able to bring a lamb, then shall he bring for his trespass which he hath committed, two turtle doves, and two young pigeons unto the Lord," Lev. 5 : 7. "Whatsoever hath a blemish, that shall ye not offer ; for it shall not be acceptable for you," Lev. 22 : 20.

3. A third thing essential to atonement was the *official act of the priest in the place appointed.*

If he were an ordinary priest, a descendant of Aaron, not the first-born, then after the beast had been slain by the transgressor, he was required to take the blood of the victim, which had been received, in a dish, carry it into the first or outer tabernacle, and perform the service of sprinkling the blood, and of cutting in pieces and burning the sacrifice ; part upon the altar in the tabernacle, and part in a place without the camp.

"And the priest that is anointed shall take of the bullock's blood, and bring it to the tabernacle of the congregation.

"And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle of the blood seven times before the Lord, before the vail of the sanctuary. And the priest shall put some of the blood upon the horns of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the tabernacle of the congregation ; and shall pour

all the blood of the bullock at the bottom of the altar of the burnt-offering, which is at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation.

"And he shall take off from it all the fat of the bullock for the sin-offering: the fat that covereth the inwards, and all the fat that is upon them, which is by the flanks, and the caul above the liver, with the kidneys, it shall be taken away, as it was taken off from the bullock of the sacrifice of peace-offerings," Lev. 4: 5-10. "And the skin of the bullock, and all his flesh, with his head, and with his legs, and his inwards, and his dung, even the whole bullock shall he carry forth without the camp unto a clean place, where the ashes are poured out, and burn him on the wood with fire: where the ashes are poured out shall he be burnt," Lev. 4: 11, 12. "And the priest shall make an atonement for them, and it shall be forgiven them," Lev. 4: 20.

From these passages we learn that the place appointed for the common priests to make atonement was the first tabernacle, and that it was done subsequently to the death of the sacrifice, by the ceremony performed with the blood, and the dividing and burning of the victim. In later times, we are told, the addition of killing the sacrifice was made to this service. It was added, however, by human, not divine authority. Jahn's Arch. § 365.

When the high priest officiated, atonement was to be made in another place; and the ceremony varied somewhat from that of the common priests. Unlike them, he himself was reckoned among those for whom the atonement was made. Hence, he himself being one of the transgressors, killed the sacrifices, then took the blood of the victims and went with burning incense through the vail into the second, the inner tabernacle, the holiest of holies, where, with the sprinkling of blood, he made atonement for himself, for the congregation, and for the holy place: he then came out into the first or outer tabernacle, where the common priests atoned, and with a like sprinkling of blood he made atonement for the altar of burnt-offering. He then, by the imposition of hands, laid the sins of the people upon the head of the scape-goat, and sent him away into the wilderness. After this he burnt part of the sacrifice, the fat, etc., upon the altar of burnt-offering in the first tabernacle, and the remainder he sent forth by a man selected for the purpose, who burnt it without the camp.

"And Aaron shall bring the bullock of the sin-offering which

is for himself, and for his house, and shall kill the bullock for the sin-offering, which is for himself. And he shall take a censer full of burning coals of fire from off the altar before the Lord, and his hands full of sweet incense beaten small, and bring it within the vail. And he shall put the incense upon the fire before the Lord, that the cloud of the incense may cover the mercy-seat that is upon the testimony, that he die not," Lev. 16 : 11-13.

"And he shall take of the blood of the bullock, and shall sprinkle it with his finger upon the mercy-seat eastward; and before the mercy-seat shall he sprinkle of the blood with his finger seven times," Lev. 16 : 14.

"Then shall he kill the goat of the sin-offering, that is for the people, and bring his blood within the vail, and do with that blood as he did with the blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it upon the mercy-seat, and before the mercy-seat. And he shall make an atonement for the holy place, because of the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and because of their transgressions and their sins: and so shall he do for the tabernacle of the congregation that remaineth among them in the midst of their uncleanness. And there shall be no man in the tabernacle of the congregation when he goeth in to make an atonement in the holy place, until he come out, and have made an atonement for himself, and for his household, and for all the congregation of Israel," Lev. 16 : 11-17. "But the goat on which the lot fell to be the scape-goat, shall be presented alive before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scape-goat into the wilderness," Lev. 16 : 10.

"And when he hath made an end of reconciling the holy place, and the tabernacle of the congregation, and the altar, he shall bring the live goat, and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the sins of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the wilderness. And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities into a land not inhabited: and he shall let go the goat into the wilderness," Lev. 16 : 20-22. "And Aaron shall come into the tabernacle of the congregation, and shall put off the linen garments which he put on when he went into the holy place, and shall leave them there: and he shall wash his flesh with water in the holy place, and put on his garments, and come forth, and offer his

burnt-offering, and the burnt-offering of the people, and make an atonement for himself and for the people. And the fat of the sin-offering shall he burn upon the altar," Lev. 16 : 23-25.

"And the bullock for the sin-offering, and the goat for the sin-offering, whose blood was brought in to make an atonement in the holy place, shall one carry forth without the camp : and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung," Lev. 16 : 27.

This atonement-service of the high priest, naturally divides itself into two parts—that which he performs with the slain sacrifice ; and that which he performs with the living sacrifice.

The service which he performs with the slain sacrifice, we learn from the above quotation, consisted in killing the victim, presenting his blood within the vail, and burning the fat of the sacrifice. The other parts of the sacrifice were burnt, but not by the priest, Lev. 16 : 27, 28, and therefore this was not a part of the *act* of atonement, but only an appendage ; for it is said expressly, that the priest, and not others, shall make the atonement, Lev. 16 : 32. If, then, the *priest* made the atonement, any service performed by others did not constitute any part of the atoning acts. In the most enlarged sense which can possibly be given them, they consisted in these three things—*killing the victim—presenting the blood before the Lord in the holy place—and burning the fat upon the altar.*

In a stricter, and it is believed also, in a more accurate sense, the *atoning act* consisted in presenting *the blood* of the victim within the vail before the Lord, according to divine direction ; for it is said expressly, "*It is the blood that maketh atonement for the soul,*" Lev. 17 : 11. The burning of the sacrifice is subsequent to the making atonement, and therefore cannot be a part of the atoning act. This is clearly expressed in Lev. 16 : 27 : "And the bullock for the sin-offering, and the goat for the sin-offering, *whose blood was brought in to make atonement in the holy place,* shall one carry forth without the camp, and they shall burn in the fire their skins, and their flesh, and their dung."

The reason assigned for giving such importance to this part of the priest's service was, that *the life was in the blood*, and the presentation of *that* was as if the entire sacrifice in all its dying agonies were presented. In cases of reported murder, nothing so strikes us aghast, and fills us with emotion, as the presentation before us of the blood of the murdered victim. the recent trial in this city, for the commission of a fearful mur

der, females, even, sat in the audience and listened to the shocking testimony presented, with apparent composure; but when it was decided to have the mangled and bloody head of the miserable victim exhibited in the court, the ladies and men of weaker nerves left the room. So the blood of the sacrifice that had been writhing in the agonies of death without, when it was brought into the tabernacle and presented before the Lord, would, to human appearance, thrill the mind with emotion, and awaken a lively perception which would discern in *that blood* the dying sufferings of the victim slain. Hence the command to Aaron to come into the holy place with a young bullock for a sin-offering, and a ram for a burnt-offering, (Lev. 16: 3,) was fulfilled when he presented in that place only the blood of those victims: "*For it is the life of all flesh; the blood of it is for the life thereof,*" Lev. 17: 14. "It was manifestly on this account that God forbade the people to eat blood," Lev. 17: 10-12. There is no such prohibition concerning the flesh of the victim. But there was a sacredness attached to the blood, because that was the part of the sacrifice which made the atonement.

In the ordinary atonements the killing of the victims, as we have seen, was no part of the priest's service, and in the annual atonements, the burning of the sacrifice was done by other hands. But the presentation and sprinkling of the blood by the priest alone. Hence we are brought to the conclusion, that, in a strict sense, the service of the priest, which constituted *the act* of atonement, was the presentation and sprinkling of the blood of the victim. Should any maintain that the atoning acts embrace in them the other services also, still, it must be acknowledged this is the one most significant and essential. The burning of incense, which accompanied this presentation of the blood, was evidently that it might not be attended with an offensive but with a sweet-smelling savor.

The second part of the atoning service of the high priest was performed with the live goat. It consisted in confessing the sins of the people and laying them upon the head of the victim, which, being then sent away by a fit man, bore them into the wilderness.

In relation to the typical atonements, then, the Bible brings us to the following conclusions:

The atonement did not consist in the *death* of the sacrifice,

but in the act of the priest with the blood of the victim, after the struggles of death were past.

The principal atoning *act* was the presentation of the blood of the victim, before the Lord, in the place appointed, by the priest.

No atonement could be made for a transgressor until he had confessed his sins.

No atonement was ineffectual, it always procured pardon or cleansing. To this the divine veracity stood pledged. "*It shall be forgiven him,*" Lev. 4: 20, 26. No instance is on record where an atonement for sin was not followed immediately by a pardon.

III. We shall now consider the illustrations of the Great Atonement derived from the types, and the points of discrepancy between these and the antitype.

1. *In respect to the sacrifices.* They were animals, in their disposition the most mild; in kind the most valuable; and in condition without blemish. So with Christ the great sacrifice for sinners. He was meek and lowly in heart, the most estimable of the heavenly world, the well beloved of the Father, sinless and unblamable in life. When offered for us he knew no sin, he was a lamb without blemish.

Every sacrifice was seasoned with salt. As salt is in its nature savory and preservative, unlike the corruptibleness of flesh with which it was combined in sacrifice, so, in the sacrifice of Christ there was combined with human nature, which is corruptible, the Divine nature, which is incorruptible, and which renders his sacrifice so acceptable both to God and the dying sinner.

As the iniquities of the children of Israel were put upon the head of the sacrifices, and of the scape-goat, and it is said, Lev. 16: 22, "The goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities," so upon Christ the great antitype "the Lord hath laid the iniquity of us all," Isa. 53: 6. "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree," 1 Pet. 2: 24. "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust," 1 Pet. 3: 18.

As the typical sacrifices were slain before the Lord, carried away and burned without the camp, so Christ was tortured in the holy city, and then carried out and crucified and buried without the walls of Jerusalem. "For the bodies of those beasts whose blood was brought into the sanctuary by the high priest for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also,

that he might sanctify the people with his own blood suffered without the gate," Heb. 13 : 11, 12.

2. *In respect to the transgressor.* He was required to bring his offering, voluntarily, to the door of the tabernacle, lay his hands upon the head of his victim, and confess over it his sins. There is no instance recorded where a priest atoned for a transgressor until after a compliance with this requisition. So it is in the gospel. By faith, the sinner is required to appropriate to himself the great sacrifice for sin, confess over it his transgressions, and plead for pardon through his atoning blood. Hence we read, "Repent that your sins may be blotted out." "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." Sins can be blotted out only by atonement. We are saved only by the blood of Jesus, as the Scripture saith, "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins. Unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood. The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin."

3. *In respect to the office-work of the priest.* The leading and principal part of this was, to take the blood of the victim after he was slain, and perform the ceremony of sprinkling, etc., in the place appointed. In addition to this he sometimes killed the sacrifice, and sometimes burnt it on the altar. But these acts appear to have been not essential to the official work of the priest, because, as we have seen, they were frequently performed by others. But the presentation and sprinkling of the blood of the sacrifice was appropriately, and exclusively, the official work of the priest, and the principal thing which constituted the act of atoning; "*for the blood maketh the atonement.*"

In the annual atonements made by the high priest, which more fully symbolize the atonements made by Christ our Great High Priest, this service of blood was required to be made in the Holiest of Holies. Hence the numerous references and applications of this symbol to Christ by Paul in his epistle to his Hebrew brethren, to whom the illustrations of this type were familiar. "But into the second [tabernacle] went the high priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself, and for the errors of the people. The Holy Ghost thus signifying that the way into the holiest of all was not yet manifest. But Christ being come a high priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building, neither by the blood

of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained *[procuring] eternal redemption for us," Heb. 9: 7, 8, 11.

Again, "For Christ is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are figures of the true, but into heaven itself, now to appear in the presence of God for us," Heb. 9: 24. "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God; from henceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool," Heb. 10: 12. "Now of the things which we have spoken, this is the sum. We have such a high priest, who is set on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in the heavens; a minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man," Heb. 8: 1, 2. "But this man, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them: for such a high priest became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners," Heb. 7: 24-26.

In the above passages, Christ is represented as being still invested, subsequently to his death, with the office of a royal high priest; as having entered in this official capacity into the holiest of holies on high with his own blood; as having sat down on the throne of priestly intercession, to remain there forever, exercising the office of his unchangeable priesthood; and as procuring the pardon of all those who come unto God for the remission of their sins through his atoning blood.

These and similar passages prove most clearly, that, as the typical atonements by the high priest were made in the holiest of holies amidst the fragrance of smoking incense, subsequently to the death of the victim, so Christ, after his sufferings were finished, "*was raised again for our justification*," Rom. iv. 25, by officiating in the royal priesthood, and atoning for penitent sinners in the holy place above, into which he has for us entered, amidst their prayers and supplications, which to God are as smoking incense, Rev. 5: 8.

The idea that Christ made atonement on the cross, is one often

* The Greek participle, *σπάρωντος*, translated in our version "*having obtained*," is an Alexandrine form of the 2nd Aorist Middle voice, and here signifies *procuring*. See Stuart's Commentary on the passage.

expressed in the writings of many excellent divines, but this we have not been able to find in the sacred writings. We do not learn from any of the typical illustrations which God has given us in his Word, that the dying sufferings of the victim constitute the atonement; but on the contrary, that the official act of the priest with the blood of the victim in the place appointed, subsequently to the death of the sacrifice, constituted it. That the victim suffered in the room and stead of the transgressor who presented it, and that there was propitiatory merit in those sufferings, is readily admitted. Indeed this sacrificed life seems to be regarded by God as being contained in the blood of the immolated sufferer, and as imparting to it its merit when the priest presents it before the Lord for atonement. This appears to be the reason assigned by God for the fact, that it is the blood which makes the atonement. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make an atonement for your souls; *for it is the blood that maketh the atonement for the soul,*" Lev. 17 : 11. That the dying of the victim was not regarded as the atonement is evident from the fact, that in the ordinary atonements the priest did not kill the sacrifice, did not perform his official work till after those sufferings were ended; yet it was the act of the priest, in which he presented those dying sufferings in the blood before the Lord, that made the atonement—it was the *priest* that made the atonement, and not the *dying victim*.

In the above extracts from the epistle to the Hebrews we see that the *manner* of making atonement, as illustrated by the types, is applicable to Christ with great particularity. Subsequently to his death he exercises the office of a royal high priest; takes his blood which he had shed in death in his hand, enters with it into the holy place on high, to appear in the presence of God for us. What else can this mean but that he has gone thither to atone for the sins of penitent, confessing transgressors, who come unto God by him? Was not this the appropriate and the distinguishing official work of the Aaronical high priests when they went into the holy place? And why is this symbol applied to Christ with so much particularity? How can he be a high priest in the holy place which he has entered, unless he exercises there the priestly office? If then Jesus executes the office of a high priest within the vail, does he not make atonement there? He ever liveth there, says the apostle, to make *intercession* for us. The Scriptures give no intimation, however, that

the priest ever made intercession in the holy place with *prayer*. It was the intercession of the blood when presented before the Lord. This gave as it were a voice to blood. The blood of Jesus speaketh, and speaketh other and better things than the blood of Abel, for it crieth out, not against the transgressor, but for him. It pleads, saying, "Father, forgive, for I have found a ransom." The context shows that this is the kind of advocacy alluded to by John when he says, "If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. And he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2: 1, 2. The Jews were in the habit of calling the high priest their *παράκλητος*, translated here *advocate*, on account of the aid he rendered them by his atonements. The intercessions by prayer which accompanied their atonements, were made, not by the priest, but by the people who stood without, praying, Lev. 16: 17, and Luke 1: 10. When Paul speaks of our reconciliation to God by the cross, Eph. 2: 16, and by the death of his Son, Rom. 5: 10, we should interpret the language as the Jews would to whom it was addressed. They would understand it, evidently, in the sense of a sacrificial death on the cross, which would be rendered efficacious only by the subsequent atoning act of the priest with the blood shed in that death, as in the case of the typical sacrifices. Offering the blood of the victim in atonement by the priest was no less essential to the forgiveness of a transgressor than the suffering of death by the victim. So it was equally essential to the justification of sinners that Christ should be raised from the dead, enter the holy place made without hands, and present there his own blood in atonement for their sins, as it was that he should die on the cross. Hence in upbraiding the Corinthians for their denial of the resurrection, Paul declares that "if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins. Then they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished," 1 Cor. 15: 16, 17. Hence also the declaration of Paul, in Rom. 4: 25, "Who was delivered for our offences, *and raised again for our justification*." The influence of the resurrection of Christ in procuring our justification is symbolized by the live goat on which iniquities were laid, and who then bore them away. So, Jesus bears away the sins of the penitent, not in his death, but in his life. When atonement is made for them they remain no longer on the transgressor. As in the types, atonement was immediately fol-

lowed by pardon, so in the gospel, this is everywhere assumed as accompanying the pleadings of the blood of Jesus.

We proceed now to notice some discrepancies between the type and the antitype. These we shall find originate, necessarily, from characteristics belonging to the one, which cannot, in the nature of the case, belong to the other. In other respects we shall find the antitype to correspond with the type. In sketching the discrepancies we shall notice only the things which compose the main body of those shadows of things in the gospel. In these are embraced *the sacrifice, the penitence of the transgressor, and the official work of the priest.*

In the types, many sacrifices were offered; in the antitype but one.

In the types, the priests were furnished with sacrifices by the transgressors; in the antitype, Jesus, our High Priest, furnished his own offering.

In the types, the high priest entered the holy place once every year, when he abode there only long enough to make one atonement; in the antitype, our High Priest having entered once, ever remaineth there.

In the types, the priests made but one atonement with the blood of the same sacrifice; in the antitype, our High Priest with his own blood makes many atonements. It is said he died but once, and that he entered but once into the holy place; but it is nowhere said he makes but one atonement. On the contrary, "This man because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make *intercession* for them," that is, as we have seen, the intercession of blood, which is only another name for atonement.*

In the types, the confession of the transgressor preceded, not only the act of atonement by the priest, but also the death of the victim. In the antitype this is impossible, because Christ suffered once for all, and his sufferings could not therefore follow the confessions of all those who have sinned. But although the sacrifice was slain previous to the repentance of the trans-

* In this essay, the term *atonement* is employed to express the office-work in heaven of our Great High Priest for the purpose of giving it a clearer illustration. Should any prefer the term *intercession* which is employed in the New Testament to express this work, there can be urged against it no valid

gressor, there is no necessity that the atonement be made for him until after he repents, because, having once entered into the holy place, our Priest ever liveth there to make intercession, or atonement, whenever it is applied for by penitent transgressors, and they must repent, that their sins may be thus blotted out.

IV. We come, now, to a consideration of the question so often proposed, "*For whom did Christ die?*"

This question, we apprehend, would never have been one of so much controversy had the representation of the doctrine of atonement, as given in the Bible, been preserved in its simplicity. But divines, who have attained, deservedly, a very high rank among the churches, have raised and discussed, as we have before remarked, certain questions concerning this subject, and then the doctrine of atonement has been made to assume a form which would correspond with the conclusion to which they have arrived. By such means, positions have been taken, and principles adopted, that have perplexed and confused the minds of unbiassed inquirers, and have led to long protracted controversy concerning this great doctrine. In the progress of these things, it has been found necessary to impart to certain scriptural terms a borrowed meaning, and to employ terms to express sentiments concerning the doctrine of atonement unknown in the Bible, and which combine truth and error. Hence we hear of its *general design* and *limited application*, as if God failed to apply what he designed. We hear also of a fresh application of the atonement, as if our Great High Priest could make but one atonement, and therefore were under the necessity of giving it innumerable applications—an idea, the shadow of which, it is believed, no one can find in the Scriptures. So also the death of Christ and the atonement of Christ are often erroneously employed as synonymous terms; whereas, in the Scriptures, the one is represented as the material of which the other is made. "It shall be accepted of him to make *atonement* for him,"

objections. It should be understood, however, that it is a *priestly intercession*, and of course restricted to penitent sinners who apply to Christ to procure their pardon of the Father, by pleading in their behalf his own blood, and that this intercession of the New Testament is that which answers to atonement in the Old. As the immolated victims of the Old Testament typified the *death* of Christ, so the priestly atonements of the Old Testament typified the *intercessions* of Christ.

Lev. 1: 4, and not that the sacrifice was itself the atonement. The dying victim is nowhere represented as making atonement, but it is made by the priest after the victim is dead. The question then "For whom did Christ die?" may require one answer; and the question "For whom is atonement made?" another and different answer.

As to the question, then, "For whom did Christ die?" the Scriptures furnish answers in abundance. Take the following as a specimen. "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life," John 16: 3. "For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved," John 3: 17. "For the bread of God is he that cometh down from heaven and giveth life to the world. And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world," John 6: 33, 51. "I am not come to judge the world, but to save the world," John 12: 47. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world," 1 John 2: 2. "The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world," John 4: 14. The term *world* is used in the New Testament with reference to the race of Adam seventy-six times. In several of these passages it signifies nothing more than a *multitude of people*, as "the world hath gone after him." Sometimes it is employed to designate the unconverted, as it is now often popularly employed, as, "The world hath not known me;" "The world will hate you." In two passages it denotes Gentiles, and in two the antediluvians. When employed to designate the inhabitants of the world, it embraces *the human race*, unless used in a qualified and restricted sense. The question then arises, How shall we determine in what passages this term is to be taken in its literal, and when in its restricted sense? Not by our fancies, but by the acknowledged laws of language. In all instances where the term is used in a restricted sense, the context, or the application of the term to something which is known cannot embrace the human family, or some other cause, must absolutely demand this restricted sense, since the laws of language require us to give to every word its natural and literal meaning, unless circumstances compel us to depart from that, and give it a qualified signification. In Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. p. 582, the following rules are laid down as our guide:

"The literal meaning of words is to be retained, more in the historical books of Scripture, than in those which are poetical.

"The literal meaning of words is to be given up, if the predicate, being literally taken, be contrary to the subject.

"The literal meaning of words is to be given up, if it be either improper or involve an impossibility.

"When the literal meaning of words is contrary either to common sense, to the context, to parallel passages, or to the scope of a passage, it must be given up."

Now in relation to the term *world* in the above and similar passages, the question arises, Do the laws of language require us to depart from the literal, and employ a restricted signification? It is not sufficient to assert, that there are many passages in which the term is found, where it does not embrace the whole human family. This is readily acknowledged. The above laws of language require the term in many passages to be restricted in its application. But the question returns, Do the above and similar passages require it? Is there any *impropriety or impossibility, any thing contrary to common sense, to the context, to parallel passages, or to the scope of the passage*, that compels us in the above, and similar instances, to restrict the signification of the term *world*? A critical, philological examination of those passages, it is believed, would require the acknowledgment that none of the above reasons can be found. It is not sufficient to affirm that "he died for the sheep," that "he gave himself for the church," because *they* are embraced in the world, and if he died for the world and they are embraced in it, he must of course have died for them. Nor will it suffice to qualify and change the sense of scriptural language, in order to give it an interpretation which shall accord with our creed. By such a practice, *repentance* has been made to signify *penance*, and the terms *hell, everlasting, all, elect*, etc., have been robbed of their appropriate meaning. Allow such a mode of interpretation, and the Scriptures would soon cease to be the standard of divine truth. The Scriptures should be allowed to qualify our creeds, and not our creeds the Scriptures. A proper interpretation of the passages which declare that Christ died for the world, will require us then to take them in their broadest sense, embracing the whole human race.

The same sentiment is expressed in numerous other passages

in different languages. Take the following example: "We thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead," 2 Cor. 5: 14. "And that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him that died for them and rose again," 2 Cor. 5: 15. "The righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, is manifested unto all, and is upon all them that believe, for there is no difference, for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God," Rom. 3: 22, 23. "Who gave himself a ransom for all," 1 Tim. 2: 6. "For if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many," Rom. 5: 15.

In the first of these passages, the reason assigned for Christ's death for all, is that all were dead. But what force is there in this logic, unless he died for all who were dead? And were not all the human family dead? None surely will maintain that the elect only were dead. In the other passages, we see the death of Christ is represented as being as extensive in its application as the effects of the fall. Indeed, it is believed, that there are more passages which assert that Christ died for all, than there are which declare that all have sinned. The Scriptures are more replete with testimonies that Christ died for all the world, than with commands that the gospel shall be preached to all the world.

The objection usually urged against this view is, that the death of Christ is represented as having a special application to his people. "He died for the sheep,"—"purchased the church,"—"gave himself for us," the saints. In relation to these expressions we remark:

1. In the above and similar passages, the sacred writers have solely in view the *relations* between the *sheep, the church, the saints*, and their dying Saviour. Consequently they had occasion to speak of the death of Christ simply in its relation to them. In other passages, where the relations of Christ to the world are noticed, he is, as we have seen, represented as dying for the world.

2. The rule adopted by some for the interpretation of the above passages would require us, in its application to other passages, to restrict the death of Christ to one single individual. Paul, speaking of the dying love of Christ, not for the world, nor for the sheep, nor for the church, nor for the saints, but only for *himself*, says, "Who loved *me*, and gave himself for *me*,"

Gal. 2: 20. The argument is that as Christ died for the *sheep*, therefore he did not die for any others. According to this logic, Christ gave himself for Paul, therefore he gave himself for no one else!

But it is objected again, that nothing is gained by maintaining that Christ died for all mankind, since all will not be saved, and that it is derogatory to the character of the Divine Being to suppose that he would allow his Son to die in vain.

To this we reply: If it be an established fact that all will not be saved for whom Christ died, this will not prove that his blood is shed in vain; nor that it has failed or shall fail to accomplish that which God designed should be effected by it. What was this? It was that, "whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life;" "that God might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," Rom. 3: 26. By this means, God's mercy will be gloriously displayed in the salvation of all who believe. His goodness will be gloriously manifested in kindly proffering salvation by dying love to all, though some may wickedly reject it. God will be glorified in Christ's death, then, as well in those who die, as in those that live. God sent Moses to Pharaoh to plead with him that he might let Israel go. He exerted his divine power in working many miracles to enforce obedience, but he declared that he knew well it would all be in vain. Was it therefore useless, and did it detract from the character of God to employ means for the accomplishment of that which he knew they would fail to accomplish? By no means. It resulted in God's getting himself glory by Pharaoh.

So the gospel, which announces to sinners that Christ died for them, will be a sweet-smelling savor unto God, not only in those that are saved but also in them that are lost. No inglorious defeat, then, will be sustained by Jehovah, though many perish for whom Christ died.

Another object gained by this scriptural view of Christ's death is, that it enables us consistently to preach the gospel to every creature. But that which does not include in it the death of Christ is not the gospel. To preach the gospel, then, to every creature, is to preach a dying Saviour to every creature, and to warn the rejecters of it of the dreadful sin of "denying the Lord that bought them," 2 Pet. 2: 1. It also enables us to make the strongest appeal to the sinner's heart, an appeal founded on dying love. Christ has died for you. How can

you slight a dying Saviour? How can you reject bleeding mercy?

This analogy between the type and the great antitype, shows us, finally, that the resemblance is preserved as far as the circumstances of the case will allow. From this analogy we learn:

That the death of Christ on the cross for the world was not the *atonement* of Christ.

That the atonement of Christ consists in his subsequent, official, priestly act in presenting his own blood as our High Priest in that holy place above, into which he has for us entered.

That as his priesthood is an unchangeable one, he ever lives in that holy place, and is ready at all times to make atonement with his blood for every penitent transgressor, who comes to God through him.

That Christ died but once, and entered with his blood into the holy place but once, as our great High Priest, but that he atones for penitent sinners often, and as often as they apply to God through him for pardon.

That Christ has *died* for all sinners, but *atones* for none until they repent.

That as soon as our great High Priest atones for a sinner he is forgiven.

That the doctrine, which teaches that the *death* of Christ is the atonement, in effect, renders his office as our High Priest merely nominal, inasmuch as it takes from him when within the vail, the official work of a high priest, which was to make atonement there.

That the priestly service within the vail is as essential to atonement as the death of the victim.

That to maintain that sinners, whether of the elect or non-elect, are atoned for in a state of impenitence, is contrary to the doctrine of atonement as taught in the Bible.

That the doctrine, which teaches that atonement is made for a sinner, and yet he is not forgiven, is in direct and open hostility to the instruction furnished by the sacred Scriptures.

We shall pass now, to a brief explanation of some other scriptural terms employed to represent the work of Christ in procuring the salvation of sinners.

Redemption. This consists of two parts. The first is the payment of a certain price for the release of one in bondage. "This Jesus did when he was delivered for our offences." "Ye

were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish, and without spot," 1 Pet. 1: 18, 19. The second part of redemption consists in the deliverance of the prisoner from his bondage. In the gospel this can be done only on the terms prescribed by the Great Head of the Church. These are, that he repent and believe and be pardoned through the blood of Jesus. "We have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins," Eph. 1: 7. "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood," Rev. 5: 9. Redemption, then, harmonizes with atonement.

Ransom. This is the sum paid for the release of a captive. In the great work of salvation it corresponds to the death of a victim for atonement. Hence it is said of Christ, "Who gave himself a ransom for all," 1 Tim. 2: 6. "The Son of man came to give his life a ransom for many," Matt. 20: 28. The ransom money does not of itself release the prisoner. This is done only on the specified terms of the gospel.

Price, Purchase. These terms embrace the sum given for a servant, and correspond in use to the term ransom.

"Ye are not your own; ye are bought with a price," 1 Cor. 6: 20.

"Feed the flock of God which he hath purchased with his own blood," Acts 20: 28.

Reconciliation. This is making those friends, who, before, were at variance. In the work of salvation (if we except Rom. 5: 10, where the cause is put for the effect, and the term is employed as synonymous with the death of Christ, verse 8) it corresponds to the second part of redemption, and to atonement in distinction from sacrifice, while ransom, price, and purchase, correspond to the first part of redemption, and to the death of the victim in distinction from the atonement made with that death. The elect, as such, are nowhere represented as being reconciled unto God, but this is affirmed of believers, penitent sinners, the saints of God. The wicked are entreated to be reconciled. "We pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God," 2 Cor. 5: 20. But the saints are represented as being already reconciled. "And you that were enemies hath he reconciled," Col. 1: 21. In order to effect reconciliation, it was not only necessary that a sacrifice should be slain, but that atonement should be made by the priest with the blood of that sacrifice. Thus

are these terms employed in perfect harmony with the doctrine of atonement as presented and illustrated in the Scriptures.

In conclusion, let us consider the practical application of this great doctrine in obtaining the salvation of condemned sinners.

In the discussion of this subject, we have seen that Jesus Christ, our adorable Saviour and Redeemer, has given himself in death as a propitiatory sacrifice for all sinners, in order that as many of them as repent and believe may be saved, and that God may be just in pardoning them. Whosoever will, then, let him come and take the water of life freely. We have seen that Christ, after having died for sinners, arose from the dead, assumed the office of a Royal High Priest, ascended into heaven with his blood which he had shed in sacrifice, sat down there on the throne of intercession, where he ever liveth, and is ready at all times to make atonement for every broken-hearted, penitent sinner who casts himself on him, and comes to God for pardon through his blood. We are taught by this glorious doctrine that no sinner, however vile he may be, will apply for pardon thus in vain. God has shown us in the typical illustrations of the doctrine, that all for whom atonement is thus made are instantly forgiven. For this the veracity of God stands solemnly pledged,—“*It shall be forgiven him.*” In the history of atonement, not an instance can be produced from the Scriptures where pardon or cleansing did not immediately follow. If an atonement was made for a house, the altar, the vessels of the sanctuary, or the land, they were immediately and invariably cleansed by that atonement. If made for sins, they were instantly forgiven. So it is with the atonements which Jesus our glorious Mediator makes for poor, condemned, broken-hearted sinners. They are always efficacious. It is said expressly by Jesus, “Father, I know thou hearest me always,” John 11: 42, 43. Whenever he pleads with his blood—for his blood it is that speaketh—saying, “Father, forgive, for I have found a ransom,” at once the sinner is forgiven. God has declared, “it shall be forgiven him.” Hence it is, that the Apostle in exultation exclaims, “Let us therefore come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need,” Heb. 4: 16.

The opinion of many excellent brethren and venerable divines, that on the cross Jesus Christ atoned for all mankind,

whilst they remain still children of wrath, unforgiven, and although many of them will at last fall into perdition, is an opinion at war with the doctrine of atonement as presented in the Bible. Nor does the sentiment of others, that on the cross Christ by his death made a full and complete atonement for the elect, harmonize better with the doctrine of atonement as illustrated in the Scriptures. There, we are taught that the death of the victim is not atonement, but that it is the subsequent presentation of his blood before the Lord, and that atonement is made for no one in any case, where it is not followed by pardon. But no one, of the elect even, is pardoned until he repents; they are children of wrath, even as others. To escape these manifest discrepancies with the Bible doctrine of atonement, some divines have maintained the doctrine of an eternal justification of the elect; and others, in modern times, have asserted that the atonement of itself effects nothing!—a position most dishonorable to the official work of the great Mediator. The pleading of the blood of Christ of itself effects nothing! No, no, precious Jesus. *Thou* never pleadest in vain. Thy Father always heareth thee. When thy blood speaketh, it procures pardon. Come, then, to Christ, all ye that are weary and heavy laden, for he *will* give you rest.

Let the Christian, then, when his conscience is burdened with guilt, and his soul polluted with sin, go to Jesus. He is his Advocate with the Father. He will make a fresh atonement for his soul, and again will he be pardoned. His blood cleanseth us from all sin. He ever liveth in the holy place to make intercession for us.

If unconverted, reader, go to Christ your great High Priest. Tell him you are a wretch undone, and ask him to atone for your sins, that you may be forgiven. Go in confidence, for he says, "Him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out." "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool."

Are you careless, indifferent to all that Christ has done for you in his agonizing death, and to the blessing he proffers you in his atoning blood? Think, how can you meet it at the judgment of the great day? What base ingratitude to turn away with cold indifference from dying love; dying love followed up with proffered bleeding mercy! Think, how your tender-hearted Saviour, your kind Redeemer, after suffering and dying for you, ascended into heaven, carrying with him the pre-

cious blood he had shed for you, sat down on the throne of intercession, where he will continue till his enemies be made his footstool, till atonement be made for the last sinner, that will be saved,—how he has been waiting and ready to atone for your sins ever since your first transgression. When you have been asleep and when awake; when rejoicing in health, and when terrified in sickness; when careless in sin, and when thoughtful under awakenings; and at all times, by day and by night, at every hour and every moment, he has been ready, and waiting to present his blood in your behalf; the instant you repent and believe, to obtain your pardon, and procure your salvation. If you die in your sins and are lost, how will a review of all this add to your sorrow and sighings in hell, when “thou shalt mourn at the last, when thy flesh and thy body are consumed, and say, How have I hated instruction, and my heart despised reproof; and have not obeyed the voice of my teachers, nor inclined mine ear to them that instructed me,” Prov. 5: 11–13.

ARTICLE V.

REVIEW OF GLIDDON'S EGYPT.

By Rev. A. B. Chapin, New Haven, Connecticut.

Ancient Egypt; her Monuments, Hieroglyphics, History and Archæology, and other subjects connected with Hieroglyphical Literature. By GEORGE R. GLIDDON, late U. S. Consul at Cairo. New-York, 1843.

AMONG all the commemorative symbols of antiquity, the Egyptian Hieroglyphics are the most intensely interesting, and perhaps, the most important. They are records of far by-gone days, reaching back into the shadowy times of primeval ages, containing the history of some of the most extraordinary men, and one of the most extraordinary nations that have ever existed. And they are, too, as it were, the autobiography of those who erected them, containing all their *thoughts of pride*, as well as an account of their actions. But until recently, they have been enigmas for the scholar to pore over, labyrinths for

the antiquarian to explore, and sculptured images for the poet to muse on.¹ Well do we remember the kindling enthusiasm with which we heard of the discovery of a *Key to the Hieroglyphics*. We would fain have hastened to the spot where those mighty monuments were withstanding the shocks of time, and bid the column, the colonnade, and the sculptured temple, speak forth the history of their nation.

With these feelings still glowing in our bosom, we have welcomed every publication on the subject that has issued from the press. And with the same feelings, we hailed the appearance of the work of Mr. Gliddon. *He* had been on the ground,—had walked amid the solitudes of Egypt,—had gazed upon all the remains of that once powerful and mighty nation, and had come home, fraught, as we trusted, with new and important revelations. In this respect, however, we must confess ourselves somewhat disappointed. Not but the work contains much that is new to the *common* reader, though it contains nothing of importance, new, even, to the *American* scholar. But along with what is valuable, whether new or old, it contains so much that is doubtful, or disputed, or false, that it diminishes the value of the book. And many of the facts, though no doubt correct, are so negligently, and carelessly, or extravagantly stated, that the most valuable part of the work, and that which is truly reliable, will suffer much, in the estimation of every scholar. But for many, probably for most of the *facts* stated, Mr. G. is not responsible. Yet for the *manner* in which the facts are stated, and for the *conclusions* drawn, he is responsible; and it is necessary for us to examine them, in order to test the soundness of some of his inferences. It will be our object, therefore, to point out, how far the public may receive the work as a safe guide, and give some reasons why, upon other points, his conclusions must be questioned.

That the Key to the interpretation of the hieroglyphic legends of Egypt has been discovered—that an alphabet of hieroglyphs has been formed—that the hierologist is able to decipher all the proper names with accuracy, and the general inscriptions with much probability, we consider as certain.² And for

¹ Wiseman, Lect. IX. p. 299, Am. ed.

² This applies to the great proportion of the characters. We believe, however, there are some exceptions, among which we must reckon the last character but one in the Cartouch of Ram-

a *general account* of all this, Mr. Gliddon's book is trustworthy and sufficient. And we refer our readers to the work for an account of these matters. The book, notwithstanding its faults, is worthy a place in our libraries, and no one, curious in "matters of Egypt," will regret its purchase or perusal.

We wish we could stop here, that our language could be altogether free from censure. But this may not be. The tone of the book, in regard to many other subjects, and especially in regard to the antiquity of Egyptian history, and the faults of the Hebrew Chronology, call for a passing notice. And because our author is so confident, and speaks so dogmatically, we are required to examine his arguments more closely, and criticise his conclusions more minutely. It also requires us to perform the more unpleasant part, of inquiring into the manner in which he has executed his task, that we may judge more accurately of his competence to discuss the subjects under consideration. And these are questions, touching, not as our author seems to fancy, the soundness of his orthodoxy, but the accuracy of his scholarship.

We have already remarked, that one thing which detracts very much from the value of the book, and will destroy much of its authority with scholars, is the careless, and often contradictory manner in which our author states his facts. He wrote too much in haste, and did not give himself time to revise and compare his statements. A few examples will show this. On p. 7, he speaks of the labours of Count Robiano in 1829, as "valuable, going to show the Semitic origin of the Coptic language, and thence," he says, "we may infer its Asiatic origin."¹ Again, on p. 19, he says, that Dr. Lepsius, "in 1835 established that the ancient Coptic is no longer placed in lin-

ses III., given by our author on p. 24, No. 1. Kircher took it for a Nilometer; Dr. Young, for a figure representing the Nile; others consider it a *hammer*; and still others, an *embalming instrument*. Champollion explains it by *εδοκμασεν*, in the phrase *ου ο Ηρακλος εδοκμασεν*, on the tablet of Rosetta, "whom Phtha approves," and he is followed by Rossellini. But Hermapion's translation of the obelisk of Ramses, is *ου Ηελιος προσεχειν*, "*whom the Sun hath chosen*." See Cullimore on Hieroglyphic Inscript. Trans. R. S. L. pp. 94-96.

¹ Etudes sur l'écriture, les hiéroglyphics et la langue de l'Égypte. Paris, 1834.

guistical solitude; but that it enters into the vast circumference of Semitic and Indo-Germanic languages."¹ How the Coptic could stand in "linguistical solitude," if it was of "Semitic origin," and consequently cognate with the Semitic languages, is more than we can imagine. But we have on p. 19, another account of the matter, when he tells us that the ancient Coptic or Egyptian, was an indigenous tongue, though the people who spoke it, as he himself allows, came from Asia! Again he says, that Quatremere "established the present Coptic language to be the ancient Egyptian itself."² Yet, on p. 20 he tells us that the modern Coptic will not always translate the *hieratic*, and *hieroglyphic* mode of writing, because these were the classical, while the present Coptic was the popular dialect of the country. And again, on p. 10, he tells us that Champollion demonstrated, in the first part of his *Egyptian Grammar*, that the Coptic of the hieroglyphics, is not the Coptic as it has been preserved to us. Again, on pp. 14, 15, he ascribes the origin "of writing to primary revelation," and yet on the same page, makes it "indigenous in Egypt," though the Egyptians themselves, as he tells us in numerous places, came from Asia.

Another specimen of his careless and confused statement of facts, is found on p. 10, in what he says of Job. Following Dr. Hales, he places him B. C. 2337, that is, as Dr. Hales supposes, cotemporary with Nahor, the grandfather of Abraham, and in the same paragraph identifies him, as cotemporary with Eliphaz, the son of Esau, the son of Jacob. The events which he thus regards as cotemporaneous, were separated by at least four hundred years, by the shortest chronology. A similar want of consistency is found in other portions of his book, and in reference to other subjects. Thus, on p. 19, he gives what he intends as some of the onomatopoeic words of the Coptic language. The first is "an Ass," called "Yo, from his *bray*." But there is no *y* in the Coptic alphabet.³ The word is written

¹ Compar. Names of Numbers in Indo-Germanic, Semitic and Egyptian Languages. 1835.

² Recherches sur la language et la litterature de l'Égypte. Par. 1808.

³ So on page 9, he translates an inscription, *Judah, Melk*; while there is no *j* in the Coptic. The true orthography would be, *Eoud Hamalek*, the *e* having the force of *y* consonant, which

in Coptic *eeue*, *eeo*, or *cheue*. Next, he mentions the "Lion," called "Mooee from his roar." The Coptic, according to the orthography of that "profound scholar, Dr. Henry Tattam" (p. 10), and rendered into Roman letters from his own alphabet, would be *moouei*, or *mouee*. What resemblance these words have to the "roar of a Lion," we do not perceive.

Another point which will tend to lessen the authority of the work under consideration, in the estimation of all competent judges, is the frequent occurrence of singular errors, in relation to incidental questions. Thus he tells us, that "it has been demonstrated, by a succession of eminent Hebrew scholars, that Genesis is composed of *several* original records" (p. 12). That which he thus denominates "demonstration," is a conjecture of Astruc, that it contains "twelve" such documents.¹ A conjecture of Eichorn² and Lamb,³ that there were "two" of them; and of Ilgen that there were "three."⁴ But Rosenmüller denies the possibility of determining the question,⁵ and Jahn pronounces all the conjectures unsatisfactory.⁶ He confounds the settlement of the time of keeping "Christmas," with that of observing "Easter"⁷ (p. 33); adopts the fable of "the

is nearly related to j. Comp. Wiseman, Lect. IX. p. 305. Greppo. Essay. P. II. c. v. p. 119.

¹ Conjectures sur le Memoires originaux dont il paroît que Moyse s'est servi pour composer le livre de Genese, à Paris, 1753. The same idea had been cautiously advanced by Vitrinaea, 1712, Obs. Sac. I. c. iv. § 23, and afterwards by Le Cene, 1741, Bib. Le Cene. Tom. I.

² Einleit. A. T. II. Th. §§ 416-427.

³ Hebrew Characters derived from Hieroglyphics. Lond. 1835.

⁴ Urkunden des Jerusalemischen Templarchios. 1798.

⁵ Scholia. Tom. I. pp. 40-55.

⁶ Intd. O T. P. II. Sec. I. c. i. § 17.

⁷ At least, we suppose this to be so, by his referring to the time of the Council of Nice. He says: "All that can positively be ascertained is, that Christ was born about autumn." This assertion is entirely without foundation. Clement of Alexandria is the *earliest* writer who mentions the day. He gives the different opinions then prevailing, some of which placed it the 25th of Pachon, and others the 24th or 25th of Pharmuthi. (Strom. I. p. 349) But does this date refer to the erratic year of the Egyptians, or to the fixed Alexandrian? Pamelius (Not. Tert.

seventy learned" translators of the Septuagint (p. 36); makes Clement of Alexandria a bishop; talks of "the pure, uncorrupted Greek translation of the Old Testament" (p. 36), made from the unmutilated Hebrew (p. 36), but which has since been "altered, curtailed, interpolated and mutilated" (p. 35); places Josephus next in authority to the Septuagint (p. 36), although his chronology is a mass of contradiction, furnishing no less than five different sets of dates; says, that "out of nineteen dates for Solomon's temple, the longest is B. C. 7:1, the shortest B. C. 479" (p. 33),¹ whereas Usher makes it B. C. 1000, and Hales at B. C. 1020; and finally denominates the Hebrew, a "version of the Bible" (p. 34), and talks of "older, purer, and more orthodox versions" (p. 37). The enumeration of such errors, has no direct bearing upon our author's ability to instruct us in hieroglyphics; but they are important as showing, either his want of ability to discuss questions of chronology, or else his sad neglect in the composition of his book. In either case, he is not a safe guide, for a single step beyond the explanation of a hieroglyphic.

We might, therefore, with perfect propriety, pass by his extravagant claims of antiquity for Egypt, without notice; but as *his* opinions on this subject, are the opinions of some *others*, we shall inquire briefly into the evidence they have given in support of their positions, and the probabilities of their accuracy. The character of these claims will be best perceived by taking several points into consideration. The first claim is, that the Chaldeans had astronomical tables which "date back as far as B. C. 2234, or 700 years before Moses" (p. 14), and yet that the Chaldeans "were an Egyptian colony." And again he says (p. 50), that "there is no point ascertained with more precision, than the almost inconceivable remoteness of astrono-

cont. Jud. c. 8) supposes the former, and makes *Pharmuthi* the same as December; but Basnage (Crit. Baron. p. 216. Bing. Antq. B. XX. c. 4, § 1,) suppose the latter, and make *Pharmuthi* the same as April. But no ancient author ever placed it later than *May*.

¹ We presume he refers to the time supposed to have elapsed between the Exodus and the building of the Temple. If so, he should have added the authority of his favorite Septuagint, which makes it only 440 years. 2 K. 6: 1.

mical calculations and observations among the earliest Egyptians, who appear to have perfected their calendar, for all practical purposes, at a period so distant that even the Deluge epoch of the Septuagint appears irreconcilable with the deductions thereon consequent. Indeed, Champollion declares, what the great mathematician Biot confirms, that the astronomical dates, procured from the tombs of the Kings at Thebes, would carry back the use of the national calendar in Egypt, to the year B. C. 3285."

The second point of evidence is, that there "are positive annals" among the hieroglyphic inscriptions (p. 34), which carry back the Egyptian nation, far beyond the period of the Hebrew Chronology. The third is, that there are a large number of "unplaced kings," that is, names of kings, the time, order (and perhaps place) of whose reigns are unknown. Fourth, that the period necessary for the building of the Pyramids must have been far longer than that of the Hebrew Chronology. And fifth, Menes, the first *King* of Egypt, according to the Egyptian historian Manetho, ascended the throne of Egypt about 2782 years before CHRIST. These are the main points of our author's arguments; or rather of the authors whom he follows, and which we shall briefly examine.

On the supposition that the Chronology of Rossellini, which is followed by our author, is nearly correct, back to the commencement of the reign of the 18th Dynasty, the accession of which he places B. C. 1822 (p. 64), we shall proceed to examine the time anterior to this. He gives us, in his list, the names of six Kings, forming the 17th Dynasty of Theban Kings, cotemporary, as he supposes, with the Hykshos, or Shepherd Kings. This Dynasty is *known* to have reigned 108 years, but *supposed* by our author to have occupied 260 years. Previous to this time, the hierologists have been able to identify only three kings of the 16th Dynasty, occupying 50 years (p. 64), and four others, still earlier, to whom they give 221 years. All these sums amount to 2201 years. The accession of Menes is placed by our author B. C. 2750 (p. 51), giving 549 years, unaccounted for, to be filled up by the "unplaced kings." But even this period our author thinks too short, and would be glad to add "a thousand years" more to it (p. 57). In order to see more distinctly the precise points in question, we give the periods of the two eras under consideration:—

		<i>Deluge.</i>	<i>Exodus.</i>	<i>Interval.</i>
Calmet,	B. C.	2344	1487	857
Usher,	B. C.	2349	1491	858
Hales,	B. C.	3155	1648	1507
Gliddon (about)	B.C. 3200 p. 37 (about) 1500 p. 41.			1700

It is not our intention, at this time, to discuss the probabilities of either the Hebrew or Septuagint Chronology, but simply to inquire whether there has yet been sufficient evidence produced to require us to give up the shorter period between the Deluge and the Exodus, and to follow the long period of our author.—First, we shall consider the *monumental evidence*. This, according to our author, carries us back to B. C. 1822, to which must be added 158 years of the 16th and 17th Dynasties, and 221 years preceding them. This amounts to 2201 years, and reaches within 148 years of the Deluge, according to the Chronology of Archbishop Usher, but falls a thousand years short of it, according to the Chronology of our author. But it should be remarked, that for the 221 years, anterior to the 16th Dynasty, the evidence is not monumental, but historical.¹ It is true, that our author tells us, that there is a long list of “unplaced kings,” who he thinks were anterior to the 16th Dynasty, and who must have occupied a great length of time. This, however, is mere assumption, indeed it is assumption against probability, for we are told both by Manetho and the hierologists, that the Hykshos, who succeeded the 16th Dynasty, “destroyed cities, and overthrew especially all the public monuments and temples of the gods. No edifices built by earlier dynasties were suffered to exist. A few ruins only remained, which were used merely as materials in the edifices of the following ages.”² It is impossible, therefore, that there should be any monumental evidence, unless it be the pyramids, previous to the 16th Dynasty. Consequently, the placing of the “unplaced kings” must be merely *conjectural*. It is on the Pyramids, therefore, that our author relies, and he tells us, that “all these works had been completed, and pyramidal constructions had ceased to be *fashionable* in Egypt long prior to B. C. 2272” (p. 57). And he estimates that the Pyramids now existing in Egypt, must have occupied at least 300 years in their erection (p. 57). But all this is

¹ Syn. p. 45. Byz. ed.

² Joseph. Adv. Ap. B. I. Greppo. P. II. c. 7: p. 141.

mere conjecture. According to his own showing, we do not know the names of the builders of over three of the Pyramids, and it is a matter of great uncertainty when these were erected. Not more than *two* of the builders of the Pyramids have been identified, even by Manetho, as living *before* the 18th Dynasty.¹ But these are all placed *subsequent* to that time, that is, later than Sesostris, by Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus.² But on the supposition that Manetho was correct, and that the two Pyramids in question were built before the 18th Dynasty, we look in vain for any evidence that all of them are equally ancient. Indeed, as far as conjecture may be allowed, the presumption is against it, as a single consideration will show. That it was customary for the kings of Egypt to erect monuments to perpetuate their names and memories, is too well known to admit of question, and that from the 17th Dynasty down they did this, we know.³ Yet, not one monument has been discovered of the 21st Dynasty, if that Dynasty and the 20th are not identical, although the succession is complete, both in the 20th and 22d Dynasties. Why is this? Why are there no remains of this Dynasty, composed at least of *seven* kings? It is at this time that Herodotus and Diodorus place the builders of the Pyramids, and we see no reason why many of them might not have been erected at this very time. At all events, it is great presumption to say, that the Pyramids are all more ancient than the 18th Dynasty. We may withdraw, therefore, for aught of any thing that yet appears, from the time supposed by the hierologists to have elapsed before the 16th Dynasty, at least 200 years, so that the kings thus far identified would reach back no further than B. C. 2000, or 350 years short of the Usherian date of the Deluge. Thus far, then,

¹ Venepheas, fifth king of the first dynasty. Syn. p. 44; Suphis, second king, fourth dynasty, said to be the same called Cheops, by Herodotus. Syn. p. 45. But there is a disagreement between these and Herodotus. Africanus, on the authority of Manetho, places Suphis in the fourth dynasty, and Sesostris in the eleventh; whereas Herodotus places Sesostris anterior to Cheops, and ascribes some of the pyramids to Mæris, the predecessor of Sesostris. Her. B. II. cc. 107-124.

² Herod. B. II. Diod. B. II.

³ No monuments have been discovered in the twenty-first, twenty-third and twenty-fourth dynasties. But the twenty-third and twenty-fourth were both short.

there is no monumental evidence that requires us to give up the shorter period.

We proceed, therefore, to inquire into the evidence to be derived from Astronomical data, and which our author, and those whom he follows, suppose must date back to an inconceivably remote period. In order to understand the nature and application of this evidence, we must recount, as briefly as may be, the character of the evidence derived from their mode of reckoning time, and of adjusting the civil and the secret years.

For a period, the extent of which is not certainly known, the Egyptians reckoned time by months of 30 days each, and counted 12 months to the year, thereby making it consist of 360 days only. At length five days were added, known in history as the *epagomænæ*, making the year consist of 365 days, which was the length of the Egyptian civil year ever afterwards.¹ But observation afterwards convinced them that this period was also too short, and that the conjunctions of the planets from which their year was dated, happened *one day later every four years*. They therefore devised the secret, or as it has since been called, the Julian year, of 365½ days.² It became necessary, therefore, in order to equate the time of the civil and secret years, to devise some system of reckoning to which both could be adjusted. This was attempted by devising a period or cycle when the beginning of the two years should correspond. Now, inasmuch as the civil year fell short of the secret, *one day in four years, two days in eight years, etc.*, it is evident, that in process of time, the new year's day of the civil year would have passed through every day of the secret year. This period would of course be four times as many years as there were days in the civil year; that is, 1460 years. Consequently, 1460

¹ According to Syncellus, these days were added by Aseth [Aphobis], the last king of the seventeenth dynasty. *Chron.* p. 98. It was under this king, Aphobis, that Joseph was supposed by the early Fathers to have been in Egypt—*Syn.* p. 49—so that our author was not the *first* to discover the fact, as he supposes.

² The antiquity of this arrangement is questionable. No mention is made of the six hours by Herodotus, who speaks on the subject (B. II. c. 4); nor by Thales (Diog. Laert. L. I.); nor by Ptolemy (Delambre. *Prem. Disc. Astr. Mid. Ages*, p. 8), though they all spent some time in Egypt. See Cuvier. *Rev. Globe.* p. 140-144.

secret or Julian years corresponded with 1461 civil years. The commencement of this period, as spoken of by the *later* historians,¹—dated from the time when the Dog Star, called by the Egyptians *Soth*, or *Sothis*, rose heliacally—was called the *Sothic* period or Cycle, and by the Greeks and Latins, the *Cynic* or *Canicular* Cycle. This period was properly a Solar Cycle. They had also various other Cycles, especially a Lunar Cycle, consisting of 25 civil years; and a Luni-Solar Cycle, produced by multiplying the Solar and Lunar elements together.² Thus $1461 \times 25 = 36,525$, the great Cycle of the Egyptians, at the end of which they supposed a restitution of all things would take place.

But there were several mistakes in the computations of these Cycles, by which they were rendered comparatively useless when applied to periods of great length. Thus the Julian or secret year of the Egyptians, being made to contain 365 days 6 hours, was 11m. 12s. longer than the true tropical year, so that at the end of a Sothic Cycle, the Equinox of the secret year, would anticipate the true Equinox of the seasons by 11 1-3 days.³ Now as four times this number of years were necessary for the Civil year to retrograde through this number of days, 45 years more were requisite for the actual completion of the Cycle, or the conjunction of the Civil year of the Egyptian, and the true tropical Cycle would be over in 1505 years. So also the Egyptian Lunar Cycle, which consisted of 25 Civil years, contained 2h. 9m. 48s. more than the actual time, amounting, in our Sothic Cycle, to 15h. 48m., and in the great Luni-Solar period of 36,525 years, to 9d. 22h. 37m. 48s. more than the true time.⁴ Imperfections like these are inconsistent with any great advances in Astronomical Science. They rather indicate, that the calcu-

¹ The first mention of this period we recollect, is in the Alexandrian Father, Clement (Strom. L. I. p. 335. Par. ed.), unless the Old Chronicle (Syn. p. 41) be older. There are some reasons for supposing the Sothic Cycle to be a modern invention. Cuvier. Rev. p. 143.

² Old Chron. Syn. p. 41.

³ See Dissertation on the Ancient Cycles, by Rev. Frederick Nolan, D. D., in Vol. III. Trans. Royal Society of Literature; Ideler. Hist. Research. Astr. Obs. Arn. and Cuv. Rev. pp. 138, 139.

⁴ Dr. Nolan. Diss. Anc. Cyc. T. R. S. L. III. p. 269.

lations were based upon observations, made either very imperfectly, or for a comparatively short period.¹ So far, therefore, are these astronomical dates from evincing that accurate knowledge of astronomy, or that immense antiquity which some are disposed to claim for the Egyptians, the reverse is most certainly the truth.

The application of these principles will be more apparent by presenting our readers with a scheme of the Egyptian year. The commencement of the Sothic Cycle is fixed by Censorinus at the 183d Augustan year, A. D. 139, on the 12th of the Kalends of August, that is July 21st.² The commencement of the same Cycle is also said by Theon of Alexandria, to have begun 1605 years before the end of the era of Augustus, A. D. 283.³ Both of these dates point to B. C. 1322, as the commencement of the same Cycle. Leaving out of consideration the imperfection of the Egyptian Cycles, the Civil year, B. C. 1322, adapted to our calendar, stood thus:—

<i>Month.</i>	<i>Sothic Year.</i>	<i>Days.</i>
1. Thoth,	July 21st	30
2. Paophi,	August 20th	30
3. Athor,	September 19th	30
4. Choiak,	October 19th	30
5. Tobi,	November 18th	30
6. Mechir,	December 18th	30
7. Phamenoth,	January 17th	30
8. Pharmuthi,	February 16th	30
9. Pachon,	March 18th	30
10. Paoni,	April 17th	30
11. Epiphi,	May 17th	30
12. Mesian,	June 16th	30
Epagomenæ,	July 16th	5 ⁴

¹ See Delambre, on the inaccuracy of Eudoxus in the determination of the Sphere. Hist. Anc. Astr. Vol. I. p. 120, etc.

² De Natali Die. c. xxi.

³ MS. Ex cod. Reg. Gall. gr. No. 2390, fol. 154, in Cory. p. 330. Greppo. P. II. c. iii. p. 87, supposes Theon, in the phrase, "the years of Menophres," to refer to the commencement of a new cycle, under a king of that name. We apprehend, however, that Menophres is simply *Msvs-p-ps* (*Menoph-re*), that is, *Menes-the-king*; that is, the first king from whose accession the cycle was dated.

⁴ In the fixed Alexandrian year, the heliacal rising of Sothis
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It will be seen from these facts, that if we know on what day of any month the star Sothis rose heliacally, we can ascertain the date of the year. This is known, at least, in one instance. The *Memnonium* at Thebes, more properly called the *Ramesseum*, is known from the descriptions, to belong to the reign of RAMSES III., called the Great,—the Sesostris of the Greek authors. His cartouches are given by our author, p. 24. This contains an *Astronomical Ceiling*, which furnishes an astronomical date of the highest importance, being nothing less than the celebration of the *heliacal rising of Sothis*, on the first of Thoth, which occurred, as we have already seen, B. C. 1322.¹ If this ceiling was erected by *Ramses the Great*, and the frequent occurrence of his name (being inscribed not less than *twenty-five times within the border*), leaves no reasonable doubt of the fact, he must have lived at the time of its erection; that is, B. C. 1322, instead of B. C. 1565, where our author places him.

That he did live at this period, there are various reasons for supposing. Manethe gives the 20th Dynasty twelve Kings, and 135, 172, or 178 years, but gives no names.² The monuments furnish the names of nine Kings, but give no clew to the reigns of more than two. Manetho gives the 21st Dynasty seven Kings, and 130 years,³ but no names are found on the monuments. There are, then, at least, ten Kings alleged between the 19th and 22d Dynasties, to whom names cannot certainly be

took place on the 22d of Epiphi, (Tomlinson on Astro. Ceiling of Memnonium, T. R. S. L. III. p. 493,) and consequently the common Alexandrian year would begin thus; except in the bissextile, when the commencement was carried forward a day, and the year began August 30. (Strauchius, Brev. Chronol. p. 44.)

1. Thoth, Aug. 29th, 30	7. Phamenoth, Feb. 25th, 30
2. Paophi, Sept. 28th, 30	8. Pharmuthi, March 27th, 30
3. Athor, Oct. 28th, 30	9. Pachon, April 26th, 30
4. Choiak, Nov. 27th, 30	10. Paoni, May 26th, 30
5. Tobi, Dec. 27th, 30	11. Epiphi, June 25th, 30
6. Mechir, Jan. 26th, 30	12. Mesori, July 25th, 30
Epagomenæ, 5	

¹ M. Biot supposes this inscription to represent the birth of Horus and the festival of the Vernal Equinox, and places it B. C. 3285; but he omits the border, which is important. Dias. Astr. Ceiling, T. R. S. L. p. 484. But Mr. Wilkinson places it B. C. 1322.

² Syn. p. 56.

³ Syn. p. 56.

given, and who, therefore, *may* possibly be supernumeraries. On the supposition that they are to be omitted, nearly or quite 200 years must be subtracted from our author's date of the accession of Sesostriis, bringing it down to B. C. 1365. This would make him living B. C. 1322, as his reign exceeded 60 years.¹

This date also agrees with the account of Herodotus, who says² that Moeris, the predecessor of Sesostriis, lived about nine hundred years before he was in Egypt; which according to Larcher and Fynes-Clinton, was about B. C. 460.³ Accordingly, Sesostriis must have lived about B. C. 1360. The account given by Tacitus, also points to the same date, as the era of Sesostriis.⁴ He tells us that in the Consulship of Paulus Fabius and Lucius Vitellius (A. D. 33) the Phenix made its appearance in Egypt, after a disappearance of several ages. This bird, he says, is sacred to the Sun, and that its longevity is differently estimated, some making it 500 years, others 1461,—that the times of its appearance were fixed by tradition. "The first," he says, "we are told, was in the reign of Sesostriis; the second, in that of Amasis; and the third, in the reign of the third Ptolemy." That the longer of these periods was the *Sothic Cycle*, is evident at sight, and it leads naturally to inquire, whether the *Phenix* was not the Coptic *Phenh*, which properly denoted a *reverting*, or *return*, and consequently might signify *period*, or *Cycle*. At any rate, it points directly to the age of Sesostriis, as the time when the *Cycle commenced* its revolution.⁵

¹ Manetho says 66 years; and there is a tablet in the British Museum, bearing date the 62d year of his reign. Diss. Astr. Ceil. p. 494.

² Herod. II. cc. 13. 102.

³ Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit. III. p. 494.

⁴ Tacit. Ann. VI. c. 28.

⁵ That the Egyptians symbolized this period by the Phenix, see Hor. Apoll. II. c. 57, Plin. Nat. Hist. X. c. 2, Solin. c. 33. Nolan, Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 339. As both Tacitus and Pliny (Nat. Hist. X. c. 2) fix the return of the Phenix to the reign of Ptolemy Eurgetes, there must have been some foundation for it. The probable explanation is, that the Egyptians observed those times, when the manifestation of Sothis fell upon one of the first days, of the *quarters* of the cycle. These would fall B. C. 1322, 957, 592, and 227; the last of which was in the reign of Ptolemy III. The

There is also another astronomical date referring to the same period. A sacred Calendar was discovered by Champollion on the walls of the palace of Ramses III. at Medinet-Habou, in which the festivals of the several months were enumerated. In Champollion's account of that inscription, we have "Month of Thoth,—Neomenia, Manifestation of Sothis."¹ According to this the "Neomenia," and "Manifestation of Sothis" belong to the same month, and *seem* to belong to the same day, and consequently fix the date to B. C. 1322.² But supposing the days to have been different, the time must have been still later; that is, Sothis rose heliacally on the 2d of Thoth, 1318; 3d, 1314; and so on, until B. C. 1202, when it fell upon the 1st of Paophi, and did not again return to Thoth, until A. D. 139. The date of this Calendar, then, reaches from B. C. 2782, to B. C. 2662, or from B. C. 1322 to 1202; and as no one ever pretended to place Ramses III. at that early period, he must of necessity belong to the later, where Herodotus and Tacitus place him.

The Astronomical dates of the inscriptions compel us, therefore, to bring down the death of Ramses III. from B. C. 1499, so as to fall below B. C. 1322, or 180 years later than our author. Consequently we have no certain evidence that the astronomical observations of the Egyptians, amounted to any considerable period beyond the date of this monument, B. C. 1322. They may have done, they probably did reach back into a much earlier period of history, but the Cycles can furnish no evidence of it, as all the earlier notices may have been made by calculating back from this date. No evidence, therefore, can yet be derived from the Astronomical dates of the Egyptians, that requires us to abandon the shorter period of the Hebrew Chronology.

But it is said (p. 14) that the Chaldeans were an Egyptian colony,—that they learned astronomy of the Egyptians, and that they have "observations which date back 700 years before Moses." If our author means by this, that the Chaldee Astron-

preceding date fell in the reign of Psammuthis, or Psametik II. of the monuments.

¹ Champ. Lett. Ecritt. d'Egypt, pp. 359-361; Trans. Roy. Soc. Lit. III. pp. 334, 497.

² In the year B. C. 1500, one of the last years of the reign of Ramses III., according to Champollion and Rossellini, Sothis rose heliacally on the 20th of Epiphi.

omy, and Astronomical Cycles were *originally modelled* after the Egyptian, he is contradicted, by every ancient historian.¹ But if he means simply that it was *subsequently corrected* by that, it is undoubtedly true. But then the time, when it was so corrected, or remodelled, becomes all-important. This, we believe, is conceded by all chronologists, to have been at the commencement of the era of Nabonassar, B. C. 747, or within a year or two of that time.² No argument, therefore, in favor of the great antiquity of the Egyptian Astronomy, can be drawn from the Chaldean. So far, therefore, is the Astronomical evidence from requiring us to lengthen the period previous to the 18th Dynasty, it actually requires us to shorten the time subsequent to the accession of that dynasty near 200 years, and to place it B. C. 1642, instead of B. C. 1822, as our author and his authorities have done. Add to this sum the time of the Kings of the preceding dynasties, so far as they have been identified, and they extend back only to about B. C. 1800, that is 550 years short of the Usherian date of the Deluge. In this time, all that is *known* to have transpired before this, could well have occurred.

The remaining point of evidence upon which the writers under consideration rely, is the testimony of the ancient historians, especially the Egyptians. This has been in part considered already, but must be carefully examined; in doing which three points must be regarded—the actual antiquity ascribed to the nation—the sources from which they drew the materials of their history, and the credibility of the historians themselves. The only Egyptian histories that have come down to us, in such a state of preservation, as to enable us to ascertain what their testimonies were, are the *Old Chronicle* and *Manetho*. Of the first, we only know that it went by the name of the “Old Chronicle,” in the days of Syncellus, by whom it has been preserved.³

¹ Notwithstanding the great alleged antiquity of the Chaldean astronomy, they could furnish Ptolemy with no observation on eclipses more ancient than B. C. 721, and even these were very indefinite, the time being given in hours and half hours, and the obscuration in half or quarter diameters. Ideler, in Halma's Ptolemy, p. 166, and Cuvier, Rev. pp. 143, 144.

² Dr. Nolan, Diss. Anc. Cyc. pp. 32, 47, 48. It was B. C. 743, according to Usher. Thoth began this year Feb. 26th.

³ Chronographia, pp. 40, 41.

Of the other, Manetho, it is sufficient to remark, that he was a native of Sebennytus, and a priest of Heliopolis, under Ptolemy Philadelphus, B. C. 250,—that he composed a work in three books, entitled *A Universal History of Egypt*, from memorials found in the Archives of the Temples.¹ This work has been lost, and only fragments are preserved by Julius Africanus and Eusebius.² But the work of Africanus is also lost, and we have only an abstract of it, made by Syncellus. So, too, the original Greek of Eusebius is lost, but a Latin translation of it by Jerome, is preserved from the 18th Dynasty down. This work was also translated into Armenian, and an abstract of the Greek was also made by Syncellus. The works of Africanus and Eusebius both contained the dynasties of Manetho, and these are the most considerable fragments known to exist. A comparison of Manetho and the Old Chronicle, will aid us in understanding the Egyptian system of Chronology.

The *Old Chronicle* makes the whole period of Egyptian history fill up the great Astronomical Cycle of 36,525 years, giving to the reigns of the gods 33,984 or 5 years,—to the demi-gods 217, and to mortals 2324 years, ending with the reign of Nectanebus, B. C. 346, according to Usher.³ But of the reign of the gods, it has been shown by Des-Vignolles⁴ and Dr. Nolan,⁵ that the 33,000 belonged to a pre-existent state. But Manetho gives to the gods 971 years 6 months and 14 days;—to the demi-gods 214,⁶ and to mortals, according to the testimony of Syncellus,⁷ 3555 years to the death of Nectanebus, or Darius.⁸ The apparent difference between Manetho and the Old Chronicle, in reference to the time of the demi-gods,

¹ Syn. p. 32.

² Whether Eusebius and Africanus copied Manetho, is doubtful, especially in the earlier dynasties. Syncellus says, at the commencement of the list of kings, (p. 43): "The dynasties of Egypt, after the deluge, according to the opinion of Africanus;" and, "Dynasties after the deluge, according to the explanation of Eusebius." And at the end of the eleventh dynasty, Syncellus says: "Thus far Manetho carries the argument in his first book. But the twelfth dynasty is headed, the first time in which it occurs, "from Manetho," etc.

³ Syn. pp. 40, 41.

⁴ Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 298.

⁵ Chron. p. 41.

⁶ Chron. ii. 660.

⁷ Syn. p. 15.

⁸ Syn. pp. 41, 66.

is made by the use of a different kind of year,—Manetho employing the year of 365 days, while the Old Chronicle employed the year of 360 days. Thus,

985 y. × 360 d.	=354,600 d.
971½ y. 14 d. × 365 d.	=354,611 d.
	—
	difference, 11 days.
217 y. × 360 d.	=78,120 d.
214 y. × 365 d.	=78,110 d.
	—
	difference, 10 days.

These coincidences show that the general system of both authors was alike. According to the Old Chronicle, fifteen generations of mortals reigned 443 years from the commencement of the Sothic Cycle, when followed fifteen dynasties, occupying 1881 years more, ending with the death of Nectanebus II., B. C. 346, or 338. But these dates in the historical period of the Old Chronicle cannot be certainly relied upon, for if we add the time given by that to all the mortal kings, 2324 to 346, it gives only 2670, falling 112 years short of the true time of the beginning of the Cycle. Such an error, for which no account can be given, is sufficient to shake the Chronological authority of the document containing it.

In regard to Manetho, we have already seen, that he could have no monumental records, anterior to the 18th Dynasty, which Rossellini places B. C. 1822, but which we have shown, must be placed as low as B. C. 1642. We have also seen, that to the 12th Dynasty there is no probability that we have the language, or ideas of Manetho. And to this we add, that the dynasties between the 12th and 18th are so uncertain, that no argument whatever can be based upon them, as will be seen from the following account of them.

AFRICANUS.¹

12.7	Diospolitan Kings,	160 years.			
13.60	" "	453 "	No names given.		
14.76	Xoite "	184 "	" " "		
15.6	Phenecian Shepherds,	284 "			
16.32	Hellenic, "	518 "	" " "		
17.43	Shepherd {				
43	Theban } Kings,	150 "	" " "		

¹ Syn. pp. 48, 49.

EUSEBIUS.¹

12.7	Diospolitan Kings,	245 years.	Some names given.
13.60	" "	453 "	No " "
14.76	Xoite "	484 "	" " "
15.—	Diospolitan "	250 "	" " "
16.5.	Theban "	190 "	" " "
17.4	Shepherd "	104 "	" " "

Bare inspection of this account is sufficient to show how untrustworthy it is. And yet it seems more so from the fact that there is no uniformity in the authors who profess to copy Manetho, either in the name, order, or length of these dynasties. It is just that vague and uncertain thing we should expect in an account compiled, as we know this must have been, anterior to the 18th Dynasty, from *mere tradition*. Subsequent to this period, there is a general correspondence between all the copyists of Manetho, and he is consistent with himself. But previous to the 18th Dynasty, the external evidence of the monuments fails him, and the internal evidence of his own books is against him, so that we cannot rely at all upon his authority, for any particulars previous to that date.

Syncellus gives us a date previous to this time, by reference to the Sothic Cycle, which has been referred to Manetho, but we think, without good ground for so doing. He says, "in the 6th year of Concharis, the 25th King of Egypt, of the 16th Dynasty, called by Manetho the Cynic Cycle, was completed, in a period of twenty-five reigns, a period of 700 years, from Mestram the first native King of Egypt."² That this was the

¹ Syn. pp. 48, 49.

² Syn. p. 82. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in regard to the time and identity of *Mizraim*, or *Mestram*; some taking him to be the same as *Menes*, others supposing him to be different. Mr. Gliddon supposes (p. 48) *Mizraim* to be compounded of *Mes* and *re*, "begotten of the sun;" but it seems to be more likely to have come from *Mes* and *rōmi*, signifying, "the father of the race." We may as well mention in this place, that we cannot subscribe to his etymology of the word *Moses* (p. 31), "saved by or from water," though it has some high names in its support. (Joblouski, Tom. I. pp. 152-157; Gesen. *in loco*.) The reason given by the daughter of Pharaoh was, "Because I drew him out of the water." (Exod. 2: 10.) The Egyptian would be, *МОУ-СА*, (*mou-sa*), "from the water," or *МОУ-СЕК* (*mou-sek*), "drawn from the water."

language of Manetho, is quite incredible, and the only inference that can be drawn is, that the end of the 16th Dynasty corresponded with the termination of the Cynic Cycle. But it could not have been B. C. 1322, nor B. C. 2782. If, however, it was the Cycle that ended in the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, B. C. 227, it would place the ending of the 16th Dynasty B. C. 1687. But this would be too late for the Chronological system of Syncellus. The several periods of the Sothic Cycle, to one of which this date must be assigned, are set down in the following table, in which the beginning of Thoth is given for the several *cardines*, marking the beginning of the several seasons, reckoning Julian years.

	B. C.	Thoth 1st.
4th Cycle.	3877	April 21st.
	3512	January 20th.
	3147	October 21st.
3d Cyc.	2782	July 21st.
	2417	April 21st.
	2052	January 20th.
2d Cyc.	1687	October 21st. Joseph.
	1322	July 21st. Ramses III.
	957	April 21st.
	592	January 20th.
1st Cyc., A. D.	227	October 21st. Ptolemy III.
	138	July 21st.

To which of these periods Syncellus fixed this date, is not quite certain. Probably to B. C. 2052, as he gives 274 years to the 17th Dynasty,¹ thus placing the accession of the 18th Dynasty B. C. 1778, which varies only eight years from his date.²

The true date of the accession of the 18th Dynasty, as determined by the era of Sesostriis, or Ramses III., could not have been previous to B. C. 1642. The date of the monument probably belongs to the 50th year of his reign, B. C. 1322,³ and hence his reign was included within B. C. 1372, and B. C. 1306. Rossellini and our author, following Theophilus⁴ and Josephus,⁵ give this Dynasty 254 years before the accession of Ramses III. But Africanus gives but 242 years,—the Armenian text of Eu-

¹ Syn. pp. 83, 86, 87, 98.

² Syn. p. 98. Rossellini places it B. C. 1822; that is thirty-two years earlier than Syncellus.

⁴ Ad Autoc. p. 240.

³ Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 336.

⁵ Adv. Appion. B. I.

sebius, 219 years,—and the Latin translation of Jerome, 239 years¹, making a difference of 38 years. The accession of the 18th Dynasty, therefore, must be placed from B. C. 1626 to B. C. 1591.

The length of the 17th Dynasty composed of *Hyksos*, or Shepherd Kings, is uncertain; Eusebius makes it 105 years,² Josephus³ and Africanus, 284 years.⁴ If, then, these two dynasties were successive, the accession of the 17th Dynasty could not have occurred before B. C. 1913, or 139 years subsequent to the date Syncellus has assigned it. The time of the accession of this dynasty, as made out from the monuments, would fall much lower even than that. Thus the accession of the 18th Dynasty, as we have seen, must be placed B. C. 1642. The 17th Theban Dynasty, cotemporaneous with the *Hyksos*, consisted of six kings, four of whom reigned 108 years. Allowing an average number of years to the two others, of 25 years each, and the accession of the 17th Dynasty would have been B. C. 1800.⁵ Only two kings of the preceding dynasty have been identified, which together reigned 50 years.⁶ The earliest date, therefore, of the monuments is B. C. 1850, or 496 years subsequent to the Usherian epoch of the Deluge.

It may be well, in this place, to mention a circumstance brought forward by our author, to sustain his view of the Egyptian Chronology,—we mean his reference to Joseph, whom he supposes to have been in Egypt, during the reign of the last king of the 17th Dynasty. The Exodus is placed by Usher, B.

¹ Cory. Anc. Frag. p. 117.

² Armenian. Cory. p. 115.

³ Adv. Ap. I.

⁴ Syn. p. 48.

⁵ Anc. Egypt, p. 64.

⁶ The fourth king of the sixteenth dynasty is the thirty-third of the *Tablet of Abydos*. The names of the preceding are unknown, unless it be the thirty-second. This *Tablet*, which is supposed to belong to the time of Ramses III., is said originally to have chronicled *fifty-two* Pharaohs that had preceded him, though only twenty-three are now discoverable, the previous ones having been effaced. But this list agrees with the list of Manetho, *first*, in the sixteenth dynasty (Anc. Egypt, pp. 60, 61). The *agreement* of the two, subsequent to the sixteenth dynasty, and their *disagreement* previous to that time, when compared with the facts already stated, confirms, in a most striking manner, the view here taken.

C. 1491. The Usherian date of the Exodus is 135 years, subsequent to the accession of the 18th Dynasty, and it may be well for us to see how this will compare with the supposition that Jacob went down into Egypt under the 17th Dynasty. Joseph was 30 years old when he stood before Pharaoh (Gen. 61: 46), and consequently was 39 years old in the second year of the famine, when his father went down into Egypt (Gen. 45: 6). As Joseph lived 110 years, he survived that time 70 years. Now the descent of Jacob into Egypt was 215 years before the Exodus.¹ Consequently Joseph died 142 years before the Exodus. It is worthy of notice, that Syncellus ascribes the introduction of the *five* intercalary days into the Egyptian Calendar to the reign of this prince,² and also, that the Cycle which ended in the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes, B. C. 227, occurred in Joseph's Viceroyship.³

We see, therefore, that as yet, no Monumental evidence has been produced, even including the Pyramids, that dates back before about B. C. 2000; also, that there is no Astronomical evidence which can date with certainty before B. C. 1650, and no Historical evidence that unquestionably reaches back even as far as this. Thus far, then, there is nothing that requires us to give up the shorter period of the Chronology. Consequently, it is not important, so far as this point is concerned, which has the greatest claims to accuracy, the Hebrew or the Septuagint. A few remarks, however, upon this point, may not be inappropriate.

That the Hebrew has much higher claims upon our credence, on mere philological and grammatical grounds, will hardly be questioned by any thorough scholar. That it is more consistent with itself than the Septuagint, all who have *examined both*, will allow. That the differences between the Hebrew and Septuagint are such that *additions* could be made to the latter, easier than *subtractions* from the former, must be evident to all who compare the two. But our author tells us, that it is indisputable that the Jews *corrupted* the dates of the Hebrew (p. 35), and that all the fathers, except "Origen and Jerome who acted under Judiac influence, denounced the interpolations." It is not a little singular, however, that these two were the only fathers of that early period whose works have been preserved,

¹ Jos. Antiq. B. II. c. 15.

² Syn. p. 98.

³ Tacit. Ann. VI. c. 28. Plin. Nat. Hist. X. c. 2.

that were familiar with the Hebrew, and consequently, that they were the only competent judges, as to the comparative claims of the two Chronologies,—the only ones competent to compare the then ancient and modern manuscripts, and see whether the Jews had made the alterations charged upon them.

Here we might properly leave the subject. But there are a few brief considerations which deserve to be mentioned, tending to throw light upon the subject of the early Egyptian Chronology. The "Old Chronicle," as we have already seen, gave to the gods 984 or 5 years,—to the demi-gods 217 years, and began the reigns of the mortals with the commencement of a Cynic Cycle. We have then—

Gods,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	985 years
Demi-gods,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	217 "
Mortal Kings, whose reign commenced								
with the Cynic Cycle,								B. C. 2782 "
Giving a total of								B. C. 3984 "

which falls *sixteen years* short of the Usherian Epoch of the creation. There can be scarce any doubt, therefore, that the author of the Old Chronicle intended to fill up all the time, from the creation, and if so, it supports the Hebrew Chronology throughout. It should be remarked, however, that the number of years assigned to the mortal kings, in the "Old Chronicle," falls 112 years short of the complete Cycle, as fixed by Censorinus. The actual date assumed by the "Old Chronicle," as the commencement of Egyptian history, was B. C. 3872, or A. M. 128, or when reduced to Julian years, B. C. 3870, at which time the month of Thoth commenced April 18th.

The period assumed by Manetho as the commencement of the historical period, exclusive of the reign of the gods, was 3555 years before the death of Nectanebus,¹ that is, B. C. 3901, or when reduced to Julian years, B. C. 3898,—A. M. 102; according to the chronology of Archbishop Usher,—J. P. 813. At this time, the commencement of Thoth was on the 25th of April, which was at that time the day of the vernal equinox of the Julian year.² The commencement, therefore, of the Egyptian year, carried back to A. M. 102, would exactly correspond with the beginning of the natural year, and hence arises

¹ Syn. p. 41.

² Diss. Anc. Cyc. p. 302, and authorities there referred to.

a strong presumption, that the Sothic Cycle was a subsequent invention, and according to which the Egyptian history was arranged by the later historians. It is also worthy of remark, that the calculations of the "Old Chronicle" fall short only *seven years* of being one Sothic Cycle and a half preceding the time of Joseph, and wants the same number of years of being two Cycles and a half from the time of Ptolemy III., while the calculations of Manetho exceed those periods by *twenty-one years*; and also that the two are separated only by one Solar Cycle of twenty-eight years. Both of them, therefore, evidently adjusted the Cycles of their history, to the nearest point of agreement between the civil and natural years. It is worthy of observation, too, that this year, J. P. 813, was a radical one, in reference to the ancient Cycles, the bissextile, of four years; the sabbatical, of seven years; and the solar, of twenty-eight years. Thus J. P. 813, divided by 4, 7, or 28, leaves a remainder of *one*, by which we know it was the first year of these Cycles. But when we apply to it the modern cycles,—the Indiction, and the cycle of nineteen years, we have remainders of three and fifteen, which show that these Cycles could have no connection with this date.¹

That the Egyptians were acquainted with the periods of four and twenty-eight years, seems evident from the arrangement of *the birth of their gods*, who were said "to have been born on *no day* of the year," that is, on the days called *epagomenæ*. According to Diodorus,² when *Saturn* espoused his sister *Rhea*, five gods were born, "Osiris, Isis, Typhon, Apollo, and Venus." But according to Plutarch,³ Osiris was born on the *first* of the *epagomenæ* (reckoning back from the end of the year); Apollo, on the *second*; Typhon, on the *third*; Isis, on the fourth; and Venus, or Nephtys, on the *fifth*. Consequently, their births could not have fallen on consecutive days, but must have been in different years, as the *epagomenæ* were successive. If, now, we arrange the *epagomenæ* for twenty-eight years, commencing with J. P. 813, we shall find that the supposed birth of each of

¹ L'Art. de Verif. Dates, Vol. I. p. 32. The year B. C. 1322, J. P. 3389, gives a radical date, being *the first year* of the Sothic, Sabbatic, and bissextile cycles, and was the only coincidence of the kind that could occur in over 4000 years. Was not that the time when the cycles were arranged?

² Hist. L. I. c. 13.

³ De Isid. and Osirid, c. 13.

these gods fell on the days mentioned, in the order mentioned, at periods distant *four* years from each other. We give first, the beginning of the several years, with their characteristics.

<i>J. P.</i>	<i>Cyc. ©</i>	<i>Thoth 1st.</i>	<i>Don. Let.</i>	<i>Week day.</i>
813	1	April 25 C.	G F.	Thursday.
817	5	" 24 B.	B A.	Monday.
821	9	" 23 A.	D C.	Friday.
825	13	" 22 G.	F E.	Tuesday.
829	17	" 21 F.	A G.	Saturday.
833	21	" 20 E.	C B.	Wednesday.
837	25	" 19 D.	E D.	Sunday.
841	1	" 18 C.	G F.	Thursday. ¹

And we subjoin the days of the birth of the gods, according to this arrangement.

<i>J. P.</i>	<i>Epagom.</i>	<i>Genethlia.</i>	<i>Feria.</i>	<i>W. Day.</i>
813	5 April 24 (1.)	Osiris, Dies	Mercurii,	Wednesday.
817	4 " 23 (2.)	Horus, "	Solis,	Sunday.
821	3 " 22 (3.)	Typhon, "	Jovis,	Thursday.
825	2 " 21 (4.)	Isis, "	Lunæ,	Monday.
829	1 " 20 (5.)	Nephthys, "	Veneris,	Friday.
833	— " 19	Papremis, "	Martis,	Tuesday.
837	— " 18	Cronus, "	Saturni,	Saturday.
841	— " 17	Osiris, "	Mercurii,	Wednesday. ²

Such an arrangement as this could scarcely be accidental, and if designed, the Egyptians must have been acquainted, both with the solar and bissextile Cycles. All these facts go to raise a strong presumption, that the true epoch of the Egyptians commenced B. C. 3898,—A. M. 102, when the civil and natural year commenced together, and that when the Sothic Cycle was invented at a later period, its commencement was fixed to the time of the "manifestation of Sothis," at the period of its invention. And at what time was this more likely to be done, than in the days of Ramses III. ? This conclusion agrees with the tradition mentioned by Tacitus, and with the astronomical dates of the inscriptions upon the monuments of Ramses. What rea-

¹ L'Art. de Verif. p. 32. Diss. Anc. Cyc. pp. 302-309.

² This exact correspondence between the *birth-days* of the gods, and names of the days of the week, would seem to indicate that one was copied from the other.

son, then, why that may not have been the date of the invention of that Cycle?

In conclusion, we hope our author will continue to enlighten the public on the subject of the *hieroglyphics*, but we hope, also, that he will leave theorizing to those who have more time to collate and compare facts, than he seems to have. It is a fault, into which all are prone to fall, to undertake to draw *general* conclusions, from *particular* facts. This has been the misfortune of our author, and we hope the remarks and suggestions we have offered, will tend to cure him of it. We wish the public to be aroused to the importance of this question; we wish to see scholars enlisted in it, and we believe our author may do much to bring about these things. But to do this, he must give us *facts*, not *theories*. Let him give the public a carefully digested summary of the evidence on these points,—that the Key of the Hieroglyphics has been discovered,—what is the character of the writing,—what are the details of history thus made known,—what is certain,—what uncertain,—and what conjecture:—what is agreed upon by the hierologists, and what things are in dispute; let him detail these things, in the way we have pointed out, and he will find ready hearers, among those who are able to appreciate his labors, and a disposition to aid him to the utmost of their power.

ARTICLE VI.

REVIEW OF WHATELY'S ESSAYS ON THE ERRORS OF ROMANISM.

Essays on the Errors of Romanism, having their origin in human nature. By Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin; late principal of St. Alban's Hall, Oxford, and formerly fellow of Oriel College.

By George B. Cheever, Pastor of Allen-st. Presbyterian Church, N. Y.

THIS is truly an admirable book. The main purpose of it may be stated in few words, being this: to show that the errors and wickednesses, combined into so vast and complicated a scheme in the Roman Catholic Religion, have their origin in the depravity of the human heart, and not merely in the ingenuity

of priests. The errors of the Church of Rome were gradual and imperceptible in their rise ; the tracing of them to their origin, and the examination of our own Protestant sects and tendencies, prove on all sides a great danger of falling into corresponding faults, a great readiness to adopt, under different names, the same habits of evil.

A single passage from one of the essays contained in this volume will develop the object of its author. "The superstitions, and the other errors of the Romanists were, as I have already observed, not the result of systematic contrivance, but sprung up spontaneously as the indigenous growth of the human heart ; they arose successively, gradually, and imperceptibly ; and were in most instances probably first overlooked, then tolerated, then sanctioned, and finally embodied in a system, of which they are to be regarded as the cause rather than the effects. Since then, as I have said, corruptions of religion neither first sprang from Romanism, nor can be expected to end with it, the tendency to them being inherent in our common nature ; it is evident that constant watchfulness alone can preserve us from corruptions, not the very same indeed with those of our predecessors, but similar ones under some fresh disguise ; and that this danger is enhanced by the very circumstance which seems to secure us from it,—our abhorrence of those errors in them. From practices the very same in name and form with theirs, such abhorrence is indeed a safeguard ; while at the same time it makes us less ready to suspect ourselves of the same faults disguised. The vain security thus generated draws off our thoughts from self-examination ; a task for which the mind is in general best fitted, when it is most occupied in detecting and exposing the faults of others. In treating then of such corruptions of religion as those into which the church of Rome has fallen, my primary object is to excite a spirit, not of self-congratulation and self-confidence, but of self-distrust and self-examination."

We do not agree with all the positions assumed or opinions advanced in this work ; but on the whole it is full of most valuable truth ; truth that commends itself to all denominations, and is well fitted to oppose the papistical influences now setting in some directions over the church of God. The book consists of an Introduction, followed by six essays on Superstition ; Vicarious Religion ; Pious Frauds ; Undue Reliance on Human Authority ; Persecution ; and Trust in Names and Privileges.

This is an important catalogue of subjects, and the volume would form a timely gift to the people of our own country, if some of our American publishers would put it forth. Meantime we shall take occasion to enter on the general subject presented, not confining ourselves, however, to the course of thought pursued by Archbishop Whately, and certainly in some points differing from him. The subject is destined to command a discussion in this country different in some measure from any it has ever undergone; the sooner and the oftener it is with a proper spirit brought before the mind, the greater safety will there be to our religion and our civil institutions.

We are often reminded of Mr. Dana's profound remark, that "God is using this world as the laboratory of the universe: and that every truth, as well as every error, is undergoing moral processes enough to make the most knowing chemist stare." In some respects, it contains almost as much as the fruitful remark of Origen, out of which the great Bishop Butler constructed his stupendous work on the Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed. By a mind as profound as Butler's, quite as fruitful a use might be made of it in a history of the Divine experiments thus far, and the prophetic ones yet to be realized. Up to this time, the experiment has been that of sin and error, and God has given full sweep to their energies, and at the same time has suffered every panacea for the misery of men in their wickedness to be tried, in order that the universe might know, by a vast demonstration, which in this world only was possible, what sin is—what it is, even without punishment, and in the most favorable circumstances, and with all possible expedients to neutralize the poison of its misery. Meantime, the truth itself has been going through a great and severe process of trial and refinement. It has been subjected to so many experiments, that we may hope that the dross is well nigh smelted out, and that it is ready for use in a period of millennial glory. For there is to be a period in which the energies of righteousness to bless the world shall be as triumphantly and completely tested as ever have been the energies of wickedness to curse it. This experiment, we are sure, has never yet been made. There has never been in existence on earth any thing at all answering, or even approximating to the wondrous glory and richness, comprehensiveness and fulness of the promises on this subject. And those who contend that there has, or that these predictions have already been fulfilled, or that they are merely figurative, or that

the world is to be emptied of its inhabitants without their fulfilment, do, in fact, put into the mouth of infidelity one of its most powerful arguments. If this be your boasted divine religion, with its power to bless the world, so rapturously vaunted, it is manifest that it is a failure. And so it is; for evil has had the mastery; and if the matter were left here, and we had no other light, we must conclude that of these two elements, sin and holiness, in conflict, sin is the strongest, and will prevail. But the matter is not to rest here. There is to be another experiment. We are only on the eve, indeed, of the completion of God's grandest experiment, for which preparation has long been making, for which, indeed, the whole six thousand years now past have been preparing. And as in a chemist's laboratory, if we may be permitted to carry out Mr. Dana's allusion into more detail, the teacher and demonstrator prepares his elements, arranges them, orders every thing with great care, and up to the last moment the spectators are gazing in expectation, perhaps sitting in the darkness, till suddenly the experiment, in the full brilliancy of its success, bursts upon the senses—so it may be with Christianity. Our period being that of preparation, and sometimes the room being darkened, as it were, so that the light, when it breaks, may be more glorious: as soon as all the elements are in order—when the Great Arch-Chemist, whose omnipotent alchemy brings good out of evil, has perfectly arranged all things, the fulness of time being come, we have reason to believe that the glory of the Lord will cover the earth with astonishing rapidity, and in such brightness and blessedness in itself and in its results, that in comparison with any previous period, the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun seven-fold as the light of seven days.

Now, it is manifest that more than a sixth part of the whole world's duration thus far, and nearly three-fourths of the whole time of the publication of the Christian religion, have been filled up well nigh exclusively with the experiment of one monstrous form of Error, the experiment of a falsified Christianity, taken apart from the New Testament, bottomed on the surges of tradition, cut and modified to suit the passions of mankind, and erected into a compound establishment of civil and religious despotism. This in the occidental, along with the great Lie of the Arabian Impostor in the oriental world, have almost divided the earth between them. It is a prodigious fact for the philosophy of history to speculate upon, that the

Pope and the False Prophet, Mohammed and the Man of Sin, have monopolized for many ages the fairest portions of the world. The consequence has been, that regions which in the early ages were the theatre of the world's highest and brightest developments of intellect, have become the abode of darkness, poverty, and superstition. The sway of a false Christianity has proved worse for the world's intellect, than that of a classic idolatry; and while the North of Europe has risen in the scale of civilization, knowledge and power, the Roman Catholic South has sunk almost to the opposite extreme of degradation. If we take an ellipse of territory extending from the Straits of Gibraltar on each side, north and south, along the Mediterranean Sea, and around its oriental limit, we shall have before us a most instructive exhibition of what two of the mightiest false sects of religion that ever ruled the world, could do to sustain among mankind some of the worst curses that Paganism itself ever inflicted upon human society. No element of a beautiful, early, undiseased nature seems wanting in those regions. The air is so soft and pure, the heavens are so serenely beautiful, the productions are so rich, so abundant, so vivid, so luxuriant, that you would almost look, in the spirit of the Grecian Mythology, for a race of supernatural beings to people the hills and plains, the woods and fountains. Alas! we are compelled to feel that man is the only growth that dwindles there; and as we admire the clearness of the skies, the magnificence and picturesqueness of the mountains, the richness of the fruits, and the beauty of the foliage, we wonder at the melancholy contrast between the loveliness of God's material creation, and the degradation of the immortal beings that inhabit it. We ask impatiently and anxiously, as we see the misery and depression of our race, amidst such inestimable natural advantages, How long shall these things be? Shall the dreadful despotism of Ignorance and Superstition never cease?

Now, so far as Mohammedism is concerned, we see even in its own bosom the means for the fulfilment of the predictions of its downfall. There are within its territorial limits a series of materials, by which God may, without any miracle, almost at any time regenerate the whole Empire. It is almost superfluous to mention those Armenian, Nestorian, and Greek sects, as a collection of combustible materials on which the fire of God's Spirit only needs to descend, when the whole oriental re-

gion shall suddenly blaze up to heaven, covered with the light of the Divine glory.

Nor do we think, though there be no such materials as these within the bosom of the Pope's territories, that there is any less hope of the speedy downfall of Popery itself, and the establishment of Christianity upon its ruins. The increase in the dissemination of God's word, even in Roman Catholic countries, is full of encouragement; nor can we doubt that, as a previous step to that Baptism of the Spirit which is to be granted to the nations, the word of God is to do its work of conviction even with whole communities as with individuals, proving itself sharper than any two-edged sword even to the seared conscience of the worshipper of Antichrist. The Spirit of the Mouth of the Lord in that prediction on which the Church rests for victory, can mean nothing but the spirit and power of God's word set loose from all fetters, and exerted according to its irresistible greatness. This dissemination of the Scriptures, therefore, and of scriptural tracts, is a bright indication, to be hailed as the finger of God, in the effort for the conversion of civilized but unchristian Europe, which will comprehend the overthrow of Antichrist finally and forever.

There is not a more astonishing and awful subject of study in the world, than the rise, progress, and perfection of Popery. To find its commencement, we have to advance back into the very brilliance of the Apostolic age, and there, in the midst of the fresh light of the cross and the very labors of the Apostles, do we find the Enemy interspersing among the living stones of Christ's temple, the foundations of another temple, out of which, in due time, the living stones were to be cast, and ground to powder. We find him laying hold of some tendencies in the very aspirations of mankind after holiness, and making out of them the very strongest sinews, bands, and supports of his system. Forbidding to marry. You find it in the Apostolic age; you find it introduced and pleaded for by holy considerations; you cannot put your finger on the line where it passed from a virtue into a sin; and yet there it stands, one of the strongest buttresses of Romanism, and one of the mightiest sources of Rome's iniquity. Praying to the Virgin and to the Saints. You must come down one step at least from the Apostolic age for this, since it was not possible to make a catalogue of Christian Saints in heaven, or to pray to them, canonized, till the first living ones were dead. Then began the Enemy, the watchful Sower of

Tares, to turn the feeling of love and veneration for good men to his purposes, and even so early as the days of Augustine and his sainted mother, you find established the habit of worshipping at the tombs of martyrs ; you find it considered a greater crime to neglect the memory of the saints, than to return drunk from the celebration of their festivals. Then grew the veneration for relics, and in the earliest establishment of Christianity among our own Saxon ancestors, you find processions of dead men's bones, and miracles wrought by them ; which things are recorded by the venerable Bede himself, with as much pious simplicity and sincerity of belief in the righteousness and truth of such performances, as he ever displayed in praying towards the altar, or in translating the gospel into the Saxon tongue. Who now shall trace the progress of the sin, from the first admiration of the coffin of St. Thomas, or the scull of Polycarp, to the placing of their bones upon the altar, the breathing of their names in prayer, the oaths taken by their memories ? This was the master-art of Satan displayed as early as the very first church among the Galatians, *beginning in the Spirit, to be made perfect in the flesh*. Whether we study the system in the abstract, or observe it in its workings among men, we will find this to be true of Romanism, that it is *the destruction of that which is good, by the gradual change of it into that which is evil*.

It is easier to follow the march of the evil, having prostrate empires for your landmarks, than it is to detect the commencement and watch the progress of the change. Between beginning in the spirit, and being made perfect in the flesh, there is a wide interval ; from a morning without clouds, to the gloom of a tempestuous evening, and a midnight without the stars.

We shall mention what the system of Romanism takes away, both from Christianity and from the soul ; and what it puts in the place of that it takes away. And in this delineation, we speak what we have seen, and not merely from speculation, or from history. We have passed through the regions of its proud and palmy state in Europe, the nations where it has developed and is still developing its power ; in some cases, we have passed along the dividing territorial line between Protestantism and Popery, where the observant traveller may witness darkness, degradation, and misery on the one side ; light, liberty, and happiness on the other. The stamps of different religions are as clear in the character of the inhabitants, as the different impressions in wax of the governmental seals of Italy and England. And even now, to make

the nations of Europe completely change character, you would only have to change upon them for one or two generations the great seals of Popery and Protestantism.

We say, then, that from Christianity and the souls of men Romanism takes away the Bible, the Sabbath, the Lord's Supper, Baptism, the Christian Ministry, the Atonement, Regeneration, Faith, Repentance, Prayer. This is a broad declaration; it can be distinctly supported in every particular. We are to remember the circle traced by the Apostle; beginning in the Spirit, to be made perfect in the flesh. The system takes away these gifts, institutions, and duties, in their purity; but, passing them through its own medium, restores them changed into a machinery of evil almost omnipotent. It takes away the soul and meaning of them all, as the life of the world, but it leaves the body, the form, for the world's bondage, superstition, sacrilege, and idolatrous worship. It sets out with them as a system of spiritual duty, freedom, and communion with God, but travels round to a point in the circle, where it clasps and locks them on the world as a system of manacles and fetters.

We shall begin with the Bible. We shall not insist on the known hostility of Romanism to the Word of God, though this is one of its most prominent characteristic features, but on the process through which it passes the Word, when it reluctantly admits men to its perusal. It holds the Bible as its prisoner, and when it permits it to go abroad, surrounds it with a cohort of its own body guards, through whom alone it is interpreted. It takes away the Bible in its purity, but restores it with its fountains of truth poisoned by tradition. Its law is, if any man receive not the traditions of the Church as of equal authority with the teachings of the Scriptures, let him be accursed. The traditions of the Church are the Bible of the people; and so efficacious with the superstitious terrors of the people, has been the persevering hostility of the Church against the Scriptures, that she has gained the great point of making the perusal of them to be regarded as a mark of heresy, and an act of impiety! Here is indeed a damning revelation of Antichrist. If any thing could mark the burning hand and signet of the Arch-Enemy of souls, it is this: the perusal of God's Word stamped as an act of impiety. But in case this seal be broken, there is the diabolical lesson learned of the Jews, *making the Word of God of none effect through your tradition*; there are the poisonous notes and comments; the translations inserting the very principles of deadly

error, the very germs of power and wickedness in the Romish system ; the doing *penance* of the body, instead of the repentance of the soul, and that too as the meritorious ground of salvation ; the example of Jacob, *adoring the top of his staff*, and so teaching to the whole church the lawful idolatry of images. Having thus opened the veins in God's Word and inserted these virulent deadly poisons, the Church of Rome, while thundering her anathemas against Bible Societies, feels comparatively safe, even in Protestant countries, although sometimes compelled to a pretended restoration of the Bible to the people. Shutting them up to her own edition of the Bible, she is safe.

Our second point is the Sabbath. The system of Romanism takes it away and blots it out of existence as a day holy to the Lord, but restores it as a feast day and a jubilee of sin. The Roman Catholic religion destroys that great connecting link between earth and Heaven, and that great safeguard of a nation's morality and happiness, the Christian Sabbath. The day is not, indeed, cut out of the calendar ; it is kept there, but not as a day of God ; the people do not know what a day of God is. We call the Sabbath by that sweet New Testament title, the Lord's Day ; and we endeavor to keep it for him who blessed us with it ; but in their view a day's sacredness is just proportioned to its fitness for the purposes of worldly recreation ; it is that quality, which devotes it to indolence and amusement. There are days already devoted to the Virgin and the saints, of greater sacredness than the Lord's day, which, indeed, in Roman Catholic countries, is but a pagan holiday, baptized into the name of Christ. The Sabbath is but one of an innumerable crowd of feast days, combining with the whole system to encourage and perpetuate the natural indolence and procrastination of the character.

In Protestant countries, the Sabbath has proved a divinely powerful agent in the regeneration and vigorous discipline of the nation's mind. It must be so, being the education of the people a seventh part of their time, in the bringing before them of themes, and exercising their thoughts upon subjects, which occupy and discipline the intellect of angels. It is in the absence of this vigorous discipline, this great tonic for a people's intellect, and in the change of it into a system of relaxation, that the national character deteriorates and runs down. Hence the great difference between Protestant and Romish countries. In New England, they use the Sabbath for the imbuing and invi-

goration of the mind with all the influences of the word of God ; in Spain they use the Sabbath for bull-fights, political revolutions, and theatres. Is not this enough to account for all the difference in character between the two countries ? In New England, the evening of the Sabbath is the favorite period for the discussion of ennobling and exciting truth ; in Spain, if a favorite drama is to be produced in the theatre, it must be Sabbath evening ; if an extraordinary display of fire-works is to entertain the people, it must be Sabbath evening. Such is the Sabbath of Romanism ; and if in some Protestant countries it dares not open its theatres, the Christian Institution is not the less emasculated of its spiritual energy—it is not the less paralyzed in its exalting and instructing influences, and divorced from the word of God.

Our third point is the Christian Ministry. The system of Romanism takes it away as a Ministry of the Word, the Bread of Life, but restores it changed into a Priesthood of Ordinances,—a priesthood, no longer the preachers of the Word, but the despots of the conscience, the keepers of the keys of Heaven and Hell. A daily sacrifice for sin, as in the Mass, and a daily priesthood to offer it up, and to absolve the conscience, are alone sufficient for the entire corruption of Christianity into a system of idolatry, superstition, and perdition to the soul. Individual religious responsibility and individual religious life are destroyed in this system, the soul's business of personal salvation being passed over to the care and responsibility of the priest. This destroys freedom, puts the conscience and the spiritual world wholly under the dominion of the priest, and inevitably moulds the priesthood into a spiritual despotism. It puts under command of the priesthood the whole eternal world of retribution, to be filled, in the absence of God's word, with whatsoever superstitious shapes of terror they please to imagine, and to be portioned out at their will to the trembling inhabitants of a world of probation. The Bible being taken away, and tradition and ghostly superstition usurping its rule, under command of a priesthood of human passions, the multitude may be moulded and governed and fettered at pleasure. In the absence of an intelligent devotion founded on the Scriptures, the religious instinct of the soul passes into dreadful superstition under absolute authority of the priest ; and with every other part of the being, and every interest in the world, in subjection to it. No possible tyranny can be so perfect as this. "The clergy of the

dark ages," observes an excellent English writer on history, Professor Smyth, "had obtained what only Archimedes wanted; they had got another world, on which to rest their engines, and they moved *this* world at their pleasure." He quotes Dryden's Sebastian :

Content you with monopolizing heaven,
And let this little hanging ball alone:—
For, give ye but a foot of conscience there,
And you, like Archimedes, toss the globe!

Such is Rome's Priesthood; not a foot, but the whole of conscience, in its dominion of that world, is theirs; and they still toss the inhabitants of this world, and its institutions too, where they have the superiority, at their pleasure. It cannot be otherwise, for he who possesses the conscience, possesses the man.

Our fourth point respects the Atonement. We say, unhesitatingly, that the Roman Catholic religion as effectually destroys the doctrine and belief of the Atonement by the blood of Jesus, as if it were by council and decree expunged from the Christian system. Alms, masses, penances, pilgrimages, constitute the meritorious purchase of salvation; and as to the intercession of any higher being, that of the Virgin Mary takes up the whole place, which in the Christianity of the New Testament, Jesus Christ occupies. Absolution from sin is purchased for money; expiation for sin, if it must be made, is wrought out in Purgatory, till masses sufficient shall have been bought and offered to release the soul from hell and admit it to heaven. The principle of faith, the life of Christianity, its only life, is excluded from this system. In the mass of minds under the Romish Church, a faith in the power and goodness of the Virgin Mary is all the approximation made towards it; so that, in truth, if the Roman Catholic religion has a Saviour, it is the Virgin Mother, and not her crucified Son. In all places and at all times to her pre-eminently the heart of the Romanist turns, as to an Omnipresent Deity. And no matter what may be the employment, or the course of life, her image sanctifies it.

In the city of Cadiz, in Spain, we were once passing by a shop of liquors with a religious friend, when our attention was arrested by a shrine of the Virgin Mary, containing her image dressed in a robe of spangled white satin, amidst a crowd of

bottles arranged in rows upon the shelves. "Look at this spectacle," said we to our companion. "What a ridiculous figure! The Virgin Mary in a grog-shop! They make her the patron saint of all iniquity." "The very place," responded the other, "where, in consistency with their religion, they should place her, as being the one where they most need the absolution of their sins, and the indulgence to commit them." We walked on, absorbed in a sense of the obstacles that lie in the way of the conversion of this people, one of the greatest of all being the utter erasement and abolition of the doctrine of Atonement by the blood of Jesus Christ.

But this is not all. The Atonement is worse than annihilated; it becomes with them a thing of daily idolatry. The sacrifice of the mass constitutes it such; the pretended offering up daily of the body and blood of the Lord Jesus for the sins of the world; they being compelled, on pain of the most tremendous anathemas, to believe that the Son of God Himself, soul and divinity, is present to their senses, and to adore him as such, in the consecrated wafer. This they worship; this is what they kneel at and adore; this is their reliance for the pardon of sin; this is their Saviour, this their God. "Where is your God?" said a little boy in Spain, who went for the first time in his life into a Protestant chapel in Gibraltar, and missed, among other things to which his senses had been accustomed in the Romish worship, the presence of the Host; "Where is your God?" It was a striking revelation of the process of religious education under that system. We are right in asserting that the Atonement is with them a thing of daily idolatry. Their system is one in which the very truth and principle which constitutes the essence of the world's salvation, is placed first and foremost as the means of daily idolatry and paganism.

Our fifth point regards the privilege and discipline of prayer. The Roman Catholic system takes this also away in its reality, but returns it as a talisman of evil. Prayer to any creature, though simply and only as an intercessor, would be an abandonment of prayer to God; but it cannot rest there; the intercessor, even though there were no image, would become the soul's idol. There is no real prayer, and scarce a possibility of it, where a crowd of saints and mediators stand between the soul and God, and to them its petitions are taught to be directed. Ave Maria! Ora pro Nobis! Mary! Mother of God! pray for us! Alas! the very conception of prayer, the very

idea of the soul's communion with God, is excluded from such a system, and the spirit of idolatry is enshrined in its stead. We speak of its practical influence over the great multitude of minds educated in it. Every saint in the calendar darts a baleful fire upon the soul. A young man in China once said to Mr. Abeel, in answer to the question, "What God do you worship?" "Oh! no matter what; just the one whose birth-day happens." Precisely the same may be said of the worship of Romanism. "What Saint do you invoke?" "Just the one whose birth-day happens." It were hard to say which system is least idolatrous.

Our sixth point is that of Repentance. Here again Romanism changes directly the medicine of the soul into its poison. In the first place, it translates the Scripture command of repentance into the command to *do penance*, a complete, absolute, and most deadly perversion of the terms of salvation. In the next place, it prescribes a variety of penances and makes them a catalogue and accumulation of merits for the soul. Thus, in the very enjoining of that act and disposition on which, in the word of God, the soul's salvation depends, it induces and provides for a self-righteous disposition of the soul, which renders the repentance of the Gospel absolutely impossible. Here, both by translation and tradition, the word of God is not only made of none effect, but its result is to separate the soul from contrition and from Christ, and to educate it in a mould absolutely the reverse of that required as essential under the gospel dispensation.

Our seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth points, are those of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, Regeneration and Faith. A justifying Faith is annihilated, and ceremonies, superstitions, and works are substituted. Regeneration is taken away as a doctrine, the very conception of its nature hidden from the soul, but it is restored as a rite, to be withheld or administered at the will of the priest. The Lord's Supper is taken away as a means of grace, but restored as an infallible channel of salvation. Baptism is taken away as a seal and emblem, but is restored as an efficacious title of the soul to heaven. Both these ordinances being in the power of the priest, and both made the substance of salvation, instead of the symbol of a grace signified, a grace only in the power of God, both are turned to sustain the despotism of the priest, and to secure the bondage and perdition of the people. So are, collectively, the whole

circle of the gifts, doctrines, and institutions of Christianity, which we have mentioned.

We believe that very little modification or change has taken place in the Roman system in regard to any one of the points now passed in survey. The effect of the system on the soul is the same in the nineteenth century as it was in the fourteenth. No man can doubt this, who stands in a Romish church, in a Romish country, and long watches the worshippers. The religious effect of the system is to be tested on the poor, the grossly wicked, the degraded, the ignorant; the others are but infidels or mockers. We have watched the bearing of men who had not knowledge enough to be unbelievers. We have seen them enter the cathedral with pale and haggard countenances, and, groaning within themselves, cast themselves down at the foot of some image, or reverently kiss the picture of the Virgin. Then, after the rapid movement of their pallid lips in prayer to her or to a saint, with the sign of the cross repeated, we have witnessed the air of relief, the appearance of satisfaction, with which they leave the temple, as if every sin were forgiven, and every burden thrown from the conscience. We have felt that in such a system communion with God is excluded, prayer has become but the vocabulary of a baptized panism.

Such is a brief sketch of the nature of this system; a scheme so tremendous, that it is truly remarked by the author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm*, that if the history only of it were preserved, the affirmation would not be credited that it ever had an existence. It is indeed a tremendous MYSTERY or INIQUITY, a system which reveals the hand and guidance of a mighty, sagacious, far-seeing, master-spirit of evil, from beginning to end. From the time when it first rises in the horizon, a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, to the time when it spreads over the whole heaven, it discloses a dreadful unity in the purpose and the accomplishment. Nor can any power less than an omnipotent divine agency be relied upon for its overthrow. The Church might despair in the presence of such an enemy, if she had not such a reliance; a fact which may suggest a reason for the express and repeated assurance of such an interposition, in the sacred records. The evil, we believe is not a disease to be cured, but a system to be destroyed utterly; whether with violence and supernatural judgments, we cannot beforehand, from the nature of the predictions, affirm.

“Whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming.” There is much contained in the grand expressions of this unfulfilled prediction. Perhaps the materials covered up in them may put all preceding dispensations into the shade, when God shall bring them together by his providence, and let the fire of heaven fall on them as a beacon to the universe. Amidst the reigning darkness of Popery, this text burns before us like a talisman of hope and glory. We believe that its fulfilment is near, even at the doors, and that in its fulfilment there is to be unveiled a scene of the glory of God, brighter, if possible, than even the blaze of the gospel illuminating every corner of heathenism. The conflict with this power will be keener than that with the spirit of Grecian idolatry; and the victory over this power will be greater than when the banner of the cross floated over the palace of the Cæsars. At that time, the genius of paganism, instead of being conquered, was but disguised with the insignia of Rome, and received in baptism into the bosom of the Christian church, to reign with undiminished energy for centuries. Now there is no new baptism for Popery to undergo, by which, with altered designation, but unchanged spirit, it can still inflict the curses of its despotism. Its nature may break forth in new forms, and forms better adapted to present taste and knowledge; but on the whole, we have found it out; and if nothing else of advantage should spring from the long night of ignorance and darkness in which the human race was shrouded, it is that Popery has fairly developed itself; it has proved itself the prison of the human mind, the decay and death of empires. And because this, among other vast experiments, of which this fallen world has so long been the laboratory, is so nearly completed, we are fast coming to the light. It breaks out on the right hand and on the left. We have been groping in the night for ages; we have been feeling our way through a dark subterranean passage, and now it opens. A sea of glory spreads out before us. The sun of God’s love and mercy shines upon it; the Spirit, like a dove, broods over it; heaven and earth seem blending together, and the city that John speaks of floats in the transparent air, and comes down like a bride adorned for her husband.

We used to think that there were two currents of prophecy indicating the near approach of the day of millennial glory, and that when we could see a like convergency in the affairs of men, we should feel that the appointed time for the whole world’s con-

version was drawing nigh. These two currents of prophecy are those which connect the conversion of the Jews and the simultaneous coming in of the fulness of the Gentiles, and we have thought we could see the evident commencement of the meeting of those two seas of glory. But there is a third line of prophecy which must converge to the same point; and it is that which announces so explicitly the destruction of the Romish power. And inasmuch as the fulfilment of this prediction, as well as of the others, is to be committed to the church as its instrument, there would be one star wanting in the horoscope of the world's destinies, if there were no movement corresponding with this promised annihilation of Antichrist yet commenced in reality.

Now, in reference to such a movement, perhaps we may see a new indication in God's remarkable providences with this country, as a great instrument in the world's regeneration. It was not merely to prepare a people to fight the battles of the Lord of Hosts against the idolatry of heathenism, that he deferred the discovery of this continent till it might be peopled with Protestants, but to train up a nation and a church aloof from the influences both of monarchy and of popery, and free from the incubus of a religious establishment, to be ready at hand for his purposes. He would have a Christian republic, out of which might go forth the spirit of his mouth and the brightness of his coming, to contend, unfettered by the forms of an establishment, and independent alike of the caresses and the powers of prelatical and monarchical authority, against that monstrous system which, under pretence of being the only Christianity that ought to be tolerated in the world, combines within itself all the evils both of a religious and a civil despotism. Certainly, there is not another nation on earth, nor a church in any other nation, so fitted by birth, training, providence, and grace, to contend against a false religion of such unlimited power and pretension. There is hardly another nation on earth that has not more or less of the very spirit of Popery in its composition; for Popery is the twin-sister of despotism and hereditary pomp; Popery is conservative of all time-honored, superstitious usages; it claims a strong affinity with the genius of monarchy itself; and the divine right both of kings and squires, as well as of ecclesiastical prelates, can find no better security than under its broad shield. And on almost every other church, the apathy and timidity of form and custom are hanging with a weight heavy as frost, and

deep almost as life; so that the daring, the energy, and the spiritual impulse, the alertness, vigilance, and keenness of vision, the indomitable spirit of liberty, the thirst for truth, and the power of faith and love, so distinctive of the Reformation, can rarely be found.

As to the time of this effort, we simply say, that good men and wise Chronologists have, with much consent, fixed upon the very century into the bosom of which we are thrown, as containing certain epochs pointed out in the records of prophecy as of the most intimate connection with the consummation of the plan of divine mercy to the world. The overthrow of Antichrist marks one of those epochs. Some learned and godly men have believed that the final conflict of the gospel with Romanism is to be attended by a period of persecution. Whether this be so or not, there must be a spirit in exercise which would endure persecution. The distinctive feature of Romanism is its utter annihilation of, and its deadly hostility against, the doctrine of justification by faith. Now, as at the Reformation, men had to take their stand on that doctrine, and gained all that they did gain by the freshness and power of it, so it will be in the final conflict of the Gospel with Romanism. There must be a new baptism of the Church with the fire of that truth, for it has lost much of its life-giving efficacy; we were almost going to say, it has gone out of fashion. So we may find the leaven of Romanism, even in churches opposed to Popery. The very existence in the world of such a mass of false religion—a system, the essence and energy of which strikes at the fundamental principle of life in real piety, could not but have exerted a most disastrous power, even over the atmosphere of evangelical truth; just as the neighborhood of great masses of ice, will change the climate even of a mild and beautiful region. If you should moor a chain of icebergs along our coasts, though out of sight, they would send their sharp and killing influences over all our year; they would bring the memory of December's snow into fantastic summer's heat, and the hardy plants that are native to us would be dwarfed and mildewed. It is something such an influence that the existence of Romanism has exerted even over evangelical piety: its dread shadow has fallen upon men's souls; its slow and awful transit over our world has eclipsed the sun, and in this portentous and disastrous twilight, the coldness and the terror have gone to the heart of nations.

Though, therefore, the event may not prove that the fires of

persecution will be actually lighted in this final conflict, yet the spirit of such faith as would sustain the soul at the stake, and make a second Reformation, must be called into exercise. The last conflict will not be with the organization, but the spirit of Romanism; and though its organization is the most perfect and tremendous in the world, and on this it may still mainly rely, it will find itself deceived and shorn of its strength, if once the evil spirit is exorcised. But the spirit is of that kind, that will tear the nations before it comes out of them. And yet it must come out of them before the gospel of Christ can be supreme in the midst of them. In the conflict with this spirit, therefore, there may be terrible convulsions, and intestine wars; for, as the organization of Rome, wherever it has been perfected, twines its roots about all institutions, so does the spirit of Rome, whatever be its residence, arm itself with all evil passions, especially with the omnipotence of ambition and pride.

Now it is highly probable, that not only a new convulsive movement of Romanism, itself, but a general development of the spirit of Romanism, though not under the precise form of the Papal power, is to precede and accompany the final conflict of the gospel with this great enemy. The signs in the Ecclesiastical world pretty plainly indicate this. They indicate a gathering of Ecclesiastical forces on the two opposite sides of formalism and spiritualism, with no longer a debatable ground between.

There are, indeed, but two kinds of religion in the world: humility and faith on the one hand, pride and ceremony on the other. There is a religion of repentance, and a religion of penance; of self-mortification from the sorrow and hatred of sin, and of self-mortification for the acquisition of merit and self-esteem. There is a religion of rites and ceremonies, totally separate from the religion of which they are the dress; a religion of mint, anise, and cummin; and one of judgment, mercy, and faith. All ordinances, when you take away the soul of piety, the faith of the gospel, become superstitions; the watchwords and talismans of pride and spiritual despotism. There is a religion that worships God, and another that worships the altar; a religion that trusts in Christ, and another that trusts in the sign of the cross, the wafer, and the holy water; a religion that brings every thought into subjection by love, and a religion that yokes the body to the car of Juggernaut; a religion of broad phylacteries, and garment-borders, and Rabbies; a religion of

grat-straining, and camel-swallowing, and cleansing of the outside of the cup and platter, and garnishing of prophets' tombs, and of the fathers' sepulchres. There is a religion, whose justification and whose whole essence is faith, and a religion whose whole material, inward and external, is form; and it makes but little difference what the form may be. A man may drown himself in a puddle of mud, if he pleases, as well as in the ocean. The *fetiches* and the hooks, and the amulets of dirt, and the crocodiles and lizards, and the sacred fires and rivers, of one vast class of devotees of this monstrous god of form and merit, are just as noble as the beads and scapularies, the altars and the crosses, the dead bones and pilgrimages, the saints and virgins, the wafer and the water, the masses and absolutions, the anointings and enrobings, the enshrining of martyrs and the damning of heretics, that constitute and characterize the devotion of the other. The mending of the fish's tail in the house of Dagon, was just as good a mark of religion, just as noble a work of piety, just as lofty an elevation of spirit, as the washing of pots and cups and brazen vessels in the temple. The primacy of the Pope and the burning of heretics, is just as good as the assumption of the exclusive divine right of ordination, and the consecration of all dissenters to the uncovenanted mercies of God. So that, whether it be the spitting to the left when a dog meets you, or the crossing of your threshold with the right foot foremost, or the saying "God bless us" when a man sneezes, or the eating porridge in Lent, and fish on Friday; whether it be the exaltation of the altar, or the cross, or the church liturgy; whether it be the brazen serpent, or the blood of St. Januarius, or the water of baptism; whether you flagellate yourself according to St. Dominic, or fast and wear sackcloth with Dr. Pusey; whether you deify and adore the image of the virgin, or the sign of Christ's passion, or any tradition of the ritual, the Pope, the Cathedral, or that tremendous talisman of Popery and Prelacy, THE church; if this be your trust for salvation, it is all one: your God is an idol; your Saviour a figment of your own depravity; your religion is form without faith, and in opposition to it.

This formalism without faith is the religion of nature: it is the creature instead of the Creator; the altar instead of the altar's God. It is Paganism, and Judaism, and Mohammedism, and Buddhism, and Popery and prelatical domination. It is the natural movement of the fallen soul in search of some religion, but at enmity against humility and faith. This formalism itself

appears in various modes of enshrinement, according to its own taste. There is a material formalism, and a spiritual formalism. The material formalism is for the grosser nature; the spiritual, for the higher and more refined. The spiritual formalism professes to adore its rites, because of their spiritual beauty; and it sees a spiritual beauty only in connection with those rites. It professes to present the poetical side of religion to the soul; but it is merely the mint, anise, and cummin of poetry, as well as of the law; it cannot rise to the higher themes of inspiration. It is the poetry of that which is seen and temporal; not that which is unseen and eternal; it is fast-and-feast-day poetry; the poetry, not of devotion, nor of feeling, but of superstition and of sense. It is just as if Raphael, instead of employing his genius on the subject of the transfiguration, had spent his life in illuminating missals and painting the dresses of the priests and friars.

In this spiritual formalism there is much appearance, and there may be the reality of piety, but it becomes a morbid and fastidious thing, instead of the vigorous and frank benevolence of the gospel. It bears about as much relation to the spirit of the gospel, as the enthusiastic love and worship of nature in a mind like Shelley's bears to the love of God. Its worship is sought in the poetry and sentimentality of religion; its piety is a cluster of hallowed associations, dependent on the *ecce signum* of a beautiful and time-honored cathedral; the prayers and responses of a rich and tasteful liturgy. The mosses that cling to the oriel windows of York Minster would fill the soul of the worshipper with emotions of transport at the beauty of the church and its venerable institutions; but, as a manifestation of the divine wisdom, the sweetest flowers that ever breathed would go unnoticed, though they sprung up nowhere else in the world, if they covered the turf of a dissenting graveyard. The white robe of a babe to be baptized, the gorgeousness and solemnity of the priest's vestments, and the sign of the cross on the babe's unconscious forehead, make a deeper appeal than the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, named on an immortal spirit. This, to the mind of a Papist or a Puseyite, would be nothing, by a Congregational or Presbyterian minister, in a plain black coat, without a liturgical apparatus and a godfather to answer for the infant.

The spiritual formalist can have no communion of spirit with the children of God, out of the line of apostolical succession; he cannot kneel in prayer with such; there is no virtue in the

sacrament of the Lord's Supper with such ; but give him a box of consecrated wafers, and a little portable communion-service of plate duly consecrated, and he can journey all over the world, and have a comfortable sacramental occasion for his own spirit, even though his dwelling may be beside a tabernacle, where the Lord's table is spread without a surplice, by a missionary to the heathen.

Now, wherever a mind is so warped by prejudice and unbelief, as to see a spiritual meaning and beauty in the things of religion only where the rubric of its own plan is complied with, or where a bishop in apostolical succession has laid his consecrating hand, it will soon cease to see what is spiritual, at any rate ; it will cease to regard the real meaning in the ordinances of religion, even when most liturgically and gorgeously administered. The mind so in love with the shadow, takes it for the substance : if there be but the shell, the kernel is of no consequence. This spiritual formalism tends, therefore, even in its best aspect, and in the purest minds ever deceived by it, to mere material formalism ; in its natural progress it comes to that, and all worship is form. A man in whom the insanity of this fanaticism has got such power, that he cannot receive the gospel or be blest by its ordinances except from the hands of prelatical consecration, will not long be anxious for the gospel at all, provided the form be preserved. Nor can any thing be more acceptable to the multitude of mankind than a religion so constituted : a religion of ceremony with the soul of pride—a religion, in which there shall be the forms of penance and of gorgeous humility without that contrition and abasement of heart required by the gospel—a religion of pomp and superstition without faith, of title and display without humility.

What could be more gratifying to men generally, in search of salvation, than the tenet of baptismal regeneration ? “ It is truly affecting,” remarks a Baptist missionary abroad, “ to observe the apparent sincerity and veneration with which many Greeks of considerable intelligence regard their ‘ holy baptism.’ A Greek can never be pressed with the subject of a change of heart, without intrenching himself behind this refuge. His religion teaches him that baptism is the first and most essential mystery, by which a person becomes a member of God's family, and a new creature in Christ, and a partaker of eternal life. In baptism, God gives to a person the forgiveness of sin, through the mediation of the Son ; this signifying,

that, as the body of the baptized is washed with water, so the soul, by the grace of God, is washed and cleansed from sins, according to the words of our Lord, 'Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' Thus reads the Church Catechism, with its refuges of lies."

Nor is it the Greek Church alone, nor the Romish Church, that lulls men to perdition under this seducing lie of a "baptismal regeneration."

In speaking of the branches of Romish superstition existing among Protestants, Archbishop Whately dwells upon some abuses of the Eucharist, and profanations of the ordinance of Baptism. He has mentioned the evil of disjoining completely from the "outward visible sign of baptism" all "inward spiritual grace," but he has omitted entirely this prodigious and soul-destroying abuse of putting baptism as the cause and conveyancer of grace—this doctrine of baptismal regeneration enshrined in the articles of the Church of England, the tendency of which is as diabolical in lulling the human heart in sin, and carrying men unregenerate from the church on earth to the retributions of a world where "circumcision is of the heart only," as any of the worst superstitions of Romanism. We are the more surprised that such a writer as Archbishop Whately should pass over this corruption in his own church, because he has, on so many other occasions, pointed out so clearly the errors of his own denomination. He has frankly noticed a point of imperfection in the Church Liturgy, which we have never seen noted elsewhere, but which is, in itself, most powerful as an argument against it. He observes, that that Liturgy "is evidently neither adapted nor designed for children, even those of such an age as to be fully capable of joining in congregational worship, were there a service suitably composed on purpose for them." Again, he speaks of the effect of superstition in another abuse of the Liturgy, in that he "has known, for instance, a person in speaking of a deceased neighbor, whose character had been irreligious and profligate, remark how great a comfort it was to hear the words of the funeral service read over her, 'because, poor woman, she had been such a bad liver.' I have heard of an instance, again, of a superstition, probably before unsuspected, being accidentally brought to light by the minister's having forbidden a particular corpse to be brought into the church, because the person had never frequented it when alive: the consequence of which was, that many old people began immedi-

ately to frequent the church, who had before been in the habit of absenting themselves."

"All these, and numberless other such superstitions," continues Archbishop Whately, "it was the business of a corrupt priesthood, not to introduce, indeed, but to encourage and maintain, inasmuch as they almost all tend to increase the influence and wealth of the Hierarchy. Let it be the Protestant pastor's business not only to abstain from conniving at or favoring any thing of the kind, but (remembering that the original source of superstition is not in the Church of Rome, but in the heart of man) to be ever on the watch against its inroads from various quarters, and in various shapes. Towards the persons, indeed, who fall into this or any other kind of fault, we cannot be too tender or too considerate in making allowances; but we must guard against that pretended and spurious charity, which is, in reality, indifference to the fault itself, and carelessness about purity of religion."

Now, all this formalism, both spiritual and material, which constitutes so much of the essence of Romanism, is the religion of the natural heart asserting its supremacy; the religion of justification by Forms, in opposition to the religion of justification by Faith. It is, moreover, the religion of Fanaticism, Intolerance, and Persecution. The fanaticism of forms has proved itself a thousand fold more terrible than the fanaticism of feeling. Enshrined within a part of the church establishment of England, it has seemed ready recently to break out anew, with assumptions of the most deadly persecuting energy. The movement already, within so short a time, is felt through the world. The missionaries of the Cross feel it, and are destined to a conflict with it, that will sorely try their faith and patience. It casts them out and unchurches them, as intruders and enemies; as men whom the Church is to watch against and supplant, instead of encouraging and supporting them. If it dared, or had the power, doubtless it would hurl the thunders of excommunication against them.

This formalism finds its completion in an established hierarchy, forced upon the people, and consolidated by the civil law. We were once much struck with an observation, dropped in conversation by an eloquent clergyman in the city of Edinburgh. He observed, that Christ had three offices, the kingly, the prophetic, the priestly; that the Pope had usurped the priestly, Mohammed the prophetic, and England the kingly. We

have been fighting against popery ; and here, said he, we are, with the monarch of England in a state establishment at the head of the Christian Church, and usurping the kingly office of Jesus Christ ! In England, the head of the state is superior to the hierarchy ; this is the popery of Great Britain ; but the highest degree of formalism will have the head of the hierarchy superior to the state, and this is the manner of popery in Rome. In its perfection, it is death to the souls of men ; it is the quickening of pride and sin. It is opposed to all missions, but those of its own Propaganda ; for rather than have the kingdom of Christ set up without bishops and a prelatical hierarchy, it would have the kingdom of darkness itself continued. This fair and gorgeous dome so covers the multitude of sins, that it were almost sacrilege to suppose that anywhere in the world, beneath the shelter of its delusions, men can have gone so far in error as to need the intervention of the missionary to regain them to the truth. It is an insult to the unity, infallibility, and majesty of the Church, to suppose that any of its branches, however far gone in error, can cease to be a vital and honorable part. The genius of formalism will support its votaries, at the cost of whatever concessions of the truth it is compelled to make.

The power which we have thus delineated is tremendous ; and yet, before the reign of Christianity through the earth, it is to be entirely demolished. The final conflict, therefore, of the gospel with this enemy, may be great and terrible : for if, when Antichrist dies, the spirit and god of formalism are to die also, there will doubtless be great convulsions. The opponents of Antichrist hitherto have waged war upon the centralization of its abuses, and upon the abuses themselves, in succession and detail. They have been hacking away at the great upas of desolation, while its roots run through the world far and wide, and runners shoot out of the ground, and form fair and stately children from the parent stock. If the tree is not only to be cut down, but the stump uprooted, the convulsion will shake all empires ; it will bring to the ground the unchristian establishments of Christianity, wherever they have sprung from the great roots of Popery in the world. When Antichrist dies, we believe the arrogant assumption by one church, of being the only true church, and by one class of Christ's priesthood, of the exclusive divine right of priestly ordination, will die with it. We cannot believe that such a foul blot of pride and domination will be suffered to stay in the church of Christ. There is nothing more utterly

opposed to the spirit and precepts of the gospel than this. If against any one thing the warnings and denunciations of our blessed Saviour to his own disciples were most forcibly and distinctly reiterated, it is this. And if there be any one thing more fully adapted than another to fill the church with the spirit of ambition, aggrandizement, jealousy, envy, heart-burning, selfishness, luxury, it is this. It has had a full and fair development, not only in the *puris naturalibus* of Popery *per se*, but also in the Church of England; the monstrous corruptions of the establishment are its natural brood; and yet, even in this country, some men's pride of place and worship of form have reached to such a height, that they can shut their eyes on those corruptions, and maintain that, rather than the establishment should be given up, the corruptions themselves had better still be tolerated. There are some men that absolutely regard them as the best form of Christianity; just as, where slavery prevails, its abominations by some are maintained to be the best form of domestic society. Nothing but the final destruction of Antichrist will make the world believe in that declaration of our Lord, "My kingdom is not of this world."

There is much false philosophy and sophistical reasoning paraded in excuse of the formalism of Popery. It is asserted, that there is in the human mind a craving after form, and a necessity of leaning upon it, which must be gratified, and that Protestantism, in its bareness, has made an unnatural and violent division between the truth and its proper array and furniture. Doubtless there is such a craving, and it is so powerful, that in its indulgence, the form without the truth becomes much more precious than the truth without the form. Beyond doubt the nature of the mind renders form necessary, up to a certain point; but beyond a certain point, form becomes unavoidably the minister of error and sin. Form weakens the soul, while faith strengthens it; form materializes its views, while faith spiritualizes them; form worships the brazen serpent, which has been given only as Faith's occasion, and then must Hezekiah grind it to powder. Form takes the ladder Jacob saw, and, instead of climbing it, idolizes it. Form takes the staff, which Jacob leaned on in worshipping, and adores the top of it, religiously affirming that this was what the patriarch himself did. In the worship of images, under pretence of venerating the memory of saints, form finds its idolatrous climax.

In the preaching of Christ and the apostles, every requisite

of form and manner, which the constitution of the human mind renders necessary, was provided for. There are some things which the body renders necessary; the two only and simple rites appointed by our Saviour, even in their extremest simplicity, render certain forms necessary; but for the nourishment of the soul in Christ, the sincere milk of the word, without symbol, ceremony or dress, save the most forcible, instructive, and persuasive language that can be employed to convey it most directly to the soul, is all that is needed. The practice of our Lord himself, is enough to prove this. The truth is, that this tendency to the bondage of form, and this necessity for it, belong to the world's childhood, and, in the childhood of the world's education, these instincts and weaknesses have had their scope and development;—in the preparatory dispensation of Christianity, the sensuous and the tangible have ministered to the instruction and discipline of God's people. The Christian dispensation itself, is more spiritual, and therefore more simple, more unfettered with the bondage of form. Now we are become men, we must put away childish things; the whole reasoning of the apostle goes upon this supposition; and he had those to deal with, who accused him of laying bare the religion of his fathers, and of despising and rendering of no reputation the seemly and beautiful array of its ornaments.

But he replied, that these cherished and idolized rites and observances were but the shadow of things to come, and that now they had got the substance, he would have nothing to do with worshipping the shadow. These were the toys of an immature age; and to keep them under the bright light and bracing air of the gospel, would be like a man keeping the whistles and sleds, the wooden swords and paper caps of his boyhood, to play with in the gravity of fifty years.

Indeed, if our blessed Lord meant that these gradations in the clergy, from the pope, the universal bishop, downward, which mark the system of Romanism, with the gorgeous rites, ceremonies and titles that accompany them, should be adopted in his own church, why did he not sanctify and keep what he found ready at hand in the Jewish economy? What more gorgeous or significant paraphernalia could be desired, than that of the temple, with its splendid services? Not one of the apostles ever put on the Levitical robes, or the Sacerdotal mitres, or ever refused to preach in a conventicle. It was reserved for the harlot of abominations to take up the cast-off frippery

of an abolished dispensation ; to deck herself out in its gorgeous array, newly patched and spangled ; putting on the rotten rags of Judaism, gilded with the cross, and idolizing in the manhood of Christianity the cradle and standing-stool of its infancy. The vain talkers about the sacred beauty of church rituals, and the poetic and sanctifying power of their lessons, need to be reminded that these things have had their day. When the gospel gives us heavenly wings, our stilts and crutches may be laid aside ; neither do we want to keep them because, forsooth they may have been made of gold and silver. These lessons have lost their vitality, and to send us back to them is like compelling us to draw again into the lungs air that has already been breathed. And yet there are those, who would lead us back to a system that requires a lord of ceremonies to usher us without mistake into God's temple, and a French posture-master to direct both priest and people in their devotions !

We have often gazed upon the gorgeous ceremonies of popery, till between the music and the painting, and the magnificent architecture and imposing forms, we have been so impressed with their power over the senses, that we have thought if a great cathedral of the middle ages could be taken by the dome and transported across the Atlantic, it would make Romanists by thousands. We are not surprised at the despotism of this system over common and uneducated minds, nor at the apologies for it in minds accustomed from childhood to regard rich forms as the indispensable requisites of Christianity. But it is strange that any mind acquainted with the history of Romanism, and that looks or can look behind the vail, should be carried away by a first impression of the novelty and magnificence of its rites ; not staying long enough among them to receive the sure after impression, both of their intrinsic idolatry and debasing and melancholy tawdriness. These things have always proved to the soul a snare rather than a ladder ; and if the travelling Protestant, with his mind filled with Wordsworth's Ecclesiastical sentimentalism, his eye with the pope's rotundity, condescension and gorgeous tiara, his nose with the fragrant frankincense, and his ear with the floating or rebounding anthems, would but stop to analyze his own bewildering admiration, and to ask where is the piety or what the religion of all this, he would find himself absorbed in a sentiment that partakes very little of the spirit of the gospel ; he would wake

out of his dream in season to prevent him from ridiculously dwelling on the delightful union of magnificence and humility in the person of His Holiness.

Now the lesson which we draw from all this is, that of simplicity in our own piety, and simplicity in the effort for the world's conversion. A great singleness of purpose for the glory of Christ will do much, even amidst the greatest obstacles; but every sinister and partisan aim will meet with a discomfiture. They who strive to advance their own church instead of the gospel of Christ, however they may seem to prevail for a season, are mistaken if they expect final success. There have been two names, derived from the blessed names of our Lord, one of which has come to signify all that is detestable and false; the other, all that is excellent and lovely: Jesuit and Christian. A Jesuit is one who seeks the supremacy of his own order; a Christian, the supremacy of Christ. So far as a man's religion leads to the worship of his own sect, or of the church, instead of Christ, it passes from the comprehensiveness of the term Christianity into the selfishness of the term Jesuitism. A Christian, so far as he worships the idea of the church instead of Christ, so far he is a Jesuit; he loses towards Christ what he gains towards the church. We apply this to every sect. The Congregationalist, so far as he seeks the prevalence of his order instead of the kingdom of Christ, is a Jesuit. The Presbyterian, so far as he maintains the divine right of Presbyterianism, and worships the book of discipline instead of the Bible, is a Jesuit. The Baptist, so far as he seeks his own sect instead of Christ, is a Jesuit. And your true prelati- cal churchman, so far as he worships his organization and apostoli- cal succession instead of Christ, is a Jesuit; the great difference between him and the others being, that he makes no secret of his exclusiveness, but deprives every other church of the title of a church, and consigns every other denomination save his own to the uncovenanted mercies of God. What, then, is the true Catholicity? We know not. It will be developed with the prevalence of the Spirit of Christ, which will at length burn up all the wood, hay, and stubble, and change our violent and despotic caricatures of the body of Christ into his own glorious body. We know not. But this we know, that as yet, if any sect profess exclusively to have it, that profession is a mark that it is not there. To what extremes will not this spirit of Jesuitism lead even a devout mind! We see in Oxford a man, said

to be of marked, irreproachable piety, whose idea of the church is simply and solely that of the church of England, her baptismal regeneration, thirty-nine articles, hierarchy, prelacy, establishment, all ; and his utmost aspirations after the prevalence of Christ's kingdom, are the spread and power of that English church and its ordinances ! True Catholicity will be the last and most precious fruit of the Spirit on earth. They who now and exclusively pretend to it, are more clearly on the way to the Rome that now is, than to the Jerusalem which is above, which is the mother of us all.

There are but two things with which we can successfully combat popery, and these two are love and faith ; love against its bigotry, faith against its form. Love will conquer, when nothing else can ; and formalism cannot prevail, where faith is in active operation. A simple desire for the glory of God and the good of souls, simplicity and singleness of purpose for the world's conversion—this will conquer popery, and nothing else will.

We sometimes think that one of the greatest differences between this and the eternal world, will be the simplicity of that world, and of our spirits in it. Simplicity is strength. It was Luther's strength in the first conflict with the papal power. It lay in that one sentence, which carries the whole gospel with it. that justification by faith is the *ARTICULUS STANTIS VEL CADENTIS ECCLESIE*. The great reformer was well nigh inspired, to find out this truth, and to disinter it from the grave of tradition and ceremony under which it lay buried, and to hold it up so that men should see its living glory. For nothing is a greater characteristic of inspiration than this : the seeing of great truths in their simplicity, all extraneous things being cut off. This was what made Christ speak as never man spake ; truth from the bosom of eternity. This was subjectively the inspiration of the Apostles. And there is a sort of inspiration now, or the power of inspiration, in the possession of the mind by one grand truth. This is what the physicians call madness ; but madness is nearly allied to great power and wisdom ; and sure we are, that not only the papists, in Luther's time, but some of the reformers, also, thought that Luther was mad, and this truth of justification by faith, the devil that possessed him.

It is this truth, which many in this age are losing sight of. They are attracted by form and tradition ; they dwell with fondness on what is time-worn and venerable in past dispensations,

instead of the dawn of spirituality in the coming glory of the new. They regard truth as the backward birth of time and the church, instead of the increasing disclosure of God's Providence and Word. They are conservatives in the church of that which is without faith and without vitality, and they seek a unity in the church, which is the spurious figment of ambition and aggrandizement, and not founded on the principle of individual union with Christ. They accustom themselves to designate the blessed reformation itself, as that great "schism" which "shattered the sacramentum unitatis," since which era, "truth has not dwelt simply and securely in any visible tabernacle." They blind themselves to all the lessons which history and experience have taught in regard to the errors of the church of Rome, and especially the tremendous consequences of attaching to tradition the value of inspiration. They renounce the great principle rescued from the grasp of religious despotism by the reformation, of individual study of the Scriptures, with the right of private judgment. And they send us to the drag-net of tradition and the tomes of fathers baptized in pagan philosophy, to see assuredly what the Scriptures do mean. They adopt and praise a system of teaching, which dwells upon the external and ritual parts of religious service, whilst it loses sight of their inner meaning, and spiritual life; and if they do not send us to the seven sacraments of Rome, with prayers for the dead and purgatorial penance for the living, they speak of the simple sacraments of Christ's institution, as containing an intrinsic saving efficacy; as being the only sources of divine grace, to the exclusion of every other, and as constituting the keys of the kingdom of heaven. Thus they teach; and they even hesitate not, distinctly to declare the Lutheran doctrine of justification to be the greatest of all heresies.

All this is portentous: betokening dissolution to the church wherever it prevails. There is a passage in Cowper's *Poems*, which, if the poet could now rise from the dead, he would believe himself to have prophesied when he wrote it:

When nations are to perish in their sins,
'Tis in the church the leprosy begins;
The priest, whose office is, with zeal sincere,
To watch the fountain, and preserve it clear,
Carelessly nods and sleeps upon the brink,
While others poison what the flock must drink:
Or, waking at the call of lust alone,
Infuses lies and errors of his own:

His unsuspecting sheep believe it pure ;
 And, tainted by the very means of cure,
 Catch from each other a contagious spot,
 The foul forerunner of a general rot.
 Then truth is hushed, that heresy may preach,
 And all is trash that reason cannot reach :
 Then God's own image on the soul impressed,
 Becomes a mockery, and a standing jest ;
 And faith, the root whence only can arise
 The graces of a life that wins the skies,
 Loses at once all value and esteem,
 Pronounced by greybeards a pernicious dream.
 Then CEREMONY leads her bigots forth
 Prepared to fight for shadows of no worth :
 While truths on which eternal things depend
 Find not, or hardly find, a single friend.
 As soldiers watch the signal of command,
 They learn to bow, to sit, to kneel, to stand,
 Happy to fill religion's vacant place
 With hollow form, and gesture, and grimace.
 Such, when the Teacher of his church was there,
 People and priest, the sons of Israel were.
 Stiff in the letter, lax in the design
 And import of their oracles divine ;
 Their learning legendary, false, absurd,
 And yet exalted above God's own word :
 They drew a curse from an intended good,
 Puffed up with gifts they never understood.
 He judged them with as terrible a frown
 As if not love, but wrath had brought him down.

We believe that there is to be a great division through the world, between what is of Rome and what is of the gospel ; between what is formal and what is spiritual. If we are not greatly mistaken, all error will be reduced to a singular sort of unity, and Antichrist will be the great towering form, around which its enormous chrystals congregate. That there is such a principle of centralization in error, as well as truth, no one can doubt who believes that the cause and source of error is not so much weakness as sin. The church of Rome owes her supremacy to the despotic unity with which she has pursued the worship of form ; the aggrandizement of the church being the object of her efforts. The disciples of Christ must owe their success in the conflict with Romanism to the power of faith, in the simplicity of their purpose, for the conversion of the soul.

ARTICLE VII.

OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF HEBREW PHILOLOGY.

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DURING the publication of that most noble monument of German learning, industry, and typographical skill, the Hebrew and Chaldee Concordance of Dr. Julius Fürst, there was issued in the year 1838, a work, small in size, but in merit of magnificent proportions, entitled, "*Jesurun, sive Prolegomenon in Concordantias V. T. a Julio Fuerstio editas libri tres.*" Its author, Dr. Franz Delitzsch, who has given many other erudite publications to the world, is the intimate friend and favorite disciple of Dr. Fürst, and is mentioned by him in the Preface to his Concordance, where this work is largely quoted, in the highest terms of affection and respect. The design of the publication, as appears from its title, is to explain and defend the principles on which the learned editor of the Concordance proceeded in the execution of his task, and particularly in the construction of the new and original lexicon which forms its principal feature. There can be little doubt but that the author has enjoyed, throughout, the assistance and concurrence of Dr. Fürst, who speaks of the work as containing a complete exposition of his theory, and of its author as one "*quo nemo adhuc melius mentem meam perspexit, et ad sensum sententiamque meam penitus penetravit.*" The *Jesurun* is divided into three books: the first comprises the history of Hebrew philology from its earliest beginnings down to the present day; the second treats of the value of Jewish tradition, and of the comparison of the language with itself and with its dialects; and the third advocates the comparison of the Hebrew with the Indo-germanic languages, especially the Sanscrit. The following article is a translation of the first book, which, from the lucid order of the narration, the acuteness of its criticism, and the amount of new and valuable information it contains, it is thought will prove an acceptable present to all who are engaged in the critical study of the Sacred Scriptures, or who feel interested in the history of their interpretation.

It cannot be denied, that the study of the sacred language and of Hebrew literature has made such great progress in the lapse of ages, that if the Church, which now seems almost divested of the adornments of learning, would only strive to turn all these improvements to her own use, and to render them subservient to the cause of divine truth, she might hope to collect and to store up a more plenteous and joyful harvest of fruits than she has ever yet obtained from this source. He who should venture to contradict this, must be regarded as mentally bereft of sight and hearing: he must be blind to the state of things around him, and deaf to the instructive voice of history. Meagre and defective was the knowledge of the Hebrew language which an exceedingly few of the early doctors of the Church (whose names are refulgent with glory from other sources) acquired with immense labor and difficulty from the schools of the Jews. For they were destitute of every aid except the instructions of their Jewish teachers, who then made use among themselves of the modern Hebrew, a language greatly differing from the ancient, by reason of the corruptions introduced into it from foreign tongues, and who had not yet learned to treat the sacred language grammatically, or to make a proper distinction between it and the deteriorated modern idiom. Hence it arose, that such an acquaintance with the Hebrew as the Fathers of the Church were enabled with much painstaking to acquire, was founded on the Jewish method, in itself imperfect and hard to be understood, and unaccompanied by even a moderate acquaintance with the grammar and history of the language.

Now it is certain, that however a people, guided as it were by a subtle and secret instinct, may excel in the practical use of their own language, it always remains to them something mysterious and inexplicable until, turning it from its mere subjective use into an object of contemplation, they begin to ascertain its principles and to preserve its purity, by comparing it with other languages, and analyzing the laws on which its structure depends. Who does not know how egregiously Plato (see only his *Cratylus*) and he among the Jews who most resembles him, Philo of Alexandria, blunder in the exposition of their mother-tongues? so much so in fact, that one can hardly tell whether they are in jest or in earnest! So too among the Romans, do not M. Terentius Varro and the old jurists, when attempting to give the etymons of Latin words, which they not

unfrequently do in the Digests,—we say, do not these men, certainly grave and sober enough at other times, seem then to be laboring under a sort of serio-ludicrous hallucination? And such is the case with the talmudical doctors, who must be allowed to have been profoundly versed in the speaking and writing of Hebrew: as soon as they attempt to explain the laws of construction or the formation of the language, they descend at once to the most ridiculous fancies. The reason is, they had no knowledge of grammar, which was not cultivated as a science till some centuries after; their only guide was nature, which, although it gave them a kind of instinctive knowledge of the causes and analogies of the language, could not enable them to furnish a rational and satisfactory explanation thereof to others. It is true that in the talmudic writings there is manifested a most acute and subtle appreciation of the laws of grammar, not indeed openly and clearly stated, but wrapped up in the intricacies of the Midrash, which is in a great measure *grammatical* and *masoretical*; yet even those remarks whose correctness grammatical science has since confirmed, are the result rather of natural tact than of a scientific application of the reasoning powers.

Hence, it is evident how superficial must have been that acquaintance with the Hebrew which the early Fathers of the Church obtained from the Jews of the talmudic age; for, as they neither did nor could possess that incommunicable intuitiveness by which the Jews themselves in a manner divined the formation and laws of the language, their knowledge was merely traditional or conjectural, loose and vague; and they were preserved from more dangerous defects only by the analogy of their religious belief. Nevertheless, the undying gratitude of the Church is due to the exertions of Origen and Jerome, as the men who transplanted the seeds and offshoots of the holy language from the Jewish nurseries into the garden of the Church, and who with admirable industry laid the first foundation of Hebrew learning in the minds of Christendom. *Origen* (born about 185, died 253), on being smitten with the desire of learning the sacred tongue, journeyed into Palestine to visit the famous monuments of Jewish antiquity, and to examine and if possible obtain some Hebrew manuscripts; he here availed himself of the instruction and assistance of learned Jews, among others of the patriarch Jullus, with whom it appears he became intimately acquainted. *Jerome* (b. 331, d. 420) continued to

an extreme old age a most ardent student of the Hebrew ; and from the time when in early youth he lived alone with a Christian Jew and learned the first elements of the language, he spared neither labor, study, nor expense, but toiled unceasingly through all opposing difficulties, to acquire a thorough knowledge of the "Hebrew verity." On returning to Jerusalem from Egypt, he placed himself under the instruction of one Bar-Chanina, (whom Rufinus contemptuously calls Barabbas,) a man of singular learning, as is evident from his pupil, and who, induced by a large reward, was wont to receive the latter into his house by night, to avoid the enmity of his own people. Jerome also associated with himself, in the work of translating and expounding the Scriptures, some of the most learned of the Jews, whose ability he speaks highly of, as in his epistles to Damasus. In fact, he estimated the importance of Jewish learning and the authority of Jewish tradition much more highly than his contemporaries ; in consequence of which, although he affected to be carrying on a controversy with the Jews, he acquired the censure and the enmity of many, even of St. Augustine himself, who knew not that the Punic and the Hebrew were the same language. "Memini," says he, in his preface to Job, "me ob intelligentiam hujus voluminis Lyddæum quendam præceptorem, qui apud Hebræos primus haberi putabatur, non parvis redemisse nummis, cujus doctrina an aliquid profecerim, nescio." And again, in his preface to the Book of Chronicles, he says, "Cum literis a me nuper flagitassetis, ut vobis Paralipomenon latino sermone transferrem, de Tiberiade legis quendam doctorem, qui apud Hebræos admirationi habebatur, assumpsi et contuli cum eo a vertice, ut aiunt, usque ad extremum unguem." When, being already advanced in years, he desired to undertake the study of the Chaldee language, he again had recourse to the Synagogue, and placed himself under the instruction of a Jew who was well versed in both languages ; following in this the example of Origen, whose doctrinal errors he rejected.

By pursuing this method of study, Jerome became the most erudite and learned doctor of the ancient Church, being able to excel Origen by the fact that the schools of Palestine were in his own time in a more flourishing condition.* There was, indeed, a great similarity and equality in the state of Hebrew studies in the Syna-

* I. G. Carpzov, *Critica Sacra* VI. § 2.

gogue and in the Church, in the time of the talmudic writers; and if this fact had been recognised by Joh. Clericus, that envious disparager of the Fathers, he would have made use of other weapons against Martianay in his *Questiones Hieronymianæ*.^{*} Indeed, after a careful examination of the works of Jerome, I can safely affirm, that he has gathered with such care and taste into the treasury of the Church whatever of most precious the Synagogue had to offer, that, next to the Talmud itself, his writings form the best source whence to derive a knowledge of ancient Jewish tradition; although it is true, that the skill in the Hebrew language which Origen and Jerome acquired from their Jewish instructors was, in accordance with the times, defective, and partook of the corruptions of the talmudic dialect, which presented as it were a rude image of the ancient Hebrew. The Church moreover in succeeding ages, as we shall see hereafter, continued in her Hebrew studies to follow in the footsteps of the Synagogue, which had been divinely constituted the guardian, not only of the sacred volume in its original form, but also of the Hebrew language itself. Consequently those Fathers of the Church who possess any knowledge of the Hebrew, attribute it to the Synagogue; and this knowledge, although turned by them from a profane to a sacred use, is never superior to that of their instructors, but on the contrary is usually more rude, more imperfect, and rarely can be said to equal it. Hence in the works of the older Fathers that agreement with the tradition of the antiquated Synagogue, and that preconceived mode of exposition not founded on argument, which perhaps the further it is removed from grammatical rules is so much the more likely to have hit on the truth;—hence those ridiculous etymologies, that idle trifling in the comparison of languages, and those attempts at explaining Greek proper names from the Hebrew;^{*}—hence that mixture of the modern with the ancient tongue,†

^{*} See the second part of Origen's book *de Nominiibus*, inserted in Opp. Hieron. by Martianay, but swarming with errors; e. g. *Κολοσαῖς* (= קרל עשוי פאנץ גענומען), *καλωνία* (= גליון ἀποκαλυμμένη). Comp. Philo I. p. 57. *Μ. Αἰθιοπία* (= חזקוניא, עשׂיח טאפֿעלונס), b. Taanit f. 20. *Νικόδημος* (חמור שנקרה חמור בעבורו, from נקד).

† As *Satanās*, comp. of Aram. טשא and Heb. נחש *serpens apostata* (*Irenæus*, in Dial. c. Tryphone); אשר = παιδεία from mod. Heb. אשר (*Origen ad Matt.* 18: 19); טיני *tentatio æterna et odium*,

that resemblance in grammatical terminology, the not understanding of which has caused Clericus to detract greatly from the honor due to the Fathers; and finally that *midrashic* volubility which took its rise partly from the fact that they as well as the doctors of the Talmud were (as is evident from their vacillating pronunciation)* destitute of the masoretic punctuation, whose invention is an enigma more obscure than Plato's number, and the want of which gave rise to a multitude of monstrous forms. Whatever they knew of the Hebrew language they had learned from the Jews, by whom it was still employed, in like manner as a traveller, passing through the borders of a foreign country, partially acquires its language and afterwards forgets it. Of grammatical principles they, as well as the native scholars, were ignorant; and, making use of the language for no other purpose than to explain the Scriptures, they give themselves no concern respecting its laws or internal analogies. The cognate languages, as the Punic and Syriac, which some of them were acquainted with, they knew not how to use, and hence were forced to depend entirely on Jewish tradition; this they are wont to follow in accordance with the analogy of faith, and if they occasionally desert it, they are apt to fall into absurdity. Hence we are justified in terming this the *lowest* stage of the Hebrew language in the Church.

In what may be called its *middle* stage, the study of Hebrew literature made less progress than might have been expected from these preparatives; and we here behold the Synagogue pressing forward with rapid strides, while the Church lags at a languid pace behind. The Jews in the time of the Geonim, being impelled thereto by an emulation of the Arabian scholars, returned to the study of the liberal arts and sciences, and applied themselves to grammatical investigations, which had received a new impulse in the ninth century. In this respect they far excelled the Arabians, inasmuch as they did

from Aram. סני, סני (Cyprian Opp. p. 459 Rigalt; comp. b. Sabbath. f. 58. (מאי דר סיני דר שידדו שנאח לאח עליו); prius = Aram. מן-אילת (Jerome ad Gen. 28: 19).

* Thus Jerome, in epist. ad Evangelum (II. p. 570. Par.): "Nec refert utrum *Salem* an *Salim* nominetur, cum vocalibus in medio literis perraro utantur Hebræi, et *pro voluntate lectorum ac varietate regionum* eadem verba diversis sonis atque accentibus pronuncientur."

not treat the Hebrew as a solitary language, separate from the Aramaic and Arabic, but embraced the whole Shemitish family in their researches.* Already had *Judah ben-Karish* (about 880) revived the study of the Targums, which in the increasing spread of the Arabic language had become neglected, and demonstrated by ingeniously selected examples the use of both the Aramaic and Arabic in the illustration of the Hebrew. How long ago, too, by the labors of *Saadias* of Fayum (d. 942), was the doctrine of the roots, the forms, and the points of the sacred language explained in works written in Hebrew and

* We find no use made by the Arabs of comparisons either with the Shemitish or with other languages. Their labors in the investigation of their mother-tongue were so extensive and profound, that, restricted to it as they were by their religious scruples, they did not pass beyond its bounds. Hence in their productions they constantly betray their ignorance of the cognate languages; and the etymologies of Hebrew names given in the Koran rarely even approach the truth. They knew more of the Aramaic than of the Hebrew, as the Jews dwelling in Arabia and in the neighboring countries made use of the Aramaic until they acquired the Arabic language; so that when a word is called *Hebrew* by Arabian writers, it is usually *Aramaic*. But the few words which they accidentally became acquainted with, however closely resembling the Arabic in form and meaning, they were incapable of using in the prosecution of further comparisons with the Hebrew or Arabic. For whatever presented a similarity to the Arabic language, seemed to them to have degenerated from the perfect model of their native tongue; which God himself, as well as the angels and saints that dwell in paradise, were feigned to speak. They held that the entire knowledge both of the materials and structure of their language was to be drawn from the ante-mohammedan poems and traditions, the Koran, the traditions of Islam called *Hadith*, and lastly from the pure domestic and native speech of the Bedouins. If any one had attempted to deduce a knowledge of the language from any other source, he would doubtless have been looked upon as heretical. They scarcely even dreamed of what might have been done for the elucidation of their language by internal comparison alone; there are indeed a few specimens in the commentaries of Beidhawi of what may be effected in this way, but they are scarcely the first beginnings of this important matter. The above has been kindly and liberally furnished me by H. L. Fleischer, the light and ornament of our University.

Arabic, and made use of in translating and expounding the sacred volume! Another distinguished individual was *Judah ibn-Chayuj*, of Fez, called also *Abu Zekeriya*, who is justly styled the Father of Hebrew Grammar, and who, opposing the license of the elder grammarians, was the first that confined within certain limits the theory of verbal roots, and confirmed the doctrine of their triliteral form. A little of his learning found its way into the Church; but wonderfully perverted, and in no wise improved upon, much less perfected. He is followed by a host of distinguished grammarians, among whom are the well known names of *Abulwalid Merwan ibn-Ganah*, the author of seven books of grammar; *Samuel Nagid*, who left twenty-two books; *Moses Gecatilia*,[†] *Jakob Elazari*, *Ibn-Ezra*, the *Tibonidæ*, and the *Kimchis*.*

But we are ashamed to confess that the Church, in which the written word of God was becoming daily of less esteem, left the grammatical works of the Jews, from which in her lack of other aids she might have derived the greatest benefit, completely untouched. Indeed, the less the holy Scriptures were had in honor, the less were Hebrew studies prosecuted; so that when any applied themselves to them for controversial purposes, they were found unequal to the Jews in point of skill. In the time of Charlemagne, the Hebrew language was indeed publicly taught by the Emperor's orders, but the experiment was not attended with much success, nor was it persevered in. The study of the Oriental languages, which had sunk under the barbarism of ages, found a champion in the great Frederic II., the son of Henry VI. and Constantia, daughter of the king of Sicily, who undertook an expedition to Palestine in 1228, and, having conquered Jerusalem and a great part of Syria, brought back into Europe, among the richest of the spoils taken from the Orientals, a number of Hebrew and Arabic manuscripts.† Of those in Arabic, he had many translated into Latin by the scholars of Bologna, and into Hebrew by one *Jacobus Anatolius*, a Jew; but this latter was so wedded heart and soul to the Arabic, and with it to the religion of Islam, that he was unable to do much for the restoration of Hebrew learning, especially in

* S. David Luzzatto, *Prolegomeni ad una Grammatica Ragionata della lingua Ebraica*. (Padova, 1836.) p. 26. ss.

† Cuspinian. de Cæsaribus, p. 419. Boxhorn, *Hist. Univers.* p. 779. Carionis Chron. p. 517.

the rude and benighted age in which he lived. Thus the Church suffered several centuries to elapse, in which to her shame and disgrace, while the power of the Roman pontiffs kept continually increasing, the study of letters was neglected and laid prostrate, and even the remembrance of the Hebrew gradually faded away and become extinct.

Yet, even in these wretched and lamentable times, the knowledge of the Hebrew language in the Church received some additions. For even in the tenth and eleventh centuries, a wonderful series of events imposed on the Church the necessity of providing against harm to herself, from her ignorance of Oriental letters. The descendants of the Moors and the Saracens, who were bound up in the Mohammedan superstition, had now long held possession of Spain, and had reduced it almost completely under their sway. Nor less great was the concourse of Jews who had collected there from the time of Adrian, and whose number was continually augmented by the arrival of those who, driven out of their settlements in Babylonia, sought a refuge in the West. Both of these classes turned their whole energies to the study of theology, medicine, and the philosophy of language; while in the Church the cultivation of polite letters was entirely given up and abolished. Their distinguished erudition left the Church ages behind, and armed them with an almost incalculable power against her, sunk as she was in ignorance and barbarism. Their singular industry caused them also greatly to excel the Christian clergy in a knowledge of the arts and sciences; so that, in their encounters with Christians, who were ignorant both of philosophy and philology, they were wont to bear away the palm. The Christians, therefore, lest they should become the sport and ridicule of their enemies, and suffer from the mouths and pens of those whose swords they had already so severely felt, now turned their attention to those branches of learning in which they found that their enemies excelled. They applied themselves, accordingly, to philosophy and physics, and also, that they might be a match for the impiety of the Mussulmans and the obstinacy of the Jews, to the languages of both these people. And now again, as in former times, the Church was compelled to have recourse to the Synagogue. She did not, however, employ the aid of Jews remaining in connexion with the Synagogue to prove the way to the requisition of the Hebrew, but of proselytes who come over to her,—the most of whom, however, appear to have been but little skilled in the

language and literature of their forefathers. *Raymundus de Penna Forti*, a Dominican (b. 1175, d. 1275) of the convent of Toledo, 1250, in consequence of magnificent rewards offered by the kings of Arragon and Castile, proposed to his colleagues that they should begin to study the languages of the Moors and Jews; and also instituted an Oriental Seminary, at the royal expense, that a knowledge of these languages might thus be brought into the Church. *Raymundus Martini*, a Catalonian (b. 1236), a celebrated defender of the Church, was at this time superintendent of one of the Oriental schools; he studied with one Paul, a convert, who, in 1263 and again in 1264, obtained the favor of the king in a contest at the court of Barcelona with Nachmen of Gerona, and was the first since the time of Jerome who can be considered as at all learned in the Hebrew.

At the commencement of the fourteenth century, Clemens V. endeavored to reinstate the institutions of Raymond de Penna and the kings of Spain, which, either through the carelessness of the times or the want of means, had been suffered to sink into neglect. In the Council of Vienna, in 1311, he published a decree *that in every university there should be established six professors of the Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic languages*, and this for the same purpose as formerly, namely, that the Church might thus be able either to repulse her enemies or to win them over to herself. On the promulgation of this pontifical decree, which was repeated and confirmed in the Council of Basle, the doctors of the Church, who, after their many vain attempts, had not yet mastered the language, had again recourse to the aid of Jewish proselytes; but as the Church had of late obtained but few of these, and still fewer who could be called men of learning, it was found impossible to appoint a single professor of the Hebrew for two entire centuries in any university, if we except a solitary one at Oxford.* But finally in the fifteenth century, when learning began gradually to revive, and the decree of Vienna was renewed, many, stimulated thereto by the Jews who had adopted the profession of Christianity, applied themselves to the study of the Hebrew language. The number of converts indeed in this century was much greater than in the preceding one and among them there occur to us some who were rather distin-

* Ulrich, *De Linguae Ebraicæ inter Christianos ante Reuchlinum cultu*, Halæ 1751. Reinhard, *De Fatis Studii Hebræo-Biblici inter Christianos*, Vitembergæ 1721.

guished in that dark age, as *Hieronymus de S. Fide*, *Paulus Burgensis*, *Alphonsus de Spina*, *Paulus de Heredia*, and *Liber-tas Cominetus*, celebrated for his knowledge of fourteen languages. It must be owned, however, that the Christians of that age pushed their Hebrew studies no further than as they might subserve the purposes of controversy. Their studies were entirely of a polemical character; that is, they were undertaken for the sake of defending and propagating the doctrines of the Church; and very rarely was an acquaintance cultivated with the Hebrew for its own sake, or for the elucidation of Holy Writ. The Synagogue, on the other hand, had labored since the times of Origen and Jerome, with the profoundest learning and most admirable industry, in the investigation of its language; and had produced such an abundance of grammatical treatises, as might have well supplied all the wants of the Church. The older grammarians had been followed by a number of eminent men, who amplified and in many respects completed, according to the principles of the Spanish or Italian school, what their predecessors had so happily begun. To the older works were added in this age, the lexicons of *Solomon Parchon** (commonly called *Machberet*, *Aruk*, or *Sepher Shorashim*), of *Nathan Jehiel*, a native of Rome, of *David Kimchi*, and *Josef Caspe* (about 1300), who made use of all the Shemitish dialects. Hebrew-Arabic, Hebrew-French,† Hebrew-German, and Hebrew-Italian glossaries, arranged either alphabetically or according to the books of Scripture, besides works on grammar, were composed by *Samuel Benvenasti* (about 1300), *Peripot Duran Efodi*, *Immanuel Romi*, *Salomo ben-Aba Mare Jarchi*, *Messer Leon*, *David Ibn-Yahya*, and many others, whose very names are to this day unknown to the Church.

The rising sun of grammatical learning which appeared in Persia, passed over in its course to Africa and to Spain, and, illuminating with its radiance the remotest countries of the earth, penetrated even to Germany, where the *Nakdani*,‡ awak-

* Born in the maritime town of Calatayud (Bilbilis Nova); he wrote at Salerno 1161, Cod. de Rossi 764, 1038.

† Pococke, *Porta Mosis*, p. 18. Cod. Paul. Lips. 102., fol. Ross. 1109.

* ‡ Among these was Simson ha-Nakdan, whose grammatical work is preserved entire in the Bibl. Paulina at Leipsic, in a MS. written on parchment (No. 102*). It is composed en-

ing from the sleep of former ages, and disregarding the adverse state of the times, gave themselves up to grammatical and critical studies. The Church, however, remained wrapped in deep slumber, resting content with her slender borrowed stock of Hebrew knowledge, with which she considered herself sufficiently furnished for combat with her enemies. The Sacred Scriptures, whose guardian and interpreter she ought to have been, she did not hold in sufficient estimation to strive on their account for the acquisition of a profounder knowledge of the holy tongue. Is it not indeed wonderful that *Nicolas de Lyra*, of Normandy, who, moreover, is considered by some to have been a converted Jew (d. 1341), was the first among Christian authors since the time of Origen and Jerome, who, in imitation of the Jews, especially of Solomon Isaaki, made use of a knowledge of the Hebrew for the interpretation of Scripture? Is it not a reproach and disgrace to the Church, that nearly five hundred years after the golden age of grammatical science among the Jews, *Johannes Reuchlin* should have compiled the first dictionary and grammar at all worthy of the name (1506),* and by which he fancied he had erected to himself a "monumentum ære perennius"? Reuchlin studied at Vienna under Jakob Jehiel Loans, physician to the Emperor, and at Rome under Obadia Sforno; he was also liberally assisted by Joh. Beham, a minister of Ulm, who had obtained several grammatical works from the Jews of that place, before they were expelled from it, and had caused them to be translated. He borrowed from the Jews every thing taught by him, even to their terminology, and not excepting a

tirely on the principles of the Spanish school, and is a carefully digested performance, exhibiting a skilful use of the most distinguished grammarians of Spain and France, (among others of אברהם בן-יהושע fol. 1 a., and Josef Chazan of Troyes, fol. 69 b.); the latter part of the work is truly excellent, expounding masoretically the doctrine of the vowels and accents, which is founded on the Masora and the best MSS.

* It is unnecessary to notice particularly the attempts in this line of *Petrus Niger*, a Dominican Monk (*Rudimenta Linguae Hebraicæ* c. 1450 ms. Paris), and of *Conrad Pellican*, who is said, in the *Chronicles of Neustadt*, to have studied under Elias Levita (*De modo legendi et intelligendi Hebræa*, Basileæ 1503). Reuchlin either did not know or would not notice them.

little of the Cabala! I wish not to remark on the indolence of the Church, shown in the fact that *Santes Pagninus*, an Italian Dominican who flourished shortly after Reuchlin, was the first since Jerome that translated the whole Hebrew Bible into Latin (1527), assisted by Kimchi's *Liber Radicum*, which however he badly understood throughout. It is much more pleasing to dwell on the circumstance, that the study of the Hebrew was somewhat promoted in this age also, and that the Church, instead of retrograding in this respect, continued, although only tardily and by degrees, to make some steps in advance. For she not only began to make use of the grammatical and lexicographical knowledge of the Synagogue, but, desirous of convincing the Jews out of their own books, felt compelled also to examine the writings of the Rabbins, which had been incredibly increased since the times of the Fathers, who maintain a profound silence respecting them. This will be made sufficiently obvious by a comparison of the *Dialogus* of Justin Martyr with the *Pugio Fidei*, which exhibits an excellent and rare knowledge of Jewish literature.

¶ We thus perceive how the Hebrew language, until the Reformation, was confined within the walls of the Synagogue, and how very few there were, in the meantime, that endeavored by their private studies to bring it into the possession of the Church. Fifteen centuries had elapsed, and scarcely a beginning was made towards introducing into it a knowledge of the Hebrew; but on the revival of the study of the Sacred Scriptures, which took place at the period of the Reformation, it began in consequence to be studied with great diligence both by Protestants and Romanists, as appears in the instance of *Thomas Cajetan* (d. 1535), who, after an unsuccessful controversy with Luther, applied himself to the study of the language, assisted by a learned Jew whom he supported and rewarded in various ways. The question then arises, in what way did the Hebrew language, in this its *third* stage, obtain a footing in the Church, and by what means was the latter enabled to acquire and to propagate this knowledge? The Church, it must be answered, seems by no means to have selected the most appropriate mode for the attainment of this object. It trusted to the teaching partly of those who had not themselves studied under Jews, or of illiterate converts, such as *Johannes Böschenstein*, *Antonius Margarita*, and others, whom I hesitate not to pronounce rude

and ignorant men, without judgment and without taste;* and partly to that of Jews, whose knowledge of their language was as slender as it was profitable to them in a pecuniary point of view, as for instance *Elias Levita* (b. 1472, d. 1549), who, from a mediocre and slightly esteemed grammarian among his own people,† became a distinguished oracle of the Church, of such weighty authority that his groundless conjecture respecting the origin of the Masoretic and Tiberian punctuation, (entirely opposed as it is to the genius of the learning of Palestine, to the pronunciation of the school of Tiberias, and to the character of the Masorites,) was sufficient to lead Lud. Capellus, Joh. Morinus, and others, into the most futile opinions. Moreover, hardly had the Church been able to convert to its own use a little of the tradition and instruction of the Synagogue, and to understand Kimchi's *Michlol* well enough to employ it for the purpose of compilation,—hardly had the *Buxtorfs* planted those trees which, if sedulously watered, might have borne fruit to a succeeding age, —when there arose some who rejected the authority of their Jewish masters, and substituted absurdities concocted from their own brains instead. Among these were *Joh. Forster* (d. 1556), a pupil, strange to say, of Reuchlin, *Samuel Bohle* (d. 1639), and one *Bibliander*, who all seized upon the over-bold opinions expressed by Luther, as to the recent invention of the points, the corrupt state of the text, and the worthlessness and even injurious tendency of the Jewish writings; but who seemed to have forgotten his opinion in the case of Pfefferkorn, and with how much modesty he owned that the Kimchis had solved the difficulty for him.

* Among the more learned of the converts who taught Hebrew in the Romish Church, about the time of the Reformation, are to be reckoned *Alfonsus Zamora* (*Vocabularium* 1514, 1526), *Paulus Paradisi*, a Venitian, who was invited into France by Francis I. (*De modo legendi Hebraice*, Paris 1534), and *Gulielmus Franchi* (ששון וקראש Sole della Lingua Santa, Bergam. 1591, 99, 1603. *Alphabetum Hebraicum*, Rom. 1596.)

† *Elias Levita's* reputation appears to have arisen from the fact of his writing in a style easier to be understood, and more adapted to the occidental taste. But I confess I do not comprehend on what grounds it is affirmed that this *Elias* brought the grammatical system of the Jews to perfection, and that the more distinguished grammarians who followed him are of no account. (*Gesenius, Geschichte der heb. Sprache* § 32.)

The Church was still an infant in the knowledge of Hebrew, when, on account of the errors she considered herself to have imbibed with her nurse's milk, she came to the conclusion that she needed no further nutriment or support from that quarter; and although hitherto her whole knowledge of the Hebrew had been derived from the tradition of the Synagogue, she conceived that she had now obtained possession of the language in her own right, and consequently set about the composing of grammars and the interpretation of Scripture for herself. Into what and how many errors, and into what vain and fruitless labors our grammarians were led, by this haughty boasting, it would be painful to recount. The ignorance that accompanied this early stage of the study caused them to mangle the Hebrew like a subject long since dead, and to fancy that any further instruction was superfluous. Hence arose a multitude of ridiculous systems and hypotheses, into which they would never have fallen had they esteemed more highly the teachings of the Synagogue, and examined its grammatical productions with greater care. Hence there crept into their lexicography that sort of superstitious divination and logical subtlety in the definition and derivation of words, over which the reigning philosophical and dogmatical systems had such influence, that the lexicon of Santes Pagninus is preferable to Stockius's *Clavis*; hence, too, originated those obscure and perplexing arcana that gave during whole centuries such trouble and disgust to learners, the *Cubus et Quadratum Grammaticum* of *Elias Hütter* (1590), and that *Systema Morarum* invented by *Jac. Alting* (d. 1699), and completed by *J. A. Danz* (d. 1727), on which many down to our own times have fruitlessly expended so much time and labor. To this source, also, are to be attributed those vain lucubrations respecting the rhythm and metre of Scripture, and that almost incredible number of treatises on the accents, all and every one of which were equally laborious in the undertaking and bootless in the execution. But that I may no further transgress the bounds of this third stage of the language, suffice it to say, once for all, that whatever is sound and historically proven in the grammatical exegesis of this orthodox age, is owing to the Synagogue, while the rest is to be attributed to their own presumption. Yet it is certainly the case, that Hebrew studies made some progress even during this slight use of the teachings of the Synagogue. For although Jewish literature was attended to for the most part only for polemical purposes, and their

ability to understand, not to speak of criticising it, was very imperfect; still the Church did in a manner lay open the way to its recesses, and formed some judgment of what and how much it contained that might be converted to her own use. The violence of controversy did much to obscure her vision, unskillfulness in the modern Hebrew gave rise to frequent misconceptions, and the defective state of history and criticism produced many crude opinions; still the Church, although she has since entirely neglected this study, produced some excellent things, and has prepared the way for us by some admirable works, such as those of the Buxtorfs, whenever we may undertake to remodel or complete what she has begun.

Towards the close of the sixteenth century, the *fourth* stage of Hebrew studies commenced, in which the Shemitish dialects, as well as the other Oriental languages that had become known to the Romish missionaries, began to be sedulously investigated and compared with the Hebrew, as the Greek and Latin had been before. This was done with great learning and with still greater industry in *V. Schindler's* pentaglot lexicon (1612), in *Joh. Fr. Nicolai's* harmonic lexicon (1670), and especially in the heptaglot lexicon of *Edm. Castell* (1669); to these were added a number of harmonic grammars, in which it was customary to join to the Shemitish dialects languages of a totally different character, as the Persian. This comparison could not however make up for the neglect of Jewish tradition, especially as it was merely external, and depended on conjectures arising from a resemblance in the form and meaning of words, and not on any fixed principles. Still the Church now for the first time perceived the comparison of the Shemitish languages to be a powerful aid in the investigation of the Hebrew—one which the Synagogue in former days had begun to make use of, but had latterly in a great measure neglected. For *David Provenzale* compared only the classical and Romance languages; *Salomo ben-Melek*, where he compares the Arabic, borrows for the most part from Abulwalid; and most of the others either confine themselves exclusively to tradition, as did those great masters of the masoretic art, *Menahem Lonzano* and *Salomo Yedidya Norzi*, or else they undertake to explain the Hebrew out of itself, assisted only by a comparison with the modern Hebrew and Aramaic, of which class were *Abraham Velmezi* or Balmes, *Mose Provenzale*, and *Mose Lebubi*. The following, who were preceded by many grammarians both of the Spanish and Italian

schools,* composed the rules of grammar in verse, viz: *Immanuel Benevento*, *Samuel Archivolti*, *David de Pomis*, *Juda Carpentorasi*, *Salomo Oliveyra*, *Sabatai Prenslau*, *Isaak Samueli Posnani*, and *Salomo Hanau*, to whom, truth obliges me to confess, none of our own grammarians in that age are to be compared. It was very detrimental to the Church, that in pursuing her Hebrew studies she continued to despise all intercourse with the Synagogue; this is sufficiently evident from the fact that those who have of late written on the history of Hebrew grammar, have not been able even to name any one Jewish grammarian later than *Elias Levita*, whose *Masoret ha-Masoret* was published in a wretched German translation (1772) by *J. Salomo Semler*, a person of very slender pretensions. In fact there were not wanting men who rejected the comparison of the dialects and ancient versions, considering the Hebrew as so sufficient for its own explanation, that light derived from any other source would tend rather to obscure than to illustrate it; among these was *Jac. Gussetius* (d. 1704), who deceived himself with the idea that the ancient Hebrew could be explained by the mere comparison of passages and a studious observation of the analogies of the language. To him must be added *Casp. Neumann* (d. 1715) and *Val. Loescher* (*De causis Linguae Hebraeae*, 1706), the former of whom attributed to each letter a certain hieroglyphic or symbolic signification, and the latter a logical value. They both agree that the triliteral stems proceed from *biliteral roots*† (called by *Neumann characteres significationis*, and by *Loescher semina vocum*), and that their signification results from the innate force of these binary compounds. This hypothesis gained such currency, that there exist perpetual commen-

* Among these was *Rabenu Tam* (d. 1171), of whom we possess a poem consisting of forty strophæ on the laws of the accents, and which contains by way of acrostic the name of *Jakob bar-Meir* (MS. in bibl. Ross. no. 563), and of *Mark Sam. Girondi* (Luzzatto, *Prolegomeni*, p. 28), whose grammatical work is contained in the preceding part of the MS., and is entitled *שקל נקוד*, which, as well as the *ספר ירידות* of *Josef Chazan* of Troyes, follows the principles of the Italian school, and exhibits a total ignorance of the theory of *Juda Chayuj*, as does also the work of *Salomo Isaaki*.

† See *Jo. Engestroom*, *Tentamen graduale de Hebræorum primitivis biliteris*, Londini Scand. 1738.

taries on the Scriptures, in which the meaning of the more difficult words is deduced in a most ridiculous manner from the aggregate power of the several letters. Still, the error of these men is deserving of our respect, both because it proceeded from a veneration for Scripture, and because by these first attempts they promoted the study of the comparison of the language with itself, which they felt to be a most efficacious instrument for its investigation. They attempted, in fact, to divide the indissoluble germs and as it were atoms of language, and to ascertain wherefore they had this or that meaning—in a word, to lay bare the innermost mysteries of human speech. This they undertook to perform, not in the *historical* manner, that is, by proceeding from the external (of which they knew but little) to the internal, but after the *ideal* method, that is, by precipitate conclusions from the internal, which they fancied their conjectures had reached, to the external.

Against Gussetius, who extolled internal comparison to the skies, and against *J. Drusius* (d. 1616), and in fact all who consider Jewish literature as of any value for the explanation of the Scriptures, arose *Alb. Schultens* (d. 1750), an author of the Belgic school, with whom, according to our reckoning, the *fifth* age of Hebrew studies began. He attacked Jewish tradition in the most furious manner, declaring that all who favored it were infected with the plague; he also endeavored, not simply by vehement language, but as it were with the very thunders and lightnings of eloquence, to level before him all who, imbued with the errors of the foul Synagogue, maintained the Hebrew to be a sacred and primeval language. "O incredibiles excessus," exclaims he, in the Preface to his Arabic Grammar, "in quos magna etiam ingenia, fulgore *Linguae et Scripturae Sanctae* delusa, abierunt! O tristia, adhuc quidem, fata literaturae hebraicae! quae ex longa captivitate per reformationem sacrorum educta, graviora mox sentire coepit vincula, atque sub *Rabbinorum* auctoritate avecta est in Babyloniam judaicam, ut *Christianorum* quoque doctorum opera ac manu commodis subserviat Synagogae in *Epha* sua!" These phillipics one could pardon, had he contented himself with refuting the really blameable errors of his predecessors, and had not passed over from the Jews to the Moslems. Among the Oriental languages which began to be treated both grammatically and lexicographically in connexion with the Hebrew, and were now brought daily more and more into use for its elucidation, the

Arabic occupied the first place ; and, as the study of the Sacred Scriptures gradually ceased to be the whole aim of the learned, it began to inspire many with a most violent admiration. To this, indeed, no one could object, had they but taken care not to deliver up the holy mother into bondage to her beautiful daughter. But such was the blind zeal with which Schultens combatted for the dignity and authority of the Arabic, that he declares it to be a more lucid language than the Hebrew, not perceiving that, as being of a much later date, it has need of illustration from the Hebrew, rather than the Hebrew from it. These rash opinions were the source of many errors, which were multiplied by his followers to an incredible extent. For these Arabizing Hebraists never thought of inquiring into the age and origin of the Arabic, its primitive relationship to the Hebrew, and the genius and peculiarities of each language, so as to determine more accurately how far the former might properly be employed in elucidating the latter. And thus it happened that the Arabic, a much younger and, through the fault of those who have treated of it, a much obscurer language,—whose grammar before Ewald and whose lexicography to this very day have been merely *empiric*, came to be regarded as a very key of Solomon for unlocking the secret recesses of the sacred tongue. This perverse and inconsiderate system of employing the Arabic became so firmly established and interwoven with Hebrew lexicography and the exegesis of the Old Testament, that even in this our own age it has scarcely been eradicated. Still it cannot be denied that, notwithstanding the errors of this period, an evident progress was made in Hebrew studies. Albert Schultens, the founder of the *hyper-arabizing* school, was also the parent of the *comparative* study of Hebrew. This is vastly different from the *harmonic* method of former times, its object being, as he himself well observes, “that these studies, which now are in an almost perishing condition, may again be made to flourish and to bring forth fruit more and more abundantly ; that we may not be content with saluting the thresholds of the dialects, or with remaining stationary in the outer halls thereof, but may force our way even to their innermost chambers ; in order that through this deeper and more intimate acquaintance with them, we may clearly perceive their *harmony* and truly sisterly connexion, whereby they constitute and represent *one body of primeval language* ; and that the true genius of the *Hebrew dialect*, with its ancient riches and admirable gifts, may shine forth from

the candlestick of the Church, and clear up with its gladdening light whatever of obscurity yet remains." This praiseworthy aim he indeed pursued, but did not attain; for, he made no distinction between *dialectic* and *exotic* comparison,* and the former he circumscribed within the narrow bounds of the Arabic language, altogether neglecting the Chaldee, and but rarely using the Jewish commentaries; while his disciples, who made the Arabic their sole oracle, left them entirely untouched.

If we now look back upon the several stages of the study of Hebrew which I have briefly described, we perceive that no aid to the investigation of the language was left undiscovered or unemployed, although many errors and abuses accompanied these first attempts. Our forefathers (to whose memory a reverence is due far higher than mere learning can command) have left us eternal monuments of immense erudition and stupendous industry: they laid many sources of knowledge open to us, and prepared the way for those advances which either have been or yet remain to be made; much they foresaw which they could not themselves accomplish,—and, which is by no means to be despised, they have taught us by their own errors what we have to avoid: yet if we suffer ourselves to suppose that they have laid the true foundation for the investigation of the Hebrew language, we are deceived by a superstitious veneration for antiquity. This is in fact a task which could not be accomplished by men who attached no weight to the authority of tradition; who were ignorant of the laws of *internal*, the requirements of *dialectic*, and the bounds of *exotic* comparison; and who, to crown all, knew not the necessary connexion and proper mutual employment of these several aids. The question then arises, What was accomplished in the next ensuing or *sixth* stage of Hebrew studies? We answer, the comparison with languages of the same and of different stocks was certainly carried much further; although in such manner, that the Arabic constantly had the preference over the Aramaic dialects, while the modern Hebrew was totally neglected. The study of Jewish literature sunk into disuse, and was even attacked with the ut-

* By *comparatio dialectica* the writer means the comparison of a language with another of the same stock, as the Hebrew with the Arabic; and by *comparatio exotica*, the comparison with one of a different stock, as the Hebrew with the Sanscrit.—Tr.

most virulence by some, as for instance *J. D. Michaelis* (d. 1791), whose rashness and inconsistency are shown in forcing in Arabic etymologies and even foisting them on the Septuagint. Etymology even in this period was not restricted by certain laws; and the more the boundaries of Oriental learning became increased, the further and wider were these wanderings extended, and the greater was the field laid open for the exercise of a perverse ingenuity. Still it must be owned that Hebrew studies acquired in this stage a degree of solidity and firmness to which they had not before attained. In it arose three distinguished men who are deserving of high praise for their efforts in promoting a knowledge of the Hebrew tongue, namely: *Willh. Gesenius*, *Herm. Hupfeld*, and *Henr. Ewald*.

Gesenius explained in the most lucid manner the principles of grammar, which had hitherto been so repulsive to students by reason of the complex form and harsh technicalities in which they were involved; he introduced order where there had been confusion, and adorned all by the pellucid clearness of his style. He was moreover the first to institute a sober and at the same time more extensive comparison with other languages; and although he here oftentimes fell into error, he ever and anon pointed out the way, by a kind of happy augury, to what was afterwards found to be the truth. He was the first to introduce into Hebrew lexicography the use of the Sanscrit, the study of which had begun to infuse a new life into the philology not only of the classical, but also of the Shemitish languages. He banished philosophy from the province of lexicography, although we sometimes observe it returning by stealth under the garb of rationalism; he perceived, if he did not always avoid, the errors of the Belgic school, and pursued the happy medium between the extremes of too much and too little in the use of comparisons from the Arabic; and, although he showed too great an *excess* to Jewish tradition, he inserted in his lexicon a great deal of useful matter from the grammatical works of the Jews written in Arabic, and especially from *Abulwalid*. *Hupfeld*, who perceived that the comparison of languages as hitherto pursued was rather conjectural than founded on induction, entered into a critical examination of the doctrine of *sounds* in his *Exercitationes Ethiopicae* (1825). He also, in his dissertation *De emendanda ratione Lexicographiae Semiticae* (1827), diligently examined the systems of *Neumann* and *Loescher* as well as of *Schultens*; and, which we with grati-

tude acknowledge, he recommended also the comparative study of the Japhetic languages, religiously observing the peculiar genius of each dialect as well as of the whole Shemitish family. He moreover rejected the doctrine of primitive triliteral roots, maintaining that they consist originally of a smaller number of elements, which have been increased by means of prosthesis, epenthesis, or paragoge.* This work, however, contains two suggestions which have no probable foundation in truth: one is, that an equivalence in the *powers* of roots results from an agreement in their *forms*; the other, that all roots are derived from *biliteral* germs, which are onomatopoetic in their origin;—both of which theories may be shown by a comparison of the Hebrew with the Sanscrit to be false. Ewald also, who has proved himself a strenuous opponent of the *empiric* method of Gesenius, has done much to deserve our grateful thanks. He entered deeply into the investigation of the nature of language, in the formation of which he rightly contends that chance has had nothing to do. He carried out the ingenious speculations of Hupfeld, concerning the sounds of letters; and, not content with a study of the mere externals of language, sought to penetrate to its very foundations. Being of opinion that the laws of the Hebrew language are not to be sought away from itself, but must be drawn from an examination of its inmost recesses, he applied the torch of reason to the elucidation of its structure, which he considered worthy of the profoundest study,—in order thus to bring to light the principles and producing causes of the phenomena that present themselves to our view,—and, by laying bare as it were the very vitals of the language, to arrive at a knowledge of the spirit by which it is animated. Accordingly this school, whose principles have been applied by Ferd. Hitzig to the interpretation of Scripture, has received the name of *rational* in contradistinction both to the *empiric* and *historical* schools. Ewald was the first to rescue the grammar from the arbitrary force of mere opinion, the hazards of conjecture, and the dicta of antiquity, and to bring it within the reach of scientific investigation; yet in so doing, he favored too much that philosophy which proceeds in the Platonic manner from ideas obtained by reflexion to the investigation of phe-

* This conjecture had already engaged the attention of many, among others of Mat. Norberg, in Opusc. II. dissert. 15 et 16 (*De verbis nudis et auctis Græcorum*).

nomena, rather than the Aristotelian method of inquiry, which ascends by induction from the observation of things to their nature and causes. So much is Ewald given to philosophizing, that to peruse his *Kritische Grammatik*, you must suffer yourself to be dragged through a Dædalian labyrinth of the most repelling obscurities: his style is exceedingly labored, and his mode of investigation still more so. You must toil as though you were reading the Parmenides of Plato; and after all, if you apply the gold you think you have obtained with all this painful exertion to the touchstone of history, the teacher of experience, you will often find it to be false metal. He seems to think that the Hebrew language has been preserved entire for the exercise of his ingenuity: he pays not the least regard to antiquity, passes by the tradition of the Synagogue with perfect indifference, and looks upon the grammatical science of the Jews as the sapless technicalities of a language long defunct. He accordingly goes to work to explain the Hebrew from itself, relying on his own powers, and looking upon all that has been done before him as of no account. He has of late begun to compare the Hebrew with the Sanscrit, but still insists that they are divided from each other by a wide wall of separation; which, however, on a nearer examination almost totally vanishes.

While on this topic, I cannot pass by that most sagacious investigator of the Sanscrit and the Indo-germanic languages descended from it, *Franz Bopp*, who yet remains to Germany the worthy successor to the fame of that exalted genius and profoundest of scholars, *Wilhelm von Humboldt*. In his works on the Indo-germanic languages, and especially in his *Vergleichende Grammatik* (1833-42), he has shown and explained by an abundance of examples the nature of the letters and the changes which they undergo; he has also adopted Humboldt's distribution of roots into *verbal*, *nominal*, and *pronominal*, which illuminates with the light of day the grammar of all languages; and has shown in those of the Sanscrit family how much in the Shemitish languages still remains to be done. He has laid down the best general plan for the treatment of grammar, and has opened the way to the comparison of languages, which alone can enable us to explain the peculiarities exhibited by each: and though he excludes from his comparisons the Shemitish dialects, of whose conformity with and natural relationship to those of the Sanscrit family he is not yet convinced, still he has prepared the latter by his able analysis of them for a com-

parison with the former; and, if I might be allowed the figure, he, acting as brideman, has led forth the Sanscrit as a betrothed encircled by her companions, to be joined in holy wedlock to the head of the Shemitish tribe. *A. F. Pott* also, whose erudition and industry are such that I know not which most to admire, has done excellent service to the historico-analytical school; and, although occasionally his comparisons are far-fetched, and his fondness for analysis carried to extremes, he has stored up a rich harvest of the most acute observations in his *Etymologische Forschungen* (1833-36), and has given a list, after the manner of *Rosen*,* of those Sanscrit roots whose meaning is established beyond a doubt, to the number of *three hundred and seventy-five*. Of these *J. Fürst* has undertaken to show that there is not a single one that is not also Shemitish.

With *Julius Fürst*, whom I am proud to call my friend and master, a new age of Hebrew studies has begun, which, if you will not consent to call it the golden age, you will at least allow to be the next to golden. For this I will now give my reasons. The sources to which all scholars in all ages have applied in order to obtain a knowledge of the Hebrew are three, *tradition*, *comparison*, and *philosophy*—the interpreter as it is called of nature: these aids, although in no period entirely separated, have never yet been properly conjoined into one equable system. One or the other has always prevailed to the neglect of the rest: thus in the talmudic age of the Synagogue, an almost exclusive attention was paid to tradition,—in the middle ages, to the comparison of the dialects,—and in later times, to philosophy; and this has engendered false views of grammar in the minds of many. In the Church, the tradition received from the Synagogue, whence she drew what knowledge she had of the Hebrew, predominated until the seventeenth century; its place was then supplied by comparison, first the harmonic so called, and then the etymological, as applied both to the Shemitish dialects and to the foreign languages which by degrees became known to the learned world; this was finally succeeded by philosophy (the favorite system of the rational school), which, despising tradition, and bestowing less attention on comparison, endeavored to explain the secrets of the structure of the Hebrew by the light of reason. The *historico-analytical* school unites all these aids

* *Radices Sanscritæ. Illustratas edidit Fridericus Rosen, Berolini 1827.*

in such proportion, as to form together one homogeneous and powerful instrument of investigation. It is called *historical* because, desiring to commence its investigations from the very beginning, it applies itself to tradition, especially that of the Jews, which is preserved in numerous literary monuments, and forms the depository of many things which we would vainly seek elsewhere;* and because it considers that the connexion of the Hebrew both as to form and meaning with the other six families of ancient languages is to be shown historically, and that each law of the language is to be historically ascertained, namely, by comparing the Hebrew with itself, with its dialects, and with other languages, particularly the Sanscrit. It receives also the name of *analytical*, because it considers language

* Here belongs the doctrine of the vowel points, the diacritical signs, and the accents, which are all commonly included under the name of the masoretic punctuation. This topic, being purely historical and traditional, has not yet been discussed by a single one of our grammarians with satisfactory learning and perspicuity. *Ewald*, it is true (in his *Abhandlungen der orientalischen und biblischen Literatur*, 1832, p. 130 ss), has treated the matter with great philosophical sagacity, but as usual without any reference to authorities and with an entire dependence on the received text (whose accentuation is faulty throughout) and on his own ingenuity. The right way was first entered upon by *G. Riegler* and *A. Martinet* (*Hebräische Sprachschule*, 1835), who however drew their materials from the not philosophical but wholly historical work of *Heidenheim*. *Benjamin Heidenheim* (d. 1832), than whom our age has produced none more skilful in the masoretic art, in his book of the *Laws of the Accents* (מסותי תענית *Rödelheim* 1808), has used for the historical foundation and development of this doctrine—besides what was furnished him by the Masora, and by a large collection of MSS. with whose critical application he was well acquainted—the most ancient treatises on this topic by writers of his nation, as for instance the *מורה נבוכד* attributed to *Aharon ben-Asher* of Tiberias, and written in rhymes of equal length; the *ספר חקירה* of *Ibn-Bileam*, a Spanish Jew; the *ספר חקירות* of *Moses Nakdan*; the lexicon of *Solomon Parchon*, &c. Excellent information has recently been afforded us on this subject by *S. D. Luzzatto* in his *Prolegomeni* (see note to p. 197), who far surpasses our own writers in his knowledge of the history of Hebrew grammar.

as the product, not of blind chance by means of an accidental concourse of atoms, but of a certain forming and guiding providence seated in the mind of man; and accordingly endeavors by a rational analysis to separate the accidental from the essential, the divisible from the indivisible, the native from the foreign, the roots from the stems, the branches from the leaves, the warp from the woof. When this is performed in an intelligent manner, we perceive that the primary material of all the ancient languages consists in an assemblage of roots, equally flexible and commutable, and agreeing in three essential respects, that is to say, in number, form, and signification; they are found pervading all these languages, are the sources of all their strength and richness, the original producers of all their wealth of words, however *different* the latter may become while following *common laws* of formation and propagation. When by means of this analysis we have ascertained that the Shemitish family constitutes in fact but one language, whose triple branches rest on a single stem, we find also that the Sanscrit tribe corresponds to it in the manner of an equilateral triangle (!). The following are favorite maxims of the *rational school*: that the Shemitish dialects are simpler in their structure and less liable to change than the more highly developed languages of the Sanscrit stock; that the former are propagated by the *formation* of roots, which is brought about partly by internal vowel changes and partly by the external addition of inseparable increments, while the latter are formed by the *composition* of separable words either subordinate or co-ordinate one to the other in signification; that the Shemitish are inferior to the Sanscrit languages in the power of multiplying verbal roots, in the variety of their vowel sounds, and in the regularity of their formation; and lastly that the former are more spiritual and the latter more corporeal in their nature. But on instituting the analysis we have above described, these dogmas are found to be vain and incoherent, and the fancied excellencies of the Shemitish languages as well as their defects vanish into thin air. I will merely allude in this place to other discoveries of Dr. Fürst which will prove of signal service in the investigation of the language, as for instance the absurdity of the so-called verbs פָּרַח and $\text{פָּרַחַ$, which were invented by arabizing grammarians after *Menahem Ibn-Saruk*, for the sake of obtaining roots of the usual triliteral form; — the *vocal power* of the letters א , ר , and ז , which being established does away with a multitude of discrepancies

between the Shemitish and Sanscrit languages;—the doctrine of *verbal prepositions*, which, though running through the whole language, have heretofore been recognised by none; as also the *nominal* prefixes and endings, which before had scarcely been thought of, although common to the languages of both stocks;—the division of the verbs into verbs ending in a vowel, concave verbs, and perfect verbs; and of the conjugations into fundamental, intensive, extensive, and reflexive;—and finally the assertion of the primitive nature of the pronominal roots, which grammarians have heretofore most absurdly derived from verbs. All these I shall treat of separately and in their proper order in the sequel.* I will merely add a few words respecting the labors of Dr. Fürst in propounding, carrying out, and perfecting the principles of the historico-analytical school, of which I have asserted him to be the founder. He first set himself to work to bring to light the so-called *Chaldee* language, the oldest of the Shemitish dialects, which he saw was despised by many, and had been suffered to sink into the deepest shades of obscurity; his object being to prove its relationship to the other Oriental languages, and by means of it, as affording the clearest evidence thereof, to demonstrate the close consanguinity of the Shemitish and Sanscrit families. He published accordingly his *Systema Linguae Chaldaicae* (1835), a work which received the applause of all its critics (among whom it is sufficient to mention Wilh. v. Humboldt), and which shed the most brilliant light, not upon the Chaldee only, but also on the Hebrew itself. To this succeeded an Aramaic Chrestomathy entitled *Charuze Peninim* (1836),† in which he vindicates the principles of the historico-analytical school against the attacks of Ewald, and confirms by a number of examples the doctrine of verbal prefixes, of which the germs only were developed in his former work. Having completed the Chrestomathy, Fürst applied himself with fresh zeal to the editing of *Buxtorf's Concordance*, a truly great and arduous undertaking, especially as the character of the editor himself as well as the progress of the age would not endure the republication of old and for the most part obsolete matter, unless what our predecessors had so well begun should appear per-

* They form the subject-matter of the third book.—Tr.

† The full title is as follows: חרזי פנינים *Perlenschnüre aramäischer Gnomen und Lieder, oder aramäische Chrestomathie mit Erläuterungen und Glossar.*—Tr.

fectured by more mature knowledge and set forth with additional advantages. Accordingly, he added to the Concordance a Hebrew and Chaldee lexicon, which had also been considered indispensable by the previous editors, *Isaak Nathan* (1445), *Joh. Buxtorf* (1632), and *Mario de Calasio* (1662); this is given in modern Hebrew, and also, with a few omissions and additions, in Latin. Here the signification of each word is developed, and all the passages of Scripture cited in which it occurs; this is done with constant regard to tradition, by first seeking out the original germ or Sanscrito-Shemitish root, and distinguishing it from the formative additions by which it is propagated and its various meanings diversified;—and this not by way of conjecture, but according to certain fixed rules. The different uses are given in which a word occurs in the monuments of Hebrew literature, whether frequent or rare; the various acceptations which flow from the primary idea are enumerated in an order which is rather historical than logical; numerous observations are made concerning the grammatical inflexion of the word, the difference between it and its synonyms pointed out, and the period designated in which it was in frequent use, acquired a new meaning, or became employed in some peculiar manner; and lastly, the distinction is laid down between prosaic and poetical terms. In this lexicon, the author has paid more attention to the etymological than to the exegetical part, which he has thought better to reserve for one of larger dimensions. In this portion of his labors, which is truly excellent, there is little, we are glad to acknowledge, which is taken from others; and there is nothing at all admitted that is not examined anew and improved upon where necessary: there is much that first strikes the mind by its novelty, and then equally delights us by its truth. It is necessary however to compare with the Latin lexicon that in *modern Hebrew*, in which is found an abundant collection of synonyms, a constant comparison with the modern Hebrew and Aramaic, and a cultivated style, which emulates, as far as the subject will allow, the brevity of Ibn-Ezra, the copiousness of Salomon Papenheim, and the ease of Elazar Kalir. It is true that this kind of writing, being somewhat hard and difficult, may displease many modern scholars, whom the learning and manners of our age render averse to the Hebrew style of composition, and who, regarding the ancient authors as the only fit models of imitation, look upon the other treasures of the language with contempt and dislike; but if we will only take the

pains to accustom ourselves to its peculiarities, we cannot but own it to be ingeniously remodelled, curiously polished, and adorned with the finest gems of eloquence. Thus much of the Concordance, which gives a faithful representation of the gradual improvements that have been made in Hebrew philology. When this laborious undertaking shall have been brought to a close,* it will be followed by a Hebrew lexicon, which has been already for some time begun, and is now drawing towards its completion, and in which the distinctions between the simple, augmented, and compound roots and words will be marked with even still greater nicety; this, again, is to be succeeded by a grammar, in which will be explained in a plain and lucid manner all the undoubted discoveries made in the course of the preceding works.

In these seven stages which I have thus briefly sketched, the science of the Hebrew language has been begun, continued, and completed; and if these be compared to the steps of a ladder, it can hardly be denied that we have now attained the last and topmost round. At no period have we been permitted so wide and unobstructed a view of the languages of the East, as that which has been opened to us within our own memory. We are placed, as it were, upon an eminence from which we may look forth on the languages of the remotest nations, and embrace them almost all within the sphere of our observation. From the time when we recognised in the Sanscrit our venerable mother-tongue, and in the Aramaic the ancestral speech of the Shemitish race, we have been enabled through our perception of their mutual relationship to enter also into a close familiarity with the Hebrew. Through a Divine Providence it has arisen that our age, which had disgraced itself by a most reprehensible disregard of the Sacred Scriptures, now abounds with numerous helps towards their better understanding, which our forefathers neither possessed nor could scarcely have any idea of. Hence it follows, if we mistake not, that now is being sown the seed of a harvest that posterity will reap; and whose maturity, although not yet arrived, rapidly draws near, by the aid of that

* This, it will be recollected, was written during the progress of the Concordance, which was published in twelve parts, extending from the year 1837 to 1840.—Tr.

Almighty grace which is removing every obstacle to its full and perfect development. "Plus ultra vocamur," says a distinguished doctor of our church, "ad eam in Scripturis facultatem, quæ sit *virilis et regalis*, perfectionique Scripturæ satis prope respondeat." Oh that the time may hasten in which learning shall minister to faith, and all our progress to the advancement of the Church; and when all shall drink to the full of that ocean of divine truth, of which as yet we have tasted but a few holy and precious drops! Already, methinks, the rays of the dawn are breaking through the thick shades that have so long environed us. Already the time approaches, when all the languages of the earth shall stand around the sacred tongue, and, like the sheaves of old, shall make obeisance to *Joseph's* sheaf; when all our studies shall revolve about the Word of Life, perpetually encircling and tending towards that holy luminary.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1843.

By the Editor.

THE Triennial Assembly was opened, on the appointed day, with a sermon characterized by those excellent qualities which mark the discourses of Dr. Wisner. The representation was, of course, not so large as in the Annual Assembly,—being limited to one delegate from each Presbytery, however numerous,—but was sufficiently large, and every way respectable. Some were there, who were also delegates, at the time of the division. Some with the wisdom of gray hairs; some in the vigor of mid-life; others in all the ardor of youth.

The Moderator, the Rev. Ansel D. Eddy, of Newark, N. J., presided with great impartiality and decorum, and the members universally exhibited a compliant, fraternal spirit. We think

few assemblies have witnessed as much of the *suaviter in modo* with the *fortiter in re*. The former was so evident as to call forth the remark from many, that "this was the only General Assembly within their knowledge, that seemed to have done any good to the city." Its influence must have been happy, for there certainly was manifested very much of the spirit of the gospel.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed view of the proceedings of the Assembly,—these have been abundantly reported through the weekly papers,—but simply to remark briefly on those topics of public interest, which elicited discussion.

Dancing. The first subject which excited attention, was a memorial from the third Presbytery of New-York, on the subject of promiscuous dancing, calling the attention of the Assembly to its prevalence in the churches, and the necessity for renewed exercise of discipline, in order to its suppression. The fact of the prevalence of dancing by professors of religion, not only in the large cities, but throughout the length and breadth of the land, seemed to be admitted on all hands. Some, however, thought that the evidence of the fact before the Assembly was not such as to call for action on the subject; some, that it belonged to the lower judicatories alone to attend to matters of discipline; that it fell not within the province of the Assembly, as now limited in its powers, to enter into the detailed evils existing in the church, and that it would be of little avail for this body to bear its testimony against prevailing sins. Others contended, and we think rightly, that the constitution expressly empowers the Assembly to act in such cases, and that one of its chief duties must now be, since its judicial powers are cancelled, to consult, in every way, for the spiritual good of the church, and to send down its admonitory voice, when any particular sins are evidently becoming prevalent.

Promiscuous dancing had become so peculiarly one of the amusements of a world lying in wickedness, and was in itself productive of so many evils, which seem inseparable from it, that all denominations of evangelical, spiritual Christians had denounced it as an amusement unbecoming the Christian profession, and savoring too much of a love of the world. Among others, a loud testimony was borne on this subject, some years since, by the Episcopal Convention. But the impression has been gradually gaining ground, for a few years past, that it is a graceful accomplishment, and a very innocent recreation,

highly conducive to good health, both by the exercise of the body, which it ensures, and the cheerfulness of the heart, which it inspires. We confess, we are afraid of it—afraid it will spoil the piety of many, seduce others away from the spiritual walks of the devoted follower of Jesus, and render the line of distinction between the church and the world so ill defined, as to lead multitudes to rely on a false hope, and stumble over worldly professors into the gloom of eternal night. Let it ever be remembered that “the friendship of the world is enmity with God;” that we must “come out and be separate;” “have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness,” and “avoid even the appearance of evil.” Dancing is not essential either to healthful exercise, or to a cheerful spirit: and, whilst we are decidedly unfriendly to locking up the sympathies, and freezing the animal spirits of children and youth, we cannot but feel that danger to the spirituality of the individual and the church is near, when those who profess to love Christ, and follow in his steps, manifest a disposition to enter into the vain and exciting amusements of an ungodly world.

The Sabbath. After hearing some very forcible and appropriate remarks on this subject from Rev. Justin Edwards, D. D., strong resolutions were offered, bearing decided testimony against public violations of the law of the Sabbath prevalent in our land, and encouraging the church to more decided action on this great question, so deeply involving the highest interests, and the permanent existence of this republic. Even these resolutions met with opposition from some few of the members; not, however, because the opponents did not feel sensible of the prevalence of the evil, nor because they did not fully sympathize with others in their love for the Sabbath, and their ardent desire for its better observance, but because they did not believe it the appropriate business of the Assembly to bear testimony against public evils.

We should have been disposed to believe, that this opposition and the arguments on which it rested had taken possession of the minds of those who presented them, in connection with their fears of the question of slavery, and had, unawares, become with them a principle of universal application, had not the venerable Dr. Hill himself warmly advocated the passage of the resolutions, and expressed astonishment at the declaration of opposite sentiments, and especially at the ground of that opposition. He believed it the *duty* of the Assembly to bear its *testimony* against

crying evils, and regarded the antagonist opinion as new-fangled doctrine, such as he had never before heard expressed in the General Assembly.

As intimated on the former topic, we are quite of the Doctor's way of thinking; and we should regret to see the powers of the Assembly so construed, or so frittered down, that its solemn voice of admonition could not be lifted up against violations of God's law. Far distant be the day, when the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, shall resolve that it has no right, and is not in duty bound, to express its disapprobation of acknowledged sins.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, its testimony has great weight with the churches, and is felt even by the world, to be a powerful testimony. On this very question of the Sabbath, its decisions will be everywhere known, and generally respected, as the final judgment of a wise and educated body of men, from all parts of the union, and of more or less influence in their spheres of action at home. We should have felt as if an important link were wanting—as one of the speakers expressed it—in that golden chain of testimony which we trust is to encircle this land on this great subject, if this Assembly had withheld its testimony.

Slavery. Under the present constitution of government and society in this country, the subject of slavery is one of peculiar interest. No nation on earth is situated in respect to it as we are; for its existence among us is diametrically opposed to the fundamental principle of that glorious Declaration of Independence, which resulted in our freedom. To proclaim the one on our fourth-of-July anniversaries, and, at the same time, to foster the other, is a mockery of truth, a proclamation to the world of our own inconsistency, and a practical desertion in the life, of the principles which we loudly proclaim with the lips.

In consequence of occasional rash procedures and unguarded denunciations, on the part of some of those interested in the great cause of emancipation, the sensitiveness of the South had become so extreme, that any agitation of the subject whatever, whether politically, ecclesiastically, or otherwise, was looked upon as disturbing the body politic, and interfering with individual and exclusive rights of southern men. Hence, it became a serious question, whether, in our ecclesiastical organizations, we ought to act at all on the subject of slavery, as we manifestly could not, without sensibly affecting the feelings of many of the southern ministers and churches, and compelling them to

adopt a separate organization, thus marring the unity of the church. On the other hand, it was felt that slavery is so manifestly a violation of the fundamental principles of the gospel, and the duty of the church to bear its solemn testimony against every crying evil so clear, that for the church in her organized capacity to shrink from the responsibility of testifying against the evil, would be to abandon the cause of truth and righteousness, out of a sinful, selfish regard to consequences.

Thus stood the matter when the Assembly convened; and men entertaining these opposite views, and coming from North, South, East, and West, were delegates in that Assembly. The question must be discussed. It was seen on all hands that there was no possibility of avoiding it. There were men there, who would never submit to an entire exclusion of the whole subject from the attention of the Assembly: and consequently all prepared themselves for a full and free expression of opinion, with a desire to reach the truth. It was resolved to sit with open doors, that all, who chose, might hear and report the discussion. The moment was big with interest when that great Assembly entered on a free, full, untrammelled discussion of that great subject which now agitates the world!—How was it to proceed? How issue? Would the speakers, ardent in the cause, be able to preserve their dignity and suppress passion? Or should we be obliged again to witness, what had been too often seen already in that same place, ebullitions of evil feelings and unguarded denunciations of brethren? If the discussion should grow too warm, would the community bear it?—And the issue! Were those who had thus far walked together in love, now to be sundered? Was this Constitutional Assembly to be broken into fragments, and were its members to go home alienated from each other, and weeping over the divisions of Israel? None could tell. All was dark uncertainty.

There was evidently a large representation in favor of some decided action on the subject; and in the earlier part of the discussion, votes on a substitute for the original report of the committee, and on a question of indefinite postponement, clearly indicated a strong feeling in favor of bearing testimony against the sin of slavery. At one time it was thought such testimony would certainly be borne by a decided vote of the body; but after a calm, deliberate, and protracted discussion, it was finally resolved, by a large majority, to leave the subject, where it has been, with the lower judicatories.

The argument, condensed and expressed entirely in our own language, was nearly as follows : On the one hand it was contended that slavery was a governmental, civil evil, made legal by the laws of the Southern States ; and not only legalized, but manumission, except for colonization, actually prohibited. Many good men, therefore, were involuntarily slave-holders, desiring to manumit, but being unable, because their slaves preferred bondage to colonization in Africa. To censure men, therefore, for what they could not help, without breaking up all the foundations of order and of society itself, did not seem to be the spirit of the gospel.

A second argument was, that a system of slavery, quite as bad as that of the United States, existed under the Roman Empire, in the days of the Apostles, and without any decisive antagonism on their part. The churches were not urged to ecclesiastical action, but, on the contrary, the relation of master and slave was distinctly recognized, and their respective duties clearly and gently pointed out. The conduct of the Apostles is a safe guide, and if they did not deem it necessary ecclesiastically to denounce slavery as a sin, we need feel no scruples about following in their steps. To act differently from them in similar circumstances, might be a very dangerous action. The proper and only safe mode of action on this system, so interwoven with the whole civil polity of the Southern States, was to imitate the Apostles, in preaching the truth on the great subject of salvation, and promulgating the grand principles of the gospel. Christ's kingdom is not of this world, therefore, his ministers are not to meddle with political matters, but to preach the gospel.

The other principal argument, on this side of the question,—that which we think had most weight,—was, that the unity of this great portion of the church is far more desirable than any divided testimony against slavery as a sin. We had lived and loved together ; had walked through the furnace, and had come out purified ; God had diffused the spirit of brotherly kindness among us, and had poured out his Spirit in nearly all our churches : why, then, should we proceed to such action, in a case at least doubtful, as would certainly lead to the secession of those Southern ministers and churches, which now sympathize with the Constitutional Assembly, and greatly prefer its organization and principles ? Shall we now, simply for the purpose of having the testimony of this Assembly against slavery, and that

at best the testimony of but a meagre majority ; shall we run the risk of marring the unity of our church ; of driving off our Southern brethren who love us, and whom we love in the faith ; and of becoming a spectacle to the world ? Will such a result be as likely to accomplish good, as our dwelling together in the unity of the Spirit, preaching Christ crucified, and in our several allotments at home, exerting our influence, according to our own views, on any and on all subjects of interest to the church and the world ?

On the other side it was contended, that although slavery is a political institution, and emancipation on the soil prohibited by law, Christians are not blameless, because they are part and parcel of the people, from whom the statutes proceed, and by whose representatives they are enacted. They voluntarily profess allegiance to the government, knowing its enactments on the subject of slavery, and do not, as the martyrs did, lift up their voices to testify against the iniquity of the laws. They ought rather to suffer wrongfully, being willing to be persecuted for righteousness' sake, and even to see the pillars of society shaken, than by silent acquiescence, help sustain those pillars when evidently resting on bases of error. Grant that the system is interwoven with all the relations of society, authorized by legal enactment, and enforced by judicial decision, can this justify the Christian in holding his fellow-man in bondage, under a system of law, whose every enactment is a violation of divine prerogative and human right ? Can he, with a clear conscience, live and move, and have his being voluntarily, where he is under a necessity of sanctioning a system which is diametrically opposed to the first principles of the gospel, which Jesus died to promulgate !

Nor could any one, under any circumstances, it was argued, be justified in buying his fellow-man. Let it be allowed that he is suffering the torments of a cruel master, that he is about to be torn from his family and sold into distant bondage ; that he comes imploringly and casts himself at your feet, begging your interposition by purchase, and promising to serve you faithfully all the days of his life ; still you cannot do the deed, because in so doing, you recognise the right of ownership in the master ; you contract for that which is not property as property ; you make the man a chattel ; you recognise as alienable, that which is inalienable, life and liberty ; you sustain the iniquitous system of slavery ; you act on the principle of doing wrong, that

good may come, and of choosing, between two moral evils, that which is the less, and, whilst prompted by feelings of compassion for the wretched, you disregard ultimate results and the greatest good of the whole, in consulting the present, temporary welfare of a few individuals.

In reply to the second argument of the opposite side, it was said, that although slavery existed under the Roman Empire, in the days of the Apostles, it differed from the slavery of our Southern States in several particulars, and was by no means so heinous; that although the Apostles did not directly assail the system as then legalized, but only proclaimed principles which they knew must ultimately undermine it, it does not follow that an Assembly of Ministers of the gospel, in this day of light and of farther advancement towards a full appreciation of the lofty humanities of the gospel, are not bound to testify against a system worse in some of its features than that of Rome, and, from the organization of the union and of the church, throwing a weighty responsibility, in respect to it, on the members of that Assembly.

It was further contended, that those passages of the Scriptures adduced in proof of the recognition of slavery as justifiable by the Apostles, were misunderstood and misinterpreted; that while the relation of master and servant was recognised as existing, the Apostles by no means justified it, when they exhorted Christian slaves to be obedient and patient, and to exhibit in their lives all the graces of the Spirit, that they might thus show forth the praises of Him that had called them out of darkness to light, and convince a gainsaying world of the power and efficacy of the religion of Jesus. Just so should we now exhort Christian slaves in this land, who have unbelieving masters, not forgetting either the exhortations of the Apostles to the latter, and reminding the slave, too, if he could obtain his liberty, to use it rather, as a better state. If the Apostles' exhortations to servants to bear and forbear could be rightly construed into a justification of compulsory servitude; then, on the same principles of hermeneutics, would the Savior's exhortation, when smitten on the one cheek, to turn the other, justify assault and battery, and His direction when the cloak is taken, to give the coat also, justify robbery. These exhortations to servants, which undoubtedly recognise the relation of master and slave, could never be meant to justify the system, because the fundamental principles and the entire spirit of the gospel are manifestly and totally opposed to

- it. No man can read the gospel of the kingdom, and imbibe its spirit, without sensibly feeling that slavery, as legalized in this land, is founded on principles directly counter to it, and encourages practices which it positively condemns.

In reply to the other principal and probably most influential argument, it was contended that, however important the unity and harmony of this part of Zion, it could never be as important as testimony against the evils of the day. Indeed, peace was desirable only on the basis of truth and holiness. First pure, then peaceable. Whatever, then, might be our aspirations for the unity of the brotherhood, those aspirations could only be breathed out in connection with higher aspirations after the purification of the church from the evils existing in its bosom, and corroding its vitals. We should regret deeply to see our brethren of the South go out from us because we testify against an evil which they cherish, and of which they ought to repent, but we cannot suffer sin on our brother, without admonition, nor can we avoid feeling deeper sorrow that they should uphold, by their countenance, a system of so flagrant iniquity. Let our brethren of the South be brought to feel that they are the chief pillars in this temple of abominations, and that as soon as their support is removed, the temple itself will begin to crumble, and soon be levelled with the dust. Neither should it be forgotten that there is danger of division in the North, if this Assembly persist in its determination to bear no testimony against the sin of slavery. Which would be the deeper wound to Zion? Would it not, on the whole, be better, if division must occur,—which we deprecate, as much as our brethren who differ from us,—that the North should be united, and the South form a separate organization, than that the North should be rent asunder, and but a small portion of it remain in union with the South?

We propose no interference with slavery as a civil institution; we do not set ourselves in opposition to civil law; we only ask a testimony as to the iniquity of the system; only express an opinion as to its moral evil and contravention of the divine law. And why, if we believe it a sinful system, should we hesitate so to pronounce it? Shall we bear our solemn testimony before the world, against the sins of Sabbath-breaking and dancing, and pass by on the other side, as if we saw not, this legalized iniquity, which is depriving God and man of their rights? Never ought it to be: never can it be with some of us. Brethren are mistaken, if they presume that we shall go with them, in the

passage of resolutions, which leave this flagrant sin untouched by the Assembly.

The discussion of this agitating question was conducted in the true spirit of free inquiry, and proved, to a demonstration, that the community will bear the discussion, when conducted in a Christian spirit, and with a desire only for the triumph of truth. The whole issue is infinitely better than if the subject had been indefinitely postponed. As it was, all had an opportunity of fully declaring their sentiments, and although not satisfied with the result, have the pleasure of reflecting that their individual testimonies will go out, through the press, to the ends of the earth.

For ourselves, we felt that the spirit of love reigned in the Assembly, and, although in favor of mild yet firm action, on the subject of slavery, we are satisfied that members sacrificed their own preference to a conscientious conviction that, under the circumstances, more good, both present and ultimate, would be thus accomplished.

We are of opinion, however, that this question cannot be put to rest, and that ecclesiastical organizations, as well as individuals, will be obliged to form and to express their opinions either affirmatively or negatively, as to the sinfulness of the system of bondage established by law in this land of liberty. And the day is probably not far distant when men will feel, with Dr. Hook, that "every Christian man, whether laic or cleric, is in duty bound to consider, *not what is expedient at the moment for the sake of peace, but what is beneficial to the cause of truth*;" and with Bishop Wilson, that "*if for fear of offending men, or from a false love of peace, we forbear to defend the truth, we betray and abandon it.*" The great problem then, is, *What is truth?* We cannot persuade ourselves that it is other than true, that the legalized slavery of the United States is a system at war with the fundamental principles of the gospel, and that it can never be defended but by a perverted view of the system of Christianity. Can it be else than sinful to enact laws providing for the regular sale of human beings, even the sale of free colored debtors, to satisfy the claim of a white creditor? Can that be justifiable, and consistent with the will of Christ, which tends to the severance of those ties, of which Jehovah has said: "What God hath joined, let not man put asunder?"

Is not that love of liberty which burns in the bosom of the slave, a part of our common nature, and a high gift of Heaven? Then to quench the spark cannot be right. In the language of Gov.

McDowall, of Virginia, "It is allied to his hope of immortality ; it is the ethereal part of his nature which oppression cannot reach ; it is a torch lit up in his soul by the hand of Deity, and *not to be extinguished by the hand of man.*" In that of Mr. Preston : "Happiness is incompatible with slavery. The love of liberty is the ruling passion of man, and he cannot be happy without it."

Does not slavery, in as far as it can, nullify the relations between God and his creatures ? Does it not take away from man his right to life, liberty, and the regulation of his actions, responsible only to his Maker, and thus interfere with his accountability and his duty ? Oh, it grates upon our ears to hear grave divines say : "*Slavery is not forbidden by the Divine law, so it is left to our own judgment, whether we hold slaves or not.*" —Dr. Dalcho. "*Slavery as it exists at the present day, is agreeable to the order of Divine Providence.*" —Rev. Mr. Freeman.

"Earth is sick,
And Heaven is weary, of the hollow words,
Which States and Kingdoms utter, when they talk
Of truth and justice."

That slavery is a wrong, an injustice, we doubt not for a moment ; and we hail the day, when every shackle of mind and body shall be broken ; when the poor slave, that now bows humbly at his oppressor's feet, shall lift himself up in the attitude and dignity of humanity, and shout *I am free* ; when the doomed spirit, which now groans under its bondage, shall burst all its fetters, and, unmanacled, drink in the living waters of God's truth, to its own refreshment and recovery, until it put on the very semblance of humanity redeemed, and join in the chorus of the skies : *Peace on Earth ; good will to man !*

Then the question returns, granting the system of slavery to be sinful, shall we as a church, through our highest ecclesiastical organization, bear our testimony against it ? There would seem to be no difficulty whatever, in answering this question in the affirmative, having once determined that slavery is sinful. Yet there are unquestionably peculiar difficulties surrounding this subject. The fact that it is, in many cases, an involuntary state on the part of the masters, a responsibility devolved on them by no choice of their own,—that it is a part of the civil constitution of the States in which they live, and manumission prohibited by law,—that action by the church might be interpreted as an un-

becoming interference with civil authority, and expose Christians resident in slave States to obloquy and to the charge of revolutionary action,—all these and other circumstances render this no ordinary question, nor one very easy of solution.

Yet, notwithstanding all these difficulties, regarding slavery in this Union as peculiarly offensive to God, and rendering us obnoxious to his displeasure, we are inclined to believe that the church, in her organized relations, is bound to look the subject in the face, in the fear of God, and openly to express her opinion. We deprecate all harsh, radical measures; all wholesale exercise of discipline, such as was perpetrated in 1837; but we think the peace of Jerusalem will be promoted, and the cause of truth and righteousness be subserved by candid, considerate, calm action on this great subject, to which the providence of God is now directing the attention of the world.

Let us talk it over then kindly; let us weigh well the obstacles; let us pray fervently for light; let the North withhold itself from fanaticism and faggotism, and let the South meet her responsibilities; the ministers and Christians of that section of our happy Union bear their testimony boldly but discreetly, and we have little doubt that now, when passion on the subject has well nigh been lulled to rest, men everywhere can be brought to see the evils of slavery, and the church's influence in its speedy removal be powerfully felt and acknowledged with gratitude.

There is no occasion for division in our body on this question. We think that the Southern church itself, if the subject be presented in such an aspect as it can be, will be brought to feel the importance of the Assembly's testimony, and unite in a vote to that effect. Amen and Amen!

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Anabasis of Xenophon : chiefly according to the Text of L. Dindorf ; with Notes : for the use of schools. By John J. Owen, Principal of the Cornelius Institute. New-York : Leavitt & Trow. Boston : Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 366.*

THE *Anabasis* of Xenophon we regard as, beyond all question, the best adapted, of all the writings of antiquity, for a primary classical school book. It is in the first place a specimen of the finest Attic, and at the same time so remarkably easy and intelligible, that the Tyro may read it with delight, whilst to the critical philologist it exhibits all the elegancies and peculiarities of this most refined dialect. There is besides an air of romance about the *Retreat of the ten thousand*, which imparts all the interest of the most lively work of fiction, whilst the inimitable simplicity of the style, and an indescribable air of truth which pervades the whole narration, secure our entire confidence ; so that we never doubt that the descriptions are those of an eye-witness of too strict integrity to misstate, and too religiously calm amid dangers, to allow that false coloring, which might arise from an enthusiastic excitement of the feelings. Xenophon himself was one of the noblest characters of antiquity,—a practical moral philosopher, a most brave and skilful commander, excelling in all the social virtues, and at the same time most sincerely religious. Every morning witnessed his devotion ; every march was commenced under the auspices of prayer and sacrifice. In short, he was one of the most finished specimens of all that was meant by that noble Attic term *καλοκαγαθος*, or the perfect Grecian gentleman of the old school, in an age when sophistry and skepticism had begun to make serious inroads on the ancient faith and purity of life.

A good edition of the entire *Anabasis* has been wanted in our schools, and we think the work of Mr. Owen well calculated to supply the defect. It has evidently cost him much labor, and exhibits everywhere evidence of the most thorough research. The notes form about one half of the volume, (364 pages,) and seem admirably adapted to the wants of the

student. We discover in them the practical teacher, most intimately familiar with the actual difficulties that daily occur in a scholar's progress. They are minute and full to a degree that some might deem excessive, and as calculated to make the learner's task easy. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the present state of classical learning among us, such books are needed for teachers as well as for scholars. The latter cannot have too many aids, if he is only guided by an instructor, who will see to it that he thoroughly understands their reason and application, instead of abusing them for the mere purpose of temporary facilities in recitation. The style of this author, although in general remarkably plain, is characterized by occasional obscurities of a most perplexing kind, arising chiefly from the use of military phrases, and from carelessness in local description. These passages have received peculiar care, and are generally cleared up in a very satisfactory manner. Special attention has been paid to the geography of the country, and in this respect the notes of Mr. Owen (comprising as they do, the latest information of missionary travellers respecting those interesting regions,) are entitled to the highest commendation.

Were we disposed to find fault with this work, it would be in respect to what may be styled the author's excessive caution in supporting his positions by too numerous references to authorities. Our own idea of a classical book is, that it should contain simply the results of the editor's best judgment in his selections from preceding compilations. Without fearing the charge of plagiarism from a succession of plagiarists, he should aim at spreading before the student the best and fullest information from whatever source derived. Mr. Owen frequently on a difficult passage, or in regard to a various reading, gives us the opinion of Schneider, and Borneman, and Dindorf, and Poppo, and then generally with most excellent judgment, gives his own, or selects the one which seems to him to be best. In almost every case of the kind, we feel disposed to confide in the correctness of his decision. Now for all the purposes of the student, the result of the author's investigations was all that he needed, and there is no probability that even the more advanced scholar would step out of his way to consult the authorities to which we are so copiously referred.

These minor faults, however, may be corrected in a second edition, and we simply suggest them to the author for that purpose. Without going into that detail which our limits will not allow, we conclude by cordially recommending the work

to teachers as a very valuable addition to our stock of classical school books. We much prefer, for this purpose, an entire work, (especially one so delightfully interesting as Xenophon's *Anabasis*,) to such fragmentary productions as most of those that are generally styled Greek and Latin Readers. It may well be doubted, whether in teaching a language, it is the best plan to arrange its several departments by regular rank and file in separate lessons, instead of presenting them as a whole, and as they naturally occur in some plain and interesting native author. We should be glad to see this book have that place, which it so well deserves, in all our classical schools, and have no doubt, that could its plan be carried out by teachers, with the same fidelity which the author has exhibited in the execution, it would be productive of the very best results. L.

2—*Classical Studies. Essays on Ancient Literature and Art. With the Biography and Correspondence of eminent Philologists.* By Barnas Sears, President of Newton Theological Institution, B. B. Edwards, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, and C. C. Felton, Professor in Harvard University. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1843.

We have here one of the most beautifully printed books of the day, doing honor to the taste both of those who projected its costume, and of those who executed the order. We love to look on a beautiful book, and therefore regret the demand for the too cheap publications of the day, because they render it somewhat hazardous for a bookseller to expend his means in adding value to his publications, by offering them to readers in an attractive dress. We trust, however, the day is not far distant, when society will roll back the tide of trash which is pouring in its muddy waters with tremendous power, and adulterating the very fountains of individual and social life. Let good men rise and say, it must not be. Let them combine their influence for the encouragement of that which is decorous and useful.

The character and acquirements of the gentlemen, who have undertaken the task of these translations, are in themselves a pledge of the intrinsic value of the articles, as well as of the faithful execution of their part of the labor. We do rejoice in the diffusion of literature of so high an order, and cannot but believe that these translations will greatly tend to waken the aspirations of youth after higher and higher attainments in classical studies. After all new methods of education shall

have been tried, we shall, at last, come back to the conviction, that there is nothing so effective in disciplining, refining and elevating the mind as these same, oft-rejected and much abused classical studies.

But of the work itself. It contains a powerful plea for classical learning, in the form of an Introduction, whilst the articles themselves tend to the same end. The first is a view of the schools of German philosophy, embracing notices of Heyne, Winckelmann, Wolf, Heindorff, Bekker, Böckh and Hermann. The second is a translation of an essay of Tegnér, on the Study of Greek Literature. The third from F. Jacobs, on Classical Antiquity. Fourth, on Grecian works of plastic art, by the same author. Fifth, the correspondence of eminent philologists. Sixth, on the Dutch Philologists, Hemsterhuys, Ruhnken and Wyttenbach.

These are followed by other articles on valuable topics, and numerous notes, giving brief biographies of most of the eminent scholars mentioned in the body of the work. Let every lover of learning read the whole volume.

- 3.—*Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. A Book for the Times. By an American Citizen. Second Edition.* New York: M. W. Dodd and Robert Carter. Boston: Tappan & Dennet,—Crocker & Brewster. Philadelphia: Perkins & Purves. Cincinnati: George L. Weed. 1843. pp. 239.

This volume has been already noticed editorially in the Repository, and has also been the basis of a distinct review. The fact of a second edition having been called for, is evidence that the author's labors have been appreciated. The argument we think sound and conclusive: and should be pleased to have the book read by those of the intellectual class, who are still skeptical as to the divine origin of the Bible.

- 4.—*Incidents of Travel in Yucatan. By John L. Stephens. Illustrated by 120 Engravings. In two volumes.* New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1843.

The author has here added two beautiful and valuable volumes to his "Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas and Yucatan." Mr. Stephens is deservedly a popular writer; and his recent investigations among the ruins of Central America and Yucatan, are appreciated by the scientific world. They have done much towards a satisfactory solution of the

question as to the origin of these mouldering ruins. The Daguerreotype views and drawings taken on the spot by Mr. Catherwood, will be of permanent value, and we are happy to know that it is proposed to publish them in an enlarged size, at \$100 a copy, under the auspices of the N. Y. Historical Society. Should the proposal be carried into effect, it will be an honor both to the Society and the country.

In the present volumes, we are introduced into many scenes of interest, portrayed in Mr. Stephens's easy, natural style, and have the details of his visits to forty-four ruined cities. But five of these had ever been visited by white men, and the existence of most of them was unknown to the residents of the capital. "It has been the fortune of the author to step between them and the entire destruction to which they are destined; and it is his hope to snatch from oblivion these perishing, but still gigantic memorials of a mysterious people." We commend the book as one tastefully got up, and especially as a monument of patient, persevering scientific research, which will tell on future generations.

5.—*Essays on the Church of God*, by John Mason, D. D. Edited by the Rev. Ebenezer Mason. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 258.

We read this book in our youth, with pleasure and profit. It bears the stamp of that gigantic mind, which wrought it out, and will fully compensate any one for reading it. Let all young ministers study it well. The style is forcible and lucid, and the arguments powerful. No one can rise from its perusal, without feeling that he has acquired clearer and more scriptural views of the church and its officers. The author treats of the Term Church—Its Organization—The Mode of perpetuating the visible Church—Initiating Seal—Infant Members—Uses—Results—Officers, Ministry, Uses, and Qualifications.

On all these topics, the discussion is thorough and strong, and in the peculiar style of Dr. Mason. The chapter on the qualifications of the ministry, is a triumphant vindication of the necessity for high intellectual attainments, on the part of those who would minister, in the fittest manner, at the altar of God.

The son could scarcely erect a better monument to the father, than by the republication of these *Essays* in a separate form, thus rendering them accessible to all at a low price.

- 6.—*Lectures on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans.* By Thomas Chalmers. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843.

This work is to be completed in five monthly parts, at 25 cts. each, three of which have been already issued. The name of Chalmers is, in itself, a guaranty that the lectures are no common-place affairs. They were originally delivered to his own people, and published at their request, and we are sure they will be sought after by many in this land, who have read the splendid thoughts and language of many of his sermons already republished here. These lectures are, by no means, critical, but good specimens of expository preaching.

- 7.—*Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature.* By John Kitto, assisted by several scholars and divines. New-York: Mark H. Newman.

This Cyclopædia is to be comprised in fifteen parts, of 80 pages each, to be published monthly, and each number to be accompanied by a plate or map. Names of high repute are announced as contributors; and if the first numbers are to be considered fair specimens of the whole, they promise well for the value and utility of the work. It will embody the discoveries and elucidations of the most recent travels and researches, and, in this respect, will be preferable to earlier works in the same department.

- 8.—*A Greek Reader for the use of Schools; containing selections in prose and poetry, with English notes and a Lexicon.* By C. C. Felton, A. M., Eliot Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University. Second edition, revised. Hartford: H. Huntington. June, 1842.

We take pleasure in commending this work to the instructors of Academies and High Schools, as eminently adapted to the wants and capabilities of pupils in the Greek language. The selections are judiciously made and well arranged. The notes upon each selection are introduced by a brief but discriminating notice of the writer's life, style, and general character. The translations are faithful and full of life, not only furnishing to the student assistance in obscure passages, but also examples of close, accurate and elegant renderings, which are too rarely to be met with in works of this kind. The references are made to the excellent Greek grammar of E. A. Sophocles. The student who carefully examines these references, will not only find them of great use in elucidating

the meaning of a given passage, but will obtain a knowledge of his grammar, which will prove invaluable in his future studies. The general appearance of the work is neat and tasteful. We should have preferred a type with a larger face, and yet so distinct is the impression, that the smallness of the letter is no great objection to the book. We wish the work an extensive circulation, which we have little doubt it will obtain.

L.

- 9.—*Apostolic Baptism. Facts and Evidences on the Subjects and Mode of Christian Baptism.* By C. Taylor, editor of *Calmet's Dictionary of the Bible. With thirteen Engravings.* New-York: B. H. Bevier. 1844. pp, 228.

The publishers have done well to give this volume to the public. We think there is, at least, a sufficient array of "Facts and Evidences" to convince any one that immersion was not, in the ancient church, the only mode of baptism, that it was by no means essential to the rite, indeed, that in itself it was not baptism at all. The engraved representations of various baptisms, taken from early paintings and sculpture, testify to facts, in a manner not to be controverted. They prove positively that, in the day in which they were made, affusion was considered the proper mode of dispensing baptism. We should be glad to see these "Facts and Evidences" of Mr. Taylor, editor of *Calmet's Dictionary*, as well as some articles in the *Repository*, by Dr. E. Beecher, receiving due consideration on the part of the scholars amongst our Baptist brethren; for then we should hope soon to see the day, when their peculiar views should no longer deprive us of the privilege of sitting with them at our Saviour's board, nor them of the pleasure of acknowledging us to be fully entitled to all the privileges of Christ's house, equally with themselves.

- 10.—*Popular Exposition of the Gospels, designed for the use of Families, Bible Classes and Sunday Schools.* By Rev. John G. Morris, A. M., and Rev. Charles A. Smith, A. M. Vol. II. *Luke—John.* Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1842. pp. 366.

This is the second of a series of Expository volumes on the New Testament, by ministers of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, intended principally, no doubt, for the families and schools connected with that branch of Zion. The English language is now so generally spoken and read by the Germans of this country, especially the youthful portion of them, that

some such expositions as these were felt to be needed. They are wholly of a practical, popular character, and adapted to be used in Bible classes and Sunday schools. The churches of that denomination will feel more confidence in them, as coming from their own ministers; and we rejoice in the belief that none but evangelical sentiments will find a place in these volumes.

- 11.—*The New Purchase : or Seven and a half Years in the Far West. By Robert Carlton, Esq. 2 Vols. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: G. S. Appleton. 1843.*

This Sir Robert Carlton, Esq., whoever he may be, is evidently telling us tales of our Far West, which have a considerable smack of reality about them; and the reality often not so very enchanting either to the dramatic personæ. We ourselves have seen somewhat of this far-famed land, yet not in so early a stage of its settlement; but we have admired its broad beautiful prairies, with their profusion of flowers; we have swum some of its deep currents on horseback, and have been caught and lost too in its thickets and on its deceptive steppes.

The author of the *New Purchase* has written us a very amusing book, detailing many of the stirring scenes among the original settlers of different localities in the West.

His description of the early mode of crossing the Alleghannies, before the smooth turnpike was constructed, or the railroad passage even thought of, is to the life; and he that would laugh a little over a shaving scene in the west, where 'tis said good old elders keep "brier hooks" of razors to try the temper of their clerical brethren—let him read this same Robert Carlton's description of it in the second volume.

The author is, we presume, a lover of true religion and generous piety, yet we think some of the scenes might have been represented as effectively without the use of the precise language of the actors, when it is unbecoming. There is an occasional profane speech, with which we should not wish our children to become familiar by reading.

- 12.—*An Inquiry into the Organization and Government of the Apostolic Church; particularly with reference to the Claims of Episcopacy. By Albert Barnes. Philadelphia: Perkins & Purves. 1843. pp. 251.*

This is a convenient and excellent manual on the points of controversy between Episcopalians and those who maintain

the purity of the ministry. It pays little regard to the fathers, but presents the scriptural argument as fundamental.

It would be well for members of the church to be furnished with armor fitted for the conflict which is at hand; and we know of nothing, in the same compass, so satisfactory as this small volume by Mr. Barnes. On the basis of the Scriptures, any one may be prepared to meet an Episcopalian, when he sets up his exclusive claim to ordination; and with the great body of the church it will be of little avail to quote learned passages from the Fathers. Whatever they may have written and done, it is not by authority. The word of God alone is the rule of faith, and the basis of all order in the church.

The substance of this "Inquiry" first appeared in the *Quarterly Christian Spectator* in 1834-5, as a reply to Rev. Dr. H. U. Onderdonk's "Tract," entitled "Episcopacy tested by Scripture." It is now remodelled, however, and appears, not in opposition to Dr. Onderdonk directly, but to the Episcopalians. Somewhat has been added on the subject of "Confirmation," and the whole has been evidently penned in the kindest spirit, and with a sincere desire to arrive at the truth.

13.—*The Kingdom of Christ; or Hints respecting the Principles, Constitution and Ordinances of the Catholic Church.* By Frederick Denison Maurice, M. A., Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, and Professor of English Literature and History, in King's College, London. From the second London Edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. Philadelphia: Geo. S. Appleton. 1843. pp. 595.

This volume, by Professor Maurice, will doubtless be extensively read. The style is winning, the thoughts are lucidly expressed, and the propositions and arguments such as must attract notice, certainly in England, if not here. Mr. Maurice is full of the idea of a "CHURCH UNIVERSAL, not built upon human inventions or human faith, but upon the very nature of God himself, and upon the union which he has formed with his creatures." Such a church, we think, exists, and embraces in its bosom all, of every name, who love the Lord Jesus in sincerity and truth. The author's desire seems to be to have this truth more universally felt and acted on. So far, we accord with him. But then, we fear, at the same time, that his views of the efficacy of baptism, of the power of absolution in the ministry, etc. etc., will tend to render the church too much a kingdom like those of this world; and not one of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

Mr. M. does not go with the Romanist in denying the distinction of National Churches, and maintains also that the Church is a spiritual body, holding a spiritual Head: yet he leans so far over towards Rome, that, if in Rome, he might easily do as Rome does. We ourselves love unity and hate sectarianism, but the unity we love, is the unity of the Spirit; not a unity resting on external forms and services, but on a living faith in the heart, prompting holiness in the life.

Whilst, therefore, we should fear the tendency of some of Mr. M.'s principles, and cannot sympathize with him in all of his sentiments, we can commend the spirit in which the book is written, as doing honor to his heart.

- 14.—*The Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection stated and defended; with a Critical and Historical Examination of the Controversy, both Ancient and Modern.* By Rev. George Peck, D. D. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1842. pp. 474.

This work, by Dr. Peck, will be appreciated on all hands. It will be regarded by his own denomination as an accurate history and a good defence of the doctrine of perfection as held by them: and it enables others to know definitely what the Methodists of the present day mean by it.

For ourselves, we feel obliged to Dr. Peck for presenting the subject with so much ability and wisdom of research: and, although we should not be disposed to adopt the views, we can readily see that, with certain explanations, it may not be so very heterodox, and would certainly be far preferable to some other species of perfectionism, which have been recently broached in this land.

- 15.—*Psychology, or Elements of a New System of Mental Philosophy, on the Basis of Consciousness and Common Sense. Designed for Colleges and Academies.* By S. S. Schmucker, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg. Second Edition, much enlarged. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1843. pp. 329.

The first edition of this work was favorably reviewed in the Repository by Dr. Krauth, and also noticed by the editor. It will, therefore, be unnecessary for us to repeat our estimate of the work at length. It has our hearty approbation as a suitable text book on psychology, especially as now enlarged on some topics of interest omitted in the former edition, such as,

—"the classification of the different entities in the Universe; the subject of mnemonics; the processes of perception and sensation, and the theories for their explanation; the different classes of feeling; the nature of analytic reasoning, and laws of human belief; imagination; and the operations of conscience."

Without these additions, the system was incomplete; with them, it embraces all that is needful as an outline, to be filled up and extended by the living teacher.

The philosophy will not, of course, be sufficiently ideal and transcendental for some minds; yet even such will confess that Dr. Schmucker has investigated the science of mind with more than ordinary attention.

16.—*The Simple Cbler of Aggawam in America.* By Rev. Nathaniel Ward. Edited by David Pulsifer. Boston: James Monroe & Co. 1843. pp. 96.

This "Simple Cbler of Aggawam" was the Rev. Nathaniel Ward, born at Haverhill, England, in 1590. In 1631, he was summoned before the Bishop to answer for nonconformity, and was forbidden to preach. Having a warm friendship for the pilgrims, he embarked for New England in 1634, and was soon settled as pastor of the church at Aggawam or Ipswich. He had much to do in framing the laws of the infant Commonwealth, and in drawing up a Body of Liberties. In 1645 he wrote the "Simple Cbler," and published it in 1647, after his return to England.

Fuller, in his "Worthies of England," says of him: "Following the counsel of the poet,

Ridentem dicere verum,
Quis vetat?

He hath in a jesting way, delivered much smart truth of the present times." Increase Mather thus writes: "An hundred witty speeches of our celebrated Ward, who called himself the *Simple Cbler* of Aggawam, (and over whose Mantel-piece in his House, by the way, I have seen those three words engraved, SOBER, JUST, and a Fourth added, which was LATE,) have been reported; but he had one Godly Speech, that was worth 'em all; which was, *I have only Two Comforts to Live upon; The one is in the Perfections of Christ; The other is in the Imperfections of CHRISTIANS.*"

This same "Simple Cbler" has written some sharp things, and withal some very true things, in this little volume. Among

others, this: "Every singular opinion, hath a singular opinion of itself; and he that holds it a singular opinion of himself, and a simple opinion of all contra-sentients: he that confutes them, must confute all these at once, or else he does nothing."

And this:

"No king can king it right,
Nor rightly sway his rod;
Who truly loves not Christ,
And truly fears not God.

He cannot rule a land,
As lands should ruled been,
That lets himself be rul'd
By a ruling Roman Queen."

- 17.—*The History of the Christian Religion and Church, during the three first Centuries. By Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the German, by Henry John Rose, B. D. Philadelphia: James M. Campbell & Co. New York: Saxton & Miles.*

We have received from Messrs. Saxton & Miles, two parts of this valuable work. The whole will be completed in five numbers of the Biblical Cabinet, each containing ninety-six pages 8vo., in double columns, long primer type. Neander is chiefly known as an ecclesiastical historian, although his labors are not restricted to this department. He is deemed impartial, thorough in his researches, and desirous of exhibiting the truth. His spirit is good, and his aim high, and he is ranked among the friends of the truth in opposition to rationalism. And although we should differ with him in some of his principles and interpretations, we rejoice in his labors as tending to counteract the spirit of infidelity in his own country. The History before us will be read with interest and advantage, by those who would know more of the state of things in the primitive church.

- 18.—*The Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the Power thereof, according to the Word of God. By that Learned and Judicious Divine, Mr. John Cotton, Teacher of the Church at Boston, in New-England: tending to reconcile some present differences about Discipline. London: Henry Overton. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 108.*

This is a reprint of an old work of John Cotton, that learned and judicious divine, who was summoned before the Court of High Commission for not kneeling at the sacrament. He

fled, however, and came to this country in 1633; and so great was his influence in New-England, that he has been called her *Patriarch*. The present volume was prepared as an antidote to the disorders originated by Ann Hutchinson and others, and also as a defence of Congregationalism.

The old style of the book, in spelling, punctuation, etc., has been preserved, rendering it quite a curiosity. Should the plan be encouraged, other similar works will be issued.

- 19.—*The Remains of the Rev. James Marsh, D. D. late President and Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, in the University of Vermont; with a Memoir of his Life.* Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 642.

Dr. Marsh was undoubtedly one of the finest scholars of our country, and his *Memoir and Remains* must be sought after by the intelligent public. Through Messrs. Leavitt & Trow, we received the work, but at so late a date, that we can only notice it very briefly. It is an octavo volume, printed with large type and on good paper, making a beautiful book. It contains an interesting memoir, by Professor Torrey, to whom Dr. Marsh intrusted his manuscripts before his death, and by whom they have been arranged, as we find them in the volume before us. From the glance which we have been able to take at the work, we presume there will be found in it food for the mind—suggestive topics for reflection. We have a systematic arrangement of the Departments of Knowledge, with a view to their Organic Relations to each other in a General System—Remarks on some points connected with Physiology,—Remarks on Psychology,—Three Discourses on the Nature, Ground, and Origin of Sin, with several Tracts, etc.

- 20.—*Church Psalmist; or Psalms and Hymns for the Public, Social, and Private Use of Evangelical Christians.* New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1843. pp. 653.

Psalmody is to the church a subject of the highest interest; a good collection of psalms and hymns one of her best possessions. What delightful and useful sentiments are impressed on our hearts by the hymns of the sanctuary, in which we united in our youth. What a treasure would they be on some solitary isle of the ocean. How precious in old age, and on the bed of death.

The church should look well to her psalms and hymns. They are earliest learned and longest remembered. How important that they should be good and true. The verse too, in

which they are expressed, is of no trifling importance. The songs of the sanctuary may be made a by-word and a reproach to Zion, if dressed in too homely and vulgar a garb. Every thing about them ought to be chaste, classic, dignified, appropriate to the worship of Him, who is supreme excellence.

We have weighed the "Church Psalmist," and it is not found wanting. The classification is philosophical, the selections choice, the poetry good, the variety sufficient, the sentiments scripturally orthodox. Having said thus much, it is scarcely needful to add, that we think churches about to make a change could scarcely do better than to adopt this collection.

It would be pleasant to have entire uniformity throughout the Presbyterian and Congregational churches, in the use of a book of psalms and hymns, so that wherever we might go, we should find our own psalm-book; but this is perhaps scarcely to be expected.

- 21.—*Dominici Diodati, J. C. Neapolitani, de Christo græce loquente Exercitatio; qua ostenditur græcam sive hellenicam linguam cum Judæis omnibus, tum ipsi adeo Christo Domino, et apostolis nativam, ac vernaculam fuisse.* Neapoli, M. D. CC. LXVII. Edited with a preface, by ORLANDO T. DOBBIN, LL. B. Trinity College, Dublin. London: John Gladding. Dublin: Curry & Co. New York: Wiley & Putnam. 1843. pp. 187.

We have here a reprint—of course in Latin—of a very rare work, which, when it appeared, excited universal attention, and secured for its author many tokens of the high estimation in which his labor was held. It became so scarce, at length, that neither Pfannkuche nor Hug was able to find a copy of it, even at Naples. The copy, however, from which the present volume has been reprinted, was purchased there in 1823. Fabricy and Wiseman both had access to it in the libraries of Rome, and Ernesti, in 1771, published an analysis of it, having probably found it at Leipsic.

The author undertakes to prove, in the three sections of his book, 1, that the Greek had become the national language of Palestine in the time of Christ, 2, that Christ, his Apostles and the Jews generally spoke Greek, 3, that the basis, on which the opposite opinion rests, will not support it.

Although we are not yet ready, with the editor, to adopt the opinion of Diodati, believing only, with Ernesti, Hug and others, that the Greek language had become almost, if not quite

as prevalent in Palestine, in the age of the Apostles, as the Aramæan, we feel grateful to him for affording us the opportunity of reading Diodati's argument for ourselves, in his own language and arrangement. We also thank him for his favorable notice of our own labors in placing Winer's Idioms within the reach of English scholars: and we certainly think, as he does, that an acquaintance with Winer is "indispensable to the scholar." When shall American students be taught to study it? Till then, their knowledge of interpretation of the New Testament must be meagre.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

Walks in London and the Neighborhood. By Old Humphrey. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843.

Mr. Carter has complied with our request, that, if Old Humphrey appeared again, he would let us see him. He appears in somewhat of a new form, but still retaining his characteristics. Piety pervades his "Walks."

The Family of Bethany: or Meditations on the Eleventh Chapter of the Gospel according to St. John. By L. Bonnet. Translated from the French. With an Introductory Essay, by the Rev. Hugh White. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 256.

The Introductory Essay is good, but disproportionately long. The Meditations are interesting; many of them striking and profitable. The family of Bethany has always been precious to the Christian, as one which Jesus loved. Mr. Bonnet has well represented it in these pages.

Lessons on the Book of Proverbs, topically arranged, forming a System of Practical Ethics, for the use of Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 107.

For this small volume we are indebted, we believe, to Mrs. Louisa Payson Hopkins. The book of Proverbs cannot be too much studied, and we regard this as one of the very best helps in that study. It is a system of ethics.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Russia.

THE University at Dorpat has recently lost two of its most valuable professors—Huek, Professor of Anatomy, and Jansche, Professor of Philosophy.—Much has lately been done for the cause of education in Siberia. At Irkutsk there is a gymnasium of a high order, besides other schools there, and in many of the villages. Von Rupert, Governor-General of East Siberia, has founded an Institute for the instruction of girls of the higher class.—Professor Koch, accompanied by a number of young artists and scientific gentlemen, has set out on a second journey of scientific research, intending to traverse Great Armenia and the Caucasus.

Prussia.

A plan is proposed for the union of the Universities of Königsberg and Greiswald, as at the latter there are more professors than students, and at the former almost a like disproportion.—The Sanscrit manuscripts, purchased in London, from the estate of Sir Robert Chambers, are now in the University Library of Berlin, under the charge of Professor Hofer of Greiswald.

Germany.

The King of Bavaria is about to erect, in his palace-park, a house like those of Pompeii, after the design made at Pompeii by Professor Zahn.—The *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, established first by Hegel, have now been suppressed by the Saxon government, after having been exiled from Prussia in 1841.—Dr. Fr. Von Raumer has been appointed Rector of the University of Berlin.—Dr. Schöll has been called as professor extraordinary to Halle.—At Leipsic, Dr. Fr. A. Schilling has taken the place of Dr. Winer as Rector of the University. In this institution are about one hundred professors.

France.

A manuscript of the celebrated republican, Buonarrotti, has recently been discovered, which throws much light on the period from 1789 to the year V. of the Republic.

Great Britain.

A large secession has taken place from the established Kirk of Scotland, and formed a free Presbyterian Church.

United States.

Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., of Andover Theological Seminary, will continue the discussion of the questions on Liberty and Necessity, especially in relation to Edwards's system, in the October number of the Repository.



THE
AMERICAN
BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

OCTOBER, 1843.

SECOND SERIES, NO. XX. WHOLE NO. LII.

ARTICLE I.

REVIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. PART THE SECOND.

By Truman M. Post, Professor of Languages, Illinois College, Jacksonville.

The Social Influence of Democracy. By Alexis De Tocqueville, Member of the Institute of France, and of the Chamber of Deputies, etc., etc. Translated by Henry Reeve, Esq. With an Original Preface, by John C. Spencer, Counsellor at Law.

THE Philosophy of Human Society is destined to become the great study of the age. The laws and condition of social progress, virtue, and happiness; the action and destiny of intellectual, moral, and political organisms; those thousand fixed forms of religion, law, government, and opinion, into which human society has crystallized; the characteristic passions and tendencies of the million: these are topics which are forcing themselves with grave and solemn interest upon the mind of our times. The investigation is one not stimulated by a liberal curiosity merely, but by convictions, every day stronger, of its practical and imperative necessity. It is becoming more and more felt, that it involves the problem which the nations must solve or die.

Men are learning from melancholy experience, that it is vain attempting to sustain political systems apart from the intellectual and moral life of a people, and that when institutions cease

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to be expressions of that life, they must soon be frittered away by reform, or retrenched by revolution. Society ever attempts to assimilate to itself the forms which constitute its visible embodiment, and failing of that, it labors incessantly to throw off what it feels unsuited to its nature, and a restraint upon its development and action.

But again, between the political forms and the spirit of a people, there is a mutual interaction. Outward institutions are not simply passive expressions; they become to some extent the plastic *moulds* of the national mind. Once created, from whatever cause, they tend to form it to their own likeness, and to stereotype with their image all after times. The products, at first, of intellectual and moral causes, they become in turn the efficient producers of such causes, and standing, as they do, permanent forces amid shifting generations, their influence, though slow, must be mighty and sure, and will perpetuate itself in the virtue or vice, ignorance or enlightenment, the magnanimity or meanness, activity or torpor, of the millions they overshadow. If they are favorable to a pure morality—the only permanent basis of human society—they of themselves furnish, for any people, an augury full of political hope; if not, they or society must die; either by slow and putrid dissolution, or in agony and convulsion; or rather, in the latter case, they *and* society must die; they throw themselves upon the pyre on which they lay the corpse of an empire.

The questions, then, that demand the investigation of the citizen or statesman, with regard to systems of political institutions, relate not only to the mutual relations of the different parts of those systems—their internal harmony, and aptitude for self-perpetuated, facile and secure action, and their operation on outward and material interests: but with a deeper earnestness they compel him to ask, what are the great social principles which gave them birth; and of the existence of which, as the central forces of society, they still, if possessing vitality, stand as indices? and whether they continue in harmony with their primordial principles? whether they now represent the ruling spirit of a people? and again, what is the influence of this dominant and central power, and of the institutions which are its visible organs, on national thought, feeling, and manners?

Immediately connected with these inquiries relating to the physiology, so to speak, of society, is the study of social patho-

logy and therapeutics—the laws of disease and cure in political bodies. These inquiries, it will be perceived, involve the gravest questions that can engage the human mind—the requirements, value, and destiny of all political systems, and of human society itself.

These are among the questions, which the work standing at the head of this article, attempts to discuss in relation to Democracy—particularly as it develops itself in American society. The author selects for investigation the Democratic form amid other social forms, because he believes, that into this type the universal society of the race is fast and irresistibly working itself; and he singles out American society, not as exhibiting the peculiar and only outward form of Democracy, but as revealing its essential spirit and action.

The attempt, and I will add, the execution, merit well of our age, and especially of our Republic. He has attempted to show Democracy to itself. It is too commonly the fact, that those vast and universal movements of human society that are seen from time to time in human history, pursuing, with the vehemence of passion and the steadfastness of fate, their peculiar ends, are ignorant, meanwhile, of what it most behooves them to know themselves. Self-knowledge is as rare in nations and ages, as in individuals; and introspection, difficult and ungrateful at all times, alike to the million and the one, becomes especially so, when outward excitements are multiplied, and an intense and restless strife for immediate and physical well-being, gives overshadowing prominence and exhaustive interest to the present, the material and the partial, and leaves little taste or aptitude, for self-contemplation or general surveys. At such periods, a calm and wide-seeing Philosophy, applied to the analysis of the present or the forecast of the future, is rarely met with.

Such an age is our own. Embarked as we are on the River of Destiny, we are content, for the most part, with taking simply the course and rapidity of the eddies, on which float our individual interests, or at most, those of a party or section; while few mark the progress or direction of the mighty flood on which we are borne. The rush of waters and the crash of many shipwrecks are in our ears: fragments of old systems, mingling with the fresh glistening forms of those new-born, are driving past us; and in the distance, it may be, the breakers lift their white signal, and the cataract utters afar its warning roar; and

the stifled cry of the millions that sink, blends with the shout of those that exult as never to die. Unheeding, meanwhile, we chase the bubbles in our own little vortex; or we pursue the rainbow painted on the spray in the forward distance, unmindful that it overarches the cataract: or, if awake to the perils that press, struggling to keep our individual fortunes afloat amid the wild drift, we cast but brief and distracted glances at the fearful power that sits upon the flood; rarely have we leisure or vastness of vision to take its aspect or dimensions. We exult, it may be, in the assurance of movement, but few discern whether that movement is toward Light or Gloom. Or, to change the figure, while, as in astronomy, we study the internal relations of our own particular system, we dimly read the movement of that mighty system of systems, of which our own is but a fragment.

The power that now sits dominant on the tide of human affairs, is Democracy: it is the ruling spirit of our era, the gravitating social force. It is the result which the turbulent and diversified civilization of modern times is elaborating; the universal solvent, into which all social, civil, and ecclesiastical inequalities are sinking.

Democracy is the *fact* of our era; whether our choice or not, matters little—it is our destiny. Ever since modern civilization began to emerge from the chaos in which sank that of the ancient world, European society has been moving toward this result, with a steadfastness that marks a great law of Providence. Like such laws, this tendency is beyond the power of human strength, or sagacity, to arrest or divert. The spirit that animates this movement, and that, through a thousand years of vicissitude and revolution, has with such persistency and vigilance, and such instinctive discernment, pursued its peculiar ends, now scents its quarry not from afar, and with accelerated rapidity hastens towards its assured goal—its day of universal triumph. That day, neither force nor fraud, nor shifts nor expedients, nor wisdom, nor piety can stave off: it is the destiny of the race: it is the ordinance of Heaven. All that remains for human wisdom is to direct and attemper this power; to prevent its extravagances and atrocities; and no longer exasperating by vain resistance, to endeavor to enlighten, humanize, and Christianize it. While Owenism, Agrarianism, and Infidelity, and the Protean shapes of Anarchism are aiming to intoxicate, blind, and madden it, it belongs to

Christian Truth and Love to penetrate it with a purer, milder, and more benign reason.

The germinant principle of Democracy is involved in the essential definition of a human being. It is no obscure corollary from the religious relations of man, especially as disclosed by the Christian Faith. It is the immediate inference which common sense and feeling draw from the revealed facts of our common origin and destiny, and of our direct relations to a common God: confirmed, also, by the consciousness of a community of reason and moral sentiment, and of innate and inalienable rights, and essential and intransferable obligations. Thus it is the child of common reason wedded to a common faith. Deriving life from these sources, it is idle to speculate upon the probable chances of baffling or quelling the democratic energy of our times. The child of nature and religion, the assurance of its life is embraced in that of its parents.

The developments of Democracy in its hours of triumph, in modern times, have thus far been too often the paroxysms of a force gigantic, but ignorant and brutalized, and taking a moment's revenge for ages of wrong; stimulated by the fearful energies of despair, or the no less fearful energies of sudden and blind hope: and again, after an hour of frightful ascendancy, throwing itself, crippled and exhausted by its excesses, at the foot of a new tyranny. Its final ascendancy, however, is foretold with assurance, by past ages of painful but certain progress: but whether its future course shall be through the abyss of revolution upon revolution, (from which it shall bring out the wisdom of woful experience,) or whether it shall be guided to its Heaven-appointed goal by the benign and purifying influence of Truth and Love, is the great problem of our times.

Such is the consideration that has stimulated our Author to the writing of these works. He regards the course of Democracy as a *fact*—permanent, irresistible, and universal. Therefore it is that he attempts to delineate this type of society—to analyze and estimate its forces and tendencies; and to forecast its action and danger, and its ultimate results. He approaches the subject as a philosopher and a philanthropist, not as an advocate. His work is written not so much for America as for Europe, and especially for France. He selects American society for his analysis, as exhibiting Democracy in the most mature and natural state in which it has yet been exhibited; as showing more of its full form and features, and less perturbed

by extrinsic and accidental influences, than where it is yet struggling into life, or when new-born of revolution, it still feels the tumultuary and convulsive throes of its birth. He does not regard Democracy as restricted to our political forms; its outward mechanism and organization may be widely varied. Nor does he look to our society for an exact and universal paradigm of its social results: allowance is to be made for peculiarities of origin and history and local influences. But the force of these being estimated, he aims to discern in our political institutions and our social condition, the vital spirit and the essential tendencies of Democracy, and thence to educe general truths, in the light of which human society may forecast its dangers and provide against them; and foreseeing the ultimate goal to which the hand of Heaven is leading, may move toward it intelligently and tranquilly, with the calmness of certainty, if not of hope.

His philosophy consists in the application of the known laws of human nature to the phenomena of our Democracy, and in constructing general propositions from the principles thus indicated. By thus pursuing facts to their principles, and principles until they disclose some universal psychological or social law, he attempts to separate the local, temporary, and accidental, from the essential, the permanent, and the universal, and to distinguish what is merely American from what belongs to human society everywhere.

It is not the aim of this article to attempt a minute criticism or analysis of these works, or to sit in judgment on their general merits. Their wide celebrity renders this gratuitous, and their high reputation might give the air of presumption to common censure or praise. The first volume, which relates to the influence of Democracy upon political institutions, was published some five years since, and has been repeatedly reviewed, both in Europe and America, with different degrees of ability, and generally with high and deserved commendation. The verdict of public opinion with regard to it may be considered as already rendered, and recorded. It has given the author rank amid the standard writers and profound thinkers of our age. The second volume, on which alone it is our present purpose to remark, will be found more attractive to the general reader than the former; it embraces also, in our view, questions of weightier moment. In it he attempts to analyze the influence of Democracy upon those interests, to which all political institutions are

but ministers and guardians ; and with relation to which alone they possess any value—the inner and spiritual life of a people, their opinions, tastes, and sentiments, and the habits and manners which are the expression of the national mind. Again, he briefly treats of the reaction of these intellectual and moral products of Democracy upon its political institutions. In this volume, as in the first, the design of our author has in general been executed with great candor and ability. There is usually exhibited the same accuracy of observation and sharpness of analysis ; the same perspicuous insight into human nature, combined with a philosophy clear, far-seeing, and rapid in its generalizations. It is, on the whole, a beautiful specimen of general reasoning applied to topics deeply involving the sympathies, affections, and hopes of the American heart. You may at times, perhaps, find difficulty in admitting the perfect accuracy and completeness of his facts, and the correctness of his postulates ; but in all cases you are compelled to admire the acumen and boldness with which he pursues facts to their principles, and principles to their remote consequences. The imagination is captivated by the brilliancy and grandeur of his generalizations, even though the reason may feel compelled to start back from his conclusions. The logical defects, which we may think we discover in the work, arise mainly from his Gallic bias toward general ideas. The French mind in our times is marked by a taste for rapid and sparkling generalization: we must also accord to them a superior faculty in this kind.

A fondness and aptitude for general ideas are essential to the philosophic faculty, and if accompanied with patience and the love of Truth, may be most favorable to the progress of an enlarged and liberal philosophy ; but if they lead one to seek after the brilliant, rather than the true, and to overstate, rather than fail to be striking and authoritative ; or if they lead to the hope of arresting general truths by impatient and hasty inductions, then, indeed, “they lead to bewilder, and dazzle to blind.” They produce a style which is apt to fascinate the inexperienced reader, and delight him with the idea that he is rapidly enriching his mind with new and profound truths. In perusing works, therefore, marked by this bias, there is need of constant watchfulness, lest one be surprised or dazzled into false conclusions, and a necessity of studying the intellectual and moral peculiarities of the author, before committing one’s self to his guidance: indeed, where it is strongly developed, the highest intellectual

and moral endowments will not warrant implicit trust. A passion for what is positive and generic may mislead the clearest and purest mind. Where great questions are at issue, the feeling of suspense is so painful, and that of certain knowledge so delightful, and the assurance of the discovery of vast truths so grateful both to our self-complacency and our indolence, that they will often blind the severest analysis, the most sincere love of Truth. Generic terms seem to furnish a sort of rainbow-bridge to ultimate conclusions, along which one may pass with easy and delightful rapidity to the desired goal, without weltering through the vast and chaotic morass of particulars, out of which the splendid arch should have been constructed. The writer unconsciously deceives himself by the use of generic terms, making the same algebraic characters represent the same values in different parts of his calculation.

In this fondness and faculty for generalization M. De Tocqueville shares largely; but in him they are uniformly tempered by a sincere love of Truth, and are guided, in most cases, by patient, accurate, and comprehensive induction. Some cases, where they seem not to have been so, will be presently pointed out. But, as a general fact, while with a bold and rapid hand he projects the outlines of vast social principles, these principles will be found to bear a severe scrutiny, and satisfactorily to classify and solve many important phenomena of American society; and his intellectual structures will be proved solid as well as glittering. Where they seem to be based upon insufficient data, we should remember how small was the field open to his survey, and how brief the experience from which he could reason, frequently those of our Republic alone; and when his generalizations seem not to accord with his facts, we should not forget how extremely difficult it must often be for a foreigner to ascertain facts with the precision and correctness of coloring essential to their true significance, especially when these facts are spread over a mighty territory, and amid a most miscellaneous population; and the inquirer himself may be surrounded by those incompetent to inform, or interested to deceive. Perhaps a simpler and deeper piety would have better qualified him to appreciate the religious element in American society, and to estimate its position and force in the system. A warmer devotional glow, if it would not have added to the accuracy and clearness of his philosophy, might have placed him on a higher point of vision, and taught him to take the course of human

destiny, by the lights not only of earth but Heaven, and might have shed upon some of his pages the hues of a brighter hope.

As it regards rhetorical qualities, his diction is commonly marked with crystalline clearness, and often, as it appears in the translation, (the original work we have not seen,) it is highly nervous and significant; though at times it becomes obscure, from his frequent use of abstract and general terms, which, to English minds at least, are bounded by a vague and waving outline. A defect which, we are informed, has been somewhat corrected by the translator. The term Democracy, he does not use in strict uniformity of import: at one time making it denote the rule of the people; at another, synonymous with political equality. Saving a few exceptions of this kind, the language is lucid, simple, and pertinent. His style is of the Ionic order, combining strength with elegance; and often reminds one of the severe beauty of the antique. In sententiousness and dignity, and in frequency of striking antithesis, it approaches Tacitus; while often, in the ease and clearness of its flow, it is more like Xenophon, or Cicero in his philosophical treatises. Often, too, like the great Roman Historian above alluded to, in a pathos, intense but tranquil, in a vigor and grandeur of thought, flashed, not painted, and in loftiness of moral sentiment, he rises to the heights of philosophic eloquence. Not unfrequently he passes from a chastened beauty to a subdued majesty: often strong, he is never too strong for himself. He has dignity without state, and force without passion.

In brief, to him who wishes to study the practical operation of our political institutions, and the impress of democracy upon the intellectual, moral, and social character of a people, sketched with graphic boldness and general accuracy, and analyzed with a philosophy always candid and acute, and often profound, in a style clear, calm, and grave, generally marked with quiet strength and sober beauty, but which, at times, swells to a solemn grandeur and pathos, we know not where we would refer him sooner than to these volumes. They deserve a place not only in every family library, but in the course of study in every American College. They treat of subjects of vital moment to ourselves, and in their consequences affecting the interests of the human race; and they exhibit facts and philosophy, without which no education in the American Republic ought to be entitled liberal—the facts and philosophy of our institutions and society. Their style, and the philosophic method to which they

would discipline the student, in addition to the knowledge they impart, come in to substantiate their claim to hold a rank in a course of Collegiate study, at least until a superior substitute can be presented. As it is, they fill a niche otherwise vacant; they meet a felt want, and if not the best imaginable supply, they are at least the only one extant. And that this supply has been offered us by a foreigner—one not biassed by personal interests, nor committed to partisan views, but standing aloof, and noting with the speculation of a calm observer—is a recommendation rather than otherwise. Though it may have taken from the thoroughness of insight, and accuracy of detail in some cases, it could hardly fail to render his views of the whole less distorted and perturbed, and his general judgments more tranquil and more just. Extreme proximity, though favorable to minute exactitude, often prevents our taking the relative proportions of things. Nearness often perplexes and confounds. It requires a distant view to appreciate the symmetry of St. Peter's. As it is, we have reason to be grateful, that text books so valuable to the student of American history and society have been furnished from whatever source. Nor will we leave this point without expressing surprise and regret, at the little prominence these departments of study hold at our universities. As an intellectual discipline, M. De Tocqueville has shown they are susceptible of a philosophical method, tasking the highest powers of the human reason. As a treasure-house of social and political truths, the records of no empire are richer than our own. Her life has been one laboratory of great principles. She has, too, a rare wealth of illustrious examples of heroic and holy virtue, of valor, patriotism, and piety, and of civic eloquence, wisdom, and magnanimity. Superadd to this, that she is the living exhibition of a social power, the mightiest at present on earth, and which is fast moving towards universal empire—i. e. Democracy—and it will be perceived, that the claims of this study to a prominent position, if not to a separate chair of instruction in American universities, are strong.

Yet it is not so much from what these works have accomplished, as from that of which they give augury, that we regard their appearance with pleasure. We cannot but hail them as "first of a long line of many such." Whether or not they have brought out results of high practical value, they have at least opened a new and rich vein of inquiry, which cannot fail to be followed up till it yields priceless treasure. They are

pioneer efforts to collate materials, and establish principles, for a new science—that of the Philosophy of Human Society. May we not hope that such a science may be one of the important gifts of the past world to the future ages? The bequest to the millennial era, of gloomy chiliads of disorder, disappointment, passionate conflict, and doleful change? May we not hope, by means of induction from experience, to arrive at important and universal truths, relative to the nature and tendencies of societies, and to demonstrate the necessary operation of great social causes, that embrace vast masses and consecutive generations? and may it not be possible thus to forestall or provide for the ultimate consequences?

Human character has its average; and this average we may arrive at by generalizing the facts of human history; just as Life Insurance Companies, though unable to pronounce with certainty upon the duration of any specific life, yet by induction from a sufficient number of particulars, can arrive at an average, on the presumption of which they graduate their premiums, so as, in the aggregate, to secure to themselves a profit from their policies. The character of societies is the average character of man; and their action is the expression of that character. Thus the conduct of masses is subject to general and ascertainable laws. And up to a certain limit, the certainty of our calculations would seem proportioned to the number embraced in the bodies corporate, whose action and fortunes we attempt to forecast; as average estimates are always safest when applied to large masses. Thus despotisms, though at present becoming rather the stereotyped expression of fixed modes of thought, and feeling, and policy, rather than of individual caprice or passion, still, as they must embrace as an essential element, the control of an individual, admit of less certain presage than aristocracies; and aristocracies, unless sufficiently numerous to ensure the invariable triumph of the corporate interest or passion over that of the individual, are more uncertain in their action than democracies.

Thus, though the course of democracies, within a limited view, often seems perturbed with caprice and passion, and while frequent changes in administrative measures and outward forms, and dominant parties, is perhaps the necessary condition of their existence, still the passions and interests, which in the long run sway them, and the persistency with which they cling to their essential properties, and pursue, through all changes, their vital

ends, are certain as the great laws of animal instinct. They are but an evolution of what lies most deep in the universal human heart; and from that heart in one age we can reason to its history in another. Great Nature wheels on her course unchanged, in the external universe and the soul of man. The material world, with its barriers and exigencies, will be around our races as they move into the light of the 100th century, nearly the same as they are now, or were before the flood; and human nature will be human nature still—the same as in the days of the Cæsars or the Pharaohs. If the future of this world is not to be a transcript of its past, it will not be because great individual or social laws are annulled, or like causes have ceased to produce like effects, but because mankind, grown wiser by experience, and listening to the suggestions of Celestial wisdom, will aim to amend and change causes themselves; and strive not so much to fetter the hands as to cleanse the heart, out of which are the issues alike of individual and social life; and because they will have learned to watch and respect the great laws of Nature and of Providence, and not to disregard or defy them.

As we hope well for the race, then, we are compelled to believe that it is possible for the nation to discover these laws in the past, and, taking counsel by experience, to guard against future shipwreck. It augurs well for the coming age, that there are those who are attempting to educe and generalize these laws; not that the importance of such a work has not been felt before, and the attempt partially, at times, been made. That extraordinary man, whose passion and genius for order, seemed to crystallize into system whatever he touched—Aristotle—attempted to reduce political facts to a science. We have to regret the loss of a work in which he described and analyzed all the known forms of government of his time, two hundred and fifty-five in number. Something of the kind also was attempted by the framers of the American Constitution. But these attempts were made for specific or political ends—for governments rather than societies—for the machine rather than the motive power.

The present seems likely to constitute an epoch in this province of investigation. A diligence and enthusiasm, hitherto unprecedented, are exhibited in the ascertainment and classification of social facts.

The works of M. De Tocqueville on American Democracy,

and the attempts of other writers of the same school, to collate, and generalize the facts of European society, nobly lead on the enterprise. Let similar analyses be applied to all the political and social systems which history develops, and let some intellectual architect, like the author of the "Principia," or the "Novum Organum," appear, with a genius vast, sincere, and mighty enough truly to generalize and interpret these materials, and may we not with confidence hope that new light may be thrown across the pathway of nations, and universal and perpetual laws be traced, through the social, as they have been through the astronomical world—laws, by the observance of which human society, with new rapidity, security and courage, may move on to its golden era? Or is all this a pleasant dream? While man, the individual, builds upon the experience of his predecessors, and thus might perpetually ascend, must his progress be limited by the fact, that he is prisoned in by a society which admits of the assignment of no certain laws, or the ascertainment of any universal truths; but which is marshalled on to its destiny by blind chance, or inexorable fate? While the individual is on the advance, must society remain from age to age stationary as the brutes, or ever return upon itself in the same dreary and bloody circle? We cannot acquiesce in such a gloomy conclusion. It is in our view cowardly and enfeebling, and as contradictory to a sound philosophy as to a cheering faith. Therefore, we hail with high pleasure the volumes before us. We are grateful for what they bring, and still more for what they promise. Nevertheless there are some opinions, to which the author arrives, which we regard as mistaken and mischievous, and from which our reason and our hopes for the race compel us to dissent.

Some of these, as vitally affecting our courage, and energy, and plans of action, we have thought it not consistent with duty to permit to pass unnoticed; and after a consideration of these, we have thought it might not be barren of interest and utility, to attempt to carry out some of the principles he has developed, and others akin to them, in their application to ourselves, and inquire what dangers and duties they indicate, and what horoscope they project of our empire.

What are to be the religious and intellectual and social features of the Democratic Era, which is opening upon us, is among the vast questions M. De Tocqueville attempts to solve, or at least to penetrate with conjecture. The answer he gives to the first

of these—that relating to the religious condition of the coming ages—seems to us alike opposed to the indications of Providence, Prophecy, and Philosophy. History, and the laws of the human mind, appear to point to dissimilar and more cheering results; and when we turn from these pages to those of the Sacred Oracles, and walk along the illumined perspective of the future they disclose, we feel as if escaped from the dim cell of a St. Dominic, or the stifling gloom of the sacred office, into the blessed light of day.

We refer the reader to chapter 6th, vol. 2d, entitled “Of the progress of Roman Catholicism in the United States.” He concludes as follows: “There ever have been, and ever will be, men, who after having submitted some portion of religious belief to the principle of authority, will seek to exempt several other parts of their faith from its influence, and to keep the mind floating at random between liberty and obedience. But I am inclined to believe, the number of these thinkers will be less in democratic, than other ages, and that our posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts, some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome.”

A startling conclusion truly. Most American readers would dismiss it with a shrug or a sneer, sorrowing at a weakness in a mind they are compelled to respect and admire, but as too palpably absurd to merit refutation. We shall not so treat it. The frequency, with which such conclusions are drawn by Catholic writers, indicates some apparent foundation. Let us inquire, then, with the seriousness to which our author is entitled, whether the belief to which he “is inclined” can be sustained by fact, and logic. Is there a natural tendency in Democracy to combine with Romanism, in Civil Liberty to ally itself with Spiritual Despotism?

We may find it at least instructive to observe, how a mind of such sagacity and candor, has been led to a belief so wide from our own; and we may be sure, that the facts which have seemed to him adequate to authorize it, have in them what strongly claims our regard. By looking at chapters fifth and sixth, it will be found, that his opinions relative to the religious tendencies of democracy, are based, first, upon supposed facts observed in American society, and secondly, on the necessary tendencies of the human mind under the influence of democratic institutions; which tendencies he thinks explain those facts,

and prove them to be a characteristic and legitimate result of democracy.

First, then, let us look at his facts. Those failing, doubts at least will be cast over the philosophy that accounts for them. His sixth chapter opens with this startling enunciation: "America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same time (according to reports worthy of belief) the country, in which the Roman Catholic belief is making most progress;" after which he significantly remarks: "At first sight this is surprising." To an American, I apprehend it will be both "surprising" and new; or it augurs poorly for the spread of Romanism in other countries. If we found representations of this kind in these volumes only, we should suppose the ecclesiastical connexion of the author had unconsciously biassed his judgment, and distorted the language of facts, if it had not led him to mistake wishes for facts. But the great candor of the author, and the uniform occurrence of such statements in Catholic writers relative to this country, will not permit us thus to account for them. Their uniformity proves them to be a part of a *system*. For instance, in Chateaubriand's "Sketches of Modern Literature," in connexion with facts and reasonings, most novel and extraordinary, relative to the connexion between Romanism and civil liberty in Europe, we find it gravely asserted that "most of the western states are now Catholic. The progress of this communion in the United States exceeds all belief. Here it has been invigorated in its evangelical element—popular liberty, while other communions decline in profound indifference"!! The facts, and the argument will, we imagine, strike an American as equally "surprising" and original. It is stated also in the "Annalles de la Propagation de la Foi" for June 1839, "In ten years the number of the Faithful has increased one third. In the Atlantic states they form a powerful minority. In the greater part of the western states they form a plurality, and at some points perhaps a majority of the inhabitants"!! This statement, though evidently phrased with a view to convey to the careless reader, more than the words strictly interpreted might hold the writer responsible for, will seem hardly less "surprising" than the former. Such uniformity and persistency of misrepresentation seem to point to a systematic fraud somewhere, or to a singular consistency in delusion. It may arise in part from ignorance, but it looks like Jesuitism—like a deliberate

imposture, practised by the Romish priesthood in this country, on their patrons in Catholic Europe, or rather a fraud by the Romish Church upon the Romish world, to stimulate their charities and their zeal. Such statements have been frequently put forth without any formal contradiction, because their notorious absurdity, amid an American community, neither required nor admitted one. This silence on our part has probably furthered the design for which they were made. They seem designed for effect upon Europe, to stimulate the hopes and enterprise of the Papists, and abuse democracy in the eyes of its Protestant friends, and at the same time to demonstrate it to its Catholic admirers, to be the "evangelical element" of Romanism; while despotic and penurious Austria, on the other hand, is to be allured into the great North American mission, by the promise of the eventual subversion of popular liberty; Jesuitism it is, that is to put a hook into the nose of the great Leviathan, now grown so fierce that none dare stir him up. Our silence meanwhile has undoubtedly been used to our disadvantage. Upon those for whom these statements were designed, the impression has been made, that the question at issue has gone against us by default.

As a summary refutation of statements, like those above quoted, let us invite the attention of our transatlantic brethren to a few statistics, which will show the value of M. De Tocqueville's statement for the purpose for which it is used. They will indicate, that even granting to be true what he says of the increase of the Catholic communion in this country, it will prove nothing of the religious tendencies of democracies. It would simply demonstrate that free institutions, civil and religious, a cheap and rich soil, and high wages being presented on one side of the ocean, and starvation and civil and religious oppression driving nations into the sea on the other, there will naturally set a strong tide of migration from the latter to the former; and this of course will produce a "surprising" increase of the communion to which this migration is attached. Such is the relation of the United States to some of the nations of the old world, and especially those of Catholic Europe; and hence the increase of that communion in this country, which has given color to the sanguine predictions of its adherents. But the increase as little proves the tendency of democracies towards Romanism as the present condition of Hindoostan does the tenden-

cies of Brahminism towards the English Episcopacy, or the irruption of Northern Barbarians the tendencies of Roman civilization towards Vandalism.

The increase of Romanism in the United States is mainly the *increase of Catholic immigration*. A failure to notice this fact gives to the reports, which Catholic Ecclesiastics are wont to make from this country, though true in words, all the mischiefs of a positive falsehood in their logical interpretation. But not only is the cause of increase unnoticed in their inferences from it, but the increase itself is exaggerated. That the Catholics constitute "a majority of the population" of any of the western states, except perhaps the one originally planted by them, is a statement too much of the Bombastes vein, to require serious denial on this side of the Atlantic. Nor do they form a "plurality" in any state other than the two founded by themselves. In most of the other states, they are far from being a "powerful minority," and it should be remembered, that Protestantism, though divided on minor points, in relation to Romanism should be reckoned as one body; in suspicion and aversion toward that system they are united. The "Annalles" quoted above estimate our Catholic population at 1,250,000. No other estimates, which we have seen, put it higher than 1,000,000; but granting it to amount to 1,200,000, their increase by birth and immigration during the last ten years has not exceeded 700,000. A few statistics will deprive this augmentation of much of its marvellousness. The council, held in Baltimore in 1830, estimated the population then within the Romish communion at 500,000. Statistics from the port of New-York (see the American Almanac for 1838) show a foreign immigration at that port from 1830 to 1837 as follows:—

1830	-	-	-	30,224
1831	-	-	-	31,739
1832	-	-	-	48,689
1833	-	-	-	41,702
1834	-	-	-	48,110
1835	-	-	-	35,303
1836	-	-	-	60,541

The number of passengers, who arrived at New-York from Jan. 1st to July 27th, 1837, was 34,554.

We may therefore safely estimate the whole number for 1837 at 60,000

For the years 1838 and 1839 we have no returns.

Suppose them equal to the average of the two years preceding, and the one following, and we have for

1838, 60,000

1839, 60,000

According to a statement in the North American Review for Jan. 1841, from Jan. 1st to Nov.

1st, 1840, the immigration at New-York amounted to 58,000 ; we may therefore put the total for the year

1840 at 60,000

According to these estimates the whole number of arrivals at the port of New-York, from 1830 to 1841 amounts to

536,208

According to the statements of the Commercial Advertiser, reported in the American Almanac for 1838, the arrivals at the port of New-York in 1836 were to the whole number of arrivals in the seaports of the United States during the same year, nearly in the ratio of 56 to 80. Applying this ratio of that year (and we have no means of arriving at that of any other) to the above estimate of arrivals in New-York, and we have for the whole immigration on our seaboard from 1830 to 1840 inclusive, 766,011.

Reports from the port of Quebec, from 1830 to 1837, make the immigration at that port during those seven years, 216,437. At the annual average this estimate furnishes, applied to the four years subsequent, the total of immigration at Quebec from 1830 to 1841 would amount to 340,113. In all probability, especially in view of the enormous amount of public works executed in the United States during that period, more than two thirds of this number have found their way into the United States, giving us an immigration, by way of Quebec, of 226,742, during the above period. Add this to the arrivals on our seaboard, and the total of arrivals in the United States from 1830 to 1841, amounts to 980,753.

The next question is, what proportion of these are Catholic immigrants ? To answer this, we must inquire from what countries they come ; and we regret that we have before us, to illustrate this point, only the reports of a single year, though we know of no reason why this may not be taken as a sample

of the rest. In 1836 the whole number of passengers arriving on our seaboard, were estimated at 80,952. Of these, from the British Isles were 47,792; from the German states 20,142; from France 4,443: making from these sources a total of 72,377. We may safely calculate that seven-eighths of these arrivals were immigrants, giving us an immigration from these countries of 64,448. Now, no one acquainted with the character of the immigrants from these sources, will doubt that at least five-sixths of these, amounting to 53,707, were French, German and Irish Catholics. Now, supposing that seven-eighths of the 80,952 passengers who arrived that year were immigrants, the ratio of the Catholic to the entire immigration of the year was nearly that of 53 to 71. Apply this ratio to the aggregate immigration on our seaboard from 1830 to 1841, and it gives, as the result for this period, 571,811. Of the immigration through the Canadas during this period, at least (as the Irish generally pass to the States while the English remain in the province) five-sixths, we might say nine-tenths, amounting to 188,951, may be added to the above sum. This gives us the sum total of Catholic immigration from 1830 to 1841, 761,762. This estimate is unquestionably too small; we have purposely made it so in order to avoid all cavils.

Now, according to the estimates of Catholics themselves, their increase during this period, allowing 50,000 to have been added during the last year, has not exceeded 800,000; and this estimate is thought to be too large by at least one hundred thousand; but at their own reckoning, against an augmentation of 800,000 there is an offset of above 760,000 immigrants, in addition to natural increase meanwhile. The latter we admit is not great; sickness and accident have dealt hardly with the poor emigrant; but amid a people that is doubling itself every thirty years, may not the natural increase fill up the deficit of 40,000?

In the light of these facts, does the progress of the Romish communion among us "exceed all belief?" Is it even very "surprising?" Does it indicate a mighty change in the course of public sentiment, or merely in the course of shipping? Does it show an increase of Romanism, taking Christendom at large? Could not a person speedily grow rich, on this scheme of gain, by shifting coin from one pocket to another? Is there any thing to warrant a tone of triumphing gratulation, even in view of numerical increase, to say nothing of intellectual and

moral value, in a country where nations are literally born in a day? But we should not compute numbers merely. A regard to the intellectual and moral worth of the increments, leaves still less reason for exultation. While Romanism has been receiving into her communion her ignorant and pauper masses in hundreds of thousands, Protestantism has gathered around herself from the bosom of our nation, and warm from its heart with pilgrim blood, her millions. Could this article reach the ears of the foreign patrons of the Romish priesthood in this country, we would say to them, as knowing something of the West, the representations made to them of this part of our republic, if not in the letter, are at least in the intent and impression, glaringly false. The disgorgement upon our shores, within ten years past, of almost a million of foreigners,—a multitude which, though comprising many that we gladly welcome, consists to a great extent of the refuse of the prisons and poor-houses of the old world, and of the abject or turbulent outcasts of ghostly and secular despotisms,—furnishes the philosophy both of the growth of Romanism in this country, and of the recent alarm on that subject.

Among the extremely ignorant and credulous, the demisavage of the frontier, or the frivolous rabbles of our great cities, priestly charlatanism and pretension may from time to time inveigle a convert. Music and painting, and costly decoration, and pompous ceremonial, may allure the weak, the voluptuous, the libertine, and the sentimentalist. But into the true American heart little intoxication has been thrown. Upon the substantial and intelligent citizens of the United States, the fascination of outward and sensuous attractions is likely to produce but little impression. We are, in general, too much of a matter of fact people,—requiring to be convinced rather than delighted,—to be converted by mere appliances to the taste, by the lull of music, or charms of painting, or by the sublimity and richness of cathedrals; and we are too much inclined to have our own way, even in things sacred, to be cheated out of our liberty of thinking as we will, and speaking as we think, by suavity of manners, or splendor of costume, or consecrated titles, by the soft matin or solemn vesper, or the imprisoned sanctity of seraphic sisterhoods. Romanism may, from time to time, secure a convert; and so do the impostures of Mormon and Matthias. For no delusion, however absurd or blasphemous, can fail of some supporters amid a people, where so much intel-

lectual and social activity is at work, not only amid the enlightened masses, but ferments in wild freedom amid the dark-minded and the fanatical. But the case of an intelligent, native born American, turning from Protestantism to Romanism, is exceedingly rare. The truth is, Romanism is almost universally felt to be antagonist to the spirit of our institutions, and as such, it is regarded with suspicion, and its thronging armies from abroad, with alarm.

If Romanism triumph in this country, it will be the triumph of fraud over generous confidence, of banded and drilled ignorance over schismatic intelligence, of cunning over strength, of the disciplined and mechanical armies of a ghostly despotism over the remiss or factious forces of civil and religious freedom. Yet let not too much reliance be reposed on the factions of Protestantism, or the power of priestly demagoguism. Let an aggressive purpose against any great principle of our institutions be disclosed and avowed, and the very alarm will be a band of union.

But should Romanism conquer in ten thousand enterprises like the one now directed towards these United States, by the means now employed, it would prove nothing of the affinities of Democracy and Religious Despotism. It would prove the tendency of democracy toward Romanism, just as much as it would its tendency to breed Germans and Irishmen, and no more. The facts then, even if admitted as De Tocqueville states them, being found entirely irrelevant to his conclusions, his reasoning to account for those conclusions has no longer any significance. Yet we will not leave it here. Let us consider a little the principles, to which he attempts to reduce his supposed facts, and by means of which he attempts to shore up his general conclusions. We read the human mind widely amiss in history and in our own breast, or his philosophy is as mistaken as his facts, in attempting to prove the necessary tendency of democracy toward Romanism; his reasonings, succinctly stated, amount to the following propositions: 1st. "Men cannot do without dogmatic belief," especially in "matters of religion," (see book 1st, chap. 5th,) and peculiarly indispensable is such belief in democratic communities. 2d. The taste for unity, which the nature of their institutions produces, requires, that the source of dogmatic belief should be one. "Religious powers not radiating from a common centre" are naturally repugnant to their mind, (see book 1st, chap. 6th.) 3d. Therefore, to

Rome, whose "great unity attracts" them, the democratic ages will return. It will be seen that the connexion between the 2d and 3d of these steps implies an intermediate one, viz. that Protestantism recognizes and presents no one source of authority in matters of religious belief and discipline.

His views, as it regards the first proposition, are developed in chap. 5th: "Men," he remarks, "are immeasurably interested in acquiring fixed ideas of God and of the soul, and of their common duties to their fellow men."—"None but minds singularly free from the ordinary anxieties of life—minds at once penetrating, subtle, and trained to thinking—can, even with the assistance of much time and care, sound the depth of these most necessary truths. Studies of this nature are far above the average capacity of men, and even if the majority of mankind were capable of such pursuits, it is evident that leisure to cultivate them would still be wanting." "Fixed ideas of God and truth are indispensable to the daily practice of men's lives, but the practice of their lives prevents their acquiring such ideas."

That these statements, rightly understood, convey an important truth, and one to be deeply pondered in our times, none will deny, but couched as they are in general terms, they may be abused to conclusions the most false and mischievous.

What is meant by "dogmatic belief"? Is it belief without reason? or simply belief without prior personal experience or investigation of the logical grounds on which all belief ultimately reposes? One would think, from M. De Tocqueville's reasoning about it, that it was like our coats, to be put off or put on at our pleasure, or a creature of popular suffrage that could be ordained or deposed, like the gods of the Roman pantheon, by the greatest number of votes. But is not this form of belief as involuntary as any other, the nature of the evidence that compels it being the only difference? Is not what we term "dogmatic belief" always based on a confidence in the *character* of the dogmatizer?—on presumption of his sagacity, knowledge, truthfulness, and benevolence, or on evidence of celestial commission and guidance? Is it not obvious, that trust in the mere dicta of others is not at our own option, and cannot subsist except in view of some qualities entitling them to credence? The question, then, whether the democratic ages will seek their source of dogmatic belief in the Church of Rome, must be determined by the inquiry, whether they will find in that church grounds warranting such confidence, and not whether they

would gladly find some one authority on which to repose. Unity alone, even did it subsist in it, to the extent which its advocates claim, would not, of itself, be sufficient to attract belief. For men cannot forget, that unity can warrant trust only so far as it is the result of intellectual freedom. The united testimony of millions on the rack will not secure it. As long as men repeat only what they are taught and compelled to utter, on pain of imprisonment and torture, the conspiring voices of a thousand generations can only carry with it the authority of the first utterer.

Mankind remember, with a vividness but too painful, what Romish unity has cost—the smothering of the human mind through dark and doleful centuries, and the consequent stagnation of human society through those long cycles of sin and shame—how many battle-fields it has crimsoned,—how many dungeons reared—how many a genius, heaven-inspired, it has stifled—how many a pure and noble heart it has broken—how many of the gentle, the brave, the gifted, the lovely, and the pious, has dismissed from the dungeon, the wheel, and the stake, to Heaven. The world will be slow to forget, that it is the pale and sickly child of fear; and the unity of despotism will have as little charm for democratic ages in the spiritual, as in the political world.

But after all, what is the vaunted unity of Romanism? Amid the dogmas of councils that contradict each other—the opposing decisions and contradictory legislation and mutual anathemas of popes—the conflicting assumptions of antagonist sacred colleges—where shall we seek it? How arrest the tenuous and changeful phantom? Amid clashing infallibilities, which shall be *the* infallible? The “voice of the Universal Church,” what is it, too often, other than the rescript of the last dominant faction, stamped with guilty frequency in blood? The strongest hand it has too often been, however polluted and crimson, that has clutched the keys of St. Peter. What then is the unity of Rome save the unity of organism merely—the unity of body with diversity of souls—the identity of a corpse, tenanted in succession by many vampires?

But if, fleeing the dreadful responsibility of her many inconsistencies, absurdities, and crimes, for which, in their time, the Romish Church arrogated the direct inspiration and warrant of Heaven, she now endeavors to take refuge in the plea of unity and infallibility in “matters of faith alone,” who shall

draw the line where faith ends, and vision begins? Who shall divide the realm of implicit belief, from that where logic ceases to be blasphemy, and thought is no longer revolt against Heaven? Who shall erect the awful barrier, over which the "limitary cherub" shall stand sentinel, and the glittering sword of God brandish its fiery circles, warning profane reason afar? Who but the infallible church itself? Thus presenting again the spectacle of an infallible spiritual despotism, the arbiter of its own limits. Might we not expect, this claim granted again, to see that ambitious despotism gradually extending its domain, under the pretence of relevancy to things spiritual, until all secular interests should be overshadowed by its supremacy, as time is overshadowed by eternity, and the visible is overhung by the invisible world?

What, then, are the grounds upon which she will challenge the trust and obedience of coming ages? Will they be allured to her doctrine and discipline, by the fact that born in the twilight of an eclipsing faith, like the earth-born monsters of fable, they attained their portentous growth in profound night? Will they find reason for implicit adhesion to a theology that to a great degree grew up apart from the Bible? nurtured and matured amid ecclesiastics, and hierarchs and councils, not unfrequently too ignorant to read the word of God, or with just learning enough to distort or wit to sneer at it? men subtle to torture isolated passages into puerile or wicked sophisms, and to wrest history into allegory, and plain fact into mystery, in support of some blasphemous usurpation? with imagination to extract from the mission of the Galilean fishermen and the "gospel of the poor," the meretricious pomp, and gorgeous ritual, and impious pretension of the Innocents and Gregories; or with a frivolous and cold-hearted skepticism, that trafficked in the superstitions it fostered, and made mockery, alike of the faith on its lying lips, and the abused credulity of the human race? Will they give in an unquestioning submission to a discipline, which, taking root in a brain-sick philosophy, fostered by popular ignorance and priestly ambition, ripened to deadly fruitage under the dog-days of spiritual despotism?—an Upas, whose leaves drank the poisonous dew of the long night of modern history, and whose branches still moan with airs borne from that dungeon-era of the human mind—from the penitential cell, the pallid vigil, the dim confessional, the midnight oratory, and the profound glooms of the Sacred Office—from sunless chambers,

whose fearful secrets were whispered only in the ear of God, and of human remorse, cruelty, and despair—the sighs of cloistered passion, unslaked desires, repented or broken vows, impenitent regrets, and nature trampled and stifled, but panting still immortal; a tree, around whose trunk blanch the bones of a glorious army of martyrs, and of unnumbered suicides of the hair shirt, the iron girdle, and the scourge. Will Christendom be persuaded to regard *that* as the Tree of Life? Will it, without interrogatory, receive to its faith and obedience that system of theology and of discipline? Will it seek for light and order there? or will the fruit of that faith and discipline atone for the untold agonies and sins of their growth? Did Rome use her ascendancy, reached by a path so tortuous and foul, so wisely and so well, that Christendom will be charmed by the memory to commit to her again the keys of dogmatic belief? If with its spirit subdued by ages of spiritual oppression, it at length could no longer tolerate her, will it, in its democratic era, with the wild passion of liberty in its heart, be fascinated to submit to her, a second time, its liberty to speak and to think?

Nor can the Romish Church shake herself from the past, and say those were the sins of her youth and her ignorance. She never was ignorant, never was young. She has always stood in the full blaze of divine illumination. Born, like Minerva in the fable, immediately of celestial power and wisdom, she had, from the outset, her full panoply—the mature perfection of her source. Other systems may change—to them there is a place for repentance—but she is not man that she should change, nor the son of man that she should repent. The vicar of Heaven, she partakes of its immutability. Such are her pretensions. They debar her from any plea of infancy or inexperience, or any promise of amendment. She cannot deny, nor denounce, nor lament, the past. In an evil hour she clad herself with the mail of infallibility. As with the armor of the knights of the middle ages, its wearer once down cannot rise under it, nor evade the strokes aimed at her. The harness of her strength has become a stifling compress, forbidding all growth or change. She must, then, in every age, be held to a strict reckoning for all her past falsehoods and cruelties. Nor can she identify herself with Christianity, and charge upon that blessed mission of love her impurities and her crimes. Vain is her attempt to foist herself upon mankind as *The Church*, and to grapple her putrid system to the eter-

nal pillars of the Temple of God. The original charter of our religion, witnessed by the signature of Heaven, and which the nations hold in their hand, refute the libel, and forever forbid the union. Vain is all her array of saintly names, her Anselms, her Augustines, her Las Cases, her Fenelons, her Cyrans, and her Pascals, in proof of her assumptions. We bless God for them, that in the darkest eras he leaves Himself not without witness, that, under the most mischievous systems, there are men whose hearts are purer than their heads, and whose devotion is stronger than their philosophy or theology. But they are no more the products of her faith and discipline, than was Socrates the offspring of Athenian Polytheism. Romanism is no more Christianity than was "Caliban a God;" and now that the fumes of their long intoxication, from her drugged cup, are passing from the brain of the nations, it will be hard to brutify them again with the delusion. Alas! Christianity slept—and the night-hag pressed on her perturbed slumbers, and abused with wicked dreams her long repose.

What title then will she show, that will constrain "dogmatic belief"? Will she point to her history, whose dark hues make the crimson annals of the secular Cæsars seem white? Will she hold out her sceptre, still wearing the bloody fingerprints of her Alexanders and Borgias? Will she direct to her stream of ecclesiastical authority, that has puddled through ages of fraud, incest, and massacre? Will she lead the nations to this, as the River of Life, of which they are to drink and become immortal? Will she point to her purple, still dripping with Albigenian massacre, and the carnage of St. Bartholomew, as the white mantle, descended to her from the meek and lowly Jesus? Will not mankind see on it forms more hideous than the demoniac emblazonry of her Auto-da-fe? Will she point to her unity, built up of the suffocating fears of those that dared not think, and the strong despair of those that dared?—that mighty cloister of the human soul, whose top shut out the light of Heaven, and whose foundations were in sepulchral gloom—which towered amid the silence of a field of graves, and through whose rusted gratings and thick air the winds of Heaven breathed but a wailing and stifled monotone—its tranquillity the stillness of fear, its order the regularity of despotism? Will she vindicate her title to the love of the democratic ages, by directing them to her long war against free thought and liberal

philosophy, and her continued denunciations against the "pestilent liberty of speech and the press"? Or, finally, will she attempt to cover the past, and to come forth to the nations in the guise of an angel of light? This she will attempt; but in an age of free and fearless inquiry, can she accomplish it? Can she bribe or awe history to perpetual dumbness? Or will she bewitch the human reason with her sorceries, or charm the memory of the world to forgetfulness? Will she dazzle with the splendor of her ceremonial the eye that would look narrowly at her? Or shall the grandeur of her cathedrals cover the multitude of her slain? Will the nations, sobered from a long delirium-tremens, be fascinated to drink again of that cup, which they have found to be brimming with the "wine of the wrath of Almighty God"? All this must be done, before the democratic ages will see in her that title to confidence which must ever form the basis of dogmatic belief and "return to the bosom of Rome"?

But it is not true, that Protestants recognize no one source of authority in matters of religious belief. They do recognize such an one, and one that is "single and uniform." It has the singleness of God, the uniformity of inspiration. It is the Bible. Therefore the want of such unity of authority need not drive them to Romanism. True, they acknowledge no church or hierarchy as the infallible hierophants of Heaven; they claim to have no inspired expositors of the word of God, and there may consequently be a diversity of exposition. But may there not, also, be a diversity of exposition of the canons and decrees of the councils and the Vatican? And if, to remedy this, new canons and decisions are issued, will they not, as long as human language and intellect are imperfect, and human nature perverse, be liable to misrepresentation? So that rescript upon rescript, and bull explanatory of bull, canon declaratory of canon, would be requisite to infinity. Will the words which man's wisdom teacheth be less obscure and bungling than those of the Holy Ghost?

In arguing the necessity of "dogmatic belief" to free nations, our author remarks, (chap. 6th,) "I am inclined to think that, if faith be wanting in man, he must serve, and if he be free, he must believe." Noble sentiment! and worthy to be written on marble. But "he must believe" what? The dogmas of the councils of Nice, Chalcedon, Ferrara, and Trent? The imperial edicts of the Vatican? Of the Gregories, the

Clements, the Urbans, the Alexanders, and Leos? The decretals of Isidore, the fatalism of Augustine, the legends of the saints, the worship of the Mother of God? Purgatory—the real presence—the distinction between homousia and homoiousia, and between “sufficient” and “efficacious grace,” or the divine legitimacy of the successors of St. Peter? Must he believe *these*, or serve? Must he receive *these*, on pain of temporal as well as eternal perdition, or rather the great verities of a just and present God, a crucified and risen Atoner and Saviour, a regenerating and sanctifying Spirit, man’s fallen estate and way of recovery, a future retribution “according to deeds done in the body,” the universal law of meekness, mercy, justice, purity, and love, giving the sanctions of celestial command to the dictates of the natural conscience, and arraigning its violators at the Tribunal of Eternal Doom? Which of the two classes of dogmas are those, without the belief of which freedom cannot live? And is a heaven-inspired interpreter required to decipher *these* from the Bible?

If, in expressing his belief of the incompatibility of complete religious “independence” with entire public freedom, our author means, by religious independence, the denial of any principle of authority in religion, the sentiment is truly philosophic and profound; and no Protestant will dissent from him: it is his adhesion to such a principle of authority—the Bible—that constitutes him a Protestant. But if he means that the rejection of all interlocutory authorities between the human mind and the revealed Word of God, or any authority adding to, or overruling that Word, not exhibiting, in its warrant, the same sign manual of Heaven, is incompatible with entire public freedom, we would ask, upon what chapter in human history, or on what laws of the human mind, this opinion is based? Are not the liberties of Europe, at this hour, attributable manifestly to the assertion of such independence, in the Lutheran Reformation? Has not Protestantism almost invariably been the handmaid of civil freedom, while scarlet-clad Rome has almost uniformly been throned on the “Beast” of secular tyranny?

There is a natural affinity between religious and civil despotism. This Rome appears, in all her history, instinctively to have discerned, and has manifested a uniform affection for her secular sister. If she has ever quarrelled with her, it has been with reluctance—not because she loved her the less, but self more. The exceptive cases are few, and those rather apparent than

real. They were the result of circumstances, that threw her for a time into an unnatural alliance, which she took the first opportunity to escape from and betray. When she has been found on the side of resistance to tyranny, it has been not because she hated human liberty the less, but because that tyranny was hostile to herself, and displaced her own—because her self-love was stronger than her natural affection; and I doubt not, should the despotisms of modern Europe become opposed to her, she will, against those despotisms, clamor most stoutly for the rights of man, while the voice that should be raised in their behalf, under the shadows of her own supremacy, would speedily be stifled in depths, read only by the eye of God. And should the public sentiment of the globe tend, with overmastering force, toward civil liberty, her love of life might lead her to give the lie to all her past history, and attempt to palm herself upon mankind as the friend of popular freedom. But there is a vital bond connecting her with secular despotism, which she cannot sunder—their life-blood beats from the same heart. History and philosophy both show this. The same principles underlie civil and religious liberty. These two species of freedom shade into each other, like the colors of the spectrum.

It has been resistance to spiritual tyranny, that has taught men to question that of the State; it has been resistance to secular power, attempting to coerce religious belief and practice, that has led to the investigation of the foundations and limits of all human governments. The direct allegiance of the human soul to a higher than all human power, being once recognized, the doctrines of the divine right of kings and of the duty of implicit obedience in the governed, is exploded forever. Thus, Protestantism and civil liberty have ministered to each other in all modern history. Thus, hand in hand, have they come down through ages of proscription and blood; with shield to shield, have they stood in the battle-fields of England, Scotland, Holland, and Germany—over the ocean they were wafted by the same wing—side by side have they grown beneath the pine and the holly in the solitudes of the New World. All that is best of American civilization is the joint offspring of both. Take the map of Europe, also, and mark off the countries which have made the nearest approaches to entire public freedom, and you will have limited the domain of Protestantism. The exceptions are only those countries, which, under the banner of Protestantism, have erected new Papacies. For whatever tem-

poral power, be it king, or sacred bench, or consistory, or synod, comes between the human mind and the Bible, matters little—it is Papacy still. Note those districts where political as well as intellectual life beats most feebly, and your eye will rest upon lands where Protestantism was early suffocated in her own blood, and civil and intellectual liberty perished with her.

Now, such having been the alliance which civil and religious liberty have instinctively and invariably formed, during the ages of their imperfect development, what facts of history, or laws of mind, warrant the prediction, that, as they approach the period of their mature growth, they will begin to shrink from each other in fear, and that men “frightened at the prospect of their unbounded independence” will voluntarily surrender the one or the other? Especially, are we to believe that men, who would not, for their life’s blood, sacrifice the tithe of a hair of their political freedom, will deliberately and spontaneously commit the arbitrament of the unspeakable interests of their spiritual being, and their liberty to think and to speak with reference to these interests, to a ghostly despotism, whose hands still drip with the gore of their fathers, and whose attributes of awe and majesty the very philosophic method born of their civil institutions teaches them to despise? Will not he, who has ceased to be awe-struck at sceptres, soon tample on the crosier also? History and philosophy alike preclude the opinion, that one domain of thought should continue free and full of light, joined on to another, dark and clanking with chains—and much more, that the soul, in one department perpetually disciplined to self-reliance, and to bear no restraints, except those imposed by its own reason, should in the other, where immortal consequences impend, and the mightiest motives press on it with the claims of personal duty, and stimulate its anxious search after truth, voluntarily submit itself to a despotism over its reason, and an espionage upon its thought, and in order to escape from the painfulness of doubt, and the labor of inquiry, should take refuge beneath a tyranny whose shadow has been to human society like that of the Angel of Death.

To attempt to combine the salvation of liberty in one department of the human mind, with its loss in another, is to attempt an outrage on nature—to join the body of life to the body of death; and we hazard the prediction, that those countries which possess religious liberty apart from political, or political apart from religious, will ere long lose the one, or gain the other;

and that governments which think to reconcile their subjects to the loss of political liberty, by fostering among them education, and freedom of intellectual and moral inquiry, are undermining themselves, and nursing under their foundations the earthquake, at which the cities of the nations shall fall. They cannot teach mankind to question all else, and leave their own authority unarraigned. They cannot make their subjects free and bold philosophers, and keep them permanently timid and slavish politicians. The human mind can be free nowhere, and enslaved anywhere—it can rest nowhere between absolute slavery and entire freedom. Till the universal human mind reaches one of these points, agitation and revolution will be the course of human affairs.

Most vain then is the anticipation, that democratic ages will drift toward the Romish despotism. Her assumptions most assuredly will not remain unquestioned, or be submitted to without challenge, in a type of society most impatient of mere authority in everything else; which regards no human opinions as sacred, and looks upon the most gray antiquity without awe; which being itself created from the ruin of older forms and fixtures, boldly pierces through show and dress, and rates things at their intrinsic and essential value.

The belief of M. De Tocqueville, therefore, relative to the tendency of democratic ages toward the Papacy, seems to us as little sustained by his philosophy as his facts. We can perceive nothing in the intellectual habits and tastes of such ages, that warrant such a conclusion, or that does not forbid it. The alternative will be not between Romanism and Infidelity, but Infidelity and Protestantism. The distractions of Protestantism may disgust and drive to Infidelity—not, I think, to the “bosom of Rome.” But Protestantism in its essential nature is no offence to the democratic taste for “impartiality,” “simplicity, and unity” in the governing power—it is in perfect and beautiful accord with it. It is only when it proves false to itself, and becomes a spurious Romanism, that it exhibits the spectacle of “religious powers radiating from different centres.” Its schisms are, to a great extent, the offspring of spiritual tyranny attempted or resisted—the effects of the spirit of the Papacy lingering in Protestantism—the paroxysms with which the demon rends the body he is loath to leave. They are the product, not so much of the right of private opinion allowed, as withheld. We acknowledge we have no partiality for this form of the Papacy. It offends by its inconsistency, and disgusts by

its pretension, and provokes contempt by its imbecility, while its tendency to annihilate the authority of religion itself awakens the most solemn alarm. But it still has the merit, that it asserts in word the eternal principles of religious liberty, though it constantly and glaringly violates them—that its theory is better than its practice, and may in time amend it; whereas Romanism is, by her essential principles, necessarily and unchangeably bound to her present policy.

Nor do the divisions of Protestantism deserve to be entitled “several religions.” Nor is this their impression. Such language is strange to us. They all hold of the same great charter, and deny all religious powers emanating from any other centre. They recognize, in general, the same fundamental truths. They are associations for a special purpose, whose powers are limited to the purpose for which they combine, and to the numbers that voluntarily enrol themselves in them. It seems impossible for a Frenchman to comprehend the American idea of a church. He seems ever to have before his eyes, as answering to this term, some great central power, with authority commensurate with that of the State, and within these limits grasping the keys, if not wielding the sword, and claiming exclusive spiritual jurisdiction.

Now, if there are sects among Protestants putting forth such pretensions, arrogating to be *the* church exclusively, or not conceding to others the same right, moral as well as political, of ecclesiastical association as they claim for themselves—assuming to overshadow our empire with their authority, while other organizations are but instances of intrusion, usurpation, or revolt; or, if by means of a national centralization, and by subordinate grades of administration and jurisdiction, they are seen causing their edicts for the adoption or amendment of rituals and symbols and ecclesiastical order, and their commands to believe or disbelieve, to profess or abjure, receive or excommunicate, to be urged with oppressive and riving force through every little band of disciples in the land; converting the peaceful hamlet into the theologic arena; the simple-hearted believer into the cunning and zealous partisan, diverting his energies from the work of sanctification and conversion to jangling and proselytism; breaking up the little flock, gathered with much toil and grief in the wilderness, that in their weakness and desolation had been drawn together by a sense of a common feebleness, and love of a common Saviour; and exhibiting to the

sneering infidelity and libertinism of her cities, the scandal of mutual suspicion, calumny, and denunciation, amid the professed followers of a religion of peace and love ;—I say, if there are sects, in whole or in part, answering to this description, they will present the spectacle of two or more suns claiming to rule the same hemisphere—of religious powers radiating from different centres—of empire overlapping empire—the lines of conflicting sovereignty crossing and recrossing in all directions—tyranny jostling tyranny—assumption clashing against assumption. They will offend democratic ideas of both spiritual and organic unity ; and to the extent that any large and powerful ecclesiastical organization, calling itself Catholic or Protestant, may exhibit such a taste for despotism, our countrymen must be pardoned if they watch its ambitious temper with jealousy. A centralization, a unity in the hands of such a power, might be calamitous to liberty. But let these vast and ponderous organisms disappear—let them cease to grate on the ear of the nation their jostling clangor, let their chain-work of subordinated judicatories and administrations cease to rattle and clash over the heads of the people—let the Church centralize in love on earth, but in authority in heaven, and the taste of democracy for unity need not be offended, nor its jealousy be aroused, by associations for religious purposes, more than by those for literary, educational, and commercial ends. There is an essential and eternal unity in truth, reason, and God. These are the recognized centralizing authorities of democracies : all others they regard as illegitimate and tyrannous.

Let us not be understood as wishing to palliate the guilt or absurdity of the present position of Protestant sects in this country. The evils are many and dreadful. The waste of men, of money and of mind—the tendency to disorganize society and to generate intellectual and moral sordidness, to narrow and de-grade education, we would not attempt to extenuate ; and especially, the fearful sacrifice of piety, and moral power, and of the souls of men. But we deny these to be the legitimate results of genuine Protestantism—they are the offspring of a bastard Papacy. It is believed, as we have said above, that the schisms of Protestantism are chiefly the exponents of attempted usurpation upon religious liberty—the forms on which such attempts are prosecuted, or in which they are resisted. To the same cause, we believe, is attributable those movements of religious, combined with social, anarchism, that our times are witnessing

in the East and West—in the East, openly warring upon the institutions of the Sabbath and the Church, on civil law and domestic order, and ultimately on marriage, property, and society itself—and in the West, urged on by a rude, clamorous and Cyclopean force, manifesting itself more or less in all of the various religious organisms, and at work in the darkness and the depths of society, full of vehement sincerity and blind passion, ignorant to build up, mighty to destroy—clamoring for union, yet pervaded with the intensest venom of schism—wordy for charity, yet the very impersonation of hate—vaporing of liberty, without intelligence to discern, or liberality to grant, the freedom wherewith Christ has made free—arrogating to be governed by the Spirit, yet enslaved and enslaving to the most narrow literalism, and the most lifeless formalism—deriving its strength from appeals to low prejudice and petty ambition, vulgar envy, to the love of novelty, and an impatience of established order, often amounting to an insurrection against all religious restraint. Such forms of fanatic anarchism, like those of Anabaptism in Germany, and fifth-monarchy men in England, are the natural result of usurpation upon human liberty, attempted in violation of acknowledged principles. There will not be wanting those that will perceive the inconsistency and resent the wrong, and who, without the capacity or the candor to make true discriminations, will declare war against all existing religious institutions. Others again, under the plea of violated rights, will be eager to wreak their revenge upon all religious and social restraints. Thus those who are restive under any settled order—who are galled by the bonds of all moral obligation, and who regard religious truth as an intrusive alarmist upon their pleasures—the agitator and the epicure—the skeptic and the demagogue—the driver of a puling theophilanthropy and a sensual sentimentalism—the witling of a flippant blasphemy—the desperado of a philosophy shallow and putrid, or dashing with waves upheaved from the bottomless darkness, against all order human and divine,—these will combine with the ignorant bigot and sincere enthusiast, and the aspirant to the glory of a religious reformer in the alleged vindication of human liberty.

Such, however, is the homage our nature compels to truth, that it is impossible to gather a party, unless around some semblance of it. The most atrocious conspiracies against human society have had some truth as a nucleus. They take their stand upon some real wrong, or some great principle really violated. We

must ever beware of furnishing to the elements of mischief in society any such germ of crystallization. If we do, we may be sure they will not be slow to perceive it, and their common affinities will gather them around it. For though some truth is required as a principle of life, it needs marvellously little to leaven an immense mass of dead falsehood with the most acrid fermentation. It requires but a single spark to explode the mighty mass of combustible matter, that gathers with time under the most stable structure of man. It is one of the mischiefs of all despotism that it drives reform into the arms of revolution; it is the curse of spiritual tyranny, that it forces spiritual reform into this evil alliance. The companionship in which reform is found again reacts upon itself, and tends to divide society between anarchical ultraism and bigoted conservatism.

Most disastrous for mankind are those periods, when liberty becomes identified with anarchism, and order with the defence of old abuses. Such an alliance is most mischievous to both. It drives from the ranks of reform those very spirits most needed to enlighten, attemper, and guide its movements—minds of clear vision, and cool temperament, and pure taste, blending with a strong love of liberty an inextinguishable thirst for order. These it disgusts, or alarms. Between liberty on the one hand, and order on the other—between abuses which they hate, and excesses which they abhor, they withdraw into neutrality, or their intense abhorrence of anarchy drives them into the arms of the opposers of all reform. Again, such a connexion is most disastrous to order, as it leads it to throw its shield around abuses constantly provoking attack and incapable of defence, and to grapple itself to falsehoods which, being intrinsically rotten, must fall, and are likely, in their fall, to drag down in ruin all that attaches to them. Thus reform, without curb or guide, is left to run its blind and passionate course of disastrous defeat or more disastrous triumph, and order married to despotism lives to corrupt and oppress, or with the tyranny she has espoused is laid on the block of revolution. Thus, in the sixteenth century, it was the excesses perpetrated in the name of religious liberty—springing in part from the fact that the Reformation was not true to its own principles—that drove out or kept aloof from that great movement the minds that should have tempered it. This was the cause which finally stopped it in the middle of its course, and left European society to reach, through ages of agony and shame, the prize that then seemed within full

grasp. The violence of the German chiefs, and of the fanatics of Munster, neutralized the timid but gifted Melancthon, silenced the sarcasm and learning of Erasmus, and enlisted them at last in behalf of Romish absurdities. It was the atrocities of French Jacobinism, that threw the mighty intellect of Burke, with its natural sympathies with freedom, into the lists of Toryism—made Southey a lauder of the Divine Right, and the democratic dramatist of Tuscany, the lofty Alfieri, stoop to courtly sycophancy. We may add, this country, at this time, exhibits the spectacle of a small party rallying around great and eternal principles, that, in other times, would have bid legions of swords leap from their scabbards, and would have filled millions of hearts with enthusiasm, and millions of voices with eloquence and prayer; but by its extravagancies, and by the acrimony into which it was provoked by wanton attacks in its early history, driving away from it hundreds of thousands who most warmly embrace its first principles, but who, because they cannot fellowship the temper and measures, and the extravagant theories, in company with which these principles are found, shrink away from a contest where they can wish to neither party a victory. Thus the moderate and cool-headed class, whose gentleness and clear-sightedness are especially in requisition, withdraw, and leave the fanaticism of conservatism and the fanaticism of reform to battle for a field which they should have claimed as their own.

Order in this world of ours lives only by reform. Ruinous for any human institute is it to think to remain stationary while the great globe is turning. Society shrinks back with horror from the abyss into which the anarchists would plunge her, but the rocks, meanwhile, on which she fixes her obstinate step, are shaking with a mighty Niagara, whose undermining fury is foaming beneath. But American society and the American Church cannot long abide on such a foot-hold. They can stand nowhere but upon the everlasting basis of Truth and Right. Whatever in the constitution, discipline, creeds, and usages of religious organizations, will not bear the closest scrutiny—whatever in their spirit or practice will not defy the most malignant interpretation, they may be sure will be seized hold of by a party, whose vulture scent of moral carrion is stimulated to unnatural keenness by their impatience of religious restraint and hatred of all excellence higher than their own. We may be sure, that every restraint not clearly warranted by the great original charter of our faith, will cause to explode from out of es-

established systems some Reformer, with perhaps more zeal than knowledge, who for one defective feature will think he does God service in laying the whole structure in ruins. Let such a Reformer come forth—smarting under a sense of wrongs, real or imaginary—strong in a conscious jealousy for God and human liberty—with a mind powerful but narrow, vehement but erratic, exhibiting the not unusual combination of a rancorous zeal, and deep sincerity, with low cunning and popular artifice—let him blow the alarm trumpet, and beat the reveille, and the “vast deeps” of popular delusion and passion will be moved, and will pour forth their armies, multitudinous, and of every hue. Malcontents of all orders, who have points of common sympathy in the worst or best parts of human nature—the weak and the wicked—the enthusiast and the hypocrite—the pious duper and the pious dupes—the open-throated atheist and the sanctimonious charlatan—the political intriguer and the religious aspirant—in short, all who, for any cause, hate or fear established order, will rally to the call. All these will rally around the religious anarchy; and whatever abuses, inconsistencies, and scandals may attach to religious bodies, they will seize hold of, and knot them into a scourge of scorpions to lash the offending organisms. Thus bringing their impeachment, they will throw down the gauge of battle, and call in the million to the arbitrament. Failing of all else, they may at last invoke the Powers of Ruin that heave restlessly beneath all established systems, and they will come,

Κοττος τε, Βριαρεως τε, Γυγης ε' αατος πολεμοιο.

They will come, and the triumph of Reform will be the restoration of Chaos.

This religious Anarchy, Papacy is anticipating with wishful eyes; she urges it on; she stimulates the prejudices and passions that are to work it out, with the design, when it occurs, to spread out to the weary and bewildered millions her bosom, with its delusive show of peace, and to allure them to abandon both their liberty and their license, their weariness of doubt and of thought, their spiritual life and its spasmodic agonies, together in her embrace. It is no new thing for the Church of Rome, when it suits her purpose, to play the demagogue, and agitate in the name of civil and religious liberty. While she claims to herself the changelessness of marble, to her agents she grants a wonderful elasticity of principle and of conscience. Not unfrequently she has been seen in history, in one country framing conspira-

cies, plotting rebellion, and weaving dark and tortuous intrigue, nominally in defence of liberty of conscience, while in another she was imprisoning and burning those suspected of its exercise. In one clime, her Jesuits, in the assertion of the most unbounded civil and religious liberty, leave a Roger Williams and a Jefferson far behind them; while in others, they invoke the dagger of the assassin and the sword of the magistrate against the champions and confessors of these "pestilent" doctrines. Against Henry IV. of France and Elizabeth of England, they preached up doctrines bordering on Jacobinism, constantly inculcating on their subjects the right of deposing and killing kings, while amid those of Philip II. of Spain, they were teaching the human mind to crouch in the dust before the heaven-descended majesty of tyrants. Again, under the reign of the Stuarts, her agents stood forth as the champions of universal toleration, stimulating resistance to the established Church even to treason, while in France, they were abusing the weak superstition and iron power of the Bourbons to pursue the Huguenots with imprisonment, confiscation, and exile. Thus, in our own times, while along the Danube Rome is teaching implicit obedience to despotism under penalty of eternal damnation, in the wilds of Connaught she is instigating passions, blind and mad with oppression and fanaticism, to banded assassination in resistance to "the Powers that be." On the shores of the Levant she persecutes for change of religious sentiment; in the Pacific she forces on the government of a feeble island universal toleration, not only of native believers, but also of foreign missionaries, considered by that government as corrupters both of its polity and morality. Along the Tagus and the Po, she withholds the Bible, and sedulously darkens the human mind, while her zeal for human enlightenment leads her to strew with her schools and universities the borders of the Mississippi. She overlooks the corrupt Italian, the dark-minded Austrian, and the bigoted Spaniard, but her sympathies glow with strange intensity, for the "scum of Protestant sects" along the shores of the Hudson, the Chesapeake, the Ohio and Illinois. Her prelates keep the conscience of Metternich at Vienna, or harangue the populace, in a political canvass, at New York. Professing to be as impeccable as the Holy Ghost, and as immutable as the decalogue, her pliancy and suppleness are most admirable, presenting in the outer courts of her temple forms elastic and changeable as vapor, while in the gloomy recess of her shrine, stands her own iron statue, rusting in the blood of fifty generations.

Now, as in Ireland she conspires and assassinates for religious equality, and in England clamors most loudly among dissenters against the union of Church and State, we predict in this country she will be found, although with her canons full of denunciations of temporal and eternal penalties against heresy, yet in ostensible alliance with religious and social Jacobins in the professed vindication of spiritual liberty against ecclesiastical intolerance. She will attempt to foist herself upon the populace as the champion of those wronged or oppressed by Protestant sects, in hopes that she will at least be received as protector and mistress. In this hope, we think, she will be disappointed. But she may do our institutions and our moral sentiment, meanwhile, terrible mischief; she may loosen the bands of religion on the public mind—may dazzle and delude the weak and ignorant, and perplex the faith of multitudes, and may swell fearfully the hosts of unbelief: a Republic tottering on the brink of infidelity, she may perhaps have power to impel down the abyss; but convert the turbulent, free-thinking American Democracy into a devout, superstitious, and submissive flock of the vast fold of Rome, she never will. However adroitly she may intrigue, and shift, and falter between parties in equipoise, she can never thereby change the great laws of the human mind or neutralize permanent moral causes.

So far are we from believing that the democratic ages will return to the bosom of Rome, that we think Romanism cannot live in those ages. She can live in them only by that freedom and tolerance of religious opinions that must forbid her spread, and ultimately prove fatal to her. Her whole policy and legislation show that she has an instinctive dread of such freedom and tolerance, a presentiment that she is to die by them. If she lives by them, she lives on poison. The spectre of a night of centuries, like other phantoms of night, she will fade into air as the day-dawn of truth brightens into morning. Indeed, paradoxical as may seem the assertion, with all her boasted growth in this country, she is at this moment dying among us. A name may spread, while the reality is perishing. The term Roman Catholic, for aught we know, may survive these thousand years; but the thing, we believe, will have died long before. But we are not now writing of mere terms. A Church assuming to be an inspired interpreter of Heaven—an authorized interlocutor between God and the Bible and the human mind—claiming the right, though it may for a while veil it under ex-

pediency, to coerce belief by force, and to punish heresy by spiritual and temporal penalties—arrogating to itself an allegiance paramount to that of the state, and to hold in its hand the sceptre of pardon, the keys of Heaven, and the chains of Hell—such a Church and the freedom of human reason and speech can no more co-exist, than two bodies can fill the same space at the same time; the one negatives the existence of the other. Such a Church we mean by that of Rome. Such she is and such must ever be; to strip her of these attributes is to slay her.

Now, the temper and institutions of democracies tend directly to produce in the mind a denial of such prerogatives; but he that denies these claims of the Romish Church, ceases by that very act to be a Romanist. This is the very result that our institutions are working in the Catholic masses brought to our shores. On their landing they are baptized into a spirit directly the antithesis of Romanism. As they become fused with our population, they cannot fail to be affected with the intellectual and moral sympathies, that enfold them like an atmosphere. Foreign priesthood and colleges can no more shut them out from these influences, than they can from the heat and cold of our climate. Conversion by this process, unnoted and unmarked by change of name, is constantly going on. The strict genuine Romanists among us would be found feeble, both in numbers and character, and those few rarely dare declare themselves. Multitudes in this country are Romanists only in name. From the most absurd and pernicious, yet most essential dogmas of that sect, they have long since cut loose. They have become Americans—they have become freemen, civilly and spiritually; they have learned to resist priestly dictation in secular matters; they yield to it little more than a nominal submission in spiritual. They acknowledge no temporal allegiance to Rome, and their ecclesiastical allegiance sits loosely on them. They assert and exercise liberty of reason and of faith. Should issue ever be joined between Romanism and Americanism—between their civil and ecclesiastical allegiance—we should find them rallying, amid the foremost and warmest-hearted, around our institutions. This class of men we respect and honor; we do not wish to forget, that in times that have tried men they have been true—that they have been prodigal of their wealth and their blood for American institutions—that among those who perilled their “lives and fortunes and their sacred honor” in the assertion of the imprescriptible rights of a human being, stands

the hallowed name of Carrol. We are aware, too, that in a recent political canvass, in New-York, many have rejected indigantly the dictation of a Romish prelate, and nobly cast their suffrages for the political equality of all sects. We are sorry to be obliged, in speaking of an ecclesiastical system, to use a descriptive title that seems to embrace such men. It is to be regretted that a name, most justly odious, is retained when the reality has been repudiated. We regret the wrong often done to their character, and the injury inflicted on their feelings, by an indiscriminate warfare on names. But they must remember that there is properly implied in the name they wear, that upon which self-defence compels an American citizen to wage implacable war, and that they must charge the wrong they think done them, to the false and undefined position in which they stand: for though *they* may change, *Romanism*, properly so called, cannot change. There may be in this country, for centuries to come, those calling themselves Roman Catholics, yet asserting for themselves and others freedom of faith, of worship, and of conscience, and while nominally adhering to the decisions of the "Universal Church," may by interpretation and construction of these œcumenical decrees find latitude for the widest and wildest excursiveness of the human reason—a body rejecting her spiritual despotism and superstitions, the doctrines of saintly intercession and virgin worship, of penance and justification by works, of clerical celibacy, and of indulgences, of venal pardon, and the right of persecution, of paramount allegiance to Rome, and the exclusive salvableness of those within her pale—such a class as probably M. De Tocqueville himself belongs to; there may exist in this country a sect of this description, nominally adhering to the Papacy; yet they will not be Papists, and when they are the sole representatives of that name in this republic, Papacy in this country, however great the number of her nominal adherents, is dead. We should not be surprised if this were the process of her dissolution. But we must never forget that these are not Romanists, nor be lulled into the delusive belief of the amended or mitigated nature of Romanism herself. This can never be. Amendment or mitigation, with reference to her, are absurdities and self-contradictions. She cannot cease to be a Spiritual Despotism without ceasing to be at all; for this is her essence. In this country she can live only by hypocrisy and disguise—she plays the Jesuit, and bides her time. Real amendment is

to her annihilation, vital reform is suicide. All other despotisms have some power of assimilation, and are striving to eke out their lifetime by conciliating the Spirit of the Age. We see this verified in the present policy of Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and Persia, and other absolute governments. But Romanism cannot repent, or change; with her, to accommodate is only to dissemble—conciliation is but conspiracy. Her past assumption and tyranny she cannot renounce—she cannot plead immaturity, or ignorance, or error. All the arrogance and the crimes that attach to her days of pride, she must continue to wear. Her purple of infallibility she cannot put off, though she finds it a shirt of torture. It cleaves to her, and is part of her—not a shred can she tear off—not a thread can she whiten—with all her stains of sensuality and blood uncleansed—her titles of arrogance and her names of blasphemy emblazoned upon it, she must wear it down through the light of the nineteenth century.

If our language seem to our Roman Catholic fellow-citizens unduly severe, or wanting in a discriminate charity, our reply is, we war with things, not names. To the terms Papacy or Romanism, we must attach the significancy developed in the crimson dictionary of history. By these terms we mean things. We mean a system self-bound to immutability. That system cannot change—an attempt to renovate or amend it, would be as fatal as that of the daughters of Pelias to restore their aged father to the graces and vigor of youth. Thus, whatever her nominal adherents may profess, the Papacy itself is self-stereotyped. Pursued by the Furies of crimes, she cannot repent—the shadows of her pride and power waiting in mockery around her decrepitude—her imperial scarlet become a Nessian tunic—wearing the likeness of a crown she cannot throw off, though it burns her brow—her feet slipping in the gore of her innumerable slain—the crosier, the scourge, the brand, and the rusted keys, still clutched in her trembling hands, she must go down to the coming ages. What she has been she must be or die, or rather, must be and die.

And are we to believe that around this shadow of ghostly power the democratic ages are to be attracted?—that they will rally to the support of her tottering steps, and kiss her sandals mottled with the gore of a thousand years, and bow in the dust before that eye, the light of whose cruel majesty has long since faded?—that they will sluice their own veins to feed her fail-

ing life-streams—and for her wage battle and death? No, hers will be a retinue, not of living nations, but of a pale host of such shadows as gathered on the soul of Richard on the field of Bosworth. On her steps will attend, not the accents of living acclaim, but voices, like those from under the altar in the Apocalypse, swelling from a thousand heights and dales—from the city and the waste—from the Escurials and the Bastiles of half the globe—from the gleus of the Alps, the plains of Provence and Holland—from the heaths of England, the mountains of Hungary, the Sierras, and the Apennines—from a thousand years of darkened intellect, and abused faith, and seared conscience, and broken hearts, and lost souls—from stifled human reason and bleeding human nature—from outraged man and from blasphemed Heaven, will gather over her in one mighty cloud of accusation, and arraign her for the grave. Such will be the attendants of her final hour. The pomp the democratic ages will form for her, will be that of her funeral—the train they will bear, will be the robe of her sepulture—the chant they will sing, will be the Pæan of the Prophet of Israel over the monarch of Babylon.

That the coming era, then, will not be one of the triumph of Romanism is, we think, as clear in the light of Philosophy as of Revelation. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by the recent movement of the English Church towards Rome. This movement indicates no tendency of the Democratic ages, but is in direct opposition to their spirit. It is not the product of our times, but of antagonist principles grafted on the English Church the century succeeding the Reformation—the hybrid Papacy of the Stuarts attempted to be held in combination with Protestantism. Our age simply witnesses the explosion. It is no farther responsible for Puseyism or Anglo-Romanism, than because its unceasing light and heat will not permit conflicting principles to be combined in the same system, but compels each to develop its affinities and disclose its consequences. The interest which attaches to recent Roman Catholic movements in the United States, has led us to dwell longer than we intended on this topic of our Author; and here the length to which this article has been protracted, compels us to leave him for the present. Whether the democratic ages, escaping from the extremes of credulity, will pass to the extreme of skepticism, and whether the human race, fleeing the tyranny of the few or the one, will at last take refuge beneath the more hopeless tyranny

of the million, these and other grave matters of thought, started in these volumes, we cannot touch upon now. We have, as it may be perceived, but just entered upon the course of inquiry proposed to ourselves. We may possibly resume it at some future time.

ARTICLE II.

THE ARK OF THE TESTIMONY, AND ITS APPENDAGES.*

By Rev. Enoch Pond, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.

WHILE the Israelites were encamped before Mount Sinai, Moses was repeatedly summoned into the mount, to hold converse with God, and to receive messages for the people. It was on one of these occasions, that particular directions were given him respecting a place of public worship, called *the tabernacle*, which was to be erected for the congregation. Not only was a complete pattern of the tabernacle exhibited to Moses, but he was favored with a full *description* of it, in all its parts, and of the manner in which every part was to be prepared.

In connection with the tabernacle, and as an integral part of its sacred furniture, he received directions, also, respecting what was called *the ark of the testimony*. Of all the sacred symbols of the Jews, the ark and its accompaniments were held to be the most important, and were regarded with the deepest veneration. As one of the Rabbins justly remarks, they were "*the foundation, root, heart, and marrow* of the tabernacle and

* The Author was led into the train of thought exhibited in the following Article, from listening to Prof. Bush's Lectures on *the Tabernacle, the Ark, the Shekinah, and the Cherubim*; and though he feels constrained to dissent from some of the Professor's conclusions, it gives him pleasure to unite his voice, with that of many others, in bearing testimony to the learning, the ingenuity, the elegance, and general good influence, of those Lectures.

temple, and of all the worship therein performed." Their place of deposit was in the *holy of holies*, where they were approached only by the high-priest; and by him only once in a year. Undoubtedly, the ark and its appendages were of high *symbolical import*—full of glorious spiritual *meaning*; and this meaning (if it can be arrived at) will, in all probability, be of deep interest to *us*, as it was to the church in ancient times.

The material of the ark is called by the sacred writer "shittim wood;" a hard, beautiful, and most imperishable kind of wood. "Two cubits and a half shall be the length thereof, and a cubit and a half the breadth thereof, and a cubit and a half the height thereof." Supposing the cubit to be a foot and a half, the ark would be three feet nine inches in length, and two feet three inches in breadth and height.

"And thou shalt overlay it with pure gold, within and without, and shalt make upon it a crown," or rim "of gold round about. And thou shalt cast four rings of gold, and put them in the four corners of the ark; and thou shalt make staves of shittim wood, and overlay them with gold, and put them into the rings by the sides of the ark, that the ark may be borne with them. And thou shalt put into the ark *the testimony* that I shall give thee." By the testimony, we are to understand the *two tables of stone* which Moses was about to receive, and on which was inscribed, with God's own finger, the law of the ten commandments. It deserves particular consideration, that the ark was prepared to receive these two tables of stone, and that it contained, originally, nothing else.*

"And thou shalt make a mercy-seat of pure gold; two cubits and a half shall be the length thereof, and a cubit and a half the breadth thereof." The mercy-seat was the covering of the ark, or lid of the chest. It was of the same dimensions as the top of the chest, and probably was *dropped down* within the crown or rim of gold above described. It is important to be remembered, that the covering of the ark was called the *mercy-seat*.

"And thou shalt make two cherubim of gold in the two ends of the mercy-seat. And the cherubim shall stretch forth their wings on high, covering the mercy-seat with their wings. And their faces shall look one to another; towards the mercy

* Whether it ever contained any thing else is doubtful. See Heb. 9: 4.

seat shall their faces be." Of the cherubim, I shall have occasion to speak more particularly, as I proceed.

"And thou shalt put the mercy-seat above upon the ark; and in the ark thou shalt put the testimony that I shall give thee." In other words, thou shalt put the two tables of stone in the ark, and then carefully place upon it the covering—the mercy-seat. "And there I will meet with thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the cherubim, of all things which I shall give thee in commandment unto the children of Israel." God here promises to take up his abode upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim, and there to hold sensible communion with his people, Ex. 25: 10–22.

When the tabernacle had been erected, and the ark prepared and put in its place, all this was remarkably, gloriously fulfilled. The God of Israel manifested himself *visibly* upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim. He manifested himself in the appearance of a cloud, from which beamed forth a dazzling, brilliant light, called the Shekinah. "A cloud covered the tent of the congregation, and *the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle.*" We have repeated references to this glorious manifestation between the cherubim, in other parts of the Old Testament. Thus Aaron was particularly directed *how* and *when* he might enter into the most holy place; for, says the God of Israel, "*I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy-seat,*" Lev. 16: 2. It is in reference to this, that we so frequently hear of the God of Israel as *dwelling between the cherubim*. Here was the visible manifestation of his presence and glory.

It was here, also, that God communed with his people, and gave *audible responses*, when consulted by Moses, and afterwards by the priests. Moses had no more occasion, when the tabernacle had been erected, to go into the mount to learn the Divine commands. He received them from off the mercy-seat. Thus it is said of Moses, "When he went into the tabernacle to speak with God, that he heard the voice of one speaking unto him from off the mercy-seat, that was upon the ark of the testimony, from between the cherubim," Numbers 7: 89. And long after Moses was dead, we find the children of Israel receiving Divine communications in the same way. Thus, when Phinehas, the son of Eleazer the priest, stood before the ark of the covenant, and inquired, in behalf of his people, "Shall I yet again go out to battle against the children of Benjamin my

brother ? The Lord said, Go up, for to-morrow will I deliver them into thine hand," Judg. 20 : 28.

The temple of Solomon was built throughout according to the Divine direction ; see 1 Chron. 28 : 12, 19. Its construction was very similar to that of the tabernacle, only on a much larger scale. When it was finished, the ark of the covenant, with its appendages, which had so long rested in the most holy place of the tabernacle, was with great solemnity removed into the most holy place of the temple. And when it was removed, "the cloud," we are told, "filled the house of the Lord, so that the priests could not stand to minister because of the cloud ; for *the glory of the Lord had filled the house of the Lord*," 1 Kings 8 : 11. The glorious Shekinah, which before had rested upon the mercy-seat in the tabernacle, now entered the holy of holies in the temple, and took up its dwelling there. And here it remained, through all the succeeding generations, till Jerusalem was taken, and the temple destroyed, by Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon.

That the Shekinah was the symbol of the *Divine presence*—the presence of the *Deity*, there can be no question. "There," says the God of Israel, "will I meet thee, and I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the cherubim." Accordingly, the God of Israel is continually represented, in the Old Testament, as dwelling between the cherubim. "Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel ! Thou that ledest Joseph like a flock, thou that *dwestest between the cherubim*, shine forth," Ps. 80 : 1. "The Lord reigneth, let the people tremble ; he sitteth *between the cherubim*, let the earth be moved," Ps. 99 : 1. "O Lord of Hosts, God of Israel, that *dwestest between the cherubim* ; thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth," Is. 37 : 16.

No believer of the Old Testament can doubt that the visible glory between the cherubim, was a symbol of the *Divine presence* ; or, in other words, a manifestation of *God*. But it has been made a question among Trinitarians, which of the adorable persons of the Trinity is here more specially exhibited. Is it the first person, or the second ; the Father, or the Son ?

Notwithstanding the highly respectable authorities which may be adduced in support of the sentiment, that the Divine personage here manifested is the Son of God, I feel constrained to reject it, and to adopt the other supposition. My principal reason for so doing is, that by regarding the Shekinah as a

representation of Christ, we introduce confusion into the sacred symbols, and make the import of them an absurdity.

It is certain, from various passages in the Bible, that Christ, as Mediator, sustains a *priestly office*; and that the high priest in Israel was an eminent *type* of him. This typical relation is very fully exhibited in the Epistle to the Hebrews; see chap. 9. But if the Shekinah was a symbol or type of Christ, and the high priest a type of Christ; the service of the high priest, on the great day of atonement, becomes most singularly absurd. Symbolically, *typically*, Christ enters into the holy of holies, and makes expiation to himself! He burns the holy incense and presents the blood of atonement before himself! He is himself not only the priest and intercessor, but the very personage to whom the intercession is made!

Nor is this the worst of it. The whole service on the day of atonement was typical of what is now doing in heaven. The holy of holies, in the Jewish tabernacle and temple, was itself a type of the most holy place above, into which the great High Priest of our profession has entered, with the blood of atonement, and with the incense of his intercession. "Christ," we are told, "is not entered into the holy places made with hands, which are figures (or types) of the true, but into *heaven itself*, now to appear in the presence of God for us." The Divine personage before whom Christ appears in heaven is unquestionably the same that was symbolized by the glorious Shekinah on earth. As the holy of holies on earth was a type of heaven, and the intercession of the high priest before the Shekinah was a type of our Saviour's intercession in heaven; it follows, of necessity, that the Shekinah itself represented *the personage* before whom our Saviour now intercedes. Hence, if the Shekinah represented Christ, then Christ is himself the heavenly personage before whom his own intercession is made. On this ground, the same absurdity, which was set forth typically in the holy of holies on earth, is literally enacted in the court of heaven. Christ appears in heaven before himself! He is Mediator to himself! He presents the blood of atonement, and offers up his intercession, to his own person!!

Absurdities such as these most certainly are not to be admitted. And I see not how they can be avoided, on the supposition that we make the Shekinah a representation of Christ. I feel constrained, therefore, to reject this interpretation, and to consider the Shekinah as a visible, glorious representation of *the*

Father. This restores beauty, order, consistency, and harmony, to the otherwise disturbed and distorted sense. In the tabernacle and temple, Christ, by his type, presented his intercession before the symbol of his Father; as he now, in his own Divine person, appears before the same glorious personage above.

In the vast work of man's redemption, *the Father* is officially supreme. It belongs to him to guard the laws, and sustain the honors of the eternal throne. It is to him, therefore, that the expiation of Christ was made. It is before him, that Christ presents the blood of atonement, and offers up the incense of his intercession. And as the Father is the personage before whom Christ actually appears in heaven, so the Shekinah before which Christ typically appeared in the most holy place on earth, must be regarded as a representation of the same person.

And this perfectly accords with the *appearance* of the glorious Shekinah. Had *Christ* been shadowed forth in it, we might have expected the appearance of a *human form*, as this was the form in which he *actually* appeared on the earth, and in which he often appeared, before his incarnation, to the patriarchs and prophets. But the Shekinah seems to have presented no definite form whatever. It was a dazzling brightness, beaming forth from the cloud; fit emblem of Him, who is represented as dwelling in light unapproachable, "whom no man hath seen, or can see" and live.

But we must now turn to those other important appendages of the ark, viz., *the cherubim*. Of these there were two; one on each end of the lid or covering of the ark, called the mercy-seat. They are represented as "stretching forth their wings on high, and covering the mercy-seat with their wings." They are also represented as having "faces looking one to another, towards the mercy-seat." In the most holy place of the temple, there were two other cherubim, of much larger dimensions, not attached to the ark, but standing one on either side of it, and overshadowing it with their wings, 1 Chron. 3: 10—13.

The precise form of the cherubim is not made known to us; nor is it certain that all the cherubim spoken of in the Scriptures were of the same form. Those described by Ezekiel had each of them *four* faces, looking towards the four points of the compass. Those in the tabernacle and temple seem not to have had more than *two* faces each, perhaps not more than one; as it is expressly said that their faces turned *inward* towards each

other, and towards the mercy-seat. The cherubim of Ezekiel had each of them *four* wings, Ezek, 1: 6—10. It does not appear that those in the tabernacle and temple had more than *two*. The cherubim of Ezekiel were furnished with *wheels*, as well as wings; an appendage not mentioned in connexion with any of the other cherubim figures spoken of in the Scriptures.

It is not likely that the cherubim were images or resemblances of any *earthly*, created object. They were symbols of some order of *heavenly beings*. This is evident from the *place* which they occupied, both in the tabernacle and temple. Their place was in the holy of holies, close by the Shekinah and the mercy-seat; and as the holy of holies was itself a type of heaven, and as the whole service performed there was but a resemblance of what is done in heaven; so, manifestly, the cherubim were symbols or resemblances of some class of heavenly beings. But who? What? What order of heavenly beings do they represent?

By Mr. Hutchinson and those of his school, they are regarded as emblematical of the Trinity. But this idea is too absurd to require consideration. God, who strictly forbade that any image or likeness should be made of himself, would not have instructed Moses, almost in the same breath, to form such an image. Besides, the God of Israel is always represented as distinct from the cherubim. He dwelt "*between* the cherubim," and could not have been represented by them.

The suppositions chiefly prevalent among Christians in regard to the import of the cherubim are, that they denote either *the angels of heaven*, or *the glorified spirits of saints in heaven*. The former of these is the more common opinion, and after much study and reflection, I am constrained to think it the true one.

From what we know of the cherubim, their characters and offices are entirely *consonant* to those of the angels. The angels are deeply interested in the great subject of *redemption*. They study it with profound attention, and learn from it "the manifold wisdom," and the abounding grace and glory of God. "Into which things the angels desire to look," 1 Pet. 1: 12. The cherubim too, as exhibited in the tabernacle and temple, appear deeply interested in the same wonderful subject. Their faces are turned inward upon the *mercy-seat*—the place where mercy and truth symbolically meet together, and where right-

eousness and peace embrace each other, contemplating the wonders and glories of the scene, in a posture of the most devout attention.

The angels are interested in *the church of God*—in the *worship* and *ordinances* of the church; and are thought by many to be present in the assemblies of the saints; see 1 Cor. 11: 10. So the cherubim are represented as deeply interested in the church, and as being present in her most solemn acts of worship. Besides the cherubim in the most holy place, pictures of cherubim were inwrought in all the curtains and veils of the tabernacle; thus indicating that the beings, of which these were the types, were present there to behold the ordinances and worship of that sacred place. Also in the temple there were not only the standing figures of cherubim in the most holy place, but Solomon, we are told, “carved all the walls of the house round about with carved figures of cherubim;” indicating the same important fact as before; see 1 Kings 6: 29, 35; 2 Chron. 3: 14.

The angels are represented as not only loving and serving God, but delightfully *praising* him. At the dawn of the creation, “the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy.” And at the birth of our Saviour, the angels heralded his incarnation with songs of praise. So the seraphim (which are supposed to be the same as cherubim) are represented as engaged in the most reverential acts of devotion and praise. They cry one to another in the upper temple, “Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory,” Is. 6: 3.

If it be said that the acts and offices of the cherubim, here referred to, are no more consonant to those of the angels than they are to those of glorified saints, and consequently that nothing can be determined from them in regard to the question before us, I proceed to notice *other* representations of Scripture respecting the cherubim, which are of a more decisive character.

The placing of cherubim at the entrance of the garden of Eden, “to keep the way of the tree of life,” is perfectly natural, on the supposition that they signify angels; but hardly to be accounted for on the other supposition. There were no glorified saints at this period in heaven; nor, so far as we know, in any part of the universe. And if there had been, why should their representations or types be stationed at the entrance of the garden of Eden, “to keep the way of the tree of life”? All this

seems very consonant to what we know of the offices of angels, but not at all in conformity with what God has revealed to us respecting the employment of glorified saints. They are not posted as sentinels in different parts of God's kingdom, and charged with the performance of arduous and responsible duties; but "they *rest* from their labors, and their works follow them." They have entered upon that *rest* which remains for the people of God.

But this leads me to remark further, that the cherubim, like the angels, and not like the saints, are represented as the *servants*, the *ministers*, of God's throne. I hardly need quote passages to show that the fact here asserted is true of the angels. They are represented as *standing*, in the posture of servants, round about the throne. "I am Gabriel, that *stand* in the presence of God; and am *sent* to speak unto thee, and to show thee these glad tidings," Luke 1: 19. It was in their capacity as servants to the throne of God, that the angels appeared unto Jacob, ascending and descending on the ladder which reached from earth to heaven, Gen. 28: 12. It is in the same capacity that they are spoken of as "doing the commandments of God, hearkening unto the voice of his word;" and as being "ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation," Ps. 103: 20; Heb. 1: 14.

It is interesting to look through the Bible, and notice the *extent* of the angelic ministry, and the manner in which it has been accomplished. We find the angels ministering to Abraham in repeated instances: to Hagar in the desert; to Lot in Sodom; to Jacob, on his return from Padan-Aram; to Moses; to Joshua; to Gideon; to Manoah and his wife; to Elijah the prophet; to Daniel, in repeated instances; to Zechariah the prophet, and Zechariah the priest; to Mary the mother of Jesus; to Joseph; to the shepherds; to Peter and John; to Paul, and Philip, and Cornelius; to the soul of Lazarus, after its release from the body; and more than all, to our Lord Jesus Christ. At the close of his temptation, "angels came and ministered unto him;" and in the garden of Gethsemane, "there appeared an angel from heaven unto him, strengthening him." Indeed, it is said of the angels of the Lord, "that they encamp round about them that fear him, to deliver them," Ps. 34: 7.

And in waiting around the throne of God, the angels have been ministers, not only of his mercy, but of his *wrath*. It was through their instrumentality that Sodom and Gomorrah were

destroyed ; that the Egyptians were visited with such desolating judgments, Ps. 78 : 49 ; that the people of Israel were smitten, after they had been numbered by David, 2 Sam. 24 : 16 ; that the hosts of the proud Assyrian were cut off as in a moment, Isa. 37 : 36 ; and that the impious Herod was devoured of worms, even before he was laid in the dust, Acts 11 : 23. It is through the ministry of angels, that both the righteous and the wicked are to be gathered, at last, before the throne of judgment, to hear their destinies awarded, and to enter on the changeless retributions of eternity.

But I have said more than was necessary to show that angels are the *servants* of God's throne. Their very name imports as much as this:—*angels, messengers*, whose office it is to do the commandments of God, and bear his messages from one world to another.

It will be evident, on reflection, that the office of the cherubim is very similar. They, too, are represented as standing near the throne of God, apparently waiting the intimations of his will. In the tabernacle and temple, their place was close by the glorious Shekinah, the visible manifestation of the presence of the Most High, and when Isaiah "saw the Lord sitting upon his throne, high and lifted up," he saw also the seraphim standing near it, ready to fly on his errands of mercy or of wrath.

The cherubim which Ezekiel saw, were in a still more obvious attitude of service. They are represented as *bearing up* the throne of God, and as constituting, by their wings and wheels, the chariot of his glory. He saw the likeness as of a firmament *upon the heads of the living creatures* ; and "above the firmament was the likeness of a *throne* ;" and upon the throne was "as the appearance of a *man*," * Ez. 1 : 22, 26. It is with reference to this representation, that we read of "the *chariot* of the cherubim," 1 Chron. 22 : 18. It is also said of the Jehovah of Israel, "*He rode upon a cherub*, and did fly," Ps. 18 : 10.

It must be evident from what has been said, that the angels and the cherubim stand in the same relation to the great Sovereign of the universe, and are employed in the same offices and

* The personage here presented, I have no doubt, is the Son of God. He appears in a *human form*. He also was the person whom Isaiah saw, sitting on his throne, surrounded by the seraphim, see John 12 : 41.

works. But where do we find any such representation in regard to glorified saints? They are indeed the servants of God, in the sense of rendering him a devoted obedience; but where are they represented as bearing God's messages from world to world; as the executors of his will in different and distant parts of the universe; as sustaining even the throne itself, and bearing on their swift wings, and rolling on their burning wheels, the symbols of the incumbent Deity? The similarity of the office of the cherubim to that of the angels, and its dissimilarity to that of glorified saints, clearly indicates that they are the representatives of the former, and not of the latter.

But there are other Scriptures which go to identify still more conclusively the angels and the cherubim. It is often represented in Scripture that the angels were present on Mount Sinai, at the giving, of the law, and had some agency or office in that great event. Thus it is said, that the Israelites "received the law through *the disposition of angels*;" or, as it might be rendered, "through *ranks of angels*," Acts 7 : 53. The law is also represented as "the word spoken *by angels*;" and as ordained *by angels* in the hands of a Mediator," Heb. 2 : 2; Gal. 3, 19. But it appears from a passage in the Psalms that *these angels were cherubim*. "The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even thousands of angels; the Lord is among them, as in Sinai, in the holy place," Ps. 68 : 17. That the beings here spoken of are cherubim, is evident from three considerations:—
 1. Like the cherubim, they are called *chariots*: "The chariots of God are twenty thousand;" compare 1 Chron. 28 : 18.
 2. The Hebrew word here rendered angels literally signifies *double ones*, in allusion to the bi-form or quadruple form of the cherubim, having in some instances *two faces*, in others *four*.
 3. "The Lord is among them, as in the *holy place*," the *Sanctuary*. Here is a manifest reference to the cherubim in the most holy place of the tabernacle and temple, standing around the glorious Shekinah. The beings spoken of in the 68th Psalm are, therefore, *cherubim*. But they are also *angels*—the same that were on Sinai at the giving of the law. "The Lord is among them, as *on Sinai*."

The foregoing observations seem to me to prove, as fully as the nature of the case admits, that the "cherubim of glory," as they are called in the Epistle to the Hebrews, were the representatives of *angels*, and not of *glorified saints*. And I know of but one passage in the Bible which seems to conflict with this

idea. The four living creatures (improperly rendered beasts) which John saw in heaven, in the opening of the apocalyptic visions, are represented as *distinct* from the angels, and as uniting with the four-and-twenty elders in singing the song of *redeeming* love: "Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain, and *hast redeemed us to God by thy blood*, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation," Rev. 5: 8—12. But it will be borne in mind that these living creatures are never called cherubim; nor are they of the same appearance as the cherubim of Ezekiel. Ezekiel's living creatures, or cherubim, had each of them four faces and four wings; whereas the living creatures of John had each one face and six wings. The living creatures of Ezekiel were furnished with wheels; of which we hear nothing in the description of John. Nor can the appearances in the two cases be identified, from the fact that they are both called *living creatures*, as this was the most general term by which they could be called, and seems to have been applied to them by the two prophets because they knew not what else to call them. Ezekiel afterwards understood that the living creatures which he saw were cherubim; but those which John saw are never called by this name. The most that can be said of them is, they are *like* the cherubim; just as it is said of glorified saints, that they shall be *like* the angels, and *equal* to the angels.*

The four living creatures of John, in connection with the four-and-twenty elders, undoubtedly represent the redeemed church in heaven; but as these living creatures are never called cherubim, and can only be said to be like the cherubim, the passage does not conflict with the idea, that cherubim are properly the representatives of angels.

Without dwelling longer on the *exegetical* part of this subject, I proceed to deduce from it some important doctrinal and practical reflections.

1. We learn from it the value of the Old Testament Scriptures. There are those calling themselves Christians, who utterly reject the Old Testament, and will not acknowledge it as any part of Divine revelation. The God of the Old Testament, they say, is a ferocious God; delighting in war, and blood, and vengeance, and altogether a different being from that God of love

* See Mark 12: 25; Luke 20: 36.

which is revealed to us in the gospel. The *religion* of the Old Testament is held up in strong contrast with that of the New, as though there could be no affinity or harmony between them.

It is enough to say of views such as these, that they are essentially infidel. It is impossible to separate the two Testaments, and retain the latter; for this is grafted directly on the former. It is connected with it by a thousand ligaments; so that if the Old Testament is given up, the New cannot possibly be retained, and regarded as the truth of God.

But there are Christians, who have no thought of discarding the Old Testament, by whom, as it has seemed to me, this part of the Bible is greatly undervalued. They consider a large portion of it as the worthless record of an old legal dispensation, which is forever done away, and which, of course, is now comparatively useless. Consequently, they neglect it, as scarcely deserving their attention.

But such were not the views entertained of the Old Testament by our blessed Saviour and his Apostles. How often did they quote it; and with what respect and reverence did they uniformly treat it! They spoke of it as the *word of God*, and constantly appealed to it as the standard by which to judge of their doctrines and practice. It was the Old Testament of which Peter said, "We have a more sure word of prophecy, to which we do well to take heed, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in our hearts." It was the Old Testament of which the Saviour said, "Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they that testify of me."

A large portion of the Old Testament is obviously of the highest importance. Its history has instructed and benefited the church in all ages. Its prophecies have confirmed the faith of thousands, and attested the inspiration of the whole sacred volume. Its poetical parts have been a constant means of warming the hearts and elevating the hopes of believers. Will the church ever cease to listen with admiration to the harp of David, and to join with rapture in the devotions of the sweet Psalmist of Israel? And that we so generally neglect the *ritual* parts of the Old Testament is owing to our own dulness and ignorance, and not to any want of interest in the subject itself. The ritual institutions of the Israelites were to them, I have no doubt, the richest part of their Scriptures. They were emphatically *their gospel*. It was through these types and

rites, that the pious in Israel discovered the foundation of their hopes. And could *we* learn to look at these rites with the eye of one of the ancient prophets, and behold through the symbolic veil their high spiritual bearing and import, we should see that they covered the same religion which is professed by us, and that they poured a flood of light on many subjects in which we, as Christians, are deeply interested.

In the preceding pages, we have considered the single subject of *the ark of the testimony*; its structure, its contents, its covering, its appendages. We have seen enough already to know (and we shall know more about it as we proceed) that *this* is a highly instructive subject. It teaches many important lessons, which Gentiles, as well as Jews, are slow to learn. Nor is this the only instructive symbol of the Mosaic ritual. Whether we understand it or not, *the whole* is instructive. The whole is included in the book of God, and not only demands, but *deserves* the prayerful attention of the Christian student. What lessons of interest did Paul draw forth from the Mosaic ritual, in writing his Epistle to the Hebrews? By tracing, in a variety of particulars, the connexion between shadow and substance, type and antitype, he has unlocked the mystery which might otherwise have hung over the ritual institutions, and instructed Christians, in all ages, to draw living water from these wells of salvation.

There is yet another standard by which to test the value of the Old Testament Scriptures, and to which, before dismissing the topic, I must for a moment advert: I mean the spiritual *attainments* of those who were trained and instructed under them. Where is the believer in modern times, who has more faith than Abraham; or more meekness than Moses; or more patience than Job; or more fervor than David; or more spiritual understanding than Solomon; or more tender, benevolent affection than Jeremiah; or more firmness in the cause of God and truth than Daniel and his three friends? But how, I ask, was the piety of these eminent saints nurtured? Where is the holy truth, the sincere milk of the word, by means of which they grew to such commanding stature, if not in the Old Testament? Is it not evident, from the consideration here adduced, that this portion of Scripture is—what Paul represents it to be—“*profitable, for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness*”?

2. But to come more directly to the ark. In this sacred symbol, with its appendages, contents, and place of deposit, God is

teaching us, and impressing upon us, *the high regard which he has for his holy law*. In illustration of this, let me call attention, for a moment, to the structure of the ancient temple, and to the place of deposit for the ark.

The temple, with its several courts, was surrounded with a high wall, 750 feet square, including more than twelve acres. Immediately within this exterior wall, was what was called *the court of the Gentiles*. Passing through this, you came to another wall, inclosing *the outer court of the temple*. Passing through this, and the outer court, you came to a third wall, inclosing *the inner court of the temple*. Passing through this, and the inner court, you came to the gate of *the temple itself*. Passing through this, you first entered what was called *the sanctuary*. Here stood the great altar of burnt-offering, surrounded by the priests, engaged in presenting the sacrifices of the people. Passing through this apartment, you next entered *the holy place*. Here stood the candlestick, the table of shew-bread, and the altar of incense, on which was offered the morning and evening sacrifice. Passing through this, you entered, at last, *the holy of holies, or the most holy place*. In the temple, this was a spacious room, thirty feet square, and overlaid with pure gold. It was situated in the deep recesses of the temple, and protected by its sacred, successive inclosures. It was open to none, except the high priest, and to him only once in a year. And *what did this splendid, awful apartment contain?* Not an individual thing, except the ark of the covenant and the cherubim covering it. And what did the ark of the covenant contain? Nothing (originally) except the tables of stone, on which was inscribed *the moral law*. And now, in this whole, wonderful, awful structure—this vast institution—*what a high and sacred regard did God manifest for his holy law!* How could he have manifested for it a higher regard, or put upon it a greater honor? He laid it down (where it still lies) at the foundation of the whole scheme of mercy. He laid it down in the most sacred recess of the temple, and at the foundation of the entire service of his church. Here rested the tables of the law, covered and protected by the wings of mighty cherubim. Here they rested—overshadowed by a visible manifestation of the Divine presence and glory—to be approached by no foot but that of the high priest, and by him only once in a year. How could the great Sovereign of the world have said, in more intelligible language, “This law is holy, and must be maintained. It has been transgressed, but

shall not be dishonored. No scheme of mercy can ever be tolerated, which brings the least stain upon the law. Till heaven and earth pass, one jot, or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."

3. In the ark and its accompaniments, God sets before us, not only the honors of the law, but that, in some way, there is *mercy* for those who have transgressed it. Over the ark there was laid a *mercy-seat*; and here God was graciously pleased to dwell, and to hold communion with his people.

Though the law is in full force, retaining all its honors as a rule of life, it is of no avail to us now, as a foundation of hope. Its insupportable curse rests on the head of every child of Adam. It kills and condemns every transgressor, who essays to build on it a hope of heaven. But God has been pleased to erect a throne of *mercy*. Over the ark, which contained his righteous law, he was pleased to lay a *mercy-seat*; and this he selected as the place of his rest. Both in the tabernacle and temple, the *mercy-seat* was the place where the tokens of the Divine presence were specially visible—where rested the glorious *Shekinah*—the pillar of cloud and of fire. Here, too, was the place where God promised to meet his people, and hold visible, sensible communion with them. "I will appear in the cloud, upon the *mercy-seat*. There will I meet thee, and there will I hold communion with thee."

To the ancient believers, all this was full of precious, glorious meaning. They saw in it that, in some way, "mercy and truth had met together;" that "righteousness and peace had embraced each other." They saw in it that a holy and righteous God could yet be *merciful*; that, in some way, he could be just to himself and his law, and yet justify the penitent, returning transgressor. In short, they saw in it a way of *salvation*; a *foundation* on which to rest their immortal hopes.

4. Nor did the ark, and the services connected with it, leave the ancient worshipper altogether in ignorance as to *the method* of salvation. Once every year, on the great day of atonement, he saw the high priest—the highest officer in the church—venture into the holy of holies, attired in his sacred vestments, to sprinkle the *mercy-seat* with *blood*, and to burn incense before it. By this awful service, the priest was instructed to propitiate the God of heaven, and make an atonement for the people. In these symbolical transactions, the believing Israelite saw much of *the method* of salvation. Through these typical atonements,

made by the blood of bulls and goats, he looked forward to a greater atonement, made once for all, consisting in a richer sacrifice, and more precious blood. In the literal incense which was burned before the mercy-seat, he saw a type of that more prevalent intercession, which was to be offered before the throne of God above. In short, the entire service of the priest, on this occasion, pointed him forward to the nobler services of his great High Priest in heaven, when he should enter into the holy places not made with hands, there to appear in the presence of God for us. Thus the pious in Israel were led to look for a *Saviour to come*; and led to exercise that *faith* and *confidence* in him, which stood connected with their eternal salvation.

5. The ark and its appendages were fitted to teach the Israelites, and to teach *us*, that the gospel of salvation, so far from impairing or dishonoring the divine law, tends rather to *vindicate* and *establish* it. The mercy-seat, on which the glorious Shekinah rested, was the appointed *covering* of the ark. It *covered* and *protected the law, which was deposited under it*; thus teaching a lesson which not a few, in our own times, have need to learn.

There are those who seem to consider the gospel as above the law, if not in palpable contradiction to it. From expressions sometimes used, one might suppose that God had, at length, discovered that his law was unreasonable; or at least that it was unsuitable to the condition of man;—‘It requires more than his creatures in this world can perform. It threatens more than they can endure. He has been pleased, therefore, in mercy, to take it out of the way, and to substitute for it the milder dispensation of the gospel.’

But opinions such as these are in palpable contradiction both to law and gospel—both to the letter and spirit of all true religion. What is that law, which it is pretended is so unreasonable and unjust? “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself.” And is this an unreasonable requisition? With how much less than all the heart should the God of heaven require his creatures to love him? With how much less than all the heart does any one think that he ought to love him? And if our neighbor, our fellow creature, is as worthy as ourself, why should we not love him as ourself? This holy law, so far from being suspended or annulled, is in full, unabated force throughout the universe. It is in force in heaven, and in the keeping of it the happiness of that world

consists. It is in force on earth, too, and ought to be obeyed perfectly here, as there; and the gospel of salvation, so far from impairing it, goes (as I said) to *cover* and *protect* it—goes to *vindicate* and *establish* it.

The suppliant, when he approaches the mercy-seat to plead for pardon, does not come finding fault with the law. He does not say, while bending before the throne of grace, ‘Thy law, O God, was unreasonable and cruel. It was so strict that I could not obey it, and of course am not to blame for transgressing it.’ But he consents unto the law, that it is just and good. He mourns and repents, he reproaches and condemns himself, for all his disobedience. He says with the apostle, ‘The law is holy; but I am carnal, sold under sin. All that God has required is right; and all that he has threatened is just; and for my numberless transgressions, I have no excuse. *Pardon mine iniquity, for it is great. God be merciful to me a sinner.*’

We here see how the very terms and spirit of the gospel all go to vindicate and establish the law. It is impossible, in the nature of things, for any person to comply with the offers of the gospel, and become interested in its blessings, till he acknowledges his obligations to obey the whole law, and heartily consents to it, that it is good. What, I ask, is that *repentance* which the gospel demands, but a holy sorrow for having broken the law? And what is that *forgiveness* which the gospel promises, but forgiveness for having transgressed the law? And what is the *salvation* of the gospel, but deliverance from the condemning sentence of the law? And for what did the Saviour appear in our world, but to magnify the law, and make it honorable, and open a way of reconciliation and redemption for those who had broken it? In every view we can take of the gospel, it rests upon the firm foundations of the law, and goes, not to supersede its claims, but to vindicate and establish them. Well then might the Apostle exclaim, “Do we make void the law through faith? Nay, we *establish* the law.” And well might the sacred ark of the testimony, enclosing in its bosom the moral law, be *covered* and *protected* by the mercy seat.

6. We learn from the ark and its appendages the deep and abiding *interest* which holy angels feel in the wonderful subject of man’s redemption. Cherubim were erected on either end of the mercy seat, and extended their wings over it. In addition to these, more lofty cherubim were erected in the most holy place of the temple, under the shadow of whose wings the whole

ark was deposited. And besides these, we are told that Solomon carved the entire wall of this most sacred apartment "round about with carved figures of cherubim." The faces of these figures (which, we have seen, represented the holy angels) were all turned inwards on the ark, in a posture of the deepest and most devout attention; thus indicating that the ark, with its appendages and contents, furnished matter of the profoundest interest and astonishment to the angelic world. Angels here saw that law which they loved and obeyed carefully deposited in the most holy place, and honored with tokens of the highest regard. They knew that this law had been dreadfully violated by man, and had reason to expect that its fearful penalty was about to be executed on him. They had seen it executed on a part of their own number who sinned, and they had reason to expect that a flame would suddenly burst forth from the ark, to devour and consume an apostate world. But instead of this, they saw the ark covered with a mercy seat, and saw the Holy One of Israel descend and take up his abode there. They saw him holding communion with apostate creatures, and dispensing pardons to guilty men. They saw the curse of the violated law removed, and yet its authority sustained and strengthened. They saw it pass away, as a foundation of hope for sinners, and yet remain in full force, and increased effect, as a rule of life. They saw, in short, that a *just God* could consistently *save sinners*; and not only that he *could* save them, but that he was most sincerely disposed to do it. They heard him crying from the mercy seat, "Ho, every one that thirsteth; come ye to the waters; and he that hath no money, come ye; buy wine and milk, without money and without price." "Look unto me and be ye saved, all ye ends of the earth."

Now these things, there is reason to believe, are matter of delight and wonder to the angelic world. "Into which things the angels desire to look." With intense interest, they cluster around the mysterious ark. They bend over it; they fasten their eyes upon it, in a posture of the most devout attention. They are never wearied or satisfied with this blessed employment. Their mighty energies are engrossed, and their eternity occupied, in searching into the wonders, and pouring forth the praises of redeeming love.

O that Christians in this world might imbibe more of their fervor, and more closely imitate their example! that those, who are chiefly interested in the work of redemption—for

whom the Son of God died, and the glorious provision of the gospel was made, might be more deeply engaged, and more delightfully occupied, in looking into the wonders of redemption, and laboring to promote its triumphs in the earth!

7. In view of the light which the ancient believers enjoyed, and the knowledge they gained from their instructive ritual, and from other parts of the Old Testament, the inquiry suggests itself, In what respects are the privileges of Christians, under the new dispensation, superior to theirs? That they are superior, in *some* respects, there can be no doubt. As much as this is intimated by our Saviour, when he said, "Among them that are born of women, there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist; notwithstanding, *he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he*," Matt. 2: 11.

The superior privileges of Christians above those of God's ancient covenant people, consist not in this—that we have another and better religion than they, or another and easier path to heaven: for true religion and the way of salvation, under both dispensations, have been the same. God has opened but one path from these apostate regions to the heavenly mansions; and in that path all true believers, both before and since the coming of Christ, have walked.

Nor are our privileges greater than those of the ancient saints, in that we belong to another church, and are brought into another and better covenant. For the church of God, and the covenant of the church, under both dispensations, have been substantially the same. "My dove, my undefiled, is *but one*; she is the only one of her mother." Christians are grafted into *the same good olive tree* from which the Jews, for their unbelief, were broken off, Rom. 2: 17–24.

Nor are our privileges superior to ~~those~~ ^{those} who lived before the coming of Christ, in that we have received much important truth, which to them was wholly unrevealed and unknown. Perhaps it would be difficult to mention a single important doctrine of religion, which is in possession of the church now, which was not shadowed forth, with more or less of distinctness and impression, to the people of God in ancient times. We have seen how much and how rich instruction was conveyed under the symbol of the ark. And yet this was but *one* of the Jewish symbols—but one of the means employed by God of imparting to his ancient covenant people a knowledge of his truth and will.

The points in respect to which Christians are exalted to higher privileges than those of the ancient people of God, may be reduced, perhaps, to the three following. In the first place, though we are not favored with a large amount of *new, unrevealed* truth; those truths which were but dimly seen before, are brought forth into *much clearer light*. They are presented in a way to be more impressive, commanding, and powerful. Instead of the type, we have received the antitype. In place of the shadow, we have got the substance. What the patriarchs saw through a glass darkly, we see as it were face to face. A vast amount of prophecy has been fulfilled. The great Redeemer of his church has come. The world has been blessed with his personal ministry, and that of his Apostles. Life and immortality have been brought to light in the gospel.

Then, in the second place, the ordinances of religion are much less numerous and onerous now, than formerly. As the old dispensation was one of symbols, typical rites and institutions were greatly multiplied. The circumstances of the church required that they should be. And yet this extended ritual is spoken of by the Apostles as a yoke—a *heavy* yoke—which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear, Acts 15: 10. It is a mercy to the Christian church, that this yoke of ceremonies, being no longer demanded, has been removed, and that the simple rites of the gospel have taken its place.

But the great blessing of the new dispensation consists in this: it is emphatically a *dispensation of the Spirit*. The Spirit of God was indeed operating in the earth, ages before the coming of Christ. He was then, as now, the origin and cause of all the holiness which existed among men. But since the resurrection of Christ, and the ushering in of the new dispensation, the Spirit of God has been poured out upon the world in richer and more glorious effusion. A new and wonderful efficacy has been given to the truth. A new impulse has been added to the cause and kingdom of Christ. Revivals of religion are frequent, converts are multiplied, and the influence of the gospel, instead of being confined to a single family and people, is being diffused all over the earth.

We are not in the number of those who are accustomed to think or speak diminutively of the privileges of God's ancient covenant people. Compared with the world around them—compared with the notions which not a few, at this day, entertain of them—their privileges were very great. But in several

important respects, ours are much greater; laying us under higher responsibilities; demanding that we be much wiser and holier persons; more heavenly in spirit, more conformed to the Divine image and will, more devoted to the cause of Christ, more useful in the world. Whether any of us really *are* more eminent saints than some who lived before the coming of Christ, may admit of a question. Or rather I fear it will *not* admit of a question. Instead of rising above them, my apprehension is that, in instances not a few, we fall far below them. But whatever our spiritual attainments may actually be, there can be no question as to what they should be. They ought to rise in proportion to our light and advantages, and ought to be as much superior to those of the ancient saints, as our means and privileges are the more valuable.

8. From the ark and its appendages, Christians may learn what their feelings and conduct should be in regard to *their places of public worship*. The place of deposit for the ark, both in the tabernacle and temple, was emphatically a *holy place*. It was holy, because the Lord was there. It was holy, because the blessed angels were there. The symbols of heaven were brought down to earth, and here was the place of their abode. And we know with what reverence this sacred place was regarded, by those who lived under the former dispensation. They would no more have obtruded into it, for any common or secular purpose, than they would have obtruded into heaven itself.

But if the Jewish sanctuary was a holy place, the same may be said of the Christian sanctuary; and for the same reasons. The Lord is still in his holy temple; not indeed by a visible *Shekinah*, but by *spiritual* manifestations of not less awful import. The holy angels, too, who, by their appointed symbols, waited around the mysterious ark, and seemed to fill the whole sanctuary with their presence, are still present in the assemblies of God's people, beholding the order of their worship, and ministering to them who shall be heirs of salvation. The Apostle Paul uses it as an argument for the strictest decorum in the house of God, that the holy angels are there as witnesses, 1 Cor. 11: 10.

When Moses was about to approach into the near presence of God, he was commanded to take the shoes from his feet, because the ground on which he stood was holy. And the Divine injunction still is, "Keep thy foot when thou goest into the

house of God, and be more ready to hear, than to give the sacrifice of fools." "God is greatly to be feared in the assembly of his saints, and to be had in reverence of all them that are about him." "I will be sanctified in them that come nigh me, and before all the people will I be glorified." These sentiments are equally true and applicable under the new dispensation as under the old; and should lead us, when we come into the sanctuary of the Most High, to feel as Jacob did when he said, "How dreadful is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven!"

9. The ark and its appendages teach another lesson, and it is the last to which I shall here direct attention. It refers to the traits of character which Christians must exhibit, in order that they may be like the angels. The cherubim which Ezekiel saw had each of them four faces; that of a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle. The faces of the cherubim connected with the ark were, probably, the same in kind, though the same number of faces seems not to have been attached to each. It has been often remarked, and I think justly, that these faces were indicative of the *characteristics* of angels; the human face denoting their intelligence and wisdom; that of the lion, their courage, generosity, power, strength; that of the ox, their patience and submission, their readiness to bear burdens and perform labors in the service of Christ; while the face of the eagle denoted their lofty purposes, their exalted aims, and the rapidity of their movements in discharging their commissions of vengeance or of love. Now these are the very traits of character, which should distinguish every child of God. They are the traits of character which all Christians *will* possess, when they arrive at heaven, and are made *like* the angels. Accordingly, the living creatures which John saw in heaven, and which (with the elders) were the representatives of redeemed saints, appeared with the same faces as the cherubim. In this respect, they were *like* the cherubim.

The traits of character to which I have referred—those which belong to the holy angels, and will belong to the saints when they arrive at heaven, and are made *like* the angels—should be assiduously cultivated by every Christian, while here on the earth. We should be aiming to grow in all knowledge and spiritual wisdom; in nobleness of disposition, courage, and strength; in patient submission, and fidelity to Christ; in the elevation of our views and purposes, and the activity of our

endeavors to promote His cause, till we arrive, in these respects, to the stature of angels, and are permitted, in connexion with them, to bend and worship before the eternal throne.

The Lord strengthen and assist all who read these pages, in their endeavors thus to grow in knowledge and in grace! The Lord bless them abundantly in this most important of all the labors of life! The Lord graciously receive them, as they pass, one after another, from this to the eternal state, and make them *as the angels of God in heaven!*

ARTICLE III.

HELPS IN PREACHING.

By Rev. Miles P. Squier, Geneva, N. Y.

GREAT simplicity characterizes the instructions of the Bible. It presents truth in forms adapted to the common apprehensions and general reading of men; and freed from those limitations of meaning, which obtain in books of science, and attend an abstract and technical phraseology. Its statements are direct, obvious, and unencumbered. They meet our consciousness, and find a response in the principles of our being. The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul. The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. Reason and conscience are with divine truth. Its appeal is to the giant principles of the soul. Its resources of influence are such as should give it sway over mind, and as entitle it to success everywhere.

Corresponding results have often been witnessed in its history. The preaching of our Lord was attended with large success, as was the Baptist's before him. Thousands were converted on the day of Pentecost. The people of Samaria gave heed, "with one accord," to the preaching of Philip; a precious revival of religion gave great joy in that city. The same encouraging fact is illustrated along the track of apostolic instruction—through Asia Minor, and into Europe—in the conversion of

Lydia and the jailer—among the Bereans—and in the rapid spread of Christianity, even to the city and palace of the Cæsars.

Similar fruits have been witnessed in later times, quite down to our own. We may refer to them under the preaching of Edwards, and the Tennants—of Brainerd among the Indian tribes, and of Whitefield. The Sandwich Islands are now an example of the triumphant success of divine truth over rude mind; and such would seem to be but the legitimate effects of the Gospel wherever preached. It is attended with every resource of conviction; every ground of belief; every argument for submission and trust; and yet the results above referred to do not uniformly attend the labors of the Christian ministry. Often, alas! very often, are they far otherwise. Nor would it seem legitimate to ascribe the want of success to the Holy Ghost. The office-work of the Spirit is embraced in the economy of the gospel. We live under the dispensation of the Spirit. He was given to abide with the church always, and may not be supposed to be now wanting, where all else is as it should be, in the appliances of the gospel. We fully acknowledge the obstacles which the truth meets in the rugged soil of the heart, as well as in the constitution of society, and the state of the world. But the conversion of such hearts, and of such a world, is the object proposed in the gospel, and in the love which has commissioned it unto all nations for the obedience of faith. For this is it adapted, and sent, and making all requisite allowance for the varied circumstances in which the recipients of Christian effort are found, may not something of the diminished success of the word, so often witnessed, be set over to its defective application? May it not be, that the church pursues her work of disciplining men to Christ, with too little intelligence and discrimination? May she not be unapprized of the *exact fastnesses* of the heart, or too little studious of the best methods of reaching its sources of feeling and action? May she not sometimes muffle the edge of the sword of the Spirit, disarm the thunderbolt from on high, and misdirect the artillery of heaven? If so, she does well to look accurately at the more appropriate features of the work to be accomplished; to keep her eye on the landmarks of her agency, as the *pillar and ground of the truth*; and which may help her in its administration, as a "worker together with God."

In this article we propose some *helps to success, in the application of truth for the conversion of men.*

We do not here attempt a *general survey* of the principles on which the cause of Christ should be prosecuted, and the truth maintained on the earth ; but confine our attention to a single point, the *application of truth to impenitent mind for its conversion*, and to some helps in that appropriate effort.

1. *An enlightened view of the state of impenitent mind, as to its powers and susceptibilities.*

It is not mind destitute of reason, or conscience, or susceptibility to motives. It can reflect on religious subjects, and be influenced by moral considerations. It is capable of being moved by truth and by all the considerations of the gospel, as really as any mind can be. Man by the fall lost none of the constituent elements of his intelligent nature, but retains them now as a rational, accountable agent—capable of being approached, and legitimately approached and influenced, by all the considerations and truths to which rational intelligence is open ; and the practical conviction of this, is an aid in preaching the gospel. The reason and conscience of impenitent men are with the truth, so far as they get possession of it. The preacher may feel that he has a coadjutor, in the constituent principles of the being of those he addresses. It is to the reason and the susceptibility of *morally right* emotions, in view of the truth of God, that he constantly appeals, and it is ground on which he should stand with no misgivings or distrust.

The objection to impenitent mind is its wrong action. Temptation succeeded with Adam, and “ he fell from his estate of holiness by transgressing the divine command.” All that is wrong in man,—all that the law charges against him, is of the nature of transgression. It is some feeling, emotion, or action, of which he is conscious, and in which he violates law. In this state of unrecovered rebellion impenitent mind now is. There is a misdirection of its powers, susceptibilities, and course. It follows other lords and other gods than the true Jehovah. The sinner has become vain in his imaginations, and his foolish heart is darkened. Self, the world, pleasure, pride, self-sufficiency, and various lusts, have crowded into his imagination, absorbed his attention, and characterized his affections, and he is now wholly astray from God, in the spirit, the habit, and the degeneracy of sin. He is like the disobedient, apostate child in a family, or the rebel province

of an empire. All that is predicable of him, which has relation to the law of God, is counter to that law.

We do not say that sinful indulgence has no eventual tendency to weaken and depress the constitutional powers of the soul,—that the heathen have not lost intellectual stature in this way, or that all sinners have not, or that the gospel has not this result of sin to encounter, more or less, wherever it is sent; but that we are not called to dispense it, under the disheartening impression that there is in it no inherent applicability to the sinner's mind—that the great elements of his moral being embody no power of responding to it;—that when the truth gets his attention, pierces the veil that sinful indulgence has cast over the mind, it still finds no intelligence, no reason, no divinely constituted moral nature to address there, and to move in accordance with its communications;—that the mind is physically disabled, and incapable of apprehending, feeling, and yielding to the claims of God, presented in the gospel;—that there is no correspondence between the truth and the properties of the mind it addresses, and no direct and perceived relation between *preaching* it and the *submission* and *obedience* it requires. It is our privilege, and for our help, to feel that all truth is adapted to mind, and all mind to truth. There is no statement in the gospel, which may not legitimately be made to man in apostacy, and no motive it contains, which *he* is not inherently able to feel and appreciate. Motives to repentance may be drawn for *his* use, and be pressed upon him, with the hope of direct influence and success, from the *holy nature*, and *intrinsic excellence* of God—from the inherent *wrong* of sin—from the loveliness of piety—from the purity of heaven, and the elements and blessedness of the rest that remaineth there. Indeed those very considerations which keep angels in their spheres, and fill heaven with joy, often have the most influence with the sinner, in convincing him of his guilt, folly, and wretchedness, and in leading him to Christ. We may come to him, then, with the messages of truth, and reason with him on the great subjects of “righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come,” with as direct an aim and hope of conviction and persuasion, and all the happy issues thereof, as on other subjects than those of religion. The subject matter of the gospel, stands related to the needed and intended issue of it, in the conversion and salvation of men, at the same point as truth on other subjects does to its action on mind. Other truth does not have influence, if it fails to secure

attention, or is neutralized by prejudice, or is rendered inoperative by unbelief or any other cause; and the object of this position is to place divine truth on the same parallel with all truth in physics or morals, as to its action on the constituent principles of mind, and that it should ever be dispensed with this full conviction and encouragement. Indeed, if it were not so, why is the revealed will of God given at all to apostate man?—why send for Paul into Macedonia, or to Rome?—why give the gospel to the heathen, or preach it at home?—why seek to *persuade men*, as did the apostle, or use his inspired exhortations—“as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ’s stead, *be ye reconciled to God.*”

II. *A discriminating view of what conversion is.*

Conversion is the change, which occurs in the sinner, in becoming reconciled to God, in passing from impenitence to penitence; from entire sinfulness to incipient holiness. It implies a knowledge of the facts of revelation, to some extent, or their equivalent, and appreciation of them; a conviction of the truth—prevailing, successful conviction of it,—conviction in the judgment, compunction in the conscience, contrition for disobedience, and acquiescence of spirit in the claims and will of God. It is the sinner yielding to the truth, and in view of it repenting of his sins, and returning in penitence and submission, from the error of his ways, to his legitimate objects, and relations, and feelings, as an intelligent and responsible agent and creature of God. It does us injury to feel that there is some unappreciable enigma about conversion; some occult, theological mystery, from which we are warned to stand aloof, on pain of the penalty of presumption or sacrilege. There is nothing in this event which is monstrous or unaccountable—nothing which infringes or suspends the conscious and rational action of the mind—nothing but what is according to the laws of mind obtaining on other subjects. Its occurrence is, indeed, the highest reason in the universe. It is the sinner *yielding to reason*, and conscience, and truth, and duty, and God, from the best considerations which can move mind,—any mind, human or angelic. It is his giving up sin for the wrong and unprofitableness thereof, and falling in with right from the constraining and appreciated obligations thereof. There is no more difficulty in accounting for the sinner’s repenting, than for Adam’s sinning. Mutability of purpose and character, is an attribute of finite minds. One who has acted wrongly hitherto, is not therefore incapacitated to

act rightly. He is not obliged to continue in his wrong. He need not always sin and hate God and his neighbor. And so we reason in common life. So the Bible treats the subject of the sinner's return to God. Its exhortations to repentance are unembarrassed with any philosophical objections at this point. Hinderances there are, as we shall see, but they lie not here. The means, the object, and end of conversion, all instruct us that it is an intelligent, rational process of mind, involving the highest exercise of its powers of thought and feeling. Many of the conceptions, which are wont to hover about and encumber this subject, are the coinage of a scholastic age. The mists that settle upon it are from times previous to that of Bacon and the inductive philosophy, and they show themselves in the varied forms of an antinomian theology, or in the more subtle insinuations and effects of a professedly by-gone "taste-scheme."

"Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,
Tempus eget"——

The conversion of the sinner is his repentance. So Peter preached, in the great revival at the pentecost. "Repent and be baptized, for the remission of sins,"—"Repent and be converted," (turn yourselves, active voice,) "that your sins may be blotted out." The appeal of Christ to the sinner was in like form, as was that of Old Testament prophets: "Repent and believe the gospel;" "Turn, for why will ye die;" and James, addressing the disciples, says "He that converteth the sinner from the error of his way, shall save a soul from death, and hide a multitude of sins."

In a theological sense, the word *conversion* describes the event under consideration, contemplated in the aspect and from the direction of the divine influence employed therein, and *repentance*, from that of the sinner's agency and compliance therein; but neither is the one without the other in this event, nor is it accomplished without the concurrence of both. Truth and the Spirit influencing the sinner, and his repenting under this influence, make it predicable of him that he is a converted man; that he is changed from nature to grace, from a state of apostasy to a state of reconciliation, and hence issues that event which we rightly term conversion. See its type in the compunction, mental agony, and submission of the prodigal son, and his return to his father; in the moving of the multitudes under the preaching at Pentecost, when three thousand were turned

to the Lord ; and see, also, a striking resemblance to it, when a disobedient, refractory child sinks upon the knee of its parent, convinced of its wrong, confessing, forsaking it, and returning to its duty in the family again.

Agencies from without do not constitute conversion. They are seen at the point of inducing and securing it. The sinner is not converted before he repents. He is in no way changed in moral character or condition, until penitence occurs. Conversion is a result through influences inducing right action, in an intelligent being, from and in view of considerations adapted to the issue. So far as appears, the process is in the highest sense rational, and need not be encumbered and scandalized by a technical and abstract phraseology, tending to make it less so, and to weaken the conscious responsibility of men in relation to it.

III. *A just apprehension of the agency of the Holy Spirit in conversion.*

This feature of the subject has been to some extent involved in the previous discussion, but it merits further attention. The gift of the Holy Ghost is superadded to the other provisions of grace, and to the grounds of success, which truth has on other subjects than that of religion. It is wholly a superadded economy, all in the grace of God, to give efficacy to the gospel on the minds of men, and sway them, in view of the truth, "to *apply* the merits of redemption purchased by Christ." Its need has grown out of the apostacy of man ; its indispensableness out of the obstinacy of his heart, and his utter alienation from God prevailing against all the influences of the truth, unaided by the Spirit. Truth is obligatory on us without the Spirit's agency. We should be bound to believe and obey God, and become all that the gospel requires, if the economy of the Spirit had never been granted. Its agency God may now forego in any instance, and yet hold us responsible for the improvement we make of his truth, and for the success of those communications of the gospel which are made to us. We know not that angels have the Spirit's agency, or need it, and we do know that its dispensation on earth adds new responsibility to men, and affixes the characteristic of a peculiar desperation, and recklessness, and guilt on him who to other sins adds this, that "*he does despite unto the Spirit of grace.*"

That the agency of the Spirit is co-ordinate with the truth, to give it success, and secure the issues which it is adapted to have on mind, if more than the statement of the position

be needful, the words of the promise to send Him, are in place, as proof: "But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall *teach* you all things, and *bring all things to your remembrance*, whatsoever I have *said* unto you." "But when the Comforter is come, even the *Spirit of Truth*, which proceedeth from the Father, *he shall testify of me.*" "When he, the Spirit of Truth is come, he will *guide you into all truth*"—"he shall take of mine, and show it unto you." How much soever, in these quotations, is appropriate to the miraculous dispensation of the church, and the prophetic office-work of the Holy Ghost, it recognizes him as the *Spirit of Truth*,—associates his operation with the truth, and indicates, plainly enough, the line of his influence in leading and guiding his people to the truth.

He is said, too, to *reprove* the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment, and on grounds calculated to induce conviction,—he is said to "*strive* with man," and we are exhorted not to "*grieve* the Holy Ghost," and are admonished of the sin against the Holy Ghost. All these expressions show that the commerce of the Spirit is with the activities and living responsibilities of the soul; that his agency on men, is laid out where it is, philosophically, capable of being resisted, grieved, checked, and turned aside. Men treat the Spirit as they treat the truth, and often resist both, in resisting either. "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost,"—and hence the unpardonable nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost: it thwarts the ultimate provision of grace.

The varied phraseology quoted above, would be very inappropriate, if the Spirit's work consisted in the lodgment of a substratum in us, in the entire passivity of the soul, as a mere foundation for right emotions. Setting aside the monstrous metaphysics of such a position, such a work, in its occurrence, does not use the truth, or involve the agency or responsibility of man. It might be performed on him, for aught we know, in sleep, or in utter ignorance of God, and when under no impression of duty. It would be a merely sovereign work of divine, creative power, having in it no correlation with truth or moral obligation.

The word of God is styled "*the sword* of the Spirit," showing the truth to be the instrument of his contact, influence, and subduing power over the souls of men.

To the same end, is the testimony of consciousness. The mind in conversion, in the commencement and progress of piety,

is *conscious* of no impression but *in view of the truth*. Although responsibility attends the whole process, we are aware of no influence, except in accordance with light in the understanding. We feel only in view of considerations drawn from the Bible. We repent in view of the wrong of sin, and the rightness of God's law and government, and the claims of his goodness and grace. We believe, from the evidence of the truth; we love, from an apprehension of the excellency of the truth, of the appreciated perfections of God, of the abounding reasons for loving Christ; we submit, from the overwhelming conviction of truths adapted to produce submission. Such was the penitence of David, and of the prodigal son; such is the reminiscence of the Christian; such is the language of the convicted sinner, and of the new convert, whose whole soul is full of praise: such, the testimony of any one who has been conversant with seasons "of refreshing from the presence of the Lord." Indeed, if it were not so, religion has no more virtue than instinct, or the service of God than that of idols.

With the intimations of consciousness, coincides the doctrine of the Spirit's agency, as taught by our Saviour in the interview with Nicodemus, so far as applicable to the point before us. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." There is an influence exerted, though the agent be not seen, and the agency be recognized in the effects. These are according to truth. There is no infringement of the laws of mind, no suspension of its conscious responsibilities, all is in accordance with the legitimate tendencies and results of truth on our intelligent nature. It is the Spirit of God, with the truth; his co-ordinate, mighty, sufficient agency, with it and for it, giving it deserved success; inducing repentance and every Christian grace, in view of considerations adapted to such issues; giving the issue which truth has over sinless mind without the superadded economy of the Spirit, which it ever should have over all mind, and which it would have over us, but for our sinful degeneracy of heart and life.

A reference may here be fairly made to what is known of the nature of mind, and the laws of influencing it. We can conceive of no way in which it can be swayed to good or evil, but through considerations presented to its view: changes in it, irrespective of these, must be irrespective of accountability, and

be without moral quality or character. What, too, are the analogies of the subject? How is the mind influenced on other subjects than that of religion, by other beings than the Spirit of God? How are men influenced by one another? how by Satanic agency, and that which is wrong? How came angels to sin? How was Eve tempted—a pure, sinless spirit, until temptation entered? She saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree to be *desired* to make one wise; considerations vastly magnified, no doubt, by the suggestions of the adversary, and filling, at the time, the whole horizon of her view, at least enough to give them a prevailing influence over her; and “she took of the fruit and did eat.” In this instance, a mind capable of choosing, and considerations inducing choice, seem to be all the material facts of the case. Habit and previous character were against the issue. A holy being became sinful in this way. Does it help us to the conclusion, that a sinful being may become holy, in the same way, “*mutatis mutandis*?” The assertion that the law of the Spirit’s agency is wholly unique and incapable of illustration, from the sources here referred to, is certainly gratuitous, is without necessity and without proof. But if there be any analogy, as here contemplated, and the agency of the Holy Ghost may be regarded as in the direction and channel of the truth; his impressions as coupled with the annunciations of the gospel, to give them their deserved and full effect; then is the doctrine of the Spirit the source of defined and intelligent encouragement, to commend ourselves, in dispensing truth, to every man’s conscience in the sight of God.

IV. *An accurate analysis of the hinderances to conversion.*

It was the fault of scholastic times to invest the subject of our repentance and recovery to holiness with an abstract and involved phraseology, and clothe it with a form of expression which has little alliance with the thoughts or language or associations of men in other departments of knowledge. There was in it bad logic, an imperfect analysis of mind, and an ill-directed effort to preserve the forms of orthodoxy, though sure to diminish its power. Nor are the effects of this impolicy yet fully worn from the face of the church. The good or ill success of the gospel is often taken out from the channel in which ordinary instruction is viewed, and based upon recondite theories, which the mind of the applicant cannot well investigate or comprehend. Faith is made too abstruse a principle for ordinary

apprehension. Conversion is viewed as part of a mysterious economy, not obvious to reason nor connected with the legitimate issues of instruction. The obstacles to piety are referred to, in some implanted principle of evil, occult in the essential nature of man, intangible to the sinner himself, and independent of his agency, and capable of removal only by a sovereign act of God, as an indispensable prerequisite to the force of truth upon the mind, or to a capacity for the discharge of duty. But the doctrines of grace are not aided by such recondite statements and conceptions. All this is like David in the armor of Saul; but the cumbrous ritual of other times, that can only embarrass inquiry, and muffle the edge of "the Sword of the Spirit." It would seem important, also, that the popular mind be free from the habit of resolving the difficulties of conversion into physical obstructions and inabilities in the nature of man. Such a reference of the matter cannot but be attended with a weakened sense of responsibility—with a spirit of self-justification, on the part of those in sin, and a diminished response to truth, as it reaches them in the ordinary avenues of instruction. The subject will bear a more practical reference, and may be brought more fully under the notice of observation and consciousness. In this light is it presented by our Saviour himself in the parable of the sower. This parable is recorded by two of the Evangelists, with an accompanying exegesis, and presents in clear light the relations between the word of God and the hearers of it. Hindrances are here detected, in the inattention and frivolity and worldliness of men, and in the agency of "the wicked one;" in minds full of other things than the word of God; in sensibilities benumbed and deadened by sinful habits and courses, and affections enlisted in behalf of selfish and worldly gratifications, preventing due consideration of the word, and its taking root in them, "*unto faith and salvation.*" The especial type of hindrances will, of course, change, with the ever-changing circumstances of the hearers of the gospel; but how multiform soever, they should not be looked for in the essential properties of the mind. They are rather the accretions of its history, than the ingredients of its being. They have arisen from its wrong action at first: they spring from that which is of the nature of the habit from within, or temptation from without. All sin is of the general nature of any particular sin: all sinful habits, much of the nature of any particular sinful habit. The obstacles to repentance in the sinner, are like the obstacles to reformation in

the inebriate; they are to be overcome through considerations of truth and obligation, and not by a creative fiat, in the listless passivity of the subject. And when repentance has occurred, the sinner will usually find the special obstacles that had prevented it, to be the most ensnaring of any in his future course, as in the case of one recovered from a particular vice. His progress away from them, and his strength against them, will be gradual, and his history illustrate the law of habit, in respect both to the sin and the holiness of men. This feature is observable in all changes of character, and not least in the highest of all changes, that from sin to holiness, from apostasy to reconciliation with God. And the reference here is, to the intent that it may contribute its influence to divest that event of needless mystery, and to exhibit it as a rational process in accordance with light in the understanding, and convictions in the sensibilities of the soul.

This view of the obstacles to piety accords, it is believed, as well with the lessons of experience as with the nature of mind, nor is it in conflict with the phraseology of the Bible. The "cannot" there found, is always that of popular use. It is correlated with facts that have arisen in the history of the agent,—with the circumstances in which he is found—with his sinful and depraved habits and state—with the variety and strength of those hinderances which have accumulated upon him in the ways of sin. It refers to what is predicable of man since the fall,—of that which is of the nature of sinful habit, in the progress of human history, and of temptation from without, acting on the course and character of man. To recur to a previous illustration, it is the inability of the drunkard to refrain from his cups,—of the voluptuary, to forego his pleasures,—of the idle man to shake off his sloth. It is the inability of one addicted to falsehood to speak the truth—of the "swearer" to cease his profaneness, or "of them accustomed to do evil," in any form, "to learn to do well:"—and those hinderances are so accumulated and prevailing, and their practical views so entirely uniform, that they are well described, for all the purposes of speech, in the language of the Bible and of common life. "Joseph's brethren hated him, and *could not* speak peaceably to him." "Ye *cannot* serve God," says Joshua, "for he is a holy God." "For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with

their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them." These are the words of Christ in immediate connection with the parable of the sower, and very graphically describe the effects of a long abuse of privilege, and great degeneracy in sin. "How *can* ye, being evil, speak good things?" "No man *can* come unto me, except the Father, which sent me, draw him." This last is justly esteemed a strong passage, but if the scope of the paragraph containing it admits of its being applied to the specific subject of conversion, the difficulty in the case was not the want of competent powers for the discharge of duty, "but erroneous opinions—pride, obstinacy, self-conceit, and a deep felt contempt for Jesus;"* as is obvious from the next verse, which says, "Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me."

No view of the hinderances to conversion should be entertained, which shall lessen a sense of responsibility in dispensing the truth or in receiving and obeying it. This event, as before remarked, is not to be regarded as a merely arbitrary and sovereign act of God, sustaining no perceived relation to the means employed in it, but strictly of the nature of a consequence of those means, and resulting from considerations of truth and obligation, made prevalent, and inducing repentance; as choice results in other things. The gracious economy of the Spirit does not change the relations of the subject. "He takes of the things of Christ and shows them unto us." The truth is the instrument and channel of his power. This indispensable and sufficient agency is but our encouragement in the direction of the truth for all the issues for which we commend it to the understandings and consciences of men, for their conversion, sanctification, and eventual salvation.

V. A just consideration of the province of the Will.

The will is inherently capable of varying its volitions. It need not of necessity follow the track of previously prevailing habits and desires. It may at any time change its choice with respect to any subject, on sufficiently appreciated inducements thereto. It may choose right to-day, though it never has before. Desires, passions, habits, biases, propensities, by whichsoever name the state of the affections is referred to, when correlated with choice, are to be viewed in the light of motives

* Barnes.

influencing choice; and choice implies a decision in view of conflicting motives, those supplied from reason, conscience, truth; the Spirit may prevail against those from passion and habit, propensity, or evil counsel. They always do in a change for the better, they fail to do it in a change for the worse. The lover of "strong drink" may supply considerations from reason and conscience, the love of family or reputation—or his friend may—that shall get him triumphantly past his accustomed haunt of dissipation, and take him home unharmed to-day to the bosom of an anxious family, though it has not been done before for months or years. Our first parents, though "created in the image of God," could sin, and did, right abreast of all previous habit and propensity. Their experience, and habits, and propensities could not have been taken away, as an indispensable prerequisite to the entrance of temptation. They were *met* by temptation, and by it overcome. They were not, by a sovereign act of God, previously withdrawn. They were put upon the field of strife, and through Satanic art and influence brought under, and temptation prevailed, and that, too, against truth, obligation, and sweet experience of the love of God. Angels, with biases and propensities the growth of ages, we know not how long, in the full sunlight of God's countenance, were not impervious to temptation, to a counter course of conduct, and temptation prevailed with them—inducements to sin overcame their long sustained and fortified propensities to holiness,—quenched the light of all their experience of the perfections and worthiness of God. They became apostates even without the example or influence of any other being in the universe, in the direction of revolt. Redeemed men or angels now, are not continued in holiness because of incapacity to be influenced by motives to do wrong, but through an economy securing the preponderance of motives in a right direction. Men are turned from their accustomed courses and habits from various considerations,—from prudential reasons sometimes—from public and patriotic motives—from love of kindred,—of partner or child. *Conflicting* passions and appetites may alternately gain ascendancy. These are matters of daily observation, and with the resources of influence, found in the truth and Spirit of God, brought to bear upon the intelligent nature and susceptibilities of man, is it wonderful, that he should turn from sin to holiness—from the service of idols to his rightful Lord and Redeemer?

The views expressed in this article, help to define and concentrate the agency of the church as a worker together with God in the gospel. They set aside diverting influences, which are wont to obtrude themselves upon our path; and give directness to the efforts which we are commanded to make in behalf of the regeneration and sanctification of those in sin.

Among the helps here indicated is that in relation to *prayer*. The resort in prayer as connected with the inculcation and results of truth, is not in abatement of the perceived responsibilities of preaching or hearing the word, but in furtherance of them. It is seeking a co-ordinate, efficacious influence with and for the truth—to deepen its impression—to quicken the sensibilities of the mind in view of it, to secure the submission of the soul to the claims of God, propounded in the gospel, and to induce repentance, and cordial faith and love, and every Christian grace.

These views illustrate the importance of *discriminating* truth; of availing ourselves of the laws of mind in dispensing it; of falling in with the consciousness of the sinner, and making all that is said to him, intelligently to aid conviction and the work of the Spirit. We know not but that the work of the Spirit in conversion may be as truly embarrassed, and his agency thwarted, through unskilfulness in the application of the truth, as by inattention and diversion of mind in the hearer.

Finally. These views indicate the nature of the address which is appropriate to the *inquiring sinner*. It should lay intelligently on his conscience, his sin and guilt and grounds of condemnation; the claims of truth upon him as a rational, accountable creature, under every obligation to love God with all his heart. It should represent these claims as immediate and overwhelming—instant upon him with ever increasing weight until he submits, and turns to God. It should admit that no doctrine of the Bible, nor relation of the subject, advises the sinner to wait where he is, until by some extraneous afflatus, irrespective of truth and conviction, he is borne within the enclosures of the kingdom, he knows not how or why. He must not be encouraged in the idea that he is merely the *subject* of influence in this matter; that he is but the *passive recipient* of the process in which he is changed from nature to grace, and that if he but hold himself subject to this action upon him, the further responsibility of the issue is not his. Such a position misconceives the doctrine of *divine influence*, the laws of mind, and the nature of conversion, and, while the sinner retains it, is like

a mountain of ice in his way. His true position in securing every help from without, is that of an active and immediate responsibility to truth; that of mental effort at compliance with just what God requires; that of concentrating the constituent elements of his being on that which the Saviour meant when he said, "Repent, and believe the gospel."

The agency of the Spirit is our help in *repenting and believing*, and in the very *process* thereof, on a responsibility wholly our own. It is in "working out our own salvation," that "God works in us both to will and to do."

The address should inculcate this responsibility, and aim at convincing the sinner that, until he repents of sin and believes on Christ, he is disowning the truth, and resisting and grieving the Holy Ghost. That his only resort is in coming at once to the mercy-seat, in penitence and humiliation of spirit, and casting himself, as one self-ruined and perishing, on the provisions of grace there revealed. There and then it is that reconciliation takes place—that his character, state, and destiny change, and that he consistently has hope, as a child and an heir of God.

ARTICLE IV.

CHARACTER AND THEOLOGY OF THE LATER ROMANS.

By the Rev. Albert Smith, Prof. of Rhetoric and English Literature, Middlebury College, Vt.

IN a recent number of this work,* we undertook to show that the early Romans were not less remarkable for probity, frugality, chastity, patriotism, good faith, and general morality, than for the valor, fortitude, and perseverance, by which they conquered the world. These known and admired features in the character of that celebrated people, we traced to the religion that prevailed among them in the earliest periods of their national existence—a religion which we maintain to have been, in some important respects, superior to that more imaginative

* No. 18, Article I.

and splendid, but at the same time more sensual and corrupting system, which was afterwards received from the Grecian world, and established on the ruins of the old simplicity. We attempted to prove that the first religion of the Romans embraced the elements of a right theology, and that it exerted a highly favorable influence over the national habits, manners, and institutions. The worship of a Deity under simple forms and without images; a deeply-seated reverence for the Divinity and for sacred things; a practical recognition of the superintending providence of God; a firm belief in the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments; are fundamental principles of true religion. To the existence in the public mind of these elements of theological belief the excellence of the Roman character is, we think, to be ascribed. On these as its foundation rests the colossal fabric of Roman greatness.

The present Article is designed to be the counterpart of the former. We propose to show that in later times there was, in the Roman character, a striking change for the worse; that this change is not to be exclusively attributed to the increase of luxury, and the influx of foreign vices, but chiefly to a preceding change in the national religion consequent on the introduction of Grecian modes of thought, the spread of Grecian philosophy, and especially the establishment at Rome of the worship of the "human Olympus" of the Greeks. A few additional remarks will make it evident that the general corruption of morals in the later periods of Roman history, the overthrow of liberty, and the final downfall of the Empire, are not to be referred to the defectiveness of education, and the want of a system of public instruction.

I. The description which has been given* of the character and manners of the Romans is true only of the earlier centuries of their history. If the state of morals and the mode of life, in the later times of the republic and under the empire, be placed beside the preceding account, a striking difference will be observed. The simplicity, the integrity, the frugality, the industry, the good faith, the patriotism of former days are gone, and in place of these good qualities the most destructive vices have become prevalent. This change was effected gradually. The Romans maintained their early character for upwards of five centuries, until the times of the

* Vol. IX. pp. 258—264.

second Punic war, and in the seventh century from the founding of the city corruption became general. The destruction of Carthage is the period commonly referred to as the turning point of the national manners, and the civil wars of the following century nearly completed the overthrow of the ancient virtues. Sallust, who lauds so highly the virtues of the early Romans, is very explicit in regard to the degeneracy of their descendants. He represents Jugurtha, a hundred years before Christ, as acting on the full persuasion that the Romans were entirely destitute of principle. When this Numidian prince was departing from Rome, having often looked back upon it in silence, he at last broke out into these remarkable words :* "A city set up for sale, and soon to perish if a buyer can be found?"—a prediction that was speedily verified. This historian describes the state of morals in the time of the Catilinian war in language which will not endure a literal translation. "It is worth while, when you have observed the houses and country-seats piled up like so many cities, to examine the temples of the gods built by our ancestors, the most religious of men. But they adorned the shrines of the gods with piety, and their own houses with glory : nor did they deprive the conquered of any thing except the power of doing injury. While their descendants, effeminate wretches, with the most crying injustice, take away from their allies all those things which as conquerors their brave ancestors had left even to their enemies : as though to do injury and to exercise dominion were one and the same thing." "Nor were licentiousness, gaming, and other refined gratifications less prevalent. The sexes relinquished all regard to chastity. Sea and land were ransacked for all kinds of dainties to gratify the palate. They slept before the time of sleep ; they waited neither for hunger, nor thirst, nor cold, nor fatigue ; but all were anticipated by way of luxury. These things inflamed the youth when their resources failed, to the commission of crimes."†

Augustine confirms the representations of Sallust, and remarks : "Other writers also express their assent to these things, although in a much less eloquent style."‡ The same

* *Urbem venalem, et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit.*—Bell. Jug., § 35.

† Bell. Cat., § 12, 13.

‡ *Et alii scriptores in hæc consentiunt, quamvis eloquio multum impari.*—De Civ. Dei. II. 18.

Christian father adds: "See the Roman republic (facts which I do not first state, but which were advanced long before the coming of Christ, by those authors from whom these things are drawn) gradually changed, and from a very fair and excellent, made a most vile and profligate state. See, after the destruction of Carthage, and before the advent of Christ, the ancient manners, not gradually supplanted as before, but swept away like a torrent, insomuch that the youth were corrupted by luxury and avarice."* This writer brings forward in the same connection the comments of Cicero on the sentiment of the poet Ennius, that the Roman greatness had its origin and support in the excellent character of the fathers of the state. "Moribus antiquis stat res Romana, virisque." "Which line," says he, "he seems to have expressed like an oracle, with equal brevity and truth. For the men, without the aid of such morals, or the morals, had not these men controlled the power, would neither of them have been able to found, or so long to maintain so great and widely extended a republic. Thus before our recollection, the morals of our country produced excellent men, and excellent men preserved the ancient morals, and the institutions of our ancestors. But when our generation had received the republic, like a very beautiful painting, although fading through age, it not only neglected to restore it to its former freshness, but it even took no care to preserve so much as the form, and as it were the faintest outlines. How much then remains of those ancient morals, on which he said the Roman power depended, when they are so consigned to oblivion, that so far from being cultivated, they are even unknown? And what shall I say of the men? For the morals perished through a want of the men, of which great calamity we have not only to trace the causes, but also like culprits to clear ourselves from guilt. For by our own corruption, and not by any accident, we retain the republic only in name; while in reality we have lost it long since."† It is needless, as Sallust observes, to exhibit at

* De Civ. Dei. II. 19.

† De Civ. Dei. II. 21. In this connection the remarks of a modern writer on the same passages from Ennius and Cicero, may be interesting. "It was her morals which raised Rome to such a height of glory; and these morals, *which the fear of the gods maintained*, relaxed as soon as the great ceased by their example to cherish among the people this regard for the reli-

large the redundancy of proof which every portion of the later periods of the Roman history furnishes of the total degeneracy of morals that prevailed. It will be sufficient to refer to the graphic and glowing picture given by Seneca of the general corruption:—

“These so many thousands hastening to the forum at the dawn of day, how base are their lawsuits, how much more base the advocates who manage them! One summons his father to court for things which ought rather to be praised. Another joins issue with his mother. A third comes forward as an informer against a crime of which himself is more evidently guilty. The judge is elected to condemn the very things which he has done, and the circle of bystanders, corrupted by the smooth representations of the patron, side with the injuring party. Why should I specify individual cases? When you see the Forum thronged by the multitude, the Septa filled with the rush of the whole crowd, and that Circus where the people show themselves in the largest collections, be sure of this, that the amount of vice is in proportion to the number of men. Between those citizens whom you see in the garb of peace, there is nevertheless no peace. A trifling consideration is sufficient to induce them to destroy each other. No one is profited ex-

gion of their fathers. It is to the ancient morals, and to the great men whom they had formed, that Ennius attributes the greatness of Rome. Cicero, in quoting this verse of Ennius, confesses that there remained nothing of the ancient morality which had supported the republic. That virtuous people who would select only virtuous men to rule them, no longer existed, and if they had existed, in whom among the great would they have found those ancient virtues? It is sufficient to read the descriptions which Cicero himself has given us in different places, of the characters of his cotemporaries, to be convinced that corruption had already reached its height, and that Titus Livy was in the right in saying that ‘their vices had come to such a pitch that they could neither bear them nor endure the application of a remedy.’ ‘We no longer recognize that religious people of whose good faith and probity Polybius boasts so much. The great ridiculed the auspices; the ministers of religion performed the ceremonies with more than negligence, and soon there was left no restraint upon ambition on the one side, and corruption on the other.’—*De Beaufort, Republique Romaine*, I. 354.

cept by the injury of his neighbor. The fortunate they hate; the unfortunate they despise. Oppressed by those above them, in their turn they abuse their inferiors. They are distracted by opposing passions. They desire all things brought to ruin for the sake of a small gratification and a pitiful booty. Their life is like that of the Gladiators, who fight with the same persons with whom they live. This is an assemblage of wild beasts: except that brutes abstain from waging war with their own kind, whereas these delight in mutual laceration. Only in this one thing do they differ from brute animals, that the latter have compassion on those who nourish them, while these devour even those by whom they are supported. Never will the wise man cease to be angry [with crime] if he once begins. All things are filled with crimes and vices. More is committed than it is possible to remedy by coercion. A monstrous contest for supremacy in guilt is carried on. The love of sinning increases daily, and shame is continually diminished. Laying aside respect for what is good and just, lust rushes on whithersoever it will. Crimes are no longer concealed: they come forth before our eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become, and so powerful is it in the minds of all, that innocence is not merely rare, but is nowhere to be found. Think you that these are individuals or but a few who have violated law? On all sides, as if at a concerted signal, they rush forth to the utter confounding of right and wrong.

— Non hospes ab hospite tutus,
Non socer a genero: fratrum quoque gratia rara est.
Imminet exitio vir conjugis, illa mariti,
Lurida terribiles miscent aconita novercæ,
Filius ante diem patrios inquirat in annos.

And how small a part of the crimes is this? He has not described the hostile camps drawn from the same families and neighborhoods, the clashing oaths of parents and children, the torch applied by the citizen to his own country, troops of furious horsemen galloping around to search out the hiding places of the proscribed, the fountains rendered deadly by poisons, pestilence purposely created, the trench dug around besieged parents, the prisons overflowing, fires raging through whole cities, deplorable abuses of power, secret conspiracies for dominion and for the public ruin, those things gloried in which while they can be suppressed are regarded as crimes, robberies and rapes, and language itself defiled with obscenity.

Add now the perjuries of the public faith, treaties broken, whatever is not defended by force carried off as the booty of the stranger, swindlings, frauds, breaches of trust, for which three places of public justice are not sufficient. If you wish the wise man to exercise as much displeasure as the nature and extent of the crimes demand, he must not be angry merely, he must rave.”*

It need not be asked whether such a state as Seneca has here described could be free. A civil despotism, with the mockery of a senate and of freedom, had already usurped the seat of liberty, soon to be displaced by a military domination still more terrible. And the remaining history of the empire is a continuous record of atrocities, in number and enormity as much exceeding any similar developments of depravity which the black scroll of humanity exhibits, as the theatre on which they were performed was grander and more magnificent than any other which has displayed its pageantry before the eyes of men.

II. There is a question of some interest which, at this stage of the investigation, is worthy of examination. Was the great change in the Roman character which has been pointed out, produced solely or chiefly by the extension of the boundaries of the republic, the introduction of foreign luxuries, and the contaminating influence of the vices of other nations? The triumph of the Roman arms, and the unparalleled prosperity of the nation, are commonly referred to as causes of new moral evils to the state. This result seems to have been foreseen by some of the wisest Romans. It was owing to such views that Scipio Nasica (Augustine *De Civ. Dei.* II. 18) was unwilling that Carthage should be destroyed. With the extension of the empire, the honor and profit connected with the public offices were increased. Sallust evidently regards this extension, with the ease and luxury which followed, as the great cause of the decline of virtue and the general corruption. The Roman conquests in Western Asia, and the consequent introduction of the refinements of Grecian art, and the effeminate vices of the East, are particularly referred to as sources of the national decay. “The Romans amalgamated with the inhabitants of Gaul, Illyricum, Pannonia, Dacia, Spain, and Britain; or the inhabitants of these countries were converted into Romans. The case was entirely different with Greece, and still more with

* *De Ira*, II. 7, 8, 9.

the provinces in Africa and Asia. The Roman colonies, merchants, magistrates and soldiers, in the last named provinces, made so small a number in comparison with the natives, that they were not able to supplant either their laws and customs, or their language and religion. On the contrary, it was matter of complaint from the earliest times, wherever the Roman legions trod Asiatic and Egyptian ground, that the brave warriors of Italy, under the sky of Asia and Egypt, became enervate, and that they received the vices and superstitions of the vanquished instead of imparting to these their mode of thinking and morals. When these degenerate Romans returned to their native land, they of course brought with them the vices and superstitions to which they had been accustomed, and infected with them the hitherto uncorrupted mass of the people. This was done by many thousands of the inhabitants of the provinces, who were brought to Rome by a desire of gain, by ambition, and by the wish to find protection against oppression, or satisfaction for injustice which they had suffered.”*

There is no doubt that this statement is substantially correct. By the extension of the empire the Romans lost in virtue what they gained in power, and their intercourse with conquered nations proved destructive to their morals. But it may still be asked, ‘In what manner was this result produced? Were the enervating effects of luxury and ease, the vicious examples of the nations whom their arms subdued, and the corrupting influences of extensive political domination the only moral causes which undermined the virtue of the Romans, and finally overthrew the vast fabric of their power? Why was not the Roman character able to abide the test to which it was subjected by the prosperity which its own excellence secured? Did the influences by which that character was formed at length cease to exist? or were the noble qualities to which those influences had given birth, at last extirpated by antagonist causes introduced in later ages?’ In the early ages, the Romans were a rude and simple nation of warlike husbandmen, possessed of a small territory, without the means of gratifying avarice, and free from temptation to foreign vices. But this primitive rudeness, and this freedom from temptation was not the *cause* of their virtues. Other heathen nations in the same state of civilization have been entirely destitute of such noble traits of character. These

* Meiners Geschichte der Religionen, I. 122.

admirable qualities were produced by the institutions which existed among them—institutions whose foundations were laid in *religious belief*. In later ages the Romans became as profligate and abandoned as they had been upright, temperate, and patriotic. At this period they were possessed of great power, and exposed to new causes of corruption. Those causes doubtless exerted their influence. But the change which had taken place was not wholly external. It was something more than new relations to other nations which overthrew the virtues of the Romans. There was an essential change in their institutions. Religion was overthrown. While other influences tended to this result, the removal of religious belief from the minds of the people was by no means the least of the causes which brought down the Romans from the height of moral greatness, as well as of military glory and political power, which they had reached. This we shall now attempt to prove.

III. The most important features of the religion of the early Romans have been pointed out in our discussion of that part of the subject. It is certain that in the first ages of the state religious belief had firm hold of the public mind, and that the institutions of Numa gave direction and strength to this belief. Whether the length of Numa's life, or some other cause be assigned, the religious spirit of his institutions became thoroughly incorporated with the national habits of thought and feeling. A change afterwards took place; but this change was unquestionably gradual. Dionysius does indeed state,* that during the reign of Tullus Hostilius, the successor of Numa, many of the religious ceremonies were neglected. He says, also, that under this martial prince the people became not only more warlike, but also more avaricious, and that they neglected their husbandry. But, on the other hand, he represents the first act of Ancus Martius to have been a speech in a general assembly of the people, in which he points out the evils that had come from the abuses which had crept in. Praising the pious and peaceful institutions of his grandfather, he exhorted the people to return to agriculture and the grazing of cattle, and to abstain from violence and rapine. At the same time receiving from the priests the sacred writings of Numa, he transcribed them afresh, and set them up in public that they might be open to examination. It would seem, however, that in the sixth century from

* Antiq. Rom. III. 36.

the founding of the city, the forms of religion had been so much changed, that when Numa's books had been accidentally discovered, it was thought prudent by the senate to have them burnt.* But the external drapery of religion is of inferior importance, so long as its essential elements remain unchanged. These have their seat in the national belief. It is by the subversion of these, and not by any change of form, that religion is overthrown. It has been shown that for nearly two centuries the Romans worshipped the Deity without images; that for a much longer period they were in all things very religious; that they regarded themselves as under a moral government, administered by divine power; and that they believed in the immortality of the soul, and in a future state of rewards and punishments. But this religious groundwork was afterwards entirely swept away. Commencing with the establishment of image-worship, the work of reform went on from step to step, till the religion and the character of the early Romans disappeared together.† The influence of religion, as it once existed, has been described in the words of Polybius. Even in his time, it would seem, the change had commenced. It need not be denied that the refinements of Grecian art contributed to enervate the stern conquerors of that ancient home of liberty. But it was the skepticism of Greek philosophy that cut the nerve of the Roman character. It has been maintained that philosophy was cultivated in the earliest times of Rome. But the whole history of the state is opposed to such a supposition. While other sciences, and many of the arts, were introduced, and cultivated to a greater or less extent, philosophy appears to have been very little known as a distinct branch of knowledge till near the time of Cicero. The attention of the Roman youth was first turned in this direction by the philosophers Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes, who, near the close of the sixth century from the founding of the city,‡ were sent to Rome as ambassadors from Athens. Cicero describes one of them, not only as a philosopher, but as an orator of such consummate skill that he defended no proposition which he did not establish, and attacked none which he did not overthrow.§ It is not strange

* Liv. XL. 29. † De Beaufort, I. 363.

‡ Brucker. Hist. Philos. 286. Cicero De Oratore, II. 37.

§ De Oratore II. 38. Carneadis verò vis incredibilis illa dicendi, et varietas, perquam esset optanda nobis; qui nullam

that these distinguished men were able to enkindle among the Roman youth a transient zeal for the study of philosophy. But the sterner spirits among the leading men at Rome at that period regarded this introduction of the Greek philosophy, as the forerunner of evils to the state. At the instance of Cato the elder, the ambassadors were honorably dismissed, and the youth directed to study the laws and institutions as before. Soon after, the Greek philosophers, and even rhetoricians, were forbidden to live at Rome. But the relation of Rome to other parts of the world had become such that it was found impossible to prohibit the cultivation of foreign literature, or to check the spread of new opinions. The young men of Rome having obtained the command of armies in the East, came in contact with the cultivated minds of Greece and other countries, and were captivated by the beauties of philosophy and the charms of eloquence. The acquaintance with philosophy became general, and exerted so much influence, that Scipio Africanus, and others like him, must be regarded as little, if at all, more the productions of the Roman than of the Grecian world. Sylla brought from Asia an extensive library, containing the works of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and Lucullus completed the establishment of Greek philosophy at Rome, by gathering around him, in his magnificent retreat, a crowd of the most eminent philosophers of his age. From his time all the Grecian sects flourished at Rome. The judgment of Cato proved correct; for the influence of the Grecian mode of thinking soon manifested itself, and in nothing more strikingly than in reference to religion. A full examination of the tenets of the Greek philosophers, with an account of the progress of the different sects at Rome, and their influence there, would lead to a much more extensive investigation than is consistent with the design of this article. The connection of the Greek philosophy with the religious belief, and the state of morals in the later times of the republic, and under the empire, will be sufficiently evident from a brief statement of the prevailing views in theology, which we will now make for the purpose of comparing these later views with the elements of religion as they existed in the earlier Roman theology. When the Greek philosophy had taken root, what were the current opinions respecting the exist-

unquam in illis suis disputationibus rem defendit quam non probavit; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit.

ence and character of God, the divine government, the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments? These are the fundamental truths of religion, and it is on these, more than on all things else, that individual and national morality depend. What then was the state of the public mind in reference to these in the later days of Rome?

1. *Rejection of the national gods, with atheism and general skepticism, became extensively prevalent.*

This fact, and its connection with philosophy, are distinctly stated in the following passage from Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*: "The spirit of inquiry, prompted by emulation and supported by freedom, had divided the public teachers of philosophy into a variety of contending sects; but the ingenuous youth who, from every part, resorted to Athens and the other seats of learning in the Roman empire, were alike instructed in every school to reject and despise the religion of the multitude. How, indeed, was it possible that a philosopher should accept as divine truths, the idle tales of the poets, and the incoherent traditions of antiquity; or that he should adore as gods, those imperfect beings whom he must have despised as men! Against such unworthy adversaries Cicero condescended to employ the arms of reason and eloquence; but the satire of Lucian was a much more adequate, as well as more efficacious weapon. We may be well assured, that a writer conversant with the world, would never have ventured to expose the gods of his country to public ridicule, had they not already been the objects of secret contempt among the polished and enlightened orders of society."*

The change of views here spoken of commenced in the higher ranks, and among those who had been connected with the armies in Greece. But as indifference to the spirit, or neglect of the forms of religion, cannot long be confined to the leading men of a nation, the new sentiments soon became general. The proof of this change in regard to religion is abundant and decisive. Of all the ancient writers, no one refers to the fact more frequently or with greater explicitness than Dionysius. In one of the many passages in which the subject is mentioned by him, after having described the solemn religious ceremonies with which the kings, and after their expulsion, the consuls and other magistrates were inducted into office, he condemns the

* I. 19.

neglect or perversion of them in his own time, and observes: "But to exhibit the extent to which a disregard of the Deity prevails among some at the present day, would be no trifling work."* The testimony of Livy to the same effect (vol IX. p. 262, Liv. III. 20) has been already cited. It is not to be supposed that Grecian influence was exerted only on the most distinguished men, or on those families whose sons were sent to Athens to be educated. Education at Rome came eventually almost entirely into the hands of Greeks, so that even the small children were instructed by Greek slaves.† A more full description of the results of the prevailing views in religion is given by Müller: "When religion became more and more the object of philosophical doubt and thoughtless mockery, it soon came to be incapable of inspiring, in ordinary men, with its former majesty, either terror or consolation. Under the Cæsars all the gods vanished before that self-interest, whose altar was the palace. Prosperous vice in purple, Tiberius and Claudius among the gods, the gods inexorable respecting eternal Rome, Augustus in unshaken power, Brutus deserted, Paetus Thrasea the victim of Nero—all this filled well-disposed men with excusable doubts and involuntary contempt. The greatest minds generalized the belief: The universe is Pliny's God; God is every thing from eternity, in every thing, over every thing, and it is vain to seek him; he fills every thing, all feelings, the soul, the spirit. In vain the stoic senators and wise men contended for the gods of old Rome, and the sovereignty of religion, against the rashness of the age; in vain they endeavored to found the new structure of morals on philosophical axioms, (a palace on a groundwork of Mosaics,) one after another of which, in moments of the omnipotence of passion, gave way. It required so much effort to live after mere ideas, that those who attempted it consisted at last of a few quiet men, who were lost in the other sects."‡

Although the Epicurean philosophy met at first with much

* *Antiq. Rom.* II. 6. See also II. 14, 24, 74. III. 21. V. 60. VII. 35. VIII. 37. X. 17.

† *Hegels Werke*, IX. 322.

‡ *Allg. Geschichte* I. 430—432. In regard to the efforts of the Stoics to restore the power of religion by connecting it with natural philosophy, see *Meiners De Vero Deo*, pp. 270, 271.

opposition at Rome, yet the proof is conclusive that it spread there to a very wide extent. It was embraced by many distinguished men, and Cicero often speaks of the followers of Epicurus as very numerous at Rome.* It cannot, indeed, be affirmed that the Epicureans wholly denied the existence of the gods; but their system certainly rendered such beings superfluous, and so far as the universe is concerned, altogether unimportant.† Epictetus charges them with getting themselves made priests of gods which, if their opinions were correct, had no existence, and with interpreting to others oracles which they themselves despised.‡ The same accusation is made against them by Plutarch.§ It cannot be believed that the development of this philosophy, in the elegant and seductive poem of Lucretius, had nothing to do with the downfall of religion at Rome. "While Catullus diverted the licentious youth with voluptuous conceptions," says Müller, "and gave refinement to their audacity, Lucretius excited among the thinking Romans dangerous doubts respecting the nature of things. The point of view to which he conducted them was opposed to that on which the laws and virtue of Rome were founded, and accelerated the decline of morals already depraved by luxury. In Lucretius were admired the majesty of ancient poetry, and the seductive charms of the Epicurean philosophy in the germ."||

2. In regard to *the doctrine of divine providence* the views of the Epicureans, and indeed the prevailing views in the later times of Rome, are better defined and more certain than those which relate to the existence of God. The Epicureans taught that the gods live a happy and careless life, wholly unconcerned

* De Finibus, I. 7. II. 25. † Brucker. Hist. Philos. 272.

‡ Diss. II. 20. § 2, 3, 4.

§ Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epic. 22. Take the comment and translation of Neander. "How painful to the philosopher, if he had a human heart, to be obliged to stand cold as a hypocrite, where men were assembled on the highest and most sacred business of the heart! He utters hypocritically—as Plutarch out of the fulness of a pious heart says—prayer and adoration, from fear of the multitude, and he pronounces words which are contrary to his conviction, and while he sacrifices, the priest who kills the victim appears to him no better than a cook." Kirchengeschichte I. 13.

|| Allg. Geschichte, I. 181.

about the affairs of men. The world was not created by them, nor have they any thing to do with its government. They neither punish the bad, nor reward the good. It is obvious that this view of the divine nature lays the axe at the root of all religion. This was clearly seen by those among the ancients who examined the tendency of such a doctrine, and by none more distinctly than by Cicero.* The Epicureans did indeed affirm that they worshipped the gods on account of the excellence of their nature as beautiful and happy, and that Epicurus himself wrote books respecting piety towards the gods. "But what reason do you urge," replied Cotta, "that men should be mindful of the gods, when the gods are not only unmindful of men, but care for nothing, accomplish nothing?" "For piety is justice towards the gods; but how can the relationship of right exist between us and them, when there is no connection whatever between God and man?"†

He maintains that the mere existence of superior beings is not a sufficient foundation for religion. These higher beings must have some connection with the world. Men must be dependent on them, and have something to hope and fear from them, or there is no room for piety.

"But Epicurus," continues the same writer, "effectually eradicated religious feeling from the minds of men, when he removed from the immortal gods their assistance and favor. For although he says that the nature of God is most excellent and glorious, he denies that there is benevolence in God; he takes away that which most strikingly characterizes an excellent and glorious nature. For what is better or what more excellent than benignity and beneficence? Take this from the character of God, and you would make no one, either God or man, dear to the Deity; no one loved, no one esteemed by him. Thus it follows, not only that men are neglected by the gods, but that the gods themselves are neglected by each other."‡

Neander regards Pilate, when he put to our Saviour in mockery the sarcastic question, "What is truth?" as the representative of many distinguished and educated Romans of his time. These were skeptics in the strict sense, who doubted whether there is any such thing as truth. Others, he thinks,

* See Bib. Repos., vol. IX. p. 278.

† Cicero *De Nat. Deor.* I. 41.

‡ *Ib.* I. 43.

contented themselves with a sort of vapid, dead Deism, which did not absolutely deny the existence of a God, but put him as far off as possible. Theirs was a sort of lazy divinity, who let every thing go as it would. All belief in a close connection between the Deity and the human race; all sympathy of God with men; and all seeking after intercourse with the Supreme Being, is, in their view, fanaticism. The world, at least, and human nature, are without a God. The same historian cites the testimony of one of the Christian Fathers in respect to the opinions prevalent in his day: Justin Martyr says of the philosophers of his time, "The majority now do not inquire at all, whether there is one God, or more Gods than one, whether there is or is not a providence; as if this knowledge contributed nothing to happiness. They seek rather to convince us that the Deity cares indeed for the whole, and for the species; but not for me and thee, and for individual men. We need not, therefore, pray to him at all, for every thing is repeated according to the unchangeable laws of an eternal revolution."* The relation of these semi-atheistic notions to the lives and morals of the Romans is here stated only in a negative form. But they are exhibited in bolder language by Robert Hall, in his Sermon on Modern Infidelity. "It was late before the atheism of Epicurus gained footing at Rome; but its prevalence was soon followed by such scenes of proscription, confiscation, and blood as were *then* unparalleled in the history of the world; from which the republic being never able to recover itself, after many unsuccessful struggles, exchanged liberty for repose by submission to absolute power. Such were the effects of atheism at Rome."

3. It has been shown that in early times the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was received without question. It must be supposed that greater refinement, together with higher and more widely extended intellectual cultivation would not, at least, cast any doubt upon its truth. But such is not the fact. *There were whole sects of philosophers by whom this doctrine was rejected.* Such were the disciples of Democritus, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, the Sceptics, and especially the numerous and influential Epicureans. Cicero, in the treatise in which he undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, represents the contrary of this doctrine, as the opinion not only of the Epicureans,

* Kirchengeschichte, I. 17.

but of the whole crowd of philosophers. "Throngs of gainsayers come forward; not only Epicureans, whom indeed I do not despise, but what is quite remarkable, every very learned man holds the doctrine in contempt; my favorite Dicaearchus, also, has most strenuously argued against our immortality."*

From Cicero's account of the opinions of the philosophers respecting the soul, it is evident that the ancient simplicity, and implicitness of belief, was at that period no longer in existence. The greater number believed that the soul is not distinct from the body, and those who admitted its separate existence, supposed it to be extinguished at death, or soon after. Even the Stoics, who did most for religion, had no confident belief in the future existence of the soul. It is obvious that when such views prevailed, the foundations of religion were undermined.

4. The disbelief of the immortality of the soul implies of course the *overthrow of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments*. But the rejection of the latter doctrine appears to have been much more general and decided than of that of mere future existence.

Even in the time of Polybius, skepticism on this point had become prevalent, and Cicero in his oration for Aulus Cluentius, represents the doctrine as universally rejected.† Cæsar, in his speech on the Catilinian conspiracy, shows clearly that he had no belief in this doctrine; and it is probable that he expressed the prevailing sentiment of the Roman gentlemen at that period.‡

Among those who undertook to administer consolation on the death of friends, the general mode of reasoning appears to have been to assume either that the soul will die, which is no evil, or that if it lives, it will be happy, which is far better. It is a remark of Leland, that the structure of Cicero's argument in the very work in which he pleads for the immortality of the soul, excludes the doctrine of future punishment.§ It was not, therefore, merely the poetic imagery that Cicero denied, but the doctrine of future punishment itself. The same was true of the Stoics. "No one," says Seneca, "is so much a child as to be

* Tusc. Disp. I. 31.

† Pro A. Cluentio, § 61.

‡ Bell. Cat. § 51.

§ Advantage and Necessity of Revelation, II. 370. "Si maneat, beati."

afraid of Cerberus;”* and, “Those descriptions which picture to us the terrible infernal regions, are so many fables. The poets have invented these things, and alarmed us with idle terrors. Death is a release, and the end of all our sorrows.”†

It is manifest from many passages that the same opinions were held by the poets. We find Juvenal singing,

“Esse aliquid manes, et subterranea regna,
Et contum, et Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,
Atque una transire vadum tot millia cymba,
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum aere lavantur.”‡

Lucan also :

“Et quid, ait, vani terremur imagine visus?
Aut nihil, est sensus animis a morte relictum,
Aut mors ipsa nihil——.”§

It was impossible that such sentiments held by the philosophers, poets, and great men of a nation, should not exert a powerful influence over the vulgar mind. These opinions must necessarily descend to the lower ranks. Lucian (Jupiter Tragicædus, C. 17. T. II.) represents an Epicurean and a Stoic as disputing before the people about providence—the rabble inclined to the Epicurean.|| If the victorious party in such a contest carried with it the popular mind, how strong must have been the influence of both, in regard to a doctrine which they were agreed in rejecting. Servius (Ad Æneid, XI. 755) expressly testifies that unbelief was spread as extensively among the common people as among the learned.¶

From the preceding representations it is evident that in later times the fundamental doctrines of religion were extensively rejected in the Roman world. But the removal of all belief in the great truths on which the national religion was based, did not put an end to superstition. On the contrary, this vice was increased a thousand-fold by the change. It is a singular paradox, but an unquestionable fact, that while disbelief in the existence of any God was rapidly gaining ground, the number of the objects of worship was continually increasing. The rage for foreign gods became a mania, and new divinities were summoned from every quarter of the globe—as though the great gulf of atheism could be filled up by a motley collection of un-

* Epist. XXIV.

† Sat. II. 149—152.

‡ Bib Repos. II. 282.

† Consol. ad Marciam, XIX.

§ Pharsalia, III. 38—40.

¶ Bib. Repos. II. 282.

couth images and barbarous names. The baser the gods the more popular they proved. Several of the emperors devoted themselves to the worship of the Syrian and Egyptian deities. With these new divinities came tribes of priests, soothsayers, necromancers, astrologers, magicians, jugglers, interpreters of dreams and signs, fortune-tellers, and all the other panders to the general superstition. Nor was it simply the superstitious fears of the people that these men dealt with. They ministered to the appetites and passions of the multitude, and became the instigators and negotiators of the most abominable crimes. Under the direction of men who, for a certain price, engaged to furnish means of escape from the wrath of God and man, assassinations, parricides, and impurities of every kind were committed. Nero rejected all the gods except one female divinity, and her he finally subjected to a gross indignity.* At the same time he kept a magician to reveal to him the future, and to exorcise the ghosts of those whom he had murdered, especially that of his mother, by which he was continually tormented. In this example of Nero, we have an illustration of the operation of unbelief and superstition among the Romans of that age. Not that all were as bad as Nero, but all shared in the general skepticism, and all had consciences, which, from the depths of pollution and crime, cried aloud for some mode of expiation. It is impossible for skepticism to annihilate, though it may pervert, the religious nature of man. Hence the prevalence of unbounded superstition.

IV. It has been shown that a great change took place in the moral character of the Romans, and that this change was intimately connected with the preceding change in the national religion. By some, however, it may still be supposed that the prevalence of atheism, superstition, and vice, among the later Romans, is to be ascribed chiefly to the want of a general diffusion of knowledge. Let us, therefore, glance very briefly at this point. The true relation of education and knowledge to morality among the Romans, may be seen by considering attentively two striking facts.

1. *At the time when the people were most deeply sunk in superstition and vice, there was more knowledge in the nation, and this knowledge was more widely diffused, than ever before.*

* Suet. Vita Neroni, § 56.

The slender means of education possessed by the virtuous and noble Romans of early times, and the small amount of knowledge which existed among them, have been already stated. Through the virtues of their ancestors, which were the offspring of religion, the Romans became the masters of the world. They were the successors of the Greeks in power, and although themselves the conquerors, submitted to be taught by those whom their arms subdued, and adopted as their own the Grecian learning. Thus a people whose ancestors, though virtuous and free, had been by no means distinguished for intellectual cultivation, became possessed of treasures of foreign knowledge. The spread of the Greek philosophy at Rome, in the time of Sylla and Lucullus, has been already referred to. From that period all existing sects, the Pythagoreans, the Academics, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and especially the Epicureans, flourished in Italy.* But philosophy (as has been already intimated) was a study for which the Romans had no genius, and in which they never distinguished themselves. It was, therefore, later than other sciences and arts in gaining foothold at Rome. Before the period mentioned, the Roman education had been greatly improved, and a knowledge of the arts and sciences diffused to a greater or less extent. In the war with the last king of Macedonia, an eclipse of the moon occurred on the evening preceding the decisive battle of Pydna. As Paulus Æmilius, the Roman general, was apprehensive that the superstitious fears of the soldiers would be excited, he caused the army to be informed of the approaching obscuration, with its cause.† This was more than a century and a half before the birth of Christ. Whether this eclipse was calculated by Roman science, or by Greeks in the Roman service, it shows that knowledge was beginning to spread, at least among the higher ranks. It is observable that Livy ceases by degrees to relate the prodigies, which in the first ten books of his history he so conscientiously records. This is no doubt to be attributed, in part at least, to the increase of knowledge. While the habit of looking back with wonder and admiration to antiquity permitted, and perhaps required, the relation of such marvellous events of the most ancient times as had become incorporated with the history

* Brucker. Hist. Philos. § 288.

† Buchholz Philosophische Untersuchungen Ueber Die Römer, I. 158.

of the nation, the diffusion of knowledge forbade the belief that the same things could occur in less remote and better defined periods. In the time of Quintilian, it appears, the sciences were taught to the common people. "Even among our country people," says that writer, "there are but few who do not know, or seek to learn something of the natural causes of things."* The soldiers in the army of Crassus, it seems, were able to read amatory romances.†

· 2. *Education at Rome furnished no security to virtue.*

It either simply refined the prevailing superstition, and changed its form, or in sapping the foundations of the existing religious system, it swept with it all religious belief, and thus eradicated the seeds of virtue.

It is objected that whatever may have been the increase of knowledge, and the improvement in the modes of instruction at Rome, there was no system of universal education, such as is proposed at the present day. This is readily admitted. But before the freedom and happiness of a nation are confidently rested on any scheme of education, it is proper to inquire whether education (without religion) *so far as it has been enjoyed*, has produced the effects which are expected from it.

Whatever may be said of the mass of the Roman people, it cannot be maintained that the higher ranks were not well educated. Were they virtuous in proportion to their cultivation? Was the line of division between the educated and the uneducated not only intellectual, but moral, so that the virtue and good principle were on one side, the immorality and crime, for the most part, on the other? This was not the fact. Vice reigned alike among the educated and the uneducated. It asserted its empire over high and low, over the polished courtier not less than the untutored peasant. The description of the

* Bib. Repos. II. 282.

† "These things were to amuse the populace. But after the farce was over, Surena assembled the Senate of Seleucia, and produced the obscene books of Aristides, called the *Milesiads*. Nor was this a groundless invention to blacken the Romans. For the books being really found in the baggage of Rustius, gave Surena an excellent opportunity to say many satirical things of the Romans, who, even in time of war, could not refrain from such libidinous actions, and abominable books." Plutarch, *Life of Crassus*.

dreadful state of morals given by Seneca is not applicable to the uneducated only. The moral debasement was universal. The same is true of the representations of Sallust. The debauched and desperate band of Catilinian conspirators were nobles; and it is plain that such a company could not have been collected except where depravity reigned among the higher classes. When Jugurtha directed his emissaries to tempt all men with gold, it must be supposed that leading, influential characters are meant; and these were polished and refined. "All things are venal at Rome," does not simply *include* the educated, it refers especially to them. In conjunction with the poets and philosophers, such statesmen as Lucullus, Catiline, Crassus, Claudius, Anthony, Pompey, Cæsar, and Augustus, were the men who corrupted the morals, and subverted the liberties of their country.

Theirs were characters produced by a skeptical period. They were men who, like Napoleon, carried their hearts in their heads. They were men who, for the most part, rejected all belief in future retribution, and even future existence, and denied the very being of a God. Or if at any time the terrible goadings of conscience vanquished their unbelief, we see them giving way to the grossest superstition.* For strange as it may seem, the rankest skepticism and the extreme of superstition appear to be next door neighbors.

There were doubtless noble spirits among the educated and

* Augustus was afraid to stay alone in the dark. Nor did he ever do so; but whenever he waked in the night called for some one to sit with him. In a thunder-storm he always wrapped himself in the skin of a sea-calf, and if the peals happened to be unusually severe, or rather when the heavens indicated that they might be so, (*ad omnem majoris tempestatis suspicionem*), he crawled into a deep hole dug in the ground for the purpose. From this hiding-place he came forth when he had sufficiently quaked, to furnish the nations in their turn an opportunity to quake. The seal-skin was regarded as a kind of amulet or defensive charm. The other measure was taken on the authority of the philosophers, who taught that the lightning never penetrates more than five feet into the earth. The emperor's weakness respecting thunder probably had something to do with a fright which he had while on a journey one night, when the lightning struck his vehicle, and killed the servant who was carrying the light before him. These and other superstitions, see in Sueton. *Vita, Augusti* 29, 78, 90—93.

refined. Such were Pliny the elder, and others like him. They did not sink to the brutishness of Cynicism, nor give themselves up to the mere polished licentiousness of the disciples of Epicurus. But these were exceptions. And while their good taste preserved them from the grossness of sensuality, they advocated principles which overthrew religion, and sapped the foundations of morality. "It is ridiculous indeed," says Pliny, (*Nat. Hist.* II. 7,) "to make that which is the highest of all, mingle in and take care of human affairs. Must we believe, or must we doubt, that this highest would be degraded by so sad and complex a ministry? It is hardly possible to judge, which may be of the most benefit to the human race; since on the one hand there is no respect for the gods; and on the other, a respect which men ought to be ashamed of." "Still it is of use in human life, to believe that God takes care of human things; and that punishments, though sometimes late, (since God is so much occupied in his vast cares,) will never fail of being inflicted on crimes; and that man is not therefore the most nearly allied by birth to the Deity, in order that he should be next to the brutes in debasement. But it is the special consolation of imperfect human nature, that God cannot indeed do all things. For neither can he call death to his own relief, should he desire it—a noble refuge which he has given to man in the midst of so many evils; nor can he endow man with immortality, etc.; by which things the power of nature is doubtless declared, and that is what we call God." Pausanias also testifies of himself in many passages, that although he quotes the traditions of his religion, he yields them no belief; and commonly no one attributes any credit to them, except merely because he has heard them related from his youth up, (*Pausaniae Descriptio Græciæ* I. 3, II. 57.) Many Romans, also, in the time of the Emperors, may have been led into infidelity by a polite rhetorical education; for he whose taste and rhetorical powers merely are cultivated, commonly loses a spirit of deeper and more serious investigation, and superficially pronounces a skeptical decision on the highest subjects. So Arnobius delineates the unbelieving Romans of his time—(*Arnobius Adv. Gentes*)—"Because you know how to inflect words properly, because you avoid barbarisms and solecisms, because you can compose or criticise a well-constructed discourse, you also think you know what is true and what is false; what can take place, and what cannot; and

what is the nature of heavenly and of earthly things" ? Theodoret also complains, that "so many half learned among the heathen refuse to take an interest in the barbarian wisdom of Christianity; while in old times, the truly wise travelled through all lands in order to become still wiser."*

3. In the state of things which has been described, *there is no reason to believe that the deterioration of public morals, and the fall of the empire, would have been prevented by any (not religious) scheme of education.* Had patriotism increased in strength as education was improved in its character and extended in its influence; had the more general prevalence of morality gone hand in hand with the diffusion of knowledge among the people; such an inference might have some degree of plausibility. But the truth is *just the reverse*. For the striking fact which we may observe in the history of Athens is true also of Rome. The period of morality was the period of comparatively little intellectual cultivation; while knowledge, crime, and political insecurity are found to have been coeval. "We see from the time of Sylla," says M. De Beaufort, "new laws established every day, and their penalties rendered more severe; but the more the rigor of punishments was increased, the more did impunity and the facility with which the judges might be corrupted, increase the number of criminals. The resources of the government being once relaxed, it was impossible to restore them to order. The laws which had been made for a free people, who knew how to use their liberty wisely, were no longer adapted to a nation which had degenerated into license. Morals had been to them in the place of laws. It was the simplicity, the frugality, the virtue of this people that had elevated the republic to that high summit of glory which it had reached. It was also the corruption of morals that destroyed it."*

Suppose the Roman system of education to have been ever so defective, at that period when the prophecy of Jugurtha was literally accomplished, and the empire was set up for sale by the Pretorian guards, and struck off to the highest bidder, who would seriously imagine that those evils in the state which had reduced the empire to this deplorable condition could have been remedied by imparting either to the people, or the soldiers, or to both, a greater amount of knowledge? Could the operation

* Republique Romaine VI. 288.

† Bib. Repos. II. 280, 281.

of the causes which had brought about this state of things have been in this way even retarded? Had there been in every village a printing press—a lyceum, and half a dozen public schools; had the gratuitous lectures on the arts and sciences been as able, and the amount of their influence as important as they were at Athens, or as they are in our own country at the present day; whatever changes may have been produced in regard to particular events, and in respect to the *manner* in which the empire fell, there is not the least reason to suppose that the certainty of its ruin would have been at all diminished. From a close inspection of the whole history of the Roman people, nothing can be clearer than that *education* in the restricted and erroneous, but too common sense—intellectual cultivation—the diffusion of knowledge among the people—was with them neither the source nor the preserver of public morality and free institutions. It was not knowledge that formed the noble character of the early Romans, but it was the Roman character that secured the acquisition of whatever amount of knowledge the exigencies of the state might require. As knowledge was not the procuring cause of morality, so neither had it power, when that cause was removed by the overthrow of religion, to secure the perpetuity of freedom.

ARTICLE V.

EXAMINATION OF DR. EMMONS'S THEORY OF DIVINE AGENCY.

By Amos Bullard, Leicester, Mass.

UNLESS the doctrines of the venerable dead may be freely examined, there is little hope for the progress of truth. So long, however, as truth is making progress, he who seeks it with an honest and fearless mind, cannot entertain all the opinions of his predecessors. Some things, at least, that were credible to them, may be incredible to him, when seen in the light of new discoveries and advancing science. By that light, he may possibly discern more in the temple of truth than they, and like them, may confidently “reckon his own insight as final;” yet *his* visions, too, must pass the ordeal of the future. But if it be remembered that the *characters* of men, unlike their

opinions, are to be tried by the standard of their own age, no one need fear that an examination of Dr. Emmons's philosophy will injure his good name. Should his theory of divine efficiency, which, as some one pleasantly remarked, he cherished "as a part of his holiness," prove indefensible, neither his piety nor his genius will be dishonored in the eyes of those who shall duly consider the circumstances in which he adopted that theory. A glance at some of those circumstances may be proper, before examining the theory itself.

Divines contemporary with Dr. Emmons, seem to have used the Bible as a text-book of philosophy. They often endeavored to establish their philosophical opinions by appeals to Scripture, though its writers do not profess to teach any thing in a scientific manner. With respect to this matter, the right principle, of late fully asserted, is this: "Since the Bible is not a system of philosophy, a mere quotation of its texts, or their incorporation, cannot be received in proof of a philosophy. We must take the Bible facts and affirmations in their pure simplicity; and we must examine the metaphysics on its own legitimate grounds. We are bound, as Christians, to believe the words of Scripture wherever we find them; but we are not bound to believe the philosophy which a father or doctor in the church has seen fit to connect with them." But in the time of Dr. Emmons, this principle, if not unacknowledged, was in practice much neglected. If, then, he made literal annunciations from the Bible, the basis of theories purely philosophical, and erred in so doing, other illustrious divines of his day were in the same error. It is well to remember this, in forming an estimate of him as a theologian.

When Dr. Emmons was forming his theological opinions, sacred criticism, as a science, was unknown in this country. We must not be surprised, therefore, if divines of that period, in founding a metaphysical scheme on some passage of Scripture, were accustomed to do so without critically investigating it. In such an operation, it was not then the usage to "inquire, and make search, and ask diligently, whether it be truth, and the thing certain." "If we look at Emmons's sermons for the learned exegesis which we may find in a German commentary, we shall look for what he undervalued, and for what his proper contemporaries had never heard of." Let us not do him wrong in measuring "his attainments by the standard of modern scholarship." If he built stately theories professedly on biblical

foundations, without a knowledge of biblical science, and cared not that men should say of him, "he hath an interpretation," so long as they would say, "he hath a doctrine," let not this detract from his merited fame. Let it be borne in mind that, in his early theological researches, he labored under disadvantages from which no one was then free, but which now no longer exist.

But it is chiefly important to observe what the prevailing philosophy was, when Dr. Emmons came upon the stage. It was the *necessitarian* philosophy. Mental science had not been redeemed from its immemorial bondage, an *a priori* method of determining psychological questions. Truth was sought, not so much by appeal to the records of consciousness, as by inference from gratuitous premises. The testimony of facts, which is always true, was put to silence by logic, which is often false. New England minds were still influenced, not only by the pantheism of Berkely, but by the fatalism of Hobbes. The current of infidelity was then, as it ever is, setting towards the doctrine of necessity, and strange as it may seem, not a few evangelical divines were swept away in the same direction. The question, whether actual efficiency is an attribute of the mind, was debated by great and good men on both sides, but more by a sort of logic seemingly machinated for the purpose, than on the ground of facts and first principles. Edwards triumphed, in virtue of his mightier enginery. And as when Hume had refuted the unsound arguments by which Descartes endeavored to substantiate first truths, he claimed to have overturned those truths themselves; so when Edwards had "demolished the metaphysics of Whitby," his school felt assured that the doctrine of a free will was laid to its perpetual rest. It had then no defender in this country so mighty as its assailant, whilst the opposite doctrine had reached its "most palmy state." It was a less questioning age, and powerful minds were more despotic than at present. Such had been the character and style of metaphysical reasoning, that fallacies might not only hide themselves under manifold subtleties, but lurk securely under indefinite and variable terms. All this, together with "the force of his amazing genius," had given Edwards the mastery. The theory of the mind's efficiency, seemed to have been *strangled* by the mass of alleged absurdities which he had heaped upon it. His doctrine of the will, though made of the materials, and cast in the mould prepared by Collins, who had been "most obnox-

ious to divines of all denominations" in England, but who attempted no reply to the arguments of Dr. Clarke refuting his scheme, was, by many divines in this country, relied upon as a "pillar and ground of the truth."

When Dr. Emmons was a student in theology the philosophy of Edwards was in full power. Its fundamental position, that "the affections of the soul are not properly distinguishable from the will," was less controverted than it is now. The fallacy of the Dictum Necessitatis, "*that a cause cannot act but by first acting to produce that act,*" had not been detected, as it has now been. It had not then been demonstrated, that, in the necessitarian philosophy, strict analysis can find no material distinction between *natural* and *moral* necessity. Metaphysicians of that day often argued from the divine foreknowledge, as if *certainty* and *necessity* were identical in their logical relations; and inferred that whatever *will* be, in the view of the Creator, *must* be, relatively to the creature. In short, none of the fallacies in the Essay on the Will had been exposed, as many believe they have now been. The doctrine of the will had not been "Determined by an Appeal to Consciousness," as, in the judgment of many, it has now been. What wonder, then, if Dr. Emmons, in his youth, assented to what he was heard expressly to affirm in his old age, "that no man in this country understood the subject of the will, till Jonathan Edwards understood it?" Why should he not have believed what was taught him by such a man, especially when, by the suffrage of the mighty in the land, and for aught any one had successfully shown to the contrary, the question of the will had been, by that man, "thoroughly looked into, and searched to the very bottom?" Why wish to search beyond the bottom? Let us not think it strange that he imbibed a philosophy which it was almost sacrilege to dispute, nor forget that "his metaphysical theology must be viewed in connexion with the principles of mental science which were early instilled into his mind."

Rejecting the doctrine of the mind's efficiency, as he must have done, or else have rejected the wisdom of his teachers, and assuming that God is the efficient cause of man's volition, Dr. Emmons perceived that it could not affect the question of responsibility, whether he supposed them produced directly, or through a complicated train of circumstances. Is he not to be commended for preferring the plain and direct, to the occult and labyrinthian necessity advocated by some of his contemporaries?

As the former view did not less accord with the dominant philosophy of the times, he adopted it, and gave it the stamp of his own positive and executive mind. Unlike many divines, he determined, in his bold uprightness, that his philosophy should speak plainly in his theology and in his preaching. Having what seemed to him a true light, he was not afraid to let it shine. That God "worketh all in all," as the efficient cause of all, being the substance of what the great masters had taught him, why should he not inculcate the "awful and amiable doctrine"? Be it what it might, supposing it true, why should it be any longer as a thing secretly brought to the ear, or as an image at which men trembled, but "could not discern the form thereof"? Why need the truth retire into palliating shades, or wish to be seen only in the dim and hazy distance? Why should he not let men look at it, with its open front and its own true lineaments, unmasked and undisguised?

What that theory is, which is now proposed as the subject of inquiry, may be ascertained from Dr. Emmons's own words. "Since men are the creatures of God, they are necessarily his dependent creatures, who can act only as they are acted upon by a divine controlling influence," vol. IV., p. 397. "None of these creatures and objects are capable of guiding their own motions, or directing their own actions to promote the purposes for which they were made," vol. IV., p. 383. "Many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God, in whom they live and move and have their being," vol. IV., p. 384. "It is his agency, and nothing but his agency, that makes men act and prevents them from acting," vol. IV., p. 272. "He exerts his agency in producing all the free and voluntary exercises of every moral agent, as constantly and fully as in preserving and supporting his existence, vol. IV., p. 383. "He wrought as effectually in the minds of Joseph's brethren when they sold him, as when they repented and besought his mercy. He not only prepared those persons to act, but made them act. He not only exhibited motives of action before their minds, but disposed their minds to comply with the motives exhibited. But there was no possible way in which he could dispose them to act, right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts," vol. IV., p. 371. "It is often thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on God's part, in order to fit Pharaoh for

destruction, than barely to leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral character. He determined, therefore, to operate on his heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to refuse. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, he did at all times," vol. IV., p. 327. "We cannot conceive that his acting is any thing but his willing or choosing to produce an effect. His willing or choosing a thing to exist, is all that he does in causing it to exist," vol. IV., p. 379.

The theory comprised in the foregoing propositions—and many more of the same import might be given—may be stated as in substance the following: *The agency of God consists merely in volition. He, by willing, is the efficient cause of every event, not only in the natural, but in the moral world. All human volitions, the good and bad alike, are produced by his irresistible and creative energy.* This is the theory of divine efficiency. We shall endeavor now to examine it.

I. *What are the alleged proofs of this theory?*

Dr. Emmons nowhere advocates it by a very strict or elaborate demonstration, but often quotes in its defence from the Bible, and still oftener propounds it in a brief enthymematical form.

1. Let us hear *the arguments from Scripture.* It is granted that we may appeal to the Bible in proof of some things respecting the divine agency. Of the fact, for example, that God has an agency in some way connected with human actions, the Bible yields proof which none but an infidel can impugn. But when one forms a theory metaphysically defining the *exact mode* of that agency, and appeals to Scripture for proof, the established principles of science reject the appeal; because the writers of the Bible do not pretend to reveal the agency of God scientifically, nor to give us facts from which its mode can be defined, as a matter of science. And even if they claimed to have done this, no argument from Scripture, for a philosophical theory, can be valid, unless the passages on which it depends be not only interpreted correctly, but such as when so interpreted, shall teach that theory. Are these conditions fulfilled

in Dr. Emmons's biblical arguments for the theory of divine efficiency? This question may be answered by referring to some examples.

Assuming that *mind* in moral agents, cannot be the efficient cause of its own acts, Dr. Emmons says, "all their motions, exercises, or actions, must originate from a divine efficiency," vol. IV., p. 366. By this he means, that God is the efficient or producing cause of all human actions. And what Scriptural proofs does he offer? One is, that "in Him we live and move and have our being." This language was used by Paul, in declaring to a heathen audience the existence of the one true God, as the source and sustenance of man's life and powers. But that he meant to teach the theory before us, or any other metaphysical theory, no commentator, so far as we know, has ever even conjectured. It was the language of poetry; and the laws of speech forbid that we should receive it as the language of science. "Even the sacred writers frequently borrow the figurative diction of poetry to convey ideas, which must be interpreted, not according to the letter, but the spirit of the passage. It is thus that thunder is called the voice of God; the wind, his breath; and the tempest, the blast of his nostrils. Not attending to this circumstance, or rather not choosing to direct to it the attention of his readers, Spinoza has laid hold of the well-known expression of St. Paul, that 'in God we live and move and have our being,' as a proof that the ideas of the Apostle concerning the divine nature, were pretty much the same with his own."*

Again, to prove his theory, Dr. Emmons quotes the following: "We are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is of God." We find no evidence that he subjected this passage to any philological examination. It was a question indispensable to his argument, whether our *insufficiency* here spoken of, implies that we cannot determine our own acts, or that, as sinners, we need an atoning sacrifice;—whether our *sufficiency*, which is of God, consists in his creating all our moral actions, or in the merciful provisions of the gospel. The true meaning of the passage, respecting which expositors are agreed, is substantially this: we are not able to originate a plan of salvation for ourselves,

* Works of Dugald Stewart, vol. VI., p. 279.

but God has done it for us. Yet Dr. Emmons cites this passage as if it were a strict demonstration that the divine will is the efficient cause of all human actions.

Take one example more. Men "cannot originate a single thought, affection, or volition, independently of a divine influence upon their minds. They are always under a moral necessity of acting just as they do act," vol. IV., p. 397. That is, their moral actions are caused to be just what they are by divine efficiency. And what is the proof from Scripture? "The way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh, to direct his steps." What is this but applying the metaphorical language of ecstatic devotion, as if it were a scientific axiom? What but wresting an impassioned ejaculation to the purposes of logic? This is transgressing the plainest laws both of interpretation and of reasoning. "Nothing is more usual for fervent devotion," says Sir James Mackintosh, "than to dwell so long and so warmly on the meanness and worthlessness of created things, and on the all-sufficiency of the Supreme Being, that it slides insensibly from comparative to absolute language, and in the eagerness of its zeal to magnify the Deity, seems to annihilate every thing else." The truth is, Dr. Emmons, finding that the Scriptures do, in some sense, ascribe human actions to God, supposes that this can be done only on the ground that he is their efficient producer; and then summons numerous passages to attest the truth of this hypothesis. We have endeavored to give a fair specimen of his biblical argumentation for the theory in question. In every part of it, he has certainly violated a principle now generally admitted, that the Bible, not being a manual of philosophy, is not to be used as such. And if it were, in what instance has he shown, by the exposition of any text, that it communicates the notion of his theory? What more is it possible to show, than that the Bible ascribes the actions of men to God, as the Being under whose moral government and sustaining power they take place? We cannot but ask, also, in this connexion, What if an avowed *pantheist* should argue from the Bible as Dr. Emmons has done? Let him found his doctrine on such texts as these: "In him we live and move and have our being." "We are not sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God." "It is not in man that walketh, to direct his steps." "There is no power but of God." "There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in

all." If these passages should be adduced as valid arguments for pantheism, what reply could be made, but that which we make to the arguments of Dr. Emmons, viz., that the Bible was not designed, and does not claim, to instruct men in any department of philosophy. And if it did, any metaphysical systems framed upon its unexamined declarations, however symmetrical or well compacted their parts, are liable, unless they can stand upon their own grounds, as matters of pure science, to crumble at the slightest touch of the philologist's wand.

2. Let us examine *the main arguments from reason*, in support of the theory. One of them is the following: "Since mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act, independently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the exercise of divine agency in every human action, without which, it is impossible to conceive that God should govern moral agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his designs," vol. IV., p. 372. This may be properly called the argument from *moral government*; though it has an antecedent premise, viz., that no principle of efficiency is to be predicated of mind, which cannot be of matter. This is the preliminary axiom or postulatum of all Dr. Emmons's philosophy of agency. The necessary consequences of this position will be stated in their proper place. It may be sufficient here to remark respecting it, that it is a naked hypothesis, a mere dictum without a single word of proof; that it is almost universally not granted; that it assumes analogies between matter and mind which have never been discovered, and leaves out of view capital points of difference which are universally admitted; and that by allowing no principle of causation in mind, which it denies in matter, it renders inadmissible the idea of any principle of *freedom* in mind, which there is not in matter. This was clearly seen by Dr. Emmons himself; nay, his own inference was, that it is even "absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will."

The remainder of the argument contains this enthymeme: God governs moral agents. But this he cannot do without being the efficient producer of all their moral actions. The premise is not denied. But the conclusion supposes that a creature's power to cause his own acts, must be an ungovernable power; as if there were no medium between such power as would make

him omnipotent, and no power at all; whereas the idea of power, as asserted for him by those who deny that he is under a necessity of acting just as he does act, is, that although he is the efficient cause of his own moral actions, yet his causative power is limited both in degree and in the sphere of its operation, and of course never uncontrollable by infinite power. The fallacy of the reasoning, then, as it respects man, lies in the assumption, that efficient power must be absolutely unmanageable power, though derived from God, sustained by him, and subject to him, because circumscribed in every sense that is compatible with free agency. The fallacy of the argument, as it respects God, lies in assuming what he has nowhere revealed, viz., the *precise mode* of his moral government. It lies in the postulate, that there is no possible way in which he can govern moral agents, without producing their volitions by his own creative will. Why not as well assume the exact mode of his existence, and of all his attributes?

The reasoning is also objectionable, because, though it was intended to illustrate the divine glory, it virtually derogates from it, by limiting the divine operations. For if God can govern mind only by the law of necessity, as he governs matter, he must not create minds above the level of matter, with respect to efficiency. If he can govern moral agents only as he does physical agents, which uniformly operate *just as he would have them*, he must not give moral agents power to operate as he would *not* have them. He must not create *efficient* beings, that is, beings in his own image; for he cannot control them. Every one should regard the *fact* of the divine government, with true faith and deep reverence, and be content, without knowing all the secrets of its *mode*. No one should presume that God cannot maintain it but by dint of irresistible efficiency. Let us not limit the Almighty to the creation of *inefficient* beings, lest he should not be able to govern any other. Let us not narrow the bounds of the Infinite One; but rather cherish the sentiment of the prophet in that rebuking question, "Is the Spirit of the Lord straitened?" May not the Omnipotent Spirit be competent to control the spirits he has created, in some way not by us metaphysically definable? Need we tremble, lest his government should not be strong enough, unless conceived of under some type of mechanical force? Why should we be afraid to trust God in the dark, or be shy of the movements of his providence, unless we can quite unravel all its complexity, and

unfold all its mystery, so as to tell the world exactly *in what manner* he touches the springs?

Analogous to the argument already noticed, is that which may be called the argument from *divine purposes*, and *fore-knowledge of their accomplishment*. "Though God knows that mankind have natural power to act contrary to his designs, yet he knows that he is able to make them willing to fulfil his purposes, and that he has determined to make them willing; and hence he knows that they always will fulfil his purposes," vol. IV., p. 305. We remind the reader, that by men's natural power, Dr. Emmons means power to do a thing, when there is created in them a volition to do it; and that by making them willing, he means "producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts." "He is now exercising his powerful and irresistible agency upon the heart of every one of the human race, and producing either holy or unholy exercises in it," vol. IV., p. 388. "Nor has he ever failed to make his creatures do what he saw necessary for them to do, in order to fulfil his purposes, vol. IV., p. 387. The argument implied in these passages, is this: God knows of a certainty, that all his purposes will be accomplished; but this he could not know without producing all human volitions by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." The premise involves two propositions, viz., God's purposes will be accomplished; and he certainly knows they will. They are both admitted. But does either of them justify Dr. Emmons's conclusion?

One part of the argument is: the purposes of God will be fulfilled; but cannot be, unless he fulfils them by creating in the hearts of men all their volitions. Does not this take for granted the very point to be proved, viz., that it is not one of the purposes of God, that moral agents shall efficiently cause their own acts? If, as most men believe, this is one of his purposes, then, surely, the execution of his purposes does not require, but forbids, that *he* should be the efficient cause of their acts. To assume without proof, that this is *not* one of his purposes, is no better for the argument than a *petitio principii*.

The other part of the argument is: God certainly knows that his purposes will be effected; but could not know this, without efficiently producing all the creature's volitions. And why not know it? Because, says the philosophy of Dr. Emmons's time, the creature's acts would be contingent in such a sense as not to be foreknowable, for want of connection with cause.

But this is the proper consequence of his own dictum, that "mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency;" and is by no means chargeable upon those who assert that the mind is itself the efficient cause of its own acts. Instead of implying that moral acts are without a cause, they expressly affirm that the moral agent himself is their cause. Their idea of contingency respecting moral acts, is in no sense opposed to the idea of cause, but implies it, and is opposed only to the idea of necessity. They believe that while the falling of a stone, or the decay of vegetation, is the effect of a *necessitated* cause, every human volition is the effect of a *free* cause, that is, the free mind. By a *necessitated* cause, they mean such an one, that, when the conditions of its acting are fulfilled, it would be a contradiction to suppose it not to act, or to act otherwise than it does act. By a *free* cause, they mean such an one, that, though the conditions of its acting be supplied, yet, whether it acts, in *any given case*, or in what way it acts, is determined by itself alone. Such a cause, they believe, is the mind of every moral agent. Thus they assign a cause and a well-known cause for every moral act; and their theory never implies that such an act is contingent in the sense that it may or may not take place, as it may or may not have a cause, but that it may or may not take place, simply in respect to its being produced by a *free* cause.

Suppose moral actions contingent in the sense now explained, and where is the ground for saying that they cannot be foreknown for want of connection with cause? The very opposite is demonstrable. For the *existence* of their cause, that is, of the moral agent, may be as well foreknown to God as that of any other cause, or as his own act in creating their cause. The *nature* of their cause, too, and its relation to its effects, may be as well foreknown as those of any other cause, for it is constituted by the same omniscient mind. If, then, future events in the physical world, are certain to God through their connection with cause, who shall say that human volitions are not certain to him through a medium of the same kind? Why should we imagine that things equally conceivable by us, are not equally intelligible to God? Whoever desires to see that human actions, on the supposition that man and not God is their efficient producer, have a manifest connection with cause, and thus to see that there is *evidence* by which God may foreknow such actions, may see it in abundance.

But it is an assumption, and a strange one, that God needs *evidence*, in order to be certain of the accomplishment of his purposes. To us, it is true, many things are known only through the medium of proof; yet some things are known intuitively even by us. And if our faculty of intelligence were not limited, we do not know that any part of our knowledge would depend on evidence. How, then, can the Infinite Intelligence be thus dependent? What is evidence, what can it be, to a mind that can be conceived of only as knowing all things *without* evidence? What is omniscience, but knowing all things intuitively? Unless we can precisely ascertain the modes and limits of this attribute, it must always be an error to infer *necessity* from *certainty*. It assumes that the Omniscient Jehovah holds much the same relation to future events as we, and obtains his knowledge of them by tracing their logical connections, which he himself has established! We might as well agree with Leibnitz, in supposing that all events and all truths being mathematically linked together, the Deity, in order to know them, is eternally working out the geometrical problem, to wit: the state of one particle being given, to determine the past, present, and future state of the whole universe! This is as good logic as is compatible with a philosophy, which confounds one idea of *certainty*, as implying the divine perception of events, with another, as predicating the absolute futurity of events; which postulates that there can be no causal efficiency of the creature without *uncertainty* to the Creator, and thus involves the conclusion that there can be no *certainty* to the Creator, any further than there is *necessity* to the creature.

3. There remains to be examined the argument from the *creature's dependence*. "Many imagine that their free agency consists in a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises; but this would imply that they are independent of God," vol. IV., p. 384. "Since men are the creatures of God, they are necessarily his dependent creatures, who can act only as they are acted upon by a divine controlling influence," vol. IV., p. 397. Since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, or actions, must originate from a divine efficiency," vol. IV., p. 366. In order to try this argument, it is only necessary to ascertain whether it implies a true definition of the word *dependent*. By man's dependence, is commonly understood his condition, as being sustained with all his susceptibilities and faculties by divine power. In this sense, doubtless,

he is constantly and entirely dependent. But according to Dr. Emmons's axiom, that mind has no higher principle of causality than matter, man's dependence implies not only that all his faculties, but that "all his motions, exercises or actions" are to be referred to God, as their immediate cause; that God "exerts his agency in producing" man's moral actions, "as constantly and fully as in preserving and supporting his existence;" and therefore that man is dependent for his volitions in the same sense as for the pulsations of his heart. Power to originate his moral actions, would make him absolutely independent, and take him out of the hands of his Maker. With such a construction of dependence, Dr. Emmons's theory is made out without even the form of an argument. His premise is, "men are dependent agents." We admit his language, in its common acceptation, but dispute his definition of it. It is true, we are dependent for all the gifts of God; but the question is, What are his gifts? It is true, we have nothing but what we have received; but the question is, What have we received? It is a question of facts, to be answered by an appeal to facts, not by hypothesis. Have we received the power of originating our own volitions? Dr. Emmons says, no; but that *without* such power, we are dependent for the creation of them by divine power. Thus, in his premise or definition of dependence, he assumes the very doctrine to be verified. His reasoning begs the question; and this of itself proves its invalidity.

Moreover, by assuming that a dependent moral agent cannot be the cause of his own acts, does he not annihilate the very idea of moral agency? Is a moral act conceivable on the supposition, that not the agent whose act it is, but another agent is the efficient cause of it? Could Dr. Emmons reconcile his view of dependence with responsibility? He attempted to do it by saying that dependence and activity "fall under the notice of distinct faculties of the mind. Dependence falls under the cognizance of reason; but activity falls under the cognizance of common sense," vol. IV., p. 348. But how does this reconcile them? What matters it, if the *two* ideas do "fall under the notice of distinct faculties of the mind"? The question of their consistency, is but *one* idea. Is the mind divided so as to give contrary verdicts respecting a single point? If, in the judgment of "common sense," man's activity implies any thing contradistinct from passivity, it implies that he has efficient power to act, or to cause his own acts; and if, as Dr. Emmons

supposes, it be the decision of "reason," that "dependent agents" have no such power, then, from "distinct faculties of the mind," we have contradictory affirmations. Either the common idea of activity and responsibility, or else his peculiar philosophy of dependence, must be set aside. It is nothing strange that the incompatibility between these doctrines, should have been regarded by many as the Gordian knot in theology. Dependence, if defined so as to exclude an essential element of personal agency, cannot possibly be consistent with accountability. To the question, *for what* is man morally dependent, Dr. Emmons could only reply, for all his moral actions. By supposing man dependent for the causation of his acts by a power not his own, he asserts dependence in a sense which most divines deny. By denying that man has causative power, he, of course, as we cannot be dependent for what we do not possess, denies dependence in one important sphere where most divines affirm it. By his very attempt to conceive of it as unlimited, he necessarily limits it even more than those whom he charges with making man independent.

We know not that Dr. Emmons has anywhere defined the moral agent's activity, or how he could define it. For if he should say it consists in moral exercises produced in us by a power foreign to ourselves, then, as we are dependent for these, he would make dependence and activity occupy an identical sphere, in the sense that we are dependent in that very particular in which we are active, and active in that very particular in which we are dependent. If he should take the only other possible view, and say our activity consists in producing moral acts by the exercise of our own efficient power, this would subvert his theory of divine efficiency. The truth is, his philosophy of dependence is utterly repugnant to any idea of a moral activity. For such an activity cannot be conceived of, but as implying the exercise of the moral agent's power to determine his own acts. If, however, we suppose that dependence and activity do not exactly occupy the same sphere—that in the sphere of dependence, is the existence and continual support of the moral agent's power to act, and that in the sphere of activity is the *exertion* of power, does the least inconsistency between dependence and activity any longer appear? In suggesting this view, the consideration of motives and the influence of the Holy Spirit is regarded as irrelevant to the question. The question is, whether we are dependent for the exertion of power, viewed

strictly as such. If, as Dr. Emmons thinks, we are as fully dependent for this as for the support of our existence, then whose is the exertion? If man's, whose is the power exerted? Abraham, at the divine command, "stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son." If, in doing this, he exerted a power of determining his choice, whose power? If he did not exert such a power, and that his own, whose was the choice? What was his activity more than a muscular activity? Any philosophy of dependence which teacheth us falsely what is the agency of man, cannot teach us truly what is the agency of God.

We have now examined, as far as our limits permit, the main arguments for the theory in question. Whether it is vindicated by such arguments, is for the reader to decide. The remaining inquiry is:

II. *What are the unavoidable consequences of the theory?*

1. If the theory be true, *the will of God is opposed to his will, or his agency to his law.* "It always was, and is, and will be, his secret will, that all things shall take place, which he sees will best promote his own glory and the highest good of the universe, whether they are good or evil, right or wrong, in their own nature," vol. IV., p. 287. Dr. Emmons, anticipating the objection, that upon his theory God's executive will or agency violates his promulgated laws, attempted to obviate it by saying: "God's secret will respects one thing, but his revealed will respects another. His secret will respects nothing but the existence or taking place of things; but his revealed will respects the nature or moral quality of the things that take place." "Holiness is one thing, and the taking place of holiness is another; and sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another," vol. IV., p. 292. This is the only defence which is attempted; and unless this analysis be true in the sense intended by Dr. Emmons, and in the only sense which is pertinent to the objection, that is, unless "sin" and "the taking place of sin" are things which have different relations to a moral agent or to a moral standard, the objection is valid by Dr. Emmons's own admission; for he says, "if the secret and revealed will of God respected the same objects, it is granted they would be inconsistent," vol. IV., p. 292.

We do indeed conceive of a material substance, as not being identical with its properties; but we do not and cannot conceive of it as a different object in relation to its Creator. So we con-

ceive of a moral act and its quality as in some sense distinct, that is, we mentally discriminate between the *fact* of an act and its *nature*. But we cannot conceive of them as different things in such a sense that one may exist without the other, or that God may be the efficient producer of the one and not of the other. They are not separable objects, nor can they have different relations to their cause. If the nature of a moral act is wanting, the act is wanting, and *vice versa*. A malicious blow of the hand is a moral act. But a blow of the same hand under the influence of a galvanic battery, is simply a physical phenomenon. Nothing is plainer than that a moral act and its quality are inseparably existent. Now the question before us, is, Can God openly forbid the one and secretly will the other, and yet his will not oppose his will; or can he prohibit the one and efficiently cause the other, and yet his agency not counteract his law? Dr. Emmons says, yes; because "sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another." Is this a true answer? If "sin is one thing and the taking place of sin is another," in such a sense that God may interdict the former, while, as the theory affirms, he secretly wills and efficiently produces the latter, and yet his will not oppose his will, or his agency counteract his law, then it is certain that there may be "the existence" or "taking place of sin" without sin; that *an act of sin may exist, and the sin of the act not exist*; or that there may be *sinning* without *sin*. But this contradicts not only Dr. Emmons's own definition of sin, as consisting in "sinning," but reason itself. The truth is, the sinful quality of an act is an inherent quality, and can be conceived of only as inseparable from the act; nay, as being that in which the act truly consists. Yet the theory supposes that God creates the act, while he prohibits the sinful quality of it; that by his "irresistible agency upon the heart," he produces, for example, a man's volition to poison his neighbor, and thus necessitates "the existence" or "taking place" of a sin, while his law is thundering against that "sin." If this is true, and yet God's agency does not violate his law, it must be that an evil moral act may come to pass without its evil nature; or that a sinful act is one thing and that in which the act consists another thing. "Sin is one thing;" and it is a thing against which "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven." But it is a thing either taking place or not. If the latter, it is nothing. If the former, it is sin taking place, or "the taking place of sin." "Sin," therefore, and "the taking

place of sin," are one and the same thing with respect to the actor or to any moral criterion. They cannot have different relations to man, as a moral agent, to law, as his rule of action, or to God, as his judge. And if God be the efficient cause of "the existence" or "taking place of sin," he is the efficient cause of "sin." His agency contravenes his statutes and commands.

2. If the theory be true, then, supposing a moral system, *utility, in opposition to right, predominates in that system.* Excluding the idea of man's efficiency, and asserting that all his volitions are the effects of an immediate divine efficiency, Dr. Emmons could not but view sin as the necessary product of infinite wisdom and goodness. Having assumed that God creates all sin, he could not justify the divine character without taking the ground, as he boldly does, that whatever sin exists, is an indispensable coefficient in effecting the highest good; and is better than holiness would be in its place. "He must form light and create darkness, make peace and *create evil*, when and where, and to what degree the good of the universe requires," vol. IV., p. 383. The theory fully coincides with the scheme of optimism proposed by Leibnitz, that God gives to men just those volitions which the Destinies require in the best of all possible worlds. It is a theory that compels us either to admit, that so far as sin exists, God prefers it to holiness even in *itself considered*, or else to believe that holiness, beyond a certain degree, is incompatible with the greatest good. For if God does not so prefer sin, it is because it is not right. Why, then, does he create it, except that, though it be wrong, holiness in its place would contravene the highest utility? Granting the theory, we cannot escape this dilemma. Right, beyond certain limits, is in its nature displeasing to God, or else it is opposed to the highest good. Dr. Emmons grasped the latter horn. He made right give way, that utility might have free course. And if, upon his theory, there can be a moral system, and any one solution of it less impeaches the divine character than another, it is the utilitarian solution; viz., that whatever sin there is, is the *sine qua non* of the best conceivable results,—the very thing without which, God would be divested of his glory and his counsels defeated; that he reserves all efficiency to himself, lest one right choice more, or one wrong choice less, than he sees to be beneficial, should mar the system and lessen the sum total of utility. Must we then receive a theory which is not only without valid

proof, but which implies that universal rectitude is incompatible with the largest enjoyment, and that God himself is under an invincible necessity of infringing the one or the other? A theory which tells us, the more sin the better as far as to the limit of all there is; that if all were right, all could not be for the best; and that obedience to God's commands, beyond a certain measure, must be an expense to his glory and rob the universe of its highest good? How can we hearken to a doctrine which forces us to believe with Bentham and Paley, that the principle of right cannot reign in the divine government; but that a nice calculation, by which the gain or loss of right and wrong may be found and accurately summed up into a net result, must form the basis of a perfect moral system!

3. Another consequence of the theory is *pantheism*.

In the first place, it is incompatible with the idea that the creature is a *personal agent*. Dr. Emmons doubtless had this idea, for every man has it; but he had it as a contraband article. His theory begins with the assumption, that mind has of itself no power to act more than matter has to move; that a dependent moral agent can no more form his own choices than a tree can evolve its buds, or determine the color of its blossoms. If this must be granted, and if the common idea of a personal agent, as having power to determine his own acts, be the true one, it follows that personal agency is not predicable of the human mind any more than of material masses. The theory implies that the mind is a mere series of exercises; and this Dr. Emmons did not deny, and could not, without violating the canons of his philosophy. He held it as his first axiom, that the human soul is not the determiner of its own moral acts; but that their proximate and efficient cause is God. Antecedent to the soul's moral acts, therefore, nothing can be found as a constituent of the soul. The immediate sequences of the soul's acts are physical phenomena, which, though signs of the soul's presence and agency, are no part of the soul. Thus we are shut up to the belief which Dr. Emmons did not disavow, that a mere series of exercises is all that constitutes the soul. The man is nothing but what we call his exercises, in creating which, God creates the man himself. This makes any rational conception of the soul, as a personal agent, logically impossible. It excludes a necessary element of personality, viz., the person's own power to determine his own acts. Man is not a *doer* of his moral acts any more than of his breathing. To call him an

agent, therefore, does not raise him to a level with what we call physical agents, if we suppose them to be the efficient causes of the phenomena which we refer to them. Much less does it raise him to the dignity of intentional and personal agency.

Besides, the soul being a mere series of exercises, as it must be if the idea of efficient power is excluded, we are chargeable with absurdity whenever, adhering to the theory, we use language intending to imply that the soul is a personal or moral agent. For, suppose we say the soul *acts freely* in view of motives. Is it an *agent* that thus acts? No, it is a mere series of exercises. Can we any better say the soul *has* moral exercises? What is the soul? A mere series of exercises. Let us say the soul *wills* or *chooses*. *Who* wills or chooses? A series of exercises. Shall we say the soul does just as it pleases? It is to say a series of exercises does as it pleases. We say the soul *acts voluntarily*. Do we mean that some *person* thus acts? No; but a series of exercises. Suppose we say the soul *ought* to do right. But who is it that is under such obligation? A succession of exercises. We may venture to say the soul is *conscious* of wrong moral exercises. Of whom is conscience thus predicated? Of a series of exercises. Shall we say the soul is responsible for its exercises? It is itself exercises. Therefore exercises are responsible for exercises. In short, if the theory be true, all the current phrases, man wills, chooses, is free, acts voluntarily, is accountable, and the like, are altogether fallacious and must be discarded. Indeed, not only all forms of speech, but all forms of thought, which seem to imply that man is a personal agent, plunge us into manifest absurdity. The theory puts an end to the creature as a personal agent.

In the next place, it follows from one principle of the theory, that God is the universal and only agent, but, as will be shown from another principle of the same, not a *personal* agent. The theory admits no principle of efficiency but the might of the Creator's will. It affirms that cause or power is everywhere the same in kind, and is literally nothing else than a divine volition. This is the all-pervading energy which originates, causes, determines, and which, of course, effects or does every thing. All the phenomena in the universe, human choices not excepted, are produced by the immediate creative acts of God. All the actions of men are "God's conduct," as Dr. Emmons very consistently names them. Between God and the remotest events,

there is, by the theory, no conceivable place or room for an agent acting by his own efficiency. God, therefore, is the sole agent, the universal and all-efficient *doer* of all things. What we call the creature's agency, is but a portion or phenomenon of divine agency sent along in certain channels of operation, as heat and electricity are diffused in their courses to effect their destined results. Man's actions, so called, not less than the functions of animal life, or the motions of fluids, are the effects of instant divine volition, and are no less divine than any other agency. Thus, God is the sum total of all causality, or of all spirit that has efficient power. God is all this, and all this is God. And what is this but pantheism? It may be equally sublime with the doctrine of Heraclitus, that God is a most subtle, swift, and fiery substance, permeating and quickening the universe, and producing every thing by a fatal necessity. It may imply a system not less compact and energetic than that of the Stoics, who believed that God is the *anima mundi*. It may be even more scientific than the notion of the ancient Egyptians, who imagined God to be all that was and is and shall be, except the visible and outward, his *veil*. But it is as really pantheism, and much the same in form, as the theodicy of the old Greek pagans whom Plutarch condemns, because they "*resolved all into divine cause, as it were swallowing up all into God.*"

If it be asked, what is the characteristic of the pantheism now charged upon the theory, we answer, it is a pantheism incompatible with the idea of a *personal* Deity. This may be confirmed by principles commonly admitted, and by the premises of the theory itself. It is an established principle, that a distinct idea of personal agency is afforded us only by the operations of our own minds. The only true conception, therefore, which we can form of the Deity, as a personal agent, must be from a consciousness or conviction of what *we* are, as personal agents. This is corroborated by Dr. Emmons himself, affirming that man "bears the natural image of his Maker in the very frame and constitution of his nature," vol. II., p. 24.; that "we derive all our ideas of God from our ideas of ourselves;" and that it is even "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," vol. IV., p. 381. But by the theory, it is no part of our agency, to cause, originate, or determine our own volitions. We can, consequently, have no true consciousness or conviction that we ever do this; and there-

fore we have no right to the idea that God ever causes, originates, or determines his volitions. As we have no power to such an effect, and as it is "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," God has no power to such an effect. But who can conceive, that, without such power, he is a personal agent? By the theory, too, as has been proved, the soul or the agent, man, is a mere series of exercises; and since God's agency is of the same nature as man's, it follows inevitably, that God, as an agent, is a mere series of exercises, that is, no personal agent whatever. Admitting the theory, we know of nothing that can be called a personal Creator or God, but an eternal process of operations without any assignable first cause.

We unavoidably come to the same conclusion, if we take as a premise, a single position of Dr. Emmons; viz., that mind cannot act, except as it is acted upon by an efficient cause without itself, any more than matter can move, except as it is moved by a force *ab extra*. From this it plainly follows, that as matter cannot of itself be a first mover, mind cannot of itself be a first cause or agent. For it is an unquestionable axiom, that matter cannot move itself, and therefore the series of its motions must be infinite or without a first mover, unless it be mind; so, *if* it be an indisputable axiom, that mind can act only as it is made to act by an efficient cause from without, then the series of its acts must be infinite, that is, without a first mover, or first cause. For the premise is not less applicable to the divine mind than to the human, made like the divine, says Dr. Emmons, "in the very frame and constitution of its nature." Thus it can be strictly demonstrated, that the idea of mind necessarily implies the idea of efficient cause; and that, to refer the acts of mind to an efficient cause foreign to itself, is, by certain consequence, to expel from the universe the idea of mind as a *first cause*. That the universe, consisting of substance and attributes, is God, was the doctrine of Spinoza. That the universe, made up of necessitated agency and its effects, is God, is a necessary consequence of the theory of Dr. Emmons. It is a theory which annihilates the idea of personality, and thus ends in theoretical atheism. It well exemplifies a saying of the celebrated Dr. Clarke, that "believing too much and too little, have commonly the luck to meet together, like two things moving contrary ways in the same circle." It disastrously defeats the pious design from which it sprung. And of its author, great and good as he was, may we not say, without any breach

of charity, what Cicero said of Epicurus : *verbis reliquit deum, re sustulit?*

4. A fourth consequence of the theory is *fatalism*. This consequence is, indeed, essentially involved in the preceding, but claims a distinct consideration. The theory denies that men have "a power to cause or originate their own voluntary exercises," vol. IV., p. 384. Upon Dr. Emmons's own construction, it denies the common idea of freedom. "Since mind cannot act, any more than matter can move, without a divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to the freedom of their own will," vol. IV., p. 372. He had too clear an eye not to see, that, if we admit no *efficiency* of mind, which we deny of matter, we must affirm no *freedom* of mind, which we cannot of matter. If any known analogy, or law of reason, requires us to deny of spirit every principle of causation which we deny of matter, then, if philosophy decides that the notions of matter are absolutely necessitated, she must decide that the actions of mind are absolutely necessitated. She must comprise both in the *same* mechanism of cause and effect, whatever it may be. If we concede to the fatalist, that mind and matter are on the same level with respect to efficiency, we meet him on the very ground where he will infallibly triumph. The question of freedom or fatalism, turns wholly upon the point, whether men have the power of a contrary choice,—a power, when they choose the wrong, to choose the right instead of the wrong. But the theory affirms that they are not "capable of guiding their own motions, or directing their own actions," vol. IV., p. 383, and that there is "no possible way in which God can dispose them to act right or wrong, but only by producing right or wrong volitions in their hearts," vol. IV., p. 371. These propositions both plainly imply that men do not determine their own choices, and of course, that they have not the power of a contrary choice, and therefore that they have not power to act otherwise than they do act. Here we have an absolute negation of freedom relatively to man ; and this is fatalism.

Besides, since it is the first principle of the theory, that mind cannot originate its own acts any more than matter can its own motions, and since man is like God "in the very frame and constitution of his nature," so that it is "absurd to say that God's agency is different in nature from our own," therefore all the actions of mind, those of the Deity not excepted, are, not less than the motions of matter, under an absolute necessity and uni-

versal fatalism. There is no alternative, but to reject the theory or abide this conclusion.

But let us regard attentively what is alleged in the theory's defence. Dr. Emmons himself infers that, "if men always act under a divine operation, then they always act of *necessity*," vol. IV., p. 351. He pleads, however, in vindication of their freedom, that they act only under "a moral necessity of acting just as they do act." But we know not that he attempts to prove any material difference between this and *natural* necessity. It is demonstrable, that the two necessities do not differ in any sense applicable to the question of free agency. A human volition is said to take place by a *moral*, and the springing of a plant by a *natural*, necessity. Where is the ground of this distinction of names? Certainly not in the causes of the two phenomena. For it must be allowed that all causes are alike, in the essential respect, that they all necessitate their effects. Both causes do this in the cases before us; and this shows the connexion of cause and effect in the one case, to be identical with that in the other. Of that connexion, therefore, two different necessities cannot be predicated. But of the *effects* or terms connected, one only is of a moral nature; and here is found the whole reason of the epithet *moral*, as applied to necessity. The word *necessity*, characterizes only the connexion of cause and effect. The words *natural* and *moral*, characterize only the terms connected. Indeed, it is conceded by necessitarians themselves, that the two necessities agree as to the nature of that connexion. This completely identifies them in every respect in which the word necessity has any proper meaning. To say, then, that men are "under a moral necessity of acting just as they do act," is to say that *their moral actions are of necessity just as they are*. And this is to affirm the contrary of freedom. "The only two opinions," says Dugald Stewart, "which, in the actual state of metaphysical science, ought to be stated in contrast, are that of liberty on the one side, and that of necessity on the other." Matter moves, it is said, under a *natural*; and mind acts under a *moral*, necessity. But the rigor of the *necessity* is no more mitigated by the one epithet than by the other. For all their import, when so applied, merely characterizes and distinguishes the two classes of events referred to as necessitated, while the necessities are intrinsically of one and the same kind.

Another apology for the theory as consistent with freedom, is, that it allows that men act as they choose; as if freedom lay in

the connection of a choice with its sequent. The answer is, that this avails nothing, if the sequent is necessitated, in every case, by the choice. To suppose that it is not, is to suppose that men may freely act contrary to choice; which is an absurdity too gross to be named. If a man wills to strike, there is no possibility of his not striking, unless prevented by a counteracting force or some physical disability. No analysis or scrutiny, however severe, can detect any thing but absolute necessity in this connexion of volition with its consequent. Where, then, is man's freedom? He is not free in *willing*, for every volition is created in him by an act of God. He is not free in *doing* what is willed, because he cannot forbear to do it. In what, according to the theory, is he more free than if subject to immovable fate? It may be said, Dr. Emmons taught that men have *natural power* to do otherwise than they do. He did so; but we cannot much rejoice in this fact, since he could give no definition of that power, which helps us to the idea of freedom. He could not say it is a power to cause or originate our volitions, for this he expressly denies. Such a power, he affirms, would make us independent of God, able to thwart his purposes, and to overturn his government. We ask, what is this natural power? Is it the same that is called, in current phrase, *the power of choice*? What, then, is the power of choice? Not a power that produces choices; for they are all produced, says the theory, by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." It is not a power *antecedent* to acts of choice, for all power there, says the theory, is the power of God. Is it a power lying *in* the choice itself, a power of determining its consequent to be otherwise than it is? No; such an absurdity would be universally rejected. Is this power some susceptibility of the mind, by reason of which, at a certain crisis of inclination or motives, choices are produced by divine causation? If such a power would make us free, then is a fulminating mixture free, because susceptible of explosion at a certain temperature, or under a certain pressure. Is this natural power, which is all that Dr. Emmons claims as the basis of freedom, a power of *acting*, in any particular, otherwise than we do act? No; for, by the theory, there is nothing in the whole sphere of man's agency, but willing, and doing what he wills; and this *doing* is, by common consent, necessitated by the willing, and the *willing*, says the theory, is produced by God's immediate power. To the question, then, what is this natural power,

which is said to be all that is requisite to save us from fatalism, we find in the philosophy of Dr. Emmons only this answer, that it is a power *to do what we will*. To affirm this power, is merely to affirm that the appointed sequent of every volition, is necessitated by its connexion with the volition; or that, when an executive act of the mind takes place, the act, which it executes, of necessity takes place. In this infallible certainty, lies all the freedom which modern necessitarians suppose to be conceivable. Volitions, says the theory, are produced by an immediate act of God; and yet man is free, because their necessary sequences never fail! The idea of power to choose or will otherwise, the theory utterly denies; and yet the man is free, because he has power to do what he wills! But has he power *not* to do it? No more than the rock dislodged from a precipice, has power to ascend or remain at rest in the middle air. We ask again, what actual power of man does the theory allow? None which does not vanish in being defined. None that would avail to lift a feather, though the life of millions should depend upon the act, unless the volition to do it were created by divine efficiency. Admitting such a theory, we are unable to believe that human actions are not as rigorously fated as it is possible to imagine that any thing can be.

Dr. Emmons attempts to rebut the charge of fatalism, by reiterating that human actions are *voluntary*. But the argument is futile, unless, by his theory, the word has some import that allows the conception of freedom. What is a voluntary act, when interpreted by the theory? If it be replied, an act of the will, what then is the will? Dr. Emmons says, "It never properly means a principle, or power, or faculty of the mind; but only choice, action, or volition."* According to this, a voluntary act is an act of choice or volition. This must mean either the volition itself, or its consequent. If the former, then a voluntary act is a volition produced by an "irresistible agency upon the heart;" and where or what is the idea of its voluntariness? But if by an act of volition be meant the *consequent* of volition, then a voluntary act is any physical phenomenon that is necessitated by its immediate connection with a volition; and we search in vain for any idea of voluntariness that does not extinguish all conception of freedom. To affix the word volun-

* Christian Magazine, vol. I., p. 148.

tary to human actions, and thence to infer that men act freely, is not to prove that freedom survives, but merely to ring changes on the counterfeit terms of it. No doubt our actions are *voluntary*, but give the word any meaning compatible with freedom, and you sever the roots of the theory at a single blow.

But, says Dr. Emmons, "God has made men capable of acting freely and voluntarily under his irresistible influence," vol. IV., p. 399. "His acting on their hearts, and producing all their free, voluntary, moral exercises, necessarily makes them moral agents," vol. IV., p. 385. It "lays them under an absolute necessity of acting freely," vol. IV., p. 351. Here we have the most compact of all Dr. Emmons's theological "*joints*." In these asseverations, is the concentrated proof and defence, yea, the very rampart of the theory. Let the reader observe, however, that the question is not, whether God's creating free agents, necessarily makes them free agents. This is never disputed, and is not what Dr. Emmons means. The question is, *whether God's creating the actions of men, necessitates those actions.* To aver the negative, is the chief exploit of the theory. The whole of it consists in the bold assumption, that our actions may be free, though literally created, as much as we ourselves are, by an act of God. The very daringness of this postulate may have prevented many from seeing the fallacy that lurks under the virtual contradiction in its terms. But upon close inspection, it is evident, that to suppose God creates volitions in which man is free, is to suppose that, relatively to man, they cannot but exist, and yet may not exist; that God necessitates that, which, by common consent, it is a contradiction to suppose necessitated. It is impossible to impart sufficient firmness to "*joints*" of this kind. Freedom and necessity cannot be predicated of one and the same act. Things utterly opposite and mutually repellent, can never be made to coalesce.

Some suppose that Dr. Emmons's definition of divine agency, as consisting *merely in volition*, redeems the theory from fatalism. Cannot man act freely, they ask, when all that God does, is merely to *choose* or *will* that he shall act just as he does act? As if this would not

"—— Touch with lightest moment of impulse
His free will, to her own inclining left
In even scale."

We reply, that, according to the philosophy of Dr. Emmons,

the only creative energy is a divine *volition*; that *that* is always creative; and that, as God merely wills man's actions, so he merely wills his existence. If, therefore, by merely willing *him*, God necessitates his existence, by merely willing his *actions*, he necessitates their existence. And yet men act freely, it is said, because, in making them act just as they do act, God merely wills that they so act! What more has he done in causing any thing to be as it is? When he said, "Let there be light, and there was light," it was a mere volition that light should be. Are human actions free, because, in creating them, God merely wills them to be as they are? He does no more in creating any thing that is *not* free. If, adhering to the theory, according to which the divine volition is in all cases alike creative, we say God wills that men shall act just as they do act, and yet *freely*, it is clear, that we use the word in no other sense than when we say matter *moves freely*. By the theory, the stone's fall and the assassin's blow are alike efficiently caused by a divine volition. The inevitable conclusion is, that, as there is only one sense in which the stone falls freely, that is, without external impediment, in this sense only the assassin strikes freely; and no human act is free, except in the sense in which all things else are free.

5. It follows from the theory, that *there is no such thing as moral accountability or blameworthiness*. This consequence is fully implied in fatalism; but its importance demands a separate exposition. By Dr. Emmons's own concession, all moral action consists in what he calls volitions. But the very marrow of the theory is, that God produces these same volitions by "his irresistible agency upon the heart." Therefore, as has been shown, it is essentially a theory of fatalism, and annihilates moral distinctions. Suppose, for illustration, that you intentionally thrust a dagger into your neighbor's breast. By common consent, not the visible act, but the volition by which it is necessitated, is the moral act. But whence this volition? God creates it in you, says the theory. It is no more determined by you than any thing else which God creates. If it be in any sense *your* volition, it is in no sense blameworthy. But it is in no sense yours, except that it is a phenomenon produced in you by a divine energy. It is only by a convenient *usus loquendi*, that it is called yours; just as respiration in you, is called yours. If, while in the presence of your neighbor, God should make your breath poisonous, and its efflux should kill him, it would be said

that your breath killed him, but you would no more be blamed, than if the lightning had killed him. So when you cause his death by a malicious blow, the volition to strike may be called yours; but God in creating that deadly volition, necessitates it as absolutely as he does the circulation of your blood. The only true verdict, therefore, must be, "*death by the visitation of God.*" There can be no greater solecism, than to suppose that any being acts under accountability in the same respect in which he acts under an absolute necessity. But the theory cannot escape the imputation of this absurdity. For it asserts that all moral action consists in *choosing* or *willing*; and yet grants no freedom but in *doing* what we choose or will. It admits that we are not directly accountable in that only particular in which it claims that we are free, namely, the *sequent* of volition. It affirms that we are directly accountable in that very particular in which it denies that we are free, namely, *volition*. How can this possibly accord with reason? Who but a pious fatalist* can believe that we are *moral* agents in the identical particular in which he himself allows that we are not *free* agents?

No appeal to the *voluntariness* of human actions can be of any weight, since the theory utterly *vacates* the term in respect of all its meaning. He who smites you with malign intent, will be arraigned for trial. But his advocate shall plead that his assault upon you was necessitated by volition, and that the volition was necessitated by a creative act of God. Which of the links in this chain will you break by pronouncing over it the word *voluntary*? To say that the man accused was free in the visible act, is to say that he might have acted contrary to his volition; which is abhorrent to common sense. The only idea that lets in freedom anywhere into the series, is, that he had power, in the circumstances, to refrain from *willing* as he did. But this your theory denies. Whatever crimes, therefore, men may commit, you must nevertheless say of them what Dr. Emmons said of the great crime of Joseph's brethren, that "God not only prepared those persons" to commit it, "but made them" commit it; or, what he said of Pharaoh's troubling the Israelites, that "God stood by him and moved him" to do it. If you plead that men are *conscious* of freedom, and therefore responsible, and if you mean by freedom any thing more than the

* "Malgré ces opinions qui touchent au Matérialisme et au Fatalisme, Bonnet fut très religieux." *Cuvier*.

absence of external constraint, then you cannot wisely listen to the verdict of consciousness; for it gives the lie to your philosophy. If the theory claims responsibility on the ground that man *exercises free choice*, we ask for a definition of free choice. If you reply, it is a choice whose consequent is unobstructed, then you shift the plea, and predicate freedom, not of the choice, but of the act following, which you do not suppose to be a moral act, nor more free than any other physical phenomenon. If you say man is responsible because he chooses or wills freely, and mean to imply personal power or agency any more than when it is said,

“The river windeth at his own sweet will,”

then, though we are surprised at the concession, yet we gladly welcome you as coming out from the dismal shades of fatalism, where the glazed eye of necessity has ever been fixed upon you, into the sweet air and sunshine of liberty. Do you frankly avow the belief that *man chooses*,—that *the man himself wills*? Wonderful! We entreat you to tell us what is the thing affirmed, in saying that man wills. If you answer, he causes or originates his volitions, you will contradict the theory. If you say he does not cause or originate his volitions, what conceivable agency has he in willing? On what ground is he accountable for his volitions? What more than a figure of speech is it to say, man chooses, man wills? If now, waiving the consideration of choice and the imputation of blame where your philosophy allows no freedom, you turn to the sequent of choice and assert freedom where you impute no blame, saying the man can do what he chooses, he can do right if he will, you may thus puzzle the artless mind. Your meaning is, that the man can do right if he has a volition to do so. But this can never make him blamable, so long as no volition is, or can be, produced but by an “irresistible agency upon the heart.”

6. It follows, *that our notion of moral evil and sense of personal demerit, must be fallacious.* The theory is, that all human volitions are produced by the irresistible and immediate agency of God. To suppose, therefore, that any of them are wrong or morally evil, is a direct impeachment of Jehovah, as the author of them. For though we cling to the truth so fully revealed, so accordant with the divine perfections, and so consoling to us, that God overrules the creature’s sinful acts for good, yet the supposition, that he is the efficient agent in producing them, foils every attempt to conceive of him, as perfect in goodness

and holiness. The very idea of an act as sinful, is annihilated by the belief that God is the producer of it. To tell us, that, though God creates sin, yet he creates it for the best conceivable purpose, only doubles the absurdity. For it supposes not only that a thing essentially and utterly evil, is produced by a Being intrinsically and infinitely holy, but that the violation of pure and eternal right, is indispensable to the greatest utility; or that God must do evil, that good may come!

If it be said that *conscience* and *remorse* argue either freedom or responsibility, the answer is, that all evil volitions of which we are conscious, are produced by God's "irresistible agency upon the heart." "With such a system not the wit of man nor all the theodices ever framed by human ingenuity, before or since the attempt of the celebrated Leibnitz, can reconcile the sense of responsibility or the fact of the difference *in kind* between *regret* and *remorse*." For what should a man blame himself? Not for any *evil intention* in his volitions; for if there be any such, it is inherent in them and necessarily created with them. If ever he *means* evil, God stands by him and moves him to mean it. Call his volitions what you may, upbraid him as you may, he is not culpable for them, since God produces them and makes them what they are. The man is merely an organic body in which the Deity operates. You may pronounce sentence against him as criminal, yet he is no more so than the herb in which, it may be, poisonous juices flow. "But he is *conscious* of wrong volitions," you say. So much the more is he deceived, if your philosophy be true; and so much the harder his fate, since he has not the power of originating right volitions. He condemns himself for choosing wrong, without the power of choosing right in the place of wrong! Is this all you read in the record of man's consciousness? He is stricken by remorse for willing wrong; and the only reason he can give, is his conviction that in the same circumstances, he could have willed right. But now your philosophy comes to his relief, asseverating that he could not have willed otherwise, motives and the agency of God remaining the same. Prove to his Maker that this is true, and his Maker will absolve him from all accountability and all blame. Convince the man himself that this is true, and he will be irreprovable in his own eyes. He will know that his heart is deceitful, but not wicked; that his inborn convictions mislead him; that his conscience is fallacious; and he will no longer writhe under its retributive lash.

You will have quenched in his soul the consuming fire of remorse. You will have persuaded him that he has nothing to suffer or to fear but the allotment of inexorable Destiny.

7. Another inevitable consequence of the theory is, *that the divine commands are contrary to reason and justice*. This is so clear from what has gone before, that it hardly needs additional confirmation. The divine commands are generally regarded as in exact accordance with perfect justice and rectitude. If, indeed, they are so, and the creature is bound to obey them, it is on the ground that he is fully able to obey them. They cannot be right, relatively to him, on any other basis. No principle can be plainer, than that obligation is founded upon power to fulfil what is required, and can in no wise transcend that power. Now, no man will question that the precepts of the divine law, in their true spirit and force, are obligatory upon men with respect to their *choices* or *volitions*. In these alone, by common consent, moral action essentially consists. Any statutes or precepts, therefore, which oblige men to do right, virtually oblige them to *choose* or *will* right. But the theory is, that men have power to do right, if they will right, but not power to will otherwise than they do. And yet God never commands men to do right, *if* they will right, but always to *will* right. The theory denies that men have *moral* power to do always right. And yet no moral precept requires directly the exertion of any other power; nor by any other power is obedience possible. The theory gives us very positive assurance, that all human volitions, good and bad, are produced and made what they are by the creative agency of God. If you advocate such a theory, we inquire on what grounds you justify God's mandates to us, or his disapprobation of our actions. You will doubtless reply that we possess all the powers and faculties requisite for complete moral agency. We ask, What are these powers and faculties? You answer, reason, conscience, and *natural ability* to do our duty. But we find that you mean by this only an ability to do it, provided we will to do it. We are able to refrain from theft, if we choose to refrain; but if God creates in us the opposite choice, we are in no sense able to refrain. Yesterday, some one chose to steal, and you confidently affirm that he had not power to choose otherwise; for such a power would endanger the divine government and the happiness of the universe. His power to forbear stealing, if he had willed to forbear, renders him, you think, a fit

subject of the prohibition, "thou shalt not steal." Does God anywhere require the exercise of such a power? No. The spirit of the command is, thou shalt not *will* to steal. But you are very sure that God, by his "irresistible agency," produced in him the wicked volition to disobey. Unless, then, he had power to act contrary to choice, he had *no kind* of power to obey. And here is our reason for affirming that, upon your theory, the divine commands cannot be justified. No man has even *natural* ability to obey, when God creates in him the volition to disobey; and therefore no man can be justly condemned for disobedience. The reasoning is summarily this: no law is justifiable which the subject of it has not power to obey. The law of God requires us always to do right. But by the theory, we have not power to do right; no, not even *natural* power, in any of those cases in which God produces in us a volition to do wrong. It is therefore an unjust law. To vary the argument: God commands us always to *will* right, or to have *right volitions*. But by the theory, right volitions are beyond our reach; at least they are so, when God creates in us wrong ones. It is therefore an unrighteous command. It is harder than the tyrant's edict, that required bricks without straw. For under it, the man is to suffer the "vengeance of eternal fire" for disobeying, when to obey was absolutely out of his power.

8. If the theory be true, *all the reproofs and exhortations, which are addressed to men, are unwarrantable and absurd*. If any man deserves reprehension, it must be for his wrong volitions. But by the theory, all his volitions with all their qualities are brought into existence by the resistless and proximate efficiency of another Being. They are what they are by the sternest necessity. If you espouse such a theory, you are to be pleased with his good actions as with beautiful trees; and you are not to blame him for what you term his evil actions, any more than for a fever or a spasm. You have no right to assume the office of reprover, nor like the mild archangel to say, "the Lord rebuke thee," to any man, whatever he may have done. By every word of censure you do him a grievous wrong, if wrong be possible. If, however, he believes your philosophy, it will be for him an impenetrable shield against all "the arrows of conviction." You may chide him for pilfering; but he can plead like Zeno's slave, "it was fated that I should steal;" and you can only retort the same heathenish sentiment, "it was also fated that you should be reproached."

Moreover, with what authority or propriety can you exhort a man to any duty? If you do so, you assume, however unwittingly, yet very absurdly, that he has the identical power which you deny, viz., power to have *good* volitions, when God produces in him *evil* ones. Besides, if he had any such power, you would act altogether in the dark, and at the hazard of urging him to will contrary to the Omnipotent will and the good of the universe. For the executive will of God, you say, has "no respect to what is right or wrong, but only to what it is wisest and best should take place;" and as you are bound to exhort him to will only that which is right, what a disaster it would be, should you incite him to will not only against the divine purposes and agency, but in opposition to "what is wisest and best should take place"!

Not least among the absurdities would it be, to persuade him to *repent*. Repentance implies sincere contrition for sin. But the theory being true, there is no sin. Nothing is wrong, or can be. The volitions of men, which include all their sins, so called, are produced by an "irresistible agency upon the heart." They are not only fated, but fated for the "wisest and best." The incendiary may have fired your buildings, but why should he repent? Not because he could have done otherwise; for God produced the volition that moved his hand to set the fire. Not because his volition was evil; for all its evil was its inherent quality, and necessarily created with it. Not because he did harm; for if he did any, it was not only done of necessity, but was the wisest and best that could take place. Not because he transgressed the divine law; for if he did so, it was in the volition divinely created. Not because he is conscious that he did wrong; for if the theory be true, his conscience is false. Dr. Emmons very consistently says, that sinners "have no reason to be sorry that any evil action or event has taken place," and that they cannot be so, "without being sorry for God's conduct," vol. IV., p. 374. By this, however, he does not mean to admit the absurdity of repentance here charged upon his theory. On what ground, then, would he exhort men to repent? We have discovered none, and can conceive of none, unless it be, that "sin is one thing, and the taking place of sin is another;" as if *an act of sin and the sin of the act* could have different relations to the agent, or to a moral standard. The absurdity of this assumption has already been exposed. If God causes the *entity* of an evil act, he

causes its *evil nature*. If man is not to repent of the *taking place* of his sin, he is not to repent of his *sin*. If God produces man's volitions, he produces all that is wrong in them. If man cannot be sorry that his evil actions have taken place, "without being sorry for God's conduct," and this Dr. Emmons affirms, then he cannot repent of the *sin* of those actions without repenting of an inherent property of "God's conduct." If by eating unripe fruit, your health should be injured, and you should say, "I repent of eating the noxious quality of the fruit, but not the fruit itself," you would talk absurdly enough; but not more so than the theologian who exhorts men to repent of *the sin of their acts, but not of their acts of sin*, that is, of their *sin*, but not of their *sinning*. The truth is, Dr. Emmons's theory of agency involves us in inextricable difficulties. It is not, as some have imagined, a system of surprising and beautiful paradoxes, but of actual and absolute, though ingeniously palliated, contradictions. It is a theory by which the moral problem is insolvable, nay, by which the very conception of such a problem is utterly exterminated. Nothing, we believe, but the genius and moral excellence of its author, has hitherto saved it from universal rejection.

The theory which we have now very briefly examined, has important relations to which we cannot here allude. If any one would convict us of having misconceived the theory, he must either show that we have not understood Dr. Emmons as he wrote, or that he did not write as he meant. If there be errors in the reasoning by which we have endeavored to verify our allegations, they will be easily detected. It will doubtless be said, that Dr. Emmons would not admit these consequences. No one supposes that he would, unless he would disavow his own cherished philosophy. "*He would not admit these consequences!*" Is he therefore wronged by an endeavor to prove that they are legitimate consequences? Where is the proper tribunal? Is he the arbiter before whom we are to try his own speculations? If these consequences can be set aside, then we are so much in the dark, that we need, for their refutation, something far more luminous than a mere *ipsum non dixisse*.

Though a necessity has been laid upon us of animadverting on the philosophy of a very eminent and excellent divine, we have nevertheless a deep reverence for his character, as one both so great and "so good, that we shall seldom find his equal." With respect to various important merits in his writings, we do

not know that we estimate them a whit less highly than his warmest admirers. We could, on many accounts, wish his volumes a wide circulation ; and his fourth volume we do heartily commend to the most careful and studious perusal of all who are disposed to look with favor upon his peculiar theory of divine agency. While we cannot but record our regret, that much of his intellectual might was so exerted that it may be available on the side of the fatalist, still the elements of his character challenge our confidence and admiration. We confide in his estimate of theology, as the most important and exalted of all sciences. We confide in him, as a man of extraordinary wisdom and uprightness ; a man in whom there was nothing time-serving, no concealment, no dark windings, no want of transparency. We admire his wit, his originality and independence of mind. We both confide in him and admire him, for his magnanimity, his amplitude of views, his noble freedom of investigation, and his rare courage in declaring his opinions. We confide in him and revere him, because he had a generous faith in the future progress of the mind—a faith inspired by “the growing capacities of men,” as well as by the history of science ; because, in theory and in practice, he condemned the groundless and disheartening sentiment, which he represents as “often flung out, that all the subjects of human inquiry are nearly exhausted,” and that no great advance in knowledge is to be expected or attempted ; because he believed there is “room left in divinity and metaphysics, as well as in other sciences, to make large improvements ;” because he was an advocate “for pushing researches further and further ;” because he disliked what he called “a caveat given to men, not to pry into things above their measure ;” because he never frowned upon the spirit of *inquiry*, as if it were the spirit of *skepticism*, nor regarded men as sinning by being inquisitive, unless they transgressed the limits of attainable knowledge ; and because any disposition to say to the earnest inquirer, “thus far shalt thou come and no farther,” would have met his severe reprehension.

In conclusion, we cannot but hope that the debatable ground between necessitarians and their opponents, is not always to be a land of shades and of conflict. It seems to us, that already “we scent the morning air of the coming day” that is to shine upon sacred philosophy. It may be a long time before that day will reach its full effulgence ; for mind has its inertia as well as matter. We cannot expect so strange a thing as

that men should readily and at once abandon their hereditary household deities. It is nothing new, that men having a philosophy which requires them to marshal, in its defence, a host of subtleties, should withstand a philosophy whose strength lies only in simple facts and intuitive convictions. So it was in the days of Galileo. We are told that Lizzi, a Florentine astronomer, in order to disprove the existence of planets which many had actually seen, clung to his *logic*. As there are but seven metals, he argued, seven days in the week, and seven apertures in the human head, *therefore*, there cannot be more than seven planets! Another astronomer of the Platonic school refused to look at the heavens through the telescope, because, as he said, if he should see the moons of Jupiter with his own eyes, he must yield in the controversy and renounce his former opinions. As science advances, there will always be a class of philosophers afraid to look at Jupiter's moons. To this class, however, we do not refer Dr. Emmons, for we think that he had the temper and faith of a genuine philosopher; but that in his youth he had been enmeshed in the mighty sophisms of a necessitarian philosophy. To the influence of that philosophy, we must, doubtless, attribute the fatalism of his theology. Still he was right in maintaining that mental and moral science are not to be sundered from each other. But if our theology shall have formed an unnatural and portentous alliance with an *untenable* philosophy, that connection must be severed, or else they must both sink together. If great ingenuity be requisite in "*making joints*" between our metaphysics and our faith, we may suspect that one of them is false. There can be no repulsion between them so long as both are true. We shall greatly err, if we imagine a philosophy indubitable because associated with great and sacred names. Let us hallow the names, but scrutinize the philosophy. As defenders of truth, we need to look well to its philosophical safeguards. If its alert and resolute enemies discover that we are trusting in the shield of a *false* philosophy, a blow may be aimed at the very vitals of our theology by some feeble arm, which even the strongest will not be able to parry. Let us see to it, lest the bulwarks of our faith, being ready to fall away, invite to the assault, whilst we are reposing in a fatal security. For truth's defence, let us never rely upon a philosophy, however canonical, that is at war with the strongest utterances of common sense, with the plain facts of consciousness, and the first truths of universal intuition.

ARTICLE VI.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY—ITS NATURE, ENDS, AND VALIDITY.*

PSYCHOLOGY is the science of mind in general; and divides itself into two distinct branches—*Empirical* and *Rational*.

Empirical Psychology finds the *facts* of mind, and gives to these facts a *systematic arrangement*. The mental states and exercises, which appear in experience, constitute all its elements; and the testimony of consciousness is assumed, as the valid criterion for any facts, which may be doubtful or disputed. If, in any case, a contradictory consciousness between two minds be alleged, the umpire lies in the general consciousness of humanity, and the appeal is made through some of the many methods by which the concurring testimony of the human race, on that disputed point, may be gathered. This ultimate test is, what is commonly and properly called an appeal to COMMON SENSE.

Rational Psychology passes on beyond the facts of mind as given in experience, and seeks some necessary and universal *principle* by which the fact is controlled, and through which alone it can be intelligently expounded. This principle is seen to be a *priori* to the fact, independent of it, and conditional for it. It is the *rationale* of the fact, or the *law* by which that mental exercise, given in experience, is altogether and necessarily determined. The Elements of Rational Psychology are not, therefore, the states and exercises of the mind as given in consciousness, and appearing in experience, but those conditional principles through which experience itself is possible, and the facts of our mental being alone intelligible. It affirms, not as through experience in consciousness, *this is*; but from the peremptory law of the conditional principle, *this must be*. The human intellect is itself cognized in the *a priori* laws, which determine necessarily its entire agency.

This distinction may be more fully illustrated by a reference to other cases than the facts of mind. Whatever is capable of

* We withhold the author's name in this case, because the article is introductory to a contemplated publication, in which it is designed to evolve more fully the principles herein foreshadowed.—Ed.

being represented under the double form of a fact in experience, and a necessary principle in science, may be used as an example.

By a long period of patient and careful observation, I may have discovered the great facts of astronomy—the revolutions of the planets, the relations of the primary bodies to their satellites, their apparent changes of form, the occasional transits or occultations of some; and, moreover, from long experience, I may have learned to combine these isolated facts into a system, and put the sun in the centre, and all the planets in their places, with their orbits, and periodic revolutions, and thus be able to plot a complete diagram of the solar system in pure space—and in this way, I should gain the whole science of *formal* astronomy. By experience I should cognize the facts of the heavenly phenomena, as they *are*. But if now, by any means, I can attain the conditional principle of gravitation, that all bodies are attracted towards each other, directly as their quantity of matter, and inversely as the squares of their distance, I at once possess the law for all these facts, and can say, not only from observation, such things *are*, but from principles *a priori* to the facts, such things *must be*.

I take any body of a triangular form, and from a measurement in experience, I find that any two of its sides are together greater than the third side. I come to another triangular body of different size and proportions, and I find myself unable to conclude from the mensuration of the former, any thing certain in reference to the latter. But I apply the measure by another experiment, and find the fact the same as before; and thus onward in my experience, so far as it extends, I affirm the facts *are* thus. But when I construct for myself a triangle in pure space, and contemplate it in its intuitive principles, as universal and necessary laws for all triangles, I cognize not only that the two sides of this triangle are together greater than a third side, but that this *must be* so for all possible triangles. *A priori* to all experiment, I know from the principle, what the fact must be.

So also with any construction of human art or skill. The materials of stone, brick, and mortar, thrown together in a mass, do not constitute a house. They must be combined and arranged according to some definite rule, or the house is not. Now the Empiric may have some other house as his copy, and by the repeated processes of mensurations, applying parts to parts, and fitting and trying through successive experiments, he may succeed in combining his materials in imitation of his model. But

the scientific architect will project his whole plan upon well-known conditional principles, and possess an *a priori* cognition of the whole structure, in the pure law of its combination.

The fabricator of plaster-busts sees the features of the human countenance as they are, and fitting his moulds to some face as the hand of nature has in fact formed it, he casts therein his yielding material, and there comes out its counterpart. But the eye of genius looks through nature to the *absolute ideal*, and chipping off the useless refuse from his block of marble, he finds at length the perfect form, of which his own bright creation was the archetype—a Venus, or an Apollo.

Such is everywhere the distinction between Empirical and Rational Science. One knows facts as they appear, the other knows the laws which determine their appearance. Mind, considered as the grand source of human intelligence and freedom, admits of being cognized in both these aspects. The facts of mind, as given in experience, and put together in a system according to the observed relations and dependences as they appear in consciousness, constitute the important science of Psychology in that division which I have denominated *Empirical*—and the conditional principles, which give necessary and universal laws to all intelligence, constitute the elements of Psychological Science, in that higher department which, in distinction, I have termed *Rational*. Through this latter process we come to know the human mind, not merely in its phenomena, as the facts and attributes which appear as its mode of being, but, in a far more comprehensive and adequate manner, according to the law of its being, as intelligent and free. In the necessary laws for all intelligence, we gain the position from which we may look over the field of all possible human science, and decide upon the whole of human experience—determining that which is possible, and the validity of that which is actual.

Here is, therefore, truly, the science of all sciences, inasmuch as it includes the source of all cognition, in the *rationale* or law for intelligence itself. It is also *Transcendental Philosophy*, inasmuch as it goes up to the conditional and *a priori* principles of all science, and thus *transcends* experience, that it may determine the validity of experience. Not *transcendental*, as has been too lamentably the fact with many who have assumed and dishonored the name, in the sense of transcending all meaning, and light, and evidence, and going forth into a region of mere shadows and empty chimeras. It draws a strong and clear line

of demarcation between Empiricism and Philosophy—assumption and science—facts which *are*, and laws which *must be*. It excludes hypothesis, and would rest only in absolute demonstrations.

Pure mathematics, and over a more limited field pure physics also, proceed in the sure and firm steps of valid science, because they derive their elements from a region beyond all experience, and deal only with those necessary and universal truths which are conditional for all possible experience. Nothing assumed as philosophy,—and above all, metaphysics,—proceeding in any assigned direction, can ever take the road to a sure and valid science, except as it strikes out its course, under the stern authority and rigid rule of necessary and universal principles. To be rational science, the law which determines, combines, and explains the whole system, must be cognized; and for this cognition, we must be able to stand without the system and look in upon it, and thus determine that the law which controls and combines all its real elements, accords with those *a priori* principles which are conditional for the system, and which are both necessary and universal. Thus, by the telescope we attain the perception of distant objects, and gain facts not otherwise within our reach, and by this means greatly enlarge the field of empirical science. We may proceed in this way without hesitation or misgiving, until we meet with some skeptic, who calls in question the reality of all assumed facts attained through the telescope. Now, surely, I shall prevail nothing in attempting to remove his doubts, while I confine myself to the mere facts and elements of my empirical system, as obtained through the telescope. I can demolish his skepticism in no other way than by going out of the system, and back of the facts obtained, and giving a rational demonstration that the laws of telescopic vision are valid. But, farther, this telescope is but an instrument for the eye, which perceives objects even without the telescope, and thus is competent to perceive the telescope itself as a fact in its experience. Now, on the assumption that the eye attains facts correctly, we have no difficulty in our empirical science. But if I meet a skeptic who questions the validity of the facts gained by the eye, I must go out beyond the objects given in vision, and in the conditional principles of optics, as the laws of vision, establish the accuracy of the organ, and thus the validity of its perceptions, before I can do any thing to silence his skeptical objections. Still farther, the eye is but the instrument for the mind. Through this organ, as in various other

ways, the mind attains the facts of experience. But I would fain know the laws of the intellect, and examine cognition in its primitive conditional principles. It is the only way in which I can meet the skeptic, who questions the testimony of the senses, and doubts whether even consciousness is not contradicted by reason ; and thus throws down all the foundations of a valid, and not a mere seeming, experience. A transcendental investigation, which goes through consciousness and experience, out to the *a priori* and necessary laws of all conscious experience, and thus expounds the fact of intelligence from the conditional principles of all human intelligence, is the only course by which this skepticism can be annihilated, and science established. The human mind, as a knower, must be cognized in the conditional laws of intelligence, before we have any true and valid rational science of mind ; and for this purpose it is necessary that we go entirely out of, and beyond, the whole field of Empirical Psychology.

All the past history of Philosophy teaches us, that no prevailing interest in thinking minds, and no permanent influence over them, have at any time been secured, except as the investigation has gone upward to the original sources of science, and the attempt, at least, has been made to settle the validity of the system, upon its immutable principles and necessary laws. This is the very spirit of the long-famous Socratic method of philosophizing. By a series of well-put interrogatories, Socrates effectually forced the disciple back to the first truths and elementary principles of the subject under investigation. While he thus secured a careful and docile spirit in the scholar, he, in this way, also, unsparingly laid bare the empty pretensions and shallow conclusions of the sophist. Plato, the most eminent of Socrates's disciples, and the world's great teacher in philosophy, still more thoroughly and extensively pursued science to its primitive source. The DIVINE IDEA was the counterpart to that intelligible law, by which nature was informed and manifested to human perception, and through which, all the phenomena of nature were to be interpreted and expounded. And his fellow-disciple, Aristotle, though studying nature in her manifested forms, rather than in the universal ideas which intellectually control her development, no less rigidly confined all science to that which can be reduced to its logical elements and conditional laws of being. Their voices have already penetrated more than twenty centuries, and are still speaking distinctly, to

all "who have ears to hear," the great foundation-truths of all philosophical science.

After the long perpetuated and empty dialectical conflicts of the schoolmen had exhausted all the resources of the mere syllogistic forms of logic, Descartes led the human mind back again to attempt the science of valid being in its first principles. The prolific germ of his wide-spread system lies in the following formula, as the original demonstration of his own existence. "It is absurd to suppose, that that which thinks does not exist, at the same time in which it thinks. Hence, this cognition—*I think, therefore I am*—is the first and most certain of all truths, which occurs, in course, to any one philosophizing."* *Thought*, as the essence of the soul, and *extension*, as the essence of body, are necessarily opposed to each other; and their connection and co-operation in nature can be accounted for, only on the theory of immediate divine impulses. The soul is *simple*, and thus immortal; and the sublimation of matter into indivisible atoms, gave, also, simplicity to the primordial elements of body. This system branched off on one side into Spinozism, by identifying the attributes of infinite thought and extension in one absolute essence, and all finite beings as the mere *modes* of the manifestation of the absolute—and, on the other side, into the Leibnitz-wolfian theory, in which God, as the primordial monade, is distinct from all finite monades, or simple elements of being; and these finite monades exist, also, in the distinctions of a real *dualism*, or that of an essential difference between body and spirit.

Bacon, moreover, as the father of the Inductive Philosophy, would have us study nature, not in its mere facts, but in the laws by which the facts are connected. These laws, which give their mode of being to the facts of nature as phenomena, are what Bacon calls "*the forms*," in distinction from the matter, of things. They are the same, in their objective being, as the *ideas* of Plato, in the subjective or mere intellectual apprehension. The distinction of the *form*, as intellectual, from the *matter*, as merely phenomenal, is, with him, essential to all true philosophy. The following aphorism is his method of express-

* "Repugnat enim ut putemus id quod cogitat, eo ipso tempore quo cogitat, non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio: *Ego cogito, ergo sum*, est omnium prima et certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat."

ing this essential truth: "The solution and separation of nature is to be thoroughly made, not indeed by fire, but by mind, as a divine fire."

Locke, also, pushed his inquiry to the original sources and extent of all knowledge. He unhappily passed over one entire division of the field of human cognition, and limited the intellect exclusively to that which comes into it through sensation, and thus opened the way to all that wide skepticism ultimately attained by the sensuous school in philosophy. But it has been altogether on account of the primitive and conditional principles of all knowledge, assumed in his system, that it has so effectually, for more than a century and a half, swayed almost the entire philosophic mind of England and America. Out of this has also grown the idealism of Berkeley, the materialism of Diderot and Helvetius, the universal skepticism of Hume, and in answer to the latter more especially, the counter assumptions of Reid, on the ground of common sense. So also, for the last fifty years, has the deep current of the thinking mind of Germany been impelled onward, in the direction which was given by the profound critical speculations of Kant, relatively to the origin and validity of all cognition. "Up to this time," says he, "it has been received, that all our cognition must regulate itself according to the objects; yet all attempts to make out something *a priori* by means of conceptions respecting such, whereby our cognitions would be extended, have proved, under this supposition, abortive. Let it be once, therefore, tried, whether we do not succeed better in the problems of metaphysics, when we admit that the objects must regulate themselves according to our cognition." The great peculiarity of the Königsberg Philosopher is found, in this reversed direction to the course of all former investigations, as really as the placing of the sun in the centre of the system, instead of the earth, constitutes the grand distinctive feature of modern astronomical science.

The disciples, or the opposers, of the critical philosophy in Germany—Cousin in France—Coleridge and Whewell in England—and all others, who have perseveringly and intelligently attempted to carry their speculations upward, to the conditional laws and primitive sources of knowledge, may be added to the foregoing, as the manifestation of how much controlling interest these original investigations possess, for thinking and philosophic minds. The reigning systems of metaphysics have

always taken a strong hold of all other departments of philosophy, and whether physical or moral science has been the subject, it has ever been moulded by the prevailing metaphysical theory. The only point in any erroneous system, against which the assault of truth can be effectual, is in the ultimate principle where the delusion or perversion originates. Assumptions and counter-assumptions, may both stand forever, one over against the other, with no power in either to demolish the opposite. The true system must have the validity of demonstration, from universal and necessary principles, and when thus strong in its own right, it can force off from its whole enclosure every intruding skeptic. In this way only, do we attain the ground for sure science. Empiricism can, at the best, only lay the ground for opinion or faith, while a rational demonstration from necessary truths compels the convictions which belong to knowledge. The former may have the name of science, until its ultimate principles are denied or doubted; but it must then have recourse to the latter, or it can never exclude the most incorrigible and inveterate skepticism. This may be sufficient relatively to the *nature* of rational psychology.

The ends to be attained.—There are many important questions of the highest speculative and practical interest to mankind, which stand precisely in this condition, that they receive a ready assent by the universal conduct and reception among men, and yet, when the general conviction is examined, it is found to rest upon mere assumption. An attempt to explain the correctness and settle the validity of this universal assent soon determines, that no conclusive answer is possible, except as gained through the transcendental demonstrations of a rational, in opposition to an empirical philosophy. Opposite parties may else maintain an endless but profitless contest, because it is, in fact, wholly a conflict of counter-assumptions. On his own premises, each may maintain his own conclusions; but the premises of each are assumptions, and no experience will enable either to go back and demolish the assumption of the other, and thus attain the triumph of final victory. Some such questions are directly embraced in the design of the present investigations, and a partial reference to them in this place, will secure the double purpose of a more full illustration of the nature of a transcendental philosophy, and of a better preparative to our future progress, by overlooking in some measure the field before us.

1. The object, known through sense, is deemed to be out of, and often at a great distance from, the subject knowing. This is especially true of the objects of smell, hearing, and sight. For present illustration, we shall fix attention upon the objects of vision. The thing seen is apprehended to be at a less or greater distance from the person seeing. And now the problem, which philosophy felt herself called upon to solve, was this—*How can the mind have cognizance of that which is at a distance from it?* The almost unanimous conclusion was, that by some means the object must affect the organ by impulse. The process was thought to be something as follows: An affection or impression must in some way be made upon the nervous susceptibility of the eye, and this must be continued up through the brain to the point of its communication with the spirit, and there, in the secret *penetralium* of the soul's temple, a junction must be effected of the impulse of the object and the action of the spirit, and the phenomenon of perception be thus completed.

But it was deemed to be an *a priori* principle—*nothing can act, except when it is, and where it is.** As therefore the object is not where the point of the mind's perception is, there must be present at that point some *representative* of the distant object. This representative of the distant object was that which was, therefore, directly perceived by the mind, and through it the distant object was cognized. This general theory, modified in minor particulars by different philosophers, was nearly universal; and the general conclusion of course was, that all our knowledge of the external world was *mediate*—through some representation of it—and never direct and immediate, as if we perceived the object itself. The result of this was a twofold skepticism, differing according to the opposite directions, in which this theory was pushed out to its remoter consequences.

Many perplexing queries arose, in the course of the investigations to which this theory of representative perception was subjected, and which each was obliged to answer as he best could. What was this representative of the distant object? Was it some image, as an excerpt and detached form from the object? Was it material or spiritual? Was its origin from the object? or in the mind? or generated from some media between the object and the mind? Did it exist when the mind was unconscious

* *Nihil agit, nisi cum, et ubi, est.*

of the perception? Might it not be infused into the mind by direct supernatural agency? Yea, may not these representatives be identical with the Divine substance? and thus, as in the theory of Malebranche, "we see all things in God." But in whatever way these questions were resolved, it still remained true in their philosophy, that not the object, but the representative of the object, was immediately perceived.

When, therefore, *on one side*, the inquiry, relatively to the validity of the knowledge of an outer world by this theory, was perseveringly carried forward, there was soon found abundant ground for skepticism in relation to the reality of our perceptions. If the object is known only through its representative, how can it be settled that the object is *like* its representative? There can be no comparison between them, inasmuch as the object is never cognized except through its image—or if there is any way of direct comparison and ascertained resemblance, then is the real object itself given, and its representative is superfluous. How then can we be sure that we know the object truly? Yea, the representative is all that the mind really perceives, how can it then cognize any thing but representations? What possible way of proving that the objects exist at all? Even still more stringently may we conclude with Bishop Berkeley, that all we can know of an external world is through the mediate representations of sense; and all of which we can be conscious is the sensation itself; and this is wholly mental, and can never be a part of, or a resemblance to, any thing material. To deny this will be to identify mind and matter. And thus the conclusion in his own language—"the existence of a body out of a mind perceiving it, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in terms, but were it possible and even real, it were impossible that the mind should ever know it."

This conclusion was not at all the offspring of any religious skepticism. By giving up all cognition of an outer world of matter, and holding on to an inner world of spirit, Berkeley supposed himself to have avoided the skepticism in religion, which, on the ground of representative perception in sensation, was else so natural, perhaps so necessary. In his view, the belief in an external world, upon the common notion that abstract sensations could be any representatives of external realities, was the chief source, both of all error in philosophy, and of all heresy in religion. By renouncing all cognition of the world of matter without, he thought to save the world of spirit to human

knowledge, and the doctrines and duties of religion to human obligation. On this side of the representative theory, therefore, skepticism took on the form of *Idealism*—the rejection of all knowledge of the world of matter, save in the sensations of the mind itself.

This theory of representative perception, carried out on *the opposite side*, led the way to a skepticism of a still more startling character. The representative is from the object, and its action is upon the nicely-modified and arranged organization of the senses. This puts in motion the animal spirits, or the fibres of the brain, and this motion is propagated onward through all the organization to the sensorium, or point where perception is consummated. Now, no motion, extending back through any material organization, can propagate itself beyond the material sphere of that organization. It can never project itself into some supposed spiritual receptacle, which is wholly without parts, and utterly incompetent for the reception or transmission of motion. No representation can thus be carried out of the sphere of the material organization, and the perception must therefore be completed somewhere within the organ. The source of all knowledge is the subtle, sublimated, material modification of the organs of sense, acted upon by the representatives of outward material objects. Perception is the product of one form of matter impinging upon another; thought is the mere motion of peculiar organic particles. Consciousness itself becomes, in the language of Hobbes, "the agitation of our internal organism, determined by the unknown motions of a supposed outer world." Or, to take the doctrine as given by Diderot, for the school of the French Encyclopediasts, every cognition, when carried to its ultimate analysis, must resolve itself into some sensible representation; and as this must have come into the intellect through the senses, all which proceeds from the intellect, that is not a mere chimera, must be able to attach itself again to its original archetype. Hence philosophy must reject every thing, which cannot find its archetype in some sensible object. On this side, we have, therefore, *Materialism*, as the form of skepticism to which the theory of a representative perception arrives—the rejection of the knowledge of all being, but the dead forms of an outer world.

But again, when this theory is taken in all its comprehensive conclusions, and carried out intrepidly to its legitimate results,

a broader and far more incorrigible skepticism ensues, than in either of the foregoing examples.

Universal consciousness testifies to the direct and immediate perception of an outer world. The knowledge of something out of and beside myself, is as direct and imperative as the knowledge of myself. Yea, in every cognition of an object, it is the object itself that must determine the peculiarity of the subjective act. I cannot be conscious that I have a perception, i. e., I cannot know that an act of perception is—that it is not some other act, except as I know the object perceived. All minds, the philosopher's and the peasant's, are absolutely shut up to this conviction, that objects external to themselves exist. It is a universal belief from which there is no escape. The skeptic himself admits this, yea, insists upon this, that he may make the conclusions of his skepticism the more invincible.

But when an investigation of this whole matter is made, on the ground of a representative perception of objects, the demonstration of reason comes out clear and irresistible, that no direct cognition of an outer world is possible. The very sensation, by which all knowledge is given, is itself but a mental phenomenon, and can furnish no ground for the conviction of the existence of any thing farther than that of the mind itself. An irresistible conviction of our nature, on one side, is flatly contradicted by an irrefragable demonstration, on the other. Consciousness belies reason; reason subverts consciousness. Man's intellectual nature is thus placed in irreconcilable conflict with itself. The very "light which is in us, is darkness"—the sources of irresistible conviction, by contradicting, annihilate each other; and all escape from universal skepticism is impossible. Our ultimate and independent grounds of knowledge prove each other to be false, and of each we must say—"falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus"—the truth of our nature is a lie, and in nothing can aught else remain, but to doubt. Here is the dreadful, but still rigid conclusion of David Hume, inevitable and unanswerable, on the ground of the representative theory of the old philosophy.

Reid, with intentional reference to Hume, but with equal effect in reference to both Idealism and Materialism, met this whole ground of skepticism, so far as self-defence is concerned, by rejecting the representative theory, and assuming the fact of an immediate and intuitive knowledge of objects themselves.

The object itself is perceived, and not its mere representative ; and on this position he could avoid all attacks from both the Idealist and the Materialist, as well as the absolute skepticism of Hume.

But this position was still but an arbitrary assumption. The whole ground taken was without any attempt to justify the title to it, but simply by an appeal to common sense. Direct and immediate perception of outward objects was an ultimate fact, neither requiring nor admitting proof, but itself the ground of proof for other things. It was a law of the human mind to perceive outward objects themselves by the senses. The universal decisions of common sense, wiser than all philosophy, forced this conviction upon every mind. The conflict was closed, not by a victory, but because each party had taken such positions, that neither could dislodge the other. Their entrenchments were two counter-assumptions, and so long as each kept within his own lines, he was secure from defeat, but also, at the same time, precluded from a triumph. The skeptic could affirm : " Nothing acts, but when and where it is ;" and from this starting point he might go out unchecked in either direction to Idealism, Materialism, or Universal Skepticism. The dogmatist could affirm : " It is an ultimate law of the human mind, to cognize outward objects directly," and thus insist upon the conclusions of Dualism, that the being of both matter and mind is cognized. And here each may remain forever, untouched by all the logical or metaphysical artillery of his antagonist.

And now, one of the ends of Rational Psychology, is to give the power of terminating this drawn-battle, in a final victory on the side of Science and Philosophy. In no other manner can the triumph be achieved, than by a transcendental process, to find the necessary law for perception, in the universal conditional principles of all cognition by sense. Neither the idealism of Berkeley, nor the materialism of French infidelity, nor the universal skepticism of Hume, can, if at all, be otherwise met by philosophical demonstration, than by cognizing the human mind in its conditional and primitive laws, under which all its possible perceptions of objects can be effected. The whole field, on which those counter-assumptions stand, is utterly inaccessible through any other pathway.

2. Rational Psychology has another more remote, and still more important end to attain, and which can be reached through

no other process. What this is, will be developed in the following train of remark.

The conditional Law of Perception understood and applied, will give to us a valid cognition of the objects of perception. An outer and inner world will be cognized, and the reality of their objects can be demonstrated. But those objects are only qualities and attributes, not the things qualified. We are conscious of the exercises which take place within us, but we have no perception of the mind itself as the agent. We are conscious of the qualities which appear without us, but we have no perception of the subject of these qualities. The senses give us the accidents but not the substance. Our knowledge is therefore confined to an exceedingly narrow field, where we have only found the law of perception, and demonstrated a valid reality to the objects which the perceptions give us. We have real qualities—as colors, sounds, tastes, etc., and we have real exercises—as thoughts, feelings, volitions, etc.; but we have no perceptions of the things which stand under these qualities, or which put forth these exercises. So far as the perceptions of sense can go, they are all but so many separate and isolated appearances; real as phenomena, but not connected in any permanent *substrata*.

Now this connection is wholly the work of the intellect, and the result of the process is what we term, judgments. The qualities are taken, as predicates, and joined in the same substratum, as their subject. We thus say, not merely that there is a *redness*, an *odor*, etc.; but that there is some *thing*—a rose, which is both red, fragrant, etc. There is not merely a *thinking*, a *feeling*, etc., but some *thing*—the mind, which thinks, feels, etc. In the judgment, we join the various attributes to the same subject, and this process of forming judgments is what the senses never execute. Conditional for judging, there must be reflection, or thinking; but the sense does not think, it only gives the materials for thinking, and thus for forming judgments. In addition to what sense gives, there is, therefore, in every judgment, something which the intellect gives, as the ground of connection for the phenomena of the senses. The qualities are connected in a *substance*, which is entirely without the sphere of the senses; and the acts, or changes, are connected to a *cause*, which is also wholly beyond the province of sense. The notions of substance and cause are thus conditional for all thinking in judgments, by which the qualities, as isolated

in sense, become connected in things through reflection. We assume the existence of substances and causes, which no perceptions of the sense can give, in order to connect in judgments those phenomena, which in sense we do perceive.

Now, having assumed these intellectual notions of substance and cause, as the permanently connecting existences of the qualities and changes which we perceive, we advance, in the same intellectual process, to far wider and more extended judgments.

The notion of a substance, as the ground in which qualities inhere, gives the conception of *body*. And of this, as a mere mental conception, I can by a process of analysis alone in simple thinking, without the perceptions of sense, form independent judgments. Thus I can predicate of body, *extension, form, divisibility, impenetrability*, etc., as *primary* qualities, and thereby gain a more distinct cognition of what body is; though instead of adding any thing to my knowledge, I have been only analyzing the cognition already possessed in my conception of body itself.

I can proceed much farther, through a process of observation and experiment by sense, and add many *secondary* qualities as the predicates of some particular body, thereby augmenting my knowledge by multiplying the predicates in the same subject. Thus, of a particular body—gold, for example—I may not only predicate the primary qualities as above, but also *yellowness, malleability, fusibility, solubility in aqua regia*, etc.; and thus on, to as many secondary qualities as sense by any experiment can perceive.

But again, far beyond all experiment and observation, I assume to go out in my cognition to unlimited propositions and universal judgments. By the *inductive process*, or the so-called Baconian philosophy, I not only subject the field of *actual* experience to science, but the whole of all *possible* experience, in the direction of the particular induction. I take my assumed notion of cause, as the ground for the connection of particular facts, and bind up the facts of the experiment in this law of causation. I apply, for example, heat in succession to several bodies, and I find that the fact of expansion appears in them all. I assume that heat is the cause of the phenomenon. I farther assume, that like causes will always produce like effects; and, having pursued the experiment until I have satisfied myself that the cause and its law of operation have been found, I then at once form the universal judgment—"heat expands all bodies."

On this assumption, that nature proceeds onward through all her changes in a uniform law of order, rests the entire superstructure of all inductive science. With the assumption that there is everywhere a causal law in operation, the inductive philosopher, in various ways, comes to his universal judgment. He may form, in the process of his own reflection, some hypothesis beforehand, and for the present use this, as if it were *the law* of nature, in the direction to which he would turn his investigation. With this, he goes forth to question and examine nature through all her chambers. If her answers contradict his hypothesis, he casts it aside as worthless; if they confirm, he holds it as hypothesis no longer, but henceforth as a discovered and established law, which will control all experience in that direction. Or, he may be observing the facts of nature in their complexity, with the silent conviction that there is some system, but with no conception what that system is; when at once, from some conspiring incidents, there shall flash out to his inspiration the great truth, by which the whole complexity is, in a moment, seen in its comprehensive unity.

So Harvey, amid his casual dissections, notices the valves within the arteries and veins, and as he sees the concurring facts, that in the former they open *from*, and in the latter *to* the heart, at once, the fact and the law of the circulation of the blood in the animal system are clear. Every contraction of the heart sends out, and every dilatation receives the blood anew; and the law of its circuit must be through the valves, which open before its own impulse. So the falling apple might, as it is sometimes said did, suggest to the great Philosopher the law of universal gravity. The attraction which brought that to the earth reaches evidently far higher. Why not then to the height of the atmosphere, and hold that to the earth? Why not to the moon, and control its motion? Yea, why not through the whole solar system, and hold each planet in its proper sphere? A few careful observations establish the fact, and the law of its working, and at once we extend this law over the universe. The revolution of the farthest planet, and the wandering of the most eccentric comet, are put unhesitatingly under its control.

Now the great inquiry here, essential to the validity of all inductive science, is not, whether a sufficiently broad induction of facts warrants the conclusion, that the law of nature has been found; for this has reference only to the *modus operandi*,

and determines merely the correctness of the process; but, whether the conditional principle, as the very foundation of all induction, is sure. The difficulty lies in this deeper and much more vital point. *By what right is it assumed that nature has laws?* How do we attain the principle of causation as the source of all change? and more especially, where is our warrant for making the uniformity of its operation universal? By what authority do we say, "that every event must have its cause"?—and, "that like causes, universally, produce like effects"? Such a principle of necessary and universal operation assumed, and then, of course, our induction may go, under its guidance, over the entire field of all possible experience; but by what right do we assume it? Can we attain a valid title to our use of this principle, and thus give, to all concluded by it, a legitimate possession for *science*? or, at the most, is it only probability, and affording ground for nothing more than *belief*? An assumption, merely, of this point, leaves the whole field open to skepticism.

Locke teaches, that we attain the principle of causation, by reflecting upon the perceptions of sense. But, surely, no reflection upon the objects of sense can get out of them that which by sense is not in them; and all that sense can give is, the qualities of things, and their changes. The mistake here is, that, inasmuch as the notion of cause is connected, in experience, *with* the objects of sense, it is therefore taken as if it had been given *in* the objects—and after assuming that it is thus given in the objects of experience, it is afterwards most inconclusively used, as a valid principle to carry out our cognition, beyond that experience in which it was given, even to necessary and universal judgments. Now all that sense can give, are simply phenomena, as facts; and never principles, as laws. And no reflection upon facts can get out of them any other judgments, than, that something *is*; not, that something *must be*. From the system of Locke, or any philosophy of experience, it is utterly incompetent to prove any right to our use of a universal law of nature, as a basis for *science*.

Hume, on the grounds of the sensuous philosophy, saw this incompetency very clearly, and drew out his conclusions of an impregnable skepticism, accordingly. All that experience can give is a series of phenomena, as antecedents and consequents. No reflection, upon these antecedents and consequents, can legitimately think into them the efficiency of the principle of

causation, by which they are necessarily and universally connected. No matter how intimate and invariable the sequences, no experience is competent to penetrate the secret nature of the antecedent, and cognize a causal *nexus* therein, which necessitates the consequent. All that experience can affirm is—so far as observed, such phenomena *have been* connected together; not at all that they *must be* thus connected; neither, *must have been* as past, nor, still *must be* in future, but simply, so experience finds them.

This most acute of all skeptics well knew the fact, that the human mind deems the connection of these sequences to be necessary; and while philosophy can never substantiate it as science, he very ingeniously explains how this persuasion of necessity is attained. His theory, though unsatisfactory and empty for all purposes of science, and confessedly terminating only in "belief," is still as plausible, and as philosophical, as the whole doctrine of experience can ever furnish. The mind, by the habit of observing these sequences in an invariable order of succession, comes at length to the persuasion of its necessity. At first, the "imagination" is "faint," but through the frequent repetition, custom excites "a more vivid and lively idea," which is a "belief" in the necessary connection and order of these sequences; and that thus, when the antecedent is given in experience, the mind ultimately comes to expect the consequent as a necessary attendant. And this is, in fact, the whole conception of causation, which can possibly, by any thinking in reflection, be gotten from the entire philosophy of sensation. The foundation-principle of all inductive science is a mere assumption, and so soon as carefully examined, the whole ground falls away, and leaves all, beyond the sphere of actual observation and experiment, to a factitious belief, which the skeptic may question and reject as he pleases.

Now, manifestly, the qualities given in sense can never be thought in judgments, as the connected predicates of one subject, except through the notion of a *permanent substance*, of which these qualities are but its *mode* of being; nor can the changes which occur in experience be connected in judgments, except through the notion of a *cause*, which determines the order of the sequences. Without these bonds of connection to the objects of sense, we can have only a rhapsody of isolated qualities and changes, where no law combines all in one *nature*, nor enspheres all possible experience, under that law, into a uni-

verse. It is in reflection that we connect the objects of sense in judgments, and conditional for all thinking in judgments is a law of order. As conditional for all experience, it is therefore preposterous to attempt to cognize this law from experience. Our only possible course is, to find the law of the intellect which regulates its *reflection*, as before, the law of the intellect which regulates its organic *perceptions*; and by carrying this out to the examination of the objects of sense, determine thus the valid being of those laws of nature, which, from their accordance with the laws of thought, make our experience of nature possible. In this way we do not assume, but we demonstrate, that nature has necessary and universal laws; on the basis of which, our induction becomes *science*, including and expounding all possible experience.

3. A greater, and more serious difficulty than any which has yet been encountered, remains still behind. The following order of thought will show what it is, as well as the impossibility of removing it, by any other than a transcendental process of investigation.

In the philosophy of sense, the necessary and universal connection of cause and effect is a mere assumption. Hume, and after him Brown, by a slight modification of the same philosophy, are unquestionably consistent with their foundation principles, in denying to human knowledge, any thing beyond the fact of mere antecedent and consequent, in the succession of changing phenomena. No *science* can, therefore, be raised upon the assumption of the necessary laws of nature. But both Hume and Brown recognize the fact, that the human mind attains the conviction of a necessary and invariable connection in the order of sequences. Hume originates this conviction, in the frequent repetition of the experience; and Brown accounts for it, by resolving the whole, solely, into the formation of the human mind. With neither, is there any knowledge of such necessary connection; but, with the first, through habit, and with the second, through an arbitrary conformation of nature, we are made to rest necessarily in such a conviction.

Now, with this "necessary belief" of the invariable connection and order in the sequence of events, from whatever source derived, there comes the occasion for a skepticism, which the philosophy of experience can never exclude, relatively to the fact, or the possibility, of any interference in the order of nature. All evidence of the alleged past interruptions in the order of

nature, must rest upon testimony; and no testimony is competent to give a conviction so deep of the violation, as is the unavoidable conclusion of the human mind in reference to the constancy and perpetuity of the laws of nature. All alleged miracles are thus beyond the possibility of rational belief. There may be very strange and unaccountable occurrences, but the human mind must conclude, that in all such cases there was really no violation of the laws of nature, but some unseen law was present which secured the strange event. At least, this necessary conviction of the uniformity of nature is sufficient ground for the philosopher to say—I doubt—in the face of any testimony for a miracle.

Nor is this all sophistry. It rests upon the very laws of human experience. If the real point of the difficulty be not turned aside, it is safe to say, that, from no philosophy of sense, has there as yet been found a conclusive answer.

Mere skepticism, however, on this point, is by no means the full strength of the difficulty. By a transcendental process, we arrive at the conclusion, not as a necessary belief from custom or from an arbitrary constitution of mind, but through a rational and rigid demonstration, that nature has fixed and constant laws. The very laws by which intelligence must proceed in reflection, as we shall subsequently show, demand this fixed order in the successive phenomena of nature. We thus shut ourselves up within the necessary bonds of cause and effect, and if our philosophy can go no farther, it will not be mere *doubt* whether there can be any interference with the order of nature, it becomes a demonstrated *science*, that nature's laws are the highest of all principles, and absolutely inviolable. Having bound ourselves fast within nature, unless our philosophy give us some principle by the help of which, *per saltum mortale*, we can project ourselves out beyond nature, then must we be content to abide the destiny of nature; and ourselves, soul and body, with all about us, are but the several links, each in our places, which constitute the progressive series of a fixed succession that is both endless and changeless. Not merely can we know nothing beyond, there is nothing beyond.

There are long-standing and far-famed theories of metaphysics, which inevitably involve these conclusions. Although they give qualifying appellations to the uses of necessity, as applied to the different phenomena of mind and matter in their connections; but yet include all the changes in each, under the

same category of an efficient causation ; when pushed intrepidly to their final issue, they utterly shut out all possibility of the knowledge of any God above nature. There is nothing within but necessitated causation, and it is thus impossible for the human mind to go out beyond the links of necessitated successions.

Aside, however, from these theories, sustained by good and great men, but who assuredly never followed them out to their ultimate results, there are more modern examples of a spurious transcendentalism, resting apparently satisfied in the full conclusion, that the cognition of the unchanging laws of nature constitutes the *ultima thule*, in the progress of the human intellect. They have followed the demonstrations of philosophy up to the cognition of nature, as ensphered in universal laws, and have thence shut off all light from beyond, which might guide them to the apprehension of any being above nature. Without any direct intimation by himself of his position, we sometimes learn infallibly from the views of a writer, that this was the only standpoint from which they could be taken ; and we know hence how to interpret him over those multiplied pages, in which, with English words and a foreign idiom, he tells his time-message, fulfils his life-task, and goes onward to the goal appointed. Others more distinctly define their position ; some in an intelligible diction, and some beyond all hope of comprehension, but there are gleams of truth, so bright and pure amid the mist and darkness, that we are forced to ask, whether the prevailing insanity may not sometimes have its flashes of inspiration.

Doubtless these views are spreading in the community, under the influence, which imposing forms, and an appearance of philosophy, and a seeming hearty sincerity, are giving to them. Especially do they captivate the minds of the youth in our colleges, who are just beginning to think and speculate. They are thus borne away from the sure footing of a sound philosophy, before the intellect is sufficiently mature to comprehend the hazard of assent, until it can see clear, and see far. With all the reverence which is here felt for nature, and all the deference paid to reason, and the earpest desire to elevate the human mind, and bring it off from the service of dead forms, to the worship of living truth, still this entire philosophy terminates in the acknowledgment of a Universe, a Soul, and a God, all completely circumscribed within the iron law of a necessitated order of operation. The whole chain is a unit, and every being and event are the component links, each conditioned by its

antecedent and necessitating its consequent. From the first link, if any first there be, no one is independent of its fellows, but one exists for all, and all for each; and the whole, including its hypothetical first link, is altogether a *thing*, possessing no proper personality. The Deity is the mere abstract force and law of the whole combination, working in and through it; and by an intestine necessity working orderly, incessantly, and irresistibly, but at the same time, also, working with simple spontaneity, alike destitute of feeling, or foresight, or freedom. This spontaneous energizing it is which evolves the universe; and the Deity can no more be without the universe, than the universe can be without the Deity. Hence the glowing, and often most sublime and beautiful representations, of the deep, ever mysterious, silent, and eternal workings of this power within and around us. All things together working on, and working out their own destiny; and the changeless law of the whole, which pervades the whole, is the God of the whole; and all is thus conclusively ensphered in a transcendental Pantheism.

And now, verily, it will but little subserve the good cause, to meet this highest form of infidelity by ridicule, or by hard names, or by reproachful epithets. It is a real, existing form of thought, and has much of high truth combined within it; and it will never be laughed out of countenance, nor beaten down by denunciation. Nature *has* fixed, and universal laws, which are working out for her a progressive and orderly development. What we need is, a philosophy which does not stop here, and worship only amid the laws and principles of nature. We must gain a steadfast position within nature, from which we can clearly look beyond nature, and cognize a LIBERTY, which while as absolute cause it can give birth to nature, is competent to originate its creations, in the full possession of an alternative election. We must discipline the mind and purify the vision, until we can discriminate liberty from instinct, or spontaneity, or unhindered causation in one direction; and come to the cognition of it, as a capacity to originate from *within* its own being, and put its creations forth to be *distinct from* its own being, while it is itself unconditioned by any prior causation. Unless we can do this, we can have no idea of a personal, independent Deity; and until we cognize the actual existence of the grand archetype of that idea, we have but an "unknown God."

Except this be accomplished, philosophy leaves her mission unfulfilled. Then, and only then, have we cognized truly a

Creator, when we have found that Being who originates the universe from himself, without himself existing at all as a component and included element within it. A living, rational, personal, free Being—who, though originating nature, still stands forth beyond nature, and can operate upon and within it, at his pleasure—can alone be the only true God. And, surely, this cannot otherwise be done, than by carrying our investigations beyond the field of actual experience, and attaining the ground of a transcendental science. The Being whom we seek is himself a transcendental object; working, himself, within and all through our experience, but never becoming a phenomenal fact for experience. The primitive conditional law of the intellect, for all rational cognition, is as essential to be cognized, in order to demonstrate the validity of the object of reason, as, before, we have shown the necessity for cognizing the laws of the intellect in both its acts of reflection and perception, for establishing the validity of substances and causes in reflection, and of phenomena in perception.

On this high ground is it, that there are now in the process of erection some of the most elaborate systems of infidelity. It were a shame to philosophy and to the church, not to make a full and final conquest of all that region, which, from the days of Plato, have been by right of discovery—and even from the days of Moses, by right of divine authority—the domain of truth, of freedom, and of science; and which has only seemed to pass into the hands of “the aliens,” by a most arrogant usurpation. Every mind which has worked its way upward to these heights of thought, well knows that there is in this pure region a broad and fair inheritance for philosophy to explore, possess, and cultivate. If some who have been there, dizzy with height and dazzled with excessive brightness, have taken up wrong positions and run false lines, their errors are not to be redressed by ridicule nor railing from below; but, assuredly, in no other method than by “girding up the loins,” and ascending to the same heights, and, by a more accurate survey, subverting their false positions and abolishing their wrong landmarks. Error, when brought anywhere within the grasp of omnipotent truth, is easily crushed; but never can we lay the hand of truth upon these errors in high places, except as some shall go up, and fix their firm stand, upon this last and highest point, where science and skepticism can grapple in conflict.

These three important inquiries, now concisely stated, respect-

ing the valid being of the phenomena of sense; the connection of these into a nature, by valid laws; and the true being of a God, out of and beyond nature, as its Creator and Governor; constitute the proper field for the science of *ontology*—or the doctrine of being—and the several answers to which, include the ends we have proposed to ourselves in the subsequent investigation. These answers can no otherwise be attained, than through a cognition of the laws of our entire intellectual action—the law of perception, which verifies phenomena—the law of reflection, which verifies the connection and order of nature—the law of reason, which verifies the being of God—and this cognition of the conditional laws of the intellect, is what we have termed *rational psychology*. The science of ontology can be approached through no other possible medium than that of rational psychology. The course leads upward, to some of the highest points of speculation to which the human mind can elevate itself. So far forth, as the answers to these inquiries shall compel conviction in thinking minds, will there be laid the sure foundations of science, and only to such an extent can skepticism be excluded. This is not the place to assert, that an affirmative answer to all these questions can be put in the clear sun-light of demonstration; but we are about to attempt, in all humility, and with some sense of the magnitude of the undertaking, how far and how firm we can find ground, on which may stand secure the whole completed structure of human science. Relatively to the above questions, the issue lies between mere assumption and complete demonstration. The first may have probabilities, commending the answer to our *faith*; the last, only, can enforce the convictions of *science*. Is then the human mind, physically, “shut up to faith?” or, is there that which it may know? So far as the present attempt avails, the sequel will show which is the alternative that must be adopted.

Validity of this Science.—As a preliminary to all intelligent progress towards the attainment of the foregoing ends, we need a distinct apprehension of that which will give validity to all our conclusions. Without this, every step must be taken wholly at random in the darkness, and if perchance we should stumble upon our object, we should be utterly incompetent to realize our good fortune. The question is not, properly, “What is truth?”—for an answer to this would embrace *all* that is true, both that which is known, and that which is unknown. Our inquiry

respects the *knowledge* of truth, rather than the abstract *being* of truth. *What is true or valid science?*

The answer is, of course, exclusive of all that depends upon testimony. The highest degree to which confidence rises from testimony is to be termed *faith*, not *science*.

Of consciousness, however, in the facts of our own experience, we are wont to say, we *know*—not merely that we *believe* them to be. But of the validity of consciousness for proper science, we need to make accurate discriminations. What consciousness is, we shall hereafter more fully examine; but, for our present purpose, the common conception of consciousness is sufficiently explicit. Where empirical philosophy is alone concerned, consciousness is, and must be, the ultimate criterion of the facts. An appeal from consciousness would carry the case wholly out of experience. The man doubts the reality of the facts, as given in consciousness; but this very doubting is a fact given in consciousness, and thus his skepticism destroys the possibility of its own valid affirmation. If his consciousness is valid for the fact of his doubting, it is equally valid for all other facts which come within it.

So also, if there be an alleged contradictory consciousness respecting the same thing, by any two minds, the appeal at once lies to the common consciousness of mankind, or, what is properly meant by *common sense*. If, from the universal language, or laws, or customs, or any other facts applicable to the race, it can be determined what the general consciousness of mankind is, relatively to the point at issue, this must at once detect, which is the mendacious consciousness. The alleged consciousness, belied by the universal consciousness of the race, must be renounced; or the man must admit himself to be *alterum genus*, and thus excluded from all participation in the common nature of humanity. To go farther, in either of the above cases, is to carry the matter wholly off from the ground of experience. This, for empiricism, is therefore the ultimate criterion for the establishment of its facts.

But suppose the skepticism does go farther, and thus cut deeper than this. Berkeley admitted a *real appearance* in consciousness, but denied all validity of an *outward being* to the objects of sense. Hume admitted the decisions of universal consciousness relatively to an outer world, and founded upon that admission, the so much more incorrigible and helpless skepticism, of a necessary conviction of universal consciousness

flatly contradicted by the plain demonstrations of reason. The skeptic may, then, affirm of his doubts, and of all other facts of consciousness, that they *seem* to be thus: but that it may only be a seeming in appearance, with no validity of real being:—and may also affirm, that the universal convictions of men, his own included, are necessitated by the conscious perceptions of sense; but that still philosophy proves this universal conviction to be false;—and then what can empirical philosophy further do? The case is carried beyond the last tribunals, unsettled; because the judge applies an assumption, to which the skeptic, with equal right, opposes a counter-assumption. Must then the case lie forever undecided? We answer, so far as consciousness, in simple experience, is concerned, there is no possible help for it. Here, then, we discriminate, and admit, that the unexamined decisions of consciousness, in relation to the validity of our experience, may be questioned. Simple consciousness is sufficient for the fact of *appearance*; we know that there is a seeming perception; but without an examination and knowledge of the law of consciousness itself, we do not *know* that the seeming perception has an objectively valid being. This may be assumed, with Reid; but while it is merely assumed, it can never prevent the counter-assumptions of skepticism.

What, then, is a valid criterion of true science? The answer we will propound, as concisely and clearly as practicable.

To *know*, involves the *knowing* and the *known*. There must be the subjective act, and the objective reality. The subjective part of the process, considered as distinct by itself, is wholly intellectual, and involves *thinking* as an exercise, and *the thought* as a product. The objective part, separately considered, is an existence independent of the intellect, and includes the *matter* as the being, and the *form* as determination of the mode of being. We may, in our farther explication, pass over wholly the thinking in the subjective, and the matter in the objective, as the merely phenomenal content of sense; and apply the investigation solely to the thought and the form. Let it be permitted to designate the thought, by the precise and exclusive term—*IDEA*—and the form by a term equally precise and exclusive—*LAW*. And now that will be valid science, or the cognition of real being, when the subjective Idea accords with the objective Law.

Particular illustrations will here more completely develop our meaning, on this necessarily abstruse subject, than any mere

statement, however carefully the language may be chosen to avoid ambiguity, and render the thought perspicuous.

The mind which first invented a watch, must have had an end in view, as the noting of time ; and then, by a process of thinking, have joined its conceptions in a certain order, by which the whole combined result was made to stand forth in its unity, as one thought. This was wholly in the intellect, and as such was the *idea*. As a process of thought, and a result attained, there was truth ; but as there was no corresponding reality existing as yet, there could of course be no cognition of a watch. There was the subjective truth, but not the objective being. Another mind perceives a watch, as a phenomenon of sense, and distinguishes all its component materials. Its whole variety of metals, shapes, relative positions, and perfection of workmanship and polish in the different parts, are all noticed and appreciated. But in all this, there is no more the cognition of the watch, as a *chronometer*, than would be gained from an inspection of an equal variety of pebbles. The *law*, which combines the whole into one system, is not apprehended ; and though it be there as object, it is not known.

Now the *idea* in the one case, and the *law* in the other case, are complete correlates ; and except as the idea in the subject and the law in the object come, in the light of consciousness, into complete accordance, there can be no *science*. It is wholly immaterial which is the order of apprehension—the thinking may have given the idea, and that may have induced the artist to put it into outward being, as the law of the combination ; or the perception of the parts, as already arranged under the law, may have induced the idea ; the difference is only that one mind is the inventor, and the other a learner—but, in one order or the other, the consciousness of their accordance must be, or there is no cognition of an objective reality.

This holds true, not merely in works of human art, but everywhere throughout nature. Every object has its law of combination and being. Animals, plants, minerals, earths, may all appear as phenomena, but they are not known in their distinctive, valid being, except as cognized in their peculiar formative principles, or specific laws of organization. And all these again have their more comprehensive law, which combines them into the round world on which we dwell ; and higher laws combine worlds into systems ; and still higher, systems into a universe. Our science reaches no farther than where our clearly evolved

intellectual idea corresponds to the apprehended law, which combines and informs the object.

Equally manifest is this in all those pure intuitions, which the mind constructs for itself in void space and time. The idea, and the according law in their construction, determine their valid cognition. In my idea, a line is a point produced; a circle is that produced line returning again into itself, with every point in it equidistant from a central point; a cylinder is the revolution of a parallelogram about one of its sides; a cone is the revolution of a right-angled triangle about one of its sides containing the right-angle, etc. And when I would construct such pure intuitions in space, the law, for the motion of my constructive act, accords completely and universally with my intellectual ideas. Thus, also, with any combination of numbers, as intuitions of pure successions in time. The rule is the expression of the intellectual idea, and the arithmetical computation ever contains within its combination the law in accordance with it. The whole science of pure mathematics rests entirely upon the apprehension of this correlation of the idea and the law.

Thus, in all cases, science demands the law, which, as it is the determining or formative principle of the phenomenon as given by sense, is that which can alone expound and verify it as a real object. But this outward law in the object can never be a perception of the senses. It can be cognized only as a correlative to the idea in the intellect. The phenomenon, without the law, is mere appearance; the intellectual idea, without the object, is mere void thought. The idea in the intellect, and the law in the object, must both be given in their correlation, or there can be no cognition.

And this directly unfolds the necessity for cognizing the intellect in its laws of operation, in order to any valid science of outward objects. The object, as known, must be in its existence conformable to the laws of thought, or it can be nothing for the human intellect. Had the phenomena of sense no connecting laws, they might appear as mere qualities and changes; but they could not be known as other than isolated, fleeting phantoms: and were these connecting laws any other than in full accordance with the laws of thought, the human mind could have no cognition of them, for it could not bring its own ideas in correlation with them. In order to verify our cognitions, we must, therefore, cognize the intellect itself; and the same thing is conditional for cognizing the intellect as for any thing

else, viz., that we cognize it in its conditional laws. This is a peculiarity of mind, that it can make itself its own object; and in its original thinking attain the idea, and through its consciousness of operation give the law, which, in their accordance, legitimates the cognition.

This is, then, conclusive for valid science, if the laws of intelligence can themselves be made the exponent and criterion of the cognitions of the intellect. We then know the knower in his laws of operation, and can apply science itself to the correction or confirmation of our entire intellectual action; just as the astronomer corrects, confirms, and adjusts his telescope. The law of intelligence itself becomes the valid test of our science, and in this law we discriminate true being from all illusive appearance, or mental hallucination, or credulous *clairvoyance*. We thus also legitimate and necessitate a *transcendental philosophy*; and albeit that it has been pressed in its blindness into the service of the uncircumcised, yet is it none the less, but all the more important, that it should be brought forth in its strength, and placed where it may feel the pillars of that profane temple in which it has been exposed to mockery.

So far as this science of sciences can be fairly extended, it legalizes the whole possession to philosophy; and by this, even mathematical demonstration itself alone sustains its claims. The whole domain of science may in this manner be cleared from all the intrusions of skepticism; but except these title-deeds be in our hands, we can never sue out a summary process of ejectment against any determined trespasser.

It is proper also to mention a consequent benefit, of no trifling moment, which the success of this undertaking secures. By cognizing the intelligence itself in its laws, we make a complete circumscription of the human mind, and determine the limits of its entire capacity. And though we are competent to say nothing beforehand of the *items* of future science, yet shall we be able to draw the lines upon the map before us, and determine the only *regions* which human science can ever explore. A *complete classification* of all science is thus practicable, and the only scientific classification which can be, viz., that indicated by the laws of all science.

The human mind will doubtless be ever progressive; but in eternity it must progress according to the law of its own action. Unless, then, new laws are to be given to our intelligence, by direct Omnipotence, we may now be able to embrace in our com-

prehension the entire sphere of our future action. When rolling cycles shall have passed in pure and holy employment, we must even yet be acting within the laws which define our mental capacities; and although then but just opening, perhaps some broad scene of life, and being, and reality, still stretching ever onward; yet, from these unchanged laws, may we even now determine the outlines of that field, within which our free, intelligent agency must somewhere be—

“ While life, and thought, and being last,
Or immortality endures.”

ARTICLE VII.

PHILOSOPHY OF DR. RAUCH.

By J. W. Nevins, D. D. President of Marshall College, Mercersburg, Pa.

FAVORABLE notice has been taken in the *Biblical Repository* of a small work, by Dr. Murdock of New-Haven, entitled *Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans*. It is only lately that the writer has had an opportunity of seeing and reading this little volume, though it has been about a year before the public.

It is not intended to enter into any particular consideration of the merits of the work, as a whole. In the nature of the case, considering its diminutive form, the vast dimensions of its subject, and the circumstances of its preparation, it could not be either full or profound. It was announced in the form of Newspaper Essays, “at the request of several gentlemen, chiefly clergymen, who said they could obtain no definite ideas of the modern German Philosophy.” After some progress had been made with the “piecemeal composition,” it was judged best to throw it into the form of a volume, that it might serve still more extensively to *literary* clergymen and others in the dark, as a lantern and clew to guide them through the intricacies and mysteries of this foreign labyrinth. The author modestly declines all personal responsibility as a “teacher of philosophical science.” He brings forward no system of his own, and offers

no "*critique* upon the writings and speculations of others." He is not a philosopher, he tells us, but comes forward as a mere *historian*, narrating the progress of speculative philosophy in modern times." This is to be sure a great undertaking. The German philosophers would tell us, as with one mouth, that to trace the history of philosophy, even for a short period, a man *must* be himself a philosopher, and a philosopher too of no mean size. To know much about any science or art, in their view, a man must first penetrate the art or science to some extent for himself. But especially necessary is this held to be, in the case of philosophy, which may be said to involve all other kinds of knowledge. That a man should pretend to understand a single system of philosophy, that of Hegel for instance, by observations taken from without merely, they would regard as not less extravagant, than it would be for him to think of measuring the sea and estimating its contents from some quiet position on the shore. With Hegel himself, philosophy and the history of philosophy are in the end one and the same thing. To be understood, it must be made to live in our own minds. All this, however, might be considered hard doctrine, and clearly *transcendental* withal, on this side of the Atlantic. We may well admire, therefore, the courage of Dr. Murdock, who in the face of such German authority, has undertaken to give us in these sketches a picture in full of Modern Philosophy, through all its varying phases, without the least thought of being a philosopher himself, from the beginning to the end of the process. And then that he should dare to do all this, in the compass of a small 18mo volume of two hundred pages, medium print and leaded, is perhaps more admirable still. Tennemann's *Grundriss*, or Rixner's *Handbuch*, as they are facetiously styled, might seem a folio to a primer in comparison. Hegel has left behind him a history of philosophy, in popular form, which fills three volumes, to the amount altogether of about 1700 full octavo pages; and yet this was considered to be so meagre on the period between Kant and himself, that his editor, Michelet, has deemed it necessary to cover the ground, from that point onward, with upwards of 1300 pages more, in a separate work. But here verily we have the world in a nut-shell. "After a brief statement of the two principal modes of philosophizing, the author endeavors to describe summarily but distinctly, all the more noted systems proposed by the metaphysical philosophers from the times of Des Cartes to the present day."

And all this in a small 18mo of 200 pages, with medium print and leads, and no more matter than might be presented in a single number of the New-York Observer. Of a truth may it be said, that we live in an age of steam; and also that America is emphatically the land of steam. Could any work well be conceived more accommodating and obliging, in all respects, to the condition of the "several gentlemen," that could obtain no definite ideas of the modern German philosophy, for whose special benefit it was undertaken, or more likely to be welcome to many "others in like circumstances?" But in the nature of the case, as now explained, we should not expect to find this history remarkably profound. To answer its vocation at all, it was necessary that it should only skim the surface of the "vast deep" it was sent forth to explore, and fetch back so much as it could pick up in its flight, and might have strength besides to carry. And this is all it can be considered to have accomplished in fact.

It is, however, for the sake of the last chapter more particularly, that the work is now noticed. Not satisfied with exhibiting, in the narrow limits that have been mentioned, the metaphysical systems of Europe from Des Cartes to Hegel and Cousin, Dr. Murdock finds room for a very liberal share of attention to what he denominates German philosophy in America. Nearly one fourth part of the whole volume is devoted to this subject, under the titles of Coleridgeism, the Unitarian Transcendentalism of New England, and the philosophy of the late Dr. Frederick A. Rauch, as contained in his *Psychology*. The entire concluding chapter is occupied with this last; and a representation is given of the views of the deceased president of Marshall College, which can hardly fail to seem to his friends generally in no small degree injurious to his memory. This to be sure would furnish no just ground for complaint, if the representation could be shown to be fair and correct. Where a man's views are published to the world in the form of a book, it can never be wrong to make them the subject of criticism; and if they should be found to involve false and hurtful principles, it is not only right, but may be said to be a solemn duty, to make this appear as extensively as possible, without regard to the author's reputation or the feelings of his friends. But in the present instance, it is believed that the representation which has been made is neither fair nor correct. At the same time, it is likely to be widely respected, as proceeding from a man

so eminent as Dr. Murdock, and so much at home as he must naturally be considered to be in the mysteries of German philosophy. However loosely and blindly the terms *pantheism* and *transcendentalism* may be used by others, they will be supposed to mean something from the lips of the accomplished translator of Mosheim, formally employed in dissecting the various systems of modern metaphysics from Des Cartes and Leibnitz downwards. In these circumstances, it seems a debt of justice, no less than of friendship, to the character of Dr. Rauch, to rescue his work, if it can be done, from the unfavorable light, in which it is here made to stand.

"Dr. Rauch," we are told by the author of these sketches, "was one of that class of German philosophers who, embracing fully the transcendental speculations of Schelling and Hegel, have labored to reconcile them with the religion of the Bible." Of his psychology he says, "There is a philosophy underlying it, which it is not difficult to discover, and that philosophy is manifestly *transcendental*, and derived from the school of *Hegel*." "As a philosopher, Dr. Rauch was a *Transcendentalist*; for he maintains that our reason gives us *objective knowledge* of things, and not merely *subjective knowledge*."—"Being a *Transcendentalist*, Dr. Rauch was diametrically opposed to the views of Kant, whose critical philosophy has for its chief aim to overthrow all Transcendentalism, or as Kant would rather call it, *Transcendentalism*." "As a Transcendental philosopher, Dr. Rauch belonged to the school of *Hegel*, and not to that of Schelling."—"Whether his philosophy is favorable to sound views of religion, deserves more examination than comports with the design of these sketches. If I have not entirely misunderstood him, he is a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of *Hegel*. It is also noticeable that his book makes no allusion to any *special revelation* from God, or to an *apostacy* of man, the intervention of a *Saviour*, the *forgiveness of sin* in consequence of an *atonement*, a future *judgment*, and eternal *retributions* after the present life. At the same time, his pantheistic, transcendental principles serve to leave little or no room for these cardinal doctrines of the Bible."

These are grave charges, and not the less so that the principal terms employed in the case are, for most persons, of such vague and uncertain signification. It is very doubtful, whether with the benefit even of Dr. Murdock's historical analysis one out of ten among his readers, not previously enlight-

ened from other sources, will be found to have any "definite idea," when all is done, of what is to be understood either by pantheism or transcendentalism, as here so liberally applied to the views of Dr. Rauch—only it must be clear to all, that they are intended to mean something very bad, and full scope is left to the imagination, stimulated by darkness, to fill them with the worst sense it may be able to command.

There are various kinds of pantheism. In one sense, we may speak of a pantheism that is found in the Bible itself, and that furnishes the only correct view that can be taken of the relation of God to his works. "Of Him, through Him, and to Him, are all things." He is the ground of the universe and its life. "In Him we live and move, and have our being." The world springs from God, and is comprehended in God, continually. This is the doctrine of the Bible. There is reason to apprehend, however, that this truth is not held for the most part in a form fully adequate to its demands. The world is so separated from God, in the general view, as to be considered in fact an independent existence. While the theory of an *eternal matter*, out of which the present system of nature might be supposed to have been constructed is rejected, such a view is still entertained of the system of nature actually existing, as may be said to involve practically with regard to God the very same error. Nor is this to be counted a light heresy. Dualism, with all its insidious plausibility, is, to say the least, no less inimical to all right conceptions of religion, than pantheism itself. It is to be taken for granted, that Dr. Murdock is orthodox at this point; and yet it might really seem that there was room occasionally to doubt it, from the way in which he exemplifies his idea of pantheism in the case of Dr. Rauch. Thus, for instance, he is dissatisfied with a passage in the *Psychology*, page 43, in which it is said that it is an error, to consider nature, and its manifold powers as a *mechanical whole*, whose parts have been brought together by some mechanic, and whose *powers exist side by side*, without having any affinity to, or connection with each other; that it is on the contrary a *system*, alive and active in all its elements and atoms, and filled with powers, which flow invisibly into each other, actuated by eternal laws. So he finds the same sort of error in the following propositions: "All li'e, wherever it exists, is *formed* and *organized*. Form is not and cannot be the result of matter which is chaotic and shapeless. *Form* in man, and

throughout the universe, is the result of *thought*. Hence *life*, being formed, does not proceed from *matter*; but is a *thought of God, accompanied by the divine will*, to be realized in nature, and to appear externally by an organized body." "The *soul of man* is likewise a *divine thought*, a creation of God, *filled with power to live an existence of its own*." "Reason has not its origin in itself; its author is God, whose will lives in it as its law." "That which truly is in nature, are the *divine thoughts, the divine laws*; and all the rest is but matter." If language like this involve pantheism, it would be easy to charge the heresy upon the excellent Olshausen in full, and to some extent on every evangelical writer in Germany of the present age. Leighton, Howe, and the most spiritual English divines of the 17th century generally, could hardly escape condemnation. It might be difficult even to vindicate the Bible itself from reproach. Seriously we might ask, can Dr. Murdock mean to exhibit the opposite of this theory of the creation, as his own? Does he hold that nature is *not* a system, but a mechanism only, made up of parts outwardly brought together and fitted side by side? Does he hold that *life can* proceed from matter? Or will he venture to say, that any existence can hold in nature, or in the world of mind, that is not rooted continually in the thought and volition of God? The propositions from Dr. Rauch are, I know, quoted as involving *more* than this. But can this be considered fair? And does it not perhaps betray a wrong habit of mind, leaning towards the other extreme, when such statements are thus felt to be the fruit of a philosophy essentially pantheistic.

But Dr. Murdock is sufficiently explicit as to the measure of odium he wishes to be included, in this case, in the imputation of pantheism. It is not the pantheism of Malebranche, or Spinoza, or Schelling, which, according to him, is intertwined with the psychology of Dr. Rauch, but specifically the pantheism of *Hegel*. How much is comprehended in this charge, may appear from what the author says of Hegel's philosophy, when he has it under consideration. "Hegel's was a system of absolute *idealism*, while Schelling's was rather a system of *realism*; for Schelling, like Spinoza, considered the original All-One as a real substance, which evolved itself into the existing universe: but Hegel considered mere ideas or conceptions as the only real existences; he believed that there is nothing in the universe more substantial or more real than what he calls *concrete ideas*

and conceptions." "They reduce all things to one primal substance, the All-One, or God, which develops itself according to certain laws inherent in its very nature, and thereby presents to us all the variety, and beauty, and harmony of this great universe. And the latest and most renowned of these philosophers makes this primal All-One to be himself nothing but an idea or conception of the human mind." Such is the general view of Hegel's philosophy, accepted by Dr. Murdock in the midst of the acknowledged darkness in which it is shrouded to his mind. Some of his followers have denied, it is true, that he taught any such system. But so he has been understood by at least a large section of his school; and this, at all events, is what is taken for Hegelian pantheism by Dr. Murdock. And so we need be at no loss to see how much is meant, when he allows himself to say of Dr. Rauch, "If I have not entirely misunderstood him, he is a *Transcendentalist* and a *Pantheist* of the school of *Hegel*." He might well speak of his book, in this view, as of *questionable* soundness, with regard to religion. Hegelian pantheism leaves no room for the idea of a personal God, or for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is admitted, at the same time, that Dr. Rauch "everywhere manifests profound reverence for God, and a deep sense of the importance of religion." But it seems to be insinuated, immediately afterwards, that this could hardly be honest, since his views are such as tend virtually to subvert the very foundations of piety.

Now, if it be a fact that Dr. Rauch is in his *Psychology* a "pantheist of the school of Hegel," he must have been so in his own consciousness to the end of his life. "Being a man of genius, and familiar with the numerous and learned works of the Germans on psychology," as Dr. M. informs us, he could not construct his system in this form without being aware of what he was about. He must have *known* that he was weaving Hegelian pantheism, with its rejection of the soul's immortality and a personal God, into his whole course of instruction on the subject of the human mind; and it must have been his *intention* to infuse this false philosophy along with what he thus taught. More than this, he must have taken pains to deceive the world with regard to his views in this respect, in order the more effectually to insinuate the poison of his errors. For his book is any thing but a bold and open avowal of pantheism: and to the end of his life he disclaimed it with abhorrence. Those who knew

him intimately will not easily be induced to believe, either that he was ignorant of his own position relatively to the pantheism of Hegel's school, or that he made it his business hypocritically to keep it out of sight. They will give full credit to his own testimony concerning himself in this case, and are likely to have as much confidence in his judgment with regard to the nature of the philosophy that is embodied in his *Psychology*, as in the judgment of his distinguished critic on the same point. Dr. Murdock pronounces him a pantheist of the school of Hegel. He himself, in the class-room and in private communication with his friends, to say nothing of his profession and preaching as a regular minister of the gospel, always reprobated pantheism, and professed in opposition to it the simple faith of the Bible. Most certainly he never intended his book to be pantheistic, and never considered it to be so in fact. The second edition of it was prepared, we may say, upon his death-bed; during his last sickness, at least, and in the midst of much solemn meditation on his condition and prospects. It is not to be imagined for a moment that he was not honest in these circumstances in what he professed with regard to this point.

It is rather strange again, if the work be so clearly pantheistic in its character as here represented, that the fact should entirely have escaped the notice of the reviewers generally on its first appearance; and especially that this should have been the case with the *Biblical Repertory*, of Princeton, which is commonly so keen of scent in the direction of every thing that is in the least tainted with German rationalism, and in the view of which Hegel might seem to stand as the very incarnation of Satan himself. Soon after the appearance of the first edition, it was made the subject of a full and able review in this periodical, where it is spoken of in terms of the highest praise. In that article, no discovery is made that Dr. Rauch is "a pantheist of the school of Hegel." On the contrary, we find the subject referred to in the following style: "If we could clearly discern in his elaborate work a tendency towards this hideous system, no considerations even of personal friendship should withhold us from denouncing it in the strongest terms. Let others, if they see cause, sneer at these fears of pantheistic speculation, as idle, prejudiced, and proceeding from shallowness of mind. We see such a gulf between the idea of a God—eternal, unchangeable, all-wise, all-good, simple, immense, and *personal*—and that of an eternal, impersonal chaos, ever striving after self-consciousness, that we conceive of

no two systems more destructive of one another; the difference between Deism and Christianity being trifling in the comparison. Of this godless philosophy, we see no traces in the work. If, in a few instances, modes of expression have strayed into the system, which seem to have come from the enemy's camp, we hope it is from mere neglect, and that these forms will be exchanged for others more becoming a Christian, a supernaturalist, and a believer in Jesus. We rejoice to see for once a work on philosophy, in which we find the name of Christ, and in which are recognized the fallen state of man, the need of regeneration, and the influence of the Holy Spirit." Thus the Biblical Repertory in 1840. But we are now assured by Dr. Murdock, that the cardinal doctrines of the Bible are *not* recognized in the book at all, and that the author of it was clearly a Transcendentalist and a Pantheist of the school of Hegel. Strange that the Argus of the Princeton Review should have been so utterly mystified and bamboozled in so clear a case. The only part of the work which causes the Review to pause with painful misgiving, is the passage on the subject of *personality*, in which some expressions occur that do certainly carry along with them a pantheistic sound; though even here a general confidence is declared in the author, as not intending himself to appear, even for a moment, in the interest of pantheism. When Dr. Rauch read this stricture, it may be here remarked, he seemed both surprised and hurt that there should appear to be any thing so equivocal in his language at this point as the reviewer supposed; while at the same time he spoke of it in the most prompt and free way, as an utter misapprehension of his meaning. In the second edition, accordingly, we find, instead of the expression, "God, who is *the* person," which was noted with anxiety, as confounding human personality with the divine, the clearer statement, "God, who is the *ground* of all personality," which, however, Dr. Murdock still quotes as a specimen of the very error it was intended to escape. And to prevent all misunderstanding still further, there is *added* to the statement, in this edition, a clear, categorical, and formal declaration, on the part of the author, as had been suggested by the Repertory, that he did not mean to mix the personality of man, in any sense, with the personality of God. "In saying that God is the ground of all personality," he says, "we mean that he freely created man; that there was no *emanation*, by virtue of which the Deity flowed forth into man, and could not return to himself again. If

that were the case, our highest wisdom would become an Ego-logy, and the Bible and theology would become superfluous. So the personality of God differs widely from that of man. Its elements are omniscience and omnipotence, and all the other infinite attributes. Those of human personality are a limited reason and will, attached to nerves and muscles."

Still there is the book to speak for itself. It involves a system of philosophy, and this we are told is transcendental and pantheistic, the opinion of the author to the contrary notwithstanding. It must be confessed, however, that the proofs of any such pantheism in the work as is attributed to Hegel, are hard to be found or felt. Dr. Murdock, indeed, quotes what he deems sufficient evidence to establish the point. But after all he reaches it, in his own way, only by implication from premises which are by no means clear, and a sense put upon various statements which it is by no means necessary that they should bear.

The representation on pages 196 and 197 is so framed as to imply, that with Dr. Rauch the universe resolves itself into four leading forms of existence, and that these in the end have no reality except as immanent acts of the Divine mind. "Four divine thoughts, combined with divine volitions, constitute the entire created universe; and *God* and his *thoughts* are all that exists or has any being." Now we do not find, in the first place, precisely this four-fold classification of existences in the book; the system it presents might be said rather to comprehend five different orders, the *Inorganic*, the *Vegetable-organic*, the *Animal-organic*, the *Human*, and the *Spiritual*. Then it is not said anywhere, that matter is a mere activity, without any essence of its own. We are told that "nature is a system, not a conglomeration. Alive and active in all its elements and atoms, it is *filled with* powers, from the mechanical up to the organic, all of which flow invisibly into each other, affect and determine each other. Thus we have a constant life—powers flow up and down, to and fro." All this, however, does not affirm that matter is nothing *but* the powers with which it is filled; and much less does it teach that these powers, thus constituting all that the world is, have no existence separate from the proper personal existence of God, as a man's sensations and exercises of thinking, are a part of himself. For it does not follow, that in resolving the idea of matter even into that of mere invisible forces, constantly at work, we overthrow the

notion of its separate substantial existence. When men speak of the *essence* of matter, they speak of something of which confessedly they can have no conception. What right, then, can Dr. Murdock have to *assume* that it must hold in the form of passive expansion in space, and not in a simply dynamic form? Can he possibly dream, that such a conception of the essence of the material world serves to make its existence more *real*, or more external to God, than if it were supposed to stand in the power of such an all-pervading force as is made to constitute its essential nature in the other view? If so, it is hard to see how *his* scheme can be rescued from the charge of dualism. When we enter the sphere of organic nature, we are *compelled* to take different ground. Who that reflects, can allow the essence of a plant to be something holding in space? It can be only monadic, indivisible, dynamic. But is it the less real on this account? The most shallow view that can possibly be taken of the *essence* of things, is that which is borrowed from the senses, making it to stand in something answerable to their phenomenal character, as the Jews of old fashioned their conception of *sheol*, or the place of departed spirits, after the pattern of their sepulchres.

But we are told, that the forces which thus enter into the constitution of the universe, are exhibited as simple actings of the divine mind, so that in the end, "God and his thoughts are all that exists, or have any being." Here, however, the argument turns upon the sound of things, more than upon their proper sense. In a deep and most important sense it is true, that the forces which fill the universe, and make it what it is, are simply and continually volitions of God. Not only are they the result of his will, as concerned in their production, but they spring forth from it afresh every moment, and stand in it perpetually as their constitution and ground. Is it possible to conceive rationally of the state of the world relatively to God, under any *other* view we may be pleased to take of its essential nature? Be its essence what it may, can it be in this respect any thing more than a perpetual *Werden*, in which existence, at the same moment, *is* and *is not* at every point of its progress? We may say, then, with the fullest reason, that the different orders of existence have their ground ultimately and essentially in *ideas*, or thoughts and volitions of God. But in saying this, it is by no means necessary that we should mean to confound God with his thoughts, as

though they could have in no sense an existence separate from his own, as a man's thoughts, subjectively considered, are a part of himself. The thoughts of God, in this case, are entities of the highest order, holding directly in the divine mind, and yet capable of entering into innumerable forms of individual existence, separate and distinct. If this seem unintelligible, it might be well to consider whether the case is made a whit more easy of comprehension, by supposing individual existences to have their ground in any other sort of entity, which, after all, to be in any true sense whatever, must have its being in God.

The quotations, then, which Dr. Murdock has drawn from Rauch's *Psychology* in connection with this point, have no such import in their legitimate sense as they are made to carry. The charge of pantheism is not sustained. We find here no pantheism in the bad sense of the term; least of all such a pantheism as is attributed to Hegel, with whom, we are told, "the primal All-One is himself nothing but an idea or conception of the human mind." There is no reason, accordingly, why we should not give credit to Dr. Rauch himself, when he tells us in his book that his theory of the world "upholds the idea of a *creation*, and not *emanation*; God remaining what he is, the unchangeable Jehovah, after the universe is created." Page 186. And we may confide in his honesty, when he tells us again, that his view of human personality "by no means teaches any form of pantheism," page 191; and that by declaring God to be "the ground of all personality," he means that "he freely created man; that there was no *emanation*, by virtue of which the Deity flowed forth into man, and could not return to himself again." Page 191.

That Dr. Rauch respected Hegel, and followed him to some extent in his philosophy, is not to be questioned; just as he respected and made great account also of the authority of Kant. But this by no means implies, that he felt himself slavishly bound by Hegel's system as a whole, or that he fell blindly into its errors. The system is acknowledged to be dark and difficult to understand. His school in Germany has included men of widely different views, ranging from an extreme *right* to an extreme *left*, on the most fundamental points in religion; and many who are not considered as belonging to his school at all, have felt sensibly at various points the influence of his general scheme. How unfair, in such circumstances, to hold every measure of conformity with him obnoxious to the charge of

the worst heresies that have been found in his philosophy? If Dr. Rauch was disposed to call any man master in this sphere, it was not Hegel, but Daub. The system unfolded in his Psychology is substantially the same that is presented in the *anthropology* and lectures generally of the latter. Daub himself, it may be said, followed Hegel. But only to a certain extent. He was as free and profound as Hegel himself. To the end, he considered himself as much under the banner of Kant, as that of any of his successors, though appropriating from all of them at pleasure. To read Hegel, Dr. Rauch himself used to speak of as a sort of pastime, in comparison with sounding the depths of Daub. With all his professed respect for the Gospel, the theologian of Heidelberg, it must be acknowledged, is no safe guide in the sphere of religion. The Christian salvation may be said to perish in his hands. But his philosophy cannot be charged, in any proper sense, with the pantheism usually attributed to Hegel.

It may be admitted that the great cardinal doctrines of the Gospel, are not made to stand forth as prominently as they might, in Dr. Rauch's work on Psychology. It is to be regretted, perhaps, that this was not done, if it had been only to save appearances, where the *principle* of the omission might not generally be understood. But nothing can be inferred fairly from this circumstance, against the religious character either of the author himself, or of his book. According to the methodology he follows, generally embraced in Germany, anthropology or psychology have nothing to do directly with theology or ethics. Any formal reference therefore to the Christian doctrines, as such, must have been felt to be in this connection unscientific and out of place. The object of the treatise is to unfold the progressive development of the human soul, as reason on the one hand and will on the other, till both are fairly evolved in their proper freedom from the *involucra* of sense and nature, under which their existence is commenced. This process, as such, is something quite distinct from religion. Only when the idea of the soul under this form has been reached, may we be said to be in the element of religion, which is the consciousness of God and our relation to Him, in which our personality becomes complete. Here, however, Psychology as a science ends, or rather passes over into the science of religion. Under the general name of Theology, this becomes on the one hand dogmatic divinity, and on the other, ethics; the

last having for its object the law for the will, or the idea of *freedom*, as distinguished from that of truth.

We see, then, in what sense "the *freedom of the will* in the natural man," is denied by Dr. Rauch. By a *free will*, he understands something wholly different from what the words mean for Dr. Murdock, or for metaphysicians in this country generally. In the one case the *contents* of the will are contemplated, in the other its *form*. The will is free, in a proper sense, only when it is fairly disentangled from the control of desires, inclinations, etc., which are mere natural affections, without moral character of any sort in themselves, so as to follow simply the law of its own nature; or when, in other words, it is animated and actuated by the divine will as its soul. And yet this last representation, strangely enough, is what Dr. Murdock finds fault with, as "giving to the divine will an absolute control over the human, in the regenerate!" As though it were not the very ideal of the New Testament holiness—*Thy will be done!* Any other view of a good will must be considered sufficiently rationalistic, to say the least. And must we not be surprised again, to hear a like disapprobation expressed, in view of the statement, that man, in his natural state, is wholly *incapable of holiness?*

This article, however, is not intended to be a defence, at all points, of the views presented in Dr. Rauch's work. It may be admitted, that the *conclusion*, especially, contains some representations on the subject of religion, which are not as clear and satisfactory as might be desired; though it is believed that this difficulty would be materially relieved, if the reader were enabled to occupy precisely the point of observation, from which the views, scientifically considered, are taken. My object has been simply to vindicate the memory of a much respected friend from the general imputation of pantheism, in the worst sense, with which he has been publicly stigmatized in Dr. Murdock's Sketches; but which, I am very sure, he would himself repel, were he now alive, with sensitive and earnest abhorrence.

ARTICLE VIII.

ENGLISH PHONOLOGY.

By Rev. Henry N. Day, Prof. of Sacred Rhetoric, Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

It must be admitted, however disparaging it may seem to the character of English orthoëpists, that the great facts in the phonology of our language are still far from being accurately ascertained. The very foundation upon which the whole structure of our language, as a spoken language, rests;—the source from which must be derived the regulating principles both of pronunciation, and, to a considerable extent, even of etymological philology, is, even at this day, but very imperfectly defined.

In proof of this, we have only to advert to the loose and discordant, not to say often absurd, observations and dogmas published by our orthoëpists and philologists of highest reputation and of most recent date. It is a question yet to be settled, if we are to regard the authority of some late writers, whether the sounds of speech are not in part formed in the chest, or even in the abdomen, while others have their seat in the head—whether our alphabetical elements, thus, ought not to be distinguished into those of the “*voce de (di) petto*” and those of the “*voce de testa*.”

The distinction between vowels and consonants lies yet, it would seem, in mystery:—some insisting that there is no such difference as authorizes a distinct arrangement into classes; others still pertinaciously adhering to the old definitions that a vowel is a sound which can be perfectly uttered by itself, while a consonant is one which cannot be uttered without the aid of a vowel; and a third class rejecting these definitions, yet maintaining that there is a generic distinction founded in the mode of forming the sounds. Even the number of vocal elements in the language is undetermined. Scarcely any two authors can be found to agree; and the enumerations vary from twenty-four to double that number.

Passing to the respective powers of different letters, we find all confusion and dissension. It would be tedious to exemplify this in full. A few instances only, taken almost at random, will

suffice. One phonologist of eminence maintains, that the vowel sound heard in *robe* is the same as that heard in *but*; and that the only difference between the *a* in *art*, *father*, and the *e* in *herd*, *terrible*, is one of quantity,—the vowel in the former words being long, in the latter short, so that if we only protract the *e* in *terrible*, we shall have the sound of *a* in *tar*. Another teaches us that the *y* in *duty* is long *e* in *mere*, and pronounces *yarn* as if spelled *e a r n*. The sound represented by *ng*, and heard in *sing*, is by some considered as only a combination of the *n* and *g*; by others as consisting of a peculiar nasal like the French, and the element *g*; by others still, as a simple element of itself, as much so as *n* or *g*.

In regard to the vocal sounds of speech as affected by accent and quantity, we discover the same unsettled state of opinion. It is yet to be defined what accent is, and how it is expressed. The seat of the accent, whether upon the vowel or consonant, or upon the entire syllable, is yet in dispute; and it is equally questioned whether two accents are admissible in the same word. One distinguished writer has laid down the broad rule, that in an unaccented syllable, the vowel has universally a short sound. Authors differ also in regard to the effect of quantity upon the vocal elements.

That there are peculiar difficulties attending investigations in this branch of knowledge, must be admitted. The rapidity with which the elemental sounds are uttered in speech, renders it extremely difficult for the heavy organs of man to seize them, and to retain them long enough to investigate and ascertain their precise power. This is especially true of the vowel sounds when not under the accent. Hence has arisen the diversity of opinion among orthoëpists as to the power of the *a e* and *o* in words like *altar*, *river*, *honor*.

Again, the influence which the combination of one element with another has upon the sound, it is difficult to estimate with exactness. In fact, this influence has not generally been taken into the account at all in determining the nature of the individual sounds, and hence there has arisen much disagreement and error. Whether the vowel sound in *fair* is the same as that in *fat*, or in *fame*, has been a matter of much contention.

A still greater difficulty arises from the fact that the standard of pronunciation in the English language is perpetually changing. The two leading causes of these changes are to be found in the natural propensity to facilitate as much as possible the

utterance of words, and in the ready communication which our language suffers with foreign dialects. For the sake of ease in utterance, for instance, the vowels in unaccented syllables, which once were fully and distinctly articulated, are now, in many words, but very imperfectly enounced. Thus the *a* in *village*, *steerage*, and the *u* in *minute*, are commonly sounded very much like short *i* in *griffin*;—this sound being altogether more easily formed, in those connections, than that of the full *a* as in *fate*; while *scutage*, *nonage*, not having been so much exposed to this corrupting influence, in consequence of their being less used, retain the original sound of the *a*. It will be found, on examination, that many of the elemental sounds in our language have been seriously affected in this way.

Again, the familiarity of intercourse which the English language suffers with foreign languages, has opened the way for material changes in our phonology. Ears accustomed to the peculiar articulations of foreign tongues, will demand the same articulations for the same representations or letters, and for kindred sounds in their own language. Thus the gallicised Englishman will be apt to give our broad *a* as in *all*, and the Italian *a*, as it is called, in *father*, the intermediate sound which is heard in France. The *b* and the *v*, by those who have been more conversant with the German, will be modified from the pure English sounds belonging to those elements. Not only this, our language receives, with singular readiness, the words of other tongues; and, unlike most other languages, receives them in their foreign dress, with little if any alteration. The foreign pronunciation naturally follows the foreign orthography; and hence our phonology has been greatly corrupted. This cause, there is reason to believe, will continue to operate; as it is not likely, notwithstanding the efforts that are repeated, in one or another quarter, every year, to reform our orthography, that it will ever be made to conform to our orthoëpy. The French may convert the English *roast beef* into *rosbif*, when they feel the want of the foreign word; but it is not to be expected, if it is to be desired, that we shall ever write *beau*, *bo*, or *cheval de frise*, *shevo de freez*. In truth, the English language, to a far greater extent than, perhaps, any other language, is constructed for the reader rather than the hearer; for the eye rather than the ear: so that, the reverse of what is usually true, instead of selecting written characters to represent the sounds of speech, our task is rather to find sounds for our written

characters. This peculiarity strikes far deeper into our language than the oral or written dress; it penetrates the whole structure;—as well our etymology and syntax, as our orthoëpy and orthography. The language must, therefore, undergo a radical transformation—must become a different language in essential features, before these influences on our phonology, by the admission of foreign words, can be arrested.

Now it is obvious that, when such causes are operating to unsettle and vary the powers of our alphabetic characters, it must be impossible accurately to determine the facts of our phonology; unless, indeed, we adopt the absurd supposition of some writers, that the sounds in all languages are essentially the same. The general laws of these changes may and should be investigated and defined; but the effects of their imperceptible operation must escape the most acute and patient investigation.

Closely connected with this source of difficulty, is that of the actual diversity of pronunciation prevailing in the different provinces and regions in which the language is spoken. Provincialisms must, almost unavoidably, mislead the most cautious and the most candid phonologist. He can hardly, by any precautions, preserve himself from confounding the dialect of a section with the use of the nation. Especially when it is considered that the distinctive character of an element may be retained, while the position of the articulating organs is considerably changed, will the magnitude of this difficulty be acknowledged. A nice observer will remark a difference between the cockney pronunciation of the word *Thames*, and that prevailing in the nation generally. Still the *t* in neither case would be confounded with any other element. In regard to many of the elements, although there is not this wide and sensible distinction, there is still a difference, which, if the attention of a practised ear is particularly drawn to it, may be detected. While it devolves on the phonologist to define precisely the limits within which these variations may be made, and still the characteristic power of the element be preserved, yet the particular sounds within these limits adopted in different provinces will be likely to escape his notice. And if they do not, there is danger that, sitting down in his study to investigate the actual sounds of the language, he will mistake what is provincial for what is national. In like manner, the individual investigator himself, prone, as he is, to regard his own usage as that of the nation, or rather necessitated, as he is, to do this in a great degree in researches of this

kind, may have his own dialect, in which he may, unconsciously to himself, differ from all the rest of the nation.

I say nothing here of the liabilities to error which grow out of the imperfect correspondence between our sounds in speech and their signs in writing—the fruitful source of so many mistakes in our phonologists.

After this glance at the peculiar difficulties that attend phonological investigations in the English language, it will not appear so strange that so little has been accomplished.

The first great question to be settled in every attempt at analyzing and describing the sounds of a language, respects the *principle* by which the investigation is to be conducted. There are three different ways of pursuing such an investigation. The first is that of following mainly the eye; and of determining the sounds from the signs. However exceptionable this might appear, even at the most cursory glance, yet, in point of fact, this mode has been adopted very generally in phonological investigations heretofore. Assuming that the consonants, so called, were such evanescent things, requiring the aid of the substantial vowel, even to render them in any case susceptible of examination, that they could not be defined nor their combinations analyzed, the attention has been chiefly directed to the vowels. With the sign or written representative almost exclusively in view, it has hardly occurred in investigation that different signs could represent the same sound; and hence the strangest absurdities have been received and promulgated with the air of authority. Of all the alphabetic elements the vowels are the most indeterminate in regard to their actual powers. They are the most slippery, the most changeable, the most difficult to be distinguished, by far, of the sounds of speech. That this is so, is confirmed by the single fact that the three Arabic vowels have no determinate and invariable sound, but their respective powers are determined by the consonants with which they stand in connection, so that often one represents the same sound in one connection which another represents in another. It is not surprising, therefore, that in words derived from the same original root, the vowel elements should be exchanged in different languages one for another, and not only be represented by different signs, but, also, have different powers. Yet we are gravely told, it is one of the great results of more recent labors in comparative philology to have established “the affinity, and, in a certain sense, the identity of the short vowels, *ā*, *ē*, *ō*, in the classical

languages!"* It has not been sufficiently borne in mind that the signs in actual use are incapable of representing the exact sounds, particularly in our language. Were any proof needed of this fact, it would be found in the discordant efforts of different phonologists to represent by means of written characters the different elements.†

It is justly considered by Mr. Duponceau, in his able Essay on English Phonology,‡ as the great reason of the failure to ascertain the elementary sounds of our language, "that the investigation has always been carried on through the medium of the alphabetical signs."

Another mode of investigation is to follow exclusively the guidance of the ear. This is the mode pursued by Mr. Duponceau. This method, however, is liable to its objections. In the first place, the ear is often a delusive sense as well as the eye. Few are aware of the great liability to deception from this organ. Even practised ears have, sometimes, been so imposed upon, after fatiguing attention to sounds, as to mistake the chord of an octave for a unison; and we are told dogmatically by a certain author, that after any vowel has been prolonged in utterance for some time, it is impossible to distinguish which it is. Thus, it is said, an *a* protracted for some time cannot be distinguished from an *o* by any ear. Now, whether this be true or not, still the remark, made as it is by practised observers, evinces the delusiveness of this sense. But, again, the combinations of the elements with one another so much influence the effect upon the ear, that where the sign and the sound of the element have been identical, different orthoëpists have represented the power very differently. Thus, in the instance before noticed, short *æ* followed by the liquid *r*, as in *fare*, is considered by some the same as that represented by the same letter in *fame*, by others as that in *hat*. And Mr. Duponceau maintains that Sheridan's pronunciation of *merchant* (martshant) differs from Walker's (mertshant) only in quantity.

* Bopp's Vocalismus in Blackwood's Mag. for Feb., 1841.

† How unsafe it must be to rely on the signs of the elements, is strikingly shown from the fact that the modern Greeks represent the vocal *th* in *then* by δ ; the *v* by β ; and sometimes the *d* by ν , and the *b* by μ ; thus Ντραβίδ, *Damville*; Μερζαρις, *Bozzaris*. Vide Schinas' *Grammaire du Grec Moderne*.

‡ Amer. Phil. Trans., new series, vol. I., p. 228.

A third mode of investigation is by observing the position of the organs of speech in the enunciation of the elements. That this method, if it could be perfectly adopted and applied, and its results be accurately and intelligibly recorded, would give a true knowledge of the sounds of a language, is clear; since every sound has its own peculiar position of the articulating organs by which its character is determined. It has this superiority over the other methods, that it directs us at once to the producing cause of the phenomena to be investigated; and in applying it, we may employ the united aid of the muscular sense, the touch, and the sight, and may retain the object of investigation longer under observation. The peculiar liabilities to error from the other methods may thus be avoided.

Observations thus made, tested and corrected by the ear, it is believed, will guide to the surest results to be attained in investigations of this nature. There is an important incidental advantage to be derived from adopting this as the principle of investigation, that it will throw light on many of the peculiar modifications of sound in our language. It will explain many apparent anomalies, and solve many seeming mysteries. Accepting this method of investigation, we shall be led, at once, to found the distinctions between the different elemental sounds directly in the organic positions which they respectively require. This principle of analysis and of enumeration will conduct us to a more certain knowledge of the nature and the number of the elements in the language. Each element having its definite organic formation, there must be so many different elements as there are different positions assumed by the organs in speech. If, in the same element, there is no change of position in the organs, we know it to be simple or monophthongal. If in uttering it, the organs change, we conclude that it is diphthongal. If in the case of a diphthongal letter, the positions at the beginning and termination of the sound are the same as those of simple elements, we know what are its constituents; we are enabled, also, at once, to determine, in like manner, in a given combination of elements, what are the particular elements combined, and thus to settle beyond dispute many vexed questions in phonology of which the ear is an incompetent arbiter. This principle, moreover, furnishes us with the means of a more exact and useful classification of the elements of speech than can otherwise be attained.

This method of investigation discovers, at once, a phenomenon

which has entirely escaped the notice of observers pursuing a different course, and thus shuns some erroneous conclusions into which they have fallen. It is the peculiar sound which is given by the organs while passing from one element to another in the same syllable. As there is no interruption in the voice, a sound must be given out while the organs are in transition, which, of course, must vary in all the different combinations. The syllable *form*, thus, is made up of something more than the elements represented by *f*, *o*, *r*, *m*. These four elemental sounds are cemented together, as it were, by those peculiar sounds which are produced while the organs are passing from one to the other. These transition sounds, although obviously they cannot be enumerated as elements, necessarily enter into speech, and are, it will be seen, of essential importance in determining the laws of phonology.

A close examination of the position of the organs in enunciation will, also, discover to us some most important laws which regulate the combination of elements. We observe, in fact, that the English language adopts readily certain forms of combination, while others it shuns; and if, by chance, etymology imposes them upon it, it seeks to change and modify them. Thus it is with all languages; and nearly all the so-called laws of euphony are merely the requisitions made by the organs of speech for their own ease of movement. In this way, we discover the reasons of certain pronunciations which seem unaccountable, when only the literal representatives of the elements are regarded. For a single example of a single class of combinations, the terminal syllables, *cion*, *sion*, *tion*, are pronounced alike, yet all of them very differently from what we should expect, by analogy, from the known powers of those letters. But on noticing the position of the organs while these terminations are pronounced, it will be found that these similar pronunciations are given by the organs being very nearly in the same position in which the elements themselves should respectively be pronounced. Thus, in pronouncing the words *pension* and *mention*, if we divide the syllables so as that *ion* shall compose the last in each, we shall have *pens-yon* and *ment-yon*; the *i* at the beginning of a syllable being represented by *y*. The only difference between these sounds, leaving out of view the initials *p* and *m*, is, that the first syllable of the one terminates in a mute sibilant, while the other ends in a simple mute. The element *i* or *g* is formed, as are also the *s* and the *t*, in nearly the same part

of the mouth as the *sh*. Hence, in rapid pronunciation, the sounds *pens-yon*, and *ment-yon*, are easily exchanged for *pen-shon* and *men-shon*; while the pronunciation pointed out by the elements differs by a scarcely perceptible difference from the one in actual use, at the same time that it is more difficult.

Applying ourselves now, with this method of investigation, to an analysis of the elements themselves, we perceive, at once, that they divide themselves into two distinct classes, according as they do or do not involve any action of the vocal organs, properly so called. The class denominated *mutes*, and by Dr. Rush *atonics*, from their being destitute of all vocality, includes nine of the elements in the English language. These may be subdivided into those which have some sound, although not properly vocal, and those which have no sound whatever, and serve merely to modify the sound of other elements with which they happen to be combined. This class of elements, the mutes, allow also, as we shall see, of a similar arrangement and classification to that of the vocal elements, and bear striking analogies to them.

Another great distinction, and one that has ever been recognized, is that into *vowels* and *consonants*.* A distinction so long and so universally made in all languages, we should at once suppose, must have some ground to rest upon. What that ground is—in what the precise difference consists, is a question to which different, and, perhaps, sometimes absurd answers have been given. It is not strange that some have been led to doubt whether there is any distinction at all that can be defined, from seeing the unsatisfactory attempts to explain wherein it lies. Yet it is irrational to suppose that this general opinion of a distinction should be utterly unfounded in fact. We may reject the definitions, so long current, that a vowel is an element which can be perfectly sounded by itself, and that a consonant requires the aid of a vowel in order to be distinctly uttered; we may question the correctness of the theory which finds the distinc-

* There are serious objections to these denominations; and the only reason for retaining them is, that they have been consecrated by long use. Dr. Rush's nomenclature of *tonics*, *subtonics*, and *atonics*, is likewise exceptionable in some respects. Mr. Duponceau calls the two classes *organic* and *inorganic*; which, although less significant, is more reconcilable with facts.

tion in the supposed rest of the organs when vowels are enunciated, while consonants demand motion in the organs of speech, although it is firmly believed that, with proper modifications and limitations, it would be difficult to overthrow this theory; we may refuse adhesion to any theory whatever that may be formed to account for the difference, and yet have a firm faith in the reality of the distinction. The fact of such a fundamental distinction, however difficult it may be to describe it, receives a striking confirmation from a foreign and independent source in the experiments of Kratzenstein, Kempelen, Willis, and others. From these experiments, and especially those of Mr. Willis,* it appears that the vowel sounds can be distinctly produced by means of a reed vibrating in open tubes; while no consonant could be attained from any similar contrivance.

But it is believed that we are not compelled to content ourselves simply with the fact of a distinction. It has already been intimated that the true distinction may be pointed out; and that it consists in this,—that the enunciation of the vowels is independent of any changes in the articulating organs, strictly so called;† while the consonants derive their distinctive character from the action of those organs. In proof of this, let the vowel sounds be enunciated in the following manner: let the short *u*, as heard in *but*, be first sounded. Then, with no change in the position of the articulating organs, let the other vowels be sounded in succession. It will be found, on trial, that all may be formed while the articulating organs remain in precisely the same position. On the other hand, it will be found impossible to enounce any one of the consonants without bringing some one or other of the articulating organs in contact with some part of the mouth.‡

* Cambridge Phil. Trans., vol. III., part I., p. 231.

† By these are meant, here, only the lips, the tongue, and the uvula.

‡ While the above distinction is regarded as the true and exact distinction between the vowels and the consonants, still it may be better for practical purposes to take the safer ground, that a consonant involves a contact of an articulating organ with some part of the mouth, while a vowel may be perfectly enounced without such contact. This is, substantially, Dr. Webster's view. It will be observed that it is by no

If the above experiments on the vowel sounds be repeated, it may be perceived, on close attention, that apparently, by some organism about the larynx, a sensation is produced in the mouth, which seems to indicate that the breath, put into vibration by the *chordæ vocales*, strikes, in different vowels, upon different parts of the cavity of the mouth. Thus, in the element *oo*, in *pool*, the breath seems to strike far back in the mouth, or even in the throat; and a vibration may be felt on applying the fingers to the outside of the throat, just above the larynx. In the element *e*, in *mete*, the breath seems to strike quite in the fore part of the mouth, and no vibration can be perceived in the throat. We are thus led to form a scale of vowel sounds according to the position at which the vibrating breath strikes the cavity of the mouth; or, to use the language commonly employed to express this fact, according to the place in which the element is formed in the mouth.* Beginning with short *u*, as heard in *but*, which is formed farthest back,† we shall have the following order in which the simple vowel sounds used in the English language succeed each other.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. <i>u</i> as heard in <i>but</i> . | 7. <i>i</i> in <i>pin</i> . |
| 2. <i>oo</i> in <i>pool</i> . | 8. <i>a</i> in <i>fat</i> . |
| 3. <i>o</i> in <i>bone</i> . | 9. <i>a</i> in <i>take</i> . |
| 4. <i>a</i> in <i>all</i> . | 10. <i>e</i> in <i>pet</i> . |
| 5. <i>i</i> in <i>pine</i> . | 11. <i>e</i> in <i>mete</i> . |
| 6. <i>a</i> in <i>father</i> . | |

means maintained that a vowel cannot be sounded when there is a contact between some parts of the mouth. It is only maintained that a vowel is independent of this, while a consonant cannot possibly be formed without it. Even the consonant *r*, the *experimentum crucis* with those who deny the distinction, cannot be formed without bringing the sides of the back part of the tongue into contact with the teeth, or upper gums. Much less can the other semi-vowel, *l*, be formed without such contact.

* The opinion, not uncommon, that the sound itself, the vocality, is originated in the mouth—that the breath issuing from the larynx is first vocalized in the mouth, is too palpably erroneous to need any refutation. Yet the language used in the text seems to sanction it; and it seems not wholly superfluous to add this caution against such a misconception.

† Although we may, on some grounds, justify ourselves in thus ranking the short *u* as formed farthest back in the mouth,

These results are, in the main, confirmed by the experiments of Mr. Willis. He discovered that, on causing a metallic reed set in a plate lined with leather to vibrate in an open glass tube, a perfect vowel-sound was produced, which was always the same with the same length of tube; and varied with the length of the tube. On applying a tube which, in respect to the distance from the reed to the end, could be lengthened or shortened at pleasure, the vowel sounds, denoted in the combinations expressed in the following table, required respectively the length of tube indicated by the figures, which denote inches and decimals of an inch, written against them.

See	0.38	Paw	3.05
Pet	0.6	Nought	3.8
Pay	1.	No	4.7
Paa	1.8	But	} indefinite.*
Part	2.2	Boot	

Mr. Willis found that a particular vowel was uniformly connected with a given length of tube, whatever might be its diameter, and that the sounds recurred invariably in the same order.

We cannot resist the temptation to break in here and interpose the following queries :

1. Do not these experiments give some sanction to the vague popular notion that the vowel elements are, in some way, associated with pitch ?

2. Do they not furnish another argument entirely independent of that before advanced, derived from the openness of the tube, in proof of the reality of the distinction between vowels and consonants ?—the tube never giving a consonant, but only vowel sounds.

3. Do they not show that the vowel sounds, in this respect also totally unlike the consonants, run into one another and

yet several distinct considerations lead us to the opinion that it should, in a strict arrangement, be placed by itself. Certainly it seems distinguished from all the other vowels by this peculiarity, that no movement can be detected in the throat similar to that which attends the formation of the others. The voice appears to come forth directly from the larynx, and not to be afterwards in the least modified. With some propriety it may thus be regarded as the primitive element, and the others as mere modifications of it.

* *Cam. Phil. Trans.*, Vol. III., p. 243.

are, therefore, extremely liable to be confounded? The sliding tube, as it is gradually lengthened, gives successively, at determinate distances, the different vowels. Why did the experimenter stop just here, and not there? What was the character of the sound produced at the intermediate distances? Were they vowels? If so, What?

4. Do they not show also that, while the vowel sounds actually in use in different languages, in different provinces, by different individuals, may greatly vary,—the Italian *a*, for instance, as heard in *father*, vibrating between the broad *a* in *all* and the short *a* in *fat*, in the speech of different nations, in different dialects,—the number of vowel elements possible in a given language is indefinite? the only limitations to the multiplication of them being the distance between the extremes, say the short *u* in *but*, and the long *e* in *mete*, and the indistinctness arising from a too near approximation of one to another. Certainly, if we suppose this first limitation of distance to be represented by a straight line, the two extremes of which shall be short *u* and long *e*, the points which may be taken in that line at which a vowel shall be formed, are, strictly speaking, unlimited. In fact, we find different languages, different dialects, different individuals even speaking the same dialect, stopping at different points in this line; and producing, thus, so many different vowels.

5. Do not these considerations join with comparative philology, in proving beyond all doubt, the absurdity of the opinion by some strenuously maintained, that the vowels are the essence of a word—constitute its frame, while the consonants are only its flesh—its form and accidental dress.

We return to the arrangement of the vowels. Confirmed as we are by the experiments of Mr. Willis, we think we are warranted in assuming the order in which we have placed them to be correct. The importance of a knowledge of this order may be seen in its bearings, not only on orthoëpy, but still more on etymology and comparative philology. It seems to us that some most absurd conclusions in philological investigations have originated from an ignorance of these phonological truths.* In in-

* So broad an assertion as this might seem to require the adduction of some facts in substantiation. But it is deemed sufficient to refer to the simple fact that, by some philologists of note, the relation of the vowel elements or *sounds* to one another, seems to have been disregarded altogether. What

vestigating the correctness of these conclusions by attending to the positions of the organs while enouncing the vowel elements, some may experience a little difficulty from failing to regard two important facts, which here deserve notice. First, in the English language, in particular, some of the simple sounds receive a modification in some instances from the action of the lips and tongue. This is true of the element *oo*, when distinctly and fully uttered. In undertaking to form it, the lips will be protruded and the breath will be forced through them in a circular form. The English *oo*, when accented and not followed by a mute, receives from this conjoint action of the lips a peculiar roundness and distinctness. This, however, is not essential to the element. It may be perfectly formed without any action of the lips, and is actually so formed in unaccented syllables and when followed by a mute, as in *bistoury*, *root*. The same is true of the short *i*, as heard in *pin*. The sides of the tongue are drawn up, sometimes, against the teeth, giving the element something of a consonantal quality. Both the *i* and *oo*, when commencing a syllable, have this peculiarity, as in *one*, *wo*, *your*, *al-i-en*. Indeed, there is a strong propensity in the formation of all or nearly all the vowel elements, when they are to be made prominent, as in pure and accented syllables, to imitate the action of the articulating organs. But this, it should be remarked, is not essential.

Again, some of the English vowels are diphthongal. Of these, one is always so; others only occasionally. The long *i* in *pine* is always so;—the organs in the larynx evidently moving, in forming it, from a position near that in which the *a* in *father* is formed to that in which short *i* is produced. The elements occasionally diphthongal are *a* in *fame*, which commences with a sound peculiar to itself, and terminates with that of *e* in *mete*; and *o* in *bone*, which commences with the sound of *o* in *coll*, and ends with that of *oo*.

We are now prepared to solve a problem which has exceedingly puzzled English orthoëpists. It respects the power of the vowels in unaccented syllables. Concerning these, Mr. Dupon-

confidence can be placed in the derivations of words from one language to another, when this relation of the sounds is entirely overlooked, and the signs are regarded exclusively? If languages were transmitted by writing, and not by speech, this would be safe; but not otherwise.

ceau* has well remarked: "There is nothing so difficult for the ear to take hold of and correctly to discriminate, as the short sounds of the English unaccented vowels. The principal characteristics of our language are strength and rapidity. The voice does not act by pressure on accented syllables, as it does in the Italian and Spanish, resting upon them awhile so as to fall gently on those that are unaccented and give them their correct articulation, but strikes with sudden force on the accented vowel, and, impelled by the momentum which it gives to itself, rolls on rapidly through the unaccented syllables to where it is obliged to renew its stroke. Hence our accented vowels are in general short, and those unaccented are passed over with so much quickness that the vocal organ does not dwell upon them long enough to enable a common ear to catch their precise sound; and it perceives only an indistinct vibration, a small vacant space, as it were, between the consonants, like the *sheva* of the Hebrews and the French *e* feminine." "This *sheva* the English phonologists have almost uniformly represented by *u* short." "Thus *allar, cancer, honor, martyr*, when their pronunciation is to be explained, will be spelled, for demonstration's sake, *altur, cansur, honur, martur*, as if the vowel sound of the last syllable in all of them were the same. But the similarity is nothing, in my opinion, but a deception produced in the ear by the rapidity of the voice passing over the unaccented vowel." These observations, although perhaps somewhat vague, are in the main, and so far as they have meaning, correct, and attest the accuracy of the author's ear. It is, certainly, a decided mark of vulgarity to confound the vowel sounds in such cases. Yet, it is true, that these sounds in unaccented syllables, are not as fully and distinctly articulated, as they are when under the accent. The following observations, it is believed, will explain the manner in which the pronunciation should be given.

In the first place, as has been seen, some of our vowel sounds are occasionally diphthongal. These, in the quick enunciation of unaccented syllables, lose one of their constituents and become simple or monophthongal. Again, although the vowel sounds are, as has been observed, in a sense independent of the articulating organs, properly so called, yet, in the English lan-

* Amer. Phil. Trans. ubi sup.

guage, to help out the sounds and make them more distinct, those organs are sometimes called into action. This is always the case when the vowels are in pure and accented syllables, as in *aw-ful*, *no-tion*. In *aw*, for instance, the mouth is opened wide, and its cavity very much arched. In the same element in the word *inauspicious*, however, the cavity is not enlarged more than it is in uttering the other elements of the word. Similar remarks are applicable to, perhaps, all of the other vowel sounds. Thus we have the general law, that each of these elements has both a *simple* and unarticulated, and also an imperfectly *articulated* power; the former occurring in rapid enunciation, the latter in pure and accented syllables, and, also, in impure, unaccented syllables, when the enunciation is slow and distinct. The peculiar distinctive force of the element, however, remains the same in both cases. And correct speakers will never, therefore, confound the vowel sounds in the last syllables of such words as *altar*, *cancer*, *honor*, *murmur*, *petal*, *level*, *carol*.

These remarks will apply to most cases of this description. There is, however, one other class of syllables where the peculiarity of the pronunciation is to be explained on another principle. Few speakers, who regard at all correctness of pronunciation, for instance, would give the *e* in the final syllable in *government* its proper sound as heard in *met*. It is not, however, entirely silent, as is the case in such words as *listen*, *heaven*. There is a sound distinctly perceptible between the *m* and the *n*. What it is, may easily be explained on referring to the fact before mentioned, that, in passing from one element to another in the same syllable, the voice continues to flow out uninterruptedly. In this particular case, it is evident that between the *m* and the *n*, the organs separate; the voice is unimpeded in its passage out of the mouth, and consequently the sound must possess a vowel character. Yet it cannot be any proper element of the language; it is at most only an approximation to one. It certainly is the furthest possible from the element *u* in *but*. The same is true in every syllable where, in the transition from one letter to another, the articulating organs separate from all contact with any part of the mouth. If the voice continue to issue, it is evident it must bear the character of a vowel sound. Such is the case in the final syllables of words like *tremble*, *terrible*. In the last syllable of *tendon*, the movement of the or-

gans, in dropping the tip of the tongue after the *d* is formed, to give the vowel sound, and then raising it again to form *then*, is easily perceived. It is plain, also, that this vowel sound is neither short *o* nor *u*, nor any other of the proper vowel elements.

One other fact in relation to the vowel elements deserves to be noticed. It is that some of them are affected by quantity; and that when protracted, the sound is somewhat more open than when short. Thus the broad *a* sound in *inaugurate* is longer and somewhat more open than in *inauspicious*; in *nor* than in *not*. While in *mock*, *cross*, *lost*, and the like, it is of a medium quantity, being neither so long as in *maulish*, nor so short as in *rock*. The element *oo*, likewise, is longer and more open in *pool* than it is in *took*.

In the English language, as in many others, the vowel elements are often found in combination in the same syllable. The *oo* and the short *i* thus, as has been before intimated, frequently precede other vowels. But for some of these vowel compounds, sometimes, but improperly, called diphthongs, we have peculiar characters appropriated; as the *u* long in *tube*, which is composed of short *i* and *oo* as heard in *took*; *ou*, as in *route*, compounded of *a* in *father* and *oo*; and *oi* in *toil*, compounded of *a* in *all* and short *i* in *pin*. The slide in passing from one organic position to the other in the formation of these compound sounds, it should be observed, gives them an effect upon the ear somewhat different from what would be produced by the two constituents alone. Being thus compounded of two other elements, they are not regarded as elements themselves, as is *i* in *pine*; since this is supposed to have for its first constituent a sound different from that of any other element.

To this class of elements belong, as another species, the mutes represented by *h* and *wh*. Although there may appear to be some impropriety in the name, if the etymology be regarded, yet both the principle of classification which we have adopted, and, also, considerations of convenience, sustain us in denominating these *vowel-mutes*. They consist of mere aspiration, and are formed, like the vowels proper, without any contact between the articulating organs and other parts of the mouth. They are, in fact, the vowels *u* and *oo* with the vocality suppressed; and cannot in whispering be distinguished from these vowels, except that, perhaps, the breath is sometimes more forcibly ex-

pelled in them, probably from habit, than in the corresponding vowels.* It is obvious that nothing forbids the indefinite multiplication of the vowel mutes in a language, but the difficulty of distinguishing them, which is greater here than in the case of the vocals. It will not appear strange, either, that different languages should select different vowel mutes from those which are found in our own language.

We have before remarked, that within certain limitations which were mentioned, the number of possible vowel elements may vary *ad libitum*. The vowel sounds attained in the way described may each be doubled, by causing the vocalized breath to pass through the nostrils instead of the lips. We may have thus a set of pure vowels, and a corresponding set of nasal vowels. The French language has, in fact, four of these nasal vowels, expressed by *an*, *in*, *on*, and *un*. That they are but the common vowels nasalized, is evident from the fact that they are formed from the others simply by causing the breath to pass through the nostrils, in a manner precisely similar to that in which the *m*, the *n*, and the *ng* are formed from the *b*, the *d*, and the hard *g* respectively.†

The other class of alphabetical elements, denominated consonants, are susceptible of a subdivision into two species. The first consists of those in forming which the articulating organs, by being brought into contact with various parts of the mouth, but partially obstruct the passage of the breath through the lips; the other of those which entirely occlude it. The first may hence be denominated the *partial*, the last, *perfect* consonants.

Of the partial consonants, the English language has none but those which are formed by the action of the two articulating organs, the tongue and the lips. Palatal partial consonants are, however, found as mutes in various languages, as the

* We are aware that the *wh*, as heard in *when*, is by some regarded as compounded of the aspirate *h* and the vowel *oo*. But a diversity of independent considerations, all leading to the same result, force us to the view presented in the text. We think this will be admitted by those who will carefully observe the position of the organs and the sound when pronouncing *when*, both audibly and in a whisper, and also when uttering the supposed combination *h-wen*.

† Have we not the vowel *ε* in *pen*, nasalized in the colloquial *eh*?

Spanish *j* or *x* in *viejo*, *Mexico*; the German *ch* in *noch*, and others; and both as mutes and vocals in the Arabic and kindred tongues. The English partial consonants are ten in number, six of which are vocal and the rest mutes. Of the vocals, five are formed by the tongue and one by the lips. The linguals are *r*, *l*, *z* posterior as heard in *azure*, *z* anterior as in *zone*, *th* vocal as in *then*, and *v*. They are formed in the order named.

The *r* is formed farthest back in the mouth, by bringing the sides of the posterior portion of the tongue into contact with the upper teeth or gums. This position is essential: different persons combine with this other and different motions of the part of the mouth; but these do not affect the essential character of the elements. They at most but modify the effect on the ear. By some, thus, and particularly is this true of the Irish, the anterior part of the tongue is sometimes rolled or vibrated against the roof of the mouth, which, especially if it is combined with a sudden abrupt separation of the tongue from the teeth or gums, gives the element a very peculiar character; it is then called the *rolling* or *vibrant r*.

The *l* is formed next in order, by raising the tip of the tongue against the upper part of the mouth.

The *l* and *r* alone of all the vocal consonants, have in our language no corresponding mutes. The reason seems to be that such mutes could not so readily be distinguished from the vowel mutes *h* and *wh*.*

These two elements possess another peculiarity in that they, unlike all the other linguals of this species, do not receive any vibration of the vocalized breath directly on the articulating organ. They only prevent the breath from flowing out unobstructed, as is the case in the vowel elements. They are hence denominated semi-vowels. They are, moreover, from being formed so near together, and from this last named peculiarity, very easily interchanged in the transmission of words from one language to another, and are liable to be confounded with one another. Children generally distinguish them but with difficulty. The *l*, moreover, being formed in the same

* In the Welsh language, however, we find the mute *l* represented by *ll*. No language now occurs which has the mute *r*, unless in some provincial dialects of the German, the palatal *ch* in *noch* is modified into the lingual. Was the Greek *ρ* when initial, as in *ῥήτωρ*, only an aspirate?

part of the mouth as the short *i* in *pit*, is often substituted for it in the derivation of words. Thus the Italian *chiamare* from the latin *clamare*, *piano* from *planus*, and the like.

The *l* and the *r* are the only consonants, except the *m* and *n*, which form syllables by themselves, as *acre*, *never*, *swivel*, pronounced *ak-r*, *nev-r*, *swiv-l*.

The next element in order is *z* posterior, as heard in *azure*, *leisure*. The organs are brought into closer, firmer contact than is the case with the *r*, and the breath is vibrated against them. This fact distinguishes this and the other vocal consonants of this species, more than any thing else, from the *l* and the *r*; as the *l* particularly allows a considerable range in the part of the roof of the mouth with which it is brought in contact. The *z* posterior is liable to be confounded with the *r*, as might be expected from their being formed so near each other, although their respective sounds differ so much. Children often, thus, substitute the *r* for this element. It is probable, although no instances now suggest themselves, that comparative philology would furnish illustrations of this remark.

The mute corresponding to the *z* posterior is that represented by the characters *sh*. It is formed in the same way. The vocality is suppressed, and there is no distinct vibration against the parts brought into contact. This last feature enables us to distinguish the *sh* from the *z* posterior, in whispering. A like remark is applicable to the distinction between all the other vocals and their cognate mutes.

These elements are formed nearly in the same part of the mouth with the short *i*. Hence the substitution of the *sh* for the *i* in certain syllables of which *i* is the initial; as in *act-ion*, *pass-ion*. So likewise, as *u* is equivalent to short *i* and *oo*, the corruption of *natshure* from *nat-yur* becomes easy.

By slightly raising the tip of the tongue and almost closing the passage of the voice, we obtain, instead of *zh*, the element *z* in *zone*; and by suppressing the vocality and suffering the breath to pass without vibrating against the tongue, we have the cognate mute *s* as in *son*.

Passing the tip of the tongue forward against the teeth, we get the vocal *th* in *then*, with its mute *th* in *thin*.

v is the only labial of this species. It is formed by bringing the under lip in contact with the upper teeth. Its mute is *f*.

It is worthy of remark here, that all these last vocal elements, with their mutes, are greatly modified in their character by the

heavier or lighter pressure of the organs against one another. The English is distinguished from most of the continental languages by its bringing the parts of the mouth into firmer contact, and by its vibrating the breath more violently against the occluding parts. The French *j*, corresponding to what we have denominated the *z posterior* as heard in *azure*, is thus much softer than the English element. The German *w*, as heard in *wald*, differs from our *v* only in this respect: as, in its formation, it suffers the breath to pass out without being vibrated against the teeth and lips, it resembles the *l* and the *r*, and deserves the like appellation of a semi-vowel.

The other species of the consonant, or organic elements, are characterized by their wholly obstructing the outward passage of the vocalized breath. As the breath can be stopped thus only by the palate, the tongue, or the lips, we have three, and but three, varieties under this species. As, further, the voice may be wholly suppressed, or be admitted only into the cavity of the mouth back of the obstructing organs, or be allowed a passage through the nostrils, we have, in each variety, also, three individual elements. It is evident, also, that there can be but three in each.

Obstructing the breath by the palate, we have the mute *k*, the pure vocal *g*, and the nasal *ng*;^{*} by the tongue, the mute *t*, the vocal *d*, and the nasal *n*; by the lips, the mute *p*, the vocal *b*, and the nasal *m*.

It is to be remarked concerning these elements, that the nasals may be protracted indefinitely; the mutes have no time whatever; and the vocals are susceptible of only a limited prolongation, viz., only while the portion of the cavity of the mouth back of the obstructing organs is filling with breath. In *g*, the cavity back of the palate being quite small, it can be sounded only while the breath is passing to fill it; as the passage of the breath outwards being stopped, the vibration in the glottis necessarily ceases. In *d*, the cavity back of the tongue being larger, more quantity can be given; in *b*, of course, more still.

It is to be observed, further, respecting this variety of the alphabetic elements, that it is the obstruction of the breath by

* That *ng* is a simple element, is determined at once by the fact, that it is perfectly formed by a single position of the organs.

the respective organ that gives the element its peculiar character. In the linguals of this variety, particularly, as the tongue may be applied to any part, almost, of the roof of the mouth, and so stop the passage of the breath, the *t*, *d*, and *n*, may be considerably modified in their character. We obtain a *t* of a different cast altogether, for instance, when we place the tongue against the upper teeth, from what is produced by placing it across the highest part of the mouth. In different dialects, however, different modifications of these elements prevail.*

The mutes, moreover, of this variety, have no sound whatever. Their only office in speech is to modify the sound of other elements with which they are connected. Thus in *top*, the tongue is first brought firmly against the upper part of the mouth, the parts separate, and at once a sound is emitted of a non-descript character, till the organs are in a position to give the *o*; when this is formed by another process, analogous to the first, the *o* sound is stopped by the organs taking the position of the *p*.

Besides the characters which represent simple elements, we have, in our language, some that represent sounds composed of different elements. The *g*, as in *George*, is one. It is evidently compounded of *d* and *z* posterior as in *azure*. Its corresponding mute is represented by *ch* as in *church*, which is compounded of the cognate mutes of the constituents of the *g* just named, viz., *t* and *sh*. *X* is another character representing a compound consonant. It is composed of *g* and *z*, or of their corresponding mutes, *k* and *s*. It is worthy of note, that *x* never represents a sound composed of a vocal and a mute, as is erroneously stated by some writers. It always consists either of *k* and *s*, or of hard *g* and *z*. The two sounds are exemplified in *box* and *example*.

From this analysis and enumeration, it appears that we have, in the English language, in all, thirty-two different elemental sounds, of which nine are mutes, and twenty-three vocal. Eleven of the vocal elements are vowels, two of which have their corresponding mutes; six are partially occluded elements, four of which have their cognate mutes; and of the remaining six vocals, three are pure and three are their nasal cognates, which have their three corresponding mutes.

* In the Shemitish languages two *t* elements are distinguished;—the Teth and the Tau.

The following table is subjoined to exhibit more readily to the eye the organic classification of the elements. The consonants are placed opposite to the vowels which are formed in the same or adjoining part of the mouth. The interchange of certain vowels and consonants will be at once explained by this representation of their juxtaposition. The mutes are placed opposite their cognate vocals.

VOWELS.		PARTIAL CONSONANTS.		PERFECT CONSONANTS.		
VOCALS.	MUTES.	VOCALS.	MUTES.	VOCALS.	MUTES.	NASALS.
1 u in but	h in hat			g in go	k in key	ng in sing
2 oo in pool	wh in why					
3 o in colt						
4 a in all						
5 i in pine						
6 a in far		r in ran				
7 i in pin		l in limb*				
8 a in fat						
9 a in ray		z in azure	sh in shun			
		z in zone	s in son			
10 e in pet		th in then	th in thin	d in din	t in top	n in nor
11 e in mete		v in vile	f in fin	b in by	p in pin	m in me

* Comp. Spanish *ll*, as in *caballo*, pronounced *cabal-yo* (= *io*.)

ARTICLE IX.

EXPOSITION OF LUKE 16 : 1—14.

By Pastor Brauns, in Oesselse, near Hanover. Translated from the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*. By the Editor.

Few passages of the New Testament have given as much trouble to interpreters, as the one before us ; few have remained so dark and dubious, notwithstanding every effort on its several parts, as the Parable of the Householder. Already from of old exposition pressed on exposition ; and if we but compare the interpretations of Glassius (Phil. Sacr. 492,) Driessen (Dia-

trib. de princip. et legibus theol. emblem.), Henke (Magazin für Religionsphilosophie, Exegese und Kirchengeschichte, p. 336), Schreiter (historico-critic. explicationum parab. de improbo œconomo descr. Lipsiæ 1806), Löffler (bei Anzeige dieser Monographie in seinem Magazine f. Prediger 1806, Band III. 1. Stück), Möller (in Augusti's theol. Blättern, Jahrgang I. Quart. 2. p. 353 ff.), Olshausen, Schleiermacher and the latest commentators,—what a multitude of meanings about the entire passage and the several parts of the parable! Whilst Glassius interprets thus: Use your earthly possessions in well-doing, to secure for yourselves everlasting habitations; Schleiermacher says: The discourse has not the remotest relation to such a sentiment! With one expositor the ἄνθρωπος πλούσιος is = ὁ θεός, with another emperor Romanus, with a third Romani, and a fourth—the Devil. To this one, ὁ οἰκονόμος is homo improbus; to that one, a calumniated, a compassionate publican, an energetic servant of God, who foils the plans of Satan, a fit companion for a Paul. One finds in the words, Make to yourselves friends, etc., an earnest *injunction*, another a bitter *re-proof*; and so a Sunday lesson can scarcely be given, which shall make the preacher more of an enigma, than this pregnant history of the householder. What diverse sermons, therefore, may the church happen to hear on the 9, post trinitatis!

The writer hitherto has understood the parable thus: Ye children of light, evince, in your *spiritual* calling, an activity as circumspect and energetic after the *everlasting* habitations in heaven, as the children of the world do to secure the *earthly* shelter; in short, be ye as active in *spiritual* things, as they are in *the worldly*. But a certain uncomfortable feeling, which remains after every reading of the parable as a distinct impression, and seems also to abide in the church after the most careful exposition, has rendered the writer of this article distrustful of such an apprehension of the passage. And seeing so many bold views advanced, he also ventures to propose to the friends of the divine word, in all modesty, a new interpretation, before which, should it be fully justified by better hands and established as the only true one, (which the author hopes,) every difficulty would at once vanish away. Will the respected reader now hear, *without prejudice*, and then judge?

Yet, let me first premise the following brief remark. *A parable can never be intended to indicate its counterpart.* This affirmation probably needs no further proof. The aim of the

parable, as its office, especially in the mouth of the Lord, renders the contrary inadmissible. Christ has consequently, in Luke 16th, not intended to recommend to his disciples a course *opposite* to the management of the steward, but a *similar* one. The symbolic in the parable must remain within the *conceivable* and *possible* ; the case need not be *real*, but it *must be possible*. The application is properly but the parable carried out, and we must consequently be able, out of the clear sense to infer the more enigmatical. But to the subject itself.

A certain rich man had a steward ; and the same was accused unto him as one διασκορρίζων τὰ ἐπάργοντα. The owner at once takes the necessary measures, and the scene described in vs. 2—8 manifestly occurs in the presence of the rich man : at least no one can prove the contrary. Φωνήσας αὐτόν, he called him before him, and having explained the cause of his citation, demanded, *on the spot*, an account of his stewardship and a surrender of it. Verse 3 by no means intimates that the steward *went away* ; he says not κατ' ἰδίαν, but ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος, to wit, *immediately*, without the owner permitting him to leave his presence, the farmers or purchasers, his lord's debtors, come together. The οἰκονόμος inquires : How much owest thou ? Take thy bill, write *thou* 50 instead of 100 measures, *thou* 80 in lieu of 100 ; and this, to deceive his lord about it ? That is not *possible* ; his lord is present ! Would he allow this to be done, without making the least remonstrance ? Did not the οἰκονόμος appear in the commonly received sense, a *mente caput*, and yet could the discourse, throughout, be of a φρόνησις (φρονίμως ἐποίησεν) with respect to such an one ? But what, then, is the meaning ? In truth, the only exegesis which abides the test of all exegetical researches is this : The steward does, what Zaccheus, in Luke 19th, also does, and what all unrighteously enriched publicans, without exception, *should* do,—the 50, and the 20 measures subtracted before the eyes of the οἰκοδεσπότης, he counts out of *his own gains* ; he makes restitution and is liberal at the same time, and that is his φρόνησις.

Is not this exposition worthy of consideration ? It is necessary. This interpretation, in the first place, does not of necessity conflict with the σκάπτειν οὐκ ἰσχύω, ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, since the mode of the διασκορρίζειν is by no means precisely indicated, and it is at least conceivable, that the steward would havelaid up of the property of his lord, a considerable amount in *his own* coffers, although not so much (his master probably

being too wide awake for that) that he could, from his savings, have sustained himself above future beggary, without employment and reputation. *Besides, he must give out of his own stock, moreover, for the covering of the deficit, whatever it might be.* Whether the 50 and 20 measures here mentioned were of wheat, and how great or small, I leave to those better acquainted with Hebrew Archæology.

The necessity of the above exposition seems to me to follow directly from the entire situation of things as described in vs. 3—8. The usually received downright deceit is not at all possible, because the lord is present. This necessity results farther from the use of *φρονίμως*. He who has managed *φρονίμως* cannot have managed so meanly; *φρονίμως* excludes meanness; *φρονίμως* is no *παραύργως*. Nowhere in the New Testament does *φρονίμως* occur in a low sense; it is not *versutus*, but *prudens*. Compare Luke 12: 42: *τίς ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ.*; here it is manifestly used in its good sense, for Jesus says afterwards: *μακάριος, κ.τ.λ.* In Matt. 25: 8, the five wise virgins are *αἱ φρόνιμοι*, who waited for the bridegroom, and were ready at the right time. The Lord recommends *φρόνησις* in Matt. 10: 16: *γίνεσθε οὖν φρόνιμοι ὡς οἱ ὄφεις καὶ* (not *ἀλλά*, for the *φρόνησις* is not the antithesis of *ἀνεγκαιότης*, any more than *prudencia* and *integritas*) *ἀκέραιοι ὡς αἱ περισσεραί.* In Rom. 11: 25, and 12: 16, it is true, *φρόνιμοι* stands in the signification of *self-conceited*, but there the bad sense is expressed by means of the subjoined *παρ' ἑαυτοῖς*. When, therefore, the *οἰκοδεσπότης* says, *φρονίμως ἐποίησεν*, this can never be translated by, callide, versute egit, but by, prudenter et integre egit.

This exposition is further confirmed by the *subject itself*. In the usual acception there is not a grain of wisdom exhibited, (granting, that *φρόνησις* could signify astutia, prudence without rectitude,) rather a silliness, bordering on the inconceivable. It were indeed almost ludicrous to represent so superficial an intrigue as a master-stroke of prudence, especially as the whole trick must be, according to v. 8, even already revealed. According to our view, however, a *true φρόνησις* is manifested: the steward effects two objects at one stroke—he makes to the lord, whom he openly confesses to have been injured, a *restitution* in some sort, since the debtors, perhaps, *were not able to pay*; protects his lord against loss, and, at the same time, exercises compassion towards men in the utmost embarrassment; moves the feelings of both creditor and debtors, who, should it

come to an extremity, were in danger, according to Matt. 18: 25, of being sold with wives and children into slavery. In short, he secured the hearts as well of his lord as of his debtors, and laid them under obligations to himself. Supposing he had wished to play a deceitful part, he could by no means know whether these debtors would unite with him in it; and still less, were the trick successful, could he with so much certainty say: *ἔργων, τί ποιήσω, ἵνα δεῖξωταί με εἰς τοὺς οἴκους αὐτῶν*. How could he be so sure, that his accomplices would not yet desert him in his misery, and repeat to him the well-known *ὃν ὄψει!* (Matt. 27: 5.)

Whoever considers v. 8, will remark, that it is so intimately connected with what precedes, that no one can, for a moment, suppose that the owner had expressed this *subsequent* to his being made acquainted with the transaction: it is no *after reflection*, but the immediate expression of joyful surprise. *Ὁτι σοφίμῳς ἐποίησεν* must not, with Luther and Fr. v. Meyer, be translated, "that he *had* managed wisely," but, "that he *did* wisely," quod ad meliorem frugem redibat, that he returned to this wise course; by which, without being obliged to resort to a new act of unrighteousness, he so securely delivered himself, by means of the wisdom of *μετάνοια*.¹

The correctness of this exposition is further established by the whole epilogue, which undeniably sounds as if the preceding representation of conduct were in the highest degree commendable. No one who reads on from v. 9, without looking back, certainly can deny this impression. The *καὶ γὰρ* (Luther and Fr. v. Meyer transfer this *καί*, as it seems to me incorrectly, at least insignificantly, to the end, "and I say unto you *also*") must be understood: *I* also say unto you, and this "*I* also" refers back to the rich owner and his *ἐπαινεῖν*, and must signify: As the owner found the conduct of the *οἰκονόμος* praiseworthy, and consequently in his heart desired the exhibition of such conduct in every one in like circumstances, so do *I* also here express this wish, and give this counsel: Ye publican-disciples, make to yourselves friends with the unrighteous mammon, as in the sacrifice of the *ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἐλαχίστου* reference is had to the *σκηναὶ αἰώνιοι*. The *ἐκ* is thereby significant: it is a material *out of*, and there is embraced in it the thought, let go the mammon and make to yourselves *out of* the same,—i. e. *ἐν τῷ ἀφιέναι καὶ παραδιδόναι αὐτόν*,—friends.

This interpretation is also recommended by the *character* of

the particular *hearers* of Jesus, by the circumstances and habits of thought peculiar to publicans. In Luke 3: 13, advice is given to them, which opens to us a view of their inner man. In Matt. 9: 10, we have, πολλοὶ τελῶναι καὶ ἁμαρτωλοί; in 11: 19, it is said of Christ, that he is τελωνῶν φίλος καὶ ἁμαρτωλῶν; 18: 17, the Lord says to the brother often reprovèd and yet continuing obstinate, ἔστω σοι ὥσπερ ἔθνικος καὶ ὁ τελώνης; 21: 31, ὅτι καὶ οἱ τελῶναι καὶ αἱ πόρναι προάγουσι, κ.τ.λ. In brief, publicans were held to be the refuse of mankind, the bloodsuckers of the people; and no class could more deeply feel than they, the fleeting nature of every thing temporal, and the duty of restitution, or, where this was no longer possible, the benevolent *expenditure* of present means. For this the Lord rejoiced over Zaccheus; and as he, Luke 19: 8, so joyfully recognized this first chief duty as his own, so Christ replied, This day is salvation come to this house! If we *rightly* apprehend the publicans of that time, we think the parable of the Saviour addressed to *publicans* who would become *Christians*, *must* have taken such a course as that indicated; it seems to us we are bound to take this view of it; otherwise we should certainly be alarmed at the result which must follow, according to the usual interpretation.

This interpretation is farther recommended by its *facility* and *comprehensibility*. On the usual sense assigned to the parable, it is truly wonderful that the disciples did not say, Master, explain to us this parable? We must probably look upon those who followed the Lord *at that time*, as not more capable than the most intelligent members of our own churches; and, verily, the best instructed of them have hitherto been perplexed, and after a statement of the ordinary interpretation, have thought that the whole could be very easily and dangerously misunderstood, and already, many a base man may have had recourse to this parable. Moreover, were it not to be expected that the Pharisees, ever lying in wait to catch every syllable of our Lord's words,—as would certainly be the case with such a discourse, understood as it has usually been to this time in numberless assemblies,—would have stepped up and said, Verily, thou preachest strange morals! Shall we not still say that thou art a Samaritan, a corrupter of the people, and hast a devil? Instead of this, they content themselves with an ἐκμνηστηρίζειν; i. e. magistrum deridebant. If the householder were intended to be exhibited to the publicans as somewhat not merely *figura-*

tive, but also *typical*, then must there *appear* in him also a *καλόν τι*, and a Pharisee would probably have done rightly, if he had cast up to the Saviour such cunning as mere prudent forethought about the future; this would indeed be too glaring, and for a publican rather dangerous than edifying doctrine, and after so frivolous an introduction must probably excite in the new disciples not a warfare with sin, but the greatest freedom of living.

Thus far all is clear, and no one, I hope, will be able to say, that there exists nothing in the text of a restitution by the steward. Yet this all seems to be overthrown again by the remark of Christ in verse 8: *ὅτι οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος, κ.τ.λ.*, according to which the steward is yet again reckoned among the children of this world, and the above signification of *φρονίμως* fails in the *φρονιμώτεροι*. Let us examine the verse closely.

If we translate, The children of this world are wiser than the children of light, the proposition, as Henke and others have remarked, is in no wise *true*. One will remedy this by restricting the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν ἑαυτῶν* to the first member of the sentence: they are wiser in *their worldly sphere*; but *that* thought is so very much a matter of course, that from its triviality, it seems altogether unsuitable in the mouth of the Lord. *We* would not enter the pulpit with *this* lesson of instruction, that an old practised thief understands pilfering better than the honest man! Moreover, the reference of the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν, κ.τ.λ.*, to the first member alone is an obvious violence. Whoever would blame an interpreter for attaching this adjection to the *last* member of the sentence, from which would then proceed this sense: the children of this world are more prudent than the children of light in their (spiritual) sphere, Caiaphas wiser than Stephen, would then verily bestow very questionable praise on the *υἱοὶ τοῦ φωτός*.

The only correct exposition is probably that which applies the *εἰς τὴν γενεὰν* to *both* members; nor is it, indeed, so arbitrary as, by most expositors, *εἰς τὴν* for *ἐν τῇ*. How is this justified?

Γενεὰ is race, generation, *ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ ἕως Δαυὶδ γενεαὶ δεκατέσσαρες*, Matt. 1: 17; then the *race of men now living*, *οὐ μὴ παρέλθῃ ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη*, Matt. 24: 34; finally, above all, a species, i. e. a *class*, as Luther has translated Matt. 12: 39: *γενεὰ πονηρὰ καὶ μοιχαλὶς*, Mark 9: 19: *ὁ γενεὰ ἄπιστος*.

Who, now, are the *υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου* and the *υἱοὶ τοῦ*

φωτός? The statement of the Lord has throughout a concealed irony towards the Pharisees, who stood near, and against everything διαγόγγυζον, ὅτι οὗτος ἁμαρτωλὸς προσδέχεται καὶ συνεσθίου αὐτοῖς, 15: 2. These children of light are the Pharisees, whom Jesus, Luke 18: 9, sq., calls the πεποιθότας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς, the δίκαιους καὶ ἐξουθενοῦντας τοὺς λοιποὺς, those in respect to whom he says, John 9: 36: ἦλθεν, ὅτι οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσι (i. e., φρόνιμοι γίνονται) καὶ οἱ βλέποντες (υἱοὶ τοῦ φωτός) τυφλοὶ γίνονται. In brief, the children of light are those who conceive themselves to be such and so promulge, to whom under the Old Testament economy a sufficiency of light had been offered, who daily had to do with this light in their instructions to the people, but yet were no children of light, σοφοὶ καὶ συνετοί, Matt. 11: 25.

Hence it follows, of course, that the children of this world are the publicans, and those like them, out of whose circle the disciples themselves were selected, those ῥήπιοι etc. the πτωχοὶ τοῦ πνεύματι, who took to heart the eternal wisdom of the Gospel, because they felt it necessary to their life. If we bring together the beautiful sense of this verse, which now begins to appear, the translation must be something like this: The children of this world (publicans and the like, grown up in the life of this world, upbraided as worldlings) are more prudent than the (self-conceited) children of light,—εἰς τὴν γὰρ ἐσθίαν αὐτῶν (with exact rendering of the εἰς) in respect to their estate, i. e., their religious and moral state, their sinful corruption, condemnation, and need of salvation, and are consequently the more inclined and ready to come over to Him who is Light and Life, and imparts to every one who seeks in earnest.

This exposition, before which all former difficulties vanish, is not affected, as every one sees without being reminded, by the fact that the steward, v. 5, confesses himself guilty, nor by v. 8, in which he is called οἶκ. τῆς ἀδικίας, for he had been an ἄδικος. Interpreters have bothered themselves greatly to ascertain why μαμωνᾶς has the adjunct ἀδικία: Schreiter more than all; yet has he, in this word, found only caducitas et fragilitas and adhered to them; certainly most arbitrarily. We might solve this problem briefly thus: All riches, thought of and spoken of as μαμωνᾶς, is connected with an ἀδικία; else would it cease to be μαμωνᾶς, and would rather be πλοῦτος. The possession itself, we would say in opposition to Olshausen, is no sin, but, as μαμωνᾶς, is in every case and always sin.

Were we to give the tenor of the parable, according to all

that has passed, we should take a special view of it, and perhaps superscribe it thus: *The necessity of restitution and respective benevolent expenditure of unrighteous gains, in order to entrance into the kingdom of Christ and the acquisition of its heavenly riches.*

It is the highest wish of the author of this attempt, as well as of many of his official brethren, that this essay be subjected to a rigid criticism, and that it be ascertained that his pen has been guided by no desire to say something new, but by a longing after truth and purity.

ARTICLE X.

THE EDUCATION OF INDIGENT YOUNG MEN FOR THE MINISTRY.

By Prof. J. M. Sturtevant, of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Ill.

THIS is confessed by all to be a subject of great importance: and yet it is one upon which the public mind is at the present time greatly unsettled. It is one, therefore, upon which discussion is not only admissible, but in a high degree necessary. There are, if we mistake not, some indications that the principles of the subject have not hitherto been well understood, and that in the practical arrangements hitherto adopted all is not right. It is now twenty-seven years since the organization of the American Education Society. After having been in operation ten years, its machinery had become so far encumbered by excessive friction, that a thorough remodeling was deemed indispensable. Such a remodeling was projected, and carried into execution, with all the disinterested and fervent piety, and all the executive energy of the lamented Cornelius. After a lapse of about fifteen years more, during the earlier portion of which period it operated with a great degree of efficiency and power, we find that again a convention of its friends is called, to save the whole enterprise from utter extinction. The extent of this danger may be judged of by the following remarks of Prof. B. B. Edwards in his able article "on the necessity of education societies," (Bib. Rep. Oct. 1842, page 445.)

"Its annual resources since 1835 have been diminished more

than half. The number admitted to its patronage during the last year, was but a little more than one-fourth of the number so admitted in 1838. Such a falling off in the means and consequent usefulness of this institution is not accounted for by the commercial relations of the country. None of its sister charities has been so crippled. The business arrangements of the community are no worse now than they were three or four years ago. Yet the society has steadily declined in its means of fulfilling its engagements."

The convention above referred to appointed an able committee to revise the whole system of the society, and suggest such modifications as they might think called for. In the wisdom of that committee we repose great confidence: and yet we cannot but regard the present as a most auspicious occasion for the free and full exhibition of all the principles which the case involves. Past experience should surely teach us caution. The supply of the church with an intelligent and evangelical ministry is an object of too much importance to be trifled with; and the consequences of another failure in constructing our system may be very serious. We must endeavor now to discover all the causes which have produced past embarrassments, and if possible to avoid them. As Christian men we must listen to every suggestion from every quarter, we must endeavor to divest our minds of long cherished and perhaps popular prejudices, and to view a question confessedly of great and peculiar difficulty with true christian candor. We revere—American Christians ever will revere—the founders and early advocates of the American Education Society. Nor is that enough to say of them. Their record is on high, and the world is already reaping a rich harvest, as the fruits of their labors in this very department. It is well for millions that the question, What would have been the religious condition of our country at the present time, had the American Education Society never existed? is one of speculation, not of experience. Still it is no disparagement of those men to say, that they did not know without experience, what can only be learned by experience. Let us not fail to profit by all the lessons which their labors have taught us: and if there are any false principles incorporated in the superstructure which they reared, let not our reverence for them prevent our discerning and removing them.

What, then, are the causes which have hitherto impeded the

usefulness of the American Education Society, and involved it in repeated embarrassments?

We shall at present insist only on two—partly because we believe these two to have been mainly at fault in producing the past reverses of the society, and partly because others have been so ably set forth by other writers on the subject, as to require no farther illustration.*

The first of these is—that the American Education Society, in common with other kindred Associations, *has encouraged youth prematurely to make choice of the ministry as their profession, and to devote themselves to it by a solemn public religious pledge.* This practice we believe to be unwise in itself, prejudicial to the enterprise in which the education societies are engaged, and attended with no small danger to the church. We shall now endeavor to give our reasons for this opinion.

1. The practice is in obvious violation of those principles which experience has established, as applicable in all analogous cases. Who does not see the impropriety of selecting our future judges, governors, legislators, and other public officers while they are yet lads in the grammar-school? Who does not feel that if for any reason we were to be induced to do so, we should commit errors for which no advantages of future appropriate training could ever compensate? And can then the church without danger select those, who are to hold her highest office and sustain her highest responsibilities, both with reference to her internal welfare, and her aggressive action upon the world, from the lads of our academies and the members of the freshman classes in our colleges? Will any advantages to be derived from educating them expressly for her service, justify her in violating so obvious a dictate of general expediency?

It may be said that the fact of their being educated for the ministry, does not oblige the various ecclesiastical bodies to license and ordain them. True—but how rare the occurrence that one is rejected! The ecclesiastical bodies regard such a candidate as having almost acquired a right to licensure, by his long, self-denying, and persevering pursuit of it. Besides, they were long ago examined and approved by wise and good men. They have all along been under the watch and instruction of good

* Bib. Rep. Oct. 1842, Prof. B. B. Edwards and New Englander, Jan. 1843.

men, and no reproach has ever come upon their character. They have been passed along from one stage of their education to another, much as travellers are transferred from one conveyance to another, by simply exhibiting their certificates of payment, and when found versed in the various branches of learning required, their licensure is practically treated as almost a matter of course, provided that in due time they make their application.

2. *This practice does actually and inevitably introduce into the ministry, many who are not called of God to that office, and from this source result some of the severest embarrassments which press the enterprise.* It is admitted that God has given to every man talents to serve the church in some capacity usefully and honorably; and that the talents of one individual, of whatever kind or degree, are as truly required to be devoted to the service of God as those of another. But it does not hence follow that every man is qualified for the Christian ministry, or can become so by any possible training; nor even that every man of sound judgment, common-sense, and respectable aptitude for acquiring scholastic learning, is of course called to that solemn and responsible office. He may still lack those certain qualities, which are indispensable to render him an edifying public teacher, or an efficient, influential, and successful pastor. Can it then be predicted with any degree of certainty of the youth in college or in the academy, whether he will be found to possess those qualities or not? Is it not rather a question which can only be decided when the character is mature, nor even then with any certainty, till it has been put to the test of experience among the realities of active life? Grant then that your examining committee is wise and faithful to any supposable extent; they must often recommend those who will not in the end prove useful in the ministry. To be secured against the frequent commission of such errors, they must be endowed with the gift of prophecy. Nor can this evil be obviated by any degree of strictness on their part. Suppose even that you adopt a standard so high, and adhere to it so rigidly, that half the applicants are rejected: the evil we apprehend would not be remedied. The evil seems to lie in an attempt to make up a judgment in a case, in which the materials of an intelligent decision do not exist; and we should still expect to find among the admitted many who would never become useful ministers, and many among the rejected whose ministrations might have proved a blessing to thousands.

What, then, must be the effect of this mode of selecting and educating young men for the ministry? What, upon the candidates themselves? What, ultimately, on the education society and on the church? A young man selected is pious and conscientious; he has acted all along as he should do under high religious considerations. He considers himself under the solemnity of a vow to God to devote his life to the ministry. He treats the question as forever settled, and refuses to listen for a moment to any suggestion leading in any other direction: he even regards it as a temptation of the devil. We think this is not over-stated: the experience of the greater portion of all those who have been educated specifically for the ministry by the aid of the church, will, we think, fully confirm it. Still it cannot be by any means certain that this man is after all called of God to the ministry. It is a matter of devout gratitude that a large portion of those who have been thus educated, have been found on trial to be in a good degree qualified for their work. Among them, however, it cannot be denied that there are not a very few, who, with a sound and thorough religious character, are still not such ministers as the church wants. And though neither the college instructor, the education society, nor the ecclesiastical body, could be expected to discover the error, the church and the community judge by experience and cannot long remain ignorant of it. Such men soon find their services not acceptable, and not in demand: they are unemployed. They still feel themselves pledged to the ministry, and their hearts are in it: they are forbidden by taste, by a sense of duty, and the sentiments of the community, to retire from the sacred office, and support themselves by secular pursuits. Their prospects for life, it must be admitted, are gloomy and disheartening. But they do not suffer alone. The community suffers deeply with them. The ministry goes begging, and suffers degradation in the popular esteem. The education society falls into disrepute. It is charged with educating incompetent men; or it is concluded that any such effort is unnecessary: as it begins to be believed, that we have already more ministers than we need.

What discerning man has failed to notice that every one of these effects is distinctly discernible at the present time, in all that portion of our country which has been the main field of the American Education Society's operations? Is not the number of candidates in readiness for any vacant place, and their zeal to obtain it, such as to make the impression that the ministry is

filled up with mere place-seekers—hanging on the church for a living? This inference is made with the more confidence, because it is said the West is in a state of deplorable destitution; and why do not those who are here wanting places go and supply those destitutions? To this question we should be disposed to make answer by asking another—Why does not the vacant parish in the New England or Middle States settle the first man who offers? or any one whom they have heard and rejected, and of whom they have said, Why does he not go to the West, instead of looking for a place here? It would probably be replied, that he is not *the man for them*. Then all parties may rest assured, that he is not *the man for the West nor for the foreign Mission*. The man who will not do for a settled regular parish, will not do for a Missionary. Is he then the man for the Christian ministry?

Now what must be the effect of multiplying in the most efficient churches of our country such an unemployed and place-seeking clergy? Must it not degrade the ministry in popular esteem, and greatly depreciate its influence? And must it not inevitably bring the object of the education society into disrepute? Will the churches continue to make efforts, and practise self-denial in raising up ministers, while a vacant parish is sure to be sought by scores of applicants? We are aware that the embarrassments of the Foreign and Home Missionary Societies have contributed something to swell the number of unemployed ministers. But this is by no means an adequate account of what is taking place. The vast fields of the West are white already to the harvest, and it has not yet been true that the truly faithful, devoted, and gifted minister of Christ, could not find here his food and raiment sure. While the resources of the Home Missionary Society have been curtailed, the number of Western churches able and willing to sustain a minister in some sort without missionary aid has greatly increased. If the unemployed minister had the same spirit of enterprise in his work, which we witness in the lawyer, the physician, the merchant, or the mechanic, he would not sit down all the day idle, concluding that no man hath hired him, till he had first thrown himself upon the wave of emigration, to see whether God had not a work for him to do in the vast opening fields of the west.

Nor are we unaware that the fact, that a minister is unemployed, is not of itself proof, either that he is not qualified for his

work, or that he is not willing to go wherever his Master calls him. We admit that, to any general conclusions of this sort, circumstances must make many honorable exceptions. And it would be matter of the deepest regret with us, that our language on this point should wound the feelings of any such brother in the ministry. Still we maintain that our principle is in general a correct one. The existence of a large number of unemployed ministers in any of our churches, does degrade the ministry, by reducing it to the vulgar level of the mere place-seeking, and it does destroy all energy in the effort to increase the supply of ministers to meet the wants of the world.

In reply to all this, it is said the evil lies in the education of incompetent men, and in their introduction into the ministry. This is readily conceded. But again we contend that the mode of effort which the church has been pursuing in reference to this object, *tends directly and inevitably to such a result*. The church has been selecting her ministers, not from men of mature years and ripe attainments, and after some experience of their ability to edify, but from the freshman classes in our colleges—nay, worse than this, from the preparatory classes in our grammar schools. We take it upon ourselves to say, that among materials so crude, untried, and undeveloped, no committee—no human sagacity, can select the candidates for such an office as the Christian ministry, without liability, nay, *certainty*, of numerous and great blunders. We said the church has been selecting her ministers, *her* ministers in this way—we mistake, she has in this way selected and trained up ministers, but when trained she is vexed and disgusted that she often finds them such as she will not employ.

And yet here they are, in the ministry—the vows of God—the solemn obligations of their ordination, which they can never forget—are on them, and yet the church rejects their services. They feel that they are supernumerary, perhaps that they are a burden and a clog. Is not a system which tends to such results erroneous? Does it not require reformation? Does not the requiring of the untrained youth of sixteen, in the very first stage of his studies, to pledge his life to the ministry, tend inevitably to this result? Let wise men judge.

But this is not always the worst form of the evil. It is to be feared that cases are not entirely wanting, (though it is hoped they are rare,) of those who on completing their prepar-

atory studies under a pledge of the Christian ministry, have found that they had really no heart for the work. Still their word is pledged in circumstances of great solemnity: the expectations of many pious friends are excited; if they draw back, if they forsake the ministry, and devote themselves to any other profession, they will be regarded as traitors to religion—as having disappointed cherished hopes, and wasted the resources of the church, bestowed for the sacred purpose of raising up a learned and pious ministry. In such a position they cannot bear to place themselves, or to violate such assumed obligations. While, therefore, they are conscious that they have no heart for the ministry, they suppress all their reluctance under the pressure of their hastily assumed pledges, and the church is burdened, in these cases, with a worldly and heartless ministry—and surely there is no greater burden she can be made to bear.

3. *The popularity of the Education Society suffers greatly from the fact, that those who have assumed this pledge not unfrequently turn aside to other professions.* Suppose that the class of persons last described decide differently, as not unfrequently they do—suppose they yield to their aversion to the ministry, and their longing for some profession offering a better prospect of wealth and fame—who has not witnessed the painful revulsion of feeling which exhibits itself as far as the facts are known? Pious friends and supporters of the Education Society are grieved, disheartened, and discouraged, and lose at once a large portion of their attachment to the cause: they distrust the management of the society, and their confidence is often shaken in every benevolent enterprise. The cause of religion itself suffers oftentimes a deep wound, ungodly men exult in the fall of promising youthful piety, and taunt the church with the hasty inference, that these young men whom they are educating for the ministry, are only in search of an easy way to get a living. We have long been intimately acquainted with those who have received and are receiving charitable aid in preparing for the ministry, and we assert without any fear of successful contradiction, that no inference could be, as a general rule, more false and slanderous. But it is equally undeniable, that whenever any youth educated for the ministry has turned aside to a secular profession, an impression has been made on the irreligious portion of the community, deeply prejudicial to religion itself: while its influence on the whole community has tended to paralyze every benevolent and religious enterprise.

Still we say let all this be endured, rather than the church be burdened with a cold, worldly, self-seeking, heartless, reluctant ministry. Let no man enter the ministry against all the wishes and feelings of his heart, simply because he has been educated for that purpose, and has pledged himself to that profession. It were far better to test all aspirants to the sacred office, as Gideon did the army of Israel, even till but three hundred of all the host were left to go up against the enemies of the Lord. So we believe all would say. Why then place a youth in circumstances of such extreme difficulty and trial?—or to speak more correctly, of extreme temptation? If you intend to rely on nothing, after all, but his love to Jesus and the souls of men as your security for his entering the sacred office—if you desire, after all, none to enter the ministry who are not drawn to it by these holy attractions, why then seek another and a far more earthly bond? Why make a pledge to enter the ministry, assumed in one's boyhood, while his character is yet undeveloped, his views but narrow and limited, and his judgment unformed, the condition of the aid you give him? If you are satisfied to rely on his sense of obligation to God, why seek to constitute an obligation additional to that, by a pledge to you and to the church?

4. We object again to the practice of requiring a pledge to the ministry, *because it invests the youth so pledged with responsibilities which he cannot reasonably be expected to be prepared to sustain.* The lad at school or in college, who has been selected for the sacred office by his own solemn publicly expressed conviction of duty, and the judgment of wise, good, and probably venerable men, and who is deriving his support from the sacred contributions of Christian benevolence, occupies a most delicate and unenviable position. On the one hand he is already invested, in the estimation of his acquaintances and associates, with no small portion of the sanctity of the sacred office itself. He is in a sense set apart to a holy use. On him the church is expending resources designed only to be employed in qualifying men to minister at her altar. From a youth thus situated is expected little less of gravity in conversation and propriety in deportment, than from those who are actually invested with the responsibilities of the ministry; while of ready and cheerful self-denial and uniform humility, much more is demanded, than even from the pastor himself.

On the other hand he is but a youth in age, and often but a

very child in experience and knowledge of the world : and will seldom be found capable of avoiding entirely the follies and indiscretions which belong to his years. Pious and sincere he may be—but piety does not make the boy a man—nor supply the place of those lessons of practical wisdom, which experience alone can teach. What wonder then if, in his intercourse with society, we find unceasing irritation and dissatisfaction ? What wonder if one is offended with his dress, another with his levity, another with his pride, another with his want of the accomplishments of the more elegant and refined circles ? And what wonder if all agree together in expressing their amazement, that the education society should think of making a minister of the gospel of such a youth as he ? The truth is, he is placed in a false position in reference to all these points and a multitude of others, which might be mentioned. He is judged by a standard wholly unfair, because it is wholly unsuited to his years, his previous opportunities, and his present circumstances.

The difficulty is greatly aggravated by the fact, that in the course of the same year he is often brought into intimate contact with the very extremes of society. The interest which is felt in one who is devoting his life to the service of the church, will often obtain for him the notice of the wealthy and introduce him to the circles of fastidious refinement, and here he must endeavor to be at home. But his own kindred and all his early friends are perhaps found, though in the most truly respectable, yet in the plainest and obscurest walks of life. To these scenes he delights to retire and feel at home. And yet, in all this variety of circumstances, he must act his part with a propriety and consistency such as would naturally be expected of one, who in a few years is to be clothed in all the dignity and responsibility of an ambassador of Christ. And is it wonderful if he often fails ? Is it not much more wonderful that he so often in a good degree succeeds ?

We put it then to the candor of our readers, is it not to be expected, that a benevolent enterprise which is yearly calling on the humblest and obscurest Christian to contribute his mite to its aid, and is yet presenting causes of irritation like these in almost every parish within the territory upon which it operates, will rapidly lose the affections and the confidence of the people ? And can we give a complete account of the difficulties and embarrassments of our education societies, till we have allowed that these causes have had a large share in producing them ?

Does not every observing friend of the enterprise himself know many individuals, who have been by these very influences entirely estranged, and even rendered hostile?

Nor are the evils of this false standard of judgment confined to the community—they are very disastrous to the young men themselves. Early notoriety is always dangerous even in the most favorable circumstances—but such a notoriety as this is pre-eminently so. Such a youth is not only an object of marked attention—but he is so while in a false and unnatural position. The effect is quite different in different individuals, but always, we fear, more or less injurious. One soon learns to despair of pleasing all, and resolves to please himself. He becomes rash and headstrong, ungrateful for favors, and reckless of the public consequences of his own conduct. Another becomes crushed in spirit in view of censures heaped upon him unjustly, and broken-hearted at the injury which the cause of Christ sustains on his account, and is either quite discouraged, or, in his efforts to please all, loses his own mental independence and individuality. Others there are again, we rejoice to admit, who have either had the good sense to conform their conduct to these circumstances, difficult as they were, or who have been so far assisted by the grace of God, as to pass through the trial without material injury. We could wish, however, that these were much more numerous than they are.

Nor are these evils in any way separable from the existing constitution of our education societies. They result directly from selecting our candidates for the sacred office, and holding them up to the world as such, and expending upon them individually, funds which have been consecrated to the service of the church in the ministerial office, while as yet they are not qualified, either by age, experience, or attainment, to abide that standard, by which, in such circumstances, their conduct is sure to be estimated. It is not because their characters are peculiarly faulty, or even because they are not peculiarly excellent, but because more is demanded than can be reasonably expected of an inexperienced youth.

5. We object again to the pledge to the ministry, *because it operates injuriously on the relations of students to one another, and is on that account prejudicial to the cause of morality and religion in our colleges.* No person can have been conversant for four years with a body of students, a portion of whom are pledged to the ministry, and on that condition receiving the

aid of the education society, without observing that there is another class of students, equally needy, equally talented, and many of whom are equally pious, and do ultimately enter the ministry, whom yet no persuasion can induce to apply for the aid of the education society. They shrink from it: it is assuming responsibilities for which they feel that they are not prepared. They perceive the disadvantages and embarrassments of that false position which we have been describing, and they will not incur them. They will submit to almost any inconveniences and hardships, in order to complete their education without assuming any such burden. The relations of these two classes of students to one another, are productive of unpleasant and injurious consequences. To those who are not aided, the pressure of poverty becomes unnaturally oppressive, because they see those whom they cannot regard as more worthy than themselves, aided and relieved by the liberality of the benevolent and the pious, while they are left, without fault of their own, to bear their burdens alone. They do not feel that their unwillingness to engage to become ministers of the gospel, is a fault: on the contrary, they regard the engagements into which their companions have entered, as rash, hasty, and unwise. Hence, this class of students are very apt to feel themselves deprived of that kind and sympathizing regard, which it would be natural that they should receive from the friends and patrons of learning.

On the other hand, those who do receive the aid of the education society, are brought into comparison with those who rely exclusively on their own resources, and honor is done to the latter, to the disparagement of the former. Receiving the aid of the education society, he becomes to a certain extent, a degradation in the estimation of the great body of the students. Those who do receive it are watched suspiciously, and their influence is diminished. We do not consider any contempt incurred in the course of unflinching adhesion to Christian principle, as an evil to him who is called to bear it: but a degradation of standing, incurred in the way we have described, by so important a body of young men as the indigent pious students of our colleges, is an evil—it is prejudicial to the religious and moral interests of these institutions. The influence of such young men in college is precious, and let us place them in circumstances in the highest degree favorable to their exerting it to the utmost extent possible.

sible. The existing system of the American Education Society does not, we are persuaded, place them in such circumstances; but deprives our colleges of no small portion of that benign influence which they would otherwise exert upon them.

But perhaps in reply to all these arguments, it will be denied, *that the obligation assumed by those who receive aid, is of the nature of a pledge.* This point, then, will require a little examination.

The appropriations of the American Education Society, are made quarterly: as a condition of receiving each appropriation, the beneficiary must sign a declaration in the following words, or an equivalent, viz:

"I hereby declare, that it is my serious purpose to devote my life to the Christian ministry.

A. B.

What then is the true import and impression of this transaction, repeated every three months during the whole course of his education? It will be readily conceded, that it does not amount to an *absolute pledge*. It is not to be supposed, that it was the intention of the society to bind a man to the ministry, in case of his becoming physically incapacitated for its duties, or that they intended to force into that sacred office, a man who should prove to be morally unfit for it. But while there are certain respects in which this transaction differs from an absolute pledge, there are several other points of precise agreement; and those are the very points from which all our arguments have been drawn.

1. The declaration as given above implies, that the person signing it has deliberately and solemnly examined the whole subject, and formed a solemn judgment and purpose in the premises: and he is aided only, on condition, that both he and his friends and advisers consider this question as settled. Against this we protest. It is a question which neither he nor his advisers are able as yet, intelligently to settle. The settlement of it depends on facts, and traits of character, yet undeveloped, and which therefore cannot be known: and to treat such a question as settled—to act on such unknown facts *as known*, is surely unsafe;—it is preparing the way for just such disappointments and reverses, as we have so often witnessed in the course of these efforts. So far, therefore, as our previous reasonings have proceeded upon the impracticability of making a judicious selection of candidates for the sacred office, while the mind is

yet immature, and the character unformed, they are just as applicable to the case as they would be if the pledge were absolute.

2. The expectation of friends and of the church generally, that the individuals aided are to become ministers of the gospel, and the feeling that they are under a solemn religious obligation to do so, unless physically incapacitated, have about the same strength as though an absolute pledge were given. Friends and the church generally, contribute to the object for this end only—the young man knows that he is aided for this object alone. True, if he is physically unable to preach the gospel, he will be considered as absolved from his obligation. But if the disqualification be moral, the public will hold him scarcely, if at all, less bound, than they would have done under any conceivable pledge. If he forsakes the ministry from a dislike of its duties, or from a consciousness of moral unfitness for them, the Christian public will be none the less dissatisfied, because his pledge is informally expressed. Hence all which we have said of disappointed hopes, of loss of character to the individual, if he fails to enter the ministry,—of injury to the general enterprise of providing for the education of the indigent,—to all benevolent enterprises, and to the cause of religion generally, applies with nearly the same force as though the pledge were of the most absolute character.

3. Nor, again, does the individual himself feel the pressure of obligation resulting from such a declaration, to differ much from that incurred by a more formal pledge. He has virtually told his friends and patrons, and the church at large, once in three months, solemnly and in writing, that he did clearly see it to be his duty to preach the gospel of Christ. And during all that time, he has been receiving aid from the sacred funds of the church, only on condition that such was his conviction, and such his purpose. Will a young man, tolerably conscientious, or having even an ordinary sense of honor, consider himself perfectly free to reverse such a decision, after having been thus fed and clothed for several years? Will he not feel that he is pledged, and that too with great solemnity?

These are the only points essential to our argument, and our reasonings are therefore precisely as applicable to the case, as though the form of words in which the pledge is expressed, had been a little more imperative. The moral effect is essen-

tially the same, both upon the individuals aided by the society, and the community at large.

Some of these evils, the lamented Cornelius and those who acted with him, clearly saw, and deeply felt; and they hoped in some good degree to remedy them, by requiring the beneficiary to refund the money received after his education was completed. The wisdom and expediency of this arrangement, we do not propose now to discuss. The public have just been presented with an able discussion of that question, in the *New-Englander* of January last, to which we have already referred. But it concerns our present purpose to inquire how far that modification in the plan of the society has obviated the evils of which we have complained in the foregoing remarks. The hope of its advocates was, that it would free the young men under patronage from their crushing dependence. What they received, it was said, would no longer be a gratuity, but a "parental loan." It was hoped that this would place them on a better footing with the community: that the young men would no longer be regarded as pensioners and dependents, living on the charities of the church, but as doing business on a borrowed capital, and therefore only responsible for returning what was borrowed, and not for the use they made of it: that, in short, they would no longer be mere "beneficiaries."

However well the system of refunding may have operated in other respects, it is to us very obvious that it has accomplished little in this. The reasons are manifest. The loan was without interest, and therefore in part still a gratuity. It was from the first found impracticable to enforce refunding with any degree of strictness. The domestic or the foreign missionary could not pay a debt of several hundred dollars to the Education Society from the scanty pittance which he could hope to receive from those self-denying fields of labor. And when a minister of Christ, educated in part at the expense of the church, for the very purpose of serving her in this very work, is called to such a field, and is willing to go, all feel the impropriety of detaining him, for the purpose of refunding the money which the church has expended in his education. In all these cases, therefore, and they are numerous, the aid bestowed is an entire gratuity. Besides these cases, there are many others where to exact payment is impolitic and impracticable. To a very great extent therefore the aid afforded is still a gratuity, except as it

is repaid by services done to the church and to the world, the value of which can never be estimated in money. Hence the appropriations made by the Education Society still continue to be considered charities, and those who receive them, beneficiaries. The churches are still solicited as before, from year to year, to contribute to its funds, and so far as popular impression is concerned, the relation of the church to those who are aided is unchanged.

But even if this were not the fact—if the aid received were a loan with interest, and prompt payment were rigidly enforced, the case would still, in reference to the points we have been insisting on, be nearly the same as now. It would still be true, that those aided by the society had been selected from the companions of their youth to bear the vessels of the Lord, and while yet in their youth invested with a portion of the sanctity of the sacred office, which they are ill prepared to sustain. It would still be true, that the Christian public would be called on to make sacrifices for the purpose of providing the means employed in their education. For however rigidly payment might be enforced, there would still be many who could never pay; from loss of health, premature death, or other providential visitations, and hence the resources derived from refunding could never sustain the society; to say nothing of the necessity of constantly enlarging its operations, to meet the growing wants of the church and the world. If, therefore, a system of refunding which should rigidly enforce prompt payment without discrimination were wise and practicable, we think it would still leave those who receive the aid of the society substantially in the same condition as at present, so far as respects the moral influences of the system. We shall never reach the root of the evil by any such change in the mere pecuniary relations of the society to those whom it patronizes. The real mischief is found where we have been seeking it; in the premature selection of candidates for the Christian ministry; in holding up to the world, as almost ministers of Christ, those who have yet only learned those first lessons of wisdom and propriety, which young men in college, or lads in the academy, may be expected to know. Do we then run any risk in predicting that, whatever changes may now be made, if this fundamental principle be left unchanged, the society will be likely ere long, again to lose the confidence of the church, and to sink into embarrassment and inefficiency?

We cannot leave this part of our subject without earnestly entreating all who love this enterprise to consider it attentively, solemnly, and prayerfully. To ourselves the case has long seemed a plain one. The opinions we have thus far expressed, have not been formed hastily and without thought. They are the result of many years of intimate acquaintance with the subject, first as a college student and a beneficiary, then as a college officer and a member of an examining committee of the American Education Society, and of a careful observation of the operation of the system upon the church, upon the ministry, upon our colleges, and upon the beneficiaries. They are not the result of lukewarmness, or of hostility towards the general object, but of a warm and fervent attachment to it—an attachment which was imbibed in our youth, and has never for one moment abated. We beg therefore we may not be heard as an enemy with suspicion, but as a friend with kindness and candor.

We are, however, aware that such a change as that proposed in the constitution of the American Education Society cannot be made without essentially changing the whole system. To aid as now indigent youth in acquiring an education, without requiring from them any pledge as to their future profession, will evidently alter fundamentally the relations of the society to the Christian community. Perhaps it will be thought by some, perhaps by those from whose opinion we would not willingly differ, that this change would be fatal to the enterprise, that it would so destroy the religious character of the Institution, that Christians would no longer cherish and support it. We have ourselves heard this objection to our views, from fathers and from brethren for whose opinion we entertain great respect. And if the other parts of the system were to remain unchanged, we should readily concede its validity. We do not believe it would be possible to secure for the society, as it would then be constituted, the affections and the efficient co-operation of the Christian public. In losing its religious character, it would also have lost the most efficient and the holiest motives by which its appeal has been hitherto sustained.

What further changes then in our mode of conducting this enterprise are needful, in order to give it a warm and permanent place in the affections of the church? We feel that this question is one of immense importance: it is vital to the whole enterprise. For if we are right in our previous positions, so long as the existing system is persevered in, any permanent

success is impossible: the society bears in its own constitution the causes of its certain destruction, and judging from the past those causes are very rapid in their action. Ten years have been quite sufficient to develop their destructive efficiency. If therefore a satisfactory answer cannot be given to the question just proposed, the whole enterprise must be given up as hopeless. To that question it is therefore necessary to give our earnest attention.

This question cannot in our opinion be satisfactorily answered without referring to the fact, that a great, and as we believe, a very sad change has taken place in the public opinion of this country, on the whole subject of collegiate education. Colleges have lost that high place which they once occupied in the holiest religious affections of the pious portion of the community. The founding of Yale College was as truly and as deeply a religious enterprise, as the establishment of any mission of the A. B. C. F. M. or as the organization of the American Education Society. The same was true of Cambridge. In the very words of the records of the colony of New Haven, they considered that the work is "a service to Christ to bring up young plants to his service."* In a petition presented to the colonial Assembly, signed by a large number of ministers and laymen, praying for a charter for what afterwards became Yale College, the following language occurs—"That from a sincere regard to and zeal for upholding the Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men, they had proposed that a collegiate school should be erected in this colony, wherein youth should be instructed in all parts of learning to qualify them for public employments in Church and civil State."† The same language is incorporated in the preamble to the charter itself.‡

In October 1753 we find the General Assembly of Connecticut resolving, "That one principal end proposed in erecting the College, was to supply the churches in this colony with a learned, pious, and orthodox ministry; to which end, it was requisite that the students of the college should have the best instructions in divinity, and the best patterns of preaching set before them."§

The light in which our puritan fathers regarded their colleges, was much the same as that in which we regard a seminary of learning in connexion with a foreign mission as an institution

* Annals of Yale College, page 6.

† Annals of Yale College, p. 12. ‡ Do., p. 13. § Do., p. 67.

in which the choicest youths of the country may be trained, under learned and pious teachers, with a hope that they will become wise unto eternal life, and very many of them able ministers of the New Testament. The colleges were regarded as the main reliance of the church for a learned and pious ministry. And hence the inhabitants of New England were in the habit of contributing individually a peck of wheat, or its value, "for the relief of poor scholars at Cambridge." In this way provision was annually made for sustaining at college those young men whose parents were unable to sustain them.

Various causes, however, have probably conspired in later years to secularize these and all other colleges in this country. It would be foreign to our purpose to inquire at large what these causes are, although the question is one of surpassing interest, both to the church and the state. One of them, and in our opinion the principal one, we will specify. The colleges themselves have changed. They are far less directly religious. Their teachers are religious men for the most part, but they exert very little direct personal religious influence over the students. The religious teaching of the college, as such, comes very little in contact with the religious principles or affections of the pupil. This is probably caused by a reaction of the public mind, and not less of teachers themselves, against rendering colleges sectarian in their character. While the people of New England were mostly of one sect, nothing hindered the religious views of that sect being fully and unreservedly taught in her colleges. But when, as at present, sects are numerous and jealous of each other, it is necessary and right that sectarian peculiarities should as far as possible be excluded. But in excluding them we are in danger of excluding all religion. It is indeed undeniable that *sectarism* is in this way tending with fearful power to exclude all religious influences from our entire system of education, from the highest to the lowest department.

We have no desire to see our colleges rendered more *sectarian* in their character, but we believe they must be made more *religious*, or they can never either accomplish their proper work upon society, or retain their hold on the pious affections of the Christian community. Nor is there any real difficulty in rendering them religious, without rendering them sectarian. The great principles of the Bible are not obscure or unintelligible: they can be understood and taught as distinct from those minor

peculiarities, which distinguish such sects as have any solid claim to be called Christian. What reasonable consideration forbids the Christian teacher to hold communion with his pupil over the Bible, any more than over Virgil, or Demosthenes, or Newton? And yet how rarely does it occur, and when it does, with what restraint and timidity and fear of giving offence is it too often conducted. We believe the Puritans were right in this matter, only they should have used the Bible instead of the catechism.

Out of this secularizing of our colleges we believe has grown that peculiar feature of the American Education Society, against which our previous remarks have been directed. The secular character of our colleges was new: they are, for the most part, devoted to *mere* human learning. In this they furnish advantages, of which in this age, the minister of Christ must not be destitute. The candidate for the holy office must therefore be sent to college. But for his religious character we must rely, under God, on other instrumentalities. We must seek out our future ministers among the pious youth of our churches, administer to them a pledge to devote their lives to the ministry, and then send them to college to acquire human learning, only hoping that their religious character will not there be spoiled. How did our Puritan fathers view this same question? They were as anxious to raise up a pious and learned ministry as we—they felt the necessity of educating the indigent for this purpose. But their system of effort differed materially from ours. They filled their colleges with religious influence, and sent their youth to them, and made provision for the support of their indigent, and expected that, with the blessing of God, they would there acquire both human and divine wisdom, and become qualified for public employments both in Church and civil State. And when means were scanty, and the burden of the enterprise pressed heavily on their resources, they taxed themselves by the head, a peck of wheat, or its value, “for the relief of poor scholars at Cambridge.” Verily, all the wisdom of the world is not with the present generation!

It seems to us therefore that the remedy is plain. Let us go back to the good old paths of the fathers of New-England. Let our effort be like theirs, two-fold—first, to fill our colleges with sound and efficient religious influences—and second, in them to provide for the education of the indigent, both in human

and divine knowledge.* Let our colleges at home sustain the same relations to the church which Missionary Seminaries in heathen lands sustain to the Missions with which they are connected. Let them be patronized from the same high religious motives, and prayed for with the same religious fervor. Let our men of wisdom and experience study the best modes of increasing the amount of religious teaching in them, without diminishing their broad, true Christian liberality.

Nor does it seem to us in the least doubtful that this system is vastly better than that which we have been pursuing, even taking our colleges just as they are. Though they are less religious than is desirable, many of them are far from being irreligious. Judging from facts, there are few conditions in which a young man can be placed, in which there will be greater probability of his becoming a Christian, and an efficient one, than in college. It is obvious also that the very fact of the church becoming again accustomed to rely on her colleges for her ministry, would powerfully tend to improve their religious character. The heart's blood of the church would again flow through them: prayer would ascend for them: the importance of piety in instructors would be felt: the whole subject would be carefully and earnestly examined, with a view to improve their religious condition in every possible way; and, more than all, there is reason to believe the Holy Spirit would be imparted.

We have probably now laid before our readers the two ideas which are fundamental to a true solution of our main question—colleges the handmaids of religion, and provisions for the support of the indigent in college. It remains to inquire in what manner these ideas are to be embodied in a practical system? To this we shall answer briefly, that we think the American Education Society should be released entirely from all responsibility of selecting and watching over its beneficiaries: and that its operations should be limited to the raising of funds. The funds raised should be, semi-annually or quarterly, placed at the disposal of such colleges as might be regarded as suitable for the purpose; and be disbursed according to fixed rules, in pay-

* We must not be understood here to speak of that religious training which is properly professional. This we believe must be acquired as now in an entirely separate course of instruction.

ing the expenses of indigent students. The amount bestowed on each college should be graduated by the number of such indigent pupils connected with it, as may come within the rules of the society. No funds should be expended at any college whose course of instruction is not thorough, or whose religious character is not sound and evangelical. There might be some difficulty in making these selections, but there could be none which would be peculiar to this plan. Such selections and discriminations the American Education Society as now constituted is obliged to make, as truly as on the plan proposed. Of this sketch of a plan we do not propose to attempt a defence: we simply throw it out as a hint, hoping that it may be pondered with candor, and adopted so far as it may be regarded as sound and practicable.

The inquiry still remains, on what principles are we to select those who are to receive aid from the funds raised? If the principles already laid down are correct, the object aimed at should be to render the advantages of a liberal education to the greatest possible extent available to promising talent in every condition in society. Good moral character should therefore be indispensable; for without it no talent affords any reasonable prospect of usefulness, and the influence of the vicious youth is corrupting and pestilential in college. But no pledge should be required to any particular profession: in this respect the youth should be left free to obey the dictates of his conscience, and the decisions of his judgment after his education is completed. He is to be understood to have discharged the obligation conferred upon him by aiding him in defraying the expenses of his education, if he shall have made the best of his talents in any way which his own taste and conscience may dictate. He is to be required to pledge his honor that he will do his utmost to acquire a thorough liberal education.

There is still one more point to which particular attention must be paid, or we apprehend the whole system will fail. Those who are to be aided must possess talents which promise future usefulness. We said in the outset that we should speak of two causes of the past and present embarrassments of the American Education Society. Of one we have spoken. *The other is, that in respect to talents its patronage has been too indiscriminately bestowed.* We admit that its intentions have on this point always been correct, and that its machinery has been worked with all the fidelity and integrity which can be required

or expected. The evil lies in the system itself—which contains no provision for such a discrimination of talent as is indispensable to its success. Its appropriations are made on the mere general recommendation of the heads of the various institutions where the young men are receiving their education. Accurate discrimination of talent by means of such a system is not to be expected. For this reason we honestly believe that the resources of the American Education Society, though they have conferred great and lasting blessings on our country, have failed to communicate that salutary impulse to indigent intellect which might have been reasonably anticipated. Perhaps experience has proved that the indigent youth can receive aid in acquiring an education, with safety to himself and advantage to the public, in no other way than as the reward of diligent and successful study, on an arena of open and fair competition. When he receives it thus, he is regarded as having fairly won the prize, and therefore as having a right to enjoy it. He is not any longer a pensioner on public charity, but is receiving the rewards of his own talents and industry. This then is probably the only way of avoiding what has ever been justly regarded as the great evil in the system of modern education societies. They bestow their benefactions in a way which applies no stimulus to intellectual effort, and affords no ground of discrimination between the aided and the unaided, the propriety of which all can see and feel. The applicant for their bounty regards himself, and is regarded by others, as a beggar, and the receiver of it as a public pauper.

It is then indispensable that on this point the system should be radically changed. We are assured that unless it is so, all other amendments will prove ineffectual and vain. The aid offered must be thrown into the field of open and fair competition, and conferred as the reward of merit. Does any one say that this will be wasting the resources of the church to educate the ungodly? We reply by asking—is it no object worthy of the highest efforts of the church, to open the doors of Protestant evangelical colleges to indigent talent in every sect and grade of society, and to provide for its thorough education under enlightened and Christian teachers? Cannot Protestants understand the importance of this subject as well as Catholics? From their operations we might learn wisdom. They do not forbear to expend money on colleges, and on the education of the *Protestant* poor, for fear their pupils will not turn out Cath-

olics. They educate them without discrimination of sect or opinion, and trust their system to make them subservient to their interests. And need Protestants hesitate? Will not their system as readily commend itself to the educated and cultivated mind as the dark superstition of the Papacy? And can they not rely on the blessing of God with as much confidence as the advocates of spiritual despotism? If the church engages in a work so great, so noble, so liberal, and so truly Christian, will not her God hear her prayers, and pour out his Spirit abundantly? Will it not be to her according to her faith? We think so: the church may safely trust God's truth and faithfulness in such an enterprise as this: or if not in this, then not in any other—not surely in her missions and seminaries in heathen lands, where the obstacles in the way of saving results are vastly more numerous and formidable.

But how, it will be asked, is such discrimination of talent to be carried out in practice? Of this question we shall briefly give our views, without argument in their defence. Every college ought to keep a scale of merit; at least, so we think; and to make up at stated intervals the aggregate standing of each pupil, formed upon the teacher's daily judgment of his recitation as recorded at the time. Such a scale of merit transmitted to the parent of the pupil, probably applies to his mind the most salutary stimulus, which the nature of the case admits. Let the Education Society require of every college upon which any portion of its funds is expended, to keep such a scale of merit, and let none in any case be aided, whose scholarship does not reach a given grade, which grade is to be determined by the Education Society. In our opinion, that grade should be much above mediocrity, and no discretion should be lodged anywhere to grant aid to any one falling below it. The conditions of receiving aid would then be four:—*Good moral character—indigence—a promise to prosecute to the utmost of their ability a liberal education—and, a certain grade of scholarship.* We would suggest, then, that the President of each college, assisted by a committee appointed by the Trustees of the same, should distribute the funds placed at their disposal equally among all those, who should, in their judgment, come within the four conditions above named. Perhaps some would prefer—perhaps we ourselves should be of the number—that a definite annual sum should be distributed to each, and that when the resources of the society were insufficient to pay that sum to all who should

be embraced within the above-named conditions, preference should always be given to superior scholarship. We are aware, however, that public opinion does not at present much favor an appeal to the principle of emulation, as an incentive to intellectual effort.

We ask for this plan, of which we have now sketched the outline, the candid and prayerful consideration of the wise, the pious, and the liberal—of the friend of learning, and the friend of religion. In principle it contains little which is new or untried. Indeed, it is nothing more than an attempt to supply the want of scholarship in our colleges, by the annual operations of one of the great benevolent associations of the day. It proposes through that association to make the yearly liberality of the friends of learning and religion, supply the place of permanent funds. The question is—is this practicable? Or at least, is it not worth the experiment? We ask that the plan may be examined particularly with reference to the following points of inquiry:

1. Can the American Education Society be sustained without a change of its fundamental principles, as indicated in the foregoing remarks?

2. Would not the plan proposed operate most beneficially upon the intellectual character of our colleges?

3. Would not the plan proposed afford a reasonable prospect of a great improvement in the moral and religious condition of our colleges?

4. Would not the plan proposed greatly improve both the intellectual, and the moral and religious character of the other professions?

5. Would not the sum of \$50,000 per annum, expended on this plan, furnish the church annually with a greater number of *efficient ministers*, and fewer *inefficient and worthless ones*, than if expended according to the existing plan of the American Education Society?

We regret that it has not been in our power to offer these suggestions to the public at an earlier stage in this all-important discussion; as well as the imperfect and hasty manner in which we have been obliged now to present them. But we have done what we could. In reference to most which we have said, we can at least say,

——“*quæque ipse miserrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui.*”

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*Ecclesiastical Republicanism, or the Republicanism, Liberty and Catholicity of Presbytery, in Contrast with Prelacy and Popery.* By Thomas Smyth, author of *Lectures on Apostolical Succession, etc.* Boston, Crocker & Brewster; New York, Robert Carter, J. Leavitt, Wiley & Putnam; Philadelphia, Whetham & Son, W. S. Martein, Perkins & Purves, etc., 1843, pp. 323, 12mo.

MR. SMYTH is already well known and duly appreciated as the author of several volumes on ecclesiastical polity, Apostolical succession, Presbytery and not Prelacy Scriptural, Ecclesiastical catechism, etc. The present volume is designed to show that Presbytery is preëminently republican, that it is liberal and catholic, and admirably adapted, in its principles, both dogmatical and ecclesiastical, to our system of civil polity. It may be well here to remark, that the author employs the term Presbytery generally, as alike applicable to all non-episcopal churches; and intends to be understood as contending, not for the republicanism of Presbyterianism exclusively, but for all those systems which recognize the parity of the ministry and rights of the people, such as the Lutheran church—the Reformed—the Reformed Dutch—the Protestant Methodist—the Baptist—the whole body of New England Puritans, generally denominated Congregationalists.

We have always wondered, how those who hold to episcopacy could contend for its republicanism and adaptedness to our system of representative government. It seems to us too manifest to be denied, without a blush, that the principles of presbytery, in its extended sense, are precisely those which lie at the basis of our political structure, that they are essentially liberal and republican, and equalled by no others in their accordance with the free spirit of our popular government.

The author has done his part well, and his work merits the commendation of all non-episcopal, and the attention of all episcopal communions. At the present crisis, it is especially demanded, when so lofty claims are set up by those who deem

themselves the only conservators of the rights and privileges of God's house. May the writer be rewarded for his work of faith!

2.—*Presbytery and not Prelacy, the Scriptural and Primitive Polity, proved from the testimonies of Scripture; the Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Reformers, and the English and Oriental Churches. Also, the Antiquity of Presbytery; including an account of the ancient Culdees, and of St. Patrick.* By Thomas Smyth. Published as above. 1843. pp. 568, 8vo.

It is not in our power now, to devote as much space to a notice of this work, as its merits certainly would justify. It is well worthy of an extended review, and we should be pleased to have one offered for our pages, as we fear our own pressing and multiplied engagements will not allow us the time necessary for its preparation.

Mr. Smyth has taken hold of a great subject, with great zeal, and stands up manfully in defence of non-episcopal polity. The day seems to have come, when we must again buckle on the armor for a conflict with the papacy and sub-papacy, or Newmania! We must show the people that we stand on solid ground, when we maintain the parity of the ministry, and undertake to substantiate our claims to as high and holy a succession, and as rightful and regular an administration of the ordinances of Christ's house, as ever belonged to Pope or Prelate.

But to the volume. Mr. Smyth has here furnished an armory, where the presbyter can be readily supplied with a panoply, all-sufficient for his defence against the hottest onsets of his antagonists, and indeed, one in which he can go forth with confidence of victory. The matter is embraced in three books—I. Presbytery the Scriptural and Apostolical order of the Church of Christ. II. The claims of Presbytery to the Apostolical or ministerial succession, sustained by an appeal to the fathers, the schoolmen, the reformers, and to the Romish, Anglican and other churches. III. The Antiquity of Presbytery, with an Exhibition of the Presbyterianism of the ancient Culdees of Ireland and Scotland, and also of St. Patrick. The first book contains 14 ch.; the second 7 ch.; the third 3 ch., presenting a full, free, satisfactory view of the whole subject in a lucid style. The chapter on the Culdees of Ireland, is especially worthy of attention.

- 3.—*Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. John Williams, Missionary to Polynesia. By Ebenezer Prout, of Halstead. First American edition.* New York, M. W. Dodd; Andover, Allen, Morrill, & Wardwell. 1843. pp. 416, 12mo.

Most of our readers have, we presume, read more or less of the "Martyr of Erromanga," the devoted Williams, whose memoirs we have before us. The "Missionary enterprises" gave us some insight into his lovely character, and consecrated energies; but enough of interesting incident remained untold, to lay the foundation of the present volume.

John Williams was the son of a pious mother, often borne up by her on the arms of faith, and given to God, in hope. Yet eighteen years of his life were spent in impenitency, until one memorable night, whilst waiting at the door of an inn, for some wicked companions, with whom he had engaged to spend the night in dissipation, and who were not punctual to their agreement, he was seen by the woman with whom he boarded, and persuaded very reluctantly, to accompany her to the Tabernacle, the house of worship. He went with a vexed spirit, and with no predisposition to give heed to the word of God. But there the arrow of the Almighty penetrated his heart until it bled with sorrow for sin, and drove him, like the hunted and stricken deer, into solitude, there to shed the penitential tear. He yielded to Christ, devoted his life to the cause of God, and in due time became a missionary to the South Sea Islands. His labors there were unwontedly successful, and his plans of operation large. It was in the execution of one of them, that of conveying the gospel to other islands than those on which he had so long and so successfully labored, that he fell before the clubs of the cannibal savages, a martyr. "How does the wave of Erromanga henceforth seem to redden with his blood, and to murmur with his name; and its corals to pile up their monument to the enterprise of his mission and the oblation of his death?"

Thus, one after another of the holy company, who have gone forth to gird the earth with a band of light and love, is summoned away from his toils on earth, to his crown in heaven. Well! though these dispensations are often mysterious to us, what we know not now, we shall know hereafter; and the wisdom and love of God will probably shine forth most gloriously, just where we could see least of it in this world of dim vision, so clouded over with sin. This and the subsequent volume from Mr. Dodd's press, will be acceptable to the Christian community, and, we presume, have an extensive sale.

- 4.—*The Wrongs of Woman. By Charlotte Elizabeth. Milliners and Dress Makers.* New-York: M. W. Dodd, 1843, pp. 108, 18mo.

Lest any should be alarmed at the title, and presume that she was becoming the advocate of what are now popularly called Woman's Rights, Charlotte Elizabeth thus introduces her work: "When we name the infliction of a wrong, we imply the existence of a right. Therefore, if we undertake to discuss the wrongs of women, we may be expected to set out by plainly defining what are the rights of women. This is soon done. We repudiate all pretensions to equality with man, save on the ground specified by the Apostles, that in Christ Jesus, there is neither male nor female!" "Complaints are usually heard from aspiring individuals of the female sex, as to a supposed depression in the scale of intellectual power and mental capability, below the mark at which they consider themselves entitled to be rated; some conceiving that the spiritual equalization is no less applicable here. It is due to our readers and to ourselves, however, to announce that we have no intention of advancing any such claims; and further to guarantee that assurance, we frankly confess our entire dissent from the views of those who hold them." "Let us, then, contentedly bear our impressive designation as the 'weaker vessel,' and on it found the rights, that we may the more effectually show forth the wrongs, of woman."

In this small volume, the writer's design is to call the attention of benevolent women to a class of poor girls, whose health and morals are both injured and often destroyed by the undue pressure made on them by their heartless, selfish employers: and to accomplish it, she tells the tale of two sisters, sent from the country to the city, in consequence of the poverty of their parents. The book will be read with interest and profit.

- 5.—*Papal Rome as it is, by a Roman; with an Introduction by the Rev. W. C. Brownlee, D. D.* By Rev. L. Giustiniani, D. D., formerly a Roman Priest, now minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1843. pp. 262.

The author of this volume has been familiar with the Papal system from his infancy, having been nurtured on its lap. He has been behind the scenes, and initiated into its arcana: and after having spent a great portion of his life in becom-

ing practically acquainted with it in all its varied forms, he comes out prepared to disclose to the public its essential principles and ordinary practices. Mr. Giustiniani has certainly a right to speak of popery, and tell us what it is at Rome, the fountain-head. If impure there, the streams which issue from it must be also muddy.

He was a devoted Romanist, until "Father Clement" fell into his hands. He purchased it at a bookstand, presuming it to be the story of some saint: but on reading it, had his eyes opened to new revelations. He sought a Bible, to controvert the declarations of that book: having, with difficulty, obtained one, he found, with surprise, the quotations of "Protestant" to be correct. His faith was shaken: yet he endeavored to bolster himself up in his old belief, until by the truth and Spirit of God, he was brought to bow, a penitent sinner, at the feet of a crucified Jesus. He, of course, feels deeply for his brethren, who are burdened with a heavy weight of unmeaning ceremonies, and in this volume speaks to them in love, hoping that some of them, at least, may be induced to read, and to inquire for themselves after the truth as it is in Jesus.

Those who wish to acquire correct information of the practices of Rome, will obtain it in this volume: and we heartily recommend it to the attention of the Protestant and Roman world. We regret to find so many errors in the printing.

6.—*Lessons on the Book of Proverbs, topically arranged, forming a system of Practical Ethics, for the use of Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes.* Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 107.

The design of the author in this little book is, "first, to present in a distinct form the series of moral lessons so admirably conveyed in the book of Proverbs, elucidating and enforcing each by appropriate illustrations and examples: secondly, to produce an increased acquaintance with the Scriptures." The intention of the writer is accomplished by dividing the whole into twenty-five chapters, embracing such topics as the following: Diligence and Slothfulness—Self-conceit—Honor due to Parents—Right use of the Tongue—Choice of Companions—Temperance, etc. etc. These and other points are abundantly illustrated by references to the Scriptures themselves; and a variety of questions is proposed, adapted to incite intellect and improve the soul. We are much pleased with the plan, and hope the book will be extensively used in Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes. We know

of no book of practical wisdom equal to the Proverbs, nor of any little manual so well suited, as this, to impress them on the youthful mind. Scotch Presbyterians were wont early to imbue the minds of their children with the lessons of this portion of God's word, and the good results were apparent in their elevated character. Mrs. Louisa Payson Hopkins has, in this work, elucidated one of the best systems of ethics ever penned: and we trust her reward will be found in the happy influence exerted by it over the rising generation.

7.—*Prayers for the Use of Families; or the Domestic Minister's Assistant.* By William Jay. From the last London Edition. With an Appendix, containing a number of select and original Prayers for particular occasions. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 311. 12mo.

The author of these prayers is a deservedly popular religious writer, diffusing through all his works much of the benign spirit of the Author of Christianity. His morning and evening Exercises have refreshed and strengthened many a weary pilgrim on both sides of the Atlantic. We love his spirit, and as we expected, we find it breathing itself out through his 'Prayers.' These forms will, doubtless, be helpful to many who, from various causes, feel themselves unable to conduct family prayer extemporaneously; and those who prefer forms of prayer will find them abounding in evangelical sentiment, expressed very frequently and appropriately in scriptural language. For ourselves, whilst we have no bigotry which would denounce all use of a written prayer as inconsistent with heartfelt expressions of piety, we have a preference for the simple, original, extemporaneous expressions of a soul imbued with a sense of its wants. The author himself says: "I cannot but earnestly recommend the use of free extemporaneous prayer, where it is practicable. There is in it a freshness, a particularity, an appropriateness, an immediate adoption and use of circumstances and events, which cannot be found in the best composed forms."

From the Preface we extract the following true and beautiful thoughts: "Men are often led out of their own proper sphere of action in order to be useful; but it is ignorance, if not discontent and pride, that tempts them astray."

"As the stream of a river is most lovely and beneficial when it patiently steals along its own channel, though it makes not so much noise, and excites not so much notice, as when it breaks over its banks and roars and rolls as a flood: so good

men are most acceptable and useful in their appointed course. Wisdom will estimate every man by what he is, not out of his place or calling, but in them. *There* we naturally look after him; there we unavoidably compare him with his obligations; there we see him habitually, and there he gains a character or goes without one."

Here are thoughts well meriting the consideration of young men and maidens too. The world will unquestionably be better when all shall learn the true wisdom of laboring patiently and quietly in their respective spheres.

- 8.—*Guide for writing Latin: consisting of Rules and Examples for Practice.* By John Philip Krebs, Doctor of Philosophy, and Principal School Director in the Dutchy of Nassau. From the German: by Samuel H. Taylor, of Phillips' Academy. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1843. pp. 479. 12mo.

We are glad to see, at last, a book in our own language which we think far better fitted to make good Latin scholars, if judiciously used, than any previously published. It comes, indeed, from Germany, whither we naturally look for our best and most original works on philology. The author is celebrated at home for his pure Latinity and his skill in the preparation of books for learners. In these respects he is probably not surpassed.—The translator has not only had the ordinary task of converting German into good English, but was, of course, under the necessity of substituting English for German Idioms, in the comparative illustrations of the Latin by our own tongue. He has executed his work well, quite as well as could be expected in a first edition. The use of the book will suggest trifling emendations for future editions, should they be demanded, as we can not but hope and believe they will be.

With such a book as this, early put into the hands of students, and used as intended, we may confidently expect an advanced grade of scholarship among our graduates, better disciplined minds, and a higher appreciation of the spirit and beauty of the Latin tongue. A boy that should study this 'Guide' thoroughly, in connexion with the careful, elaborate reading and translation of select passages from the purest Latin authors, would know more of the principles, idioms and beauties of the language, than is ordinarily known by those who have received their diplomas and are ready to become *teachers*.

We do love *thoroughness* in teaching and learning and hence we welcome the work before us, and heartily commend

it to the attention of trustees and conductors of classical schools. We could and would write more on this topic, but must desist.

- 9.—*Bible Majesty: or Christ's Dominion over the Nations: with an examination of the Civil Institutions of the United States.* By Rev. James Wilson, A. M. Philadelphia: Missionary Society of Reformed Presbyterian Church. 1842. pp. 122.

The author of this volume takes high ground on the subject of Christ's dominion; contending that as he is Lord of all, and the kingdoms of this world are given to him for a possession, all nations are bound to recognize his authority, and to form their constitutions and laws according to the principles of the gospel, and with a direct recognition of Christ's Headship. Consequently it is wrong to elevate to office any but Christians. "If government is entrusted to Christ's enemies, it is in violation of his institution" of government. Of course, God's people can rightfully vote for no candidate for office, who does not practically confess Jesus to be his Lord.

After an examination of the constitution of these United States, it is concluded to be entirely atheistical, making no direct recognition of God, or his providence: and the practical operation of it decidedly so. These thoughts are worthy the consideration of all Christian people: and, although we might not go the whole length of the author, in some of his positions, we do believe that good men ought to be far more cautious than they are in the exercise of the elective franchise. They ought not to aid in elevating those to office, who have no regard for God or his law; and whose example will tend powerfully to the corruption of the body politic.

- 10.—*Elements of Algebra, being an Abridgment of Day's Algebra, adapted to the Capacities of the Young, and the Method of Instruction in Schools and Academies.* By James B. Thompson, A. M. New Haven: Durrie & Peck. Philadelphia: Smith & Peck. New-York: Robinson, Pratt & Co. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1843. pp. 252. 12mo.

Day's Algebra has long been popular and useful as a text book in colleges: and is too well known to need commendation at this late day. The present abridgment by Mr. Thompson, is designed "to divest the study of Algebra of all its intricacy and repulsiveness; to illustrate its elementary principles so clearly, that any school-boy of ordinary capacity may

understand and apply them ; and thus to render this interesting and useful science more attractive to the young." Many of those divisions of the science, which belong to the higher department of Algebra, are here omitted : the whole is reduced within a suitable compass for academic and common school instruction, and the principles so clearly stated and illustrated, that we cannot but think it well adapted to the end for which it has been prepared.

- 11.—*Brande's Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art. Alison's History of Europe.* New-York: Harper & Brothers.

The former of these valuable works is now complete in 12 parts, and will make two large 8vo. volumes, containing a mass of important matter in a compendious form, and suitable as a book of reference on the different branches of human knowledge.

The latter will soon be completed in 16 numbers, and make four 8vo. vols., thus offering to the public one of the most interesting and valuable histories ever prepared. We doubt not the publishers will be abundantly compensated for their laudable enterprise.

- 12.—*Jessy Allan, the Lame Girl : a Story, founded on facts. By Grace Kennedy, Author of "The Decision," "Father Clement," etc. From the ninth Edinburgh Edition.* New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 107. 18mo.

The Authoress of "Decision," and of "Father Clement," is capable of writing an interesting and useful book : and although "Jessy Allan" is not equal to either of the others, it is yet admirably well written, and ought to find a place, at least, in every Sunday School Library. It is a tale of sorrow, and yet of joy. It tells the story of a poor girl, cursed with wicked parents, who yet, by the grace of God, was brought an humbled child to the feet of Jesus. She was lamed by a wound from a lump of stone coal, and after many days and nights of suffering, was obliged, at last, to submit to the amputation of one of her legs. Under the operation, she exhibited Christian patience and submission : and although she recovered and lived in health for many months, she afterwards was attacked with disease, which brought her to the grave. Through all her sufferings, she confided in Jesus, was calm and composed, and finally departed in peace to be with Christ.

- 13.—*The Saints' Everlasting Rest.* By the Rev. Richard Baxter. Abridged by Benjamin Fawcett, A. M. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 540. 12mo.

Of Baxter's 'Saints' Everlasting Rest' it were almost a work of supererogation to say any thing to commend it. It is every where known and admired, and he must be an ignorant man indeed who has never heard of it. Such a legacy has seldom been left as the Saints' Rest. How many has it directed to a better portion than they were seeking on earth! How many has it comforted in the hour of affliction! How often has it opened the gates of the upper temple to the Christian, and led him to pant after its pure and sublime worship! One thing we must notice in respect to the execution of the work. It is printed on large, clear type, so as to be suited to the failing vision of the aged, who must soon expect to cross over Jordan.

- 14.—*The Cottage Fireside; or the Parish Schoolmaster.* By Henry Duncan, D. D. Ruthwell. Author of the *Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons, etc. etc.* From the fifth Edinburgh edition. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 251. 12mo.

"The chief object of *THE COTTAGE FIRESIDE* is to point out and remedy the common abuses which take place in the education of children, particularly among the Scottish peasantry"—"to convey, in an agreeable form, instruction to parents in the art of education, an impressive lesson to children in the duty of obedience and the happiness of good conduct, and to all, a striking illustration of the importance of regulating the heart and affections."

We think the author has accomplished his purpose, and in the happiest manner. Seldom have we read a book with deeper interest. It is full of touching incidents, narrated with so much simplicity and naturalness, that they tenderly affect the heart, and at the same time inculcate the most important lessons on the subject of education. "A family Picture," in the first chapter, is a graphic representation of scenes which too often occur, from the mistaken tenderness or thoughtless severity of parents, in the management of children. The drowning on the Sabbath, in the third chapter, will bring tears to many eyes; and the angry mother and the murder, in the fourth, will awaken deep emotion and fixed attention.

- 15.—*Lectures on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans.*
By Thomas Chalmers, D. D., LL. D. Second Edition.
New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.
1843. pp. 521. 8vo.

Mr. Carter has completed his reprint of Chalmers's Lectures in numbers, and now offers them to readers in one large volume. We have so recently noticed the work in another form, and the author is so popular, that further remark is unnecessary. Many will differ with the Doctor on some points. Among others, where he concedes that baptism is primarily immersion, and that this was the prevalent mode in apostolic times. Yet, even granting this, we cannot see that immersion is obligatory, as a necessary mode of baptism.

- 16.—*An Ecclesiastical Catechism of the Presbyterian Church, for the use of Families, Bible Classes, and Private Members.*
By Thomas Smyth. New York, Leavitt & Trow, 1843,
pp. 124, 18mo.

This little work has been formerly noticed in the Repository, and we need only add, that the demand for a third edition is evidence of the favor of the public, and their appreciation of Mr. Smyth's labors. The catechism is simple and lucid in style, adapted to the end in view, and likely to be extensively and usefully studied.

- 17.—*Antioch: or Increase of Moral Power in the Church of Christ.*
By Rev. Pharellus Church. With an Introductory Essay,
by Rev. Baron Stow. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln.
Rochester: Sage & Brother. 1843. pp. 258.

There are, in this book, some admirable lessons, which we should be gratified to see deeply impressed on the minds of our Baptist brethren, as well as on our own: e. g. tenacity of misproved dogmas—sectarianism not moral power, etc.

- 18.—*An Inquiry concerning the Lawfulness of Marriage between parties previously related by Consanguinity or Affinity. Also a Short History of Opinions in different Ages and Countries, and of the action of Ecclesiastical Bodies on that subject, by Rev. William Marshall.* New-York: Mark H. Newman.
1843. pp. 212.

We can only say that Mr. Marshall has gone extensively into the subject, and reasoned well.

- 19.—*Bickersteth's Treatise on the Lord's Supper: adapted to the Services of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. With an Introduction, Notes and an Essay, by G. T. Bedell, D. D. Fifth Edition.* New York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter.

This work has already passed through so many editions, and met with so much favor from those for whom it is intended, as to need no commendation from us. The author is known to be an evangelical clergyman in the Episcopal church; and although some of the instructions in this volume are especially adapted to members of his own denomination, the most of them are equally suited to all of every name, who call on the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity and truth, and love his ordinances.

- 20.—*Second Causes; or Up and Be Doing.* By Charlotte Elizabeth. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 230. 18mo.

This is one of Charlotte Elizabeth's best books. It is written in a forcible style, abounds in scriptural language and illustration, and is evidently adapted to stir up the deep emotions, and give vision to the faith, of the Christian. She would urge God's people to look away from second causes to the Great First Cause, to rely with confidence on his promises of aid, and to go forth, in his strength, to urge the warfare with the powers of darkness. These powers, she thinks, are now mustering themselves for the great battle; a crisis is at hand, yea even now is, which will demand of the followers of Christ an apostolical and a martyr's spirit. She sees Popery advancing, with rapid stride, to the height of temporal and spiritual power in England itself, and fears the day is not far distant, when the "Man of Sin" shall have wended his way into the affections of those in the high places of power. Read and admire.

- 21.—*Remains of the Rev. Richard Cecil, M. A. To which is prefixed a View of his Character.* By Josiah Pratt, B. D. F. A. S. From the Eleventh London Edition. New-York: R. Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843. pp. 283. 12mo.

Cecil's 'Remains' will be welcomed by many to a place among the books which they love to peruse. Cecil was a striking subject of divine grace, led back from the dark waters of sin to the pure fountain of holiness, through the instrumentality of a pious mother's prayers and admonitions; and he has left behind him in his 'Remains' and 'Sermons' abundant evidence of the loveliness of his spirit, and the strength of his faith.

ARTICLE XII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Russia.

To the University of Dorpat, the Emperor has assigned an annual contribution of 23,370 silver rubles, for the purpose of multiplying the professors and the means of instruction,—three new professors in the medical faculty, one in the judicial, and fourteen in the philosophical, making in the last twenty-eight.—Under the title *Historica Russiæ monumenta ex exterarum gentium archivis atque bibliothecis deprompta ab A. C. Turgenewio*, there has been published, in Petersburg, a collection of documents, illustrating the early history of Russia, down to 1580. They are principally excerpts from the archives of the Vatican, and accounts of the Venetian ambassadors.

Germany.

Rauch, the Sculptor, has finished his model for the equestrian statue of Frederick the Great. It is to be cast in bronze, and erected in Berlin.—In Kiel, there has been formed, a society for aiding oppressed Protestants, resident in countries where an opposite faith prevails. It has now ninety-nine members, and has collected a considerable sum of money.—Number of students at Breslau, in the winter-semester, 676; of Professors, 40 ordinary, 10 extraordinary, 26 private docents, 4 lecturers, and 7 other teachers:—at Giessen, 445 students; Göttingen, 691; Heidelberg, 633; Jena, 423; Leipzig, 867; Marburg, 271—a great reduction; Tübingen, 847; Würzburg, 512—Hupfeld, of Marburg, is successor of Gesenius, at Halle. Bekkar has published a new edition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Böckh, a metrical translation of the *Antigone* of Sophocles; Hengstenberg, the 2d vol. of his *Com. on the Psalms*; Tholuck, one on the *Psalms* also; Hävernicks, on *Ezekiel*; Dr. M. Baumgarten, a private docent in the University of Kiel, has published a portion of the first part of a theological commentary on the *Old Testament*. The whole work is to be embraced in four parts; 1, A general introduction and the *Pentateuch*; 2, *Historical Books*; 3, *Poetic and Didactic Books*; 4, *Prophets*. It is intended to be in respect to the *Old Testament*, what Olshausen's is for the *New*, and its completion is looked for with interest.—The state of ecclesiastical matters is yet unsettled in Prussia. Whether Presbytery or Episcopacy will prevail, is uncertain. The tendency is rather towards the latter, and that High Churchism, of course. Tholuck commends the translation of Gladstone's work with a preface.—Julius Müller, of Halle, is increasingly popular. Doubtful whether Hävernicks will succeed at Königsberg, and will probably go to Berlin. Uhland is in Leipsic, preparing an important historical work.

France.

De Sacy's library, recently sold at auction, contained 364 Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Syrian manuscripts, of peculiar interest.—M. Siebold, the Dutch traveller, has presented to the Paris Academy of Science some beautiful maps of Japan, copied from those executed by Japanese geographers. The person who allowed the *European barbarian* to copy them, the chief astronomer of Japan, was imprisoned for it.—Louis-Philippe is engaged at his "Mémoires," which, it is said, commence with the emigration of the Duke of Orleans to Switzerland.

Great Britain.

Puseyism has received a shock, but we shall not be surprised to see it recover with renewed energy and success.—The Free Church of Scotland has taken a noble stand, and, with the spirit manifested by its leaders and the people, will undoubtedly prosper.—Of course many books are issued from the press, illustrating the times of the Reformation. Among others, the *Life and Times of Reuchlin, the Father of the German Reformation*. We have received a copy of this work. It embodies the principal matter of the work by Mayerhoff, is written in a fine style, exhibits a view of the state of religion and literature in Germany prior to the reformation, and represents Reuchlin in an interesting light. It is well worthy to be read by all, in connection with D'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*, to which it forms a fit introduction. It will soon be issued from the press in this city.—Kühner's *Greek Grammar*, announced in our April No., as to be published at Andover, has been translated and issued in London. ,

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EDITED BY
JOHN HOLMES AGNEW.

SECOND SERIES.
VOLUME X. NO. XX.—WHOLE NO. LII.

OCTOBER, 1843.

NEW-YORK:
OFFICE OF THE REPOSITORY AND OF THE ECLECTIC MUSEUM OF FOREIGN
LITERATURE.

No. 236 BROADWAY.

BOSTON:
SAXTON, PIERCE & CO. 133¹/₂ WASHINGTON-STREET.

LONDON:
WILEY AND PUTNAM, 35 PATERNOSTER ROW.

1843.

8 sheets.—Postage, under 100 miles, 12 cents, over 100 miles, 50 cents.

